Are there different types of dialogues with different aims and structures?

In this episode, Dr. Laurance Splitter finally engages in a real dialogue with another person, in this case, Professor Maughn Rollins Gregory, Director of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children in the USA, and an outstanding scholar and teacher in both education and philosophy. Maughn has written extensively about the nature of dialogue itself and this is the subject of their conversation.

In previous episodes, Laurance expressed some puzzlement over the question of whether there are different forms of dialogue with different aims and structures. He and Maughn share a common background in the theory and practice of the community of inquiry, where the inquiry – and the ensuing dialogue – are driven by a commitment to solving a problem or answering a question which is puzzling or intriguing. In this kind of process, our reasoning “riders” tend to lead the way over our more intuitive or emotive “elephants” (using a metaphor previously attributed to Jonathan Haidt), although it will still be driven by such emotions as curiosity, surprise, wonder, intellectual humility, etc.

In previous episodes, Laurance has proposed a slogan for this kind of inquiry and dialogue: we aim for truth but are extremely wary of proclaiming that we have found it. Coming from the philosophical tradition of American Pragmatism, Maughn prefers to talk about aiming for what is most reasonable to believe, rather than for truth per se, but they are willing to live with this difference for the sake of the discussion.

Laurance invites Maughn to address types of dialogue that are not part of, or aimed at, inquiry, particularly the dialogue required when different groups not only disagree on fundamental issues, but are being led by their rampaging “elephants” which prevent any real dialogue from even taking place, because each side is so committed to its own narrative that it does not even recognize the legitimacy of the other side. In short, they are not willing or able to treat one another as persons. Citing scholars including Emily Robertson, Douglas Walton, Cleo Cherry Holmes, Miles Holton and Stephen Festmeier, Maughn provides some examples of different sorts of dialogue with their own aims and structures (aiming at affirming solidarity or strengthening relationships, or developing a mutual sense of personhood through group dynamic exercises where inquiry itself is not involved, etc.). Those engaged in such dialogues are often learning how to negotiate together; there is no “truth” to be discovered or constructed, rather the aim is working out what we can all live with.

Maughn and Laurance agree that regardless of which type of dialogue is involved, neither those directly engaged or those looking on from outside should try to pre-empt the outcomes of the dialogue. Like inquiry, dialogue has a life of its own and we should follow it where it leads.

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