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The Spy Who
The Spy Who Outran the KGB | Before Gordievsky, and the Secret War Inside Britain - with Author Tim Tate | 4
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Podcast Announcer
Wondery subscribers can binge full seasons of the Spy who early and ad free on Apple Podcasts or the Wondery app. Don't just fill a position. Find the ideal candidate who will drive your business forward. For qualified candidates who match your needs, try Indeed Sponsored Jobs. Spend more time interviewing candidates who check all your boxes. Less stress, less time, more results. Now with Indeed Sponsored Jobs and listeners of this show will get a $75 sponsored job credit to help get your job the premium status it deserves@ Indeed.com wonderyus just go to Indeed.com wonderyus right now and support our show by saying you heard about Indeed on this podcast. Indeed.com wonderyus Terms and conditions apply. Hiring do it the Right Way with.
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James Austin Johnson
Indeed mom and dad, mom and mom, dad and dad. Whatever Parents Are you about to spend five hours in the car with your beloved kids this holiday? Driving to Old Granny's house, I'm set to scene. I'm picturing screaming, fighting back to back hours of the K Pop Demon Hunter soundtrack on repeat. Well, when your ears start to bleed, I have the perfect thing to keep you from rolling out of that moving vehicle. Something for the whole family. He's filled with laughs. He's filled with rage. The OG Green Grunk Give it up for me, James Austin Johnson as the Grinch. And like any insufferable influencer these days, I'm bringing my crew of lesser talented friends along for the ride. With a list guest like Gronk, Mark Hamill and the Jonas Brothers, whoever they are, there's a little bit of something for everyone. Listen to Tis the Grinch Holiday Podcast wherever you get your podcasts.
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Charlie Higson
Wondery. From Wondery, I'm Charlie Higson, spy, novelist, actor, comedian, and this is the Spy who. Thank you for joining us for our final episode of the Spy who Outran the kgb. Oleg Gorzewski wasn't just a spy. He was one of the Cold War's most audacious double agents, a man whose betrayal of the KGB reshaped the geopolitical landscape. As the Soviet Union's chief spy in London, Gordievsky secretly worked for MI6 for over a decade, feeding Britain and the west priceless intelligence on Moscow's operations, nuclear strategy, spies out in the field, and the Kremlin's inner workings. His defection didn't just expose Soviet secrets, it deepened the paranoia on both sides, proving that even the most trusted insiders could be playing for the other team. To hear how his story unfolded, make sure you've listened to episodes 13 of this season. In this episode, I'm going to sit down with author, documentary maker and investigative journalist Tim Tait, writer of books such as the Spy who Was Left out in the Cold and To Catch a Spy. Tim is well versed in the world that leads up to Oleg Gordievsky's defection and the consequences which followed. We're going to discuss the relationship between the Soviet Union and Britain, how the Soviets got their hands on so many British institutions, and the fallout from Gordievsky's exposure. Welcome to the Spy who Tim.
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Tim Tait
Thank you very much for having me.
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Charlie Higson
Before we start getting into the details around the relationship between the UK and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, can you take us back in time a little to the world before our spy Oleg Gordievsky was operating? Why was the Soviet Union so interested in the uk?
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Tim Tait
In fairness to the Soviet Union, it was interested not just in the UK but in all of the countries of the West. It began putting out feelers in the 1920s, and for a very simple reason. It had a revolution to defend. In its view, Western countries were trying to undermine that revolution. What Moscow learned very quickly is that it needed to know what Britain, France, Germany, and eventually the United States was up to. And it started looking. The Soviet Union isn't just the bad guy in this. Britain did exactly the same. And when the US caught up, it started doing the same. There were spies everywhere. There's a lovely quote from a former US intelligence officer from the period who said there were so many spies and so many international intelligence agencies looking for them. It was like the Christmas Day sale at Macy's.
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Charlie Higson
Did the decline of the British Empire make the UK more vulnerable to Soviet infiltration?
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Tim Tait
Absolutely. It's not just the decline of the empire. End of World War II, Britain is essentially broke, right? You know, we're in hock to the United States for the leased land. We've got a government saying we have to have a vast expansion, so we have a. Of spending on a welfare state. And at least in secret at first, we have a government saying, we need a British atomic bomb. It cannot fund all of this. At the same time. It is one of the four powers controlling the epicentre of the new Cold War battlefield. And that's the ruins of Germany. It's like a perfect storm. You have a declining power which has ambitions and pretensions above its pocketbook. You have an emerging power in the United States which has the pocketbook but no experience for an organization like the KGB or the gru. That's the military intelligence we were wide open and vulnerable.
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Charlie Higson
And was the UK also a wide open back door to disrupting NATO and the UN?
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Tim Tait
NATO starts in 1949, by which point the Cold War is well and truly in play. How, if you're Moscow, do you get into NATO? Will you choose the most vulnerable? I mean, it's like hacking today. You find a back door into the most secure service. Britain was a terrific backdoor into NATO.
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Charlie Higson
You've spent many years studying this relationship. What's the most surprising or troubling insight you've gained about how espionage shaped the 20th century?
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Tim Tait
The most surprising and the most troubling is oddly not one that you're gonna find in the conventional histories of intelligence and espionage.
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Charlie Higson
Excellent.
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Tim Tait
Come the end of the Second World War, Britain and the United States particularly competed with themselves and with each other to hire Nazi intelligence officers because they were the ones who knew where the Soviet intelligence officers were. And for their part, Moscow did exactly the same. It tried to hire Nazi intelligence officers because they knew where Britain and America had its spies. What happened is that those spies essentially dictated early Cold War policy from both sides. The whole geopolitical sphere in 1945, 1946, is being dictated by ex Nazis. I find that deeply disturbing.
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Charlie Higson
You've written about a man who had a dramatic impact on the world of espionage, Peter Wright. So can you tell us who he was?
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Tim Tait
Peter Wright was, for 20 years a very, very, very senior MI5 officer. He rose to the rank of Assistant Director. So you're pretty much at the next to top rung. He joined in 1955. He was appointed, first of all as a principal scientific officer. And he starts to look at MI5's surveillance technology. MI5 had a pretty good Second World War. It had really done good work, some of it controversial. In the years after that, between the end of the Second World War and Peter Wright joining it had basically gone to rack and ruin. When he gets there, as he described it, everything's covered with this thick layer of dust. There aren't even tape recorders. Everything is recorded on acetate disc. Nothing worked. And the Cold War, if nothing else, from its outset, was always going to be an electronic war. And so Wright set about upgrading all of MI5's surveillance technology. And that's where the problem started.
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Charlie Higson
So he discovered that the intelligence services were not effective, that the Russians were outsmarting them at every turn.
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Tim Tait
There was a real problem, as he would later testify in a secret court session. And I obtained the transcripts of that between 1951 and 1958. This is right speaking. We had no success against the Russians. Everything we tried, every operation, be it a technical operation or double agent operation, they all failed. The reason was that the Soviet Union, the Soviet intelligence agencies, had for two decades penetrated Britain's establishment. Not just politics, not just the civil servant, not just academia. They'd got agents in place inside MI5 and MI6.
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Charlie Higson
And was Peter Wright the first person to kind of discover all that?
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Tim Tait
Pretty much. When he worked this out and the Service said to him, right, well, you need to go back and find out where that problem started, he was officially directed to go back through every last file going back to the 1930s. Again, he testified about this in a secret court session. Government insisted he couldn't say this publicly. He said, When I left MI5 in 1975, 1976, MI5's files listed 35 eminent persons as Soviet spies. Not one had ever been dealt with.
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Charlie Higson
I mean, it sounds like there's almost more Soviet spies in MI5 than there were British. And I gather suspicion went all the way to the top and that even Roger Hollis, the boss of MI5, was suspected of being a Russian mole.
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Tim Tait
MI5 accepted as a result of what Wright and his colleagues did, that it was penetrated, that there was a mole or moles inside there. When I was doing my research, this fascinating document, MI5 Assessment, which had been passed to the Cabinet Office but kept secret for decades. And it says in simple terms there are only two candidates. There's the Deputy Director General and the Director General.
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Charlie Higson
And what's the thinking on that now?
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Tim Tait
Well, the thinking has been muddied because successive governments have tried to cover this up. Wright went to his grave yelling as loudly as he could that Roger Hollis was most probably a Soviet spy. That's the Director General. Hollis was allowed to retire. He was never charged with anything. And there had been succession, were a succession of internal inquiries, all of which to one degree or another said, yeah, Marlis, looks like a Soviet spy to us.
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Charlie Higson
You said earlier that the Soviets had penetrated, which I think is the word used many British institutions. Did this start sort of way back in the 1930s?
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Tim Tait
Absolutely started in the 1930s. Moscow has a long history of this. It's very good at this to a degree. Britain and certainly the United States, where Johnny come lately's in this game, the Russians. The Soviets have been at this since the 1920s. In the early 1930s again, remember the background, the rise of fascism. Yeah, who's gonna combat fascism? To a whole group of intelligent young men and women, communism, Soviet Communism, seemed the only Bulwark against fascism. And Moscow cultivated that, it cultivated that belief and particularly at Cambridge and Oxford universities, it got a recruiter, it got a spider, if you like, at the heart of the embryonic espionage web. And that's this extraordinarily talented academic who went on to become a member of the Royal Household, Sir Anthony Blunt.
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Charlie Higson
So he was the recruiter at.
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Tim Tait
He was the recruiter at Cambridge, he was a young don at Cambridge and he recruited other young men and women saying, come join us, come and work against fascism. And he recruited an absolute stellar array of the brightest and best at that time. Come the start of the Second World War, they've left university. What do they do? They go into politics, they go into the civil service, they go into academia and they go into the security and they're embedded. Peter Wright would tell you, and he did, and he wrote this, that there were hundreds upon hundreds of Soviet spies in Britain in the late 50s, early 60s.
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Charlie Higson
So we know the Cambridge Five, Kim Philby, Anthony Blunt, et cetera. Their names are now very well known. But I mean, who were some of the lesser well known but equally damaging agents?
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Tim Tait
Bear in mind Wright is the man who exposed most of this one, who he said was always the most important was Alistair Watson who was. It's not a name that trips off the top of the.
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Charlie Higson
No, I've never heard it before, few people have.
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Tim Tait
But Alistair Watson held a very, very important role in defense and other areas. Those names, like Watson, like the other ones that Wright developed, they don't mean anything to anyone these days. Or there is one name that does. Rothschild. Victor Rothschild. The third Baron Rothschild was a close friend of Blunt, of Burgess Maclean. The ring of five. Rothschild goes into MI5 at the start of World War II. But he's very, very, to coin a phrase, economical with the truth about his associations. And his wife, his second wife who joined him, NMI5 Tess, was under suspicion for 10 years of being a Soviet agent.
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Charlie Higson
But they kept them in place.
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Tim Tait
Yeah.
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Charlie Higson
Whilst being under suspicion, they were protect.
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Tim Tait
They do, they weren't just kept in place. Peter Wright, he uses them as sounding boards. He runs the evidence past them to see what they think. It's extraordinary. You could not make this up.
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Charlie Higson
I mean, do you think that this sort of system of recruitment of clever young people is continuing to this day? Is it as avert as that or is it more covertly supporting organisations and movements that they think might be sympathetic?
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Tim Tait
The recruitment is far, far better today. Right. You know, at the time when the ring of five and all these people are recruited, certainly recruited into MI5. There was no system. I mean, again, I've got MI5's own reports which say, yeah, someone knew somebody else and went round to see somebody else and said, he's a jolly good chap, let's have him. And it was as chaotic and as undisciplined as that. Hardly surprising that some moles slipped in.
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Charlie Higson
But have they learned any lessons from all this?
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Tim Tait
I think so. Everything we think we know about intelligence operations, be that historic ones like Gordievsky, modern ones, everything is mediated. The narrative we are given is an approved narrative. It's almost impossible to get behind that narrative and ask to see and to find primary source evidence in real time. Whenever I talk to my colleagues in the United States, people in the same line of business as me, they say, well, you know, you can just get a Freedom of Information act request and you'll get the stuff. And I said, yeah, I do. I do that with the CIA, I do that with the FBI. You can't do that in this country. MI5, NMI6 and GCHQ are specifically excluded from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. People like me, people like you cannot ask for documents. MI5 does, to its credit, release some files once they've become 50 years old, but it's only at its own whim, and those whims are utterly unfathomable. MI6 doesn't do that at all. So everything that we are being told is what somebody wants you wants us to know and believe. That's exactly what Moscow does too. And it stops us evaluating and coming up with an accurate historical narrative. If we don't understand our history, we're doomed to repeat it.
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Charlie Higson
So Tim Peter Wright identified 35 high ranking Soviet agents in British institutions such as MI5, MI6, diplomatic services, government departments, trade unions, journalists. It's a very long list. I mean, what happened to those agents? Were they all put in jail?
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Tim Tait
I found this utterly shocking. Nothing happened to them, nothing at all. Some of them were quietly retired, pensioned off with a nice fat government pension. Others were moved out of harm's way into sinecures in government service where they wouldn't have access to sensitive material. Not one had his collar felt. No one was ever prosecuted, no one was ever sent to jail. Even Sir Anthony Blunt, the spider at the heart of the original web, was given complete immunity and continued being the keeper of the Queen's Pictures, the monarchy's vast royal art collection. Up until very close to his death, he was protected. He lived lavishly in central London. It was covered up spectacularly.
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Charlie Higson
The Soviets seemed to be very successful in actually recruiting British people, as it were. But there was no similar thing of somebody over there trying to find westward leaning students or whatever.
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Tim Tait
Yeah, we did. We did have spies. Of course we had spies. We've always had spies. It's much easier to detect and to neutralize them in a dictatorship, in a repressive regime. Here we have freedom to a degree, and that freedom is exploitable. And that's what the Soviet Union did.
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Charlie Higson
So the west was more reliant on people like Oleg Gordzewski, the subject of the series.
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Tim Tait
Yeah, I mean, there's a long trail of defectors from really the end of the Second World War through to the middle of the Cold War. Defectors from the Soviet bloc countries. And by and large they all go wrong. Defectors aren't easy to handle. But through their own failures, British intelligence and American Intelligence by and large screwed those defections up. Godievsky is, so far as we can tell, the shining example of a success story. But what strikes me is that what he's providing is a very different sort of service. What Kim Philby, probably the best known of the Cambridge spies, the Ring of Five, or George Blake is doing for the Soviets, is betraying secrets, it's betraying agents. What Gordievsky is doing is providing something just as vital to the British government, which was analysis, which was an understanding of what the Kremlin was thinking. Now, I don't think you can underestimate that, but it's a different type of spying.
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Charlie Higson
I mean, do you think that if MI5 and MI6 had worked more closely together and if they were more closely aligned, do you think things would have been different?
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Tim Tait
Yes, very much so. There's always been hostility between MI5 and MI6, naked hostility. @ times they're fighting amongst themselves. Wright and his group of officers were bitterly resented by old school MI5 officers. They were regarded as really rather dangerous and frankly, if you're the KGB or the GRU in Moscow, you're going to. That'll do very nicely, thank you very much. The big case which says this would have made a difference is Philby. He is an absolute die hard believer in Soviet Communism. He's a spy from conviction and those are quite rare. And he becomes, throughout the Second World War and thereafter, a very, very senior officer inside MI6 with the ability to control and in some cases derail British intelligence operations. MI5, it tried to get MI6, for whom Philby worked on board, to back it. It ran interference in the investigation, it gave Philby nice little outs and did so for years and years and years. And the damage that caused was enormous. It wasn't until Philby finally defected that MI6 suddenly said, yeah, yeah, yeah, he, he really was a Soviet spy, wasn't.
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Charlie Higson
He? Had they been thinking, well, maybe if we just keep it quiet, it'll get hushed up and go away. We won't be made to look stupid. And they did end up looking.
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Tim Tait
Stupid. It's not just them that ended up looking stupid. The Prime Minister whom they had, Harold MacMillan 6 had induced the prime Minister to give Filby a clean bill of health in the House of Commons. That made him look stupid. It made British intelligence look stupid in the eyes of the Americans and it gave American intelligence, particularly the parts of it which were inimically suspicious of Britain in the first place, it provided them with a reason, A, not to trust us and B, to try and meddle in the nexus, the intersection between British intelligence and British politics. And boy, did they.
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Charlie Higson
Meddle. So do we know how successful Peter Wright was in improving technical surveillance? Do we know anything he actually personally helped develop.
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Tim Tait
That? Oh, absolutely. We know that two or three of his innovations were the gold standard and they were beyond the gold standard. They were state of the art. When we finally shared them with the FBI or the CIA, the agency, CIA was particularly miffed that we hadn't shared them earlier. Wright developed groundbreaking technical capabilities to intercept communications, to remotely start up recordings using everyday objects. You know, there's a phone on the table in front of you, he could make that turn in to a listening device. The Soviets were doing much the same thing. I should say Wright was at the forefront of doing it in the.
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Charlie Higson
Uk. Is he mainly sort of surveilling, if that's the correct word, stuff that's going on in the uk and communication between UK and Russia, rather than being able to penetrate into Moscow.
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Tim Tait
Itself. Well, it's both, isn't it? What he did and what they were doing was using those places they surveilled or in many cases burgled as a back door into finding out Soviet bloc intelligence, their secrets. It's the mirror, if you like, of what Moscow is doing to us. And Wright and his colleagues, his words bugged and burgled our way across London at the State's behest, while pompous bowler hatted civil servants pretended to look the other way. It's so. It's just worth bearing in mind that at the time all this is going on, MI5 and MI6 don't officially exist. I mean, they've been at work for decades, but they've never been established by law. And the government, in its quaint phrase, said these were unacknowledged. So because they didn't exist, Britain spies were free to do what the hell they liked. Laws didn't apply to.
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Charlie Higson
Them. Tell us a little more about Mikhail Golianewski. Was he operating in a similar way to.
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Tim Tait
Gordievsky? No. He was and he wasn't. I mean, nothing is ever black and white, isn't he? He was a colonel in Polish intelligence. He had a side gig working for the KGB in Moscow. That wasn't uncommon. Not least cause Moscow liked to keep an eye on what its satraps were doing in Warsaw. He, like Gordjevsky, becomes disillusioned with the Soviet system. And in 1958 he volunteers to be what's technically called an agent in place. Translation, it's someone who risks their neck staying inside, in his case, Polish intelligence and feeding information to the West. And he did that for two and a half years before he escaped. He defected in a defection, which is just as dramatic as that of Godevsky. He arrives eventually in the us. His intelligence is shared with Britain and leads to the exposure of huge spy rings in this country. And I have the agency's own documents. It says, this man is the most important spy we've ever had. 1600 Soviet agents, he exposed. 1600. No one has ever done that. Within two, three years of that, he was absolutely round the bend, claiming to be the last son of the Tsar of Russia. When he identifies the Portland spy ring, that leads to the unmasking of three separate illegals running a huge spy ring, shipping admiralty secrets, really serious secrets, stuff which helped the Soviet Navy evade our submarines and our torpedoes, shipping that to Moscow with impunity. MI5 knew nothing about them, it just knew absolutely nothing. Until Kolineski comes along, talks to Peter Wright and the whole thing is set in motion. And that was not an isolated.
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Charlie Higson
Case. When spies like Gordjevsky and Golieneski are exposed, what's the diplomatic fallout between UK and.
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Tim Tait
Russia? It's priced in. That fallout is priced in. This is a game. It's called the Great Game for a reason. It's a game. We have spies, they have spies. We find their spies, they find our spies. When we find them, we kick them out. They kick out our spies in return. This is baked into the cake. It's what.
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Charlie Higson
Happens. The Soviet Union's economic decline was evident in the 1980s. Why did the west still treat it as an evil.
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Tim Tait
Empire. Because it was, is the simple answer. I mean, yeah, it was. The west has known that within its own creation, the Soviet Union would eventually provide the seeds of its own destruction. It was never, ever going to last forever. But although it was financially, economically beginning to fall apart dramatically by the early to mid-80s, it still had enough power and influence to cause mayhem, particularly in Eastern Europe and Central Europe. So, you know, when you say, well, why the British government and the American government, why did we take it so seriously? It's because it was.
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Charlie Higson
Serious. So Gordjevsky was exfiltrated in 1985. What do we see happen for the rest of the decade in terms of paranoia between east and West? Because you would expect tensions to.
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Tim Tait
Reduce. Yeah. And in fairness, that paranoia is both justified because the Soviets did get up to bad stuff, just as we got up to bad stuff. But at the same time, it's coming from two fairly right wing governments, the Reagan administration in D.C. and the Thatcher prime ministership here. It suits those politicians down to the ground to say, here is the big bad wolf, the big bad Soviet wolf. And everything we do is justified because there's this big bad wolf coming to blow our house down. That's.
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Charlie Higson
Politics. Now. The wilderness of mirrors phrase is used to describe the reality of Cold War espionage where every piece of intelligence could be genuine, it could be deception or counter deception. And from what you've been saying about your suspicions, about how neatly presented Gordievsky's, you seem to implying that it's very difficult to separate fact from.
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Tim Tait
Fiction. I think that's absolutely true in terms of intelligence, information, raw intelligence. When intelligence comes in and our guys do this, their guys do this, they collect little snippets of information. I overheard him saying something there, that person there said something there, it comes in and what emerges on the desk of the counter intelligence officer is essentially a Rorsach test. And you look at it, the counterintelligence officer and looks at it and says, I see that picture. That's what that picture is. Another counterintelligence officer is quite likely to look at it and say, yeah, I see a butterfly. That's part of the problem. The only way for you and me, the people who are listening to this podcast, to know and to have confidence is to have access to the files, which to be crude about this, we pay.
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Charlie Higson
For. So, Tim, you've written about lots of spies and in this podcast we unpack the story of one fascinating spy each season. Who do you think we should cover.
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Tim Tait
Next. This is a hobby horse of mine. It's Golianewski. The story of his escape, his defection is so dramatic. When I was writing it, and bear in mind, I had access to all the Polish intelligence service files on it, I was able to put together the tick tock of the days of his defection as well as the American files. It's such a dramatic story. It's such a story of bravery, of hubris, of ambition, of corruption. And on top of that, there's a good bit of sex and money in there as.
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Charlie Higson
Well. Well, maybe in a future series we'll get you back and you can talk us through that amazing story of Golianevsky. But thank you so much for being our guest today. That was really.
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Podcast Announcer
Interesting. Thank.
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Charlie Higson
You. But also slightly scary and depressing. Whether we have learned anything from this or whether people have just learned how to lie and use propaganda better, I think the latter. Yeah. Yes. There's always a big question where you're looking at political scandal and secrets being exposed. You know, is this conspiracy or is it just incompetence? Is it blundering? I got the impression from what Tim was saying that there was a huge amount of blundering and incompetence. And like the story in a classic Coen brothers movie, someone makes a mistake and then by trying to fix it, they make even more. More mistakes and the things escalate and it ends up in a far worse mess than it would have been if people had just owned up and been honest from the start and confronted these problems. But there's also. There's this ongoing thing of. Of all the different intelligence agencies being suspicious of each other and. And sort of almost treating each other as the biggest enemy rather than whoever it is you're supposed to be defending the country against. Have. The CIA doesn't want to talk to MI6 and MI6 doesn't want to talk to MI5, and they're all suspicious of each other. And at the end of the day, as Tim said, you know, we're paying them. This is all our money. Thank you for listening and do join us for our next series of the Spy who, hosted by Raza Jeffrey. Next time, we open the file on David Rupert, the spy who jailed the Omar bomb plotter when down on his luck, trucker David Rupert is seen mingling with IRA hardliners. The FBI and MI5 use him to infiltrate the Republican paramilitary's deadly inner circle. But what begins as an intelligence coup soon mutates into a deathly nightmare of bombs and blood. Follow The Spy who Now wherever you listen to.
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Podcast Announcer
Podcasts, Wondery subscribers can binge full seasons of the Spy who early and ad free on Apple Podcasts or the Wondery.
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Charlie Higson
App from Wondery. This is the final episode in our series, the Spy who Outran the kgb. This episode of the Spy who is hosted by me, Charlie Higson. Our show is produced by Vespucci for Wondery with story consultancy by Yellow Ant. The producer of this series is Ashley Clivery. Our sound designer is Alex Port Felix. The supervising producer is Natalia Rodriguez. Music supervisor is Scott Velasquez for Frisson Sync. Executive producers for Vespucci are Johnny Galvin and Daniel Turkan. The executive producer for Yellow Ant is Tristan Donovan. Executive producers for Wondery are Estelle Doyle, Theodora Laludis and Marshall.