S3.E6 - Diego Da Rin (Int. Crisis Group) joins us to talk about Haiti's Security Crisis

Summary

The STIMPACK Podcast: Episode S3.E6 – Diego Da Rin (Intl. Crisis Group) on Haiti’s Security Crisis

Release Date: March 13, 2025

Hosts: Jeff Frazier
Guest: Diego Darin, Analyst at the International Crisis Group

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Introduction

In the sixth episode of Season 3 of The STIMPACK Podcast, host Jeff Frazier welcomes Diego Darin from the International Crisis Group (ICG) to discuss the escalating security crisis in Haiti. This episode delves deep into the complexities of Haiti's current situation, exploring the roles of local gangs, international interventions, and the broader socio-political landscape affecting the nation.

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Background of Diego Darin

Diego Darin, a 31-year-old analyst at ICG, brings a wealth of experience in conflict resolution and research. Born in Bogotá, Colombia, Diego is the first generation in his family from the capital. His roots trace back to Popayán in the El Cauca department, a region historically affected by armed conflict involving groups like the FARC. Diego's academic journey includes studies in philosophy, law, and social sciences with a focus on Latin American history, shaping his profound understanding of conflict dynamics and resolution.

Notable Quote:

“I wanted to do something that would have some impact. I was always attracted by working in conflict resolution.”
— Diego Darin [02:13]

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Early Career and Path to the International Crisis Group

Diego's initial foray into journalism and research in Colombia provided him with firsthand exposure to conflict zones. In 2018, while working as a journalist for La Silla Huasia during Colombia’s presidential campaign, he focused on post-conflict issues following the 2006 FARC peace agreement. His transition to the International Crisis Group was motivated by a desire to engage in impactful work beyond academia. Six months after the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse, Diego joined ICG, dedicating his expertise to analyzing and addressing Haiti's multifaceted security challenges.

Notable Quote:

“I was completely obsessed since the first day. I started understanding, well, trying to understand some things...”
— Diego Darin [08:35]

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Understanding Haiti's Security Crisis

Diego provides an in-depth analysis of Haiti's security landscape, highlighting the limitations and challenges faced by international interventions. He discusses the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), a proposed initiative aimed at bolstering Haiti's National Police to combat pervasive gang violence.

Key Points:

1. History of International Interventions:

   • Reference to MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti) which operated from 2004 to 2017.
   • MINUSTAH successfully reduced violence and gang power but faced significant criticism for human rights abuses, including sexual violence and the introduction of cholera.

2. The MSS Initiative:

   • Proposed as a successor to MINUSTAH, MSS intended to be a multinational security support mission rather than a traditional UN peacekeeping operation.
   • Focused on providing strategic support to Haiti’s security forces rather than direct engagement with gangs.

3. Challenges and Shortcomings:

   • Initial deployment of 400 Kenyan police officers proved insufficient against gangs controlling 90% of the capital, Port-au-Prince.
   • Financial constraints hindered the MSS’s effectiveness, with the estimated annual cost at $600 million but securing less than $100 million.

Notable Quote:

“Most of the dollars are supposed to come from the U.S. but there’s been all sorts of political issues around getting that money to flow properly…”
— Diego Darin [17:34]

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Fieldwork and Firsthand Observations

Diego recounts his recent field trip to Haiti, emphasizing the stark socio-economic divides and the brutal realities faced by residents in Port-au-Prince. He highlights the dualism within the city—where affluent areas coexist with impoverished neighborhoods under gang control.

Key Observations:

• Socio-economic Disparities:

  “There is this other universe, completely disconnected, which is Petionville, up in the hills where there are expensive bars and clubs...”
  — Diego Darin [22:34]

• Humanitarian Concerns:

  “The most difficult thing is to leave Haiti and watch Port-au-Prince burn while knowing people are stuck there in horrible conditions.”
  — Diego Darin [21:15]

• Public Sentiment and Fear: Many Haitians are traumatized by gang violence, including instances of extreme brutality. The populace remains deeply skeptical of any negotiations with gangs due to their violent history and ties to political elites.

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Analysis of Current Challenges and Potential Escalations

Diego outlines the precarious situation in Haiti, where underfunded and understaffed international missions struggle to contain powerful gangs. He underscores that without substantial support, the MSS is unlikely to achieve its objectives, leading to worsening conditions.

Key Points:

1. Insufficient Funding and Support:

   • The MSS lacks the necessary resources to make a significant impact, with funding far below what was projected.

2. Gang Dynamics:

   • Gangs, while controlling large portions of the capital, are facing internal fatigue and a desire for change. However, their objectives remain complex, balancing aggression with strategic negotiations to avoid international backlash.

3. Potential for Further Decline:

   • Diego warns of scenarios where increased gang power could lead to governments being forced to negotiate, potentially undermining sovereignty and stability.

Notable Quote:

“The international community hasn’t stepped up to give the funds… the situation can cross a threshold that will make huge headlines.”
— Diego Darin [19:32]

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Recommendations and Path Forward

Diego advocates for a multifaceted approach to address Haiti’s security crisis, emphasizing that military interventions alone are insufficient. He calls for comprehensive strategies that include:

1. Strengthening Local Security Forces:

   • Ensuring that Haiti’s National Police are adequately funded, trained, and equipped to handle gang-related threats.

2. Addressing Corruption and Impunity:

   • Tackling systemic corruption is crucial, as it fuels the power and influence of gangs.

3. Implementing DDR Packages:

   • Demobilize, Disarm, and Reintegrate (DDR) packages should focus on community-based solutions that involve victims and ensure justice and reparations.

4. Political Reforms and Elections:

   • Establishing a secure environment is a prerequisite for fair and effective elections. Diego suggests phased or regional elections to gradually restore democratic processes without exacerbating conflict.

Notable Quote:

“Most of these groups were created and controlled by the elites to serve their own interests. So Barbecue is just the top of the iceberg.”
— Diego Darin [32:00]

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Future Outlook and Closing Thoughts

Diego remains cautiously pessimistic about the immediate future of Haiti's security situation, highlighting the need for urgent and substantial intervention. He stresses that without concerted international support and internal reforms, Haiti's conditions are likely to deteriorate further, making comprehensive peace and stability an elusive goal.

Closing Remark:

“This is doable… you can subdue them if you have enough support.”
— Diego Darin [41:37]

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Conclusion

Jeff Frazier and Diego Darin provide a sobering yet insightful exploration of Haiti’s security crisis. The discussion underscores the complexity of achieving lasting peace in Haiti, the critical shortcomings of current international efforts, and the urgent need for a holistic approach that goes beyond military intervention. For listeners seeking to understand the intricate dynamics at play in Haiti, this episode offers invaluable perspectives and expert analysis.

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Listen to the full episode here.
Access the detailed report by the International Crisis Group here.

Transcript

[Jeff Frazier]

Hello, everyone. Welcome back to the stimpact podcast. This is Jeff Frazier. We're going to do something a little bit different this time. Quick trigger warning. We get a little bit graphic in this episode. Just a heads up. I interview my colleague Diego Darin from the International Crisis Group. And the International Crisis Group is a cool organization. They're kind of like a think tank, but they go deeper. They. They have country only analysts that actually go behind enemy lines do the interviews. In this case with the gangs and with the civilian population, with the actual of the MSS and the Haitian national Police and the. Everybody right, went deep. And then he reported to our A Haiti working group that I'm a part of, and I really enjoyed his analysis, and so I invited him to join us on our podcast today. I think you'll really enjoy him. A young guy, only 31 years old, but tons of experience, very intelligent, and I. I think you'll enjoy hearing his perspective. So here we go. All right, welcome, everybody. The one and only Diego Darin has joined us. Did I pronounce that okay?

[Diego Darin]

Yeah, it's. Whatever.

[Jeff Frazier]

You. You. You say it for me. You say it for me, saving your full name for me.

[Diego Darin]

Diego Darin.

[Jeff Frazier]

You wrote that's Spanish. I thought it was a French derivative.

[Diego Darin]

Well, actually, it's. It's Italian.

[Jeff Frazier]

Oh, it's Italian. There we go. So you roll.

[Diego Darin]

The R is Colombian, and my last name is Dalian.

[Jeff Frazier]

Okay, but you speak French, right?

[Diego Darin]

Yes. Well, my father is French. My mother is Colombian. I was born and raised in Colombia until I was 19, and then I went to. To Paris to. To do my studies.

[Jeff Frazier]

Okay, okay. Okay, that explains it. Now we're getting the whole story. Well, hey, thanks so much, Diego, for joining us today. Excited to have you. I'm sure our listeners are excited to hear from you as well. We wanted to start with the early Diego stories. Right. I wanted to know a little bit. We want to make you a real. So tell us a little bit. We know a little bit about where you grew up. Tell us maybe what made you start paying attention to the world? What made you kind of go into the career that you went into, and then maybe we'll ask you some questions about your early starts.

[Diego Darin]

Yes, of course. Well, I was. As I was saying, I was born in Bogota, but I am the first generation from Bogota, which is the capital in Colombia. My family comes from Popayan, which is the capital of one of the most, well, kind of dangerous or where conflict is more intense in Colombia, which is El Cauca in the southwestern part of Colombia, where the FARC were created and where other. Where many others illegal armed outfits like started having roots in the early 60s and 70s. I didn't know what I wanted to do for my studies, but I wanted to do something that would have some impact. And I was always attracted by, by working in conflict resolution. Although my, my career doesn't, didn't follow very thoroughly this line, but this was like the, the, the, the issue that, that interested me more.

[Jeff Frazier]

Wait, so how did, how did you get exposed to that issue at all? I guess I can guess because of the politics in your neighborhood. Right. So are you like watching the news on TV and then just enthralled more than your peers?

[Diego Darin]

Well, I was, I was mostly struck by how in Bogota we felt that war was so far from us and that war didn't affect us in Bogota. Well, I was, yes. Since the early 2000s, I started like keeping a close eye on what President Uriue did during his two mandates, which was his iron fist policies against the guerrillas in Colombia. And I was really interested on how, well my family was an Uri Vista because they wanted for somebody to have, like to regain control over the country.

[Jeff Frazier]

Yeah.

[Diego Darin]

But I started understanding that there was a lot of issues about the policies that, that his security first was having as consequences in rural communities that were stigmatized and some many times understood as collaborating with the guerrillas. And that's how like I started being interested in that, but mostly about the Colombian conflicts.

[Jeff Frazier]

What are we, what ages are we talking here?

[Diego Darin]

Well, since I am 30. Well now 31 years old. So. And this was when I was in school, so about 10, 12 years old.

[Jeff Frazier]

Wow. Okay. I sure do. I'm thinking about my 10 year old son who, who is focused on March Madness basketball tournament right now. Right. He's not paying attention to the farc. Okay, so awesome. Thanks for sharing. Tell us a little bit about early career. Right, so like we, we know a little bit about what piqued your interest and got you globally minded and the fact that at a young age you even knew what conflict resolution was on a global foreign policy scale. That's just awesome. Especially since I'm learning most of that as a grown wrinkly adult. Right. But tell us a little bit about early career. Right. You start to jump in. Maybe first job.

[Diego Darin]

Yeah, well, it was kind of chaotic because I started, as I was saying, school in Colombia. What, what, what interested mostly to me it was doing research, investigation, and I wanted to become a journalist. I started doing philosophy. Then I rejoined law school and I was Doing philosophy and law. And then for my master's I did like a master's that is like social sciences for Latin America, but with a major that was history. And we, we were focused mostly on. On contemporary history of Latin America.

[Jeff Frazier]

Cool, cool. So you start to get intrigued at this kind of conflict area journalism idea, investigations, research. Tell us a little bit about your first dabblings in there. Maybe some of your first scars.

[Diego Darin]

Well, I was doing. And it was actually like, like my first actual job, I was doing research in Al Cauca in this department where my family comes from intellectuals that were engaging social movements during the 60s that were trying to convince some social movements, indigenous and peasant communities not to get engaged in armed revolution direction rather on social years.

[Jeff Frazier]

Are we talking about here? When, when are you doing this work?

[Diego Darin]

This was in 2018. 2017. 2018. I was doing my fieldwork there and I didn't want to return to Paris. They didn't like it very much. So I looked for a job and I started working as a. As a journalist for. For a local media outlet that is called La Silla Huasia. That does. And this was during the political campaign, during the presidential campaign in which current President Petro lost the campaign to the right wing candidate Iwan Duque. And I was working in the journal during that, in this newspaper for a year, but mostly focusing on what we called at the time in Colombia post conflict issues because they had reached an agreement with the FARC in 2006. After that, people were calling it not conflict, but post conflict policies, although the conflict was still raging as it's still raging in Colombia today.

[Jeff Frazier]

Sure, sure. Okay, awesome. So now tell me about your jump into the Crisis Group.

[Diego Darin]

Well, when I end when I. I was thinking about doing a thesis PhD, but I wanted to do something that wouldn't be just on a shelf, that maybe in 20 or 30 years from now somebody would read it. And I wanted to do something that had some impact during my. While I was studying in Paris, I was also engaged in. I was a film programmer and I was working in doing movies with some friends of mine who do that. And I was wondering if I would jump into documentary filmmaking. And I was like looking for jobs in investigation within organizations that wanted to have direct impact in conflicts or I was working on two possible movies and I was trying to find funds and grants to do this. But then there was this vacancy at Crisis Group and they were looking for a research assistant in the Latin America program. And this was six months after the assassination of President Jovenel Moise And I was the only one who spoke French in the team. So they asked me, do you know something about Haiti? And I was well, you know, I did some contemporary history of Latin America. So I'm familiar with the revolutionary process, the process of independence dependence, but not so much about current affairs. And my boss, Renata Segura just gave me a near death course of an hour and a half about all that she had learned in the years she has been working on Haiti. And that's what this started. And I was completely obsessed since the first day. I started understanding, well, trying to understand some things, trying to. Well, I started learning creole since the start. And it is such an amazing country and with so many. It is intellectually challenging. It's so difficult to understand all this overlapping crisis. All the individuals are involved, the private sector, politicians, armed groups, their connections between them and with people not only in Haiti but in other countries. And since the start I was completely. I thought that it was a country that I would be interested in in the years to come. And so I started, I was first research assistant, then I was consultant and I'm an analyst in Crisis group. Well, but only focusing on Haiti and.

[Jeff Frazier]

I'm sure that's plenty of work. Yeah, that's good. So tell us a little bit about what crisis group does and why. Why you get to be a full time analyst on Haiti.

[Diego Darin]

Well, and this is kind of one of the main characteristics that what we stand for. Many organizations do like reports or on cross coding themes in different countries. But we have analysts that are only focused in a country or in a region of a country. Very in depth analysis of one specific country. And we try to always be on the ground in Haiti. It is difficult for me to be there. We don't have the budget for me to have a full, well security for a full year. So I go in and out of Haiti and the idea of crisis group is to of course produce reports, analysis, but mostly to produce like this in depth analysis and very optimistic date information about a specific country and do recommendations, give like actual recommendations to key local or international players that could have some weight in, in, in. In terms of changing policy to, to resolve conflict or reduce violence.

[Jeff Frazier]

Excellent. Let's then segue into your work a little bit. Tell me about back in. I guess it was probably 2022. Yeah, probably 2022 when everyone was talking about this MSS and debating it a bit. Tell me about what your thoughts were looking forward into the mss.

[Diego Darin]

And so at the UN people started talking about that there was huge reluctance not only from the Secretary General, but other countries as China and Russia to. To again approve another peacekeeping operation after Minusta that was in Haiti between 2000, 2004 and 2017, which for our.

[Jeff Frazier]

For our listeners, that Minusta is a UN General Mission. So you get UN troops come in. It's big. It was what, 20 years or 17 years? Something like that. Big mission.

[Diego Darin]

Yeah.

[Jeff Frazier]

So it's. That's an acronym, minusta. I don't even remember what it stands for anymore. Sorry, keep going.

[Diego Darin]

Is this French acronym? Yeah, it was the Mission for Stabilization of Haiti that came to Haiti after President Jean Bergman instead was. Well, it is a debate, but was forced into it.

[Jeff Frazier]

Don't go down that rabbit hole.

[Diego Darin]

And they achieved the minusta, achieved to lower the levels of violence, to reduce the power of gangs. But after the 2010 earthquake, they were not so much focused on reducing violence, but in other issues. And people remember in Haiti, mostly the MINUSTA because of, for example, what they call the minusta babies, peacekeepers that left babies without giving any kind of support to the women that they impregnated and sexual and violence, abuse against minors, women, and also the introduction of cholera. So these three things really kind of affected very much the way MINUSTA was remembered, is remembered today. These were some of the reasons and the past mistakes that in the Security Council are always cited as reasons not to enter again into a peacekeeping operation in Haiti. But the idea was then to build a new model that could. So people in the Security Council thought this, that it could be the future of peacekeeping because it wasn't a UN mission. It would be a mission that would be led by a specific. By a country and that would gather troops from many other countries. So this was a multinational security support mission. Support mission. Because it wasn't the mission who would lead the operations against the gangs, but that would support the local security forces in planning and conducting the operations. And so they would be not replacing the security forces, but giving them support, strengthening them, so that when they would leave Haiti, they would not only have helped the local security forces to regain control, but also strengthen them so that they would be in a better place to take over after the foreign mission would leave.

[Jeff Frazier]

Yeah. So just to put. For the listeners to put a little more color around that. So the basic idea being that the MSS would per. For example, to hold security at the airport or at the port itself or other kind of key locations where they would hold ground and basically pull duty for the hmp, the Haitian National Police, while the HMP went and did the Anti gang operations and hopefully the FA day as well, the little military as well. So they wouldn't be necessarily engaging the enemy directly, but in directly.

[Diego Darin]

But the mandate that the Security Council gave them, it's quite clear they are not only a static mission providing security to key infrastructure as the ports, the airports, the roads, but also kinetic. Kinetic operation because they would be helping the Asian police in planning and conducting anti gang operations in gang strongholds. And this is critical because peacekeeping operations normally enter in a specific environment to keep peace, in environments in which there has been, for example, a peace agreement or in an environment where it is peace to keep. And so they are not such a kinetic force that are going to engage directly. And this multinational mission was allowed to do that. They had a very robust mandate that allowed them to go after gangs and this was critical.

[Jeff Frazier]

Do you know, I don't know the UN well enough to know how often does it happen that UN mission, not, not a security support mission, but a UN peacekeeping mission or PKO would actually do kinetic operations as well?

[Diego Darin]

Well, it is not very common. It is not very common. And that's why also there is such a reluctance from several actors in the Security Council and the Secretary General to allow a peacekeeping operation because it is, it is not a. They don't usually go with their train for. Right to. This is like peace enforcement.

[Jeff Frazier]

Yeah.

[Diego Darin]

What he's keeping do is like to keep.

[Jeff Frazier]

Achieve it. Yeah, yeah. So we're jumping around a little bit. So for the listener, we started talking about 2022 when country was preparing for this potential MSS. And I'm gonna go back and get Diego's perspective on. On that, see if he can rewind. But he just hinted at an issue today which is where we have the MSS that's in place. These soldiers that are. I shouldn't call, I don't know if I can call them soldiers. Troops, officers, soldiers who are in place right now who are hoping for more help. And a lot of people around the world are hoping that they're going to get that help in the form of a pko, a peacekeeping operation. So that's blue hats, right, from the un, their actual UN soldiers as opposed to what we have now, which is a UN approved multi country force, which is a different thing. Right. The key difference there being that the money comes from the U.N. right. Directly. It's a different set of budgets. One of the biggest issues that we've had to date is. Well, it comes from the countries through the UN Right. And their existing budgets. So one of the issues We've had is most of the dollars are supposed to come from the U.S. but there's been all sorts of political issues around getting that money to flow properly and in sufficient quantities. So we're kind of teasing time zones a little bit. So let me ask this question again, but differently. What were your thoughts of what the MSS would be beforehand versus what's happened? Like, I guess I'm asking were you hopeful and have you been disappointed? Have you been surprised in any way by the mss?

[Diego Darin]

I haven't been surprised that they haven't had success in their operations because they don't have the means to be successful.

[Jeff Frazier]

Let me ask it differently. Have you been surprised at how it just didn't come together? Right. Like, so we, we were talking in 2022, late 2022, about an MSS being 25, 3500 troops, right. And we've just never gotten anywhere close to that. What are we at now? Like 8:50 something, 870 something?

[Diego Darin]

Yeah, they reached recently 1,000 troops, great police officers and Caribbean soldiers.

[Jeff Frazier]

And that's after being there for a year and in change, right. And they started out with like 400 and it's crept up to that right.

[Diego Darin]

Until December there were just 400, around 400 Kenyan police officers on the ground operating. So it is not surprising that 400 Kenyan officers cannot do it over a capital that is 90% controlled by gangs.

[Jeff Frazier]

That have maybe 11,000 members.

[Diego Darin]

So it is not surprising. And what is disappointing is that the international community hasn't stepped up to give the funds. That, that of course the attention of the international community is absorbed by other security crises as Gaza, Ukraine, Sudan. But the money that is needed to have a fully staffed and fully financed multinational security force in Haiti is not so much if you compare it to the billions that are needed in other crises. What Kenya was asking. Well, the estimated cost for one year of the mission was 600 million. And after a year the trust fund didn't have even $100 million. So this is why the Kenyan mission hasn't been able to really at least have a chance against the gangs because they don't have the funds. They are underfunded, they are under equipped, they are understaffed.

[Jeff Frazier]

Okay, thank you. Let's go into your most recent trip down there and as part of putting together this report and we'll link to the report so you guys can my, my fellow nerd Haiti watchers who love that kind of stuff can check out their report. It's a fascinating report. Tell me about your trip down There what your first impressions were, what maybe some. Some of the process. Like what do you do to produce a robust report like that?

[Diego Darin]

Well, another of our. Of the features of our work in Crisis group is that we try to talk to all the parts of a conflict, to everybody that is directly involved in the conflict, to victims, to. To the government, to the opposition, to civil society organizations, to regular citizens, to street food vendors, to everybody. So when I go there, I try to have these high level meetings to discuss policy with government officials, to discuss different issues. Would that be economic issues, violence, justice and. Well, I cannot enter into much of the details, but I try to move as much as I can. It is. It is difficult to enter to gun control areas, but we managed to do so in different ways and trying to understand to the better extent what every party in the conflict is looking for, what their objectives are and how could we gather all this information and produce recommendations to at least reduce violence.

[Jeff Frazier]

Great. Tell me. So I understand the process a little bit. I think we're getting that. Tell me about your emotional side of that. Your initial impressions during your trip, some of your. Your first kind of blush reactions.

[Diego Darin]

Well, I. I always say that the most difficult thing is to leave Haiti to be in that plane and watching poropence burn and just know that you can be spared and you can go out and all these people are stuck there in such horrible conditions. And it's not everybody. You know, there are two universes in Po Prance. There is the lower part of the city, which are the slums or middle class neighborhoods that are the most affected by gangs because most of the gangs started controlling most the slums in the coastal part of Pogop Ghaz. And they started spreading going up the hills. And there is this other universe, completely disconnected, which is Petionville, which is up in the hills where. Or. Yeah, these subscale neighborhoods with hotels, with hotels with very expensive bars and clubs where everybody go at night as if nothing was happened. Nothing was happening in the lower parts of the city. And it is quite frustrating and to words like collide and to go from the upper hills in the morning and go all day to the lower parts of the city and go back at night to the hills where you are safe.

[Jeff Frazier]

Agreed. Yeah. That is a stark contrast.

[Diego Darin]

It is also very difficult to go. To talk people who very frequently are risking their lives talking to you and not to have anything concrete to. To. To give them. They are always. People always ask me, why should I be speaking to you? I have to be very frank. I Don't have much to offer. We are an organization that has some impact, but not every time people hear us, of course.

[Jeff Frazier]

Yeah, Yep. I know that feeling. Incredib. And it's been a little while since I've had that feeling. So you're. You're bringing it back fast. But thank. Thank you for doing it. Tell me a little bit about what we've seen in your report, which is, you know, fairly, fairly dismal assessment of the current status.

[Diego Darin]

Well, you know, every time journalists or governments ask us, how dire is the situation, how bad can it get? And when I started working on Haiti, I was thinking, like, every month, it cannot worsen. This is already too bad. But when you think that Pope France and when I talk about pogrop ghans. But because conflict is mostly concentrated in Pope France is in the brink of collapse, gangs and elites always can do more and make the situation worse.

[Jeff Frazier]

Tell me a little bit about that. How do I say this? I often have to characterize how it could get worse. Right. For people. Often. I spoke to a high level political official recently who said, and I quote, I thought Haiti was already a lost cause. Right. Which, of course is heartbreaking and frustrating to me. And so I then have to very quickly characterize how it most definitely can get worse for everyone. Can you take a stab at that? At talking about maybe the staging, where things go if we do not, if no one intervenes, where do we end up next? Right. And where can it get?

[Diego Darin]

Well, in a. In a macro image, I really. Well, because most people are interested when asking about what will happen with Haiti, about what the gang's objective are. And what I really think is that most gang leaders just. There are many of them who are tired of being in battle every day and just want a way out. And actually that's why they started collaborating together in February last year when two rival coalitions that were fighting for control of the capital for about three years regrouped and started working together in this viv ensemble Living together coalition. And their objective was twofold. First, to derail plans for a stronger force than them to be on the ground because there was these discussions about the deployment of the multinational security mission. And second, to force. Well, to topple the government and to force new authorities to engage in negotiations with them and to achieve an amnesty for all their crimes. Because most of them are tired and don't want to get well, want a different life, even if they want to remain powerful. But they are tired of this life. And so it is hard for me to Think that gangs would want at some point to overthrow the government, to take power themselves, because they are intelligent people, even if they are macabre. But they know that if, for example, Chrisier Barbecue or Vitelhomme proclaim themselves president or prime minister, this would like force the United States or other countries to have a much more radical reaction to the developments in Haiti. If you have barbecue president, the US might invade Haiti again, and they know that. So they want to strike a balance, to have maximum military pressure on the authorities to force them to do what they want, which is for now, to engage in dialogues with them, but not to trigger a foreign invasion. So this is where what, in terms of politics could happen, but what happens in this conflict? Well, pop France is a city at war, and people. Well, you see things that are incredible. And for example, there was these clashes about a year and a half ago between the two rival coalitions in Cites Soleil. And there was all this garbage that was piled up that wasn't allowing the water from the canals that go from all the parts of Port Khaenz to go to the sea. And during the rainy season, all this loam was completely flooded and nobody could enter or go out for about a week. Not only to they didn't have water. And most of the houses are building like very cheap materials and sometimes they don't have doors. And people were telling me that during combat, the corpses of the people that were killed were going as the. As the slum was flooded through the streets and sometimes they woke up and there was a corpse that was entering the house. It is like things that it's hard to imagine that people are living in Pop ghans and sometimes when we have meetings with internationals that are trying to help and that they don't fully grasp the severity of the situation, I try to give them a reality check. Like saying some of the things that I see and that I hear that happen in Haiti that sometimes make them understand how horrible the situation is.

[Jeff Frazier]

I'm with you that yes, it can get a lot worse. But I'm. I'm also with you that these. I look at the gangs on a spectrum or a continuum of wild, lawless, animalistic tendencies. And then on the other end you've got guys who are a little bit closer to expecting some sort of political influence and power and are trying to behave in a manner that might allow them to receive some form of amnesty and keep playing. And then on the other end, you've just got straight animals, right? And I'm hopeful that those cooler heads Will prevail. I've also heard the same sentiment that you are, that these guys with the cooler heads, they. They want to be done right? They. They want peace. They want way too much in exchange for that piece. Right. Their DDR packages. So for those who are listening to DDR package, what does that demobilize, disarm and reintegrate? Yeah, reintegrate. So it's a. It's a package that community or the Haitian community can together offer to the opposing force in exchange for peace. Right? And the level of generosity that you are forced to give these gangs, the, the opposition force in this case, goes up. If you're the stick you're carrying or the, the influence, the bargaining strength you have goes down, right? So if you show up with, you know, 30,000American soldiers, you. You have all the bargaining strength, and you don't have to offer any DDR package. You just show up and, and kill everybody. Right? To be extreme. Right? And if, if the opposite is true and you have no leverage, you have no bargaining strength, then you have to offer a generous DDR package. And right now our situation looks more like that, right? The. The latter. Diego, what. What do you think it's going to take from a DDR package standpoint if. If nothing changes, right? We stay in this situation where the gangs clearly can take territory at will, right. If they decide to move forward, they can, right. Depending on how dedicated they are to wanting to do that. Just about every territory, there are some territories high in the hill that have enough money to buy ammunition, and they have weapons of their own, and they can defend them pretty well. In fact, those guys at the top of the hill and Kenskoff area are doing a pretty good job right now, right. On their own. And so. But the fact that, that they can essentially take things as will if they want to, puts us in a situation where the existing Haitian leadership has to confront the idea that they may have to just make a deal. And what do you think that that looks like under the current leverage?

[Diego Darin]

No, I. I think that the international community has not been standing idly as the situation worsens. They have been talking about the multinational security mission, but they haven't rallied support or sufficient funds for it to be fully functional. But if the situation, when there will be a threshold that will be crossed by that, I mean, I don't know, something that will make, like, huge headlines in international media, for example, the government being forced to relocate from Pogop Ghans to Capaycin or another city, then the international community will have to do something. And there won't be. Haitians are extremely opposed to any deal with gangs, currently extremely opposed, because these are gangs that have killed and burned people alive in the streets, in the streets, dismembered people, kidnapped, demobilized over a million people. So Haitians are not ready now to hear about negotiations with the gangs. And mostly because most of these armed groups were created by politicians. So before having a tangible change in security and symbolic victories against the gangs, Haitians won't be ready to hear about DDR, about dismantling, about dialogues to demobilize. And what people will need at some point, if there are successes in terms of security against the gangs, is that any dialogue with gangs will put the victims in the center of the process. That if there is not just retributive justice against the gangs, there will be truth. For example, that gang leaders will tell how the gangs were created, which were and how their links to the elites, to the political and economic elites evolved over time, how they access weapons that are illegally trafficked from the United States and other countries. So people will need like a serious process that would engage reparation for victims, truth and also some justice for all the crimes that have been committed by the gangs. But it is important to remember that most of these groups were created and controlled by the elites to serve their own interests. So barbecue is just the top of the iceberg. It is extremely important to know that just by killing gang members, you won't solve the gang problems or the problem of violence in Haiti. Most there. There are people who know very well the country, who have been, well, Haitians that have been studying violence and politics for years, decades, that tell me the central problem in Haiti is corruption and impunity. So it is not only by going after gang members with a security mission that you will be able to resolve Haiti's problems. Of course, it is the first step now that gangs control almost all the capital and that are able to paralyze the country anytime they want. But to have a long term solution, you will need to completely sever the links that the elites have with illegal armed groups. And this is a crucial thing.

[Jeff Frazier]

Great. The. And maybe we can close with this, this line of questioning. So the notion that. Actually let me contend against one point that you made. You said that. That the people are not ready for peace. Right. Because they're not ready for any sort of DDR package or, or anything that looks like that. And of course that' true broadly right. And at. But as you know, Haiti is not one thing and nobody is of one mind. And I, I do believe there are some neighborhoods who have a relationship with their, their gang or their, their gang leadership where there, there is a desire for peace and some sort of, you know, civility. They want peace enough and the, they believe their, their bad guys are not so bad that they can't figure something out. Right. So there are some neighborhoods that fit that description and many neighborhoods that do not. That's the boacale side. Right. The buckle are ready to burn their, their gangs. Right. And they won't, they wouldn't put up with DDR for nothing unless it involves a fire tire fire. Right. So if that's the case. Right. We have Haiti is not all one thing. Let me segue into a question. What, what are your thoughts on and I think this is actually in your report on alternative approaches to elections of some sort. Right. How can we get the political process to move forward in a, a disag way? Yes, it's unrealistic to have national elections now because there are many neighborhoods where you couldn't possibly have sufficient amount of voter turnout to consider that legal representation. And so what, what do we do? Right. Is there some clever way that we can create some sort of fractionalized or rotating election process or some way that, where we can get clever to get at least some elected officials in place to have a country? Right. Because right now we have the transitional presidential council. That is obviously problematic.

[Diego Darin]

Yeah. Many people say that bad elections is better than no elections. But if you have elections this year, you could have lower turnout than the, the, the turnout in, in the last election since 2016 that was less than 20%.

[Jeff Frazier]

Okay, let me interrupt real quick because I want you to add fidelity to that. You just said 20% as a national number. Right. But couldn't we have, you know, spikes, you know, go to capation, you're going to get 90% voter turnout. Right. That'll be just fine. And that's the extreme other side. Right. And so can we talk about it with a little more fidelity? Right, so, so shouldn't capitian and let's call it the top 10 safest. You know, Lakai and Jacques, Mel and Juana met and you know, a handful, let's say 10. Well out of the 10 departments, I bet you five of them could have a legitimate election. Like, can you respond to that a little bit?

[Diego Darin]

Yes. Well, and this has been also a scenario that has been floating around for doing elections, which would be for example, having staggered elections to divide the country in different regions so that some, the security Forces could focus on safer areas to advance in the electoral process. There is an enormous risk of having this, is that, for example, if you start with Haitian or the north, the famous politicians who were popular there, for example, Jean Charles Moise, could lead the elections for president and then it would be hard to reverse that trend. And there would be politicians who would be leading the campaign and that would have an upper hand. And there would be huge discussions about.

[Jeff Frazier]

What if you didn't have a presidential election? What if it was just, let's fill the parliament and all your deputies.

[Diego Darin]

Yes, well, this could also happen and it is also being discussed. But you first need, and it always comes to security and logistics. For now, the authorities have not, as they have been mostly their attention has been mostly absorbed by how to divide the cake of the Haitian administration and not actually focusing on basic governance, on restoring security, creating a national security council, giving the necessary support to the electoral council to move forward to elections. There is not enough funds for now to go to elections. There is not enough logistics. All the votes are counted in Porob Khans. Currently. This is the system. So you need to transport them. Before, it was the Minusta, the peacekeeping operation that was doing that, helping to transport and secure all the votes that were gathered and transported to Pogomhas. Now the gangs control all the access to the roads that communicate to the rest of the country. The airport is closed, so you need a minimum security threshold. The problem is that politicians have their eyes on elections and this is preventing them from focusing on the main issue that Haitians want them to focus on, which is security. The majority of Haitians that I interviewed for this report that is mostly assessing how the government has advanced with its priorities, were telling me, I don't mind if I have to go to vote in two or three years. What I want is to have security. What I want is not to be raped or killed while I'm going to buy some milk. And this is what the government should be focusing on, is on restoring security. And what we recommend is for the Haitian government to establish a security threshold in which they could move forward to organize elections. Because before having a minimum security level, what will happen is that gangs could penetrate the Haitian administration to an unprecedented level.

[Jeff Frazier]

Yeah, there's a business concept we call confront the brutal facts. And I do not feel like anyone in the, the current transitional Presidential council or the international community is willing to confront the brutal facts, which is so far, nobody cares enough to crank up the dial on the MSF or bring in the pko, the UNPKO or anything else. Right. And we need peace and we need it right away for all the reasons that you've mentioned. And I just don't see anyone stepping up to change that equation anytime soon. And so I'm stuck here asking questions like the one I just asked you, which is what's our fallback position? Can we do something? Can we have some country? There's plenty of nation building efforts that we could do in the north and now in the south with the new international airport in Lakai last week. There's things we could do everywhere but Port Au plans that we can't do right now because we have no elected officials. Right. And I guess that's just where I would love for somebody to confront the brutal facts and consider a fallback position.

[Diego Darin]

Yeah. The Haitian government has to at some point open their eyes and try to see how dire the situation is for most Haitians understand that they have to put the interests of the country before their own interests. And the international community has also to understand that this is an issue, at least the security issue that can be solved. This is doable if you have support. This is doable. Not as in other countries where there is such a complex security issues in pop ghans and the bonit where the gangs are in power. You can subdue them if you have enough support.

[Jeff Frazier]

I get a kick out of the notion because we compare budgets of Ukraine. It's like 350 billion that we've sent there and the US we've sent less than a billion. I understand that Ukraine is more important from a security standpoint. From an America first security standpoint. I get it it, but is it 350 times more important? Maybe, but I don't think so. All right, so I'm with you. Well, Diego, thanks so much for joining me today and, and talking to our, our audience. I'm sure they're enjoying all the, the truth that you're speaking. So thanks for your time. Hopefully we'll have you on again in the future at some point. But thanks so much for all your work and trying to further the mission and push the cost forward. So thanks again in.

[Diego Darin]

Thank you so much for the invitation and thank you for putting Haiti in the spotlight.

[Jeff Frazier]

You got it. Thanks, Diego. Have a good one.