Jeff Frazier (5:13)

Fascinating. What do you think it is about you that has made you comfortable for an entire career to. To be facing these situations over and over and over again? Having. I understand that the need, that whole truth to power kind of feels like maybe it's a fight for the underdog kind of a thing.

Vonda Felbab Brown (5:34)

Yeah.

Jeff Frazier (5:35)

Is that maybe what it is?

Vonda Felbab Brown (5:36)

I think it's definitely, you know, fight for the underdog in many ways. Lots of the people I interact with are very marginalized people, whether they are just victims of terrible violence at the hands of insurgents or criminal groups, or victims of governments who repress and brutalize them because of different ethnicity, because of different political views, or because they simply make the judgment that living under an insurgent group or terrorist group without having any options makes the person be part of that group, or because they are very indiscriminate in what kind of policies they apply, be indifferent to what kind of civilian damage they cause in their policy responses.

Jeff Frazier (6:19)

So I think that's part of it.

Vonda Felbab Brown (6:20)

But I would. I would also say, you know, the background in an authoritarian system really made me value the importance of freedoms, of civil liberties, the importance of courage to be willing to challenge those in power. And so I think that's a very important component of that. But look, it's, you know, it's not a joke or not just a joke that my friends call it my depression portfolio. Because one of the things that I have really made the center, the hallmark of my work has been not just to talk to governments or militaries in these contexts, but really get as much to the ground as possible. Talk with people who are living the daily reality, who are making daily survival choices, often very, very complex choices. And often their stories are just excruciating. And especially in the context of a world in which the powerful countries are more and more inward looking, unwilling to provide aid, humanitarian aid, other kind of aid. More and more people around the world do not have an option or do not have options, not even to escape, not even to migrate, because the world doesn't want migrants, as we are experiencing so dramatically in the United States. And so it's really hard to listen to just stories of excruciating suffering, no option out of it. And so I feel a commitment. I feel a commitment to, you know, these people to at least indirectly tell their story, even if it's not, you know, speaking about a particular individual, even if the chance that this will change policy might be limited.

Jeff Frazier (8:00)

Well, and we know that you. You have a massive influence on that, and so we're grateful that you do that work. So I want to get into, in just a minute, into the details of your recommendations and your assessment for Haiti right now, today, because so much has happen, happening. But before we get there, I want the audience to understand how you have collected this data. Right? Tell. Tell them a little bit about maybe the last year or so, what you've been doing, what the nature of your own field work has been to people who don't understand what that is. So. Because I want them to understand how supremely qualified your assessments are.

Vonda Felbab Brown (8:38)

Well, well, thank you. So, you know, that's very kind of you to say. Of course, you know, anytime you do deal with very fluid situation, analyzing data is just hard. Right. You might have different trends happening. And especially if you're assessing things like will a group win or take over a country, which group within a number of armed actors will prevail at any one particular moment. It's very hard. So none of us have a crystal ball, but thank you for your praise in advance. So I have, for the past really, I guess, two years, year and a half, been interviewing as many people who work in Haiti, live in Haiti, or who work on Haiti as possible. And so, you know, at this point, this would be hundreds of people, or at least over 200 people, probably considered more than that, and a wide sector of people. So this would be people who are political analysts, people who work in private security companies, people who are journalists, foreign or domestic, who work in international ngo.

Jeff Frazier (9:45)

I don't know if you remember this, but you remember how we met was actually, you called me to interview me after. After.

Vonda Felbab Brown (9:52)

I remember that very well. I just didn't want to give it away. But I left it up to you, too.

Jeff Frazier (9:57)

Fine. Yeah, yeah, that's for the audience. That's how we met. So we spent probably two hours on the phone. You asked every detail, and I shared everything that I could. So I'm sure that's fairly a representative sample of one of the hundreds of interviews that you've. You've conducted.

Vonda Felbab Brown (10:13)

Yeah, absolutely.

Jeff Frazier (10:14)

You know, great. So maybe you.

Vonda Felbab Brown (10:17)

Yeah, well, I was just also going to say Haiti is, of course, not the first country that I worked on. And in fact, I have been working on other countries much longer, so in places like Afghanistan or Mexico for, you know, 25 years. And it's really hard to say that you're working on something for 25 years. It really dates you. So I don't have 25 years of work on Haiti. Being able to bring in comparative perspectives from the region and outside of the region has also been very useful in interpreting information that people give and in structuring and thinking about the type of individuals that are very important to speak with and whose perspectives matter.

Jeff Frazier (11:00)

Fantastic. Fantastic. So maybe tell us a little bit about your most recent observations. What, what work are you doing now? Because I want to start talking about what's happen right now in Haiti because you. You got such great perspective. What's some of the work that you've been doing recently. So the last report I read of yours is a couple of months ago. It was very thorough report, super valuable. What has been passed around many circles in D.C. as hugely influential. What even maybe what you want to summarize on that and then what you've done since I'm sure.

Vonda Felbab Brown (11:34)

Well again, very many thanks for the kind words. So the, the report that you are referring to was written for the US Institute for Peace. And really the it was essentially a net assessment of different types of arm actors in Haiti. And I've used the term arm actors. That's controversial. It's certainly rejected in many quarters. So many people would say that a criminal group is not an arm actor. But let me be open minded in our conversation today. I would say that a lot of the criminal gangs as they exist in Haiti are and I would also apply that term to militia groups that have emerged vis a vis the actors. So that that report really looked both the criminal gangs and many of the different criminal gangs, but also the Haitian National Police, the army, the Wakala, the militia groups that operate in Haiti as well as the UN blessed UN US funded multinational support mission for Afghanistan that's called mssm. Their capacities, their interests and the balances of power that can be established the effectiveness of policies that the MSSM has brought in. And the report was very unhappy one because it concluded that the capacities of the multilateral support mission were vastly inadequate for the violent situation and the power of the gangs that have the MSSM has been facing. And this would be even if the MSSM actually reached the full staffing, which it doesn't have, the numbers of the staffing have been changing, indicative of the struggle to staff the mission at some point. The ambition was 3,000. At one point was even larger. Right now we are somewhere under 1,000 personnel. But even if we got three times as much, in my view that's still vastly inadequate. What was also another core finding of that report was the multifaceted growth in strength of the gangs, not just in the battlefield, although that's an important part of it, but also in their ambitions, political influence. And although there is wide variety of the gangs and they're not all equally powerful, they're certainly not all equally ambitious. They don't have have equal political connections and capacities. The very powerful and very, very powerful gangs have become far more political in their outlook and far more politically savvy. So you know, the, the title of the report is slipping the Leash. And that refer to the fact that for a long time Haitian politicians have been criminal gangs or militias, variety of street armed actors for their political purposes. And gangs were one of these actors. And this goes back statesman back to the east, at least in Haiti. But what has happened over the past 10 years, especially acutely so and then very much so in the past three, four, five years, is that the gangs no longer just obey the politicians or the businessmen. They dictate terms and they, they have their own ambitions. That doesn't mean that every single gang wants to topple the government and wants to rule. Nor does it mean that the gangs have a vision of governance. This is not like the Taliban that had a vision of when we take over Afghanistan. This is the kind of detailed governance that we will institute. The gangs don't have that, but they certainly are not just satisfied to be on the leash of the politicians. And the balance of power has dramatically changed. So what I've been doing since, in addition to kind of most immediate thinking of what can be done in the deteriorating situation we'll be talking about, is looking at different targeting policies and different targeting options, or even more broadly different strategies for dealing with the gangs amidst a very unfavorable balance of power to the government, for the international community supporting the government and looking at the effectiveness or the lack of and risks and plus and cons and pros of policies such as high value targeting. So one of the things you hear a lot is if only the government were able to get rid of some key gang members, the situation would radically improve. It's a common, common view. So I'm looking at this theme in my recent work. If this so called high value target were adopted and executed, what would success mean? What would be the consequences? What is the likelihood that it could be executed effectively?

Jeff Frazier (16:06)

Well, so hold on, so you're saying that the international community is looking to consider various decapitation strategies or different approaches to the potential of decapitation, so eliminating high value targets. And you're saying that, that you've begun to consider the impact of that or the opportunity or ability to achieve that.

Vonda Felbab Brown (16:29)

So what, what would be required to accomplish this strategy? What's the likelihood that the strategy could be mounted? And then if you imagine leader X is taken out, what kind of effects would it likely have? Would it in fact produce collapse of the gang? I actually do not subscribe to the quite commonly shared belief that high value targeting will be very effective and that it will significantly weaken the gangs. So you know, it's certainly true that you have some gangs that and gang leaders that are far more savvy and capable than others. These would be people like Jimmy Charity, whose nickname is Barbie, or gang leader, whose nickname is Izo, who is one the gang leaders most involved in even international level, regional level drug trafficking. Nonetheless, the history of both decapitation in Haiti and decapitation around the world is that criminal groups and even insurgent groups are rather capable of replacing leaders. And we have seen that in Haiti repeatedly, not because the government, in plural, have had very successful decapitation strategy, but because you have incidences when rival gangs kill off gang leaders all the time, or lieutenants are paid by someone, police in Haiti at various times, or businesses in Haiti to decapitate a particular gang leader. Because you have essential rebellion from within the gang. And some of the most dramatic examples of this was the death in late 2023 of a guy called Iskar who had been heading the genine alliance. So the gangs in Haiti have been constituted at least prior to a big truce, along two big groupings. The groupings are pretty loose. They're called families, Although often the bonds are far looser than in a family. So Iskar was really the man, even more so than Jimmy Charissier, who was heading the genine alliance. And he gets killed in November 2023. And this certainly, in the immediate circumstance, created all kinds of internal problems within the alliance and also specifically for barbecue, who was facing all kinds of other challenges. So for Jimmy Charizie, his co leader, if you would like, some would say his deputy, but co lead, the deputies, co leader of the coalition. But it was also stunning how quickly the alliance shored up, how Cherisie himself, who was facing all kinds of internal pressures from within the group and externally was able to consolidate his power and arguably emerge even more powerful out of shifting and out of the decapitation. And this is just one story of where we see that repeatedly. So. So the first notion, if you take out the leader, the gang will collapse, often doesn't materialize. The second element is, though, that the transition to a new leader can be very violent. And the violence is not beneficial to the state necessarily. The violence can really complicate the security situation even more. Governments in general struggle when they have act against very many armed groups. That is hardly true just about Haiti, but it also tends to be really terrible for people who live in the violent areas, who live. Who live in the neighborhood that are contested among gangs. So. So violence as a question there so is not benevolent.

Jeff Frazier (20:01)

Let me ask you a quick question along that. So the violence I think you're referring to is. Is the inter gangs between gangs Gang on gang violence Viva Ensam for the AUD A is a coalition, right. You're probably looking at, I don't know, 10 to 15 different kind of discrete gangs that are have agreed to ally and in throughout history these guys have all fought each other. Right. And even when I was in captivity there was intergang fighting happening and then also they were fighting against the police and they were fighting against the population. That's that Bakale movement that, that, that we've discussed. So if the gangs are successfully able to pick one enemy, meaning the state or the MSS rather than each other, that is an a massively effective strategy for them. And I would say that they've been largely successful, shockingly successful since Vivan SAHM has become a thing in not being so angry at each other where they're just fighting block to block for their own territory. Vonda, would you agree with that assessment that yeah, you know, they've, they've largely held the alliance?

Vonda Felbab Brown (21:15)

No, absolutely I agree with you. I would say stunningly and not in a positive way, but like in a shocking way successful. Right. So Viva ensemble. Just the deal. The pact that brought together two sets of gangs that were at each other's throats, that defined themselves as core enemies into a truce. At first in the summer of 2023, then it seemed to be kind of collapsing when Iskar was killed. That was seen as death knell Vi Ansam and then three months later we see Viv Ansam being resurrected at the strength that few imagined and taking on the state to an extent that they were able to get rid of the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Ariel Henry. And that came just short of completely taking over seats of power in the country. And then the expectation was that as the gangs accomplish deposing Henri and as the new government was instituted, eventually the international force arrived that we would see the gangs turning on each other. And that didn't happen. And again, you know, we are a year at this point from when the Andri government fell. We are recording in late March 2025 coordination, first of all the non aggression among each other as well as the coordination against state. And now the MSSM is really palpable and very dramatic. That doesn't mean however that if we end up with one of the drones that the government is now flying, taking out someone like Vitellomo, which is another of the gang leaders or Barbecue Charizier, that we will not see fighting over territories. Whether it's between different gangs who are trying to fill the void or within the gang itself as they're fighting over establishment of who takes over the leadership.

Jeff Frazier (23:09)

So the, the audience understands the, the drones that Vonda just mentioned, these, these are small drones. So think 24 inch square drones with some sort of explosive attached to them. So they're, they're actually smaller than what I've even seen what they're using in Ukraine. I don't know where they're getting them. And Vonda, you don't have to answer that.

Vonda Felbab Brown (23:29)

Well, even if you do, I would just say that. Well, before the government of Haiti, the Haitian National Police has now moun drones. The Haitian gangs were actually flying drones themselves both for reconnaissance and reconnaissance and integration of operations. But for several years now, we have the Mexican cartels using these off the shelf drones that one can easily buy just in stores with very primitive explosives to conduct all manner of operations against the Mexican government, against Mexican government officials, but also for the purpose of large scale depopulation. So just a little bit of a diversion, something that might be, might end up seeing in Haiti. It would be really.

Jeff Frazier (24:14)

Yes, but to be clear to the audience, we have not seen that from the gangs in Haiti yet. Only, only the MSSM has that correct currently.

Vonda Felbab Brown (24:23)

Yeah. So the Haitian gangs have only been using them for, for intel. But look, it's not very easy. Not, it's not very difficult to weaponize it. It was very primitive, very accurate.

Jeff Frazier (24:35)

Yeah, good. So let's move toward, if you're okay with it, your thoughts on aggression both in the, up in the hills. So the Kenskoff Thomason kind of area, that, that kind of aggression coming. So just for the audience's edification, that if you imagine Port au Prince is on foothills, right. So you know, the water is, is pretty close. Got the Port au Prince, right, which is literally the water and then close to that is the airport and then there's just sloping foothills and most of the city is on those foothills. And the higher you go up, the nicer and fancier it is. That's where the hotels and things like that are. And if you go higher up there, you eventually get these kind of wooded homes. And that's an area called Kens Cough and, and there's some other areas and. Well, while those areas have been largely off limits to the gangs, not the case anymore. So now you've got heavy attacks coming from the gangs from above. Right. So they're, they've come over the mountains and now they're coming down onto the fancy neighborhoods. And that is a particularly bold move. Cuz that's Largely where many of the power brokers in Haiti are. So you're kind of striking them at the heart of their own neighborhoods. And so lucky for them, they've got the money to mount a bit of a defense. But the gangs aren't giving up. But Vonda, I'd love to hear your, your take on that. The level of aggression that's been crank up in that area.

Vonda Felbab Brown (26:05)

Yeah, I mean, far from giving up, you know, I, I would say that we are really seeing unprecedented onslaught push by the gangs, at least since the effort to get rid of Anri. And I would say that in many ways it's even more profound than the effort to get rid of Anri. So one of the things that your listeners need to understand is that there is fake relationship and engagement between Haitian politicians and criminal gangs, also between Haitian businessmen and the criminal gang gangs. And both politicians and important members of the business community have long been used to using gangs for their purposes, whether it's brutalizing the opposition, getting votes, eliminating business opposition, or getting free, not free, getting safer access on certain roads at the expense of the rival. But even when we think of the desire to get Prime Minister Henry, who was in power as a result of the assassination of the former president who had not been elected, was widely seen as illegitimate. Certain core supporters and other core political opponents. The violence was against an individual or set of individuals. The push now into the top areas that you are speaking about is much more open challenge to the political class and to the business class overall. I don't want to make the claim, and I don't believe that this is the gangs against every politician or every businessman. The allegiances are still there, but they're being contested. And the level of threat that the business and political elite now feels, I would say is even greater than, or in some ways even greater than when we had to push against Henri. So, first of all, the notion that people could somehow insulate themselves from violence if they have sufficient power and they have sufficient money is being challenged. But also the. The political bargain is being challenged really in a profound way. Now, I don't believe that we are in a situation where the bargain inevitably has to collapse. I think that the gangs are still looking for some renegotiations of the bargain. I think that the, the current violence is also a response to policies like using the drones for decapitations. The government hasn't succeeded in killing any prominent gang leader with these, abandoned with this approach yet. So it's also very much in my view about deterrence that the coercion the push is saying, okay, you don't do this to us. It's about balancing of power. There is the fantasy that he might have elections. In my view, that could only happen if there are new bargaining arrangements from the politicians with the gang leaders and they're looking for payoff. I don't want to give the impression that the gangs are completely throwing the system under the bus and that they just want to completely take over the system state, but they're coming close and they're certainly saying that the price that used to be, the arrangements that used to be are now being profoundly renegotiated. And you know, of course it's not just, just threats to the people at the, at the hills and as individuals, those areas control water supply to, to Port au Prince. The gangs already control all roads essentially in and out of Port au Prince. Some of the gangs, like Ezos, have very large maritime assets by Haitian standards, by gang standards. And we're talking a few more boat, but more than the Haitian Coast Guard has, or at least more operational boat than the coast guard had. So there is very much a sense of encirclement and siege in the city. You know, I argued last year when things seem to be calming down in May, June, July when the MSSS was arriving, that the declines in attacks, that not taking the presidential palace, not taking the airport, were not because the Haitian police, supplemented later on by the mssm, were really able to defend them, but because the gangs make a choice not to go for them now. But right now, at the end of March, as we're recording the podcast, more and more people in Haiti are afraid that the gangs will actually go for taking over those seats of power. Now there's different difficulties. International MSSM force is parked at the airport. So, you know, if they wanted to seize the airport, it's a difficult, different scenario than last spring. The much harder for them. They would presumably encounter significant pushback from the mssm, but nonetheless, the situation is dire. That's just in the broader political balance of power picture. For individual people in Haiti and in Port au Prince, the situation can be absolutely dire. We see mass amount of displacement in Port au Prince over the past month. Some 60,000 people. People often don't have any areas to go anymore. This is part of, you know, even just going up on the hills, that there's just inability to move. By some accounts, 9 out of 10 people in Haiti do not eat every single day. At least half of the population is food insecure, which is a gentle term for the brutality of Starvation and famine. Employment opportunities are very minimal. Schools are not functioning. Thousands of schools have been not functioning or destroyed. Maybe one third, maybe of the country's hospital work. And when we say one third, it doesn't mean one third uniformly distributed across the country. You could have zero or very, very few in a very large area. The northern part of the country is in a better security situation than Port au Prince. So it's not all uniformly distribute. So the daily situation is just horrendous for people. And now on top of that, we have the administration removing protections for the Haitian people who were giving temporary status in the United States, US So. So these individuals will be deported, will face massive hardships. But it also means big decline in remittances, a lifeline for many, many families and for the economy, and a big decline in, on top of, or already a big decline as humanitarian aid has been cut off.

Jeff Frazier (32:23)

So let's talk about solutions. So the recommended strategy that you would consider, whether it be on one end of the spectrum, you've got very low international interest to support Haiti. Right. If, if no one's coming to the rescue, Haiti should do X. If somebody wants to come to the rescue and is going to crank up the dial and spend a little more money, how do they do that in a responsible and effect way, in your estimation? Do you want to weigh in on that?

Vonda Felbab Brown (32:54)

Yeah, sure. Look, let me start with the easier one, but the one that's also very elusive. It is clear that we, Haiti, those who care about Haiti, need a much larger force than the mssm, much more robust force. The MSSM is composed of a variety of police officers with variety of training. The bulk of the forces come from Kenya. And many of these forces were given US counterterrorism training and applied it in various ways in Kenya. But you have supplements to do force from various Caribbean countries or Latin American countries that could be very small deployments on the order of tens of individuals or less per country, all of which creates just massive operational challenges. A lot of the force is understaffed, but overall the force is understaffed and a lot of people are under trained. They are really facing warfare, urban warfare situation, and they have no where. The training, the resources, the equipment, the skills to be operating and the rules of engagement, the permissions from the governments to be operating in this. If tomorrow the MSSM disappeared because all funding was stopped or because the countries just decided they wanted to preserve their people. We just had the second MSSM officer killed, second Kenyan officers killed. Yeah, the country would just go to Nairobi would go to the gangs. Now the MSSM has really not been improving the security situation. It's just been slowing the rate of deterioration.

Jeff Frazier (34:24)

Slowing it. Yeah.

Vonda Felbab Brown (34:26)

So you know, if in then in, in a world when the world cares and is willing to staff it and pay for it, we need a much larger force. That's not an easy proposition. Haiti has had a variety of large forces, including Minusa, a UN led force that became very, very, very controversial, deeply resented, implicated in sexual abuse, in the spread of cholera, in very many problems. But the reality is that a small limited force, whether it's 3,000 or 5,000, is just not going to cut it. And we will just be living different versions of what 2024 was like with the Anasa San. So much larger force that has air components and not just little drones with, you know, what's called sometimes potato bomb, very primitive detonation device air components. So helicopters for sure, far more powerful, effective drones, including for intelligence sustainability to stay in the air. One of the problems with the drones is that the payloads are limited, so you can fly them, they try to find the target, however good or bad that policy is, but they can cannot stay in harbor very long. So they either drop and go back or they just stop functioning. And I think you would also need a really different strategy that needs to, in my view, create kind of concentric circles of improving security. But we don't. We are nowhere at this place. Right. So there was a hope in the fall that the MSSI mission would be headed as an official UN peacekeeping force if that had happened, that there was hope that there would be more money, more financial resources and greater stability and predictability of the payments. That's of course before the Trump administration, where there is just overall uncertainty today whether the Trump administration will be funding peacekeeping operations anywhere in the world at what scale and rate. But you also have challenges on the UN Security Council about agreement for that. So that reality just seems completely allusion. What does it then mean? Well, if no one's willing to come in, although, you know, you see every so often protesters and even politicians in Haiti suggest that maybe a private security force should arrive. I think Haiti is in such a situation that a responsible, competent Western security company is better than just collapse that you're seeing in the absence of an international UN peacekeeping, much larger UN military mission. The problem has all along been who will pay for the Western private security companies. So now you're seeing once again Haitian protesters, Haitian, even politicians calling for Russia's Wagner Group, which is now called Africa Corps, to Deploy to Haiti now. This would be massive change in how the United States and Russia and Soviet Union have operated, how they saw Latin America. I think it would be deeply detrimental to US interests. But us have you start seeing these calls once again because there is such desperation in Haiti. The alternative is we will not have any injection of power from an injection of military power from the outside. The outcome then is an outcome that's undesirable but also understandable, that is that we will see rebrokering of deals and relations between Haitian politicians and gangs. Now that process could be difficult and.

Jeff Frazier (37:52)

Of course that's going to be a frustrating thing because no, nobody wants that lack of justice. Everyone wants justice for the atrocities that have been committed.

Vonda Felbab Brown (38:01)

Absolutely. And isn't it. So it's both, you know, lack of justice, but it's also just repeating the same pattern that keeps bringing us to these moments because that those, those bargains are inherently unhealthy and unstable for a country. But without external injection of power, I don't see how internally there is anything thing that could challenge the gangs. So we either have outright takeover of the country.

Jeff Frazier (38:29)

Let me ask you this. I would love, I would love your response to this. So, and I'm of course not recommending this is, this is just observation of a dynamic that could occur. One of the reasons that this dynamic to which you referred before, which is where the. You've got these oligarchs who, who puppeteer the gangs in many ways. And so what one of the reasons that those oligarchs are being attacked right now and Kenskoff, like we mentioned before, because the money has stopped flowing. Those oligarchs had been paying the gangs for many years. And then a lot of sanctions came down from the international community which the oligarchs used as an excuse or cover to stop paying. Right. Which makes sense and it's convenient for us. And that's the intent of sanctions. Right. Is to stop that money from flowing. And that money has been coming from corruption and all the different kinds of corruption, whether it be from government or from businesses and you know, all those, those sources. So that dynamic, that corruption driven funding that eventually flows down to the gangs and now the, the fact that that is stopped in some ways by choice by these oligarchs. Can that whole system blowing up get us to a point where there is no value flow from the oligarchs to the gangs? And then you don't get a recycling of this dynamic because there is no value flow? Is that a possibility?

Vonda Felbab Brown (39:52)

I mean it's certainly a possibility. I don't think it's very likely though. So I think that when it comes to the gangs completely taking over, burning down a house of an individual or burning down the national palace, we will see resurrection of the value flow in the first place. But also let's imagine that the politicians are just no more paying. The gangs have other income. Drug trafficking is an important income for some of them and will be growing in importance, but also just generalized extortion of just daily life. And we would have to have complete halt of every economic activity for there not to be money to be made from, from this extortion. Of course, the more the economy shuts down, the smaller the extortion rent payments will be. But it's very difficult to imagine that we would have zero cash going to the gangs. So say that there's no more payments.

Jeff Frazier (40:42)

Sure.

Vonda Felbab Brown (40:42)

Then we would have, I think two situation. The gangs just overtly take over over or the government role becomes completely irrelevant. It's either in many ways it's like sort of Somalia in 2011, 2010 kind of scenario. So the government is tiny, hunkering down in like few buildings, but really unable to do anything in of itself. And the gangs rule whether they fly a flag over the national palace or they don't fly a flag. Now, if we got to the situation where, where there is no more stay, there is no more the enemy, there is no more payments from the politicians, then you first of all have the possibility of the Viva Ansam collapsing and violence spreading between the gangs. Or you would have the gangs need to reach out to some politicians, whether old timers or newcomers, people like Guy Philippe, to be running the country. Ultimately, gangs can run thieves, they can run run limited territories, but they don't have the capacity to be engaging in anything like running the national economy. And of course they also face sanctions from. Sanctions from the international community, even if the international community does nothing other than like totally embargo and sanction Haiti. So I actually think that the gangs would go for putting forward some politician, new or old, to be running the country on their behalf.

Jeff Frazier (42:07)

Well, and the bigger issue is if, if they keep courting Russia and China, who, who fill in that vacuum? If we create the vacuum, I think we're pretty confident who fills that vacuum. Vonda, thank you so much for your time today. You've been spectacular. I, I know we, we could talk forever. Are there any parting points that you, you would like to make before we let you go?

Vonda Felbab Brown (42:30)

Sure. You know, the parting point I would make is. Look, we need to, we need great empathy with the people in Haiti. And that means both being generous and supporting them in wise ways in Haiti, but also supporting people who are migrants and vilifying migrants. Stopping remittances is bad not just for Haiti and humanity. It's not just bad for individuals, for people of Yar as a country, as an individual, but it's also bad for us because we could also have Haiti becoming an outright crime island where it becomes the epicenter of drug trafficking in the Caribbean. It's already a drug smuggling place, but it could just become outright crime state. That is bad for us. And anytime we allow as a country to treat people brutally because they don't have US Citizenship, we are just teaching US Law enforcement forces to one day start treating in the same way, without warrants, without respect towards rule of law, US Citizens in the same way.

Jeff Frazier (43:38)

Well, thank you so much, Vonda. Your time is immensely valuable. So grateful to have you on. Love your perspective, love your work and thank you for doing it. We're all better for it. So thank you again. Thank you. Hopefully we'll have you on again at some point in the future.

Vonda Felbab Brown (43:55)

Absolutely. Thank you very much for having me on the show and, and your support and very, very kind words.

Jeff Frazier (44:00)

You got it. You got it. Thanks for Wanda.

C (44:11)

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