Podcast
The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments
Hosted by Brad Neal · EN
A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening!
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Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.
Apr 29Tap to summarizeHikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 24-889 24-889 HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS V. AMARIN PHARMA, INC. DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1370 CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow." Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S , 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses, Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones." Id . at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use "actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use." Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005). The questions presented are: 1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use? 2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or even mentions, the patented use? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2023-1169
Transcribe →Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe
Apr 29Tap to summarizeMullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 25-1083 25-1083 MULLIN, SEC. DHS V. DOE DECISION BELOW: CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A952) PRESENTED TO JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR AND BY HER REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A999) PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS ALSO DEFERRED. THE APPLICATIONS ARE ALSO TREATED AS PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT (25-1083, 25-1084), AND THE PETITIONS ARE GRANTED. THE CASES ARE CONSOLIDATED, AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT. CERT. GRANTED 3/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-2995
Transcribe →Cisco Systems v. Doe I
Apr 28Tap to summarizeCisco Systems v. Doe I | 04/28/26 | Docket #: 24-856 24-856 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. V. DOE I DECISION BELOW: 73 F.4th 700 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 3 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Whether the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting. 2. Whether, if ATS aiding-and-abetting claims are cognizable, mere knowledge rather than purpose suffices to show the requisite mens rea. 3. Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, allows a judicially- implied private right of action for aiding and abetting. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 15-16909
Transcribe →Monsanto Co. v. Durnell
Apr 27Tap to summarizeMonsanto Co. v. Durnell | 04/27/26 | Docket #: 24-1068 24-1068 MONSANTO CO. V. DURNELL DECISION BELOW: 707 S.W.3d 828 GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT PREEMPTS A LABEL- BASED FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIM WHERE EPA HAS NOT REQUIRED THE WARNING. CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA'') creates a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the use, sale, and labeling of pesticides. The Act preempts any state "requirement[] for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under" FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. §136v(b). For decades, EPA has exercised its authority under FIFRA to find that Monsanto's Roundup product line and its active ingredient, glyphosate, do not cause cancer in humans. Consistent with that understanding, EPA has repeatedly approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning. FIFRA prohibits Monsanto from making any substantive change to an EPA-approved label unless it first obtains EPA's permission. Respondent is one of more than 100,000 plaintiffs across the country that nonetheless seek to hold Monsanto liable for not warning users that glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup, causes cancer. The federal courts of appeals and state appellate courts are divided over whether FIFRA preempts such claims. The Third Circuit has held that it does. In the decision below, the Missouri Court of Appeals joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and state appellate courts in California and Oregon in holding that it does not. The question presented is: Whether FIFRA preempts a state-law failure-to- warn claim where EPA has repeatedly concluded that the warning is not required and the warning cannot be added to a product without EPA approval. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: ED112410
Transcribe →Chatrie v. United States
Apr 27Tap to summarizeChatrie v. United States | 04/27/26 | Docket #: 25-112 25-112 CHATRIE V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 136 F.4th 100 LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case concerns the constitutionality of geofence warrants. For cell phone users to use certain services, their cell phones must continuously transmit their exact locations to their service providers. A geofence warrant allows law enforcement to obtain, from the service provider, the identities of users who were in the vicinity of a particular location at a particular time. In this case, law enforcement obtained, and served on Google, a geofence warrant seeking anonymized location data for every device within 150 meters of the location of a bank robbery within one hour of the robbery. After Google returned an initial list, law enforcement sought - without seeking an additional warrant - information about the movements of certain devices for a longer, two-hour period, and Google complied with that request as well. Then - again without seeking an additional warrant-law enforcement requested de-anonymized subscriber information for three devices. One of those devices belonged to petitioner Okello Chatrie. Based on the evidence derived from the geofence warrant, petitioner was convicted of armed robbery. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 2. Whether the exclusionary rule should apply to the evidence derived from the geofence warrant. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-4489
Transcribe →Blanche, Acting Atty Gen. v. Lau
Apr 23Tap to summarizeBlanche, Acting Atty Gen. v. Lau | 04/22/26 | Docket #: 25-429 25-429 BLANCHE V. LAU DECISION BELOW: 130 F.4th 42 CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), various categories of aliens, including those who have committed or been convicted of certain crimes, are "ineligible to be admitted to the United States" and subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2); see 8 U.S.C. 1229a. Under 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(13)(C), a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who is returning to the United States after a trip abroad is generally not "regarded as seeking an admission into the United States" and is therefore not typically subject to the inadmissibility grounds in Section 1182(a). But that general rule does not apply to an LPR who "has committed an offense identified in section 1182 (a)(2)" i.e ., an offense that would render him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). The question presented is: Whether, to remove an LPR who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the LPR's last reentry into the United States. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-6623
Transcribe →FCC v. AT&T
Apr 21Tap to summarizeFCC v. AT&T | 04/21/26 | Docket #: 25-406 25-406 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION V. AT&T DECISION BELOW: 149 F.4th 491 CONSOLIDATED WITH 25-567 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq ., empowers the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to assess monetary forfeiture penalties for certain violations of the Act or the FCC's regulations by issuing a notice of apparent liability, giving the regulated party an opportunity to respond in writing, and then issuing a final decision. If the regulated party declines to pay and the government sues to collect the penalties, the regulated party is entitled to a de novo jury trial in a federal district court. Alternatively, the subject of an FCC forfeiture order may pay the monetary penalty and file a petition for review in a court of appeals, thereby triggering a judicial-review proceeding in which no jury is available. The question presented is as follows: Whether the Communications Act provisions that govern the FCC's assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures are consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-60223
Transcribe →T. M. v. Univ. of MD Medical Sys. Corp.
Apr 20Tap to summarizeT. M. v. Univ. of MD Medical Sys. Corp. | 04/20/26 | Docket #: 25-197 25-197 T.M. V. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION DECISION BELOW: 139 F.4th 344 CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1707
Transcribe →Sripetch v. SEC
Apr 20Tap to summarizeSripetch v. SEC | 04/20/26 | Docket #: 25-466 25-466 SRIPETCH V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION DECISION BELOW: 154 F.4th 980 CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over an exceptionally important question regarding the SEC's civil-enforcement power. In Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020), this Court held the SEC may seek equitable "disgorgement" in civil-enforcement actions if an award "does not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits" and "is awarded for victims ." 591 U.S. at 74- 75 (emphasis added). In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit held that investors can be ''victims" for disgorgement purposes despite not suffering pecuniary harm. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit recognized a direct "split" on this question, "reject[ed] the reasoning of the Second Circuit," and "joined the First Circuit in holding that a finding of pecuniary harm is not required." This statutory holding was the sole basis of the Ninth Circuit's decision, and it leaves the SEC's enforcement power in disarray: disgorgement requests are ubiquitous in SEC actions, and there are now conflicting rules in the two main circuits (the Second and Ninth) where enforcement actions are most prominent. There are millions (if not billions) of dollars at stake. The question presented is: Whether the SEC may seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm . LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3830
Transcribe →Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara
Apr 2Tap to summarizeTrump, President of U.S. v. Barbara | 04/01/26 | Docket #: 25-365 25-365 TRUMP V. BARBARA DECISION BELOW: CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that those "born * * * in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," are U.S. citizens. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause was adopted to confer citizenship on the newly freed slaves and their children, not on the children of aliens temporarily visiting the United States or of illegal aliens. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship , which restores the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause and provides, on a prospective basis only, that children of temporary visitors and illegal aliens are not U.S. citizens by birth. The Citizenship Order directs federal agencies not to issue or accept citizenship documents for such children born more than 30 days after the Order's effective date. The question presented is whether the Executive Order complies on its face with the Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. 1401(a), which codifies that Clause. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-1861
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