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- [00:00]
A
Hi, this is Joe from Vanta. In today's digital world, compliance regulations are changing constantly and earning customer trust has never mattered more. Vanta helps companies get compliant fast and stay secure with the most advanced AI automation and continuous monitoring out there. So whether you're a startup going for your first SoC2 or ISO 27001, or a growing enterprise managing vendor risk, Vanta makes it quick, easy and scalable. And I'm not just saying that because I work here. Get started@vanta.com.
- [00:29]
B
John, thanks so much for joining the show. I have been texting you so much, asking you for background information on what it's like to be a spook. Sorry if that's a offensive term, but you really captured me with that podcast, the Winds of Change, which is excellent. I know you have your own, but I have to ask you first, is your last name really Cypher? Did you make that up?
- [00:50]
C
Yeah, because it's a crappy last name. Like, I wouldn't. I would make up a better one if it was fake, I think.
- [00:55]
B
But it's perfect for what you do.
- [00:57]
C
I suppose that's. That's true, but Cypher suggests, like, I'm more like, I have more knowledge of sort of math and technology, and I don't actually have any skill in that regard.
- [01:06]
B
I think it's like someone that is hard to read.
- [01:08]
C
Oh, okay. All right.
- [01:09]
B
That would make a great spy.
- [01:11]
C
Right now, I'm more supportive of my name. That's good. Thank you for that.
- [01:16]
B
What was your. Tell me about your time working for the CIA. What exactly did you do?
- [01:19]
C
Sure. I worked for 28 years in the CIA in the clandestine service. So as you know, the CIA has a variety of different group tribes, if you will. There's a big analytic cadre that stays in Washington that writes up reports, you know, experts on everything under the sun for various administrations. And they, they get the information from human spies overseas and satellites and diplomats, and they put it all together. That's the analytic cadre. Then there's a collection cadre, which is what we did. We a pretty small group of people who mostly live overseas. And our job is to meet and recruit potential spies sources for us overseas. So the idea is if the US Government can't get information from satellites and from diplomats and from traveling business people and from all these other things, then. And the government believes it needs it, our job is to try to steal it. And the way we generally steal that information, first of all, we're looking for information we can't get any other way. That we have to contact people, and our job is to meet people who have access to those secrets we need, whether it be an Iranian nuclear scientist or a Russian person in the Kremlin or someone in Beijing. And our job is to meet, befriend, assess, decide if that person has access to information. Are they the kind of person who might have a motivation for their. Angry at their boss or anger at their country? They like the United States, they need money, whatever it is, and recruit that person as a spy and then meet them clandestinely and secretly to keep them safe. So there's the. And that. So I worked in the clandestine service overseas, usually undercover in embassies around the world two, three, four years, you know, running sort of spy networks and stuff. So there's the analytic, then there's a whole group of people who do science and technology and those type of things. Inside CIA. So I was in the spy thing for 20 years. I worked in places like Moscow and Pakistan and.
- [03:14]
B
Wow.
- [03:14]
C
And in the Balkans and a variety of other places.
- [03:17]
B
Really dangerous places to be working.
- [03:19]
C
It's mostly fun and mostly nice. And you have to be someone who likes living overseas, who likes foreigners, who likes talking to people and, and learning from them and that type of thing. So it's a really. It was a. It was an enjoyable career, but I retired almost more than 10 years ago now.
- [03:35]
B
But it's a little bit like being a journalist, except I can't offer them safety. Like, I can't say, I'll make you an American and then ship you off and take care of your family as well. You know, I do try to figure. Figure out the motivation of people that could give me information that would be valuable for the public.
- [03:50]
C
No, that's exactly. In fact, when I was inside, obviously we couldn't and didn't talk to journalists, you know, because we're doing secret work and we're undercover. But. But now, like, I find journalists are the most interesting sort of, you know, friends and people to talk to because you're doing very similar work. You're interested in the issues of the day. You know, you're developing relationships with people of trust. And so, yeah, very similar type of professions.
- [04:13]
B
We're cultivating sources too, which is a big part of it. And that's sort of where I wanted to go with you in terms of the idea of the CIA and who they talk to. Everyone, you know, I'm obviously a Neptune expert, so the word CIA comes up a lot. Mossad, etc, and you know, people say, was he a CIA agent? And I. And I've always sort of dismissed this idea that he was an actual agent, but I don't dismiss the idea that he may have moved in intelligence circles and perhaps not even one intelligence circle like that. He could have been an American businessman abroad like you mentioned earlier. And that because he was with dignitaries, he had pictures with Mohammed bin Salman, Prince Andrew he met with, you know, Prince Michelle of Yugoslavia. He had these high level networks across the globe that it might be valuable for him too, knowing that he's a con man and playing both sides of the law to perhaps even tip off, you know, intelligence agencies to speak with people. And I was wondering if you ever, if that, if that sounds like something that might be plausible or if you're aware of anything like that.
- [05:23]
C
All right, so we have to unpack that. It might take a little time. So I have some definitions for us. So.
- [05:27]
B
Okay, for sure, let's do it.
- [05:29]
C
One of the words that ends up messing people up is the whole agent word. And so.
- [05:33]
B
Exactly.
- [05:35]
C
FBI employees are called FBI agents.
- [05:39]
B
Right.
- [05:40]
C
And they are a law enforcement organization and they often have sources, you know, snitches, people who provide information for them, but in the law enforcement sense.
- [05:48]
B
And they can do it sometimes for non prosecution deals.
- [05:51]
C
Yes, that's right. You know, for.
- [05:53]
B
Yeah, like the, like the mob boss, the don or whatever.
- [05:56]
C
And it's law enforcement in, in pursuit of their, their objectives. CIA were called CIA officers. We use the term though agents for our sources. And so if I recruit, let's make this up. An Iranian nuclear official who's providing us information on secret information on their Iranian, Iranian nuclear program. That is my agent. That's a controlled source or asset is another word that I meet secretly that provides us that information, that intelligence. We need to understand Iranian nuclear program. So we call ourselves officers. Our agents are our sources. The, or spies, it might be a better word. You know, they're spying against their country, they're spying against their regime to provide the United States something.
- [06:39]
B
Do you pay them these, these spies?
- [06:42]
C
Well, every single source, spy agent, if you will, has a different motivation. Some of them refuse to be paid. They're doing it for patriotic reasons or they think their government needs to go a different way. There's many we do pay others that, you know, they want to eventually work for a number of years like an Iranian nuclear scientist. We might make a deal with them is he wants his children to leave Iran and be educated in the West. And we'll say, well, okay, you're in a dangerous business if you work for us for Name your time, 5 years, 10 years, we will resettle you in the United States and bring your family with you and give them new lives and new jobs. And so every human has different motivation.
- [07:23]
B
Different ways, an exchange, something.
- [07:26]
C
Yeah, yeah. And so that's part of our job, is to figure out what it is that makes this person tick, what motivates them, what. What is their access to information, you know, because we don't want to meet with someone who might, you know, get into trouble or, you know, be talking to somebody else. And so when you say Epstein was a con man, that immediately goes against the kind of person we would want as a source. Right? You don't want someone who is playing games or is involved talking to other people. We want someone who is working for the United States government in secret, and we understand what they're doing, understand their motivation, and that person is, you know, we're helping to keep them secure and safe. And so that's. That's one thing.
- [08:03]
B
What if you just have a hunch that he's a con man because. But, you know, that he's around really wealthy people who are giving him their money? All right, so that arms dealer, you.
- [08:14]
C
Know, that goes to another thing here then. Okay. The CIA is a foreign intelligence service. Our job is to collect foreign intelligence on foreign countries.
- [08:23]
B
Right.
- [08:24]
C
You know, and in fact, we're very careful to stay away from American things, American politics. You see President Trump trying to talk now about, oh, the CIA, you know, was. Was engaged in trying to, you know, make my election illegitimate in 2016 and stuff. I mean, the CIA is only reporting on what they're learning from foreign sources. Now, that doesn't mean that we don't talk to Americans sometimes, but we do not recruit Americans in the way that I told you before. So we're not like meeting an American, pretending I'm a State Department person, assessing them, defilling if they have spice, and then recruiting them as a secret source to work. We have, you know, Americans we have to be upfront with. We have to explain to who they. Who we are, what is the situation, what is the danger they're in, you know, why they might be willing to talk to us. So there are some Americans who, for a variety of reasons in certain positions, will talk to American intelligence and tell us things, but we don't run them, you know, as controlled sources in the way I was talking to before. And then there's a separate category which might fit, and we can talk about it with the Epstein stuff is there are some Americans who volunteer to tell American intelligence. And they might even be doing the same thing for, you know, the State Department. Diplomats explain when, you know, they're traveling overseas, like you said, they're meeting important people. They're in circles that American diplomats are not in, or we CIA officers are not in. And when they come back to the United States, they might say, hey, listen, I just want to tell you, I did this trip. I met this person. Here's what I know about them. They're voluntarily doing that in an open way. The CIA is not saying, we want you to go over there. We're going to pay you to do this. You need to go ask this question. That's a different thing altogether. This is voluntary reporting. So there are Americans who do that who might. Back in the old days when there was no Americans going to China, for example, someone who had an academic who might be going to China could come back and volunteer, but we can't make them. If someone goes there and comes back and we say, hey, you know, are you willing to talk about this? And they say, no, you can't. They're American citizens. We can't make them do that.
- [10:21]
B
Yeah, it's interesting because I was, I, I mentioned this, but my, my ex boyfriend, he was a war correspondent. War correspondent. He's a war photographer. And he was captured in Syria by isis for over 30 days, and he had to live with them, and it was really intense. And when he returned to the United States, he actually ended up debriefing intelligence when he returned because they wanted to know about him, about what he saw and what he learned at the time. I mean, he's not. He wasn't a source out there. He was just captured because of his work.
- [10:55]
C
In that sense, there's different organizational, bureaucratic things here and laws and regulations around each of them. So the CIA could ask him to speak about. He's doing it. And, you know, a patriotic American would understand ISIS is a danger of the United States and probably be very willing to explain and help them understand. But if he said no, the CIA probably couldn't talk to him. The FBI, on the other hand, has law enforcement capabilities, and they might say, isis, we are aware that that group that had you specifically had targeted or kidnapped other Americans. And they can actually sort of compel or impel someone to speak to them because they're American law enforcement. They have the writ over American citizens.
- [11:34]
B
That might be what happened was that he was actually. It was more FBI than CIA. That was actually.
- [11:39]
C
It could be. But, you know, if he has information that benefits both we could sit together and, and talk these things, talk those things through.
- [11:47]
B
So, yeah. Is there a lot of interaction between the two agencies?
- [11:50]
C
Yes, quite a bit. I worked a lot with the FBI. For example, one of the, you know, responsibilities of the CIA is to stop foreign intelligence in the United States, which means. So one of the things we work on is trying to catch American spies. So there's been spies in the FBI, Robert Hansen, Alder James and the CIA, number of people in Defense Department and other places. And their job is counterintelligence, counter espionage officials. And the FBI is to, you know, try to stop this, find it and then investigate and then eventually try to arrest and put in jail these people. But oftentimes it's CIA information that, that leads them to that. So we have a term sort of in intelligence calls, it takes a mole to catch a mole. So it's often our source, say in Moscow that gives us a piece of information that says, hey, you know, we think, you know, there's an American is giving us this piece of information in this situation and we have an obligation, not an obligation, it's actually legal thing to go to this FBI and say we've received information that might lead to American citizen who's committing espionage. And then the FBI takes that over. But we often work together closely on that. So I worked very closely with them on the, the Robert Hansen investigation and eventually arrest because it involved us collecting information in Moscow and sharing it with the FBI, which then investigated him and made a case to the court.
- [13:07]
B
What about the friendlies? Like the Five Eyes and Mossad? Like, do you often see there's sharing of intelligence between FBI, CIA, the friendlies? And then do you ever notice that these American volunteers will sometimes volunteer that information to other countries as well?
- [13:23]
C
So there's, there's, there's sort of rules around sharing of intelligence. And so, okay, if we get information from the Brits, for example, and we do share a lot, like, you know, a lot of our source, we may not tell them who our sources is, but we'll try to put together the information because they think it's important to the British or the Germans or Japanese or whatever, we will share that intelligence with them. That's very normal. And they do often do the same type of thing with us. Go back to your question again. I sort of lost my place there.
- [13:54]
B
I was wondering, we were talking about the ones that you're hostile to, like the kgb, but I said, what about the friendlies? How often do you see these sort of American volunteers who come in with Information also sharing to friendly counterparts like Mossad or, you know, MI6, the Five Eyes group.
- [14:13]
C
Right. So to go where I was going in terms of, like, if American volunteer, like we talked about, say your boyfriend shares information with us, we cannot just share that with foreign. We have to ask the permission of the person who gave us information. So if I.
- [14:28]
B
But what if he went to them too?
- [14:30]
C
Well, I'm gonna, I'm gonna get to that. So if they, if, if the Brits come to us with information and we want to share it with the French, we have to ask British permission. We can't, we can't share someone else's information. So an American citizen, we wouldn't be able to share that. Now, yes, an American or other people can peddle information. They can go to other places and share information. So in American, your, your boyfriend, for example, could then go off to Britain and anywhere else and explain and talk that through. Like, we can't stop him. We can't. Unless he's committing espionage against the United States. Right now what do you do is, though, oftentimes in the intelligence world, there are people who are out there who are, you know, realize that giving information is, is power. And giving information might get them money or something. So they might come to the American embassy with a piece of information, hoping to get some money, and then go over to the Brits and try to do the same somewhere else. And so oftentimes we do discuss with foreign intelligence services, you know, if we have a piece of information, it looks like the Brits have very similar piece of information we might discuss, like, hey, you know, is there a chance that this might be the same source? Because we don't want to play that game where people are peddling information around. Because one of the things is that person may get themselves caught, may be peddling information to our enemies too. And so, yeah, there, there's constant coordination about those things. Now, can an American do that? Yes, but we would. Yeah, we would not. If we thought, let's say Epstein. If we thought that Epstein was running around telling foreign services stuff, but he had come to us and told us interesting stuff, but we saw that he was playing this game with everybody, we would probably determined that he was a con man and stay away from him.
- [16:11]
B
What if his information was too good to say no to?
- [16:15]
C
Well, if the Brits are getting it too, they'll share it with us, you know, or we might go to the Brits and say, listen, this guy is clearly running around, you know, we might go to the Israelis of Brits and say, hey, this guy's clearly running around telling all of us this, let's make an arrangement here.
- [16:28]
B
Or he's telling the Brits one thing, the Mossad one thing, the Americans another thing. And everybody feels like they're getting new info, but he's, but he's getting money from everyone or he's getting some sort of deal, essentially.
- [16:42]
C
That's right. And that's, that's possible and harder to decipher. Right. If we figure out that he's selling the same thing to everybody, we can make a deal and say, listen, from now on, we'll talk to him and you got, and we'll share the information. You guys stop talking to him because it's, it's dangerous for him. But yeah, if he's sharing pieces of it around, yeah, it may take longer to pull that apart and realize that he's up to, he's up to that. But obviously an intelligence service would be really wary of someone who's plays games like that.
- [17:09]
B
But it would be. I mean, what if he actually was a Mossad agent? Like, would he, he, would he be someone that could live freely in the US like that? And, and because he's a part of the five eyes, it's fine.
- [17:20]
C
Well, no, well, Israel's not part of the five Eyes. And, and Israel is not supposed to recruit and run American sources. That would be considered, you know, there's. What's his name is in prison. Was in prison for.
- [17:32]
B
But aren't. Aren't all American Jews considered Israelis as well?
- [17:37]
C
No, they're not considered Israelis. The Israelis might consider them because they're Jewish. You know, they, they've benefited by the diaspora of Jews around the world. Sometimes, you know, there's an affinity there and they might go to them. And you know, the Chinese do that with ethnic Chinese. Other countries do that.
- [17:52]
B
You know, like they say, you can always get our citizenship. You can come back and claim your citizenship.
- [17:56]
C
I think so. You would probably know because he considered.
- [17:58]
B
Living there after he was arrested instead of serving time.
- [18:01]
C
And there are American citizens who do work for Mossad in those times. They're Israelis and American citizens.
- [18:06]
B
I can remember having a meeting and they fought idf. A lot of Americans. I know, right? Yeah, right.
- [18:12]
C
But if, if, if the, if the Mossad is running an American citizen as a spy, as a source, that's against the law. Like, you can't. We would not support that. Now if he was volunteering to them and, and they have told us about this, that maybe that's. But yeah, I mean, he's, he's showing, in that case, he's showing that he's a bit of a scumbag and we would try to stay away from.
- [18:36]
B
It's almost like he didn't even need to go to the intelligence agencies. He had a Ehud Barack staying in his home.
- [18:43]
C
That's right. And that's another, that's another piece of this is there's lots of people who are interested in information, you know, Israel, by the way. And so if Ehud Barak is getting this information and then he's telling, you know, people, Mossad and people around him what he's, they're learning that's getting into the system and benefiting Israelis and potentially us any anyway, so it doesn't have to be the intelligence service who's collecting this. I mean, our State Department, their job is to go out and meet people and get information as well. It's just that our job is to try to get the secrets that the diplomats can't get.
- [19:16]
B
Right. And I just want to clarify because I made a mistake by saying Mossad was a part of the five eyes. The five eyes are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the U.S. yes, and you can confirm that obviously. But Mossad is considered an ally, right?
- [19:32]
C
Yes, but there are, what are these allies that, you know, they have their own interests, they have a lot of, you know, because of the nature of where they are, they play a sort of a, more of a hardball game of intelligence. So the, the level of trust. We do incredible things together, but there's also a little bit of concern that, you know, they are interested in getting into our, the backbone of our telecommunication system or they might be interested in, in running Spice. So there's not a hundred percent like friendly trust. Like we're all, like, we're all one brotherhood. Yeah, it's very, we work very closely together and do some pretty dicey stuff together, but there's still some areas where, you know, they're off, you know, assassinating people and things like that, and we can't get into that game.
- [20:14]
B
To me, when I think about Epstein knowing what I know, I feel like he just ran a pretty sophisticated, well, actually pretty basic honeypot scheme, like a very old school KGB scheme where he had these young girls and he was around really high net worth people and he kept their secrets. And he said, okay, I brought you to this island. You had this bacchanal type experience. You see even text messages from the head of Barclays, Jess Stanley, asking for Beauty and the Beast or Snow White. And Asking for girls explicitly. And Epstein is the one who's running it and just is giving money to Epstein at the end of the day and all these other really wealthy men. And he's obviously creating experiences that would be socially embarrassing for these very high net worth men. And he's a financier and he's also creating experiences for them that would not be socially acceptable or appropriate outside of his, the world that he's created. And you know, perhaps he has video footage or he has, you know, pictures, which is surveillance, which is what the girls told me. But he had been, you know, keeping track of all of this. And it seems pretty basic to me. And maybe the money is offshore, it's hard to reach, it's a difficult. It's. Even the people who have been who he's given money to can't find it themselves. And so I don't, I don't think his operation was as sophisticated, as high flying as people think. I do have another theory, and you can correct me if you're wrong, if I'm wrong, as someone who's worked in law enforcement, that he may have been playing both sides of the law, knowing he was up to no good, also offering intelligence services, maybe CIA, maybe FBI, information on the cases that they work on. Because he, he did help the prosecutors in the case of Stephen Hoffenberg, one of the biggest Ponzi schemes in the world. That was one of the first cases. It was a 450 million dollar scheme that was his partner. So he, he had already had experience working with federal prosecutors very early on in his career. So he would know how to play both sides of the law certainly.
- [22:22]
C
I mean, look at Whitey Bulger and the great sort of mafia criminals or whatever or Irish Mafia up in Boston was, was, you know, murdering people and, you know, stealing and stuff, but at the same time was sharing information with the FBI about the Italian Mafia, because he had information about those and they was in, in a certain sense was being protected by pieces of the FBI. It turns out an FBI agent who was running him eventually got arrested and thrown in prison and stuff. But. Right, yeah, so, I mean, a criminal, criminals are, you know, they're savvy people and so helping law enforcement thinking that, that maybe protects you is certain something that might come to come to someone natural, naturally like that. Now, in terms of high net worth people, in some ways this may be above the intelligence agencies. Right. So those people who are coming and that he was working on, they could be involved in this corruption, this criminality. What have you now until like us as an intelligence service and CIA, like we're not interested in reporting on, you know, rich people and finance. It's national security. Right. So I'm more interested in what North Korea is doing and what Iranian nuclear what?
- [23:27]
B
Yeah, but he was hanging out with Mohammed bin Salman.
- [23:31]
C
True.
- [23:31]
B
I mean, we're little Khashoggi Douglas, an arms dealer. He knew Robert, you know, he knew Robert Maxwell. Who, I mean, did you, did you, did you know that Marburg Maxwell was Mossad? I mean, was that your understanding?
- [23:44]
C
Well, I mean, I don't follow it closely, but yes. My understanding is, you know, he's one of those. Now like again, the Israelis might know, use big time powerful Jewish people in other places that can help them do things to become more and more, you know, enmeshed with Israeli intelligence. We're less likely to use rich people overseas, rich Americans to do things like that for us because, you know, it's against the law. You don't want to put Americans at risk overseas. The Israelis are much more concerned about their, their security in the part of the world they're living in. They're willing to take those. So they have a different set of laws in that sense.
- [24:23]
B
But from your time in the CIA, because you were dealing with Russia, which was part of his zone and Israel. Do you remember Robert Maxwell?
- [24:30]
C
Hey, it's Ryan Reynolds here for Mint Mobile. Now I was looking for fun ways to tell you that Mint's offer of unlimited Premium Wireless for $15 a month is back. So I thought it would be fun if we made $15 bills, but it turns out that's very illegal. So there goes my big idea for the commercial. Give it a try. Try@mintmobile.com Switch upfront payment of $45 for.
- [24:53]
B
3 month plan equivalent to 15 per month required. New customer offer for first 3 months only. Speed slow after 35 gigabytes of networks busy. Taxes and fees extra. See mint mobile.com I was being a Mossad agent.
- [25:02]
C
I mean, you don't, I mean, but.
- [25:04]
B
The CIA, is that just something you can't reveal?
- [25:06]
C
Because it's, I, I don't know. I mean the CIA is big and, and we compartment information. So if I'm working in Russia, the Chinese people, people working in China don't share their information. Like, you know, it's need to know. So if I'm working on Russian things, sensitive things, I'm not telling my buddies back home about, oh, I'm running this source or that source. And so it's possible that another part of the Agency is. I don't. Yeah. I don't know, engage with Mex or at least knows what's going on there with, With Israelis and Maxwell. But I didn't.
- [25:35]
B
He. He had a connection with Russia. That's why I asked. Well, if there was, you know, when.
- [25:40]
C
I was working on Russia, we, again, we were trying to recruit people in the KGB and in the. The Kremlin and this and that. I mean, people, even if it's important around the fringe, like a lot of people, like, oh, you guys must have been knowing what Donald Trump was doing in Russia back in the 70s. I'm like, no, we don't really care about what Americans are doing there. Even though, you know, in retrospect. Yeah. I mean, if he was involved in something dirty, the FBI, I mean, the.
- [26:05]
B
CIA has a little bit of a history of spying on Americans. Operation Chaos, 1960s when where Nixon LBJ demanded the CIA surveil American citizens. Do you remember that?
- [26:17]
C
There's a big difference. Yeah. The CIA in the early years after World War II was put together almost like the British and the notion. And there was a concern because we had no sources in Russia that Stalin and the bomb and we had to, you know, we had to act like they did. And so those years of overthrowing countries and getting involved in stuff, there's a big change in the 1970s. So there was a Church and pike commissions on the Hill and, and used to be the CIA just reported to the president and maybe a couple senior senators. 1970s, they changed it. So it's, there's very official, like if the, if the White House wants to ask the CIA to do something, there's a written process which was shared with the oversight. They created the oversight committees in the 70s. They created a process by which presidents have to ask and go through the oversight committees or a whole series of reforms. So, so post 19, mid-70s reforms after Nixon and stuff, the completely different world in. In that sense. And you know, because back before, yeah, there was a whole process by which our counterintelligence was, you know, opening Americans mail to. To check out, you know, connections overseas and these kind of things. But those things are now specifically written into law as against the law.
- [27:29]
B
Who does the CIA report to now?
- [27:31]
C
Still to the President and to the, you know, but we have, but we also have to inform fully our oversight committees in both the Senate and House as well, and Justice Department and those places.
- [27:41]
B
What does the word hyper fixer mean in intelligence circles?
- [27:46]
C
It means the same thing to you as it would mean to me. I Mean, I guess someone who's useful and helpful. I mean, you know, one of the things, you know, that if you're in an American city and you're looking for someone who can help you collect information on what's going on overseas, there's. There's those kind of people who know everybody. And so if you can go to someone who knows everybody and say, hey, listen, I'm looking to get information on, you know, what companies might be doing work in on this area and this place. You know, I mean, so someone who can be of assistance that can help make those connections. Because that, I mean, intelligence, like most anything else, is networking, Right. And so it's personal relationships. It's relationships, it's networking. So hyper fixture is someone who can find ways to connect you with who you need to be connected with.
- [28:34]
B
Sounds like something that Epstein could do.
- [28:36]
C
Yeah, possible.
- [28:39]
B
Had you ever heard that he was a hyper fixer type during your time?
- [28:42]
C
Just, you know, I'm just reading and learning about him from people like you and others. So I.
- [28:46]
B
Okay, okay. So you and I first connected again after many years because I wanted to ask you about a. About something that his bodyguard, Igor Zinoviev, said he's a Russian UFC fighting bodyguard who was there to protect him in case one of the fathers tried to kill Epstein. Which is not surprising that that might happen after the activity. So I've been in back and forth communication with the CIA for over a week right now, trying to get a clear answer on the record whether Igor Zenobiev has ever stepped foot on grounds at the CIA to get a note for Jeffrey Epstein while he was in jail in a county jail, by the way, for state crime for being a sex offender, would the CIA have it documented whether Igor was on the property?
- [29:36]
C
Yeah, of course. And first of all, I mean, allowing a. A Russian onto c. I almost. They would say no. And then what is the reason? By himself, without Epstein, Epstein's in prison. I mean, it's not dumb. I mean, why would they possibly allow someone to. To visit?
- [29:54]
B
But you're also saying, though, that you were trying to get Russians on the property. Like you were trying to recruit Russians on the property.
- [29:59]
C
No, not on property of CIA headquarters. At. In. No, no. We're trying. Trying to recruit Russians in Egypt and in Mexico and in Moscow to work for us. We're not bringing them to CIA headquarters.
- [30:12]
B
Oh. Like, even if there was a family that had just left Russia. Okay. And they immigrated to the United States and they were, like you said, nuclear physicists or doctors or they were working on some sort of super bug.
- [30:25]
C
Right.
- [30:25]
B
And then you said, now you're in the United States, would you please come to Langley? We'd love to debrief with you.
- [30:31]
C
The debriefings are usually away from Langley. We could. If someone had been, like, this incredible source for the United States, they had provided. Saved American lives, we could bring them to CIA headquarters to give them. To have the director shake hands with them or give them some kind of little award or something like that to thank them for their service. But they. That's very held together. I mean, there's. You know, it's very official. The. The people at the gate and the security officers are given. You know, when they come in, there's people who have to escort them. They have special badges, and they're kept in certain places to. Kept away from the general, people who work for. So. So it's. Yeah. I mean, an ethnic Russian could be brought onto the thing, but a Russian bodyguard without the person he's supposed to.
- [31:12]
B
Be like, well, he was in prison, so. Or jail.
- [31:15]
C
But then why would anybody. I mean, if he's the person we want to talk to, why would his body go like. I don't see it. I don't.
- [31:22]
B
What do you mean? You think that the. You think CIA would have sent the. Would have sent them to the prison or the jail to talk to Epstein?
- [31:28]
C
Why do they want to talk to Epstein? Like, I don't get the Epstein.
- [31:31]
B
Maybe Epstein could be that hyper fixer even while he's in jail.
- [31:35]
C
I mean, the CIA, it's a big place with lots of people all around the world. We have direct connection with, you know, intellect, all friendly intelligence services, other intelligence.
- [31:46]
B
Service presidents hanging out with, like, kings and princes.
- [31:49]
C
I can get the kings and princes for the most part. I don't need Jeffrey Epstein.
- [31:55]
B
Were you hanging out with them for hours on an island? You know what I mean? There's.
- [32:00]
C
Yeah, but that. Why do. But Epstein's a criminal. Like, I don't understand why the CIA would not be interested in the crap he's doing on that island. You know, the FBI might be interested in who's visiting the island and what Americans and that type of stuff for law enforcement reasons. But. Okay, I mean, yes, there are people who have connections that might be interested. Of interest to the CIA, but there's only a limit to that. If it gets to a point where this person is a potential embarrassment, someone who's involved in criminality, who's. Who's slippery and slimy, and it depends on what things he has connection to. If he's just meeting lots of important, interesting people. I mean, we can get to important, interesting people ourselves for the most part.
- [32:43]
B
There are many meetings between Bill Burns, who was the CIA director under Biden after Jeffrey Epstein, served time in prison, and that was when he was the Deputy Secretary of State, and even afterwards in his career. Why would he have.
- [32:59]
C
Before the Biden administration then?
- [33:01]
B
Yeah, it was before the Biden administration.
- [33:02]
C
Right. So he was working in State Department. I, I don't have any idea why he would. Yeah, the State Department would meet with Epstein.
- [33:10]
B
Okay. I mean, but you said that the State Department and CIA sometimes work together, Right? They pass long information.
- [33:15]
C
Well, we work in like for example, when I was CIA overseas, I was undercover as a State Department officer. I worked with Bill Barnes and in Russia, Bill Burns was the ambassador in Jordan and Moscow and a number of other places. Very senior State Department officer. So. So they're in sort of the same milieu. They're living overseas, working out of US Embassies, making connections. They have obviously different in reason. Like my job is just to recruit secret sources. Their job is to, you know, represent the United States, represent the President's interest to make connections with the government to a. The official business between the United States and whatever country they have.
- [33:46]
B
But they also offer you a house to have these meetings and a place to have these, these top secret meetings and to send.
- [33:53]
C
We don't. Well, we don't usually have the meetings in our houses, but.
- [33:55]
B
Yeah, no, no, no. I mean, they like a property, the embassy, the official building, you know.
- [34:01]
C
Yeah, but we don't, we don't need our sources in the embassy either. But.
- [34:04]
B
Yeah, you don't, you don't normally bring them into the embassy. Oh, I thought you just said that, that you would bring them into the embassy. Real. Okay. I mean, not even from protection from their governments if they.
- [34:17]
C
Well, I mean, I suppose if someone was, you know, was, was going to be caught and whatever. Like there's, there's, you can look at, there's people like in China who, you know, came to the embassy to get protection and that type of thing. But, but essentially I'm meeting someone in public. I'm meeting them out at other places developing a relationship, and then we're finding a ways to meet clandestinely, whether it's in an alley somewhere or a hotel room under alias or whatever. We don't, we don't bring them into the embassy. But a lot of people who end up spying for us start as volunteers, and so sometimes that happens. Is they come to the embassy first, claim to get a visa, claiming to talk to someone and, and volunteer their services, and then our job is to get them away from the embassy and meet them.
- [34:57]
B
Well, yeah, then you need it. Then you, like you ultimately need the.
- [35:00]
C
Embassy provides my office our jobs or.
- [35:04]
B
Yeah, you're not going to have a CIA office abroad, essentially is the point.
- [35:09]
C
Say it again.
- [35:10]
B
Like, the CIA is not going to have an office in every country that says CIA on it.
- [35:16]
C
No, no, no. You're undercover usually.
- [35:18]
B
Yeah. You're State Department official. Yeah, exactly. So which is why I was wondering if that would be interesting. And also in Epstein's schedule that was confiscated, it said that he had multiple appointments with the CIA.
- [35:36]
C
I don't know. I mean, more information on that. Like I didn't need to know about what or with who, what. Because there's different parts. I mean, it's like, for example, like I'm trying to think of something if, if he was working, like you said, on arms deals, things, we might be trying to come up with an operation to figure out where the, I don't know, the North Koreans are sending a ship under cover to Africa. And we want. And we might think that, you know, the Libyans are going to put nuclear stuff on that we might need to figure out where that is so that we can board it or get the military to get it or whatever. And so, you know, he may have a piece of that or something that he's sharing with some part of the US Government, whether it's the State Department or with us or what have you. So I'd need to know a little bit more about, you know, just to say he talked to the CIA. Could mean a variety of things. It could mean.
- [36:26]
B
Right.
- [36:26]
C
Almost nothing, or it could mean something really sexy and interesting. I just don't know.
- [36:32]
B
I guess we'll never know. One last question.
- [36:36]
C
Someone knows.
- [36:38]
B
I think we know that. I think more than a few people know. But Glenn Maxwell, suddenly reliable source after the doj, said she was not in her own case and she was not willing to stand, take the stand for cross examination. Do you think the DOJ should be taking her so seriously right now?
- [37:02]
C
Well, I mean like. And he just informed American I, it looks like they're trying to find a way politically to protect the President. And so, And President Trump has put so many non serious people in serious positions that see their job as protecting the president that when you say that, you know, for most of my career, if you said the DOJ is meeting with someone, I would Consider them professionals following the law, trying to do their job. I'm skeptical of that now. I think there could be someone there whose job is to try to find out pieces of what she knows and cover up other pieces of what she knows, or there's some partisan reason why they're talking to him. And I'm very skeptical of that. Just based on Donald Trump's behavior and, and the people he's put in these positions, I just can't take them seriously and I don't trust them. And I think it's very dangerous now that we've created intelligence services, Department of Justice and these other places that are so hyper partisan, you can't, you've. We've lost faith in their ability to do their jobs professionally.
- [38:06]
B
I do want to ask you about another CIA connection that Jeffrey Epstein had. Adnan Khashoggi is a famous Saudi arms dealer. He was a key figure in the CIA's Iran Contra operation during the 1980s. Epstein is reported to have worked with him as a financial fixer for Khashoggi. And these arms deals were obviously a part of the CIA and that's why people believe that Epstein was an arms dealer himself and why he would be useful to, you know, foreign intelligence agencies. What do you think about that? I mean, the fact that that's so publicly known.
- [38:40]
C
Yeah, it's interesting and I haven't dug into that in a while is before my time, obviously. And if I recall, I mean, a lot of the Iran contour is being run out of the NSC in the White House. Oliver north and they were using pieces of the CIA, the relationships in Iran and other. Other things. And so I mean, I think there's law enforcement and Justice Department have been over that. So I think it's, it's obviously an area that's of great interest and that's the kind of thing we're talking about. If there's a, if the White House has said that we want, you know, you know, different parts of the U. S. Government to play different parts here and we want CIA to, to get involved in a piece of this arms deal, then maybe someone like Epstein could, could play a small role there. So that's certainly worth investigating and I wouldn't be surprised if there's a connection.
- [39:26]
B
Yeah. And I mean, this might seem very far afield, but President Trump bought his yacht, the Princess Trump, from none other than Adnan Khashoggi.
- [39:39]
C
Yeah, I recall part from the, from the whole Iran Contra thing is part of the problem was that the NSC was contacting people like Khashoggi and others who have actually been put on a blacklist by the CIA. So the CIA had dealt with Khashoggi and said, this guy, this guy's definitely a criminal. And we had talked to him, but over time we realized that he's non trustworthy and we shouldn't talk to him. But then Oliver north and others wanted to use him to get things done. And so it becomes a, becomes a difficult issue. Yeah.
- [40:12]
B
So there is sort of a history of this happening, like, oh, this guy's a criminal, he's a scumbag, but he can get things done.
- [40:20]
C
Right. We, but you know, for the most part we stay away from those kind of people because essentially nothing good comes out at the end.
- [40:25]
B
Well, nobody wants, like they didn't want to work with Whitey Bulger. Like that was an ideal situation.
- [40:31]
C
It was a criminal situation. An FBI guy was still in prison for it, so. Yeah, exactly.
- [40:36]
B
But sometimes the criminals know the other criminals.
- [40:39]
C
Yeah.
- [40:40]
B
If you came to me and were like, tara, tell me all the criminals. You know, I'm not hanging around with gang members. You know what I mean? I'm hanging out with my cute little dog Pancetta.
- [40:47]
C
You want to get in there in this sense, like, I mean, just because there's a. Yeah. He's obviously trying to play the different systems off against each other.
- [40:54]
B
Right.
- [40:54]
C
It's like. But so you always need to talk the FBI people too, because they're the ones that, you know, they're the ones that are in charge of Americans. Right. We're not in general, we're not interested in Americans. Right. So there must be a connection in terms of the.
- [41:08]
B
Well, there is a document in, in the files which I pull up for this episode where I show that he had to speak to the FBI for his non prosecution agreement in Florida for the federal case so that they would close the seizure port, a forfeiture part of his case. And so I'm sure in that dialogue he helped them out in some way. You don't just like close pieces of the case without getting information from this guy.
- [41:35]
C
But the FBI can, can force Americans to do things the CIA can't. You know, we can ask an American to voluntarily help us with something, but we can't. Where the FBI can say, you know, you help us with this or you're going to be arrested or whatever.
- [41:49]
B
But it can certainly put in some goodwill if you're offering information with the government. Right?
- [41:53]
C
Yeah, yeah.
- [41:55]
B
I mean, I even think about it as a journalist when we have sources and powerful sources in particular that give us a lot of information. And I see them sometimes, and I'm like, I don't think they're getting a lot of scrutiny publicly from journalists. And it's most likely because they're the source.
- [42:10]
C
Right, that's good. That's a good point. The only difference with the FBI is, is. Is, you know, they can make that person talk, which means.
- [42:19]
B
Well, they have to be compelled.
- [42:20]
C
Yeah.
- [42:21]
B
Right.
- [42:21]
C
Yeah.
- [42:22]
B
Yeah.
- [42:23]
C
Oh, well, unfortunately, you and I can't do that in our professions, but.
- [42:27]
B
Well, we could spend hours talking about this. Maybe I'll come back to you with another one next time I do your show. What's the name of your show again?
- [42:32]
C
Called Mission Implausible. It's. It's about conspiracy theories and trying to look at conspiracy.
- [42:37]
B
Oh, I'm trying to stay away from those. I was hoping you could cut down. I was hoping you can cut through that.
- [42:41]
C
You got to help us. Like, for example, wasn't it that guy Acosta who was in Trump's thing? Was.
- [42:45]
B
Yeah. It was the Labor Secretary who had to step down because.
- [42:49]
C
Yeah.
- [42:50]
B
Oh, I'll tell you all about it. I know every detail.
- [42:52]
C
Nice. Okay.
- [42:54]
B
Yeah. Clandestine meetings at bad hotels. I can tell you about that. Bad airport hotels that I've unfortunately had to stay at.
- [43:02]
C
Yeah, well, yeah, we'll keep digging. It's interesting stuff.
- [43:07]
B
Okay, thank you.
- [43:08]
C
Yeah. If you find out why that supposed Russian was at the CIA, I'd be fascinated to learn that.
- [43:15]
B
Oh, yeah. I'll see if we ever get an answer from the FBI.
- [43:17]
C
Yeah. All right.
- [43:18]
B
I mean, the CIA. Excuse me. We'll see if I ever get an answer from the CIA.
- [43:22]
C
Well, they. There's a record of everybody who comes on that compound, so don't. Don't believe them if they say there isn't.
- [43:28]
B
That was another episode of the Tara Palm Mary Show. Thanks to all of you. If you want more of my reporting, you can go to Tara Palmeri.com and sign up for my newsletter, the Red letter. That's T A R A P A L M E R I dot com. And you can get my exclusive reporting straight to your inbox. And you can watch these lives in real time as I try to talk to sources and try to get down to the bottom of things. You can also support this show by liking, subscribing, sharing it with your friends, leaving a review, rating it. You can, you know, you can just send me tips, leads, let me know what you know. This is a huge, sprawling case, and it's going to take a lot of time. I want to thank my producer, Eric Abenate. I want to thank my thumbnail artists. Adam Stewart, Sarah Carney and Abby Baker on Socials. And Luke Radel, who has been helping with research. I'll be back again soon.