Dimitri Contakos (3:05)

Hey, what's up, guys? This is D. Do us a favor and check out our patreon page. It's patreon.com the teamhouse. You get both Teamhouse episodes and Eyes on Geopolitics episodes completely ad free. You get them early too. You can ask us questions. You can also watch the team ass episodes live as we shoot them. So. And you help support the show and support what we're doing here. It's patreon.com theteamhouse those links are in the description or if you're listening, it's in the show notes down below. So you can click it real quick and easy and it helps us keep the lights on. So we appreciate it and we appreciate you guys listening. Thanks a bunch of.

Jonathan Hackett (3:47)

All right.

Dimitri Contakos (3:47)

Hey everybody. Welcome to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics. I'm here with Mick Mulroy, Jonathan Hackett, Mark Polymeropoulos, and myself, Dimitri Contakos. We have two Marines versus two Greeks. The KY jelly is about to be.

Mark Polymeropoulos (4:06)

Don't drop the soap. Come on. Of course.

Dimitri Contakos (4:07)

Make that.

Jonathan Hackett (4:08)

What is.

Dimitri Contakos (4:08)

What is KY jelly? Make his puritanical values. All right. Anyway, a lot going on. I know jokes. Hope everyone's having a good day. A lot happening week three of the, you know, the war in Iran. Lots happening. We have a couple of muse heading that way. Marine Expeditionary units. It's about 5,000 ish marines. We also had a lot of. A lot of bombing on Craig island, which is like the. The central hub of Iranian oil. About 90% of it goes through there or stops there before it goes to wherever to the end points. No real end in sight. It seems like these ra. And we also have Israel planning on invading Lebanon. Southern Lebanon. So a lot is happening right now. Guys, where are you at with this? What are you guys tracking exactly?

Mick Mulroy (5:10)

Mickey, greetings from Montana. Where we finally got snow after we got done with all our winter training.

Mark Polymeropoulos (5:16)

Right.

Mick Mulroy (5:17)

Then it snowed. Yeah. So where to start? I would say ultimately, from my perspective, I support the attacks that depreciated the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program, and the Navy. I think that is where the US should have hung its Hat they should have acknowledged it was a war of choice. I think every attempt to try to claim it was an imminent threat has been proven not to be the case by the intelligence community. ICBMs kind of like a decade away. And then of course, the issue of that Secretary Rubio brought up about like, well, Israel's going to attack them, so they were going to attack us, so we had to attack them. I just think that shows a lack of coordination. And I was just reading a Wall Street Journal article this morning that basically said there wasn't an NSC process, not that the NSC got it wrong, that there really simply wasn't. It was just the key principles without any input from anyone else. And, you know, it's water under the bridge now. But I think it would be a good idea to reinstate the whole concept of the interagency policy deliberations and with significant injects by the intelligence community when it comes to making overall plans. Because again, although I support the strikes, I, you know, it can be the right thing. Done the wrong way is still the right thing. And I think that's where we're at is what I'm doing trying to get at now the question is going to be. So we just thought about the fact that we might need a MU to take Carg island because there's really no way to put to explain that any other way is that we didn't think this through or that asset would have already been in the region. It wouldn't be getting shifted from what we claim to be a higher priority region in the Indian Pacific to go to the Middle East. And then we of course, should get down to why Carg island is so important and then I'll kick it to you guys. Carg island was one of the reasons why Iran submitted in the Iran once it started being targeted substantially, they got scared, super scared. 90% of their processing of their oil goes through there. It looks like the idea is we've hit the military targets, so softened it. We could use the MU BLT Italian landing team to go in there and seize it. And then we put it at risk to the regime if we were to target the actual energy. There's nothing to bargain with. Right. Like it's all over. So the concept, my understanding from talking to my friends who are, you know, work in the issue is the only way to actually use it as a bargaining chip is to seize and hold it. There's a lot of concerns that come from that The Marines will be very vulnerable. This is technically boots on the ground, to use an overused A phrase. So there's a lot. I'm not saying that this is just a simple decision, but that is the concept behind it, that we seize hold and then say let everything through or we won't ever give you your the resources you need to fund your own regime. So I'll stop there. But I think that's going to be the biggest discussion as the MU gets closer and closer to the area of operations.

Jonathan Hackett (8:49)

And if I could kind of zoom in the operational level a little bit on there with, with Hog Island. When we think about this island and seizing it, there's a key challenge that is a major planning factor that has to be considered because this MU would, would have to physically pass through the Straits of Hormuz if they want to project close by. And that's a challenge because 750km separates Carg island from the straits. So they're going to be at risk for 750km moving around the straits up to Kharg Island. If the MEW wants to be close enough to the island to take it with a close in seizure, that means the other alternative is launch air assets carrying troops over into the straits into the island, which in my view of it is probably. That second option is more likely to happen where the Amphibious Readiness Group, which is three vessels, would probably stage off of Fujairah. And I'll say why Fujairah? In a second here. Or Muscat. Muscat's a thousand kilometers away. Fujairah, 750 kilometers away. That gap of, of kilometers between Fujairah and Muscat. It's like a kill zone space, a huge amount of space. You don't want to be that far away. You don't want to be in Muscat and have to project Osprey's and other tactical aircraft that far. Or from Jordan, from Muafak Salty Air Base or from other air bases. Turkey is not going to be amenable to this. We've already talked about why in the past. We can talk about it again. But you're gonna have to rely on Gulf partners or standoff forces to actually fly to the island. That introduces additional risk into the mission profile because rather than launching an amphibious raid from the ship, you have to launch it in a more traditional troop carrier method where the troop carrier is exposed the entire time. We've heard Hegseth this week say that the drone capability has been reduced 90, 95%. Even if that's true, they started out with 30,000 drones. And I bet they've been producing drones since the war started. So that means even if they reduce it to 5% of the amount of drones, it only takes one drone to strike a US Troop carrier to dramatically change the trajectory of this conflict. Because US Policy is very sensitive to American casualties, as it should be. That's how we are designed and we care about our troops. And if one troop transport gets down, if one, you know, 24 Marines go down in Persian Gulf because of a shahed drone, that's just one drone that cost a few thousand dollars, that could ultimately change a billion dollar, 90 degree change in this conflict. The island of Fujairah itself can only hold about two and a half billion dollars worth of oil. That's the way the capacity works there. So we'd basically be sacrificing two dozen Marines lives for about $2 billion of oil, which is about the tenth of the amount of oil that normally passes through that strait. Was it worth it? And that's going to be the question that's going to be asked as we look at the planning of this.

Mark Polymeropoulos (11:32)

You know, there's something I think overall on this that I wanted to raise with everyone here is, you know, as we watch, you know, these painful press conferences, I mean, Secretary Hegseth with, you know, his kind of JV football rah rah speeches, which are kind of getting to be interminable, and I can't even watch them. But then you have General Kaine come up, who seems a little more sober and realistic, and I think that's what you should focus on. I almost think we're all not we. But, you know, the administration is kind of drunk in military math. And if you, you know, if you go through this, you know, you can make a case that the US is doing very well right now in terms of military objectives. It's not finished. I don't think we've actioned the nuclear program. At least I haven't seen any of that. But when we're talking about attrition, the Iranian navy, the military, I mean, clearly they're killing thousands of Iranian troops and IRGC and others. And so you can make that argument. But I mean, it's almost remarkable because we saw this in Afghanistan with really kind of rosy projections. And what we're missing instead of Hegseth, there is, where's Marco Rubio, who is not just the Secretary of State, he's the national Security Advisor. And you know, we were joking before the show, all the memes of him with all of his various outfits are kind of hysterical. But he has too many jobs. And ultimately, I would be much more comfortable if we had someone actually talking, not just on military matters, but on strategy, because on the political dynamics, on diplomacy and on strategy, I don't know if we're winning, especially when the Iranians seem to be in it for the long haul. It's an existential fight for them. And ultimately they're going to try to outlast us. And they'll do so in two ways. One is economically, whether it's squeezing the Straits of Hormuz and gas prices going up or attacks on civilian targets in the Gulf or, God forbid, a pretty significant strike in which US Forces are killed, which would have a huge political effect in the United States. And so I think, Mick, I had lunch with Dan Shapiro a couple days ago, former US Ambassador to Israel, and I think he had the same job you had at the Pentagon in the last administration. He was very much like John and maybe not like D as he's hanging out with AOC in Brooklyn, but it's very much like us in terms of, hey, you know, you can make a case for this. But the administration hasn't. They didn't go to the American people, they didn't go to Congress, and they certainly didn't seem like they planned. And so my question on this entire, you know, affair, it's not an excursion, by the way, which I thought was preposterous what Trump said, but perhaps it's the right thing to do. But we have completely, and I'm sorry to say this incompetent people, not at the Pentagon, but in kind of the overall civilian leadership executing this. And that's what gives me a lot of pause. And on that note, it's okay if we criticize this. I mean, you have Hegseth went out and so did others. And Jake Tapper from CNN just did a brutal takedown of Ari Fleischer, the former Bushman's press secretary's, kind of comments saying that it's unpatriotic to criticize this. Well, that's what we're supposed to do. That's what a democracy does. And those of us who are actually, I think, correctly criticizing this like we have on this show today, do so from a position of knowing what we're talking about, having been in war and seeing the consequences, but also from the right place and like, hey, maybe we should have done this. But, you know, the execution of this is all screwed up for so many different reasons. And so just that idea of kind of the reliance on kind of, you know, when I say military math, it sounds really good, but there's so much more to it. What do you guys think of that? Is that a fair criticism of just the focus on, you know, how many strikes, how much ordinance we've dropped? Like, where's the grand strategy here? I don't see it.

Jonathan Hackett (15:11)

Well, there's also the risk of relying on these numbers. If we rely on these numbers the way we are and say that this is the measurement of success, we actually dig a hole for ourselves. Because the question then becomes, well, how many weapons do we still have? How much supply do we have? How much can Israel still shoot down? And this has become a big controversy in the Israeli press, talking about the amount of interceptors they have. It's kind of a no, no thing to talk about because the reality is they don't have many. And if we continue measuring and making that the headline that we have conducted X amount of strikes will be our own. Numbers will begin to look like failure soon if we can't actually continue striking at the rate that we want. It's almost like the Enron collapse, when Enron was making its books and they couldn't admit that they actually didn't make that much revenue this month. It's a very similar thing where, well, now that's the number you've said is your success and you can't meet that number anymore. Now what?

Mick Mulroy (16:03)

Yeah, it's kind of like that famous dialogue between the former U.S. army colonel and former Vietnamese army colonel where the U.S. guy says, you know, we beat you in every battle that we fought. And then the Vietnamese colonel said, that is true and entirely irrelevant. Right. So we have to. I mean, I do think we should have defined this from a point of view of military objectives and not an absolute one.

Jonathan Hackett (16:31)

Right.

Mick Mulroy (16:31)

Because to John's point, we're never going to get complete eradicate eradication of their ballistic missile program, for example. But we can say we've brought it down as much as we can and we think it's, you know, any continuation is not worth it. And then we can do a pause. Right. We don't. We have to wait to see what Iran does. But we could offer a, you know, a ceasefire, essentially, and see if they're willing to do so. And if they're not, then they keep attacking us and we have, you know, have to make the decision. But we've defined it very amorphously to include regime change, which was. I would have guessed that if there was a normal NSC process, the intelligence community would have said, do not use that as an objective. It's not going to happen. It's just not going to happen. We have no even prospect of putting a large ground force in. And if we don't, not that I would ever advocate for that, but there's a 0% chance of the regime falling because there's no other armed element that could actually facilitate that. Even, you know, the talk of the Kurds, etc, is not even close. So I would have thought I would have taken that off even a discussion.

Mark Polymeropoulos (17:45)

Obviously, by the way, Trump is the one who actually raised that in his. In a true social post in the middle of the night. And everyone's like, oh, my God, he just advocated for regime. That was, that was two weeks before, three weeks before the war started. And so they're stuck with that from the beginning. And I would agree that would not be something in a regular NSC process in which anyone would have advocated that. But you're almost reactive to that now. And so now we're kind of. And by the way, there's also the blood of Iranians who stayed on the streets on our hands. I mean, I really do believe that. And, you know, and so that's where we kind of are now. Yeah, sorry, go ahead.

Mick Mulroy (18:20)

The last part is, you know, the idea of this unconditional surrender, like it's going to be Japan in, you know, like 1945. I mean, they're not going to do that. They have no reason to. Are they going to surrender to an aircraft? I mean, I just would hope to your point, Mark, It's American to criticize policy. We on this show criticize the policy that led to the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. And we're going to critique this, too. And that's America. And, you know, for those that don't like it, maybe they should rethink of what they think of freedom of speech. But I want us to be successful because, you know, I'm all about the US being successful in this. I hope they can redefine or at least they can couch it, how they want to find something that we can actually meet militarily and then start looking for an off ramp. And then if, if we get it, we get it. And I think they can claim, you know, they did something that many administrations said they would do but weren't willing to do, so they did it, and it essentially reduced the capacity of this regime militarily, at least substantially. But we're going to have to redefine it and have to potentially even acknowledge that things like regime change were Never really in the cards. So it'll have to be a little bit of humble pie. But I still think there's a way that the United States can define this, that this will be successful ultimately.

Mark Polymeropoulos (19:46)

John, John, I want to ask you a quick question about. And this, this seems to, everyone seems to have forgotten the, the NSS strategy, the National Security strategy. So literally there was a document that was put out several months ago and go back, I would encourage viewers to read this. Dee, maybe you can actually post it, because it literally says, and it's a, it's a withering critique from the Trump administration on all the previous administrations. It essentially says, get the fuck out of the Middle East. And I mean, whether it's ground forces, whether it's all the things that we're doing now, it was a blistering criticism, and yet we are there in a capacity far beyond what any other president has done. Mick, you mentioned that maybe Trump did do more than anyone thought possible on Iran, yet we are going specifically against his national security strategy, the strategy of the Pentagon, everyone with a pivot to Asia. I mean, John, we just pulled a mew out of, out of the Pacific. And so I just, I want both of you guys. But maybe John, first, just talk about that. Just first, because there is this incredible dichotomy. I mean, and again, it's, the American public has no appetite or has no kind of attention span. But I think those of us in the national security space are like, holy shit. Like we have, we've gone like we went on, we're on full nuclear Middle east mode now, when we've just been told for the last year how, you know, all the shit we did in the past, both you guys, we're not doing anymore, and here we are on steroids.

Jonathan Hackett (21:10)

Yeah, actually, when I was working with Counter Threat finance people at agency, they would always say, follow the money, see where the dollars are being spent. And that will help you figure out where the kind of center of gravity of someone's thought process is. And if we look at our own dollars being spent on our own centers of gravity, from a red hat perspective, where has the US spent dollars the most since 1978, let's say, or 1973, perhaps, and on security assistance in particular, the number one recipient of security assistance since 1979 by law, is Israel, number two is Egypt, and number three is Jordan. Right. And there's policy reasons for that. Congress sets that spending. So whether the President wants to do something somewhere else, that spending forces them to do something where the dollars are supposed to be spent. And I think that's a very important kind of baseline to start with to understand why does the Middle east keep pulling us back. It's because policy is designed for that. Dollars are spent there. True. We spent a lot of money in Ukraine. We spent a lot of money in Japan and South Korea, for example, and even in Africa, especially during 2017 through 2021, there was a lot of special operations work in Africa. But the congressional decision is that the US Will spend money on Israel, number one, Egypt and Jordan. And that has to happen and will happen by law. So until that changes, it's very difficult for the President's policy to actually shift somewhere else. And I remember 2013, the pivot to Asia that Secretary Clinton mentioned. Everyone was making the big hoo ha, like, oh, here we go. We're moving to Asia. Then we get pulled right back to Afghanistan, right back to the Middle east, because that is our statute says we will do that and we will spend $6 billion a year, and no country is allowed to be given more security assistance than Israel. That's our laws. They say that this is not a surprise or some political statement. I mean, this is the truth. And I think that's very important for people to understand. You know, why is there this magnetic pull? It's because our laws say so. And if we don't like that, we need to vote people into office that will do something different. And until we do that, Congress is going to continue making these resolutions that are 100 to 0 in support of Israeli policies in the Middle East. And that means our dollars are going to be spent that way, too, again right now. I know, but, hey, even AOC voted for that, too. So, I mean, this is a major thing in Congress that. Where. Where are the dollars going? Well, they're going there. And that means we're going there, our troops are going to go there. And it's very interesting to look at the Pacific angle right now. The US Just asked for. Well, President Trump just asked for China and Japan to send ships to the Middle east to help secure the Straits of Hormuz, which is very fascinating because we just pulled a MU out of Japan, the 31st MU, which is designed to protect Japan and the first island chain from a Chinese excursion toward Taiwan. And now we're asking that potential adversary to also send troops with us to the Middle East. I mean, it's just kind of interesting to look at that. But the reason the US Is asking,

Mick Mulroy (24:02)

there's nothing like my American Express platinum card. I love that I can earn hotel credits. When I travel, I can also earn resi credits so you know I'm hitting

Jonathan Hackett (24:10)

the restaurants everyone's talking about. Plus with the digital entertainment credit, I'm even more excited to catch my favorite channel shows. All in all, I can access over $3,500 in annual value with benefits and

Mick Mulroy (24:21)

eligible purchases across travel, entertainment and more.

Jonathan Hackett (24:24)

Learn more@american express.com Explore Platinum enrollment requirements monthly and other limits in terms apply.

Mick Mulroy (24:31)

My name is Mackenzie and I started a GoFundMe for the adoptive mother of a non verbal autistic child. The mother had lost her job because she wasn't able to find adequate care for this autistic child, so she really needed some help with living expenses, paying some back bills. So I launched a GoFundMe to help support them during this crisis and we raised about $10,000 within just a couple of months. I think that the surprising thing was by telling a clear story and just like really being very clear about what we needed, we had some really generous donations from people who were really moved by the situation that this family was struggling with. GoFundMe is the world's number one fundraising

Sponsor/Ad Voice (25:21)

platform, trusted by over 200 million people. Start your GoFundMe today at gofundme.com that's gofundme.com gofundme.com this podcast is supported by GoFundMe. The sun shining, birds are singing, and all feels right in the world until

Jonathan Hackett (25:38)

the season changes and suddenly you lose

Jack Murphy (25:40)

your motivation to get out of bed.

Jonathan Hackett (25:42)

In fact, one in five people experience some form of depression no matter the

Jack Murphy (25:46)

season or time of year.

Sponsor/Ad Voice (25:47)

At the American Psychiatric association foundation, our vision is to build a mentally healthy nation for all because we want you to live your best life and be your best you all year round.

Jonathan Hackett (25:58)

Please visit mentallyhealthynation.org to learn more. Is because the US can only secure 10% of the daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz with our naval assets that we have. That's important to think about because we have half the number of ships now than we had in 1988 when we did Operation Praying Mantis and successfully defended the Kuwaiti vessels that were US flagged. We have half the number of ships now. True, our technologies have improved, but there's not much to do against these mines because we just decommissioned four of all. Four of four of our demining vessels no longer exist, so we lost that capability. We have zero percent of that capability. We have two littoral combat ships that can help with that. They're not designed for that. They're not task organized for that. And those ships have had their own problems coming into production and to use. Besides the mine laying issues, those ships are kind of looked at within the Marine Corps and Navy as a little bit of a disaster zone. So those are, those are the things we have to de mine now we're asking our potential adversary to come help us and we're asking Japan to basically make itself naked for its navy against a potential Chinese incursion to come help us with our operation in the straits that Japan probably didn't agree with in the first place.

Mick Mulroy (27:06)

Yeah, on that point. Jonathan's point. So the Avenger class minesweepers were decommissioned, I think it was like last year, right? The last one, yes. Literally terrible timing. They were designed specifically. They didn't have metal holes, they were silent. They had all this special kind of radar. That's what they did. I mean that was their sole mission. They gave that mission to the, as Jonathan said, the littoral combat ships, I think the Independence class, but they do it with drones. Right. It's really not the ship itself, at least my understanding. And again, we're Marines, not naval officers, but they basically gave it to a multipurpose platform. And so the question and people, and I've talked to people that really think, I think know this, they're concerned that they haven't nearly been as tested obviously as the ones we decommissioned. And this might not go as smoothly as we had hoped, but it wasn't made. The decision was made before this conflict. So it's not really casting aspersions anybody, it's just we've got to deal with, with that. But to your other question mark. Yes. I mean as I've mentioned before, I'm more of a Reagan era Republican as far as national security. So this idea that we were going to withdraw from the world, stop being the leader of the free world, focus on homeland security, which is to be frank, I mean, every country focuses on homeland security. If you want to be that exceptional nation, you got to go beyond that. Literally every country focuses on its own security. And now it's proven already in a matter of months to have not been the right decision. And the people who wrote it, including the national defense strategy so specific to the military, are now on Capitol Hill defending the war in Iran.

Mark Polymeropoulos (29:01)

It's incredible. Rich cult.

Mick Mulroy (29:03)

Yeah. Like, like three weeks later.

Mark Polymeropoulos (29:05)

Yeah, it's incredible.

Mick Mulroy (29:06)

Right. So the, the, and maybe I'm not to put it down all on process, but the process of the NSC is what creates the national security strategy. And then of course, the component of the NSC that's specific to the defense. Civilian and uniformed creates the defense strategy. It just doesn't seem like there was. There's obviously not a consistency and it's almost like we tossed the whole thing already, you know, within a month of passing it. So we'll have to see, I'm sure the counter argument be like, no, we got to take care of Iran so that we can then do our strategy. But I think it's pretty clear. And to other. Jonathan's other point on the fall of money. The Middle east is always going to be important to us. Let's just accept it. Let's just accept that with the U.S. taxpayer pays enough to our national security that we should be able to do all the above, right? All the above. We can do it. We can do it diplomatically. Intelligence, militarily, we can be the exceptional country, the indispensable nation around the world, and we should view it that way. Yes, we have priorities like we always have, but this idea that we can only focus on ourselves and dominating the Western hemisphere is just not what does not live up to the what the United States, I think true mission is, which is to essentially be that leader of the free world.

Mark Polymeropoulos (30:33)

And also the notion on the mu. Just one, one quick thing for both of you guys and John Johnathan, maybe jump in here because I think that there's a couple of things here. One is, I think, Mick, you mentioned that it certainly appears that it's amazing because the problem set of the Straits of Hormuz should have been first. And I mean, look, the Pentagon, you know this, you've stared at this fricking problem set for several decades. So the idea that we're unprepared for this is quite extraordinary. Or perhaps there was a recommendation to the civilian leadership that wasn't taken on this. But I find that remarkable and that we're at a place now where, and I don't understand why it's not more of an issue where it's, is it, is it getting baked in that there actually might be U.S. ground forces? The MEW is going, is that a feint? Is that, is that a threat to the Iranians or is it actually, if you look at the Straits of Hormuzz, militarily, is this going to be required because it's so difficult. So, but, but here we are not. Not only has there been, you know, we've expended a huge amount of money on this. The region's a bit of A mess. We're actually talking about putting US forces on the ground. I mean, again, just if you, if you kind of sit back and think, well, wait a second, you know, during the Trump campaign or the initial stage of the Trump administration, this is actually unfathomable what's occurring right now. I guess maybe the question on that is also a political question too, is that the American people, are they going to be okay with this? And because likely there will be American servicemen and women who die if we go down this road. I cannot imagine. And just you take a look at the air to air KC135 crash. I mean, bad shit happens or drones hitting our people in Kuwait. Probably there will be casualties if we do this. I mean, your thoughts?

Jonathan Hackett (32:15)

Yeah, I mean, on the political question, the people have spoken through their representatives and senators whether or not they want to stop this war and the Congress decided not to make a resolution to stop it. So I mean, based on our system, that's the output of our system that those who are elected chose to allow this to continue, which is whether we agree with it or not. That's how it's designed to work. If it's working properly.

Dimitri Contakos (32:38)

Of course, we can all admit it's bullshit. It's okay. We can all.

Jonathan Hackett (32:42)

Approval.

Mick Mulroy (32:43)

It's approval. That's why they should look.

Dimitri Contakos (32:45)

Yeah, but I mean like the latest polling is like, it's at like hovering around 30 approval for this. It's like the American people do not want this to go on. And they definitely. I'm an American citizen. I don't want boots on the ground. I love. Let's go covert. Full, full force, baby. You know what I mean? Let's do that. Not interested in Marines getting killed on Carg island or more KC135 people crash. Like not interested at all. It's no benefit to us whatsoever as a country. Zero.

Jonathan Hackett (33:16)

I think there's two indicators you can kind of analyze from this with the, with the Marines. So first of all, the fact that the Marines were not positioned there or chopped there, like change of operational control from the Pacific to the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain before the conflict started kind of indicates that that was not part of the initial planning, first of all. And second of all, moving the marines from the 7th Fleet to the 5th Fleet is a strategic decision, not an operational decision, which signals to me that they will be probably used. This isn't likely a feint because the amount of things behind the scenes that have to occur for the Marines to move from one to the other and be positioned somewhere Else it's not simply a military objective that's being achieved here. It's also a political and strategic objective that requires a lot of thought and planning to do the level that needs to move them there. So that, that kind of signals to me that yes, they will be used. And looking at Carg Island, I mentioned earlier the distance between the straits and Carg island, there's another distance that's really important and that's the distance between Kharg island and Abadan. Abadan is the primary, like mainland part of the entire oil production for Iran and it's not very far away from Carg Island. And if the government, right now, the US government is looking at an incremental approach to kind of solving this problem that they've created in the straits, they'll put marines maybe on Kharag island and then say, well, it's only 100km to Abadan, that's not too far. Maybe we take Abadan, maybe we also take Bushehr because Bushehr, if you'll remember from the nuclear strikes, is a primary location of Iran's nuclear program where there is currently uranium underground. Well, that's even closer than Abadan. Well, that's another great point to project forces onto the mainland. And the reason I'm mentioning this is because of something we all remember from Afghanistan and Iraq, which is mission creepy. Yeah, Once you've got the forces there, right? Absolutely. Once you've got the forces there, it's only one more step. Well, it's just a little bit. It's almost like a gambling problem or an addiction, you know, like, well, I'll just have one more cigarette before I quit, you know, and if they're right there in front of you, it's very tempting to use, especially if it gets short term domestic wins. And we can say, well, we took hard easily, we took Maduro easily. Oh, we can do Cuba. You know, like these things suddenly become easy in your mind psychologically because of successes you just had in somewhere other realm.

Mark Polymeropoulos (35:30)

Mick, just the thing I think sometimes, and this is like instinctive, we always want to give, and I say this with respect, you want to give the US military a pass on this because I think there's a criticism of the civilian leadership, but you can't give the military a pass to the Pentagon if it does look like, as both of you have suggested, that, you know, the MU was never activated, that the Straits of Hormuz was not considered. You know, there's big fights on social media. You have people like, you know, John Spencer who can't ever see anything go wrong that any administration or Israel ever does. And he's been howling the last couple of days saying that, you know, all of us who are saying that there was no planning for the Straits of Hormuz don't know what we're talking about, except we have our own eyes and you can see. So how did the Pentagon. I mean, we can focus in a little bit on the military, too. I know these are your old brothers and sisters, but how did this happen again? Or was advice not taken? But you do have to kind of look at the Pentagon planning on this and say, okay, this is a problem set we've stared at forever. What are your thoughts?

Mick Mulroy (36:30)

So I think. I mean, I don't know, to be frank, to be clear, but it looks like it was decided by a very small handful of people. And again, referencing this Wall Street Journal article without a lot of input beyond the chairman, when it came to the military side, because the military would have taken the guidance and to be prepared for missions and started doing. That's what the chairman's office does. Right? The global integrator. They would have started doing things to facilitate not only what they expected the campaign to go, but also the branch plans and contingencies that have to plan for the idea that the Mewes just now and it's two weeks away. Right. Something like that. I mean, that just. It's impossible to say that that was. That that indicates anything other than they didn't plan for this.

Mark Polymeropoulos (37:22)

Right.

Mick Mulroy (37:23)

I'm sorry. It just is what it is. I don't think the chairman could even. Yeah, right.

Dimitri Contakos (37:27)

It's kind of wild that like. Like, it's like they decided to open up a sandwich shop, but instead of a sandwich shop, they're going to war. Five guys. Like, let's just start a business, you guys. It'll be fun.

Mick Mulroy (37:41)

Insane deep with a former MU commander friend of mine on how this would go. And I'm not going to go through it because I don't want to give any information away. You know, the top lines are this. It's difficult to get there. And Jonathan already hit it. You know, basically you have to traverse 700 km of Iranian coastline to get there. Unless you fly. But flying's got its issues, but it's also staying there. Right? You know, being able to protect your force when you're there, which is going to just be, you know, bombarded and then like, what if it doesn't work? That was the biggest. It was a. More of a strategic question from my friend That I was talking to is like, okay, so we're going in with the idea that it's going to put so much pressure that Iran's going to capitulate and open the straits and sue for peace. What if we get there? The Marines are getting bombarded. They've, they've successfully taken the island, they've done everything militarily successful, as we would expect Marines to do, and Neuron just blows them off, you know what I mean? Like they just. Nope, we're still going to block the straights of our moods and we're still going to keep attacking our partners and allies.

Dimitri Contakos (38:48)

And I have a question about.

Mick Mulroy (38:50)

That's a great question.

Mark Polymeropoulos (38:52)

Yeah, let me just jump in right here. I got, I got a bullet guy.

Dimitri Contakos (38:54)

All right, bye.

Mick Mulroy (38:55)

Thanks, Mark.

Mark Polymeropoulos (38:56)

Leave this open or.

Dimitri Contakos (38:57)

No, no, you're good.

Mark Polymeropoulos (38:59)

Okay. Sorry guys.

Dimitri Contakos (39:00)

All right, bye.

Mick Mulroy (39:02)

Take care, bro.

Dimitri Contakos (39:03)

I have a question about Craig island, about like, let's say the Marines do take it. Are they assuming that. Is there like a thought process that like, you know, we're going to have 2,500 Marines there. It's Iran's like central hub of like distributing oil. They're less likely to attack it because they're going to fucking destroy their entire economy. Is that like a thought process that's going on?

Jonathan Hackett (39:27)

Well, the important thing is that these ballistic missiles have different range capabilities. So they can't use their long range ballistic missiles to fire on Kharg island unless they reposition their transporter erector launchers further away. So this is already a problem that the regime will be thinking through. But that number of Marines you mentioned, 2,200, 2,500, that's not the amount of Marines that will take the island. Because the way that the Marine Expeditionary Unit is designed is to be an air and ground task force. So there's an air combat element, a ground combat element, and a logistics combat element, plus some other sustainment elements around that. What you'd probably see instead is a battalion landing team, which is 550 roughly people actually physically seizing, holding and sustaining on that island, while you'd have other people kind of in these rings of distance around it to protect, sustain, resupply, deploy, redeploy, do reception, staging, armor, movement, integration. All these things that go into what's called the rapid planning process or rapid response planning process that the MU uses to plan for exactly this type of contingency. So the MU can do it operationally. It's part of their doctrine to do. That's why, that's why The Marine is, the Marine unit is being sent there because it's literally the only entity in our entire Department of Defense that can do exactly this operation as their primary mission objective. Right. Question is, as you asked, is are they safe after that? What does that mean after that? Well, the regime has like 4,000 mines right now. The transits before the war started were around 140/transits per day around the straits. So if you do the math on that, they can still put the straits at risk regardless of what we do in a car island for a very long time in terms of combat time. Right. So even if we did, it takes us two weeks to get there, first of all. So there's a lot of things happening in those two weeks. Then they actually seize and hold the island, which takes a few days to do. Now we're talking about next month. The regime could then deploy more mines. They're not sophisticated devices. They could deploy more mines. They're magnetic. They don't really require very much to be used, especially with small boats that they have. The other very important thing we haven't mentioned yet is the Houthis have not been active. And so if countries try to move oil somewhere else while this, while the US is trying to do this chess piece movement in the Straits, for example, Fujairah, which I mentioned at the beginning of the show, it's important because there's actually a land based pipeline across the Saudi the peninsula that can move a small amount of oil to Fujairah and then send it out. There's another one across Saudi Arabia as well. But that's not quite in the discussion right now. But the Houthis can target that Fujairah port from the south to North. Right. So even if we put troops outside Fujairah to protect the mu that's been deployed inside the Gulf, that that back element, that rear element could now be at risk by the Houthis on the other side. So these are like very important things to think about. As we're thinking what happens when those Marines actually land the island. It's not just the island that's now a thing to consider for force protection. It's also the things in the rear area that we consider to be the rear area that the enemy can then open up and harass us in the rear area. Hate to use the Vietnam comparison, but this did happen in Vietnam when we were doing operations into North Vietnam. And then the North Vietnamese activated forces in South Vietnam to bring the fight to us in our rear areas, which threw us off balance numerous times in many of their North Vietnamese successful operations against us. And we had superior forces at that time as well.

Mick Mulroy (42:42)

Yeah. I think they struck Fujairah yesterday.

Mark Polymeropoulos (42:44)

Right.

Mick Mulroy (42:45)

I mean I saw certainly social media posts that. And then of course the Houthis can also put other, you know, the Red Sea, Bob El Mandeb, all other places. This, this hasn't gotten as bad as it could get.

Jonathan Hackett (42:59)

Exactly.

Mick Mulroy (43:00)

And we could end up with although I agree with Jonathan and my friend, we can take the Marines will take the island if task. The question is how do we get them out of it. Now if everything works fine and they, and it's basically a tick for tack, then I guess that's how we get them out of it. But if they don't concede, and they don't really seem to be willing to concede anything. The other point, and I think we've talked about this before, is this whole mosaic defense of Iran. Right. They, they are designed that if they take a significant threat to the regime, which this obviously was, they operate very independently, like 31 different provinces, different commanders, different intelligence collection capability, militias, special type operations. I mean this is what they are designed to withstand. So I don't necessarily know how we could ever get to a point where they would unconditionally surrender. I think they'll always be somebody that's in the regime even if we keep decapitation strikes. So we're in a position where again why I'm advocating for the US to set our own objectives to determine when we met it and then unilaterally do a pause if necessary and see if it can decompress the whole situation where Iran will follow. But if the whole idea is to put military pressure enough to get the regime to have some kind of signing of surrender, it's just, it's putting a task on the military that's ill defined and really unachievable. Right. I mean if you're going to fight an asymmetric war, you have to be willing to take more pain than the other. And that's what they've clearly decided to do and they've clearly decided to take as much pain as we can give them.

Jonathan Hackett (44:40)

Yeah. There's another Vietnam era quote that the Americans win or they what is it? They, they lose if they don't win and the other side wins if they don't lose.

Mick Mulroy (44:51)

Yeah.

Jonathan Hackett (44:51)

Because it's about attrition. Americans are not designed to support attrition because we have a democratic process that puts pressure every four, two to four years on what Our war policy is. And if that war lasts longer than two to four years, you're almost guaranteed a shift in how the war is going to be executed in a way that misaligns with the original objectives of that war.

Dimitri Contakos (45:09)

I want to ask you guys about the. There was a Bloomberg report about the US army sending 10,000 interceptor drones developed like in Ukraine to the Middle east to combat Iran's like missile and drones they call it, they're from AI enabled company MerOps it's called. It cost about 15 grand each. And you know, I love this idea. Why the fuck didn't we have that like three months ago there before we start three weeks ago.

Mick Mulroy (45:37)

I think that is a bird that actually catches bees in the air or something I think.

Dimitri Contakos (45:42)

Is that it?

Mick Mulroy (45:42)

I thought it was like an acronym, but it's not. It's actually name. Yeah. It's time for the United States to wake up to the realities that are we're seeing in Ukraine.

Dimitri Contakos (45:53)

Right.

Mick Mulroy (45:53)

Low cost but efficient lethal options. Instead of thinking that everything has to be, I'm probably dating myself here, a Cadillac that we spent an incredible amount of money on and somehow that gives us a superior advantage in every conflict we fight. It's just simply not the case. And this assassin's mace concept, I think everybody uses that term because it sounds cool that the Chinese have is basically, you know, find something that's 100% cheaper to kill, something that's 100% more expensive. The United States needs to realize that is a concept of war fighting that we need to embrace. I know that there's like a desire to have every district in the country participate in the building of some massive new weapon system. And I'm not saying that all those weapon systems are not a good idea, but we have to have a balance. And this is really proven that this war of attrition is. We're going to run out of interceptor missiles here shortly.

Jonathan Hackett (46:53)

A great comparison is the one shot head costs $30,000 to make which is one of these one way attack drones. $30,000. One tomahawk is $3.6 million per tomahawk and just I mean orders of magnitude different and the outcomes can almost be the same depending on what the target is that you strike with this either device.

Dimitri Contakos (47:16)

Yeah. So my question is like why didn't we plan to have like 5,000 of these drones down there dispersed across all of our bases ready to intercept instead of using Patriots and you know, that cost probably what, I don't know what a patriot misses 1.3 mil. I think I read. You know. That is incredible. Yeah, yeah. I think forget the fads, too. The fads are like, insane. Insanely more expensive. So, like, why not have 5, 8, 7,000 drones ready to rock at all our bases dispersed in the region, especially before we're about to. You know, we decapitated a regime that now is completely out of control. Right. Like you mentioned the Mosaic Doctrine. Like, we don't even know who to negotiate with. Like, how long will it take if we did reach a deal with the top brash for like the rest of the 31 provinces still, like, oh, yeah, okay, we're going to back off now.

Mick Mulroy (48:09)

That's a good point. I mean, we don't even know this current status of the Supreme Leader. I mean, I don't think it's a conspiracy theory to say, hey, how come he didn't do a video or speak?

Jonathan Hackett (48:21)

Right.

Mick Mulroy (48:21)

And then I've talked to an Iranian who was like. And by the way, the grammar was horrible. And this person's pretty educated. And it didn't. I mean, I didn't read or know this to be true, but I'm pretty sure based on what this person said is like, the person, A, used terrible grammar, B, used a lot of more Arabic words than they would have expected and obviously didn't appear on camera or audio. Like, there's something going on there.

Dimitri Contakos (48:50)

Well, he was injured in the initial attack, right?

Mick Mulroy (48:52)

Right.

Dimitri Contakos (48:52)

Yeah.

Mick Mulroy (48:53)

But maybe far more injured than we might know. And then the question that I've also heard from people who followed Mostaba's career is he pretty much does what the IRGC tells him to do is what is what I would sum up my half an hour conversation. So it's the IRGC that's in charge, and it's an amorphous group. Like, so who are we going to negotiate with? Essentially, is the point of your question. D. And I don't know that we have an answer to that.

Dimitri Contakos (49:23)

I mean, it was pretty much clear before these bombings start. The attacks started and we basically left

Jonathan Hackett (49:29)

the worst guys alive.

Mick Mulroy (49:30)

Yeah, yeah. Who you think? Laranjani and Kaliboff. Kaliboff. That's the speaker. Right, of the Parliament.

Jonathan Hackett (49:39)

You've got the speaker of Parliament and the supreme National Security Council leader. But these, these guys are old IRGC guys from the Iran Iraq war, and they're the kind of lever pullers that have been the lever pullers for decades. And everybody else that was killed was someone beholden to these two guys. So the fact that these two guys are still alive, it's like we almost got the opposite outcome that we were looking for with the strike deck that we used, which could have been just because we didn't have enough humint on the ground to actually validate the targets at the very opening when we were doing the triggered strikes, to actually hit those, those large scale first three strikes on day one. Because as far as the strikes that I've worked on, we, you know, if we want to have that one individual in there, we're going to make sure we know who else is in the room with them because if we, you know, they're strategic effects if you kill the wrong people at the wrong time. And it seems that we just drop bombs on large gatherings of folks during Ramadan, which is actually a strategy that I have used as well because you get the most bang for your buck when they're all having Suhor dinner together. But if you don't know who's in there, you might end up eliminating the ones that you actually wanted to survive for a specific amount of time to get a specific end state after that strike.

Dimitri Contakos (50:49)

So you're saying, John, that don't plan a war on the back of a napkin with five guys, Is that what you're saying?

Jonathan Hackett (50:57)

Six guys.

Dimitri Contakos (50:57)

Might have been six guys. I'm sorry.

Mick Mulroy (50:58)

Yeah, I'm sorry.

Jonathan Hackett (50:59)

Yeah.

Mick Mulroy (51:00)

I mean, they're critical people, but the whole point is they should be informed. Right?

Dimitri Contakos (51:04)

I mean, but who's the only one that's like actually like General Kane.

Mick Mulroy (51:08)

Right. General Kane, I think, you know, is doing the best he can. But the other guys, save, say the Secretary of State, they go from talking about domestic policy to say, I mean, they don't have time to be an expert on all this stuff.

Dimitri Contakos (51:22)

I totally agree.

Mick Mulroy (51:23)

Excuses for them.

Dimitri Contakos (51:24)

But that's why you need a robust nsc. Yeah, like, that's why you need that robust nsc. You're an executive, you're not in the weeds. But like, yeah, you shouldn't just be like, like, again, this isn't starting a business. This is actually going to war that's going to kick, that's killed thousands of Iranians. You know, we have 150 plus injured Americans, plus like now I think it's over 12 dead and there's no end in sight. It's like, these are huge decisions that you're in charge of.

Sponsor/Ad Voice (51:53)

Like shop the Sherwin Williams spring sale and get 35% off paints and stains March 13th through the 23rd. Whether you're refreshing your interior or exterior, we've got the colors to bring your vision to life. And with delivery, getting everything to your door is easier than ever. Shop online to have it delivered or visit your neighborhood Sherwin Williams store. Click the banner to learn more. Retail sales only some exclusions apply. See Store for details. Delivery available on qualifying orders

Dimitri Contakos (52:26)

during Lowe's Pro Savings Days Save more on what goes into the job.

Jonathan Hackett (52:30)

Add power to your lineup with a

Dimitri Contakos (52:32)

free Dewalt 20 volt max 5amp hour battery when you buy a select Dewalt 20 volt max tool. Plus get up to 35% off.

Sponsor/Ad Voice (52:39)

Select major appliances from Whirlpool, Maytag, and more.

Dimitri Contakos (52:43)

Get the job done right. Keep more in your pocket.

Sponsor/Ad Voice (52:46)

That's Pro Savings Days.

Dimitri Contakos (52:48)

Our best lineup is here at Lowe's.

Sponsor/Ad Voice (52:50)

Ballot through 327.

Jonathan Hackett (52:51)

Selection varies by location.

Sponsor/Ad Voice (52:52)

Raw supplies last this episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere. People listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify, and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for, well, more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour, you might as well publish it.

Dimitri Contakos (53:42)

Anybody with wrinkles in their brains would understand that, like, I need to get as much information from as many experts as possible before I make a commitment like this that will lead to people dying and, you know, potentially hundreds of billions of dollars. Forget even the oil, like in our economy, like, just the actual money that it costs to sustain operations. And I'm a dummy and I know that, like, you know, you would think the people in charge would be like, yeah, let's get as much information as humanly possible. Get smart guys in the room like Mick and John and Andy and like, you know, and tell us the truth so we can make an actual decision, not get dog dogged by Israel.

Jonathan Hackett (54:23)

The challenge is when military planners are presenting these options. They're in their advisor capacity and they're saying, here is the most likely outcome. Here's the most dangerous outcome. Here are some black swan events to look out for. We recommend against the most dangerous option we recommend against this particular avenue. And then the decision maker will look at that and say, I'm ignoring your advice and I'm taking the most dangerous option, plus I'm tacking on these other political outcomes because I want to do that. And that's not against the current administration. That's how every administration works. That's how it works. At the embassies, when we're at the country team meeting with the ambassador and the senior defense official says, sir, I don't think that this is a good idea to do X. And the ambassador says, thank you for that. I'm doing X. And there isn't much you can do about it, because then they'll come back to you and say, now plan for X, even though you just told them that that was a bad idea. And here's all the reasons why. You have to put all those reasons why to the side and use them as contingencies, and then plan for how you're actually going to execute this thing that you just told them was a bad idea.

Mick Mulroy (55:18)

And these meetings in the past have been recorded. I mean, not necessarily recorded, like, verbatim, but there's notes and minutes and what we agreed to and what the Defense Department agreed to, and part of it is to hold us accountable for later, and part of it is just so everybody goes on record.

Dimitri Contakos (55:37)

Yeah, right.

Mick Mulroy (55:39)

Where did you stand? Did you think it was a good idea? Did you think it was not a good idea? And with the idea that we hope that we get better, as we go back and look at the decisions made and say, you know, the Bay of Pigs or what have you, don't see that happening now. I don't. I don't know what the current status at the NSC is, but to have the Secretary of State be both the national Security Advisor and Secretary of State means there's not a national Security advisor or Secretary of State. It's got to be. It has always been robust. It was robust the first Trump administration, especially when General McMaster was there. Yeah, he was. I thought he was very present. Had a strategy for everything. Army officer, of course. Right. I thought he was very good. But he was a good example of, like, a robust, engaged national security apparatus that the president could, to Jonathan's point, they can rely on or not, but it's there. And chances are they would at least take it into consideration. Decisions.

Dimitri Contakos (56:43)

Do you think that there's anything that has anything to do with, like, how well the Venezuela operation went, even though it's, like, totally night and Day, you know, a two hour J suck operation in the dead of night compared to sustained air operations. Like do you guys think that because that went so well and like, you know, as well as it possibly could be, there was one guy who was injured that added into the calculus of like President Trump and whoever else to be like, yeah, we could totally fucking do this. Let's just be fucking easy with the United States.

Mick Mulroy (57:17)

Well, President Trump referenced it several times. I think the whole idea that he can find somebody in the regime that he can work with and then put pressure on them to capitulate is what he did in Venezuela. It's just an entirely different country. Again, I think that would have been something that would have been identified in the discussions about this. It would have been like, yeah, you could very well end up with somebody who's more extreme than the actual person that you took out, in that case the former spring leader. And it looks like that's what happened. And that's what, you know, from what I've seen from open reporting, that's what the IC said was going to happen. Not to you know, tout something that's not in our own interest, but it seems like that's what they said was going to happen and that's what is happening and it's unlikely to change. So we have to deal with the current situation. Not the one we want or the one we try to present, but the one that's actually is.

Dimitri Contakos (58:10)

Yeah. And if you guys were listening, we did say that too before this popped off as well John did.

Jonathan Hackett (58:16)

So if you want, you guys should be making some money on Poly Market. With all my.

Dimitri Contakos (58:19)

Yes, for real. I know. With all he called the who the new boss was going to be called everything. John's secretly very wealthy from all those predictions.

Mick Mulroy (58:28)

You can bet on all this stuff.

Dimitri Contakos (58:29)

Yeah.

Jonathan Hackett (58:30)

Oh yeah. There's actually the CFTC just put out new guidance on how and or how not to bet on events like assassinations, wars, things like this that are morally questionable. There are some prohibitions, but they're very hard to regulate. These what they're called event contracts. And yeah, it just came out like two days ago about what you can actually do. The problem is someone from unit 8200 before the war started made like 500 grand off of what happened. And then some people at the Pentagon, like three to four people at the Pentagon also made a bunch of money on the war before it happened. So now this is being considered insider trading, which is a huge problem now because it's not actually regulated as a securities market. So now we need to reinterpret how we understand what securities market means as far as event contract bidding. Wow.

Mick Mulroy (59:19)

Just shocking it's even legal.

Dimitri Contakos (59:24)

Yeah. Anything else, guys, sticking in your craw in terms of, like, have we touched on, missed anything?

Jonathan Hackett (59:31)

Yeah. I'll mention one thing that I think should always be mentioned during this war, and that's the Iranian people, because these are ultimately the ones that have to bear the cost of whatever happens, whether the US succeeds or fails. That's kind of not as important in my mind as what happens to the Iranian people, because they're the ones that. They got this war, many of them support it. But the outcome is important because I remember in 2003, when we invaded Iraq, Iraqis were on the street cheering the fact that Saddam Hussein was gone. We all remember these videos, but because of decisions that outsiders made about the inside, that cheering turned into gunfire very quickly. And it's very important that we don't lose sight of the fact that the people that we need to win over are the Iranian people. And that can quickly go sour. That's almost 90 million people that right now support us. That could be almost 90 million people that don't support us if we don't smartly execute the. Especially the exit from this conflict, if there is such an exit. And the important thing to note there is, in the last couple of days, the regime has been putting out a lot of propaganda out in the media about, if you protest, we're going to kill you. And the IRGC intelligence organization, which is actually the premier, it's almost like the CIA inside of Iran because they don't have domestic foreign separation in their intelligence operations. That's who's actually putting these messages out. And they've been arresting dozens of people over the last few days and charging them with crimes against the regime about propagating anti Islamic, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. However you want to describe it. What basically they're charging them with is trying to go out in the streets and protest, because we've kept saying that we want to enable these people to go out and do a regime change. But 95% of the Internet is cut off. And the regime itself has said the 5% of the Internet that's on is only for people who support the regime. So they are themselves saying that 95% of the country doesn't support them. I mean, that's. That's crazy. But they're saying that. And that's really important from an outsider perspective. How do you want to Win this conflict. How about you put up a mesh network, low earth orbit satellites, direct to cell communication, so that people can get on their phone and say, hey, meet me at 5pm at the square so we can go protest, right? Or hey, that barracks was blown up. There are weapons there. We can go take those weapons and start going out in the streets and fighting back. That component is missing. And that component, in my opinion, is necessary if we actually want to keep those people on our side as we exit from this. However we do exit.

Mick Mulroy (61:46)

Concur. Radio Free Europe, leader of Free World. We still. Yeah, exactly. The concept is, what I'm hitting at is that we still need to be that shining city on a hill that. I know it sounds a little Pollyannish, but that's the way I view the United States.

Sponsor/Ad Voice (62:06)

So.

Mick Mulroy (62:07)

And I think it was directly to Jonathan's point that we need to be that beacon for them and not just treat them like they're just a pawn in this thing. We support them until we decide that it's easier to deal with and throw them under the bus.

Jonathan Hackett (62:20)

And it seems like that's where a divergence between us and Israeli strategy is happening because Israel is striking police checkpoints. They're striking very low level tactical, you know, vehicle checkpoint areas where cars have to pass through. And they're doing that because what they're trying to do is remove the place where the actual enforcement actions are happening against the people so that the people can come out and do things. They're using very interesting AI enabled drone swarms right now with facial recognition to actually identify some of the guys that were killing people in January, the actual person, and then go. Go kill them with a drone. So that's a huge divergence between what we are doing with these standoff munitions. From a distance, Israel is actually in there on the ground removing the real problem, which is regime people with guns from the streets.

Mick Mulroy (63:06)

Change your route.

Jonathan Hackett (63:07)

Exactly.

Mick Mulroy (63:08)

Dismantle the Islamic Republic. Yeah,

Dimitri Contakos (63:13)

yeah. Interesting times, guys. All right, this was great as usual. I want everyone to check out the links down in the description. The Whitefish Security Summit is happening in a couple weeks, so check that out. That link is down in the description. John Hackett, of course, is incredible books. Iran, Shadow Weapons and Theory of Irregular Wharf. What's your other book called?

Jonathan Hackett (63:35)

Theory of Irregular War.

Dimitri Contakos (63:36)

And yeah, those links are in the description as well. Mark P. Of course, down there. And if you want to help support the show, go to patreon.com the team house you get both eyes on and Team House episodes ad free and early and yeah, as always guys, great show.

Jonathan Hackett (63:55)

Had great talking to you guys.

Jack Murphy (63:59)

Hey everyone, I want to tell you about my new novel the Most Dangerous man out in June. It is a novel about a Regimental Reconnaissance Company soldier who gets kidnapped while he's on a mission to West Africa and when he wakes up he finds that he is now being hunted for sport by a group of tech billionaires through the wilds of West Africa. This book is based on stories that I heard over the years about Safari Ari guides taking wealthy clients hunting for poachers on game reserves in Africa. I took that and I took a century old short story, the Most Dangerous Game and modernized it. And the product is this book which I think will feel contemporary and resonate with audiences today. Thank you and please check it out.

Sponsor/Ad Voice (64:54)

This episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere people listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify, and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for, well, more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour, you might as well publish it. This episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere people listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify, and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for, well, more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour, you might as well publish it. This episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere people listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify, and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for well more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour, you might as well publish it. This episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere people listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify, and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for well more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour, you might as well publish it. This episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere people listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify, and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for well more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour you might as well publish it. This episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere people listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for, well, more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour, you might as well publish it. This episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere people listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify, and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for well, more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour, you might as well publish it. This episode is brought to you by Spreaker, the platform responsible for a rapidly spreading condition known as podcast brain. Symptoms include buying microphones you don't need, explaining RSS feeds to confused relatives, and saying things like, sorry, I can't talk right now, I'm editing audio. If this sounds familiar, you're probably already a podcaster. The good news is Spreaker makes the whole process simple. You record your show, upload it once, and Spreaker distributes it everywhere people listen. Apple podcasts, Spotify, and about a dozen apps your cousin swears are the next big thing. Even better, Spreaker helps you monetize your show with ads, meaning your podcast might someday pay for, well, more microphones. Start your show today@spreaker.com spreaker because if you're going to talk to yourself for an hour, you might as well publish it.