← The Trade Guys
Loading summary
Transcript81 lines
- [00:01]
A
I'm Scott.
- [00:02]
B
I'm Bill. And we're the Trade Guys.
- [00:07]
C
You're listening to the Trade Guys, a podcast produced by CSIS where we talk about trade in terms that everyone can understand. I'm H. Andrew Schwartz, and I'm here with Scott Miller and Bill Reinsch, the CSIS Trade Guys. Coming up next on the Trade Guys, we'll talk about the US China trade truce and how long it'll hold. Then we'll talk about sipa, not to be confused with ipa. And finally, we'll talk about other countries doing deals in the absence of the United States, all on the next episode of the Trade Guys. Gentlemen, this is a very special podcast because we have with us one of our favorite spirit CSIS colleagues. That is Erin Murphy, who is deputy Director of the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics, and she's also a senior fellow in our Emerging Asia Economics program. Erin, welcome to the Trade Guys.
- [01:09]
D
Thank you for having me. This has been a dream, not only to be on the Trade Guys, but also to be called everyone's favorite colleague. So it's, you know, great honor for me.
- [01:18]
C
You are. And, you know, I don't know if it's a dream to join us schleppers, but you certainly have raised the bar of this podcast podcast with your mere presence.
- [01:27]
D
Well, thank you. No, it's great to be here. Big fan of the Trade Guys. Learn something every week, and I would say that this year more than most, it is really critical to listen to their Trade Guys. There's so much going on, it's hard to keep track, but these guys are.
- [01:41]
B
On top of it for sure.
- [01:42]
C
So tell me what is going on with you? We know you have really cool news.
- [01:48]
D
So I also have just joined the podcasting game and have just recently released the first episode came out on Tuesday for a podcast called Economics Echo being, you know, things that are rippling effect out there. And the idea is that, you know, policy developments, concerns among the voting public, like where did our manufacturing jobs go? Why is China stealing all our stuff? You know, developments or deteriorations of international institutions like this doesn't happen overnight. They have roots in history, and it really matters to understand what those roots are so we can figure out what to do about it or why we're in the situation we're in. So this podcast, Economics, tries to do that.
- [02:32]
A
Hey, Aaron, this is Scott. Can you tell the audience a little bit more about how frequently you'll do this? I presume it's an interview program of some sort. So tell us who your guests might be and the topics you're expecting.
- [02:44]
D
Sure. So it's going to be in two tranches. It's a narrative podcast, which means it takes a lot of work. I've got to write scripts, I got to interview people and do a lot of research. So unfortunately, it's not on a weekly schedule for infinity time, but we're going to be releasing a new episode episode each week for the next four weeks, take a little break and then bring it back. And so the episodes cover quite a lot of interesting things. With the focus being on Asia, as I am with the Emerging Asia Economics Program, we're looking at issues that have happened in the Indo Pacific that still have impact here. So the first two episodes, it's a two parter, is on the 1997 Asian financial crisis, where we see how a currency issue in Thailand infected the entire region and almost brought down some of the world's largest economies, but also brought down governments too, and also impacted the United States. And we still see those impacts today. We also talk about the China accession to the World Trade Organization. And we also compare the anti Japanese sentiment that we saw in the 1980s when Bill was working on the Hill and saw his fellow congressman smashing Toshiba stereos in the parking lot, but comparing it to the anti Chinese sentiment that we're seeing today. And then in the second tranche, we're going to talk about the changing relationship between the US And Vietnam. We're going to be looking at the changing manufacturing issue in the United States, how a lot of that got outsourced to China, and also look at sovereign wealth funds.
- [04:13]
A
Aaron, this sounds like a really interesting set of ideas. What's the format? Can you tell the audience what they might expect? Is it an interview show? Is it a prepared show? It's like Netflix. You can binge watch it.
- [04:25]
C
Are you just going to shoot from the hip the way we do?
- [04:27]
D
I have to shoot from the hip, but I think my producer, Marla Hiller, would probably get really upset with that. I could take it in very interesting directions, but this is a narrative podcast, so it requires a lot of finessing. So that includes interviews with policymakers, journalists, scholars that experienced whatever issue we're discussing, and also how they shaped it. It also has news clips, speeches from the folks that were working on it, whether they were from the World bank or they were presidents of the United States. But we a variety of topics. So, for example, the first two episodes are on the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which talks about how a Thai currency issue basically ran rampant throughout the region and even infected, I would say, economies as far as Russia, Brazil and the United States. So I talked to Caroline Atkinson, who was working at the U.S. treasury Department during that time and was coordinating with European and World bank and IMF colleagues. I speak to Thidinan Phang Surak, who wrote his PhD thesis on how this happened in Thailand and how there are concerns that it might happen again. An Indonesian scholar who discusses how this actually brought down the Suharto government and ushered in democracy into Indonesia. So we have quite a few guests that really talk about their experiences. We also have a trade guy on two of our episodes, the great Bill Reinsch, who talks about China's accession to the wto, as well as with Wendy Cutler and the negotiator for China at the time, Ambassador Zhang. And he also talks about on an episode comparing the anti Japanese sentiment in the 1980s to the anti Chinese sentiment.
- [06:08]
B
Today that we see revealing my age, God and I are the only ones here that probably remember the 80s. But this all sounds great. I mean, it's wonderful little history lessons. And I, I love history. And you preempted my question, which was going to be, when am I on it? And you took care of that already. So I think we're all looking forward to it. And listeners can access this on the CSIS website, right?
- [06:36]
D
That's right.
- [06:36]
B
And the first episode starts what, next week or this week?
- [06:39]
D
It already started Tuesday, June 10th. The first part of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis is out. The second part, how it all resolved and what its impacts have been, will be released next Tuesday. And then you get to hear Bill the trade guy on the next two Tuesday. So, yeah, I love history as well. I love talking about this nerdy stuff and I love hearing about how Bill's congressional colleagues smashed Toshiba stereos in the congressional parking lot in the 1980s.
- [07:09]
B
I think you have a picture of that. That was a famous incident. Don't get me wrong.
- [07:13]
D
They may have photoshopped you in the back just to be like, look, see, it's Bill.
- [07:16]
B
Yeah, I was not there. That was a House of Representatives issue. I was working in the upper body at the time. We were much too dignified to do that.
- [07:26]
D
Oh, a likely story.
- [07:27]
B
Yeah. Well, yeah, it is a likely story. But anyway, thank you so much. I'm looking forward to this. This is great. And all of our listeners out there, check it out.
- [07:36]
C
Absolutely. Aaron, don't leave me with these guys.
- [07:39]
D
You know, Andrew, business calls. I got to write more scripts and, you know, get more interviews. For this podcast, but I think you're going to be fine. But thank you guys so much for having me.
- [07:49]
C
Very welcome.
- [07:50]
A
Hope you treat Bill better than Peter Navarro did.
- [07:55]
D
Sorta, yeah. Of course.
- [07:57]
B
The difference is I gave her permission and I didn't give Peter permission to use my stuff, and he did it anyway.
- [08:06]
A
There you go.
- [08:06]
B
And I've never forgiven him for that. China is not the only perpetrator of IP theft, let me tell you.
- [08:14]
C
Well, that is another matter. Aaron, thanks again.
- [08:16]
D
Thanks, Andrew.
- [08:17]
C
Guys, let's get to the news, which is extensive. Let's talk about this new US China trade framework, which I'm not sure I really understand. Do you guys understand it?
- [08:30]
B
Well, sort of. I mean, there are limitations on how much you could understand because there's no text. There may not even be one, but there certainly isn't one available. And that, by the way, fits a pattern that we're beginning to see, which is make the announcement, brag about it, and don't release the text, or at least don't release the text until later. And what happens when you do that then is that all the journalists can only write what they're being told. And what they're being told is it's great. Two or three days later, you can see the text, do an analysis. But by that time, nobody cares because Trump has moved on to the next one. I did a column on the UK deal, you know, the week after it happened, and nobody paid any attention. I mean, nobody pays any attention to my columns anyway, but nobody paid any attention to that one because Trump had moved on. It was old news. So there's not a lot of accountability on these things. But based on what has been said, I think I'd say a couple things about it. One, it really is a ceasefire, not an agreement. The agreement was that both sides agreed to do what they said they would do in Geneva on May 12, but then didn't do. So it's a return basically saying, yeah, we meant it on May 12th and now we're serious, and now we're going to do it. Well, we'll see. There was a lot of mutual recrimination post May 12 as to both sides saying the other one was not meeting its commitments. There are different interpretations of why that is. So I think there was agreement that that was so that people were not following through. There are different interpretations. Why? For those of you that want to get into the weeds of that, I recommend a forthcoming piece by Scott Kennedy, our China Economic Scholar here. This one appears in Foreign Policy Magazine. So when it comes out, which I hope will be soon. Take a look at it. But basically it takes it back to before the May 12 fell apart. There appear to be two trade offs. One is magnets for students. The United States agreed to let Chinese students go to school here, graduate school here. And the Chinese agreed to resume shipping industrial magnets, which are really critical for our automobile industry and a number of other high tech products. And we were running out. That one seems pretty clear. According to Commerce Secretary Lutnick. The second one appears to be rare earths for export controls. That is, the Chinese will resume shipping some, maybe all that's not clear. Rare earths? Yeah.
- [10:58]
C
Does it include magnets?
- [11:00]
B
The magnets and the students are one deal. The rare earths and the export controls appear to be the other deal, that they will restart shipping rare earths again. And we in turn said we would remove some export controls. The United States has not been specific about which ones. It appears to be the ones that they imposed post 5-12-From the US point of view, in retaliation for the Chinese slow rolling the export of magnets and rare earths, which they said they would do starting on May 12th. Those particular ones are a directive on chip software design products and one related to technology for Chinese commercial aircraft. So whether they will also withdraw a directive that came out the day after May 12, which told the world basically that the new Huawei chip was subject to US Export control jurisdiction and they shouldn't buy it, which irritated the Chinese. It's not clear to me whether they're getting rid of that one or not. But basically it sort of says, you know, we meant it on May 12, and now we're actually going to do it. I think the thing that people will be talking about, I think, I'm sure Scott has a view on, is whether this indicates a change in the relative positions of the two parties. What China has demonstrated, I think, is that it has, unlike Trump telling Zelenskyy that Trump has all the cards. China's just got finished demonstrating that they've got cards and they're important cards. They have stuff that we, in the short run, can't get anywhere else and can't process anywhere else. So it allows them to, I think, leverage us in ways that they had previously only hinted at or signaled at. And now they've kind of brought out the bazooka. And it'll be interesting to see where that goes. And then I'll stop rambling and turn it over to Scott.
- [12:50]
A
Yes, well, Bill's the expert on export control, so I'm glad He covered that piece of it. There's apparently a cap on tariffs as well. Yes, the cycle of tariff escalation was capped at current levels. So I think that's an important element of clarity for traders. That's a part that's quite important. And second, I would just review that. This is a long multi year project, in the mind, at least of some of the administration figures. Today, before a congressional hearing, Treasury Secretary Bessant talked about the key issue for the world economy over the next few years is whether the United States and China can rebalance their trading relationship to something that is acceptable to both sides. He described that in a fair amount of detail about what that meant and what he expected. But while Bill gave an accurate estimate of where they are now, I expect this to be ongoing. I think they're going to continue to work it. Think of it as a commercial real estate development that you've got an initial contract, but there's going to be lots of amendments to the contract over the five year construction cycle. So there's work to be done here. Bill's right. It's a little frustrating that we don't know all the details, but there does seem to be enough of a China deal to call it one. And I think that will at least provide importers some clarity on what to expect.
- [14:08]
B
Well, that's a good point. I mean, it does not solve any of the fundamental differences.
- [14:12]
A
Oh, no, no.
- [14:13]
B
That the two parties have. It kicks the can basically dating from May 12th. Trump provide a 90 day window to further resolve issues, which takes them to August 12th, I think, or 13, something like that. We'll see what happens during that period. My guess is in the short run, nothing aside from implementing what they agreed to on Monday and Tuesday because the same people on the US Side are preoccupied with the shorter deadline, which is the July 8 deadline for all the other countries. And so they're going to try to bring those to a conclusion. So I suspect China will wait a bit. But for those of you that spend a lot of time thinking about China and working on China, there's going to be a lot of commentary on whether this shifts the leverage in the relationship. And I think the US View for a long time has been that we were in the top position because the Chinese economy was in trouble. We were their biggest destination for their exports. It's an export based economy. If we threatened to cut that off, they'd fold. Well, they didn't fold. And not only did they not fold, they found counter leverage. And it's kind of a lesson there because it suggests that, I mean, they're a big country. Not a surprise that they have some leverage. But it's a reminder even to smaller countries that sometimes they have things, maybe a particular critical mineral or two or a particular technology that nobody else has, and that gives them a significance that might be much greater than their macroeconomic weight in the global system. So I hope it's a lesson for the Trump administration to see that these things are more complicated than they might think. And just the sheer size of the US Economy is not necessarily going to be decisive in every case.
- [15:52]
A
Some may take that, but I'm not sure that's the lesson they're picking up. And look, the President's unconventional in a lot of ways. As a political officeholder, he's pretty nonlinear when it comes to these sorts of things. But what I've noticed is now that there's a IPA case at the Court of International Trade, that appeal and similar district court case that could have enjoined the President are now just the appeals processes going forward without any injunction. So that gives the President somewhat of a free hand. The other thing is the economic reports are basically proving the doomsayers, if not wrong, perhaps premature or exaggerated. But, you know, you step back from this and the trade deficit has been cut in half. Inflation is the lowest since 2020, and roughly at the Federal Reserve's target of 2% on an annual basis. Employment reports look very solid. The Atlanta Fed, which does the GDP now calculations, puts Q2 GDP at 3.8%. Last I looked at it overall, the country in Rasmussen polling. The right track, wrong track question. For the first time in 20 years, half the country thinks we're on the right track. So it's one of these things. Not to mention the fact that I think Congress is really loving all these tariff revenues because they don't have to raise taxes on their constituents if they've got tariff revenues to bring down the deficit. So there's a lot of things working in the President's favor at the moment, which probably likely means he's not going to take the lessons that Bill would like him to. But it's, it's going to be an interesting time to watch.
- [17:29]
C
Can we just get Bill in a meeting in the Oval Office and they can just hash this out?
- [17:33]
B
Oh, that would be a frightening prospect. I'm in the doomsayer category, a moderate doomsayer category. So I have to disagree with Scott. From the beginning, I think the doom people said this was going to be a summer Q4 problem. We've talked about this. There's been enormous stockpiling. Our trade deficit reached record levels in March because everybody was bringing in stuff in anticipation of what we have. It takes time to work all that through the economy. So I'm not surprised that we haven't seen an impact yet. The other reason why we haven't seen an impact, don't Forget, is the April 2 Liberation Day tariffs haven't gone into effect. The only thing that's in effect is 10%.
- [18:14]
A
Well, the 10% is actually helping exports. It soften the dollar by about that amount and it's helping revenue.
- [18:21]
B
Exactly. If and when, and they may not happen, this gets back to the taco issue. But if the threatened tariffs go into effect and you get into the 30, 40, 50 range with a bunch of countries and when the sectoral tariffs come in, Trump just today, we're recording this on Thursday, June 12, said in the near future he's going to have to raise car tariffs to 50% in order to guarantee more manufacturing here. You know, if he carries through on these things on steel, aluminum's already at 50%, a lot of people are going.
- [18:53]
C
To be taking the bus.
- [18:54]
B
Well, yes, and that's when you're going to see the economic impact. Now, if he doesn't do it, then I think Scott's numbers will hold up, which would be good for the economy. But if he does actually do some of the things that he said he's going to do, then I think the doom people are going to be right.
- [19:09]
C
All right. Well, guys, I want to wrap this up, but I want to ask, you know, is this a stable truce? And I really still can't tell who has leverage.
- [19:18]
A
Well, is it stable? No, because there's a lot of components, a lot of elements of the economic relationship which either aren't covered or aren't being considered properly. But we got to live with this, find out what the problems are. And there's a lot of market opening in China to US Goods that is expected by the administration that there's no plan for yet. There's no, there's no specific commitments on, on the Chinese side. So there's, it's a mess at the moment. So I don't think we're resolved. I think we've got the outlines of what is going to take many months to resolve. And we do have a ceiling. So if that part holds, that probably helps the holiday season somewhat on the predictability for importers.
- [20:00]
B
And I'll respond to the second question. Who has leverage? I think the answer now is that we both do.
- [20:06]
A
Yes.
- [20:07]
B
And the lesson though of this episode really is for the Trump people because I think they thought going in that we had all the leverage and the Chinese had none. And now I think they understand or they should understand that the Chinese have some leverage too, and that needs to be factored into their calculations. Because we had automobile people and other people coming in saying we're running out of stuff, you know, and we're running out of it. And the only right now there's only one place to get it. And so that means the leverage is a lot more balanced. I mean, the other element of that is I wouldn't say the Chinese have managed their economy successfully. It's still not in good shape. But, you know, this is not a democracy in China. They've managed the people fairly well and, you know, they're soldiering on. And so if we thought that there was going to be enormous pressure internally in China and Xi Jinping to change his policies, that hasn't occurred. And I don't think it's going to occur.
- [21:03]
A
So the great Mike Tyson was right. Everybody's got a plan till they get punched in the face.
- [21:09]
B
Well, that's an. That's actually very good because my take would be we just kind of got punched in the face. There you go.
- [21:17]
C
All right, guys, I want to talk about sipa. Not to be confused with iepa. Trey, guys. After nine years of talks, Indonesia and the EU are finally moving to conclude sipa. What does this tell us both about the EU and Indonesians trade ambitions and how important is this deal for both sides?
- [21:37]
A
One of the things it says is that the trade negotiation beat goes on regardless of what's happening here in the US now for almost a decade in the 1990s, the most popular thing to do was a bilateral free trade agreement with your neighbors that didn't have much coverage. That was the path of least resistance for market opening. It helped make all these value chains that we rely on today work more effectively. This is sort of one of those. So we're kind of back in that business again. It happened in the 90s. Most of the low hanging fruit was harvested by the turn of the century. And it was quiet for a while, but now they're picking up again. So I think that's a way that many countries can, in terms of trade strategy, respond to the less predictable environment in the U.S. interestingly, when you think about it, the U.S. was not in this business very much in the 1990s because we were insisting on high standard comprehensive agreements. And everybody else was leaving their sensitive items to the side and basically making new rules for production. It worked for them. It worked, I guess, okay for us. But once again, we're back doing something different. But this is just an example of, I think what we'll see a lot of is people who are looking for ways to recapture efficiencies that U.S. policy and other sort of high tariff policies have stripped away and looking for new opportunities.
- [23:00]
B
I think that's right. Except I think Scott is using the word we a little bit too loosely. We in this case means everybody else.
- [23:07]
A
Yes. Not the United States.
- [23:09]
B
Not the United States. And so what you're seeing is EU Indonesia, EU India, trying to revive mercosur, the agreement with South American countries, primarily Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. And I think now Bolivia with Venezuela sort of suspended, trying to bring that across the finish line. There are still a number of EU countries that haven't ratified the EU Canada Agreement. They're trying to finish that one off. There's actually talk in Europe about joining tptpp, the Comprehensive Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership. Not all these things are going to happen. But what I take heart from on this is exactly what Scott said. These are a very conventional approach to trade negotiations. These negotiations, they're not gold standard FTAs. Scott is right, but they're about opening markets, they're about liberalizing trade, they're about lowering tariffs and eliminating barriers. That's what we used to do. That's what the previous four presidents before Trump did with varying degrees of success and varying degrees of enthusiasm. And the interesting thing now is they, everybody else are still doing that. So this is my column this week. I think the people that are saying globalization is dead, you know, we're moving on to a different era. I'm not sure they're right because the rest of the world is sticking with the same path that we've been on for quite some time. The problem for us is that we're on the sidelines just watching, which cannot possibly be good news for our exporters, because deals are going to be cut and we started this. They're probably cut on a preferential basis, meaning if you're not in the agreement, you don't get the benefit. And so we're not going to be in the agreements and our exporters are going to be disadvantaged.
- [24:53]
A
I made that argument a number of times, many, many years ago that the US Is falling behind in these things and we're falling behind again. But maybe the best thing to do is encourage everyone to read Bill's column.
- [25:05]
B
Did anybody Pay attention to you the first time.
- [25:07]
A
Well, we passed a few agreements, but not really.
- [25:12]
C
I take it you guys believe that with us on the sidelines, the EU is stepping into a bigger leadership role.
- [25:19]
A
Perhaps, but they're doing what's in their interest and it looks pretty conventional, but a lot of conventional things are in national interest and are in economic interest.
- [25:28]
B
I'd say they're stumbling into it. I'm not sure it's an example of leadership, but what they're doing, and, you know, it's not rocket science, the US Message is we're no longer a reliable partner. And so the obvious conclusion is find other partners and it doesn't mean abandoning the United States. I spoke this morning at the Swedish Chamber of Commerce, Swedish American Chamber of Commerce, and the same issue came up. I think I was off the record, but since I said it, I think I could safely, safely say it again. It doesn't mean you have to abandon the US And I don't think anybody is. It means just don't put all your eggs in one basket, which is a basic element, you know, and that's what's happening. I think the EU is realizing the US is important, but there are other places that we can show growth with.
- [26:14]
C
Okay, so along those lines, when you look at the UK, India and EU, India, FTAs, is India emerging as really the next big trade partner for countries seeking to diversify away from China and, and what's driving this surge?
- [26:28]
B
Well, it's certainly emerging as the next big target. You know, people like to do agreements that are big, which means meaningful economies. And India is now, in terms of people, the biggest country on earth. So sure, everybody wants to do a deal with India. I think what we're seeing is that turns out to be very difficult. The news yesterday and today has been that the US talks with India have slowed down because both sides are sticking to their positions.
- [26:54]
A
Yep.
- [26:54]
B
Scott, take it away.
- [26:55]
A
Despite India's size, scale is not easily available, particularly in the production of goods. They do scale well and other things they've done magnificently in high tech services, for instance. But by and large, because of India's federal structure, it is very difficult to scale up and get the kind of efficiencies at scale that China has offered. That made China really the center of factory Asia for a number of years. And look, it's a huge multi party democracy. They've got a process that's sluggish and requires a lot of compromise, just like ours does. So these things do take time, but that's the goal, and certainly that's the hope for India. But if you have a billion plus people who have ways to improve their living standards and to support production on a range of products, it's probably a good thing.
- [27:45]
C
So I take it we are going to be seeing the Indo Pacific region become one of the core engines of global trade in the absence of new US Trade initiatives, correct?
- [27:55]
B
Yes.
- [27:55]
A
Yes, I think that's right.
- [27:57]
B
Okay, no question.
- [27:58]
C
All right, let's talk about CPTPP for a second. It continues to attract applicants, but it seems to be a bit stalled. What's the future direction there?
- [28:07]
B
I think slow enlargement. I mean, the UK just joined. They entered at the end of last year. It gives new meaning to the term Asia Pacific, I think, since the UK is currently devoid of any physical presence there, as far as I recall. But they're in. There's a lengthening list of countries that want to be in the act of negotiation. Right now is with Costa Rica, which I think is probably will end up getting in. It's a fairly safe choice. Ecuador has expressed interest. Uruguay has talked about it, although they're not. They're on the Atlantic side of the Pacific. So I'm not quite sure. But then again, so is the uk.
- [28:43]
A
So is Britain.
- [28:44]
B
Yes. So the, the interesting ones, there's three to watch. China and Taiwan. Both applied a day apart and those are stalled. Going back to what Andrew said, I think the polite term is that what the CPTPP Secretariat has said is there is no consensus on those two, which means that, you know, one or more of the countries are objecting to going forward. So it's not clear to me where that one will go. The other one that we're all waiting to see is South Korea, which has not joined the list yet, which has talked about it frequently, both internally and externally, and has just had a change of administrations last week with the election of a new president. So we'll see if it's something that he chooses to do. He's appointed as Trade Minister Han Ku Yeo, who had been the Trade Minister in a previous administration, and you may see more interest being expressed there. That brings back a lot of historical issues though, because in order for them to get in, Japan will have to say it's okay. And the Japanese Korea relationship has been, I guess the best thing to say is uneven for more than 100 years. So we'll see. But that's the big one that we're watching. But right now I think the one act of negotiation is Costa Rica.
- [29:56]
A
Look, there are a lot of groupings and a lot of ways to get to trade liberalization in the Asia Pacific and what I learned from watching ASEAN over the years. These 10 nations with vast differences in scale and economic developments always move forward. They always move toward more open markets, even if it's slow. That's the general direction.
- [30:18]
C
Guys, great episode. Thanks for your insights today. We want to thank our colleague Erin Murphy. Everyone should listen to her new podcast. And we will be back next week with another episode of the Trade Guys to our listeners. If you have a question for the Trade Guys, write us@tradeguyssis.org that's tradeguyssis.org we'll read some of your emails and have the Trade Guys react to it. You've been listening to the Trade Guys, a CSIS podcast.