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[00:01]
A
I'm Scott.
[00:02]
B
I'm Bill and we're the Trade Guys.
[00:07]
C
You're listening to the Trade Guys, a podcast produced by CSIS where we talk about trade in terms that everyone can understand. I'm Alex Kisling, and I'm here with Scott Miller and Bill Reinsch, the CSIS Trade Guys. Thanks for listening to the Trade Guys. On today's episode, we discuss the Trump administration's proposed new tariffs on Canada, the implementation of Section 301 tariffs on more than 80 countries, and the implications of tariff provisions contained within the Russian sanctions bill currently making its way through Congress. All that and more on today's episode of the Trade Guys. All right, Trade Guys, we were off the air last week, so we've got a lot to catch up on. So let's dive right into today's episode. And the first big issue I want to cover this week is President Trump's proclamation to impose a 50% tariff on on certain goods from Canada, which would go into effect on August 19th. Scott, this was big news. So can you tell us what's driving this? And also under what authority is the president proposing these tariffs?
[01:12]
A
Yes, well, let me talk about the section of law that he used for this. And also this is the continued tension between the US And Canada on a whole range of issues, trade among them. But this was an action taken under Section 338 of the Tariff act of 1930, also known as Smoot Hawley. It was actually a direct lift from a previous Tariff act of 1922. So it's been in US law for over 100 years, but very seldom used. And I think the first thing I would say about this provision is that once again, Justice Kavanaugh, in his dissent of the IPA case that was before the Supreme Court this year, he called it once again. So, so go back to that case. Read the Justice Kavanaugh's dissent. And he identified this section among the three sections the administration was most likely to move to. Now by saying that he called it. It's clearly a present function of law, but it's not really a workaround. And that's what I thought until I read the section and looked into it. It is actually a superior tool for what the administration is trying to do. It is narrow and much narrower than an international economic emergency. But it's express authority that the President has, and the president has that express authority to add a whole series of trade actions in the case of discrimination, not really about emergencies or economic effects. It's about discrimination. And that for me is spot on. For what? The situation that we're facing with Canada, there are basically three categories of goods where this applies. First, autos, actually, autos and auto parts. The second is spirits, alcoholic beverages, and the third is dairy. In each case, I won't go into detail, but in each case, there's substantial discrimination against US products that were designed in retaliation. And so there's such that it has dramatic negative effects on U.S. exports to Canada. In the case of American whiskey and spirits, the Exports are down 81% since the action was taken, which basically, I don't know if you. How much you know about liquor in Canada, but most provinces, I think all provinces run their own. It's a state monopoly selling liquor, so their state ritual coordination are very high. But in any case, this amounts to first, only about 5% of total U.S. exports to Canada. They avoided some of the sectors which would be where we'd have the most need or the US consumer would be disrupted, specifically energy, potash, the ingredient in fertilizer. They excluded critical minerals. They excluded civil aircraft, which is part of a WTO dispute. And they also excluded all the categories covered already by section 232. So pretty clearly they're firmly in place. This is a section of law. While it has not been used, this is a quite literal reading of what the section authorizes and who has control. And they're following it to the letter. The question I have is, what does Canada want? This is the part that. So I actually think the Trump administration is on pretty firm ground doing what they're doing. The response of Canada is somewhat puzzling because they're usually quite pragmatic when it comes time to a decision. Just because they're so reliant on the US for all their exports. We're so deeply integrated with them, and they can wind up. They're sort of out in real trouble if they don't try to find compromises. They're usually pretty darn good at it. But now you have the only G7 economy which is in recession technically, is Canada. And the responses are still sort of a lot of domestic politics in place of negotiation and proposals. So I know, and I know that's what the US Is doing. The US Is on pretty firm ground, as I see it. I'm not sure what Canada is doing and how this gets resolved. Bill, you may have a better idea.
[04:58]
C
So, Bill, what do the Canadians want here and what's been the response so far?
[05:01]
B
I have a slightly different point of view than Scott. I think three things. First, what a shock. Their irony abounds in all these things. And the great irony in this particular case is the discriminatory things that Trump is complaining about are exactly the Canadian retaliation for U.S. tariffs. In other words, he is complaining about a problem that he created. The Canadians reacted and the reason they reacted I think has something that I wanted to get to in our podcast with Diego Marroquin. And we didn't have enough time. And so I'll mention it now, and that is that I think the US Is misreading Canadian politics on this. And there's a difference between the Canadian political situation and the Mexican political situation in Mexico. Diego thinks that the Mexican business community and the Mexican government wants to try to accommodate Trump. They don't want to rock the boat. They've been down this road in the past and this is their approach in Canada, where the prime minister is in less secure position than the Mexican president who's been elected as one term only and has an overwhelming majority in the legislature. Prime Minister Carney, as of, I think four months ago, now has a one or two seat majority in the Parliament. He's brand new. Canadians are deeply offended by what the United States has done. And it's good politics in Canada to attack the United States right now. The liquor bans were not and exactly. Scott said the liquor bans came from the provinces. This was not a federal. The federal government doesn't have authority to do that to begin with. And the federal government didn't recommend it. It was provincial leaders deciding on their own that they were going to do it. And by the way, it's also individual Canadian consumers. They decided they were not going to buy American spirits. So there's a real question about, even if this was removed, whether it would make any difference as far as actual sales were concerned right now. But the dilemma, I think for Trump is that for Carney, pushing back on the Americans is good politics in Canada. And the harder Trump pushes Canada, the harder it is for Carney to make concessions and I think does not push us in a good direction. It's a different politics than in Mexico and it's something that is going to make it much more difficult for the Canadians to do what Trump wants.
[07:15]
A
Now, recessions aren't under good politics anywhere, last I checked.
[07:19]
B
Well, exactly.
[07:20]
A
So Canadian recession is probably not good for Prime Minister Carney.
[07:23]
B
It's not good for anybody. He's got a little while before he has to have an election, but he's got a narrow majority in the Parliament and he's got a lot of people who are cranky about what's going on in the United States about us.
[07:34]
A
Yeah.
[07:34]
B
Longtime listeners, by the way, may remember Olivia's predecessor, Evan Brown, who I happened to see yesterday. And he was just back from a lengthy road trip which took him to Alberta, among other places. And he said that everybody was very nice to it. Just report Canadians remain being nice to individual Americans, but they're not very happy about the United States. In addition to the irony, I think two more things. I think Scott is more or less right, that about the statute, although I think it's a little more complicated than he's suggesting. The way I read the statute and since it's never been used, you know, it's first impression, you know, there will be lawsuit, of course.
[08:11]
C
Yep.
[08:11]
B
So we'll find out what the courts think eventually. But what the statute seems to require is basically discrimination specifically against the United States. In other words, a market barrier that doesn't let anything in from other countries doesn't count. They have to treat the US Differently from everybody else. And I think if you look at the liquor test, it meets that test. And if you look at automobiles, I think it meets that test. I'm not so sure about dairy. I think dairy. The US Is the primary victim of Canadian tariff dairy policy, no question. But I'm not sure that the dairy policy is actually phrased in such a way as explicitly discriminate against the US
[08:48]
A
I actually disagree with that, though, particularly on cheese. European cheese has a much easier time of it than American cheese.
[08:54]
B
Why?
[08:54]
A
From an import standpoint, some of that is regulatory, but there is discrimination on cheese as well.
[08:59]
B
Okay. Well, not knowing anything about cheese in Canada, I will temporarily concede the point. The final point is that because the statute also contains a mandatory 30 day waiting period, none of this goes into effect until August 19th. And that's convenient because there's a widespread feeling in the trade community this is another Trump leverage move.
[09:20]
C
Sure. Yeah.
[09:21]
B
And my column this week, if anybody
[09:23]
A
gets it, it's got a month to
[09:24]
B
resolve it, talks about that. And now they got 30 days to try to figure it out.
[09:28]
A
Sure.
[09:28]
B
And so I'm a little skeptical that these things will actually end up happening. There may be a deal cut. It does create the opportunity in which you can be sure we will exploit for another taco moment where Trump chickens out once again and settles for something that is less than the 50% that he demanded. We'll see.
[09:46]
C
Scott, what are the chances this goes forward?
[09:49]
A
I think it's fairly high. Only because the hostility toward the Trump administration and U.S. policy in general is high enough that it's excluded pragmatism, which maybe it'll return all of a sudden, but we're not dealing constructively as we have over a very long period of time, despite occasional upsets which happen in any relationship. So something's different now. My sense is I can't quantify it. I can't give you chapter and verse, but my sense is it's more likely to get worse before it gets better.
[10:17]
B
Okay. I was intrigued to see that the Machinists union and the United Steel Workers, both of which are unions that have Canadian and U.S. members, have Trump urging him to think very carefully about imposing further tariffs on their items, which are steel and machinery and things like that. With respect to Canada, the letter was pretty clear in suggesting that they don't think additional tariffs on Canada are good for their members and they don't think it's good for the US Economy. So the natives are a bit restless there. And people that have supported Trump, like the steelworkers down the line on tariffs, are beginning to make a distinction with Canada. And that's, I think, an interesting development.
[10:55]
C
That's interesting. Well, I hope our erstwhile colleague Evan Brown had a wonderful time picking up his liquor and cheese in Alberta. And we, we miss him on this show. I want to move on to another big item that has come up, of course, since we last recorded an episode, and that's the Section 301 tariffs. The Trump administration, of course, just hit more than 80 countries with the new tariffs from anywhere from 10 to 12 and a half percent. And they took effect right as the section 122 tariffs were set to expire. Bill, I'm going to turn to you first. What's been the reaction since these tariffs went into effect on the 24th of July?
[11:28]
B
We've talked about this a number of times before, and our expectation was, you know, that this is just replacement for the IPA tariffs that were invalidated and that he would end up, he, Trump, would end up doing, finding a way to impose them. So they were more or less the same. They're beginning to do the final announcement which went into effect July 24, which was as the 122 tariffs were expiring. So there was no gap, which is one of the things that I had speculated about, which will make all the customs authorities happy because now they don't have to rearrange the tariff schedules twice. They only have to rearrange it once. They've made some tweaks. And so what they did was not exactly what they originally proposed, which I thought was kind of interesting. I don't know what it means, but it was interesting. And I'm grateful to Peter Harrell who has this he own substack. And if you don't get Peter's substack, maybe you should because it always has interesting thoughts in it. And he's actually went through the original proposals and noted a number of differences. First of all, there were some countries that shifted the rate. You remember the original proposal was 10% or 12.5%. And the 10% were for countries that had laws on forced labor but weren't enforcing them adequately. And the 12.5% were for countries that didn't even have the law. So it turns out that there's been some revision. So India, Sri Lanka and Honduras moved down from 12 and a half to 10%, which USTR said had something to do with things they discovered after the original proposal. Meanwhile, several countries, Japan, Korea and Switzerland moved up from 10% to 12 and a half percent. So I'm not quite clear why that happened, but there it is. They moved because their 122 tariff was 10%, but they're back in the 12.5% category now. In addition, the administration made a distinction between some countries where the new rate, the forced labor rate, is stacked on top of the existing MFN rate, which is, you know, give or take 3%, depends on what the item is. And in some countries they've embedded the underlying MFN rate into the 301 rate. So basically the EU, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Switzerland get a bit of a break because their 12.5% or 10% as the case may be, is not stacked on top of the normal US tariff. It's the total is 10 or 12 and a half percent with the three or so, whatever it is, embedded into it. Everybody else has it stacked on top, which means they're going to be a little bit at a disadvantage. There were also more exclusions than were originally proposed, mostly agricultural products, some metal related products, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which would be no surprise. So there is, you know, it's gotten fine tuned. Might be the best thing to say about it. There will be litigation, as we expected. One lawsuit has already been filed by two small businessmen and there is one that if it hasn't been filed yet, it will soon will be by, I think the same group of Democratic attorneys general that went after the section 122 tariffs and got thrown out of that case for lack of standing. So we'll see what happens this time around.
[14:38]
C
We've talked about that in the past. Bill, you still feel that 301 is more durable from a legal standpoint than other things that we've seen in court?
[14:46]
B
Well, yes, it goes back to what Scott said about 338. It is explicit tariff authority. So the argument that the court used on IPA, which is the court concluded that IEEPA didn't authorize tariffs. That argument is not relevant to 301. But you know, you can see the vultures are circling on this already. Knives are out for the administration and the argument is going to be, I think, largely on how sketchy the investigation was. And this is something that point we made several weeks ago. The absence of any real proof of what these countries are doing. And the report simply resorts to assertions. And this will be picked up by the plaintiffs however they decide to sign their case and say it's all really fake. You know, it's a scam designed simply to reimpose the tariffs. The investigations were not real. I don't know if the court will buy that. Clearly the President has the authority to oppose tariffs. I think Peter Harrell's comment was that, yeah, that's true, but he's kind of turned the statute on its head. The statute 301 was designed to basically give the United States leverage to deal with very specific individual cases.
[15:54]
C
Yeah, let's get Scott.
[15:55]
A
These things are very fact intensive. It's not so much an overall error on the part of the administration. The plaintiffs will have to show on a case by case basis where the administration erred. And look, I agree with Bill's comments about this. Looks fishy. I mean, every time I read about the rates imposed and the rationale, I hear the voice of the Queen of Heart from Alice in Wonderland. You know, it's like sentence first, trial later. We'll get the verdict when we feel like it.
[16:21]
B
Isn't she the one that said off with our heads? Well, here we are.
[16:24]
A
Yes, sentence first. That was the key complaint. You know, we don't need no stinking verdict.
[16:30]
B
Well, this is what we've both said about Trump from time to time is his strategy is ready, fire, aim.
[16:35]
A
And we're seeing that again, it's express authority. So that's the reason it might well be sustained. Just because, simply put, the President has express power to impose tariffs in these situations. So they're following the rules as best they can. And that's, that's where we are.
[16:51]
C
I want to just sticking with 301, there's been some signaling that there could be another Round coming down the pike here, I think, on, you know, 15 countries plus the EU related to what the administration I think is calling unfair manufacturing practices. What do you know about that?
[17:05]
B
It's coming.
[17:06]
A
That's the excess capacity investigation that's been going on for some time now. So, yes, that is the second tranche that has different timetables, but it's been in play all along.
[17:15]
B
It's coming. Ambassador Greer hinted that it was imminent. It's going to create a dilemma, I think, for the administration because I think all. Well, it's 15 countries plus the EU, so I'll just say 16 to make it simple. I think all 16 are also subject to the forced labor tariffs. And what apparently the rumor is. And I think rumors on this are coming from other countries where there have been discussions. The rumor is that Ambassador Greer is telling countries with which we have trade agreements, which would be the eu, the UK and several others where they've already been signed and negotiated, that the intent is to not have the US Tariffs go higher than what the US Agreed to in those negotiations. So for Japan, Korea, the EU would be 15%. For the UK it would be 10%. Well, with the forced labor tariffs, they're already bumping up against that. You know, they haven't exceeded it, but they're bumping up right close to it at 12 and a half or 10. And if you add in now an overcapacity tariff, it gives the United States very little margin to add on an additional penalty without exceeding the limit they committed to last year in these agreements and without exceeding what Ambassador Greer has been telling these countries they're going to do. So, you know, maybe with Trump, you know, agreements are always temporary, subject to change at whim.
[18:34]
A
This is confusing for everybody. Monday of this week, this is July 30th. So this past Monday was the one year anniversary of the Turnberry agreements with Europe. How we do it there, we're still shuffling our feet on those things.
[18:46]
B
Yeah, and there's where we agreed to 15%. And if you throw in right now with the forced labor tariffs, they're at 12 and a half. So that doesn't give you much room between 12 and a half and 15 to impose an additional penalty on the EU for overcapacity. Now that does create an interesting possibility that the administration might actually play that investigation straight and find some of these countries innocent. That would be a remarkable development. It would be fun to watch. If somebody gets off the hook, that'll be cool.
[19:15]
C
I want to clear one thing if we can, and I'M not sure that we can, but our more astute listeners who've been listening to us over the past few months know that whenever we talk about 301, we've mentioned 60 countries. And yet a lot of the reporting around 301, as it went into effect on the 24th, mentioned 80 countries. Do we have any sense of where that gulf is between the 60 countries and the 80 countries? We were debating this as we led up to today's show, and I'm not sure we ever landed on an answer. But Bill or Scott, if anybody has a guess there, I'd welcome it.
[19:44]
B
Well, our diligent researchers have been working on this night and day since Monday with no definitive result. I think the one thing we realized is that if you count countries, it's probably 86, because the 60 counts the EU as one, and the EU, in fact, from a country standpoint is 27. So if you think about it that way, it's 59 plus 27, which adds up to 86. Now the New York Times consistently says it's 80, and I have no idea how they get to 80. I can see how they get to 86, and I can see how it's 60. I don't see how it's 80, but it's more than 80 from a strictly country standpoint. So there it is. That's the best I can do. Scott, do you have an answer?
[20:28]
A
Yes. That's as good as we're going to get. In the world of trade, there is no European Union. There's only the European communities. And because they negotiate as a customs union, they are individual members of the World Trade Organization as well as the bloc itself, ec, as they call it, there is a member. And so the counting is different almost everywhere. Sort of like knowing the number of government agencies in the US Federal government. I don't think there's a reputable number on that. So.
[20:54]
C
Okay. Well, if that's as good as we're going to get, I'm going to tell the researchers to put their pencils down for this one. But I want to turn to our final big topic of this week, and that's the Russia and Iran sanctions bill that passed the Senate by a wide margin earlier this week. And within that legislation are provisions granting the president new tariff authority, including targeting countries that import Russian energy products, which includes some of the world's largest economies, of course. So, Bill, let's start with you on this. Unpack what's in this legislation and which countries could be targeted if it were to go through in its current form.
[21:26]
B
One small correction. It hasn't passed yet. The Senate voted overwhelmingly to take the bill up.
[21:31]
C
Yes. I'm sorry. Yes.
[21:31]
B
86 to 12.
[21:33]
C
Yes. Yes, I'm sorry. Procedural.
[21:34]
B
Which, which is a sign that it is going to pass overwhelmingly, but. And probably today, Thursday, because the senators probably want to go home for the weekend. So stay tuned for that. This being the Senate, there will be amendments. And, and one interesting thing that's come up that I hadn't really thought about, but people in the Senate and in the House for that matter, who've been reading the bill rather closely have pointed out that it gives the President significant new tariff authority, which is not really what a lot of people in Congress want to give him right now because they believe, privately or publicly, that he's misusing the authority he's already got. What the bill says is that the President can impose tariffs up to 500% on Russian imports, which actually may be symbolic more than anything else because we don't have much trade with Russia right now for obvious reasons. And the trade we do have is fertilizer ingredients and some minerals, neither of which I think the President really wants to impose a 500% tariff on, unless he wants to get the farmers even angrier with him than they already are. But it also contains authority for the President to levy up to 100% tariffs on countries. The five countries that buy the most Russian oil and gas, and Those are about 80% of the Russian oil and gas is bought by China and India, China roughly half, and India another 30 plus percent after that. You've got Turkey, LNG in the case of France, and a third fifth one that I'm blanking on at the moment. It's probably not that significant a provision. It's a practical matter. I mean, the President may want to depose 100% tariffs on France because he's mad at Macron about something, but I don't see this being huge. But what? Senator Wyden, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and his House counterpart, Richard Neal. Wyden's not the chairman. The ranking member of the Finance Committee and the ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee, Congressman Neal from Massachusetts, both have flagged this as a major expansion of presidential tariff authority, which they think would be a huge mistake given the way that Trump, in their view, has misused the existing tariff authority. So I think we can expect an amendment on this on the floor from wide and colleagues of like mind, and then we'll see what happens. I mean, there's lots of steps in between deleting this one amendment would be that don't let him do it without congressional approval. And Senator Wyden and Senator Neal actually have introduced bills separately to clean up some of the existing statutes because they think that the president has. Is overusing his authority and conveniently that the legislation they've introduced would repeal what we've been talking about, repeal section 338. It would repeal section 122, and it would try to get a better congressional handle on what's going on on trade. So I would expect an amendment on this. Don't know if it'll pass. The Republicans may be locked into passing the bill as is, as a memorial to the late Senator Lindsey Graham. But it's an interesting development that shows that, you know, once again, the natives are kind of restless out there. Yep.
[24:28]
A
There's some tension on this. But look, once Congress has granted an authority to the executive, it's very difficult to take it back. And I would think that this would be something that would at least get the threat of a veto. Would it arrive in the final form in an amendment that is incorporated in the bill? But there's a long way to go on this, and we'll have to see how many amendments and of what substance. There are many steps that Congress could take between withdrawing the authority entirely and leaving it as is with no constraints like advisory positions or needing specific authorization for some things and not others. There's a lot of work to be done.
[25:06]
B
Well, and it's moving slowly because this is Senate action. The Senate may pass it because the Senate's in this week and next. The House has gone away until September and they still have to act on it. So this is not going to move very quickly.
[25:17]
A
Fortunately, the trade guys are not taking an August recess.
[25:20]
C
Given all the news, Bill is foregoing his usual August retreat to the south of France to continue recording episodes for us. Very nice of you, Bill. We appreciate that.
[25:30]
B
Any talk.
[25:32]
C
All right, guys, we're going to leave it there today. Thanks as always to our listeners for joining us and we'll be back with you again next week. Take care. Until then, thank you.
[25:39]
B
Thank you.
[25:45]
C
You've been listening to the Tray, guys, a CSIS podcast. For more audio content, visit csis.orgpodcasts thanks for tuning in.

Summary5 min read

The Trade Guys – “Tariffs, Tariffs, Tariffs: Sections 338 & 301 and the Russia Sanctions Bill”

CSIS | August 3, 2026
Hosts: Scott Miller, Bill Reinsch
Moderator: Alex Kisling

Episode Overview

This episode dives deep into the Trump administration's latest moves on tariffs, specifically:

The newly announced 50% tariffs on select Canadian imports (under Section 338).
The implementation of sweeping Section 301 tariffs on over 80 countries.
New tariff authorities included in the Russia and Iran sanctions bill. The hosts discuss the legal authorities, international reactions, political maneuvering, and broader economic and diplomatic implications of these actions.

1. Trump’s New Tariffs on Canada (Section 338)

Background & Legal Authority

Scott: Highlights the use of Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Smoot-Hawley), rarely invoked but a “superior tool” for targeting discrimination against U.S. goods, not just emergencies.

“It is actually a superior tool for what the administration is trying to do ... it’s about discrimination.” (01:49)
Section 338 applies when there is “discrimination” specifically against U.S. products. It covers three main categories: autos/auto parts, spirits, and dairy.

Impacted Sectors

Significant impact on American whiskey and spirits (exports down 81% post-Canadian retaliation).
Exclusions made for energy, potash, critical minerals, civil aircraft, and Section 232-covered goods.

Canadian Response & Political Context

Bill: Points out the irony—the discrimination Trump complains about is retaliation for previous U.S. tariffs:

“He is complaining about a problem that he created. The Canadians reacted…” (05:08)
Canadian politics matter:
- Prime Minister Carney’s weak parliamentary majority; leveraging anti-U.S. sentiment is “good politics” in recession-era Canada.
- Provincial, not federal, origin of liquor bans. Even if lifted, consumer sentiment may keep U.S. spirits out.
Key Quote:

“For Carney, pushing back on the Americans is good politics in Canada. And the harder Trump pushes Canada, the harder it is for Carney to make concessions…” (06:38)
Dispute over dairy:
- Scott: “European cheese has a much easier time of it than American cheese.” (08:47)
- Bill concedes the point, noting he’s “not knowing anything about cheese in Canada…” (08:59)
Mandatory 30-day waiting period before tariffs effective (through August 19th), seen as a window for negotiation (“another Trump leverage move”).

U.S. Domestic Reactions

Notably, unions like the Machinists and United Steel Workers—with members on both sides of the border—have warned against further tariffs on Canadian goods.

Memorable Moment

Scott’s prediction: “It’s more likely to get worse before it gets better.” (09:48)

2. The New Section 301 Tariffs on 80+ Countries

What’s Happened?

The Trump administration imposed Section 301 tariffs (10% or 12.5%) on over 80 countries on July 24th, coinciding with the expiration of previous Section 122 tariffs to “prevent a gap.”

Adjustments & Tweaks

Some countries’ rates shifted after review (India, Sri Lanka, Honduras down to 10%; Japan, Korea, Switzerland up to 12.5%).
Special treatment for trade agreement partners—EU, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Switzerland—whose new rates do not stack on top of their MFN (most-favored-nation) rates, unlike the rest.
Additional product exclusions: Focused on agriculture, metals, semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

“So there is, you know, it’s gotten fine tuned. Might be the best thing to say about it.” (13:47)

Legal & Political Analysis

Bill: Section 301’s legal grounding is “more durable” than prior authorities (like the IPA) since it provides explicit tariff power. Nonetheless, lawsuits are already being filed over the investigation’s rigor.
Scott: Points out the administration’s process seems hasty and politically driven:

“Every time I read about the rates imposed and the rationale, I hear the voice of the Queen of Hearts from Alice in Wonderland… sentence first, trial later.” (15:55)
Bill: “His [Trump’s] strategy is ready, fire, aim.” (16:29)

Forthcoming Section 301 Actions

Another “tranche” (round) is in the works, targeting additional countries (15+ EU) over “unfair manufacturing practices” and “excess capacity.”
Potential issues: With current forced labor tariffs close to negotiated caps (e.g., 15% for the EU), there’s little room to raise tariffs further on these partners.

3. Russia and Iran Sanctions Bill – New Tariff Authorities

Legislative Status & Core Provisions

Status: Senate voted (86–12) to take up the bill, not yet passed; House action pending September.
Would allow:
- Up to 500% tariffs on Russian imports (largely symbolic given low U.S.-Russia trade).
- Up to 100% tariffs on the top five importers of Russian energy—China, India, Turkey, France, and another minor country.

Congressional Concerns

Surprise and concern among members:

“It gives the President significant new tariff authority, which is not really what a lot of people in Congress want to give him right now because they believe, privately or publicly, that he’s misusing the authority he’s already got.” (21:33)
Senators Wyden and Congressman Neal are pushing amendments to restrict this authority or require Congressional approval.

Outlook

Scott: “Once Congress has granted an authority to the executive, it’s very difficult to take it back.” (24:28)
The bill’s progress may be slow—Senate could pass soon, but the House is on recess until September.

4. Miscellaneous & Listener-Focused Insights

Country-Counting Confusion

Alex references discrepancy: “80” vs “60” countries hit by Section 301 tariffs.
Bill’s answer: If you count the EU as 27 separate members (instead of one unit), you reach 86 countries. The NYT’s “80” figure remains unexplained.

“...in trade, there is no European Union, there’s only the European communities.” (20:27)

Tone & Notable Exchange

Trademark “Trade Guys” blend of in-depth analysis, dry humor, and gentle disagreement (e.g., cheese debates, Alice in Wonderland references).
Quote:

“The strategy is ready, fire, aim. And we’re seeing that again.” – Bill (16:29)

Important Timestamps

Trump’s Canada tariffs & Section 338 explained: 01:11 – 04:57
Canadian reaction & political dynamics: 05:00 – 10:16
Section 301 tariffs on 80+ countries—details and legality: 11:28 – 16:50
Upcoming 301 actions & the problem of tariff 'stacking': 16:50 – 19:44
Counting countries confusion: 19:44 – 20:53
Russia/Iran sanctions bill and expanded tariff authority: 21:25 – 25:05
Legislative outlook and Congressional pushback: 25:05 – 25:31

Conclusion

This episode provides critical insights into the shifting landscape of U.S. trade policy:

The Trump administration’s use of obscure but potent tariff authority (Section 338) to ramp up pressure on Canada.
The expansive and swiftly evolving application of Section 301 tariffs, with global and domestic legal/political consequences.
Growing Congressional discomfort with unbridled presidential tariff powers, particularly as new sanctions bills threaten to extend those authorities.
Throughout, the hosts stress the complex interplay between legal mechanisms, international politics, and U.S. domestic interests—leavened with their signature candor and wit.

Recommended for listeners seeking a clear, expert, and accessible breakdown of the biggest trade stories shaping U.S. policy and global markets.

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Transcript60 lines

[00:01]
A
I'm Scott.
[00:02]
B
I'm Bill and we're the Trade Guys.
[00:07]
C
You're listening to the Trade Guys, a podcast produced by CSIS where we talk about trade in terms that everyone can understand. I'm Alex Kisling, and I'm here with Scott Miller and Bill Reinsch, the CSIS Trade Guys. Thanks for listening to the Trade Guys. On today's episode, we discuss the Trump administration's proposed new tariffs on Canada, the implementation of Section 301 tariffs on more than 80 countries, and the implications of tariff provisions contained within the Russian sanctions bill currently making its way through Congress. All that and more on today's episode of the Trade Guys. All right, Trade Guys, we were off the air last week, so we've got a lot to catch up on. So let's dive right into today's episode. And the first big issue I want to cover this week is President Trump's proclamation to impose a 50% tariff on on certain goods from Canada, which would go into effect on August 19th. Scott, this was big news. So can you tell us what's driving this? And also under what authority is the president proposing these tariffs?
[01:12]
A
Yes, well, let me talk about the section of law that he used for this. And also this is the continued tension between the US And Canada on a whole range of issues, trade among them. But this was an action taken under Section 338 of the Tariff act of 1930, also known as Smoot Hawley. It was actually a direct lift from a previous Tariff act of 1922. So it's been in US law for over 100 years, but very seldom used. And I think the first thing I would say about this provision is that once again, Justice Kavanaugh, in his dissent of the IPA case that was before the Supreme Court this year, he called it once again. So, so go back to that case. Read the Justice Kavanaugh's dissent. And he identified this section among the three sections the administration was most likely to move to. Now by saying that he called it. It's clearly a present function of law, but it's not really a workaround. And that's what I thought until I read the section and looked into it. It is actually a superior tool for what the administration is trying to do. It is narrow and much narrower than an international economic emergency. But it's express authority that the President has, and the president has that express authority to add a whole series of trade actions in the case of discrimination, not really about emergencies or economic effects. It's about discrimination. And that for me is spot on. For what? The situation that we're facing with Canada, there are basically three categories of goods where this applies. First, autos, actually, autos and auto parts. The second is spirits, alcoholic beverages, and the third is dairy. In each case, I won't go into detail, but in each case, there's substantial discrimination against US products that were designed in retaliation. And so there's such that it has dramatic negative effects on U.S. exports to Canada. In the case of American whiskey and spirits, the Exports are down 81% since the action was taken, which basically, I don't know if you. How much you know about liquor in Canada, but most provinces, I think all provinces run their own. It's a state monopoly selling liquor, so their state ritual coordination are very high. But in any case, this amounts to first, only about 5% of total U.S. exports to Canada. They avoided some of the sectors which would be where we'd have the most need or the US consumer would be disrupted, specifically energy, potash, the ingredient in fertilizer. They excluded critical minerals. They excluded civil aircraft, which is part of a WTO dispute. And they also excluded all the categories covered already by section 232. So pretty clearly they're firmly in place. This is a section of law. While it has not been used, this is a quite literal reading of what the section authorizes and who has control. And they're following it to the letter. The question I have is, what does Canada want? This is the part that. So I actually think the Trump administration is on pretty firm ground doing what they're doing. The response of Canada is somewhat puzzling because they're usually quite pragmatic when it comes time to a decision. Just because they're so reliant on the US for all their exports. We're so deeply integrated with them, and they can wind up. They're sort of out in real trouble if they don't try to find compromises. They're usually pretty darn good at it. But now you have the only G7 economy which is in recession technically, is Canada. And the responses are still sort of a lot of domestic politics in place of negotiation and proposals. So I know, and I know that's what the US Is doing. The US Is on pretty firm ground, as I see it. I'm not sure what Canada is doing and how this gets resolved. Bill, you may have a better idea.
[04:58]
C
So, Bill, what do the Canadians want here and what's been the response so far?
[05:01]
B
I have a slightly different point of view than Scott. I think three things. First, what a shock. Their irony abounds in all these things. And the great irony in this particular case is the discriminatory things that Trump is complaining about are exactly the Canadian retaliation for U.S. tariffs. In other words, he is complaining about a problem that he created. The Canadians reacted and the reason they reacted I think has something that I wanted to get to in our podcast with Diego Marroquin. And we didn't have enough time. And so I'll mention it now, and that is that I think the US Is misreading Canadian politics on this. And there's a difference between the Canadian political situation and the Mexican political situation in Mexico. Diego thinks that the Mexican business community and the Mexican government wants to try to accommodate Trump. They don't want to rock the boat. They've been down this road in the past and this is their approach in Canada, where the prime minister is in less secure position than the Mexican president who's been elected as one term only and has an overwhelming majority in the legislature. Prime Minister Carney, as of, I think four months ago, now has a one or two seat majority in the Parliament. He's brand new. Canadians are deeply offended by what the United States has done. And it's good politics in Canada to attack the United States right now. The liquor bans were not and exactly. Scott said the liquor bans came from the provinces. This was not a federal. The federal government doesn't have authority to do that to begin with. And the federal government didn't recommend it. It was provincial leaders deciding on their own that they were going to do it. And by the way, it's also individual Canadian consumers. They decided they were not going to buy American spirits. So there's a real question about, even if this was removed, whether it would make any difference as far as actual sales were concerned right now. But the dilemma, I think for Trump is that for Carney, pushing back on the Americans is good politics in Canada. And the harder Trump pushes Canada, the harder it is for Carney to make concessions and I think does not push us in a good direction. It's a different politics than in Mexico and it's something that is going to make it much more difficult for the Canadians to do what Trump wants.
[07:15]
A
Now, recessions aren't under good politics anywhere, last I checked.
[07:19]
B
Well, exactly.
[07:20]
A
So Canadian recession is probably not good for Prime Minister Carney.
[07:23]
B
It's not good for anybody. He's got a little while before he has to have an election, but he's got a narrow majority in the Parliament and he's got a lot of people who are cranky about what's going on in the United States about us.
[07:34]
A
Yeah.
[07:34]
B
Longtime listeners, by the way, may remember Olivia's predecessor, Evan Brown, who I happened to see yesterday. And he was just back from a lengthy road trip which took him to Alberta, among other places. And he said that everybody was very nice to it. Just report Canadians remain being nice to individual Americans, but they're not very happy about the United States. In addition to the irony, I think two more things. I think Scott is more or less right, that about the statute, although I think it's a little more complicated than he's suggesting. The way I read the statute and since it's never been used, you know, it's first impression, you know, there will be lawsuit, of course.
[08:11]
C
Yep.
[08:11]
B
So we'll find out what the courts think eventually. But what the statute seems to require is basically discrimination specifically against the United States. In other words, a market barrier that doesn't let anything in from other countries doesn't count. They have to treat the US Differently from everybody else. And I think if you look at the liquor test, it meets that test. And if you look at automobiles, I think it meets that test. I'm not so sure about dairy. I think dairy. The US Is the primary victim of Canadian tariff dairy policy, no question. But I'm not sure that the dairy policy is actually phrased in such a way as explicitly discriminate against the US
[08:48]
A
I actually disagree with that, though, particularly on cheese. European cheese has a much easier time of it than American cheese.
[08:54]
B
Why?
[08:54]
A
From an import standpoint, some of that is regulatory, but there is discrimination on cheese as well.
[08:59]
B
Okay. Well, not knowing anything about cheese in Canada, I will temporarily concede the point. The final point is that because the statute also contains a mandatory 30 day waiting period, none of this goes into effect until August 19th. And that's convenient because there's a widespread feeling in the trade community this is another Trump leverage move.
[09:20]
C
Sure. Yeah.
[09:21]
B
And my column this week, if anybody
[09:23]
A
gets it, it's got a month to
[09:24]
B
resolve it, talks about that. And now they got 30 days to try to figure it out.
[09:28]
A
Sure.
[09:28]
B
And so I'm a little skeptical that these things will actually end up happening. There may be a deal cut. It does create the opportunity in which you can be sure we will exploit for another taco moment where Trump chickens out once again and settles for something that is less than the 50% that he demanded. We'll see.
[09:46]
C
Scott, what are the chances this goes forward?
[09:49]
A
I think it's fairly high. Only because the hostility toward the Trump administration and U.S. policy in general is high enough that it's excluded pragmatism, which maybe it'll return all of a sudden, but we're not dealing constructively as we have over a very long period of time, despite occasional upsets which happen in any relationship. So something's different now. My sense is I can't quantify it. I can't give you chapter and verse, but my sense is it's more likely to get worse before it gets better.
[10:17]
B
Okay. I was intrigued to see that the Machinists union and the United Steel Workers, both of which are unions that have Canadian and U.S. members, have Trump urging him to think very carefully about imposing further tariffs on their items, which are steel and machinery and things like that. With respect to Canada, the letter was pretty clear in suggesting that they don't think additional tariffs on Canada are good for their members and they don't think it's good for the US Economy. So the natives are a bit restless there. And people that have supported Trump, like the steelworkers down the line on tariffs, are beginning to make a distinction with Canada. And that's, I think, an interesting development.
[10:55]
C
That's interesting. Well, I hope our erstwhile colleague Evan Brown had a wonderful time picking up his liquor and cheese in Alberta. And we, we miss him on this show. I want to move on to another big item that has come up, of course, since we last recorded an episode, and that's the Section 301 tariffs. The Trump administration, of course, just hit more than 80 countries with the new tariffs from anywhere from 10 to 12 and a half percent. And they took effect right as the section 122 tariffs were set to expire. Bill, I'm going to turn to you first. What's been the reaction since these tariffs went into effect on the 24th of July?
[11:28]
B
We've talked about this a number of times before, and our expectation was, you know, that this is just replacement for the IPA tariffs that were invalidated and that he would end up, he, Trump, would end up doing, finding a way to impose them. So they were more or less the same. They're beginning to do the final announcement which went into effect July 24, which was as the 122 tariffs were expiring. So there was no gap, which is one of the things that I had speculated about, which will make all the customs authorities happy because now they don't have to rearrange the tariff schedules twice. They only have to rearrange it once. They've made some tweaks. And so what they did was not exactly what they originally proposed, which I thought was kind of interesting. I don't know what it means, but it was interesting. And I'm grateful to Peter Harrell who has this he own substack. And if you don't get Peter's substack, maybe you should because it always has interesting thoughts in it. And he's actually went through the original proposals and noted a number of differences. First of all, there were some countries that shifted the rate. You remember the original proposal was 10% or 12.5%. And the 10% were for countries that had laws on forced labor but weren't enforcing them adequately. And the 12.5% were for countries that didn't even have the law. So it turns out that there's been some revision. So India, Sri Lanka and Honduras moved down from 12 and a half to 10%, which USTR said had something to do with things they discovered after the original proposal. Meanwhile, several countries, Japan, Korea and Switzerland moved up from 10% to 12 and a half percent. So I'm not quite clear why that happened, but there it is. They moved because their 122 tariff was 10%, but they're back in the 12.5% category now. In addition, the administration made a distinction between some countries where the new rate, the forced labor rate, is stacked on top of the existing MFN rate, which is, you know, give or take 3%, depends on what the item is. And in some countries they've embedded the underlying MFN rate into the 301 rate. So basically the EU, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Switzerland get a bit of a break because their 12.5% or 10% as the case may be, is not stacked on top of the normal US tariff. It's the total is 10 or 12 and a half percent with the three or so, whatever it is, embedded into it. Everybody else has it stacked on top, which means they're going to be a little bit at a disadvantage. There were also more exclusions than were originally proposed, mostly agricultural products, some metal related products, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which would be no surprise. So there is, you know, it's gotten fine tuned. Might be the best thing to say about it. There will be litigation, as we expected. One lawsuit has already been filed by two small businessmen and there is one that if it hasn't been filed yet, it will soon will be by, I think the same group of Democratic attorneys general that went after the section 122 tariffs and got thrown out of that case for lack of standing. So we'll see what happens this time around.
[14:38]
C
We've talked about that in the past. Bill, you still feel that 301 is more durable from a legal standpoint than other things that we've seen in court?
[14:46]
B
Well, yes, it goes back to what Scott said about 338. It is explicit tariff authority. So the argument that the court used on IPA, which is the court concluded that IEEPA didn't authorize tariffs. That argument is not relevant to 301. But you know, you can see the vultures are circling on this already. Knives are out for the administration and the argument is going to be, I think, largely on how sketchy the investigation was. And this is something that point we made several weeks ago. The absence of any real proof of what these countries are doing. And the report simply resorts to assertions. And this will be picked up by the plaintiffs however they decide to sign their case and say it's all really fake. You know, it's a scam designed simply to reimpose the tariffs. The investigations were not real. I don't know if the court will buy that. Clearly the President has the authority to oppose tariffs. I think Peter Harrell's comment was that, yeah, that's true, but he's kind of turned the statute on its head. The statute 301 was designed to basically give the United States leverage to deal with very specific individual cases.
[15:54]
C
Yeah, let's get Scott.
[15:55]
A
These things are very fact intensive. It's not so much an overall error on the part of the administration. The plaintiffs will have to show on a case by case basis where the administration erred. And look, I agree with Bill's comments about this. Looks fishy. I mean, every time I read about the rates imposed and the rationale, I hear the voice of the Queen of Heart from Alice in Wonderland. You know, it's like sentence first, trial later. We'll get the verdict when we feel like it.
[16:21]
B
Isn't she the one that said off with our heads? Well, here we are.
[16:24]
A
Yes, sentence first. That was the key complaint. You know, we don't need no stinking verdict.
[16:30]
B
Well, this is what we've both said about Trump from time to time is his strategy is ready, fire, aim.
[16:35]
A
And we're seeing that again, it's express authority. So that's the reason it might well be sustained. Just because, simply put, the President has express power to impose tariffs in these situations. So they're following the rules as best they can. And that's, that's where we are.
[16:51]
C
I want to just sticking with 301, there's been some signaling that there could be another Round coming down the pike here, I think, on, you know, 15 countries plus the EU related to what the administration I think is calling unfair manufacturing practices. What do you know about that?
[17:05]
B
It's coming.
[17:06]
A
That's the excess capacity investigation that's been going on for some time now. So, yes, that is the second tranche that has different timetables, but it's been in play all along.
[17:15]
B
It's coming. Ambassador Greer hinted that it was imminent. It's going to create a dilemma, I think, for the administration because I think all. Well, it's 15 countries plus the EU, so I'll just say 16 to make it simple. I think all 16 are also subject to the forced labor tariffs. And what apparently the rumor is. And I think rumors on this are coming from other countries where there have been discussions. The rumor is that Ambassador Greer is telling countries with which we have trade agreements, which would be the eu, the UK and several others where they've already been signed and negotiated, that the intent is to not have the US Tariffs go higher than what the US Agreed to in those negotiations. So for Japan, Korea, the EU would be 15%. For the UK it would be 10%. Well, with the forced labor tariffs, they're already bumping up against that. You know, they haven't exceeded it, but they're bumping up right close to it at 12 and a half or 10. And if you add in now an overcapacity tariff, it gives the United States very little margin to add on an additional penalty without exceeding the limit they committed to last year in these agreements and without exceeding what Ambassador Greer has been telling these countries they're going to do. So, you know, maybe with Trump, you know, agreements are always temporary, subject to change at whim.
[18:34]
A
This is confusing for everybody. Monday of this week, this is July 30th. So this past Monday was the one year anniversary of the Turnberry agreements with Europe. How we do it there, we're still shuffling our feet on those things.
[18:46]
B
Yeah, and there's where we agreed to 15%. And if you throw in right now with the forced labor tariffs, they're at 12 and a half. So that doesn't give you much room between 12 and a half and 15 to impose an additional penalty on the EU for overcapacity. Now that does create an interesting possibility that the administration might actually play that investigation straight and find some of these countries innocent. That would be a remarkable development. It would be fun to watch. If somebody gets off the hook, that'll be cool.
[19:15]
C
I want to clear one thing if we can, and I'M not sure that we can, but our more astute listeners who've been listening to us over the past few months know that whenever we talk about 301, we've mentioned 60 countries. And yet a lot of the reporting around 301, as it went into effect on the 24th, mentioned 80 countries. Do we have any sense of where that gulf is between the 60 countries and the 80 countries? We were debating this as we led up to today's show, and I'm not sure we ever landed on an answer. But Bill or Scott, if anybody has a guess there, I'd welcome it.
[19:44]
B
Well, our diligent researchers have been working on this night and day since Monday with no definitive result. I think the one thing we realized is that if you count countries, it's probably 86, because the 60 counts the EU as one, and the EU, in fact, from a country standpoint is 27. So if you think about it that way, it's 59 plus 27, which adds up to 86. Now the New York Times consistently says it's 80, and I have no idea how they get to 80. I can see how they get to 86, and I can see how it's 60. I don't see how it's 80, but it's more than 80 from a strictly country standpoint. So there it is. That's the best I can do. Scott, do you have an answer?
[20:28]
A
Yes. That's as good as we're going to get. In the world of trade, there is no European Union. There's only the European communities. And because they negotiate as a customs union, they are individual members of the World Trade Organization as well as the bloc itself, ec, as they call it, there is a member. And so the counting is different almost everywhere. Sort of like knowing the number of government agencies in the US Federal government. I don't think there's a reputable number on that. So.
[20:54]
C
Okay. Well, if that's as good as we're going to get, I'm going to tell the researchers to put their pencils down for this one. But I want to turn to our final big topic of this week, and that's the Russia and Iran sanctions bill that passed the Senate by a wide margin earlier this week. And within that legislation are provisions granting the president new tariff authority, including targeting countries that import Russian energy products, which includes some of the world's largest economies, of course. So, Bill, let's start with you on this. Unpack what's in this legislation and which countries could be targeted if it were to go through in its current form.
[21:26]
B
One small correction. It hasn't passed yet. The Senate voted overwhelmingly to take the bill up.
[21:31]
C
Yes. I'm sorry. Yes.
[21:31]
B
86 to 12.
[21:33]
C
Yes. Yes, I'm sorry. Procedural.
[21:34]
B
Which, which is a sign that it is going to pass overwhelmingly, but. And probably today, Thursday, because the senators probably want to go home for the weekend. So stay tuned for that. This being the Senate, there will be amendments. And, and one interesting thing that's come up that I hadn't really thought about, but people in the Senate and in the House for that matter, who've been reading the bill rather closely have pointed out that it gives the President significant new tariff authority, which is not really what a lot of people in Congress want to give him right now because they believe, privately or publicly, that he's misusing the authority he's already got. What the bill says is that the President can impose tariffs up to 500% on Russian imports, which actually may be symbolic more than anything else because we don't have much trade with Russia right now for obvious reasons. And the trade we do have is fertilizer ingredients and some minerals, neither of which I think the President really wants to impose a 500% tariff on, unless he wants to get the farmers even angrier with him than they already are. But it also contains authority for the President to levy up to 100% tariffs on countries. The five countries that buy the most Russian oil and gas, and Those are about 80% of the Russian oil and gas is bought by China and India, China roughly half, and India another 30 plus percent after that. You've got Turkey, LNG in the case of France, and a third fifth one that I'm blanking on at the moment. It's probably not that significant a provision. It's a practical matter. I mean, the President may want to depose 100% tariffs on France because he's mad at Macron about something, but I don't see this being huge. But what? Senator Wyden, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and his House counterpart, Richard Neal. Wyden's not the chairman. The ranking member of the Finance Committee and the ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee, Congressman Neal from Massachusetts, both have flagged this as a major expansion of presidential tariff authority, which they think would be a huge mistake given the way that Trump, in their view, has misused the existing tariff authority. So I think we can expect an amendment on this on the floor from wide and colleagues of like mind, and then we'll see what happens. I mean, there's lots of steps in between deleting this one amendment would be that don't let him do it without congressional approval. And Senator Wyden and Senator Neal actually have introduced bills separately to clean up some of the existing statutes because they think that the president has. Is overusing his authority and conveniently that the legislation they've introduced would repeal what we've been talking about, repeal section 338. It would repeal section 122, and it would try to get a better congressional handle on what's going on on trade. So I would expect an amendment on this. Don't know if it'll pass. The Republicans may be locked into passing the bill as is, as a memorial to the late Senator Lindsey Graham. But it's an interesting development that shows that, you know, once again, the natives are kind of restless out there. Yep.
[24:28]
A
There's some tension on this. But look, once Congress has granted an authority to the executive, it's very difficult to take it back. And I would think that this would be something that would at least get the threat of a veto. Would it arrive in the final form in an amendment that is incorporated in the bill? But there's a long way to go on this, and we'll have to see how many amendments and of what substance. There are many steps that Congress could take between withdrawing the authority entirely and leaving it as is with no constraints like advisory positions or needing specific authorization for some things and not others. There's a lot of work to be done.
[25:06]
B
Well, and it's moving slowly because this is Senate action. The Senate may pass it because the Senate's in this week and next. The House has gone away until September and they still have to act on it. So this is not going to move very quickly.
[25:17]
A
Fortunately, the trade guys are not taking an August recess.
[25:20]
C
Given all the news, Bill is foregoing his usual August retreat to the south of France to continue recording episodes for us. Very nice of you, Bill. We appreciate that.
[25:30]
B
Any talk.
[25:32]
C
All right, guys, we're going to leave it there today. Thanks as always to our listeners for joining us and we'll be back with you again next week. Take care. Until then, thank you.
[25:39]
B
Thank you.
[25:45]
C
You've been listening to the Tray, guys, a CSIS podcast. For more audio content, visit csis.orgpodcasts thanks for tuning in.