Podcast Summary

Podcast: The Tucker Carlson Show
Episode: The 9/11 Files: They Could Have Stopped It | Ep 3
Date: October 7, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode of "The Tucker Carlson Show" delves deeply into what U.S. officials and intelligence agencies knew prior to the September 11 attacks, and why multiple opportunities to stop Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda were missed. Drawing on firsthand accounts, official memos, and declassified reports, the episode argues that both the Clinton and Bush administrations had ample warning and actionable intelligence about the threat posed by bin Laden, yet repeatedly declined to act decisively. The conversation features extensive commentary from former CIA officer Mike Scheuer, who directly worked on the bin Laden issue, as well as narration from the host and archival clips.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Intelligence Warnings Before 9/11

• The Bush administration received clear and dire warnings about Osama bin Laden's plans well in advance of the attacks.
• The August 6, 2001, Presidential Daily Brief ("bin Laden determined to strike in US") explicitly mentioned possible hijackings and Al Qaeda activities in the U.S. ([00:26]).
• CIA Director George Tenet referred to the system as "blinking red" in summer 2001, signaling imminent threat ([00:26]).
• Numerous agencies (CIA, FAA, NORAD) were aware of and even rehearsed scenarios involving hijacked airliners crashing into U.S. buildings.

Quote:
"On August 6th, 2001, President Bush received a presidential daily briefing. Its title literally, bin Laden determined to strike in US..." – Narrator ([00:26])

2. Missed Opportunities to Capture/Kill bin Laden

CIA's Bin Laden Unit & Internal Frustrations

• Mike Scheuer, former chief of the bin Laden unit, describes frustration over internal resistance to sharing information and acting on intelligence ([04:17], [07:08]).
• John Brennan, then CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia, allegedly withheld basic information needed for building a profile on bin Laden ([07:08]).

Quote:
"We kept sending a message because it was important. We were building a base of data... And so we finally sent a message that said...please do this as quickly as possible. He called Tennant and that was the end of that. Don't send Brennan any more of these notes." – Mike Scheuer ([07:08])

Aborted Operations

• Multiple plans to capture or assassinate bin Laden at Tarnak Farms in Afghanistan were approved, rehearsed, and then called off at the last moment—often due to fears of civilian casualties or political blowback ([09:03] to [10:59]).
• After embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, a capture plan was revived too late ([11:15], [11:46]).

Quote:
"The last, one of the last dumps of overhead imagery we got happened to show a child swing set. And they suddenly said, oh, we can't do that. What if that picture gets out and we, you know, we'll be responsible." – Mike Scheuer ([10:14])

3. Bureaucratic & Political Paralysis

• Both the Clinton and Bush administrations are depicted as overly cautious, prioritizing political considerations and fear of failure over operational opportunities ([15:07]).
• After clear attacks like the USS Cole bombing, the U.S. did not retaliate, ostensibly because of insufficient legal proof—something intelligence insiders dispute ([14:19]-[14:44]).

Quote:
"We knew right away it was Osama bin Laden... And we just stood there and said no. What was he, what are you talking about?" – Mike Scheuer ([14:19])

4. Pattern of Withholding and Downplaying Threats

• The narrative asserts a pattern in which intelligence about bin Laden was available, actionable, and often ignored or suppressed for bureaucratic, political, or unexplained reasons ([15:23], [16:22]).
• There’s skepticism about official explanations for not acting on known threats, highlighting the culture of fear around media criticism and public perception.

Quote:
"My impression over the course of my career after over 22 years is that the first thing the seventh floor ever considered when you brought them in operation to approve was what if we fail and how will we get roasted by the media?" – Mike Scheuer ([15:07])

5. Escalating Warnings in 2001

• Throughout the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence received repeated, escalatory alerts about upcoming large-scale terrorist attacks ([17:18] onward).
• Some officials tried repeatedly to get the administration to take these warnings seriously, but encountered resistance or indifference—from John Ashcroft saying he didn’t want to hear about Al Qaeda, to Wolfowitz dismissing threat reports ([17:18]).

Quote:
"Ashcroft responded by saying I don't want you to ever talk to me about Al Qaeda about these threats. I don't want to hear about al Qaeda anymore." – Narrator ([17:18])

6. Unanswered Questions and Culture of Secrecy

• The episode ends with open questions about insider trading before the attacks, the rapid disposal of physical evidence, and whether foreign intelligence services withheld critical warnings ([18:43]).

Quote:
"Who beside Al Qaeda knew the attacks were coming and who specifically profited from these trades? It seems possible, probably likely, that foreign governments, including supposed allies, knew the plot was coming. Why didn't they warn the United States?" – Narrator ([18:43])

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Bush’s infamous quote:
  "There's an old saying in Tennessee. I know it's in Texas, probably in Tennessee that says, fool me once, shame on. Shame on you. It fooled me. We can't get fooled again." – George W. Bush ([00:10])
  (Used to underscore confusion or lack of leadership)

• Scheuer on missed kill/capture opportunities:
  "To me, going after Osama bin Laden was hard work, but it could have been accomplished by 97. And then from 97 till I left in 99, there were 10 more opportunities and none of them were taken advantage of." ([12:59])

• On government priorities:
  "They suddenly said, oh, we can't do that. What if that picture gets out and we, you know, we'll be responsible." – Mike Scheuer ([10:14])

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Intelligence warnings & Bush administration context: [00:00]–[04:17]
• Mike Scheuer's background & Bin Laden profile: [04:17]–[05:48]
• Missed CIA operations & interagency friction: [07:08]–[11:09]
• Pattern of aborted strikes against bin Laden: [11:09]–[13:37]
• USS Cole attack & lack of response: [13:37]–[15:07]
• Political/media considerations in decision-making: [15:07]–[16:22]
• Escalating summer 2001 warnings: [17:18]–[18:43]
• Open questions about 9/11 and next episode tease: [18:43]–end

Tone and Style

The episode's tone is urgent, skeptical, and geared toward exposing inadequacies and evasions in official narratives. The speakers frequently emphasize missed opportunities, bureaucratic inertia, and unanswered questions, with an undercurrent suggesting official negligence or even possible cover-up.

Conclusion

This episode presents a detailed chronology and analysis of how multiple early warnings about bin Laden and Al Qaeda were ignored or downplayed by the highest levels of government. Through the lens of Mike Scheuer and primary source documentation, Tucker Carlson’s team constructs a narrative of institutional failure—and hints at deeper secrets and unresolved questions that will be explored in the next episode.