← The World with Richard Engel and Yalda Hakim
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- [00:03]
A
Sky News, the full story first. Hello, it's me, Yalda Hakim, and I'm in London.
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And me, Richard Engel, and I'm in Tel Aviv.
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Explosions and gunfire have been heard on the outskirts of Mali's capital, Bamako, as well as other cities. Well, in the last hour, the Foreign Office has issued a warning urging UK citizens in the country to stay indoors.
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Peace talks continue to stall as President Trump tells his negotiators not to go to Pakistan to meet with the Iranians. The Iranians have reportedly delivered their proposal for peace, which Trump is not happy with. And here in Israel, an alliance has formed to try and topple Prime Minister Netanyahu. But will it work?
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A
And the deadliest region of the world for terrorism that nobody really focuses on, talks about. We're going to talk about it on the podcast today. We're going to take a deep dive on Mali in Africa, where extraordinary events have seen the country rocked by insurgents. It's unprecedented and worrying with, with huge parts of West Africa under real threat from Islamist extremists.
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And as always, please follow us on Spotify and Apple. Write to us at theworld sky.uk and watch us on YouTube. Just look for the World with Richard Engel and Yalda Hakim. All right, let's get going.
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A
Richard, it's so good to see you. We're both in the Middle east over the course of the last few weeks. You're back in the region, back in Israel. Just tell me what's. What's been going on.
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B
So I was here and I've been here for, for weeks now. And I just left. I was in New York. I had some meetings, I had some events, did a little work there. And I just got back now, and we are in this kind of waiting period. It seems that President Trump wants to find a way out of this Iran conflict. Talking to people in the U.S. it is clear it is not popular. Prime Minister Netanyahu is not popular among many Americans. People are angry that this war is still going on and no end in sight. So there is a growing frustration that this, what does he call it sometimes, this excursion, this little diversion that we're doing in the Middle east is still going on. And the Iranians seem to be hanging on, and maybe even better than hanging on, they seem to be confident that they can absorb this pain, continue to stick to their demands, and that they're holding quite a few cars with cards. With oil prices high and the Strait of Hormuz still not fully open.
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A
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, it's being Described, Richard. And it has continued to be described as a war of choice for the United States. And we've talked about this on the podcast a lot. The fact that for this regime in Iran, it's an existential threat. And so it's all about survival. And the Iranians have put another proposal to the Trump administration, haven't they? Laying out what they think the next few weeks and months should look like in terms of a peace deal, how to open up the Strait of Hormuz, including lifting that U.S. blockade on the street. And frankly, Donald Trump, his cabinet, the administration say no, we're not happy with it. It's unclear exactly what they're unhappy with. But they want the nuclear deal to be front and center of any kind of negotiation. And the Iranians are saying, we'll deal with that later. Right now we've got to figure out what we're going to do about the Strait of Hormuz and bringing this war to an end.
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B
Exactly. So President Trump initially thought that, that this was going to be over very quickly, that it would be easy, that a massive bombing campaign, a shock and awe style campaign, would collapse the regime, that protesters would take over. They went into this without a real long term plan, which is obvious now. Instead, the government is still there and the Iranians are trying to split the issue, saying we'll focus on Hormuz and we'll deal with this nuclear issue, which is really about nuclear enrichment. Can Iran have the right to enrich, even to a low level, which Iran says it needs or not? And the Americans are saying no, you're just playing for time. You're stalling. He needs authorization. And that is becoming a real issue for him, particularly as he's losing some domestic support. So a big issue in the U.S. but the basic concept, this basic explanation, this basic justification, that Trump saved hundreds of millions of lives, because had he not acted that morning, the United States would be wiped off the map and other countries would just cease to exist and there would be a nuclear Armageddon. Just isn't true. And the origin stories are incredibly important. And now this origin story is becoming more and more exposed and people are getting more and more frustrated because it started with this idea that they were gonna blow up the world in days, which they weren't going to do, couldn't have done if they wanted to. So this isn't me getting inside the Iranians head and knowing their intentionality. They just didn't have the capacity. And now it moved to the Strait of Hormuz and that became the Justification. President Trump selling anyone who uses oil. This is your war too, even though Europe wants nothing to do with it. And I think you're sensing, I was sensing in the US a growing frustration about this. People believing we've seen this movie before, we did this in Iraq. We. Why are we doing this again?
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A
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, as you say, we're eight weeks now into this war and at the time we were given a dizzying, you know, head spinning multitude of reasons and excuses and thinking behind why this was necessary in this moment. So the idea, the justifications for this war continued to be not just questioned. But, you know, many people are saying, well, what was the strategy? What was the plan? Here we are arguing about opening up the Strait of Hormuz when frankly, it was open eight weeks ago, before this war began. It's only closed as a result of this war and because of this war. You know, Richard, I spoke to a captain of a ship last week, an Indian captain, and he told me, I have been stuck here for almost 60 days since this war began.
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He was floating at sea on his
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vessel, floating in the Strait of Hormuz at a.
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That's a great interview, by the way.
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A
Yeah, it was, it was quite something. And actually we probably should play an excerpt of it so our listeners can hear it.
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When war started, we just found ourselves in between this conflict zone and we saw several, hundreds of missiles flying over our head. We witnessed several missiles and explosion noises and the shock of those explosions we were felt on ship. You know, even though we are quite far from land, but still we could feel the shock on the vessel. We heard the news that war has started and there are attacks happening on merchant ships. It was very disturbing. You know, my whole crew was under constant stress and they had so many questions on their face and they were worried about their well being and safety.
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A
He was so stressed out and he said, morale is low. My crew are anxious, they're depressed. Some of them, you know, shouldn't even be here. Their contracts had come to an end. I said, what about food? What about water? He said, actually, we're grateful to our company because these smaller ships come and they bring us these supplies. But he said, it's not as easy as it seems. The images he was showing us were just of like the smaller ship coming and dropping off supplies. But he said, you know, the, the level of coordination because we are in an active war zone. There are drones flying overhead, there are missiles flying everywhere, there are airstrikes just to get that ship to us through the Strait of Hormuz, through this kind of war zone to get to us is a monumental task when we put in a request. So, you know, we forget that there are humans and crews on these ships just sitting there waiting and dealing with these missiles and drones.
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And you mentioned all these little vessels that are moving around. So we think of the Strait of Hormuz as just a few giant supertankers that are moving through, or in this case, not moving through, but there are all these little boats that are moving around. And the Iranians can use those to drop mines in the water or they could be explosive. They're called the Mosquito Fleet. And it's proving to be very complicated and very difficult to deal with because there's lots of them and they're tiny and there's lots of ships that do need to move around to bring supplies to the, to the larger vessels.
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A
But I want to just focus on Israel because you're there right now and it's not just the war that Israel is prosecuting here. Domestically, the political situation is intensifying. This is an election year for Israel. It's, you know, huge deal for the country because, you know, we will find out in a few months time if Benjamin Netanyahu is going to continue to be the prime minister of the country. He's dealing with all sorts of legal battles. He's seeking a pardon from the President of the country and the attorney general who'll call on that. And then, you know, the President has to issue that pardon. But domestically, it's like a pressure cooker as well in Israel. Just talk us through what on earth is going on.
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B
So the big announcement just a couple of days ago was that these two former prime ministers who both hate Netanyahu, they've been in power before, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid are forming a coalition together, they're calling it Together, this new political movement. And it has one objective. They're going to try and unite the enemies of Netanyahu to unseat him in elections six months from now. And they announced this political coalition, this new movement, standing side by side in podiums and talked about how Netanyahu must be held accountable for the failings of October 7th. Because don't forget, this election six months from now will be right around the three year anniversary of the October 7th massacre, when Hamas militants, about 3,000 of them, crossed out of Gaza and went on a killing and kidnapping spree. And Netanyahu has never accepted responsibility for that. The answer has always been, we'll deal with that after the war. Is over. Which is why his critics say he never wants the war to be over so that he never has to take accountability. There have been others in the military that have fallen on their swords and resigned. But he himself has said, we did the best we can, and then changes the subject to saying, and look at what we're doing now. We destroyed Hamas, we destroyed Hezbollah, the Syrian regime is gone, we're attacking Iran, and maybe you're going to get a regime change there. He's focusing on the post October 7th, let's call them accomplishments from his point of view. But I wouldn't count Netanyahu out entirely. It's a coalition system here. So you have to form a coalition, different parties get together. And if you can cobble together enough friendly coalition members and you're the leader of the biggest group, then you get to remain as prime minister. And this is Netanyahu's specialty. He's the longest serving prime minister in Israel's history for a reason. He knows this game well. He knows how to put together. He's currently running a coalition. All Israeli governments are coalitions. And he's running one that has some very extreme members in it, and it's not clear that those members are going to leave him. He could shuffle it a bit and take some more religious parties in, but new polling that was announced and conducted after this announcement shows that they might not win, that Netanyahu, with the coalition he has, or a slightly modified version, could still remain in power. So he's a very skilled coalition builder, Israeli political operator. There is opposition to him. But these two men, Bennett and Lapid, have also said they're not going to include any Arab parties. They're not going to make their coalition as broad as it was in the past. So it might be difficult for them to unseat Netanyahu. A lot can happen over the next six months. But here in Israel, it's. It's being, you know, people are talking about it, but in no way is this does it feel like a groundswell. There aren't. The protesters aren't back out. Netanyahu still has his popularity. People feel that they're on a war footing. The war in Lebanon has flared up again. I didn't think that ceasefire was ever going to last anyway, so I could be very wrong. But here in Israel, there's not this wave of excitement. And people aren't counting down the days for Netanyahu to leave.
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Absolutely. I mean, you know, ruling out Netanyahu would be foolish. He's an incredibly wily politician. As you say, he's very good at putting these coalitions together. There was a lot of concern when he put this coalition which involved the extreme right wing elements of Israeli politics. And there was a lot of concern. We saw those protests before October 7th and the coming together now of, of Naftali Bennett and Yellow pid. There have been some who have criticized it, but they've also tried to sell themselves as trying to defeat the party that was in power that allowed October 7th to happen. And you and I have often talked about the fact that October 7th was a massive security failing in Israel. And the fact is that I've spoken to security officials who have said normally heads would have rolled, there would have been an inquiry and we would have seen heads roll just as we did during the Yom Kipp. But that hasn't happened in Israel. There isn't this level of accountability. And what we've seen from Benjamin Netanyahu is the constant push for wars on multiple fronts. And in the end, the war in Gaza became incredibly unpopular inside Israel. And yet the war that has been launched against Iran, whether it was the 12 day war last year in June and you and I were both in Israel at the same time together, or it's this particular one, it is extremely popular in Israel and people do support it. They do see and view Iran as an existential threat. But you mentioned there, Richard, the war in Lebanon and let's talk about that.
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B
You just came from there. So what's your sense of what's going on in Lebanon? Where is this going?
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As the ceasefire was being announced, people were saying, well, what ceasefire? It's going to be incredibly fragile if it frankly holds at all. And just in the last 24 hours, I've seen reports where the death toll in southern Lebanon, at least 40 people have been killed. And I was there just the day after that strike that took place where the people of Lebanon thought there was going to be some kind of ceasefire. Instead, 100 strikes in 10 minutes, killing over 357 people, which left the entire nation shocked. What we now have, frankly is, as you say, how can there be a ceasefire when the IDF are on the ground? They've created this buffer zone that goes at least 10km into Lebanese territory, this so called yellow line where we're looking at reports of entire communities trapped within this yellow line. And you know, I left just days before this Lebanese journalist, Amal Khalil was killed. And she was a very well known journalist in the country, had operated and worked across the country for decades. And it was gut wrenching. So, you know, journalists continue to be targeted, aid workers continue to be targeted. But the Lebanese government continues to say that these are war crimes that are being committed, a breach of international law. And in the background, Lebanese and Israeli officials are trying to talk. The Lebanese government is trying to hold these direct talks with Israel. There've been a couple of rounds now to try and come up with some kind of resolution. But Lebanon has become an important piece in the negotiations between the United States and Iran as well.
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B
You mentioned the 1973 war. That was initially a total catastrophe for Israel. We have Anwar Sadat in Egypt as president. He attacked Israel in a surprise attack. And then ultimately Ariel Sharon sort of cut behind him. And the war ended before the Egyptian army potentially was going to lose this war. But it was a terrifying moment for Israel. And had that war had more momentum and other states joined in, it really could have been the end of Israel. But I think one of the reasons that Netanyahu has been able to stay in power is that we're kind of seeing the third expansion of Israel right now since its birth. I think you're seeing the third expansion with Israel taking a piece of Gaza. You have Israel expanding, continuously expanding in the west bank through the settlers. You have Israel having taken a piece of Syria and now taking and presumably holding a piece of Lebanon. So a perimeter has been built all around Israel, all around its borders from the north to the south. And I think people see that in Israel as a kind of victory that came out of the defeat of October 7, the shock, the horror of their 911 moment. And Netanyahu is being credited for creating this, for expanding Israel after an unexpected defeat along the lines, let's say 1973.
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A
The Lebanese authorities today are saying that they want Israeli forces off their territory, that it's a breach of their sovereignty. So, you know, Richard, we'll have to wait and see sort of how everything pans out. And you'll have to keep us up to date from, from Israel.
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B
I will do my best. And you off the top of the show, you said you were going to talk about Mali. Mali is a, is a phenomenally interesting country. It's big. And a lot of the Al Qaeda threat that we used to talk about and a lot of the ISIS threat, let's call it the extremist threat, the terrorist threat, which was traditionally in the Middle East, a lot of that has shifted to North Africa. And Mali seems to be in a really tough place at the moment. And you guys, you've had Yusra there covering it and she's been killing it.
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Yeah, absolutely. We're going to speak to Yusra after the break to talk about what on earth is going on in Mali because as you say, it's a hotbed of Islamist extremism and it's seldom talked about. So I'm looking forward to having that conversation with with Yusra.
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I'm Sam Coates from Sky News.
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And I'm Anne McElroy from Politico, downing
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Street Drama, Leadership, Battle and Policy. U Turns, we're on it before it breaks.
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where the real political conversations are happening.
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Hit follow and listen to politics at Sam and Anne's wherever you get your podcasts. Welcome back to the World podcast and for this half of the podcast, a very special guest, our Africa correspondent, Yusra El Bagir. Yusra, thank you so much for joining us and welcome to the podcast.
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D
Thanks for having me. Elda. It's good to be on with you.
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A
It's always really good to talk to you because we dive into stories and places that frankly, you know, sometimes don't make the headlines. You and I often talk about the situation in Sudan, but today we're gonna talk about Mali. And often Mali is, you know, overlooked. But actually the issues that Mali frankly faces with jihadism, Islamist extremism is something that we should be talking more and more about and the world should not be ignoring it. And this is something that I often hear when I do speak to people about Mali. But I just want you to help our audiences understand what on earth is going on there.
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D
So Mali is in a really, really tough situation, Yalda, because they have literally tried everything, every military pathway that is possible for them. So they were coordinating with the French Operation Burkan, which is basically a Cross Sahel operation, to fight jihadism. They had a UN peacekeeping mission, Munisma. They now are operating under a military junta that came into power through a coup. And this junta has been working with Russian mercenaries. They're working with Wagner and now what is called Africa Korps. So they've tried everything. And one thing that I think people are feeling is the futility of these kind of military approaches because Janim, the Al Qaeda backed jihadist group that we saw in the capital Bamako and have just taken towns in the north, is just increasing in influence, in strength, in power, and Genem is operating transnationally so we've seen Jeanem in Burkina Faso, where we were earlier this month. We've seen it in Niger. We've also seen them hit Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast. There's worry about them in northern Ghana as well. So they're operating kind of across different countries, but they are Mali, homegrown jihadists. They are from Mali. The leader of Jinem is from Kadal, the city in the north, the regional capital of the north that they just took over, took from the government. So it's a really tough situation. People in Bamako, now that we've been speaking to, say that they're holed up in their houses. They haven't been able to go out. The army announced clearing operations, but have basically kind of cordoned off areas in the capital. They've been dealing with a fuel blockade that's been orchestrated by Jenim for the last eight months. So JNIM was blocking all fuel getting into Bamako in the south, and then eventually launched this series of coordinated attacks that people are describing as the largest coordinated attack in Mali since 2012. So it's really tough. And I think what's most concerning is that what does this mean for the region? What does it mean for other countries that are dealing with the threat of Jinem? The fact that Jinem is able to operate so cohesively across different countries and territories speaks to their adaptability and their agility. But also they're known to be a group that doesn't just operate tribally, that they recruit from different ethnic groups and different tribes, which is going to be tough for governments that are kind of focusing on a military approach to get under. Because radicalization, as we know, needs to be addressed socially, it needs to be addressed within the community. And that seems to be a component that is missing in terms of how the Mali junta approached this threat and how other countries within their coalition, the alliance of Sahelian States, are approaching jihadism. It's kind of of rhetoric versus reality, and we saw that in Burkina Faso, and I'm concerned about the spread of this to those countries as well.
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A
Yusra, you've highlighted a number of things, and I want to break it down, but I first want to ask about. You say that this is the most coordinated and most Brazen attack since 2012. Why did Jeunim feel it could attack now? Why was this moment the moment for them?
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D
Back in November 2023, the UN peacekeeping mission was pulling out of Mali, and they were pulling out of bases in the north. And separatists felt that this was kind of their time to gain their territory, to entrench themselves. But what happened is we saw the Malian army with Wagner at the time, take those bases, take those towns and push separatists to the border. And so the Tuvadan rebels teamed up with Jnin. So they managed to, through their military approach, they created actually a stronger partnership between JNIM and the Azawad separatist movement. And they helped them, they coordinated their attacks in the north with them, and then they were able to also push into the south. And what we saw in Kadal is that Russian troops and the army were holed up in that UN base. And the Russian troops, the mercenaries, were able to negotiate safe passage and left. And it was wild to see the videos of them fighting. And then they announced that they had been able to withdraw from the base safely. And the statement from the rebels was, you know, we urge Russia to withdraw from this for future cooperation. So it's just wild to think that Russian like Africa Corps troops are in the heart of all of this. But also that, that, you know, it's sad that there isn't a catch all solution to this. You know, they thought, okay, we're not gonna work with the French, we're gonna work with Russia. You know, this kind of decolonial rhetoric. And in reality that didn't work. And what will work is the question now. And what does this mean for Jeanin? As just before I came on with you, Jeanim put out a statement and said that they are going to lay full. They're laying down a full siege on Bamako. So they're not. We were watching to see if it was a takeover or just a show of strength. And I think it's a kind of calculated series of moves. They may not take over the city just yet. They may just lay siege or negotiate, you know, get in a position where they can negotiate better. But as we speak, the Minister of Defense, a general, was killed. There are reports that the head of security has been killed. And we saw the chief of the army come on television and address the nation, but there are reports that he's injured. And then he came out and spoke. So it's hugely concerning, but also very precarious. Like we could hang up and something else could happen. Like it's just in complete flux.
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A
Yeah, and I saw those reports about the Defense Minister getting killed. So we've talked about the partnership that has been formed between Jeunim and the separatists, and that's why they feel particularly empowered in this moment. Talk me through the weakness of the government. Why are they so incredibly weak? And why is it that different strategies they're trying isn't, frankly, working at this in this moment?
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D
So I think my main concern around the western Sahel is that there is a lack of governance that is needed at this time. And I think what's needed at this time is almost like honest governance. You know, you don't need a perfect solution. You don't need someone. No one's gonna save the day. But there needs to be more honesty with people about what the threats are so that they can actually have some choice in how they deal with it.
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A
What I also find interesting about what you've just said is the way that Jonim and the separatists are moving to not sort of necessarily take over the big cities, but just trying to test the waters in many ways. We saw this played out in Syria, for example. You know, we saw this played out in Afghan when the Taliban started to take over provinces first, then the big cities, then move on the major cities. It feels like they are taking a leaf out of that playbook and sort of saying, well, we don't. Let's just see how far and how weak, you know, the junta is and how far we can push them and what their alliances are and whether they can step in and support them or whether we can just completely overrun some of the. Of some of these smaller villages and
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D
towns, for example, 100%. I mean, there's like, the surprise element of the attack and just immediately going for the minister of defense's house and killing him and going for that top brass right away. But then again, like, the restraint, I think, is the surprising element. Right? You think they just go for gold and take the capital. But there seems to be theater involved. Like, there's a show. It's like, we're gonna do this slowly and painfully. And one thing that. That I think is really important is that there is no world where a jihadist takeover of Mali is a good thing. They have killed so many civilians. There are camps full of people who have fled Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, in the Ivory coast, in Cote d', Ivoire, just full of communities that have been ransacked by them. So the junta is incapable of protecting their civilians, clearly, but the jihadists are not. Are not the alternative. There isn't a world where Malian citizens would accept them as rulers of the country because they have seen what they've done to their communities.
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A
Is there a world, though, Yusra, where they do take over, though? When you talk about this level of corruption Mismanagement, the foreign interference, you know, the level of debt, the instability, the security failings. Is there a world though, that, you know, things are so weak that frankly, they do overrun and they do eventually take over and it will require foreign intervention.
- [31:44]
D
I mean, anything is possible. Honestly, the world that we're living in, I think we all know anything is possible. At the moment, we don't know how much they actually do want political power. We can't really get a good gauge because even when we've tried to reach out to people who live in areas that are controlled by jnm, it's really hard to reach people because they're surveilled, because, you know, the governments that run the telecoms or the juntas that are fighting the jihadists that are running their territories. Right. So it's really hard to understand what their pseudo states even look like, to understand what kind of governance they would provide. We just. All we know is that they're managing to recruit more and more people and that they're forming these alliances with tribal leaders that, that benefit them. One thing that's also important about Jenim is that Jenim was born out of an alliance of five jihadist groups. So they're very good at that kind of bridge building. It's not tough for them to kind of gain more and more traction and more and more kind of factions within the group. But at the moment, it's really unclear what they want to do more than actually just humiliate the junta, because that's what they're doing. They're humiliating the military rulers.
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A
And you talked about alliances with Russia. I mean, and the Wagner, they've come in to try and stamp out terrorism, and clearly that's just not happening.
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D
From really early on, everyone was saying that actually the Russian involvement, military involvement was not working. Like we were seeing an uptick in jihadist attacks after Russia came in. And that's not to say that the French cooperation was perfect. It just wasn't actually helping. I think there was hope from people on the ground that actually, like a change in tack would, would mean that there would be some sort of, you know, shift in terms of how the jihadists were managing to gain traction. It was interesting because the Mali and junta kind of committed to Russia, moved away from France. There wasn't a multi pronged approach. It was kind of very singular. Like the pendulum just kind of swung from the west to Russia. And I think that was really harmful because it created this kind of scenario where it's like you're kind of putting Everything on the table and you could just lose it all. And that's possibly what's happening here.
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A
And in terms of the French, where do they fit into all of this now?
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D
Well, the French are. I think they're going to be looking at this with a lot of kind of smugness because they'll see that their withdrawal is what kind of spurred this on, that they're not there to. To lead their former colonies to safety, because they do have that kind of paternalistic sentiment towards their former colonies in West Africa. But ultimately the French weren't doing it either. Jeannin was on a kind of upward trajectory anyway. So it's not like French involvement was helping, it's just that it was kind of almost curbing the inevitable. And they were training the troops and they were sharing kind of military intelligence and they were doing things kind of across the Sahel. And I think that was actually probably the strongest point, the strongest advantage was that they were working with different countries so they could share that intel transnationally. Whereas now you've got Russian troops in Mali, just focusing on Mali, and then you've got Burkina Faso dealing with it by itself, and then you've got Niger with some Russian troops. So it's a really isolated approach with the facade of a coalition. So they've kind of isolated themselves into a corner and their allies and friends next door are not capable of helping them or maybe just not willing to help them because they're dealing with it in such an extreme way as well. And they're as exposed.
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A
Meanwhile, these jihadis have formed coalitions with separatists, with each other across the board, from country to country, and you formed a, a powerful alliance. Are we talking tens of thousands? I mean, how many of these, you know, GNM fighters are we actually talking about in this moment?
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D
I honestly, it's so opaque. That's. And I think that's been to their advantage. Where I've, you know, I've read all these profiles on Janim and how they started and all this stuff, and you really don't get a sense or a sense of understanding of what they're actually doing now, how they're operating now. I think they must have a lot of fighters if they're able to operate in such large swathes of territory across that region. I mean, they've attacked West African coastal countries beyond the Sahel. They've attacked Togo, Benin, Ivory coast. But they also launched their first attack on Western Nigeria in October. So they're moving across. So I wouldn't be surprised if there were just hundreds of thousands, but we honestly don't know. And that is, is their strength that they operate kind of in this formlessness. It's very interesting.
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A
And what about their funding and support? Do we know where that is exactly coming from?
- [36:49]
D
So there's a theory online, and I believe it's a conspiracy theory that, you know, it's coming from France and the West. And I think that is very much the kind of junta rhetoric that the Westerners are funding an Al Qaeda backed terror group. Like there's an absurdity to it because. Because obviously this group is a threat to the west as much as it's a threat to Africa. It's so opaque. And I think when you look at even within Mali, the crackdown on press, the fact that local Malian journalists are unable to work, there's a slogan or a phrase called media terrorism. So they've revoked accreditation from Al Jazeera and other outlets that were operating on the ground. And so it's so hard to just get the facts anyway. And so that environment that they've created to almost protect themselves from accountability has also protected their opponent. Because when people can't operate freely and you won't give people even embeds to the front line or you won't show them what's happening militarily, then no one understands. And so the fog of war is just like a perpetual state of being for people in Mali and in Burkina Faso and Niger.
- [37:58]
A
So Yusra, your main concern and those who are watching this situation develop closely is that the world is not focused looking away. The international community is not paying attention to what's going on on the ground. And before we know it, you could see these jihadists overrunning these governments and
- [38:19]
D
taking full control 100%. I mean, I've been yelling about terrorism in Africa since 2018. I remember pitching story after story. And everyone just kind of sees it as this, like this inherent instability in Africa. But they don't understand that these networks affect everyone. And these groups are building strength, they're building power. And that means that they can launch attacks in Spain, that they can launch attacks all across the world. So there's a real sense of, and I get this a lot with Sudan. You and I talk about this. Is this really like navel gazing approach and thinking that these countries are far away and not realizing like we are living in an increasingly globalized, shrinking world where what happens in Africa does impact everyone, what happens in Asia impacts everyone. So I just think it's really short sighted. And essentially these groups are not gonna just stop at Bamako. They're not gonna stop at the neighboring country. They're gonna look towards, like, global influence. And people need to understand the threat and not buy easy propaganda from these military leaders who are just, like, tapping into sentiments of, you know, people are unhappy with the west, fine, but you can't believe that these guys are helping their people. That's harmful to the people in those countries, but also to everyone in the world who's affected by terrorism.
- [39:41]
A
Yusra, always really fascinating talking to extraordinary developments there in the sub Saharan African region. And we will try and monitor it closely. But thank you for helping our listeners understand the situation a little better.
- [39:57]
D
Thank you. Thanks, Hilda.
- [40:08]
A
So that was Yusra El Bagir. Really fascinating stuff there about the worsening situation in west sub Saharan Africa. Richard, have you been to that part of the world?
- [40:19]
B
I have. I've been to Mali, and I actually had the pleasure of traveling pretty much all over the country on boat, on planes, in vehicles, and it's one of the most fascinating and beautiful countries I've ever been into. The food is phenomenal, if you like peanuts, and I love peanuts. So lots of stews and colorful costumes and dancing and real rich culture. Some of the most amazing architecture that has made with. With timber and mud brick that I've seen anywhere in the world. But it's a lovely country. I'd go back any second and fabulous music, you know. Have you ever listened to the Mali blues?
- [41:02]
A
Yeah, I love music in that part of the world.
- [41:06]
B
So, yeah, listen to it all. Listeners out there, listen to the Molly blues. It's great. It's unlike things you may have heard before. And it's. It's really everywhere. People are always, always play in it particularly. They used to have a Timbuktu music festival. A little dangerous now, but great, great place, rich culture, wonderful food, wonderful music. But unfortunately, they're having some problems. Real problems.
- [41:33]
A
Well, Richard, always fascinating hearing your tales and your stories from different parts of the world. Really great to talk to you. And of course, we're gonna stay connected and try and figure out what happens next in the region.
- [41:48]
B
We certainly will. Great to see you in person. Last time you left me solo here, I had to steer the ship alone, but great to be back together and please everyone out there. Watch us on YouTube or just search for the world with Richard Engel and Yelda Hakeem.
- [42:05]
A
Thanks so much for listening.
- [42:27]
C
I'm Sam Coates from Sky News.
- [42:29]
A
And I'm Anne McElroy from POLITICO.
- [42:31]
C
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D
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C
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