Did COP29 deliver?

Summary

Podcast Summary: This Week in Global Development

Episode: Did COP29 Deliver?

Date: November 26, 2024
Host: David Ainsworth (Devex)
Guests:

• JC Chase Limbicz (Devex Climate Reporter)
• Claire Schaaker (Managing Director for Climate, The Nature Conservancy)

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Episode Overview

This episode takes a critical look at COP29, specifically examining its outcomes, the new climate finance deal, and implications for global development—especially for the world’s poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries. The panel unpacks the headline commitments, the negotiation dynamics, and what the future holds for climate policy, finance, and multilateral cooperation.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Headline Deal: The $300 Billion Commitment

(00:37–05:50)

• COP29 concluded with an 11th-hour agreement: a $300 billion annual target for climate finance, set to start in 2035, with an aspirational $1.3 trillion “goal.”
• The panel points out this target “pleased no one,” particularly failing to meet the expectations of least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS).
• The core frustration: The $300 billion is a “mobilized” target (i.e., including private finance) rather than a clear “provided” commitment from rich countries’ own budgets.

Claire Schaaker (01:16):
"It's a deal. It was a deal that pleased no one... For the least developed countries and the small island developing states, this was not what they were looking for."

• Inflation significantly undermines the real value of the promised funds by the time 2035 arrives.

David Ainsworth (05:50):
“300 billion here as if it’s going to be worth as much now as it will be in 11 years. Whereas in fact probably the value of 300 billion will have depreciated by about 40%.”

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2. Disunity, Definitions, and Deep Frustrations

(05:50–11:41)

• Acrimony marked negotiations, with procedural and diplomatic missteps.
• The longstanding Developed vs. Developing country divide failed to reflect today's multipolar economic reality; pushback emerged regarding which countries should pay.
• Many LDCs and SIDS sought a “provide, not mobilize” target, minimum contributions, and grant equivalency (i.e., money that doesn’t add to their debt).

JC Chase Limbicz (03:36):
“There’s no division in the final draft... The developing countries are really upset about the fact that there’s not a clear target coming from north to south.”

• The deal was “gavelled through” without full opportunity for objection, raising questions about process legitimacy.

Claire Schaaker (10:52):
“…it got gavelled through without opening the floor. So there were a lot of countries that wanted to object that weren’t given the opportunity…that’s the point where multilateralism really gets shaky.”

• Lack of clear, enforceable definitions for climate finance—confusion on what counts, and much of the finance is recycled ODA, not new money.

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3. Form of Finance: Loans vs Grants

(12:47–15:10)

• Debate over the “grant equivalency” was central; many recipient countries object to loan-based climate finance, given existing debt crises.
• The final deal failed to specify the form of assistance (grant vs. loan), diminishing possible positive impact and accountability.

JC Chase Limbicz (13:06):
“For grant equivalency, most aid outside of climate finance is counted [in that system]... Climate finance is not counted like that. And we’re already in a serious debt crisis.”

• Broader, interlinked issues discussed, like climate-smart agriculture and the need for resilient food systems in affected regions.

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4. Why Did COP29 Disappoint?

(15:45–22:02)

• Political realities: Global North faces domestic challenges, election cycles, and internal weakening (notably in the EU and US), decreasing appetite for bold commitments.

JC Chase Limbicz (16:03):
“I’m not really sure they ever planned on giving more... I feel like the LDCs didn’t have a whole lot of leverage. They weren’t going to walk away and they didn’t really have… more of an olive branch here.”

• Geopolitical tensions:
  • Breakdown of the G77 + China bloc, with rifts over who should contribute vs. receive.
  • Influence of petro-states, especially Azerbaijan (host), resisting strong language on fossil fuel phase-out.
  • Visible intra-European weakness and shifting alliances.

Claire Schaaker (17:36):
“We saw a breakdown of the G77 in China... In addition to that, there was the plays by the petro states and much more visible than ever before.”

• The Azerbaijani presidency’s handling of the event drew criticism for chaotic, non-transparent negotiations.

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5. Looking Ahead: Next Steps in Climate Policy

(23:59–29:27)

• Next COP (Brazil) expected to focus on:
  • Finalising the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA).
  • Integrating climate and biodiversity goals.
  • Implementing newly agreed carbon market rules.
  • Countries setting/revising their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

Claire Schaaker (23:59):
“People will be featured in all of the different angles of that for climate... the connection between climate and nature and indeed designification, the three COP sort of integration, we’re expecting Brazil to focus on that much more and it’s long overdue.”

• Brazil's proactive approach (early NDC submission) signals potential new leadership in international climate negotiations.

• US (possibly under Trump) preparing to withdraw from Paris Agreement again; others (e.g., Argentina) considering following suit, risking a domino effect.

JC Chase Limbicz (26:59):
“We could see this kind of combination of biodiversity and climate a little bit more obviously, which just might kind of streamline the process... The US pulling out of the Paris Agreement is going to be a big part of what we see.”

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6. Geopolitical Shifts and Erosion of Solidarity

(28:14–30:06)

• Political will in the Global North is waning—voters are skeptical of large outlays for climate finance amid domestic “cost of living crises.”
• The public in donor nations increasingly sees climate finance as remote from their problems, even as climate impacts mount globally.
• Challenge: Justifying South-directed climate finance as North also faces climate disasters.

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7. Closing Thoughts: Glimmers of Hope

(30:13–31:23)

• Panelists close on a cautiously optimistic note: market forces, technological change, and real-economy shifts (e.g., renewables) can drive progress, sometimes despite lagging political agreements.

Claire Schaaker (30:13):
"We can take hope that the real economy is actually driving a transition now... It's not something... that's led by federal governments... They're really driven by the economy and what's cheapest. And we now see renewables definitely in that space."

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “It was possibly one of the most heartbreaking COPs I’ve been in. It was just awful watching the poorest countries... watch any sort of strong, clear commitment...just not land. It’s going to stay with me forever.”
  — Claire Schaaker (02:55)

• “There’s no real definitions either of what does and doesn’t count as climate finance... airports and coal stations and goodness knows what count as climate finance.”
  — David Ainsworth (11:41)

• “Climate finance seems to be pretty much the worst form of funding anywhere in international development for reasons that are extremely, kind of hard to understand.”
  — David Ainsworth (12:28)

• “The only way we know a decision’s been made is because the gavel has fallen.”
  — Claire Schaaker (11:06)

• “We had to get a deal. There was, because of this conversation about who the contribution base should be... that really became very shaky.”
  — Claire Schaaker (17:38)

• “Even though tons of different countries, no matter where you are now, are getting hit by climate impacts, obviously those in the Global South are getting hit much harder. But I can see that definitely becoming a bigger issue moving forward.”
  — JC Chase Limbicz (29:27)

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Timestamps for Critical Segments

• 00:37–05:50: The finance deal breakdown and why LDCs & SIDS feel let down
• 05:50–11:41: Definitions, donor/recipient divides, and the messy process
• 12:47–15:10: Grant equivalency and modalities of climate finance
• 16:03–22:02: What went wrong? Geopolitical, procedural, and historical explanations
• 23:59–29:27: What’s next? COP30, adaptation goals, integration with biodiversity, NDCs
• 30:13–31:23: Panelists’ closing thoughts and hope for progress outside of political gridlock

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Conclusions & Takeaways

COP29’s outcome epitomizes a growing disconnect in the multilateral climate process, with high expectations unmet, political divides growing, and technical/financial outcomes diluted by consensus-based bargaining. Despite frustration, panelists urge listeners to recognize shifts happening in technology, markets, and society that may yet outpace the world’s politicians—offering a glimmer of hope for genuine climate action.

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Transcript

[A]

Hi everyone. I'm Rajkumar, President and Editor in Chief of devex. This week we'll be breaking down the big headlines in global development and bringing in some top experts to help us do it. If you want to follow along with the stories we're talking about, check out devex.com and subscribe to our daily newsletter, the Newswire. There's a link in the description. Follow us along on Twitter and you can see many of the stories we're talking about today. And we'd love to hear what you think this is this week in Global Development.

[B]

My name is David Ainset. I'm the business editor here at devex and I'm joined by my colleague JC Chase Limbicz, our climate reporter, and by Claire Schaaker, who's the managing director for climate at the Nature Conservancy. And this week I think we're going to talk mostly about cop. Obviously, I think the place to start is that we had an 11th hour deal as there is every year at COP. 300 billion for climate, but not until 2035. So what do we think? Is this a good deal, Is this a bad deal? Is this somewhere in between? Claire, let me come to you first. What do you, what were your opinions about it?

[C]

It's a deal. It was a deal that pleased no one. I think maybe the richer countries were pleased that they managed to keep on the table, that the, that the more recently rich, more recently big emitting countries could also contribute. It's not just up to the original rich big emitters, but we were in special measures for most of the time. It was really, really acrimonious from the very beginning. The COP president didn't come out in glory, shall we say, for their diplomatic efforts and managed to upset everyone at some point in the process. But for the least developed countries and the small island developing states, this was not what they were looking for. They really wanted a firm provide target, how much the rich countries were going to actually provide from their own budgets and then a mobilized target, how much they could mobilize private investment, other other innovative sources of funding. And they wanted something around grant equivalence and they wanted something about a minimum contribution to the very poorest and most vulnerable, specifically the LDCs and small island developing states. They got a 2 mobilized target, so 300 billion commitment and then a 1.3 trillion goal. It's a bit like the 2 degrees and 1.1 degrees in the Paris Agreement where we committed to stay below 2 and aimed for 1.5. We've got the same sort of idea in the finance space. But the original, I mean I think everyone's aspiration was that 300 billion commitment was actually a provide from the richest countries to the poorest countries, not a mobilized target. So I would say that it was possibly one of the most heartbreaking cops I've been in. It was just awful watching the poorest countries that are so indebted and really can't take loans and really struggle to attract private investment. Just watch the, the, the any sort of strong, clear commitment where accountability could be held to actually land and yeah, it's going to stay with me forever. I think it was more like Copenhagen than Paris, that's for sure. In terms of a deal.

[B]

Jesse, do you, was, was that your impression as well? Do you feel fairly similar about it?

[D]

Yeah, I, I mean I don't think that, that there's any way to see this as a good deal for developing countries if there's a million different holes that you can poke in this. First of all, it won't even really come into effect for the next 11 years and it's already not really fulfilling what we need it to fulfill. 300 billion is, is not a lot of money for what they were asking for. They wanted a 1.3 trillion. So even kind of that headline number isn't huge. And then when you really break this down and you look at inflation from 2009, it's, it's barely anything more, maybe 50, 50 billion. And then if you look forward to 2035, that's even more inflation. So you know, the total that these countries are going to get is a lot less. Going into this they were hoping they were sort of structuring the discussion like an onion they said. So the core of the onion was supposed to be how much developed countries were giving to developing countries. And then the outer part of the onion was supposed to be the rest of the finance, private MDB funding, kind of any other mechanisms for fulfilling these gaps? There's no division in the final draft. It's all just one kind of onion, I guess. And so they're really kind of upset about that. The developing countries are really upset about the fact that there's not a clear target coming from north to south. And yeah, I guess this you mentioned, Claire, the Baku de belem kind of 1.3 trillion sort of handout. I think it was sort of a last ditch effort to come to consensus at the end of the night. But if you really look at the wording of the paragraph, it's, it's a one year effort. To explore how countries can scale up finance in a kind of more concessional, grant based, non debt creating way. So it's a, it's a recognition that we need 1.3 from the countries which is something. But it's really, I read it initially as just like a legal kind of handout to bring the least developed countries in the small island developing states back to the table.

[B]

Let's pick up on a couple of things that you guys talked about here. I'm a little bit obsessed with inflation when it comes to these targets. It feels as if everybody ignores inflation. We talk about 100 billion as if 100 billion is worth as much today as it was 10 years ago when the target was set. We're talking about 300 billion here as if it's going to be worth as much now as it will be in 11 years. Whereas in fact probably the value of 300 billion will have depreciated by about 40% ish, depending on what happens to inflation by the time we get there. You said that this is essentially not really a real terms increase on the target that was produced way back in 2009. It feels very disappointing. I would guess. So this is kind of a sign that they're not taking this terrifically seriously at all. The rich nations are not actually committing more than they ever really have done.

[C]

Yeah. And they blame the cost of living crisis and domestic challenges they have. There's a lot of elections that have just happened about to happen that made it harder. And that's all true. But we also of course had the US election. That means that we had to do a deal this time because it was going to be harder later. So as Jesse's saying, this sort of process that they've offered could be helpful. But we will see some of the rich traditional donors disappearing during the year. So they're calling it Bakri de Belem dialogue process. I've forgotten already to 1.3 trillion. And as Jesse says, this is the opportunity to get back on the table. What's going to be the grant equivalence? What's the provide commitment as opposed to mobilized commitment? What's the minimum contribution to LDCs and SIDS and set the rules a bit. But we had two years. This cup we knew in Paris was going to be the cup where we had to reset the new climate finance guide. We have not been short of preparation time and the two year process that was set up to lead us to this point spent its entire time filibustering and wasting time. And we literally only got numbers on the table in the final two days of this cup.

[B]

And that just to clarify the provide commitment versus the mobilize commitment. This is the money that is coming from the rich donors themselves as opposed to the money that they're trying to get their private providers and this sort of thing.

[C]

Yeah. So the mobilized target is the outer piece of the onion. It's all the sources of funding that provides target would be if we'd had one just what the rich countries would confirm that they themselves would provide to mobilize the rest of the and so increase the accountability for who's going to give what. And the reason that we've struggled with that so much is because the developing, sorry the developed countries traditional large emitters called developed countries back in. Was it 1971? I'm trying to remember when this classification was formed by the un. But back in those days there was a really clear set of industrial nations that were the large emitters and it made perfect sense that they were the ones that should be. But now we're getting accumulating emissions from emerging economies that are also doing, you know, high GDP is above quite a large number of the EU countries per capita GDP above, you know, I don't know, Portugal and Greece and so on. And yet Portugal and Greece are expected to contribute and these bigger richer countries are not. So they wanted to expand the contribution base and that is why it has been as tragically difficult as it has because it suits no one to get a deal where we're really clear about who's contributing.

[D]

Yeah. If you don't mind. Just to clarify further, I think at the beginning there was some slight discussion of do we change the definition of what counts as developed and developing and that was just a non starter. And so the way that they've worked around this issue is to say that all the funding from that's going into MDBs from whichever country will count towards this 300 billion goal. And countries have the option to opt out of this if they want to. But the way that negotiators are interpreting it is that everybody's automatically opted in. And I think the main issue that this solves is China because China has the largest emissions globally but is a developing country. But at the last minute India was, was really the country that was keeping everything from happening because they, they felt like the whole point of this money is develop to developing. And so to start including developing countries in this goal takes away from that. It was approved at the end, but it was followed by, I don't know like six or seven countries Kind of coming out with very strong language and talking about how upset they were with it. I think India took. They're each supposed to talk for three minutes and I think India's speech was about 10.

[C]

Yeah. And actually the other thing that's worth just pausing on. Sorry, Jesse and I have got a lot to say. It was very dramatic. But the other thing that's worth just highlighting is that it got gavelled through without opening the floor. So there were a lot of countries that wanted to object that weren't given the opportunity and then had the. You know, that's the point where multilateralism really gets shaky. Because if they say we're not accepting this despite it being gavel through, then how does decisions actually get made? The only way we know a decision's been made is because the gavel has fallen. So, yeah, I mean, it's the process, the diplomatic process was not ideal. And you saw a lot. You saw Simon Steele and his advisors all standing up behind us going, oh, my God, what just happened? Yeah, it was, it was messy.

[B]

So we've got a multipolar world in which the, the definition of the people who should be paying and the people who should be receiving the payments are outdated. Nobody can agree on the change. We've got a deal that isn't worth enough money. It isn't going to come into effect for 11 years. We, we've got a situation where, where there's no real definitions either of what does and doesn't count as climate finance. So nobody really knows. We've got people claiming that airports and coal stations and goodness knows what counters climate finance. We've been told that this is money that should be additional to, to official development to oda. But in practice, almost all of it actually is taken from oda. It's ODA that's been repurposed from somewhere else. There's almost no money that's additional to oda. Added to this that the number of holes in this deal are remarkable. Climate finance seems to be pretty much the worst form of funding anywhere in international development for reasons that are extremely, kind of hard to understand.

[C]

Good summary.

[B]

Thank you very much. Another issue that we're focusing here that you raised with me earlier, Jesse, is grant equivalency. And you touched on this as well, Claire, just Briefly, this is 300 billion of finance, but the form of the finance is still very much up in the air.

[D]

Yeah, I mean, yeah, Claire, you mentioned that that was something that developing nations were asking for. They were asking for grant equivalents and then for the Funding to be divided into pots of adaptation, mitigation, loss of damage. Neither, none of, none of those things made it in. But yeah, for grant equivalency, most aid outside of climate finance is counted in grant equivalency, which means it's only how much alone is subsidized, just a small percentage of it. Climate finance is not counted like that. And we're already in a serious debt crisis. A lot of small island developing countries and LDCs are really struggling. It was there in the first draft and I think by the second one it was complete, it was gone. It wasn't really a, I don't think it was really a serious discussion about it. So this funding's coming through. But as, as much as the nations want, you know, that that can be a loan which arguably, you know, for, for a lot of civil society organizations at least doesn't really make a climate finance. It's, it's an investment that they have to pay back.

[B]

If we're looking at the value of a loan versus a grant, these are vastly different numbers. Right?

[C]

Yeah. And the value of longer term, I mean that's the other thing is there was, there was a lot of discussion in the run up around the terms in which it's given. So it's better quality, it's easier to access, it's longer term support. It's behind programmatic approaches, it considers locally led climate action and invests at the right level. All of these things where, you know, the apple piece, which there's remnants in the text but anything that actually gave any sort of teeth disappeared. What we see is that the rising.

[D]

Global average temperature, but also these more extreme weather patterns, they impact agricultural yields. There's going to be a real need now to optimize what we call climate.

[C]

Smart agriculture, resilient agriculture practices.

[D]

How do we make sure these things are feasible, that they're implementable and that they're giving farmers more access to the tools that they're going to need to adapt and become more climate resilient. In a special edition of the Devex Climate plus podcast, hear from CropLife International's Emily Reese and Lori Goodwin about how agricultural innovation and science can be key drivers and tackling climate change and building resilience in our food systems. Listen to Climate plus wherever you get your podcasts.

[B]

I think we've, we've spent 20 minutes or so essentially saying to each other that this is not a very good deal.

[C]

I think that's, it was pretty tragic.

[B]

Yeah, that's essentially where we've got To. Okay, so I guess what went wrong? Why was it such a bad deal, do we think?

[D]

I mean, I, I don't know if I fully have the answer to that. Part of me kind of thinks this is always what developed countries were planning on offering before, Before I even got to Baku, I talked some to some people saying, you know, like, they're not going to offer more than 4,400 billion. I'm not really sure they ever planned on giving more. And I have a feeling the same is true about grant equivalency. But the other issue here is that this was the cop where this needed to happen. We had a lot of protesters saying no deal is better than a bad deal. But I don't, There's a lot. I'm not sure how true that is. There's an argument to be made that now that we have a deal, it's going to be really hard to change that number. Even though I think they did reduce the time. I think they're going to reconvene in 2030 rather than 2035. But I, I mean it's, once you've, once you've set a number, it's going to be hard to change. But at the same time, next year is one dedicated to NDC's nationally determined contributions. And putting more issues on the table is probably just going to make it harder for us to come to any conclusion. And we also have a Trump presidency and he's already said that he's planning on pulling out of the Paris agreement. So I feel like the LDCs didn't have a whole lot of leverage. They wanted to get a deal through. They weren't going to walk away and they didn't really have no one, no one was giving them more of an olive branch here.

[B]

That ring true with you, Claire, as well?

[C]

Yeah, I, yes, it was definitely, I mean the election, the reality that we had to get it done at this cup. I completely agree, Jesse. There was, you know, yes, protesters were saying no deals better. Sorry, yeah, no deals better than a bad deal. But I think that everyone knew that wasn't true. We had to get a deal. There was because of this conversation about who the contribution base should be, which are the countries that need to be supporting. We saw a breakdown of the G77 in China when they, they've, they've managed to drive things together before, but because it was suddenly, you know, the Indias and the Chinas and so on being brought out into a different group, that, that really became very shaky. And then we saw some Countries sort of actually specifically naming, you know, China and India shouldn't be recipients, they should be providers or at least not recipients. In addition to that there was the plays by the petro states and much more visible than ever before. They've usually spoken through others. This time they were speaking directly in plenary. A number of the petro states just sort of pushing back and it was clear that Azerbaijan was very much, you know, in a camp with. It was. It was much harder to get the idea of there being a strong language about fossil fuel phase out than it had been last year. I mean we saw it as a painful success but we just I think assume once we'd got it, we'd got it. But no, they were looking to row back on that as a result for the richer, high emitting countries that want to be progressive on climate, they were fighting two battles at once and that actually made it that, that everything was being played off each other and we didn't get the language we were looking for on phase on maintaining the language on phasing out fossil fuels. We had, we had to push that back to Bill M Cup to, to next year. So there were, there were a few different things at play. And then I guess the other thing is just we've got, you know, the German government had just fallen. The EU hasn't fully formed, wasn't really, you know, in the sort of. The election to the EU had left them feeling a bit weaker. German government just fallen for the French were. Macron was, was very upset by Azerbaijan's first statements of saying some unkind things about France and Netherlands history as colonials, colonial masters. So there was just a whole lot of geopolitics at play in the rooms that made it harder for the least developed countries and small island states to actually have a voice and to be heard. And this was particularly disappointing I think because there's been this process, the climate and development ministerial process that's all about the LDCs and SIDS sitting with the progressive forward leaning donors and trying to agree how the whole system can improve, can improve. And we're seeing, you know, New Zealand for example has just started this programmatic approach to financing climate in the Pacific islands, five Pacific islands I've just started with so that we are seeing progress in that space. But it didn't translate into the negotiations in any real tangible ways which was I think all the more disappointing because so much effort has been spent on trying to get some of these things sorted.

[D]

I can add to the presidency conversation. This was my first cop so I don't know exactly how these things normally look in the last hours, but from what I heard, I mean that the presidency is responsible for organizing the negotiations to some degree, the conversations that these countries have to be having. And they weren't really doing that. So there were all of these kind of on the side negotiations happening while the presidency was gabbling in kind of the more, the less controversial issues of the night. At some point I saw, I saw representatives from the us from the Africa group. I think there was someone from South Africa, like really top negotiators, just in a huddle on the side of the room, clearly doing the most important work of the night. But it wasn't in an official capacity. So I think there was a lot of criticism around how the Azerbaijani presidency organized the whole conference.

[B]

This feels like something which foreshadows a wider problem right across development. Arguably, climate is one of the most key issues that we're dealing with here. But when we're looking at things like debt, for example, which is similarly mired in controversy and in just kind of inaction, we're seeing a real, a move from obviously in the United States towards screw all of you, we don't care. And then a real European weakness. As you said, Claudia, the EU right now is a bit purposeless. They've just had elections, they're finding new commissioners, they don't have a strong voice. Traditionally, the Germans and the French have really piloted what's going on in the eu. Germany's in a complete mess. It can't do anything. France is in a bit of a mess. The United Kingdom has been in a complete mess where all of us are kind of based, is beginning to get its act together. I think can actually speak with a little bit of a stronger and clearer development voice.

[C]

But.

[B]

But it's kind of having been possibly the worst of all offenders, is now suddenly in a position where it's okay. And it's the best of all the major voices that we've heard around the table here. And I think we saw a lot of this at the G20 as well, a lot of the same issues. And it just looks like potentially we're going to continue to see these problems moving forwards. Let's move on to. We kind of need to wrap up relatively quickly in this kind of COP special. But let's move on to the other issues. Beyond the 300 billion and the financing target, there are a number of other things which we wanted to get done at this, at this cop. I think we didn't make much progress on Those and there's a huge to do list in the next one, by the sound of things. Just talk us through what's coming up, what's next? If we're looking forward, where do we think we're going next in these negotiations?

[C]

So gga, the global goal for adaptation should come to a finale at the next cup. And I think nature and adaptation will be. People will be featured in all of the different angles of that for climate. So, you know the role of adaptation for helping shore up our development gains. But also look at new pathways and I think that connection between climate and nature and indeed designification, the three COP sort of integration, we're expecting Brazil to focus on that much more and it's long overdue. So certainly for the smallest countries, these are just one, you know, the biodiversity and climate crisis are one crisis that we're trying to respond to together and actually sh how finance flows around those broader opportunities, what the innovation is, to be able to tackle those issues in a more coherent way is very much what we're expecting. The G20 leadership that Brazil showed on Bioeconomy was an example of that, I think, of what that could look like, what that would mean. I think it's worth noting that we've got the carbon market rules agreed at this cop, which has been one of the longest processes. It was the last set, last part of the Paris rulebook that hadn't been agreed, that's now been agreed. So that's a. That's a huge and important step forward. And I think what we'll now see is, you know, getting to grips with the detail, the sort of technical detail underneath that, and actually moving things forward, which is actually quite exciting. And I. I suppose the other thing. Well, not the other thing, the main thing actually coming up for us over this next year is the. Is the next ambition moment. So every government is meant to set out their new set of NDC commitments, what their climate commitments are for reducing emissions and for tackling the impacts of climate through adaptation and how to respond to loss and damage. Brazil showed great leadership by putting their NDC in early, so they submitted theirs already. It's a whole of economy. It covers a lot of what you'd want to see and it really is a leadership statement. And the UK also signaled a significant cut in emissions. I haven't set it out in full yet, but they gave us a really good idea of that. They will be following the advice of the UK's Climate Change Committee, which is really reassuring. So there's some very positive aspects to the start of this, moving into this new ambition year, and the fact that it's with Brazil and Brazil is so ambitious themselves, I think, is also a good signal of where new leadership can come from. And Brazil and China have a lot of dialogue. So I'm hoping that we'll see that sort of, because China also cares about climate and nature being tackled together, that we might actually see some real progress in that agenda.

[D]

Yeah, I think the main thing to look at next year is the ndcs, like you said. I have heard that there's a real effort to combine the biodiversity goals with the climate goals, the NDCs and the MDSAPs, as they're called. And part of what perhaps could make this easier is that Colombia, I think, holds the presidency over the biodiversity COP for the next years. And there's all. They already showed that they're working with Brazil, I don't know, a month ago so, during COP16. So we could see this kind of combination of biodiversity and climate a little bit more obviously, which just might kind of streamline the process of. Of making these goals. And then, yeah, I think obviously the US pulling out of the Paris Agreement is going to be a big part of what we see. Whether or not this creates a domino effect, I think is something to look at. During COP 29, Argentina kind of, I don't know, toyed with leaving or said they were going to leave, but then didn't ultimate ultimately do that. And it wasn't. It didn't seem to be related to the fact the US likely will, but it's still kind of opening the door to that as an option for countries, so. And then obviously everything else Claire said as well.

[B]

Yeah, I think that's a fascinating geopolitical kind of focus here, really. It's very unclear. We're in a situation where these are obviously really key issues to countries in the global south, whereas in the global north, they're wrestling very much with their own kind of internal problems and are not necessarily very focused on this. And a lot of people in the Global north right now, I think, are thinking, screw you. As I said, we've really got our own problems. We can't be bothered helping you out. I think it's very hard to sell to the public in Europe and North America that you're spending 300 billion even on climate when these people feel quite embattled. I think internally it will be interesting to see what happens in the rest of the world in response to Trump. And I feel like that's kind of a tide that the development sector and the climate sector is going to have to kind of ride because we don't know exactly what's going to happen, which way European governments are going to swing. Are they going to say, well, Trump's doing it, so we're going to get in behind him, or are they going to say, we can't work with America, we're going to go off and find some other allies? I think it would be very interesting.

[D]

Yeah, I think it's worth noting, too. I mean, the first time we came up with this goal was in 2009, and climate impacts were not nearly as heavy in the global south and in the global North. Now we're seeing these impacts in the north as well. And this money is very clearly for developing countries in the global South. And so when we're talking about justifying this to the electorate, you know, they're not going to see any of this money. Even though tons of different countries, no matter where you are now, are getting hit by climate impacts, obviously those in the Global south are getting hit much harder. But I can see that definitely becoming a bigger issue moving forward.

[B]

All right, I think we're pretty much coming up to time. Any last words from anybody? Anything.

[C]

I guess I would say that, you know, the Trump leaving Paris agreement and indeed Argentina is also considering it already. So we will see this, you know, potentially happen. But, you know, re entering isn't that hard either. And we have to, we have, I think we can take hope that the real economy is actually driving a transition now. It's not something, you know, during Trump's first term, we saw a greater scale out of solar in the US than any other time. So there are some things that just aren't led by federal governments or, you know, sub national governments even. They're really driven by the economy and what's cheapest. And we now see renewables definitely in that space. So on the, we now have to have that same transition happen in forests, in land use, in the food systems and so on. But it feels like we now know that these can occur and that we can get beyond politics. So, you know, it's been a very depressing conversation just now. It was a very depressing and distressing cup. But, you know, I feel like we should, we should end on a moment of hope that actually there are things happening in the real world that will, will drive progress, whatever.

[B]

Yes, it's worth noting that the world has gradually been getting better for people to live in for a very long time. And there is reason to hope that it, it will continue to do so, even though it feels when you look at agreements like this, as if it's kind of hard to believe. But okay, let's, let's leave it on that more positive note then, that things might continue to get better despite our politicians. And thank you very much to both of you for joining me today. Thank you as always to our audience for listening in. We will hear from you and see all many different devex events. Thanks very much. Take care. Goodbye.

[A]

This has been this Week in Global Development. If you enjoyed this episode, don't forget to subscribe using the link in the description to get even more coverage and analysis on the most pressing development issues of the day. Become a Devex Pro member by going to devex.com membership and signing up. Thank you for listening and see you next week.

[B]

SA.