Iran and the U.S., Part Three: Soleimani's Iran

Summary

Throughline: Iran and the U.S., Part Three: Soleimani's Iran
Hosted by Rund Abdelfatah and Ramtin Arablouei | NPR | Release Date: June 29, 2025

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Introduction

In the final installment of the "Iran and the U.S." series, NPR's Throughline delves deep into the intricate and often tumultuous relationship between Iran and the United States, focusing particularly on the rise and impact of Qasem Soleimani. Hosted by Rund Abdelfatah and Ramtin Arablouei, this episode explores the historical developments, strategic maneuvers, and personal narratives that have shaped the contemporary dynamics between the two nations.

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Historical Context: From the 1950s to 2001

Rund Abdelfatah sets the stage by tracing the U.S.-Iran relationship back to the 1950s, highlighting pivotal events such as the CIA-backed overthrow of Iran's Prime Minister. The narrative progresses through the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the subsequent U.S. hostage crisis, the expansion of conflict into Lebanon, and the emergence of Iran's uranium enrichment and cyber warfare programs. This historical backdrop establishes the longstanding tensions and complexities that underpin the modern relationship.

Quote:
"The relationship between the US and Iran is on a lot of people's minds right now." – Rund Abdelfatah [00:15]

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The Post-9/11 Landscape and Shifting Alliances

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks marked a significant turning point, altering Iran's isolationist stance. Karim Sajadpour, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, explains how the U.S. began targeting both of Iran's regional adversaries: the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. This shift fostered unexpected cooperation, as Iran saw strategic value in dismantling these hostile forces.

Quote:
"The terrorist attacks of September 11th of 2001 changed that situation completely." – Karim Sajadpour [03:00]

Ramtin Arablouei introduces Ali Alphoni, a senior fellow at The Arab Gulf States Institute, who elaborates on Iran's constructive role during this period, particularly in cooperating with the U.S. to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan.

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The Rise of Qasem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guard

The focus then shifts to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its influential figure, Qassem Soleimani. Established post-1979 revolution, the IRGC was designed to safeguard the new regime against internal and external threats. Karim Sajadpour provides a detailed account of Soleimani's humble beginnings, his early involvement with the IRGC, and his rapid ascent to leadership within the Quds Force, the IRGC's intelligence arm.

Quote:
"The Revolutionary Guard and Qasem Soleimani embody both sides of the Islamic Republic of Iran's identity." – Rund Abdelfatah [06:30]

Soleimani's leadership was characterized by a blend of Shia Islamic ideology and Persian nationalism, which proved highly effective in mobilizing support and expanding Iran's influence across the Middle East.

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Iran's Strategic Operations in Iraq

During the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), Soleimani emerged as a formidable commander, leading Iranian forces against Saddam Hussein's invasion. His hands-on approach and charismatic leadership earned him respect and loyalty among his troops. Post-war, Soleimani was instrumental in combating drug cartels in Kerman province and later became the head of the Quds Force.

Quote:
"Qassem Soleimani became a Revolutionary Guard commander and began to build his reputation as a brave warrior." – Ramtin Arablouei [18:22]

With the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Soleimani played a crucial role in shaping Iran's strategy by leveraging both Shia militias and Sunni extremists to destabilize American and allied forces. This dual strategy aimed to inflict psychological and material losses on the U.S., undermining public support for the war effort.

Quote:
"Mr. Soleimani believed that by imposing heavy losses on the United States military in Iraq... it would impact the willingness and support of the American public to preserve a sizable United States military presence in Iraq." – Karim Sajadpour [32:04]

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The Complex Relationship with Sunni Extremists

One of the most controversial aspects of Soleimani's strategy was his collaboration with Sunni jihadists, including members of Al Qaeda and later ISIS. Ali Alphoni discusses how Soleimani utilized these groups to execute attacks against U.S. forces, notably through the actions of Abu Musab Zarqawi, whose 2003 bombings significantly hampered the American mission in Iraq.

Quote:
"Here you have one, if not two generations of American military forces whom... they would have still said Qasem Soleimani." – Ali Alphoni [32:09]

This alliance, however, was short-lived as ISIS's brutality and ideological extremism eventually posed a direct threat to Iran's Shia allies, compelling Soleimani to pivot towards combating this new adversary.

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Involvement in Syria: A New Front

The Syrian Civil War presented another strategic challenge. The IRGC, under Soleimani's leadership, committed significant resources to support Bashar al-Assad's regime. This involvement was driven by the strategic imperative to maintain a stable ally and secure Iran's interests across the region.

Quote:
"The Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guard Corps perceived this as a serious threat which could take away all their gains from them." – Karim Sajadpour [42:13]

Soleimani's efforts in Syria not only bolstered Assad's position but also expanded Iran's influence, reinforcing the concept of Syria as a "bridgehead" connecting various regional theaters critical to Iran's strategic vision.

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Dual Perceptions of Soleimani: Hero and War Criminal

Throughout his career, Soleimani was venerated in Iran as a national hero and a staunch defender against American imperialism. Rund Abdelfatah captures the duality of Soleimani's legacy, portraying him as both a revered military leader and a figure responsible for significant regional instability and human rights abuses.

Quote:
"The late Major General Soleimani was a man with at least two faces." – Karim Sajadpour [45:09]

Ali Alphoni offers a critical perspective, highlighting the extensive suffering in Syria and the ethical compromises made by Soleimani and the IRGC, which have left a lasting negative impact on the region.

Quote:
"I think that history is not going to reflect well on Qasem Soleimani when his biographies are written in the future." – Ali Alphoni [27:47]

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Conclusion: The Enduring Legacy of Soleimani's Iran

The episode concludes by reflecting on Soleimani's profound influence on Iran's regional policies and U.S.-Iran relations. His strategies have left an indelible mark on the geopolitical landscape, shaping conflicts and alliances that continue to resonate today.

Quote:
"This is the complexity of the individual. I respect the first one, the war hero, but of course I condemn the other face, which is that of a war criminal." – Karim Sajadpour [45:09]

Rund Abdelfatah and Ramtin Arablouei encapsulate the nuanced legacy of Qasem Soleimani, underscoring the multifaceted nature of his role in both empowering Iran and perpetuating regional conflicts.

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Notable Quotes

• "The relationship between the US and Iran is on a lot of people's minds right now." – Rund Abdelfatah [00:15]
• "The terrorist attacks of September 11th of 2001 changed that situation completely." – Karim Sajadpour [03:00]
• "The Revolutionary Guard and Qasem Soleimani embody both sides of the Islamic Republic of Iran's identity." – Rund Abdelfatah [06:30]
• "Mr. Soleimani believed that by imposing heavy losses on the United States military in Iraq... it would impact the willingness and support of the American public to preserve a sizable United States military presence in Iraq." – Karim Sajadpour [32:04]
• "The late Major General Soleimani was a man with at least two faces." – Karim Sajadpour [45:09]

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Key Takeaways

• Qasem Soleimani played a pivotal role in expanding Iran's military and geopolitical influence across the Middle East.
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), under Soleimani's leadership, employed a complex strategy involving both Shia militias and Sunni extremists to counter U.S. and allied forces.
• Soleimani's involvement in Iraq and Syria significantly shaped regional dynamics, contributing to prolonged conflicts and humanitarian crises.
• The dual perception of Soleimani as both a national hero and a war criminal highlights the complex ethical and moral dimensions of his legacy.
• The episode underscores the enduring impact of Soleimani's strategies on U.S.-Iran relations and broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.

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Final Thoughts

Throughline's exploration of Soleimani's Iran provides a comprehensive understanding of the intricate interplay between individual agency and broader geopolitical forces. By examining Soleimani's rise, strategies, and legacy, the episode offers valuable insights into the enduring complexities of U.S.-Iran relations and the broader Middle Eastern landscape.

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For those interested in delving deeper into the historical and strategic facets of international relations, Throughline continues to offer engaging and informative narratives that illuminate the past and its lasting influence on the present.

Transcript

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[Rund Abdelfatah]

Hey, it's Rund. The relationship between the US and Iran is on a lot of people's minds right now. And we've been bringing you episodes from our archives on how that relationship has developed over time. We started in the 1950s with the CIA backed overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister. Next we looked at the Iranian Revolution and 1979 US hostage crisis, the expansion of conflict into Lebanon and the start of uranium enrichment programs and cyber warfare. Today we're looking back at the Iran Iraq War, 9, 11 and the killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guard General Gossam Soleimani.

[Karim Sajadpour]

I am in a situation where the.

[Ali Alphoni]

Americans learned a possible Hijack.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Our number one has been staff and.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Our five is in staff.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

We're 56865. We have, I believe it is a Boeing 757.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Can you see him up there, sir?

[Ali Alphoni]

That's concurred. It looks like he's rocking his wing.

[Karim Sajadpour]

The cor. Oh my. I can hear you. I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you.

[Ali Alphoni]

And the people. And the people who knock these buildings.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Down will hear all of us soon.

[Ali Alphoni]

In the tragedy of that moment, for those of us who paid attention to Iran, there was this glimmer of hope that both the United States and Iran are adversaries of the Taliban in Afghanistan which was hosting Al Qaeda. So it seemed like there was this natural convergence of interests. And by all accounts, Iran played a quite constructive role in cooperating with the US and campaign to get rid of. Welcome to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

This is Karim Sajatpour, a senior fellow.

[Ali Alphoni]

At the Carnegie Endowment and adjunct professor at Georgetown.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Until 2001, Iran was boxed in. It was isolated and surrounded by enemies. On the east side, the enemy was the Taliban regime. On the western side, Baghdad and Saddam Hussein's regime. The terrorist attacks of September 11th of 2001 change that situation completely because the.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

US would soon go after both of Iran's enemies.

[Karim Sajadpour]

The Revolutionary Guard welcomed the development.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

The Revolutionary Guard is a military arm of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It's also called the irgc.

[Karim Sajadpour]

And there were secret meetings in Geneva. The IRGC intelligence officers handed over maps and and exact locations of Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan to American representatives for which American presidencies were very thankful because American intelligence presence at the time in Afghanistan was very limited.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

This is Ali Alphoni. He's a senior fellow at The Arab Gulf States Institute. He's been researching the Revolutionary Guard for years and he wrote the book on.

[Karim Sajadpour]

The topic called do you believe it or not? I don't remember it right now. I don't know.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Iran unveiled.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Yes, yes, Iran unveiled. You know, I never liked the title of the book, you know, that's why I don't.

[Ali Alphoni]

There was this hope in the air that maybe there's finally an opportunity for U. S. Iran rapprochement. You know, many Iranians were hopeful about that.

[Karim Sajadpour]

But the good vibes, you know, between the two changed completely when President Bush delivered his so called axes of evil.

[Ali Alphoni]

Speech in which you put Iran, North Korea and Iraq lumptim as part of one axis of evil.

[Karim Sajadpour]

States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world.

[Ali Alphoni]

That only confirmed the already very cynical worldview of Iran's hardliners that cooperation with the United States is futile.

[Karim Sajadpour]

The Iranian side and the Revolutionary Guard, they felt betrayed.

[Ali Alphoni]

They felt they had played a constructive role in helping to get rid of the Taliban.

[Karim Sajadpour]

In their own opinion, they had helped.

[Ali Alphoni]

The United States and they were rewarded by being placed in the axis of evil.

[Karim Sajadpour]

At that time, the Revolutionary Guard and the political leadership in the Islamic Republic decided that President Bush could not be trusted and the United States was a very, very serious threat. They also believed that it was about time to impose some losses on the United States. That became reality after 2003, where the United States also invaded Iraq. Let me say this to all Iraqis who are listening. The regime is not telling the truth. There are no negotiations taking place with anyone in the Saddam Hussein's regime. There will be no outcome to this war that leaves Saddam Hussein and his regime in power.

[Ali Alphoni]

Let there be no doubt, many of the greatest advocates of the Iraq war believed that this would be a project to democratize the entire Middle East. And that's going to immediately delegitimize the Iranian regime. It's going to delegitimize the theocracy in Iran. And so if you're Qassem Soleimani and Ayatollah Khamenei, you think to yourself, we will do everything in our power to make sure that the US War in Iraq is a colossal failure.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

The Revolutionary Guard and Qasem Soleimani embody both sides of the Islamic Republic of Iran's identity. On the one hand, they position themselves as the only power in the Muslim world resisting American imperialism. And on the other, they behave cynically and try to dominate the affairs of the Middle east at any human cost.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

In this episode we're going to explore the origins of the IRGC and the story of Qasem Soleimani to understand exactly what their impact has been on the Iran U.S. relationship.

[Ali Alphoni]

Hi, this is Maryam from Iran and.

[Karim Sajadpour]

You'Re listening to Throughline from npr.

[Maryam]

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[Rund Abdelfatah]

Goat thief this is the sound of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei leading prayers at the funeral of Qasem Soleiman. After a few minutes, he breaks down and cries. This moment perfectly illustrates the impact of Soleimani's death. Here you have the most powerful person in the country, the Middle East's longest running autocrat, weeping openly because one of his soldiers has died. But he wasn't just any soldier. He was the head of Iran's Al Quds Force, which is the intelligence arm of the Revolutionary Guard, established after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, when Iran's king, the Shah, was dramatically overthrown by a mass movement supporting the cleric Ayatollah Khomeini.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Ayatollah, do you know yourself whether your followers are armed?

[Ali Alphoni]

They have told me that they are getting prepared and I have given the.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Permission to prepare themselves.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Which means getting arms.

[Ali Alphoni]

Yes, the Revolutionary Guards were essentially set up in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, because the Shah's military, which Ayatollah Khomeini inherited with the revolution, he was inherently mistrustful of them because he said, these are not my men. These were men who were trained by the Shah's government. And so, like most authoritarian regimes in the Middle east, they were extremely paranoid about the prospect of a coup. And for that reason, they set up this initially ragtag group of men they called the Guardians of the Revolution to be the protectors of the revolution.

[Karim Sajadpour]

And even if you look at the name of the institution, the exact and word by word translation is the army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. In other words, the name Iran, you know, is not even mentioned in the name of the organization. And in the logo of the organization, there is, you know, a picture of the globe, not a map of Iran. So clearly this group of Iranian revolutionaries perceived their own organizations as the vanguard of an internationalist revolution.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

This is Qasem Soleimani speaking. When he died, he was one of the most powerful and well known people in the Middle East. But his story starts the exact opposite way. It ended in complete obscurity.

[Karim Sajadpour]

He was born the son of landless peasants who left school after only five years of schooling, left the village mountain of Rabur, goes to Kerman and begins working as a construction worker. There is no record of Mr. Soleimani being a revolutionary activist prior to the revolution of 79. After the revolution of 79, he appears to have joined the local branch of the Revolutionary God Corps in Kerman. At that time. We are not aware of his ideological beliefs. But there is one thing that we know in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, and it is that many of them more or less lost their belief in the clerical class. They believed in Khomeini, yes, as a spiritual leader and as a leader of the revolution. But most of the other members of the clerical class they completely distrusted. And the reason for that is that Revolutionary Guard officers, they were taken out and recruited to serve as personal bodyguards to the clerics. As personal bodyguards, they had to live physically under the same roof as members of the clergy. And when you live with people, you find out that not everyone wearing a cloak and a turban is a saint. You find out that someone who, from the pulpit of the mosque is preaching against drinking alcohol, perhaps enjoys a drink at home, somebody who is rating against homosexuality, may be interested in handsome young men at home. So the sanctity of the clerical class completely came down, crashing. So instead of being overtly anti clerical, the IRGC officer corps, including Mr. Soleimani, they developed an ideology which made mixed Shia Islam and Persian nationalism, Iranian nationalism. So in that sense they managed to combine the two. And this combination was so unbelievably potent that it managed to mobilize millions of Iranians.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

When Qassem Soleimani joined the Revolutionary Guards he was very young, only in his early 20s, but he still managed to impress his commanders enough to get an important task, one that probably had an impact on him for the rest of his life.

[Ali Alphoni]

One of his earliest assignments was to go quell a Kurdish rebellion in northwest.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Iran, because at the time there was an anti government uprising in Kurdistan.

[Ali Alphoni]

And if you see the photographs of that rebellion, they are incredibly violent. Approximately 10,000 Kurds died during that period. And I think that that was his baptism into that kind of career.

[Karim Sajadpour]

He saw terrible things with his own eyes and perhaps he also engaged in acts which are difficult to defend morally. But at the time it was perceived as necessity in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Iran. Immediately after that came the heroic phase of the Revolutionary Guards history in Iran. And that is the war with Iraq.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

In 1980, Saddam Hussein invaded southwestern Iraq and the Revolutionary Guard forces were some of the first to respond.

[Karim Sajadpour]

In the frontline cities, Iranian troops hurried to engage the invaders. Local resistance was led by Iran's Revolutionary Guards who were fiercely loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini.

[Ali Alphoni]

What was initially this small ragtag group of men mushroomed into thousands of men.

[Karim Sajadpour]

They relied heavily on rifles and rocket propelled grenades and in sporadic engagements exacted a heavy toll of the invading forces. From their example stemmed the Iranian mood of self sacrifice in a holy war. Iraq, in the beginning of the war was occupied, occupying some of Iran's most important oil producing areas. If Iran lost land to Iraq, the entire country would collapse.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Even though the Iranian side was outgunned, they were able to push Iraq's military back to its borders in two years.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

To those who are sitting in the house of God, standing up against the enemies of God, I will kiss your hands and shoulders because the hands of God are above you. Qassem Soleimani became a Revolutionary Guard commander and began to build his reputation as a brave warrior.

[Karim Sajadpour]

This is the commander who would be talking personally to all men that are under his command before each attack. And we are talking about the war which most of all resembles World War I. It was trench warfare. You had at least 250,000 Iranians being killed in that war.

[Ali Alphoni]

He wasn't this commander who would sit in a bunker in Tehran and order people around you Know, he. He liked to go out there in war zones and appear to be, you know, man of the people.

[Karim Sajadpour]

And here you have one commander, a young man from Kerman doing reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines to minimize the risk for men under his command. And I'm really emphasizing this because most of the people from Kerman, they were in same division, and many of them were actually personal friends and sometimes family members of Mr. Soleimani. On one occasion, Radio Baghdad, which was transmitting programs in Persian language, made Mr. Soleimani a minor celebrity of the war. Because on one particular occasion when Mr. Soleimani was doing a reconnaissance mission, this, you know, young peasant sees a goat and he steals the goat, brings the goat back and prepares kebab, you know, for his men. And Radio Baghdad apparently heard of this story and began propagating the name Soleimani the Goat Thief.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

With all my soul and belief, I believe our war was full of those blessed souls who the heavens were ecstatic to meet. Soleimani the goat Thief went on to fight for the entirety of the Iran Iraq war with almost no leave, repeatedly committing acts of bravery. By 1988, when the war ended, he was widely considered to be a warrior.

[Ali Alphoni]

He had this charisma which really engendered enormous loyalty and affection. And even after the war ended, you know, he didn't, like many Revolutionary Guardsmen, then just enter the private sector and try to go off and get rich. Like his entire life was the revolution and projecting Iranian power.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

At the end of the war, Suleimani was sent back to his home province, Kerman, where he became the chief of the local Revolutionary Guard Force.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Kerman province is close to the Afghan and Pakistani border, and at the time in the 1990s, many Afghan and Iranian drug cartels were operating in those areas, transporting particularly opium from Afghanistan to Iran and from Iran to the international market. Mr. Soleimani became heavily involved in the fight against the drug cartels. Later, when Iran and Afghanistan, you know, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were almost on the brink of a war, the Quds Force was looking for a new face, for a new command. And because Afghanistan was the primary threat to Iran's national security, the regime needed an Afghanistan expert. And Mr. Soleimani was one of those people. So that was the reason why he became the chief commander of the Quds Force.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

Qassem Soleimani, in the course of two decades, had gone from a completely un unknown construction worker to the head of Iran's most important intelligence military organization. But this was only the first half of his rise, because just three years into his tenure as the head of Al Quds Force 911 happened, he found himself right in the middle of the action, helping shape Iran's response to an incredibly difficult foreign policy challenge. And in the process, he showed a more cynical, deadly face to the world.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Hola Me amo vers de Houston, Texas.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Y Vosas through line the NPR Ramtin and Rond.

[Karim Sajadpour]

I love y' all.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

You make sitting in Houston traffic way more enjoyable.

[Ali Alphoni]

Thanks.

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[Maryam]

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[Ramtin Arablouei]

Part 2 Gospel of.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Chaos After Iran fell out with the U.S. in Afghanistan, they caught a break. A strange opportunity presented itself. When the Taliban government collapsed, many members of Al Qaeda fled Afghanistan and crossed the border into Iran. They were quickly arrested and interrogated by Iranian incident intelligence.

[Ali Alphoni]

And at that time there was a debate within Iran about whether these Sunni jihadists were a threat to Shiite Iran or whether they were an asset. You know, there were bin Laden family members. There was a guy who later went on to become the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Zarqawi, and I think Qasem Soleimani was unique. That was kind of his sinister genius in thinking, you know what, we can potentially use these folks. And Soleimani assigned two Revolutionary Guard commanders to essentially tend to their needs. They were given televisions. They were given money to build a library. Their families were taken out on shopping outings. One of the most notorious Al Qaeda explosives experts, a guy who's still alive, he's still on the run. Sayf Al Adel, he had access to this very posh gym in north Tehran in a neighborhood called Elahir, where he used to swim laps alongside foreign diplomats. And you know, the children of Osama bin Laden, affectionately called Qasim Soleimani, Haji Qasim, they used to break bread together. My friend Siamak was tortured in prison. He was in solitary confinement. And it really angers me to think that hardened jihadis, you know, Al Qaeda members were treated as guests, and real patriots who love their country are treated like criminals and put into solitary confinement and exiled. And I think that history is not going to reflect well on Qasem Soleimani when his biographies are written in the future.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Now that Soleimani had these Al Qaeda fighters on his side, he had to figure out exactly how to use them.

[Ali Alphoni]

The way they figure out to do that initially is by taking these Al Qaeda jihadists and simply unleash them into Iraq with understanding that you guys go do what you do, go after the United States. Car bombings, suicide bombings. And just a few months into the war, August of 2003, Abu Musab Zarqawi, the Jordanian Al Qaeda leader, he sets off these three major bombs, which essentially destroys the American experiment in Iraq in its infancy.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

One bomb hit the Jordanian Embassy, another hit the United nations, which reduced their peacekeeping presence there.

[Ali Alphoni]

And lastly, Zarqawi conducted this car bombing against the major Shiite shrine, Imam Ali mosque in Naja. This was unheard of at the the time that someone would go set off a car bombing at a mosque during Friday prayers. This totally radicalized the Shiite community in Iraq, and it essentially pushed them into the arms of Iran and Qassem Soleimani, who said to the Shiites of Iraq, we can protect you. You know, there's some slight parallels here with the way the United States fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, because the United States also supported these mujahideen, you know, essentially the jihadists of their day, to go fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, obviously not realizing that those folks would be the antecedents of Al Qaeda.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Different conflict, same strategy.

[Ali Alphoni]

And you never understand until years later what is going to be the residual impact of these choices.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

Soleimani didn't just use Sunni extremists to cause chaos in Iraq. He also used Iran's money and influence to organize militias among his fellow Shiites in southern Iraq.

[Karim Sajadpour]

It managed to use the Iraqi Shia militias, who should be thankful to the United States military because the US had overthrown Saddam's regime. But the Islamic Republic managed to mobilize them against the United States. It served the interests of the Islamic Republic to maintain Iraq in a state of controlled chaos and anarchy so that the United States could not declare itself the winner of developments in Iraq.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

How does Ali or anyone else know this? Well, one Iraqi Shia fighter, while being interrogated by American military intelligence, explained exactly how he worked with Iran.

[Karim Sajadpour]

He would go to Tehran, he would receive bags of money, approximately $700,000 to up to 1 million to to form a group of fighters in Iraq.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

Al Quds force funded, equipped and even trained Iraqi Shia militias on how to ambush and attack vulnerable American forces. But one of their most effective tactics was teaching Shia fighters how to use.

[Ali Alphoni]

IEDs, improvised explosive devices.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

I'm staying here.

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[Ali Alphoni]

Which proved to be very effective in getting through metal tanks and maiming and killing injuring U.S. troops.

[Karim Sajadpour]

At the very minimum, 600American servicemen were killed in those years.

[Ali Alphoni]

U.S. officials hold Soleimani directly responsible for, for conceiving of that. And that's why you have one, if not two generations of American military forces whom, if you were to ask them, who is your worst adversary in the world, the person you see as the greatest threat to the United States? And even when Osama bin Laden was living and Baghdadi was living, they would have still said Qasem Soleimani.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Mr. Soleimani believed that by imposing heavy losses on the United States military in Iraq that it was possible to target the psychology of the American society. Every single time an American is coming home in a body bag. It would have an impact on willingness and support of the American public to preserve a sizable United States military presence in Iraq. And in some ways, it worked.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

American public support for the war in Iraq waned as the conflict became more costly in lives and money. Slowly, the American presence in Iraq began to shrink. By 2011, the number of American soldiers there was a fraction of what it was just five or six. Six years earlier. Emboldened by their success and fearing the downfall of allies in the Middle east, the Revolutionary Guard, with Qassem Soleimani leading the way, began to make moves beyond Iraq. Hi, this is Bob Rogers from Merida, Yucatan, Mexico. And you are listening to Throughline on.

[Ali Alphoni]

Npr, where the past is omnipresent.

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[Ramtin Arablouei]

Part 3 A String of Pearls.

[Ali Alphoni]

At.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Least 20 protesters have been killed during marches in several Syrian civilians cities.

[Ali Alphoni]

It's estimated that up to a million people have taken to the streets to.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Challenge President Bashar al Assad's rule. Protesters demanded the end of the regime, ripping down a statue of the president's father, bracing to see the reaction of heavily armed government security forces. The answer came quickly and violently. Here they are, members of the elite Revolutionary Guards on the front lines of Syria's civil war. The Islamic Republic perceives Syria as a bridgehead connecting western Afghanistan to Iran, to Iraq, to Lebanon. Mr. Rafsanjani, the former president, he referred to this as a string of perils. If one of them collapses, it's going to cause very serious trouble for the rest of the system. And the strategic thinking of Mr. Rafsanjani was shared by the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard. And Bashar al Assad had to be defended at all cost. At all cost. Not because they liked Bashar al Assad. They criticized the as a matter of fact, but they believed that collapse of the Bashar regime and emergence of a different type of regime, it would be bad for Iran. So the Islamic Republic began systematically to send first Quds Force officers, then deployed Lebanese Hezbollah, who did so rather unwillingly because Hezbollah's raison d' esch is to protect Arabs against Israel and but here they are going to kill fellow Arabs in Syria. So it was very embarrassing for Hezbollah. But they also felt that they had no choice.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

This is an Iranian Al Qud sold serving as an advisor to the Syrian military, talking about the opposition to Bashar Al Assad. He says that it isn't a war between the Syrian people and their government. It's a war between good and evil, between Shias from Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq against Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This man was likely reporting to Qasem Soleimani, who was tasked with coordinating and organizing the defense of Bashar Al Assad's regime. He did this at a time when Assad's military was using chemical weapons against its own citizens and bombing rebellious Syrian towns, indiscriminately, killing combatants and civilians alike. Despite all of this extreme violence, Syrian rebels and citizens were still gaining ground. And things were not looking good for Soleimani's military.

[Karim Sajadpour]

After a few years, they were suffering so many losses that the Islamic Republic had to deploy other ships. Shia militia groups in Syria, for example, Shia Afghans from the Fatima Division, different Iraqi militias who were already busy fighting the civil war in Iraq. Some of them were also sent to fight in the civil war in Syria. And at some point, of course, they were so desperate that Major General Soleimani had to travel to Moscow and ask Vladimir Putin for military support because they needed air support. And after that, things began to go very well for the Revolutionary Guard. The Revolutionary Guard commanders, they genuinely believed that Syria was a sensational success story. They won against all odds. While Damascus remains a target for armed.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Groups in the region, local residents are.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Without doubt, Bashar Al Assad has won the war.

[Ali Alphoni]

Of course we won the war. No one can argue with that. And as long as our President is in power, everything will be fine in Syria.

[Karim Sajadpour]

The war in Syria not only provided the Revolutionary Guard with an opportunity to achieve military success on the ground, but unfortunately also gave them the opportunity to compromise themselves ethically and more.

[Ali Alphoni]

The United nations has found massive evidence pointing to the Syrian government's involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Syrian activists have accused the forces of President Bashar Al Assad of killing hundreds of people in a nurse gas attack.

[Ali Alphoni]

The accusation goes to the highest levels and implicates the president, Bashar Al Assad.

[Karim Sajadpour]

They are accomplices of Bashar Al Assad's regime. Use of chemical weapons against the Syrian population. They're accomplices of the Syrian regime using famine against his own population as a means of controlling them.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

In 2014, after years of fighting in Syria and Iraq, Qasem Soleimani and the Quds Force all of a sudden had a new problem. Isis. And there's a logical question here. If Iran had been able to work with Al Qaeda, then why couldn't they just support poor isis? Well, Al Qaeda was a little different than isis.

[Ali Alphoni]

Al Qaeda was not out gratuitously beheading Shiites the way that ISIS was doing for the Iranian regime. ISIS was just beyond the pale.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guard Corps perceived this as a serious threat which could take away all their gains from them.

[Ali Alphoni]

ISIS posed a real threat to Iran's Shiite allies in Iraq.

[Karim Sajadpour]

At some point, Islamic State was threatening Baghdad.

[Ali Alphoni]

At the same time, I would argue that both Iran and the Assad regime in Syria actually utilized these Sunni jihadists.

[Karim Sajadpour]

Presence of such an inhumane enemy, universally condemned as a terrorist organization. It was not such a bad thing from the Iranian side because the Islamic Republic, which had hitherto difficulties explaining and legitimizing its military actions in Iraq and Syria, suddenly had a legitimate cause to engage in the fight against terrorism on those occasions, just as it did before in. In 2001 in Afghanistan, the United States and Islamic Republic cooperated with each other. The United States Air Force was providing air cover to the Quds force operatives and Mr. Soleimani personally so that he could cleanse the city of Tikrit of the Sunni radical elements and Islamic State. At that time, in 2014 and 15, the Quadz Force and Mr. Soleimani, both of them were on the the list of designated terrorists of the United States government. So you clearly see strange bedfellows at times of war.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

And this is the moment when Qasem Soleimani became internationally known. The Revolutionary Guard knew his appeal. His face was put on posters. Camera crews followed him as he visited soldiers in Syria. Music was made about him. And all the way up to his death, he was successfully marketed as kind.

[Ali Alphoni]

Of this Shiite Che Guevara.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

This is footage of Qasem Soleimani speaking to Al Quds Force in Syria. Zarbek is actually, actually pretty good. And this is a song in Arabic made to honor him.

[Karim Sajadpour]

The late Major General Soleimani was a man with at least two faces. One face. That is the face of a young man who left his little village to go to the front to defend Iran against the invading Iraqi army in 1980. That very same individual, of course, also had another face. That face is the face of a general who cynically attacked and killed American servicemen in Iraq since 2003. And also, most unfortunately, engaged or was complicit in war crimes in Iraq. And Also in Syria, these two faces show the complexity of the individual. I respect the first one, the war hero, but of course I condemn the other face, which is that of a war criminal.

[Ali Alphoni]

And I think I have a somewhat different perspective here than many analysts of Iranian origin because not only did I live in Iran, but I also lived in Beirut and I would travel every couple weeks to Damascus for a year. And so when I see the destruction of Syria, these numbers are not just a statistic for me that 13 million people displaced, you know, 600,000 people killed. I see Bassem Soleimani as being directly killed, complicit, and that horrific violence. This is frankly my problem with a lot of Iranians who comment on this because I feel like they totally lack a self awareness about, you know, they only view him in this Iranian context and they don't give a shit about the role he played elsewhere in the region. And I tell people, how would you feel as an Iranian to watch millions of Iraqis mourning Saddam Hussein? A lot of people commented about Suleimani was that he was soft spoken. He wasn't someone who was like this fire breathing radical. And I'm always reminded of this Persian saying about the clerics, that if you look at the hands of the mullahs of the clerics, their hands are always like perfectly manicured, as if they haven't done any manual labor in their life or even known war. They talk a tough game, but they've never served in conflict. And I always think that's probably one reason why Suleimani was soft spoken. You know, he didn't need to breathe rhetorical fire because everyone knew he had his elbows deep in blood.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

That's it for this week's show. I'm Rund Abdelfatah.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

I'm Ramtin Arablouei and you've been listening.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

To Throughline from npr.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

This episode was produced by me and me and Jamie Yorke, Lawrence Wu, Laine.

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Kaplan Levinson, Lou Bolkowski, n' Jeri Eaton.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Fact checking for this episode was done by Kevin Voelkel.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

Thanks also to Anya Grundmann, Aida Porasad and Austin Horn.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Our music was composed by Ramtin and his band Drop Electric.

[Ramtin Arablouei]

If you like something you heard or you have an idea for an episode, please write [e-mail] thanks for listening.

[Karim Sajadpour]

SA.

[Rund Abdelfatah]

Foreign.

[Maryam]

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