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Say hello to Mia.
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A fresh cut, a friendly vibe and a well placed podcast ad.
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Get the word out about your business through Acast. Visit go.acast.com advertise to get started. Welcome back to the to the Contrary podcast. I'm Charlie Sykes. We're going to be doing something a little bit different today. We're going to be taking a deep dive into what conservatism used to be and what it has morphed into and where it might Be going. Conservatism used to have three stools. You know, under Ronald Reagan was free market economics, social conservatism and anti communism. Abroad now though, we have the MAGA New Right stool, which has four legs. Nationalist economics, anti immigration, social conservatism again, but America first foreign policy, which we are seeing playing out. And on today's podcast we're joined by the author of a new book, Furious Minds, that takes one of the most interesting looks at, at this new dynamic, the intellectual underpinnings of what we're seeing playing out in real time. And Laura Field is a. Laura Field is an associate with the Illiberalism Studies Program at George Washington University and a non resident fellow at the Brookings Institution. And we have a lot to talk about today. Well, Laura, thank you for joining me. You know, that comparison between the Gipper stool and the MAGA New Right stool is from your book. So let's just walk through what we're seeing now because. And I have a number of questions about sort of the intellectual roots of the conservative movement. I mean, a lot of these things have been around for a long time. I've described them as a recessive gene, but you break them into a number of categories. The national conservatives, the Claremonters, the. The Post liberals and the hard right underbelly. So let's just start with. And there's overlap between these groups. Right. But they are distinctive.
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C
Them as like clustered network. It's a clustered network. So you've got a lot of overlap, a lot of people who could be in different categories. And the book sort of tries to. Through the writing, not the chart. Right. There's a chart that sort of separates it all and disaggregates it. But I think I'm trying to show how these people are connected and interact with one another, though they do have some really deep differences intellectually. And the story overall of the book, just to kind of put this on the table, is basically of radical or of ideological radicalization. So the book charts it basically. It's Pretty Limited from 2016 to 2024. I do draw on history, you know, when I need to, to talk about, you know, the Paleocons or what have you, because those things are important. But I really try to chart how this movement coalesced during the first Trump administration, how they managed to survive after January 6th and then kind of consolidated their power, which was very surprising to me. I thought they'd sort of take the off ramp. Right. And so they, they didn't. And so the second. And they they continue to radicalize. And so I sort of chart in the very, you know, I've got the chart of the different groups, but I also try to show how each contingent kind of got drawn into the extremes while they were taking over the Republican Party.
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B
Well, and the paradox, of course, is that Donald Trump himself is not an ideological figure. Right. He's not a man of deep thinking, historical thinking. He is not a philosopher of politics. So I guess part of the question is, as we get into all of this, is sort of the chicken and the egg. Is he a product of this intellectual movement, or is he the person that basically opened the door? These folks, I mean, how influential are these people in Donald Trump's world?
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C
Yeah, I mean, that's the kind of million dollar question, or maybe it's a billion dollar question. But I mean, he's. I think, the way I think about it is that at first he was very much an opportunity for them. They were coming in sort of from the back end, providing this justification. But I think there's something where they saw that what he intuitive, what, what he intuited lined up very neatly with what they were already kind of immersed in. And that kind of old paleo thinking about America, which is kind of the nativism, the sort of semi isolationism, these kind of, these kind of that, what the fringe thought, Buchanan ism, that, that was kind of festering already. And they were, some of these intellectuals were already on board with that, and they saw that Trump represented that, and so they were quite happy to justify it intellectually. And the course of the last decade or so, I think that they've gained quite a lot of power, perhaps unbeknownst to Trump. I mean, I sort of think of him as providing camouflage for this movement, which isn't all powerful by any means, but they are a really important slice of the conservative movement. And I think they are in charge of the kind of DC World now. Right. And that has a lot of implications for the whole culture. So the book's kind of narrowly focused on them, but we could list off their victories. Right.
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B
Well, listen. Well, we've been living through some of their victories. So again, so these categories are the hard right, underbellied, the post liberals, the national conservatives, and the Claremonters. Let's go at the other side of the people who the people will recognize. Donald Trump sits amid this, atop this pyramid. But where would you put, say the Authors of Project 2025, Kevin Ro, for example, the president of the Heritage foundation, who's under a lot of fire because, of course, he's been defending Tucker Carlson. But which category do you put? Because they have really been in many ways the engine of the first nine months of the administration. So where do you put Kevin Roberts, Heritage Foundation?
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C
I mean, he's a great figure because he's just kind of all over the place. He's really emblematic. He's kind of like J.D. vance. He's emblematic of all of it. I mean, he's Catholic. I don't think he's an integralist or might not identify with those particular people who are the intellectuals. I haven't seen much of that. But he's, I think, very well connected in the Catholic world. He is very close with the Hermont, with the Claremonsters. Right. I mean, he worked with them through the in the lead up to January 6th, actually, with when he was at the Texas Public Policy Institute. So he's very close with them and very on board with all of that. And they saw it as a real victory when he got the leadership at Heritage. And then he's also just, he's explicitly when in 2022 at the last. Well, maybe I'm going too much in the weeds. But he also was very explicitly getting on board with national conservatism.
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B
Right. And you have him listed in your chart. You have him listed under the national Conservatives. But you're right. I mean, he's close to a lot of these other folks. So where would you put Stephen Miller, who is continuing to rise in prominence? Would he be hard right, post lib, national conservative? All of the above?
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C
No, I think he'd be hard right slash national conservative. I think he's kind of on the border there where I mean, I do include him in the book. There's a chapter, two chapters that are kind of about this hard right, which I don't they sort of the reason they sp intellectually speaking. Right. I mean, they span these other three groups. So you have Christian nationalists, you have these kind of pagan Nietzscheans, you've got Curtis Yarvin, who I put in there, who's, you know, kind of the tech bro monarchist. So you've got just the smattering of weirdos who I put down there because they are all sort of more virulent in their rhetoric and violent in their rhetoric and sort of more explicitly racist and fascist and misogynist. So they're just kind of like, you know, festering down there. But there are these clear ties to the other groups.
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B
Well, the reason I mentioned Stephen Miller, obviously is, you know, he has Donald Trump's ear. And he's become increasingly outspoken. You know, I've described him as pulling the mask off. In fact, what I wrote in my newsletter yesterday was that when I describe, when I call him a fascist, that's not a pejorative. That is now a description of what he is, you know, with the iron laws of power, his views on race, which are not subtle at all. And so we know that from Stephen Miller's mind to his mouth, to Donald Trump's ear, that he's having this tremendous influence on him. And, and I struggle with trying to think where, you know, what are the streams in American conservatism that led to this moment where someone like a Stephen Miller would be so influential. I mean, the. I could be in European history, you go back to the triumph of the will. And I'm sorry to do that so early in the podcast, but when you think of the Reaganite approach to foreign policy, you know, the post war world, where does Stephen Miller come from? Guess what? I'm sorry, I'm not asking this as clear as I can. It feels as if he comes from more of a European right tradition than from an American conservative position. But correct me if I'm wrong on that.
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C
It seems right to me. Greg Sargent has a great piece about Stephen Miller's kind of intellectual background that I think is worth reading in the New Republic that came out a few weeks ago. It's kind of a deep dive into Miller. But I think you're right that there's a lot of what's happening is kind of European ification, if that's a word of the, of American conservatism. And so you do see these European elements. Carl Schmidt would be the main one I would point to. And Strauss is involved, too. That's the school I kind of come from. It's the Straussian school of political philosophy where the, the Claremonters are sort of saying that they're drawing from that tradition. I think they're doing it badly. But you get these kind of deep reactionary impulses that I think that. And then they are drawing on those sources. The post liberals certainly are too, with their sort of. The post liberal group is the Catholic group and that. That's also known as Catholic integralism. And it's this sort of effort to reject the Catholic Church's settlement with liberal democracy and pluralism and religious pluralism and to sort of reintegrate church and state. And it's, it can get very complicated, complicated and. But they're drawing on these old reactionary French thinkers. A lot of the time. So you just. You see all these things coming in and you. I mean, the fascist part, which. I think you're right. I mean, I sort of avoid that language in the book, but since the book, I mean, was written, it's becoming less and less controversial in some respects. Just. I don't think it's necessarily. I don't know if that. It's good messaging, but. But just. If you study fascism. Right. From an academic perspective, you can see that there's just a lot here that matches up. And I think Stephen Miller's probably the best example.
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B
Yeah. I mean, Stephen Miller's rhetoric is so naked. I mean, we've thrown out a lot of these different categories. So, you know, post liberal, you know, and again, you know, these are the kinds of things that even deep into Trump's first term, the idea that there would be a substantial post liberal movement was kind of stunning. You know, these are people, as you point out, people like Patrick Deneen and Adrian Vermeule. Is that how you pronounce it? Who basically reject liberal individualism, arguing for this common good defined outside modern liberal norms, and then are open to the use of government power and coercion to force these values on. And again, very much a departure from at least the libertarian strains or the classical liberal strains in conservative.
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C
Yeah, it's a very explicit rejection of libertarian economics and libertarian thinking. And it's quite. You know, I think they're the most radical of the group. There's a scholar named Kevin Vallier who calls them the premier radicalism of the New Right. And I think that's great, a great phrase. And they're very sophisticated. And I mean, I can go through. The Claremonters are the best. They're a good contrast. Right.
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B
Because the Claremonters, this is the Claremont Institute in California. I mean, and you've written about this extensively.
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C
Yeah. So the Claremont institute, founded in 1979 by some students of Harry Jaffa, who was a wonderful Lincoln scholar in some. In some respects, and then quite a sort of fanatical voice in other ways. But they. Their basic stance is that they want to restore the principles of the American founding as they understand them. They've got a pretty narrow understanding of what that means, and there's not much room for sort of historical change or. And they're very much against the New Deal and the growth of the administrative state. Right. So they're kind of. They've kind of got this small government way of thinking about the American Constitution, which is fine. But then what has also happened is that in Their minds. Things have gotten so off the rails, right, over the last 50 years, say, and liberalism has been so successful, and the left in particular has been so successful, that what is called for now is basically a counter revolution, right, to restore the real principles. And so that's got this fanatical edge. That's how they justify January 6th. That's how they justified Trump from the beginning, and that's how they justify everything that's happening. And there's no real limit, I think, to how they. To what they think is warranted because it's got this kind of fanatical edge.
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B
Well, let's not underestimate how incredibly shocking and radical this transformation was. And I think the first time you and I spoke on a podcast, we were documenting the fall of the Claremont Institute, which at one time was very mainstream, very respected conservative think tank, and this shift to the conspiracy thinking to sort of this rejection of much of the American progress and the anti pluralist thinking, the embrace of things like January 6th, if you are tracking how the right lost its mind, this is really a microcosm, isn't it, what happened? And I have to say that, yeah.
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C
It'S a real hotbed of it, right?
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B
Very much so. And quite influential. Now, the national conservatives, I think that we've seen a lot of that with JD Van be one of the most prominent. This whole idea of the homogenous nation state, you know, and ethnic, cultural, Christian nationalist visions, very much the blood and soil. I mean, obviously we see the influence of that in the administration.
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C
Yeah, I mean, they're not explicitly blood and soil. They sort of try to avoid that. But the book kind of chronicles how they've moved from something that rejects racism or tries to, and then has moved to something more like heritage Americans. Right. In the language that we see some of these people using. And I think. But it's all the idea there is that you need to have a flourishing nation state and a nation state system internationally. You have to have a pretty homogenous country with people, shared history, shared religion, shared language. And very soon that tips in. I mean, you can see where that leads.
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B
So the shared values of these groups. And again, we see this in the news every day. I mean, this hostility to liberalism and ploy, you know, nationalist economics as opposed to free market economics, you know, isolationism, which again, how that's interpreted seems to be up in the air. The obviously reactionary social values, but also the tenant. And this, I think, took people by surprise, this tendency toward the illiberal uses of state power from a party that used to be, you know, small government and really saw that in that first nine months of the shock and awe of the Trump administration or the re engineering of institutions and media and education, law enforcement to fit the. Their vision. These are not people who believe in government restraint, small government. These are not libertarian. This is a complete rejection of any sort of libertarian conservatism. They really do feel that they can use government to shape every aspect of civil society.
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C
Yeah, I mean it's this convenient thing where the Claremonsters are saying I'm using that term because they've said that I made a mistake in my book by not calling them that. So I'll go ahead and do it, but.
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B
Oh, I see.
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C
Okay. But the Clare monsters have, you know, their, their view is that things have gotten so badly that we're just. That they're justified in destroying the administrative state and doing what, you know, this counter revolutionary stuff and Caesarism and so forth. But then the post liberals have been much more explicit about the need to basically commandeer whatever's left of the state, take it over from within. Right. Adrian Vermeule has written about integration from within, which is basically a takeover of the bureaucracy by individual Catholics and other sort of right thinking people. And Patrick Dean has talked, has spoken about regime change. Right. And replacing the elites. So there's this sort of deep effort to take over the administrative state.
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B
It's revolutionary.
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C
Yeah, yeah. And it's, that's the part that's very radical. So. And that's the kind of, I think longer term thing, but they think that basically the integralists. And I think that there's enough sort of commonality here in terms of.
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B
Define integralists for me. Yeah, define integralists, yeah.
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C
So that's when I say the integralists are the most radical sort of this, this very. It's quite a narrow group of Catholics, conservative Catholics, who again are rejecting the Catholic Church's settlement.
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B
Well, and the Catholic Church' interpretation of the Gospel, the New Testament, what Jesus wanted, what the Pope thinks, what the Pope is urging them to do. But they're still Catholics, right?
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C
Yes. I mean they're very careful about some of this. So they're careful about it. It's a very sort of elaborate philosophy about how certain encyclicals and so forth are being interpreted. But it's this effort to say no, actually Catholics have a right to try to reorient the state towards the common good, as we Catholics understand it, which is objective, which means sort of promoting family values, probably, you know, getting rid of Gay marriage. I mean, just all of this stuff is packed into that. And so Adrian Vermeule has written this book called Common Good Constitutionalism, which is a new form of jurisprudence that aims to do away with originalism because originalism is toothless. Right. And doesn't actually direct us, direct the Constitution towards what's good.
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B
And so much more result oriented.
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C
Much more result oriented. And. And so that's, I mean, again, radical departure from the older forms of conservatism, including originalism. And I don't know how much purchase this actually has. I mean, in the judicial branch, I think that this isn't very realistic, but it can kind of be used. It's a very flexible doctrine. You hear a lot of these guys talking about the common good, and again, there's this deep moral impulse in it. I mean, and in the education policy, I think of Christopher Ruffo, who's always now talking about the good, the true and the beautiful. Beautiful. As though, you know, the federal government and state legislature should reorient the education system towards things that sound very nice. But when they're saying they're the ones who are the arbiters of these truths and these beautiful things, I mean, that's very, I think, very worrisome for anybody who cares about pluralism or individual freedom.
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B
Well, I mean, as you point out, I mean, they're united less by what they want than by what they really hate. And they kind of hate this pluralism, you know, whether it's, you know, religious, cultural, sexual pluralism. But again, to your point. So who, in their view, who gets to decide the common good and which traditions count and which traditions don't? I mean, all of these things, right?
- [22:24]
C
That's a great question.
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B
I mean, I'm in favor of the good and the beautiful and everything, but who gets to decide? My guess is that Christopher Ruffo and I might have different opinions about all of that.
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C
And a lot, you know, I think that's the kind of question that they won't. They're just making these. These grandiose statements. I mean, there is a sort of smacking of fascism in a lot of that, too. And this is where the manosphere comes in and they're all hyping up each other with their, you know, their bodybuilding posts and all of this. Right? Yeah. Talking about the Romans and the Greeks and, you know, that's, you know, I try in the book to show, you know, those kinds of ideas. I mean, I'm all for the beautiful, too, and I like ancient architecture, but this Is this is kind of insane.
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B
Well, you know, as you point out though, I mean, these, their embrace of state power is sort of interesting. You know, on the one hand they're claiming that, I mean, you've touched on this. They are all victims, right? They're all victims, constantly victims of state censorship and everything. And yet their vision is this sort of, you know, full on embrace of authoritarianism. I mean, conservatives used to be very, very skeptical of state power. I mean, that used to be what conservatism was about. Why you would not concentrate power in government, why you would certainly not concentrate it in Washington, why you wanted a robust private sector and private institutions and individual rights. These folks openly advocate the use of the state, control education, restructure civil society, enforce moral norms. I mean, so I want to keep coming back to what a complete departure this is from much of the conservative tradition in America.
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C
Yeah, I think that's fair. I think that how they would, how would they, what they would say to that is that, yes, but the conservative, I mean, this is what they've been saying from the beginning, right, is that the conservative movement had not succeeded in preserving anything and conserving anything. So in a way they, they feel like they're truer to conservative values because they're the ones willing to impose them. And they would also say that I think some of them in their heart of hearts maybe don't like the authoritarianism. You might know better than I do, Charlie, but. And so what they tell themselves is that the United States is, is so controlled in most of its, you know, institutions that matter. Like Curtis Yarvin talks about the cathedral. Right. So the higher education, the media that these, these institutions. I think it's conspiracy thinking. I don't think this is true and the elections proved that it's not fully true. But they would say the liberals have so much power that even if we try to be authoritarian, we, you know, it's an uphill battle for us because we're so, you know, because we're so powerless and weak.
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B
Well, if that's what they're saying, that's.
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C
Maybe what they're thinking in terms of the, or how they, some of these men are justifying their embrace of the, the radicalism. Hey, I'm Elise Hu, host of the podcast TED Talks Daily. Did you know Paylocity offers one platform for HR finance and it that means innovative sol on demand payment which offers employees access to wages prior to payday, flexible time tracking features which enables staff to clock in through their mobile device and numerous other cutting Edge integrations are available to all your teams in one single place. Learn more about how Paylocity can help streamline work and bring teams together@paylocity.com 1.
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A
There are a million reasons people start therapy. A breakup, burnout, a new job, a new year. Whatever your reason, there is one place to start. Grow Therapy meets you where you are, with support that actually sticks. Whether it's your first time in therapy or your 50th, grow makes it easier to find a therapist who fits you, not the other way around. They connect you with thousands of independent licensed therapists across the US Offering both virtual and in person sessions, nights and weekends. You can search by what matters like insurance, specialty, identity or availability and get started in as little as two days. And if something comes up, you can Cancel up to 24 hours in advance at no cost. There are no subscriptions, no long term commitments. You just pay per session. Grow helps you find therapy on your time. Whatever challenges you're facing, Grow Therapy is here to help. Sessions average about $21 with insurance, and some pay as little as $0, depending on their plan. Grow accepts over 100 insurance plans, including Medicaid in some states. Visit GrowTherapy.comStartNow today to get started. That's GrowTherapy.comStartNow GrowTherapy.comStartNow. availability and coverage vary by state and insurance plan.
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B
So you touched on this. Can you explain to me just this reliance on masculine rage and the aesthetics of domination? I mean, kind of the less the intellectual style of this new maga, right? And the emotional style. I mean, it does seem that this whole obsession with strength, the humiliation of opponents, hyper masculinity is. I mean, this is kind of core to the movement's mass appeal. Right. I mean, and so it sometimes feels that these intellectual arguments are kind of a justification bolted on justification for these other resentments toward women, toward gay people, cultural elites, you know, democratic norms that are seen as soft. So what is. I mean, we've been dancing around the fascist word, but that whole masculine raid aesthetics of domination and humiliation, boy, that has some real historical resonance, doesn't it?
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C
Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I think it's harder and harder to ignore that part of it. And that's part of the crack up in some ways. Right. That's happening on the GOP with Marjorie Taylor Greene and some of these things. Heritage Foundation. I mean, I think somebody asked me, okay, so your book's called Furious Minds. What are they so angry about? Right?
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B
Yeah. What are they furious about?
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C
Yeah. And I think that the simple answer, or the short version is they're angry about their loss of status. Right. And the people who made it happen, the elite. And then the shorter version of that is the women who made that happen. Right. These historical changes that we've seen over the last 50 years in who has legitimacy in public life. And this is very explicit in the hard right with, with someone like Bronze Age Pervert, where he blames what he calls the longhouse for everything that's wrong. Right. And the Longhouse is this old power of the matriarchs that he thinks has taken over our culture. Even though, you know, if you look at any, I mean, even in higher ed, where they say the longhouse is probably the strongest, I mean, there are still huge, you know, imbalances in, in many, many fields about how. Anyway, so. So that's. They're very angry about, about some of that. I mean, there's a lot of things to be angry about, I think, in, in America. And so they're taking full advantage of that. But, but a lot of the time it has these pretty ugly expressions when it comes to women.
- [29:42]
B
Yeah. And I think that that's pretty obvious. So here, here's the part of the paradox because, you know, when we think of the Magarite, when I think of the maga, right, I will often think of many of these things, figures from the new right media, many of whom, frankly, are not that bright, are not that serious. And your book, though, goes into this intellectual underpinning. And the scary thing about this is, and correct me if I'm getting this wrong, I mean, you're basically, you're not saying that these are not serious people or they're unintelligent. In fact, they are deadly serious, which is what makes them dangerous. So let's talk a little bit about that intersection between sort of the, the unserious surface of the maga, right, and this, this underbelly that, you know, these, these people need to be, you know, need to be taken seriously, even if they are. Well, I mean, because they are so dangerous.
- [30:32]
C
No, I mean, it's a, It's a big problem because I, I think that it's a problem that they haven't been taken seriously. And I say in the book, you know, when I, when I tell people what I've been working on, right? And I say, I've been writing about MAGA intellectuals, they just say, oh, that's an artist oxymoron. What are you talking about? There's no such thing. And, and I get that. I really do. I Mean, I spend as much time reading this stuff as probably anyone would ever want to. And I, so I understand that and I don't hold them all in high esteem, but they are very, many of them are very intelligent, very savvy. They've been very deliberate in what they wanted to do. They're drawing on real traditions in the United in conservative thinking. I mean, they are not reinventing this whole clock. Some of them, you know, there are other traditions they could draw on and they're, you know, they're not choosing the ones that I might. But. And they're drawing on the traditions of political philosophy in real ways. They're very well read. And I think that there's a kind of failure of imagination to think that they're just all idiots and that because they might be bigots or just people that I, you know, you have a small, a strong moral revulsion to that they aren't very, very smart. And even, you know. Yeah. So I think it's a big problem and it's sort of, there's a kind of limited framework there where you're just, that's kind of a being trapped inside a pretty small minded way of seeing the world if you can't accept that there are brilliant people doing very dark things well.
- [32:03]
B
And again, this is what makes them so dangerous. And I think that we discovered that in 2025 where you might have the clown show, you know, on, on the new on the news. But then you do realize what, what people, you know, you know, who were the authors of Project 2025 were able to do. Russ Vogt was able to do what Stephen Miller is doing. J.D. vance, I think is in many ways absurd, but he is certainly not unintelligent. By the way, which category do you put him in? Do you put in your chart you have JD Vance as a post liberal, which is actually one of the scariest things when you realize that, that this man who is a heartbeat away from the presidency, not only is appealing to the hard right underbelly and the national conservatives, but is very much philosophically rejecting the classical liberal traditions in this country.
- [32:55]
C
Yeah. And he has self identified as a post liberal. And I think the only time I've been in a room with him was at the book launch for Patrick Deneen's book, which was titled Regime Change. And you know, and he was on the panel for that with Kevin Roberts.
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B
Really great, wonderful.
- [33:13]
C
But I, oh, let me just add that Vance, Vance. No, just to be clear, Vance fits in all of, he's in all of those rooms Right. I mean he is, he's close with the Claremont Institute people. He's certainly spoken at the natcon conferences and, and supports all that. So I mean he's, he's, he's sort of their Frankenstein monster as high been thinking about it. He really is their sort of creation. And he's close with the tech guys obviously too.
- [33:36]
B
Well, and this I think is worth mentioning. Donald Trump again, is not a man of ideas or a man of history or a man of philosophy. But JD Vance is not just a continuation of Donald Trump because he does have this much firmer ideological basis. Okay, so let's go back to the speculation about the MAGA crack up. You know, going back to your chart here about the three tools of, you know, of Reaganism, free market, economic, social conservatism and anti Communism. For those of us in the conservative movement, I think what we realized, you know, in the early 1990s was that anti Communism was the glue that was holding together this conservative coalition. When Ronald Reagan left the scene and the Soviet Union fell, that glue began to come apart and you began to see some of these tensions that had been simmering for a long time between the social conservatives, the libertarian conserv. It is, you know, the, you know, the free marketers, the globalists, et cetera. And you began to have this breakup which we've seen how it's, you know, played out with the rise of Trump. Well, now we have the maga, new right, stool nationalist, economic, social conservatism, anti immigration, America first. What happens when. But the glue that holds it all together is Donald Trump and sort of the shared animosity. Donald Trump leaves the scene. Obviously these movements do not go away, but the glue is gone. And we're seeing this really nasty fight between mainly in the media figures, between the Ben Shapiro's versus the Tucker Carlsons. The Heritage foundation is caught up in all of this. How do you see this playing out? I mean, how fragile and volatile is this coalition right now? Post Trump Trump, it's.
- [35:27]
C
So I'm going to include the necessary caveat that it's impossible to know. Right. And because I've been surprised by them again and again and again. And so I think a lot of this depends on how people who are still call themselves conservatives and work in the conservative world conduct themselves right. And whether they're willing to start taking a stance. I think it's very fragile. I mean, I'm very hopeful long term. I don't think that this coalition. I think it, I think you're right, it does depend on Trump, Trump so much. And Trump's in a very weak position right now in some respects. Right. Because of the Epstein files and because of these, the people. He's just very unpopular and so and Vance is in a, in a difficult position too. He's the standard bearer for the imaginu. Right. And he's the future as far as I think anybody in the conservative movement is sort of openly saying. And he's proven very loyal to Trump, Trump and he, that what it puts him in a bind because Trump is unpopular and because it allows him, he can show no leadership. He can show no moral leadership. Right. He's depending on that Trumpian base, which is depending on Tucker Carlson's audience and is still depending on the donors who reject that, the anti Semitism and everything that Tucker's up to. So I think it's a very, very delicate situation. And I don't see, I don't really know how they get through that, that I'm hoping that the voters, I mean, part of what the purpose of my book is, is like what I was trying to do is to show how extreme and radical a lot of this is, to show how they've got these horrible bedfellows. They've been. It's not just anti Semitism, it's incredible Islamophobia, it's incredible misogyny and there's all this racism. So I mean, this is a very tawdry situation and I don't think American voters are there with them. I think the more that this, this stuff starts to fester, especially when you have leader, I mean, but what you need is people like Robbie George who are going to say something about it, who are going to step away from it. And I'm hopeful that when that continues to happen, it might then maybe the kind of, maybe it's a house of cards. I don't know though. I have no confidence in that because they've also been so successful and so pragmatic at wedding together these very, very disparate groups. For them, most of these people, it's fine to be Nick Fuente, but it's not okay to be a Democrat. And so this is very dangerous. I think things can get, they can get a lot worse. Right. So we really need to start seeing a lot more courage, I think, on the part of our leaders. And then of course, it depends on what the Democrats do. And that's a whole other story.
- [38:03]
B
Well, I mean, let's talk about Nick Fuentes. I mean, the fact that we ended 2025 with a debate about. Among conservatives, about whether or not Nick Fuentes was part of the big tent was an indication of this radicalization that you're talking about. And I thought was very interesting watching JD Vance, the heir apparent, very clearly, and feel free to disagree with me, that he has decided that he will have no enemies to the right. So when you had those young Republicans that were caught online with these incredibly racist comments, a lot of Republicans immediately excommunicated them. J.D. vance came to their defense when Tucker Carlson.
- [38:39]
C
Just young people.
- [38:41]
B
Right, right. When Tucker Carlson platforms, Nick Fuentes, there were a lot of conservatives who said, you know, you've gone too far. That is not what you should be doing. J.D. vance goes to the Charlie Kirk thing and essentially endorses that. So what's been happening is that it feels as if that window of it keeps moving more and more extreme. You think about Tucker Carlson from five, six years ago. He was right wing. He was Trumpy, nothing compared to what he is right now. I've used an analogy, and again, it's not your analogy. It's my analogy that sometimes watching these influencers, like watching competitive meth dealers on the street corners and the way they compete with one another is, I am serving the purer meth. No, no, no. I am serving the purer meth. And it seems to be. It feels as if it has become more and more radicalized. And while Vance is going along with that to solidify his hold on the right, I think it's very questionable how that's going to play with the great electorate, because they are becoming in their own bubble. All of the incentives are to make them more radical and more extreme. Right. I mean, right now, all of the incentive structure in the media and in politics is to continually move to the more extreme, revolutionary positions.
- [40:00]
C
Yeah, that seems right. And it seems like part of what Trump, Trump. Part of his was success was obviously that sort of willingness to just. To just say it. Right. And to just be that person who would do whatever it took and, you know, speak his truth or whatever. But there's a. I think that there's a kind of exhaustion that maybe comes from watching this. Right. And I think. I don't think. And J.D. vance, at a certain point, he just starts to look like a spineless coward, you know?
- [40:31]
B
Well, yeah, I mean, that's. So can you explain to me briefly in the few minutes we have left, the American first foreign policy is really, really central to MAGA and to Trump's appeal. I mean, going back to, frankly, to his first campaign, the no endless wars so how do the American first people react to Donald Trump's increasing, shall we say, belligerence on the international stage? The attack on Venezuela, the threats against Greenland, the desire to absorb Panama and Canada, do they see that as consistent with America first, or do they see that as a loss of focus on America First? How do they regard it?
- [41:17]
C
I think there's a lot of tension. There are sort of these obvious tensions within the movement, and I haven't been able to see, you know, exactly how they're responding to the current situation. I think they're in a real bind. But I. So there's. There are a lot of these people, but Yoram Hazoni is the best example I can think of who has really. He's the leader of the National Conservative Movement. Right. This sort of organizing group, and he has really planted his flag on behalf of nationalism and against imperialism. Right, Right.
- [41:47]
B
Okay.
- [41:48]
C
And so that puts him in a difficult position. It made it difficult. I mean, he basically had to stand with Ukraine when. When Russia invaded. And so he sort of did mildly. He said, I reject. He basically was like, I hope this is a wake up call for all the liberal internationalists who think that nationalism doesn't matter because the Ukrainian people need defending. And so he stood against Russia, and that made a lot of people mad in the movement because they were sort of pro whatever Russia is. And so I think they're faced with this in a much more immediate way with Venezuela because it's an obvious sort of act of US Imperialism. I don't know how Hazoni could possibly justify that, except for the America first part of it, which is what they're arguing, you know, is, well, that doesn't mean we're not involved in wars overseas or anything. It just means that we really are going to be very realist, very transactional, and we're going to exert American power for whatever is good for the United States.
- [42:47]
B
So is there a. Is it a nationalist imperialism, which is America first everywhere in the world, not just at home? I mean, is that. Is that a.
- [42:55]
C
Exactly, exactly. I mean, I think that's traditionally what happens with a lot of very. With a lot of nationalist countries. Right. When you start embracing nationalism, I think the natural vector for that is imperialism. So that's what Yoram Hazon's book completely denies, which is comically. It's just ridiculous as a historical fact. Right. And I think generally speaking, what we see in sort of the. Because this. This phenomenon of this new conservatism and this re. This radicalization is certainly not Just limited to the United States. And scholars see it as a sort of return to a sovereignties model and to a transactional realism abroad. So there's a kind of way of defining the New Right that's sort of a rejection of that liberal internationalism and embrace of transactional realism, you know, and.
- [43:45]
B
I think that's very clear. So one other thing maybe you can help me puzzle through. What is the fascination among Christian nationalists, the admiration for Vladimir Putin? This was another one of those things where those of us that are children of the Cold War are going to wait. How did American conservatives, particularly Christian American conservatives, decide somehow that Vladimir Putin was a champion of Western Christian morality? Can you explain that in any way whatsoever to me?
- [44:15]
C
Yeah, I think partly what's happening is that in Russia there's a kind of remythification or an effort to restore the old Orthodox, Orthodox Church, right? And a kind of sort of turning back to pre communist Russia as this mythical culture and world that's lost but can be recovered. And there's a kind of mythos to it as part of the nationalist bundle. And I think it's analogous to how basically how the Claremonters talk about the founding as a kind of, in a sort of religious. With a religious fervor. And then of course, there's also this whole world in, in the United States of Christian nationalism, which isn't just sort of the. There are all these different parts of the Christian nationalist world. And that language is controversial. I try to disentangle some of this in my last chapter on Christian nationalism. But there is a kind of myth making around the founding that's not totally fabricated, right? That's about, you know, that the country was a Christian nation and the founding was pluralistic and liberal and preserved religious liberty. And I think that they're very, you know, there are different ways of understanding this depending on whether you're looking at the founders or whether you're looking at the population and the demographics. And, you know, different founders had different ideas about where the country should be going. So. And then of course, there's 2, 150 years of history, right, that. That have shaped the country and its religious institutions. But there is this sort of desire to return to that Christian founding and the Christian path past. And so in some ways it's just, it's deeply analogous to what's happening in Russia, but I think it's more resonant with the American found. I mean, I think it's more analogous to how Americans think about the founding. Does that make sense?
- [46:03]
B
Well, you know, yeah, it does make sense in a way that things that don't make sense make sense. You know, I guess my whole skepticism about this as somebody that was very much, much part of what people thought was the conservative intellectual movement pre Donald Trump, to find out that it really was not that influential in terms of conservative politics, that in fact was kind of a thin pie crust over something that was more molten. And, you know, as you look at the way things are playing out, these ideas are important, but are important. But I think they're used. My sense is they're used opportunistically by people who will be prepared to jettison them and pick and choose whatever actually is most convenient to them. That this is not a movement driven by ideas, but that uses ideas as post hoc justifications for what they want to do. So, again, the idea that MAGA is an intellectual movement. I know that's your whole point. I think it feels sometimes a little bit pretend that the MAGA that we see in real life is actually motivated by these ideologies. I mean, the corporate leaders that are coming in and cutting the deals with Donald Trump, the law firms, they're not doing it based on any sort of a principle. This is pure transactionalism. And if they can justify it some way by citing some sort of an intellectual, they will. But I think we need to understand, or let me get your sense of it, understand what the actual hierarchy is. And if these people think they're driving the bus, but I'm not sure they are driving the bus.
- [47:41]
C
Us. Yeah, I mean, I, I don't think. I'm not trying to say that MAGA is an intellectual movement. I think there is a, an important slice of MAGA that has become into. That is intellectualized, maybe we could say, and that has become extremely powerful because of the ideas. I don't, I mean, the chicken and egg question is important, but I, And I guess sort of maybe the counterfactual here is could they have managed. Managed. Would. Would Trump be. Where would Trump be today without this intellectual movement? Right. And I think that's interesting. And I also think that in politics, I mean, this is kind of Aristotelian of me. Right. But people are driven by what they think is good, and arguments are part of that. Right. Articulating.
- [48:27]
B
They want to convince themselves that what they want is good.
- [48:29]
C
They do, and they want it and they want to. And they articulate those things. And I don't think it's just power seeking. I think in politics, power is going to be mixed with. Right. There's Going to be power and ideas and ambitions that are all stirred up together. And I can't get inside the heads of these people I write about, but I think in some instances they are sincere in their convictions in a way that we have to take that possibility seriously because I think that's more dangerous than even opportunism, because it can be very compelling. Right. It can be very persuasive and. And they think it's true in many. Sometimes it's just raw opportunism.
- [49:10]
B
Right.
- [49:11]
C
But a lot of the time, I think that that's what we. That we were failing to see, that. No, there's a. There's a deep religiosity to this. There's a sincerity of conviction that if we don't take it seriously, then we're not going to understand how it's working psychologically and dynamically in our politics and how it's impacted. Impacting all these young people who are being drawn to it. And so. And I think that there's, you know, so there's just a lot there that I think we're too. It's. It's too easy to dismiss it. And though I get the impulse, like, I share it.
- [49:40]
B
No, no, no, no. I think the point is that all of these movements have true believers, and we need to understand that the true believers are far more dangerous than the opportunists. The opportunists will peel off. The true believers are there right until the dead end. And, you know, even among the most evil regimes in the world, there were true believers. I mean, and there were people who really did have religious fervor for these political movements. Now, we may find them to be completely and utterly deplorable, but that doesn't mean that they did not, you know, firmly hold them. And as you point out, you know, some of these ideas are. They're very edgy, and they can be attractive to younger people, particularly because they present them with very radical revolutionary ideas that they've never been exposed to before. And we've seen historical how that can be very, very appealing to people looking for some sort of a countercultural, you know, revolutionary approach to reality. And we are living in revolutionary times, aren't we? And these people are tapping into that.
- [50:44]
C
Yeah, and that's what one of the things I wanted to do with the book. I mean, I wanted to have an explainer, right, to explain who these people were, to chronicle the history. But I also really wanted to show how seductive it is because, you know, I've been seduced by ideas that are I sort of find reprehensible now. I find that. I mean, when I was young, I was drawn to all kinds of stuff because it's exhilarating. Right. And. And I want young people to continue to have that experience. I'm not against that. You know, and I'm. But. But I think a lot of the stuff they're being that these young. That the kind of maga new writers peddling is. Is first of all pretty idiotic. Right. And untrue to the. The traditions I care about. But there is something very seductive about all of this. And. And there's sort of also. Also exploiting a kind of stagnant, boring liberalism, right. That is, you know, has its own problems. And so they're really. They're really trading in the vulnerabilities of liberalism. We could talk for another hour about that. Right, Right. But there's something seductive here that. That needs to be attended to, especially, you know, for the long term.
- [51:44]
B
Right.
- [51:45]
C
What are. What are liberal people who care about pluralism going to do? Gonna say? How are they gonna respond to these deep and very worrisome tendencies?
- [51:57]
B
You know, just listening to you, I'm remembering a book that I read many, many years ago that I remember being really shocked by. And it was a book about. And this is before all of the domestic stuff. So I was reading about European history, and it was a book on fascism. And the point in the book was, the thing that you need to understand about fascism was how deeply romantic it was. And I remember thinking, well, wait, what are you talk about? That was the last thing on my mind. And yet there is a romanticism to the power and the tradition and all of this stuff that you see. And for a lot of us, I think we have to take out a lot of the filters to go through. Like, what is Pete Hegseth, you know, when he's doing these things? What is he appealing to? He's appealing to a certain ethos that can be kind of. Of whether you want to say romantic or psychosexual or whatever, there is an appeal compared to, as you point out, kind of the dull, gray, bureaucratic face of liberalism. And if liberalism does not deliver, if it does not excite, if it does not provide a vision, it's not going to be able to effectively compete with that kind of exciting, revolutionary appeal that you have documented in this book. And I think this is a very important point. Point.
- [53:15]
C
Yeah, yeah, I think so. I mean, I think liberalism has the resources within it to do this. I think there are all kinds of ways in which liberals can. Can, you know, be much more. There's a much more liberal. Excuse me, there's a much more robust liberalism out there that's sort of waiting to be articulated and defended. And, and hopefully I think. I mean, there are liberal politicians who I think are good at this. But. But there's a lot of work to be done.
- [53:39]
B
Not. Not enough of them. The book is Furious Minds. It is absolutely outstanding. It is both an important and an extremely timely read by Laura K. Field. Laura, thank you for coming on the podcast. I appreciated this conversation very much.
- [53:52]
C
Thank you, Charlie. That was a real pleasure.
- [53:55]
B
And thank you all for listening to this episode of to the Contrary podcast. You know why we do this, why we're going to continue to do this into 2026? Because it is so important to continually remind ourselves we are not the crazy ones.
- [54:21]
C
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- [54:48]
B
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- [55:14]
C
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