A man, no plan, Iran

Summary

Today, Explained – "A man, no plan, Iran"

Date: March 2, 2026
Hosts: Sean Rameswaram & Noel King
Guests: Greg Carlstrom (The Economist), Nahal Toosi (Politico)

Episode Overview

This episode unpacks the unprecedented escalation between the United States and Iran, focusing on the evolving conflict, Iran's shifting strategy, the Trump administration's opaque objectives, and the risks of regime change. With on-the-ground insights from veteran Middle East journalists Greg Carlstrom (The Economist) and Nahal Toosi (Politico), the episode tackles the dangers, ambiguities, and potential regional ripple effects of America's latest war.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Unprecedented Escalation in the Gulf

Greg Carlstrom on the Scale and Speed of Conflict

• Rapid escalation: Carlstrom describes the scope as like nothing seen since the Gulf War (1991).
  • "It is unprecedented... the speed with which they have struck, the scale of the targets..." (02:06)
• Iran’s initial retaliation targeted U.S. military bases in Gulf states, then shifted to civilian infrastructure—airports, luxury hotels, residential neighborhoods, and energy facilities.
  • "All of these things have no conceivable military value as a target. These are civilian targets, plain and simple." (04:47)

Notable Quote

• "Look at those plumes of smoke, the global ramifications that will be felt... when they're fueling their cars, when they're beginning to pay their bills. We can mark this as the moment where that begins." –Carlstrom (05:32)

2. Iran's Rationale for Targeting Civilians and Energy Infrastructure

• Iran aims to pressure Gulf states—U.S. allies dependent on peace and commerce—hoping they’ll demand Trump end the war.
  • "Missiles and drones zooming overhead, that's bad for business, that's bad for tourism, that's bad for the economic model of these countries." (06:01)
• Iran’s limited ability for direct military retaliation means civilian and economic targets are its strongest leverage.
  • "It cannot fight the United States directly... all it can do is attempt to fire missiles and drones at American ships or continue attacking the Gulf." (07:08)

3. Comparisons to Past Iran-Israel and U.S.-Iran Conflicts

• The current missile volleys are smaller than during Iran's war with Israel in June.
  • "We've seen much smaller volleys, sometimes only two or three missiles at a time." (07:59)
• Iran may be rationing missiles due to damaged launchers or preparing for a prolonged conflict.

4. Trump’s Ambiguous War Goals

• Trump alternates between vague, sweeping goals and offhand comments about possible quick deals or regime change.
  • "The bombing is going to continue until the, quote, objective of peace throughout the Middle East and indeed the world, unquote, is met. How do you interpret this statement at this point?" –Noel King (09:17)
  • "I'm not sure how to interpret any of his statements... he tells one outlet, this is going to continue until I bring freedom to the people of Iran... another, maybe this will be over in two or three days and I'll cut a deal." –Carlstrom (09:41)
• Reported confusion (and even farce) at the top:
  • "He said, I have three candidates in mind to replace the Supreme Leader of Iran... and then a few hours later, he told another outlet, actually, those three guys were killed in the first round of strikes. So turns out we can't rely on them." –Carlstrom (10:19)

Notable Exchanges

• "Is there any suggestion that in order to get what it wants, the US will have to put boots on the ground in Iran?" (11:18)
  • Carlstrom says that's unlikely, but lasting regime change is hard without it: "It is very, very difficult to change a regime from the air. There are very few examples in history of that working." (11:26)
  • Preference may be for installing an insider, "a Venezuela scenario", not direct American rule (11:57).

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5. Iran’s Power Vacuum and Internal Dynamics

Nahal Toosi on Iran’s Leadership and Systemic Resilience

• Following assassination strikes, an interim council leads Iran: President Massoud Pezeshkian (a moderate), a Guardian Council member, and the Supreme Court’s chief justice (both hardliners). But there is confusion about military command. (18:09)
• The regime’s survival mechanisms: repression, diplomacy, and pivoting to Russia/China.
  • "It was designed... to regenerate itself. People step in when other people leave or die." (19:42)
• The U.S. and Israel are targeting not just elites but also extended networks—pushing the limits of regime endurance.

Notable Quote

"The Iranian system was never built around a single cult figure... This is a systematic place. And it was designed... to regenerate itself." –Toosi (19:42)

6. Prospects—and Limits—of Regime Change

• The U.S. appears to assume removing leaders will spark systemic change, but the regime is structurally resilient.
• The opposition, inside and outside Iran:
  • No organized internal opposition with real leverage (22:15).
  • Exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi’s name is chanted but lacks true ground support; U.S. officials don’t see him as viable. (23:09–24:55)
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is best positioned to seize power.
  • Could lead to a military dictatorship or even more hardline policies, including on nukes. (25:06–26:13)
  • "The IRGC... are probably in the best position to take power. Even if they put a cleric in front as a symbol, the real power could lie with the IRGC." –Toosi (25:17)

7. The Risk of Catastrophic Collapse

• The risk is not neat regime change, but regime collapse: a power vacuum, chaos, and possibly civil war.
  • "If you decimate the leadership, but then nothing really rises to take its place... you could have what's called regime collapse, right? That's another term. And it just could become a chaotic failed state." –Toosi (26:38)
• Regional destabilization: Attacks may draw in Arab states, threaten broader conflict, and disrupt global energy.

Historical Perspective

• Acknowledges U.S. regime change’s catastrophic Middle East record but notes the "long arc"—Iraq is now more democratic but paid a huge price.

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Notable Quotes & Moments with Timestamps

• “It is unprecedented... everyone expected that there was going to be a conflict between the United States and Iran... but the speed with which they have struck, the scale of the targets... we've never seen anything like that in the Gulf, at least since the Gulf war back in 1991.” –Greg Carlstrom (02:06)

• “All of these things have no conceivable military value as a target. These are civilian targets, plain and simple.” –Greg Carlstrom (04:47)

• “Missiles and drones zooming overhead, that's bad for business... the hope was that they would cave under the pressure... and then Gulf states would pressure [Trump] to wrap up the war.” –Greg Carlstrom (06:01)

• “I'm not sure how to interpret any of his statements... he tells one outlet, this is going to continue until I bring freedom to the people of Iran. He tells another... maybe this will be over in two or three days and I'll cut a deal.” –Greg Carlstrom (09:41)

• “The Iranian system was never built around a single cult figure... it was designed... to regenerate itself.” –Nahal Toosi (19:42)

• “There's no real organized opposition inside Iran... many have been thrown in prison. Many have had to flee...” –Nahal Toosi (22:15)

• “The IRGC... are probably in the best position to take power... Even if they put a cleric in front as a symbol, the real power could lie with the IRGC.” –Nahal Toosi (25:17)

• “If you decimate the leadership, but then nothing really rises to take its place... you could have what's called regime collapse...” –Nahal Toosi (26:38)

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Important Segment Timestamps

• 02:06 – Greg Carlstrom on the unprecedented nature of the US-Iran war
• 03:00–05:55 – Iran's targeting strategy, shift to civilian and economic infrastructure
• 06:01 – Why Iran is hitting Gulf states and their economic model
• 07:46 – Missile volley comparison & Iran’s resource constraints
• 09:17–11:18 – Trump's incoherent/contradictory objectives on Iran
• 11:26–12:55 – Prospects/limits of US ‘regime change’ from the air
• 18:09 – Nahal Toosi on Iran's current (interim) ruling council and power dynamics
• 19:29–21:06 – What regime change really means inside Iran
• 22:15–24:55 – Iranian opposition, the role of Reza Pahlavi, weakness of organized resistance
• 25:06–26:13 – The role, power, and threat of the IRGC
• 26:38 – The specter of regime collapse and regional catastrophe

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Tone & Language

The hosts maintain a balance of critical distance and wry observation—especially regarding the Trump administration’s messaging—while guests provide sober, fact-heavy analysis. Throughout, there's a sense of urgency, uncertainty, and underlying skepticism about the prospects for straightforward solutions.

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For Listeners New to the Episode

This episode offers a clear, accessible analysis for anyone trying to understand the latest US-Iran conflict, highlighting not only the immediate military developments but also deeper questions around regime durability, American strategy (or lack thereof), and potential for broader regional chaos.

It strongly cautions: there’s no simple fix, and the consequences—especially for Iran’s people and global stability—could be far-reaching and long-lasting.

Transcript

[A]

It's Today Explained. This week's big news was supposed to be that Sean Rama's firm is back from parental leave.

[B]

But then there was even bigger news. So I texted you on the weekend and I was like, yo, do you want me to do the bigger news? And you were like, my name's Noel King.

[C]

Step aside.

[B]

Let's go to the president to see why he's doing war with Iran.

[D]

Every time you see someone with missing arms and legs or a face that's been absolutely shattered violently, it was almost

[B]

certainly caused by an Iran roadside bomb.

[A]

He is not trying to beat the forever war allegations.

[D]

Somebody said today. They said, oh well, if the president wants to do it really quickly after that, he'll get bored.

[B]

I don't get bored. There's nothing boring about this.

[C]

The president says he doesn't have the

[B]

yips about sending in ground troops.

[A]

He also says we accidentally killed the people who were supposed to take over from the ayatollah.

[C]

Oops.

[A]

Sean, you glad to be back?

[B]

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[A]

When things get hard.

[D]

How do you talk to yourself?

[A]

I'm Robinar Son, VP of fitness programming and head instructor at Peloton. And this week on my new podcast, Project Swagger, I'm sharing my strategies for how to build better self talk. It's time to work on befriending yourself. Follow Project Swagger wherever you get your podcasts. You're listening to Today Explained, we reached Greg Carlstrom, longtime Middle east correspondent for the Economist in Riyadh today. Greg has seen a lot over the years. Has he seen this?

[B]

It is unprecedented. I think in the run up to this war. I mean, everyone expected that there was going to be a conflict between the United States and Iran once Donald Trump started this enormous military buildup. And everyone expected that Iran was going to lash out at Arab countries in the region because it had warned that it was going to do that. But the speed with which they have struck the scale of the targets, not just American military bases in Gulf states, but all sorts of civilian infrastructure we've never seen Anything like that in the Gulf, at least since the Gulf war back in 1991. And it's taken a lot of people by shock in this region.

[A]

Let's talk about what Iran is doing today. So the US Is still bombing, Iran is retaliating. What is Iran hitting?

[B]

So it's firing at Israel. Of course, it's been firing volleys of ballistic missiles there which have notably been smaller than the ones that we saw during the 12 day war between Israel and Iran back in June. But the bulk of Iran's retaliation has been aimed across the Persian Gulf at the uae, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman. All six of those countries have been targeted. When the war began on Saturday morning, at least for the first few hours, Iran was mostly firing at American military targets in those countries.

[D]

Plumes of smoke seen in an area

[A]

of Bahrain near the headquarters of the U.S. navy's 5th Fleet, an Air base in Doha, also hit where there was

[D]

a significant US Military presence.

[B]

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Oman, where tankers were struck just off its shores in the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global shipping route where one fifth of the world's oil passes through. The regional headquarters of the U.S. central Command is in Qatar. The headquarters of the Navy's Fifth Fleet is in Bahrain. And those bases were targeted. But Iran shifted very quickly to aiming at civilian targets in these countries.

[D]

In fact, the airport was hit by a second attack in the early hours

[A]

of this morning with black billowing smoke rising up above the city.

[B]

There was the luxury hotel here hit the Burj Al Arab.

[C]

You can also see the damage that has been wrought to several of these residential homes that were around this small synagogue here in the city of Beth Shemesh on the outskirts of Jerusalem.

[B]

All of these things have no conceivable military value as a target. These are civilian targets, plain and simple. But Iran has been focusing its fire on those. And then on Monday, signs that it's also beginning to aim at energy infrastructure in the region. A refinery, an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia was targeted with a drone. Similarly, a natural gas facility in Qatar, both of which have temporarily gone offline in the aftermath of those attempted attacks. Big explosion here at the, at the Ras Tanura.

[D]

That's the Aramco factory, Saudi Arabia's biggest oil company there.

[C]

And of course, this is state backed.

[B]

And you see, look at those plumes

[C]

of smoke, the global ramifications that will be felt by people all over the

[B]

world when they're fueling their cars, when

[C]

they're beginning to pay their bills. We can mark this as the moment where that begins.

[B]

So it looks as if Iran now not just stopping at airports and hotels, but also beginning to go after the energy infrastructure that is critical for the economies in the Gulf and for the economies of the world.

[A]

Hey, why is Iran going after civilian targets? Why not just keep hitting the US Military?

[B]

The logic of it for the Iranians is that all of these countries in the Gulf, they are close American allies, they have good relations with the Trump administration, and they really do not want to be involved in a war. They have thrived for decades on this reputation for being oases of stability in a very turbulent region. Whatever else is happening in the rest of the Middle east, the Gulf has historically been pretty quiet. So missiles and drones zooming overhead, that's bad for business, that's bad for tourism, that's bad for the economic model of these countries. And so for Iran, the hope was that they would cave under the pressure of these attacks, and then Gulf states would use their relations with Donald Trump to pressure him to try and wrap up the war. They would tell him, essentially, we can't endure this any longer. You need to end the war, because this is becoming unsustainable for us. That is what Iran has been trying to accomplish with these wanton attacks on civilian targets.

[A]

Do you think that's going to happen? I mean, the US Says it's going to continue its campaign. Do you think Iran will continue retaliating?

[B]

I don't think it has many other options. It cannot fight the United States directly if there are no American troops on the ground in Iran. Iran cannot shoot down the American jets overhead. It almost certainly cannot do that because its air defenses are so degraded. All it can do is attempt to fire missiles and drones at American ships or continue attacking the Gulf. It's really the only means they have to try and influence how Donald Trump perceives this war, to try and impose costs that might push him to end it sooner.

[A]

You mentioned earlier that the response from Iran is not as strong as it was during the war last June, the very short 12 Day War last June. What is that telling you?

[B]

Right. That's the Israeli assessment. If you think back to what we saw in June with these attacks on Israel, they were enormous barrages of dozens and dozens of ballistic missiles fired at a time. And sometimes there were hundreds of these missiles in a day. The first few days of this war, we've seen much smaller volleys, sometimes only two or three missiles at a time. And I think what that suggests is that Iran either does not have the capability to fire larger volleys because so many of their missile launchers have been damaged or destroyed, or that they are trying to ration the missiles that they have because they expect that this is going to be a prolonged conflict and they have a finite number of the long range missiles with the capability to hit Israel. So they are rationing what they have there. Whereas in the Gulf, it's a different calculus. They've actually fired more missiles and drones at this point at the Gulf than they have at Israel, significantly more. And that's because of geography. It's because the Gulf is so much closer. They're not reliant on a small number of long range missiles. They can use short range missiles, they can use drones more effectively to target the Gulf. And so they have a much larger arsenal that they can use and they are using it.

[A]

I want to ask you about what President Trump says the objective is here. And the President has been about as coherent on this as he is ordinarily. But he, he posted this weekend that the bombing is going to continue until the, quote, objective of peace throughout the Middle east and indeed the world, unquote, is met. How do you interpret this statement at this point?

[B]

I'm not sure how to interpret any of his statements.

[D]

No, we don't get bored. I never get bored.

[B]

Because if you look at all of these interviews that he's given, I mean, it's remarkable he's in the middle of a war, but he has found a lot of time to call seemingly every journalist whose number is in his phone to chat over the past few days. And you know, he tells one outlet, this is going to continue until I bring freedom to the people of Iran. All I want is freedom from, for the people. He tells another one, maybe this will be over in two or three days and I'll cut a deal. I can go long and take over the whole thing or end it in

[C]

two or three days and tell the

[B]

Iranians, see you in a few years if you start rebuilding. There was this remarkable pair of interviews where in one of them he said, I have three candidates in mind to replace the Supreme Leader of Iran. I won't be revealing them now. Let's get the job done first. And then a few hours later, he told another outlet, actually, those three guys were killed in the first round of strikes. So turns out we can't rely on them. I asked him about who is going to take over now that the Ayatollah, the Supreme Leader, is gone. And his answer was interesting. He said, the attack was so successful, it knocked out Most of the candidates, he told me it's not going to be anybody that we were thinking of because they are all dead. I mean, what is he driving at here? I don't know. It's not clear that he knows. I think really he wants to be able to say Iran has been a problem that bedeviled American presidents since Jimmy Carter. I fixed it. But what that looks like, what I fixed it means, we really have no idea.

[A]

Is there any suggestion that in order to get what it wants, the US Will have to put boots on the ground in Iran?

[B]

I haven't heard much talk about that. But at the same time, it is very, very difficult to change a regime from the air. There are very few examples in history of that working. And so if the goal here truly is regime change to rip out the Islamic Republic root and branch and replace it with something else, it's very difficult to see how that happens without ground troops. I think the preference for Trump and for the administration is probably something closer to a Venezuela scenario where you find a pliant regime insider who can take power now and who is willing to deal with America, be more amenable to American interests. It's not quite regime change. It's changing the figure at the top, but it's leaving the foundations of the regime intact. I think that's the preference. And if that's what they want to do, if they can find that person, it doesn't require troops on the ground. But we don't know. I mean, the other question I think at this point is how bad do things get in the Gulf? How bad do things get with attacks on energy infrastructure here? You know, there's going to be a point at which some of America's allies start to say either you need to end this or you need to do whatever it takes to protect us and to make sure that Iran can no longer fire missiles and drones at us. And again, that's something that's perhaps tricky to do just from the air.

[A]

Greg Karlstrom is the Middle east correspondent for leading magazine the Economist. Coming up next, what is the plan here? Support for Today Explained comes from Found Found says managing your finances can be difficult no matter who you are, perhaps much more so if you're running a business. That makes things all the more complicated, they say, especially when it comes to figuring out things like taxes and expenses. Found says they bring everything into one place. They help you cut through the clutter, banking, bookkeeping, invoicing, taxes, all in one. That way you have fewer subscriptions. No more struggling with clunky Tools Found focuses on easing the pain of tax season by automating expense tracking and identifying potential write offs. On top of that, they say you can send invoices at no cost and pay contractors directly, all from the same app. You can take back control of your business. Today you can open a found account for free at found.com that's f O-U-N-D.com found is a financial technology company. Guys. It's not a bank. Banking services are provided by lead bank member fdic. You can join the hundreds of thousands who've already streamlined their finances with foundation

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[C]

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[B]

This is today, explained

[D]

Nahal Toosi, senior foreign affairs correspondent and columnist for Politico.

[A]

Who is in charge in Iran right now?

[D]

It's a very good question. Technically, they've said that they've appointed an interim council to lead the country for now. It consists of the president, Massoud Pezeshkian. He's something of a moderate in the Iranian system. And then there's a member of the Guardian Council and the chief justice of the Supreme Court. They're considered hardliners of sorts for the most part. But to be honest, it's a little bit unclear in the sense that who is really running the military? Who's making the military decisions? There's a very senior guy named Ali Larajani who has a lot of power as well. It's a little vague, especially when the bombs keep raining down.

[A]

How did this regime, which right now seems, as you say, to be in complete disarray, how did it survive so Many years.

[D]

Well, everything through repression, diplomatic negotiation, balancing its anti Americanism by appealing to other world powers, such as China and Russia. It has used any number of tricks. I mean, it has had international relations with plenty of countries, if not America, over the years, but increasingly it has become isolated as well. It was getting weaker and weaker. And my sense is that the Trump administration saw a moment of unusual vulnerability and just went for it.

[A]

It went for it with the idea, presumably, that if you sort of take out the leaders of the regime, then you get regime change. Is that what is likely to happen here?

[D]

You know, it's interesting. I've been thinking a lot about this. The thing about a regime is it's not just about the people, right? It's not just who's there. It's also about the process of everything from elections to making decisions. It's also about power and how power is allocated within a system. The Iranian system was never built around a single cult figure, that type of thing, to where you could just take one person out and everything else would change and, you know, there'd be rainbows and unicorns or whatever. This is a systematic place. And it was designed, it has been designed to regenerate itself. People step in when other people leave or die. What's different now is that the US And Israel, Israel in particular, because they're really the ones carrying out the assassinations. They have just been going after as many figures as they can get, even ones who aren't really in power, apparently, like people who might be related to someone in power. And it seems like it just depends on how deep they can go to where the whole whole thing could fall apart. But then you still have the armed forces, you still have the paramilitaries. There's a certain limit, and there's a certain limit to munitions, for that matter.

[A]

Yet you wonder if President Trump has thought through process, as you put it. He said this weekend he hopes that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police will work together with Iranian patriots. So the protesters who've been protesting in the streets, he's essentially saying that the military and the police who massacred these protesters earlier this year should now work alongside them. Doesn't sound likely. Does it sound likely to you? Is Trump hitting on something here?

[D]

Look, strange times make for strange bedfellows, right? Fair there. You know, there's been reports over the years that there are people in the military and armed forces, police forces, who don't like the regime, who would prefer to. A lot of these guys are there collecting a paycheck at the same time, a lot of these guys killed thousands of Iranian protesters just weeks ago. Right. I'm not saying it can't happen. Someone might emerge. But I would have a lot of questions.

[A]

What does the organized opposition in Iran look like? Is there someone inside of Iran who has the political leverage to take over right now?

[D]

I think the short answer is no. There's no real organized opposition inside Iran. There are opposition figures. Many have been thrown in prison. Many have just had to flee the country. There are some who are under house arrest, that sort of thing. And some kind of came from the system and tried to change it. And so they might not have legitimacy in the eyes of many Iranians who really, really want complete regime change. I mean, there's just not a real organized group. There are different groups outside Iran who claim to be opposition leaders and organizations to a degree, but many of them have not been inside Iran for a long, long time, and they don't really have the confidence, and they haven't really proven themselves as having a ground game inside the country.

[A]

Tell me about Reza Pahlavi. It seems like maybe he, the exiled son of the last Shah of Iran, might fall into that category.

[B]

Yes.

[D]

You know, he's been outside the country for nearly 50 years. And over the decades, he has every now and then emerged and, you know, tried to kind of make some noise and say, the US should do something. We should support the people of Iran. This intervention is critical in the sense

[A]

that it could be really a humanitarian

[D]

intervention to protect more lives in Iran

[B]

that otherwise might be lost.

[D]

In recent years, his profile was really has risen. I mean, you could just chart it. But it's partly because he and his aides have pursued kind of a political polarization approach. They've really sided with Republicans. They've really been pro Trump, and they have gone out of their way, especially online, to intimidate to a degree, and push aside others who are in the opposition, who say they're opposition leaders, that sort of thing. It's been a pretty divisive approach. At the same time, because he has such name recognition inside the country and because he has managed to raise his profile, it sort of has worked for him so that more and more people, even inside Iran, chant his name and they say his name. But does that mean that he has cells or units or groups on the ground in the country who can take over institutions and take, you know, the armed forces over that? I have not seen any evidence of that. He says he's in touch with many Iranian defectors, including from the Armed forces, but we really haven't seen proof of that. And the US Officials I speak to do not seem to think he's a senior, serious player.

[A]

Wow. What about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? If they take over? Some analysts suggest possibility, maybe keep an eye on them. What is that then? Is that like a military dictatorship?

[D]

So over the years, we have heard reports that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has grown in power and stature inside the system. Now, the IRGC is not the normal Iranian military. It reports directly to the supreme Leader. It's very religiously, theologically driven. But also, I'd say there's probably a fair amount of interest in the economic side of things for them. Because they own large parts of the Iranian economy, they are probably in the best position to take power. Even if they put a cleric in front as a symbol, the real power could lie with the irgc. And this is a group that could, on the one hand, be very pragmatic. If you say, look, you know, let's make money, let's have peace. On the other hand, they could grow even more hardline and anti American and anti Israel and push even harder with having a nuclear Iran down the line. So, yeah, it's definitely, probably in many ways the odds on favorite in terms of really having seizing the mantle of power in the country.

[A]

You well know that the United States has attempted regime change in the Middle east before, and the results were catastrophic. How concerned are you that we are looking down the barrel of another catastrophe here?

[D]

Look, if you look at the conflagration in the Middle east right now as a result of these actions, it is deeply concerning. It's a question of how. How many countries will get drawn in. At some point, the Arab states might feel like they have to attack Iran because it's been attacking them. This could get very ugly. It could spill across borders. It could destabilize a number of places. Most of all, it could destabilize Iran. I mean, if you decimate the leadership, but then nothing really rises to take its place. You could have what's called regime collapse, right? That's another term. And it just could become a chaotic failed state. So there's a lot of concern there. I do think, though, you kind of have to ask yourself about the really long arc of history, right? Yes, Afghanistan is a different story. It's back in the hands of the Taliban. But Iraq, for instance, continues now to hold elections. It's gone through some very, very tough times, but it is a somewhat functioning democracy. The people there are freer than they were under Saddam Hussein. I mean, we're talking, you know, it's been more than 20 years now, but things do, over time, change. And the question is, is it worth it? And also, is it worth American lives and American treasure to make this sort of thing happen? And I just think keeping that nuance in everyone's mind,

[A]

That was politico's nahal toosi, ariana espudu and avishai artsy produced today's show. Jolie myers edited and patrick boyd and david tadashore engineered. Andrea lopez cruzado checked the facts, and I'm noel king. It's today, explained.

[C]

Sam.