The Trump-Saudi-Israel drama

Summary

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Episode Overview

Title: The Trump-Saudi-Israel Drama
Podcast: Today, Explained (Vox)
Date: July 27, 2026
Hosts: Sean Rameswaram, Noel King
Guests: Michael Gordon (Wall Street Journal), Michael Koplow (Israel Policy Forum)
Theme:
This episode explores President Trump’s controversial new nuclear energy deal with Saudi Arabia, the backlash from Israel, and how the arrangement could reshape alliances and nuclear norms in the Middle East. The hosts, joined by expert guests, unpack the specifics of the deal, its diplomatic context, and its potential regional and political consequences.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Background: How the Deal Unfolded

• Michael M. Grynbaum ([00:00]):

  • Introduces Trump’s recent announcement of a nuclear power deal with Saudi Arabia, which notably did not include normalization with Israel or reference the Abraham Accords.
  • Trump faced immediate criticism and subsequently said the deal would be contingent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords (normalizing with Israel).

• Summary of Context:

  • The Abraham Accords set up the framework for normalization between Israel and certain Arab states.
  • The Trump administration’s announcement is diplomatically awkward, especially with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visiting Washington.

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2. Deal Details and Historical Context

• Michael Gordon (WSJ) ([02:09]):

  • Both the Trump and Biden administrations explored civil nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia.
  • Under Biden, such a deal was conditional on Saudi normalization with Israel and included benefits for Palestinians; this was derailed by Hamas’ attack on Israel.
  • Trump revived only the nuclear energy portion, with no normalization in the deal text.

  Key Quote:

  “What happened under President Trump was he revived one portion of that, which was the civil nuclear agreement. It was signed, and there's nothing in the agreement about normalization.”
  – Michael Gordon ([03:29])

• Deal Structure ([05:37]):

  • 30-year agreement, potentially lucrative for US nuclear companies.
  • Provides near exclusivity to US companies; China, Russia, and France are excluded.
  • "MAGA diplomacy gone wild": Tries to boost US nuclear industry and shut out rivals.

  Key Quote:

  “For President Trump this is like a MAGA diplomacy gone wild. This is tens of billions of dollars potentially for the American nuclear industry, which has not been thriving coming our way.”
  – Michael Gordon ([06:26])

• Proliferation Concerns ([04:03]):

  • Unlike the UAE “gold standard” deal, Saudi Arabia did not agree to stringent limits (no enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear fuel, broad inspections).
  • Deal includes a two-year study on Saudi enrichment; US can halt enrichment and block seeking other partners for a decade post-study.

  Notable Explanation:

  “The Saudis want the option to have the enrichment of uranium. They want a complete fuel cycle on their own territory...That's what most of the controversy is about.”
  – Michael Gordon ([04:36])

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3. Strategic Rationale and Risks

• US Interests ([09:15]):

  • Economic: Boost US industry.
  • Geopolitical: Freeze out Russia and China.
  • Debate: Would proliferation risks outweigh commercial and strategic benefits?

• Risks of Encouraging Regional Nuclear Proliferation ([10:19]):

  • Might prompt other Middle Eastern countries to press for similar deals, not necessarily with the US or with “gold standard” safeguards.
  • UAE could seek to renegotiate its own agreement.

  Key Quote:

  "It could, because you're sort of legitimizing the spread of nuclear technology...if there's an arrangement in the region that is less than the gold standard...the UAE can now come back and say, wait a second..."
  – Michael Gordon ([10:39])

• Political Vagaries ([12:48]):

  • The deal's future is uncertain—it could be altered or reversed by a future US administration if the planned two-year study isn’t completed before a potential Trump exit.

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4. Israeli Reaction and the Abraham Accords

• Michael Koplow (Israel Policy Forum) ([17:24]):

  • Netanyahu’s visit to Washington is expected to be tense; US and Israel now differ on strategy toward Iran and the new nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia.
  • Israelis were surprised the deal excluded mention of Israel or normalization.

  Key Quotes:

  "It absolutely took Israel by surprise...There was no mention of Israel. There was no mention of normalization."
  – Michael Koplow ([19:30])

  • Trump, amid backlash, claimed on Truth Social the deal was contingent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, but this was not in the signed agreement.

  • Likely outcome: "eventual" or "aspirational" Saudi commitment to normalization, not immediate or guaranteed.

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5. Tensions in the US-Israel Relationship

• Power Imbalance and Israeli Miscalculation ([22:23], [24:05]):

  • Trump’s public stance: he is in charge, not Netanyahu.
  • Israel bet on Trump always protecting its interests, but faces proof that their “special relationship” is subject to Trump’s priorities.

  Memorable Exchange:

  Michael Gordon (impersonating Trump): “He'll do whatever I want him to do. He's very, very good man. He'll do whatever I want him to do. Without the United States, there would be no Israel.”
  Michael Koplow: "Without me, there would be no Israel."
  ([23:08]-[23:20])

• Israeli Concerns Beyond Normalization ([25:30]):

  • Israelis dislike that the deal isn’t as "stringent" as the UAE’s agreement, may erode regional nuclear norms, and could embolden future adversaries.
  • The episode likens this to the US starting Iran’s own civilian nuclear program decades ago—what seems peaceful today could enable future threats.

  Key Quote:

  “People shouldn’t forget that Iran’s nuclear program started off also as a civilian nuclear program that the United States provided for it under the days of the Shah.”
  – Michael Koplow ([26:42])

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Notable Quotes and Moments

• On Nuclear Proliferation Risk:

  "That's what most of the controversy is about."
  — Michael Gordon ([04:56])

• Deal’s Regional Impact:

  “It could be a win-win or it could blow up in everybody’s face.”
  — Michael Gordon ([12:52])

• On the US-Israel Dynamic:

  “Prime Minister Netanyahu undoubtedly is feeling some stress in this relationship, and when he shows up here tomorrow, he's going to do whatever he can to try and repair any risks...”
  — Michael Koplow ([23:48])

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Segment Timestamps

• 00:00 – Episode opens, introduction to the "big bad deal"
• 02:09 – Michael Gordon explains the deal’s context and contrast between Trump/Biden approaches
• 05:37 – Deal structure and what’s actually included (and not)
• 09:08 – US motivations; economic and strategic drivers
• 10:19 – Risks for regional nuclear proliferation and diplomatic blowback
• 17:24 – Israeli reaction, Michael Koplow's analysis
• 19:30 – Surprise in Israel, Trump’s attempt at damage control
• 22:23 – Netanyahu’s status in the Trump relationship
• 24:05 – Israeli miscalculation and strategic fears about Saudi nuclear empowerment
• 26:42 – Historical parallel with Iran’s civilian nuclear program

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Tone

• Engaged, urgent, and slightly sardonic when discussing Trump’s style and the unusual diplomatic sequence
• Analytical when unpacking technical and diplomatic nuance
• Expresses Israeli and US concerns candidly, with skepticism about future political and regional stability

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Takeaways

• The Trump-Saudi nuclear deal is controversial for its lack of normalization with Israel and its ambiguous nuclear safeguards.
• Israel, long believing in a special status with Trump, is left scrambling and faces potential strategic risks.
• The deal reflects MAGA-style economics but may open the door to regional proliferation and future diplomatic headaches—especially if future US leaders change course.
• The episode serves as a real-time window into shifting alliances, transactional diplomacy, and the unpredictable mix of politics, policy, and personality at play in Middle East statecraft.

Transcript

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

President Trump announced a big nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia last week. Energy, not weapons. Weapons usually come later. But what makes this one kind of wacky was that Trump had to immediately walk his own deal back. Turns out people were big mad that the deal appeared to leave out one of our allies in the Middle East. Maybe you've heard of Israel. So Trump says JK this deal's contingent upon Saudi Arabia signing on to the Abraham Accords. In case you forgot about Abe, he's a landmark set of agreements between Arab states and Israel to normalize relations. Normalization means basically play nice, set up embassies, talk about trade, security, that sort of thing. The point is, that's not in the deal. But Trump's people are going on the TV and saying we are in discussions with the Saudis about coming into normalization with Israel. All this as Benjamin Netanyahu travels to Washington to meet with the president on Tuesday. Awkward. Two guys named Michael are gonna help us wrap our heads around this big bad deal on Today Explained from VO. Support for the program today comes from Fetch pet insurance. Fetch is the most complete pet insurance for dogs and cats, according to Consumer Advocate. You get paid back up to 90% of vet bills at any vet in the United States and Canada, with claims paid back in as little as two days. Go to fetchpet.com save right now for your free quote. That is fetchpet.com save avoiding your unfinished

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[Michael Gordon]

I did a lot of reporting on this and I've been tracking this issue really since the first Trump administration. And what's interesting about this, and it's important to understand the context and the history is this issue was explored during President Trump's first term in and then during President Biden's term in office. In fact, President Biden was prepared to go through with a civil nuclear cooperation deal with Saudi Arabia, but only on certain conditions. He had a plan that would sort of provided something for everyone. There could have been US Saudi nuclear cooperation deal which Basically means the US Provides the technology to Saudi Arabia and the American companies do a lot of the work. But that was going to be conditional on Saudi Arabia establishing formal diplomatic relations with Israel. That was under Biden. And there were other aspects to it. Biden envisioned a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia would be the only defense treaty the US has with a state in the region. US doesn't have one with Israel. And because the conditions for Saudi normalization are a credible pathway toward a Palestinian state, there was something in it for the Palestinians as well. All of that was basically undermined when Hamas attacked Israel. And all that was essentially put on the shelf. What happened under President Trump was he revived one portion of that, which was the civil nuclear agreement. It was signed, and there's nothing in the agreement about normalization.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

So President Biden was also interested in a deal of this sort. But is it not true that for years the United States refused to help Saudi Arabia develop a civilian nuclear program?

[Michael Gordon]

Well, the US Proliferation policy for a long time had been to try to discourage the spread of potentially dangerous nuclear technology in the Middle East. And for example, there is a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates. It's known as the gold standard. And it's called the gold standard because the United Arab Emirates has reactors purchased from South Korea, but with American technology. But it gave up the right to enrich uranium on its own territory or reprocess spent fuel. It explicitly relinquished that. In fact, there's no right. It just said it committed itself not to do that. It also committed itself to the most wide ranging inspections. What's striking about this deal with Saudi Arabia under Biden and under Trump is it doesn't meet the gold standard. The Saudis want the option to have the enrichment of uranium. They want a complete fuel cycle on their own territory. And they simply won't agree to the Additional Protocol, which is an iaea, International Atomic Energy Agency kind of process that provides for the most wide ranging inspections. They won't adopt that. That's what most of the controversy is about.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

Let's talk about the conditions. If you don't mind. Maybe now's a good time to just ask explicitly what is in this deal?

[Michael Gordon]

Well, that's important question because they haven't. Even though I spoke to administration officials who spelled out a lot of these conditions, and even though the administration has confirmed the accuracy of the Wall Street Journal article, they haven't really been put in a press release or anything of the kind. But the conditions are as follows. First of all, it's a 30 year deal. That's a long time.

[Michael Koplow]

Yeah.

[Michael Gordon]

And that's a lot of potential revenue for an American companies. Second, there's something close to exclusivity for American companies in this deal. The Russians and the Chinese can't be part of it. And that's important because for President Trump this is like a MAGA diplomacy gone wild. This is tens of billions of dollars potentially for the American nuclear industry, which has not been thriving coming our way. And that's how it's been advertised by the U.S. energy Department. That's an important thing. So 30 years exclusivity. The other thing about it is that it opens the door to enrichment of uranium on Saudi soil. Now I've seen a lot of senior officials go on television and say that's not part of the deal. They're going with American companies, American workers.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

But there is no enrichment envisioned in this plan.

[Michael Gordon]

Any agreement that we would make on civil nuclear energy with Saudi Arabia or

[Michael Koplow]

any other country is going to have safeguards in place to ensure that those

[Michael Gordon]

cannot ever be turned into a weapons program.

[Michael Koplow]

I mean that's, that's the gold standard.

[Michael Gordon]

It is part of the deal. It's part of the deal that was briefed to me and everyone's confirmed the accuracy of the report. But it's structured in a very careful way. There's to be a two year study about whether enrichment of uranium on Saudi soil is commercially viable and makes sense for what the Saudi civil nuclear ambitions are. A two year study, once the agreement takes effect and the presumption is the Saudis want enrichment on their soil. So let's take this scenario, two year study, decide that uranium enrichment for civil purposes is worth doing. American companies would then be involved in building this under a so called black box arrangement in which the Senate sensitive nuclear technology is not shared with the Saudis. That's one scenario. Let me give you a second scenario. You come to the end of the two years and the Saudis say, well we, we're ready to have you build us for gazillion dollars a nuclear enrichment, uranium enrichment site. And the Americans say no, we don't think it makes a lot of sense. We think you should import your fuel the way the UAE does. We don't want to go that route. According to the terms of the agreement, the US has the right to do that two years from now. In that case, under the terms of the agreement, the Saudis would not be able to seek another partner to help them do this enrichment or enrich on their own for a decade. So that's how the agreement is structured. And that's what I expect the Congress will see.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

Why did the United States want this? You keep talking about making lots of money. Is it just to support our nuclear industry? Is that it?

[Michael Gordon]

That's a big part of it. But it's not only that. It's to freeze out Russia, China, France, other countries who would otherwise be the vendors, and perhaps under less rigorous provisions. So the argument for doing this in the part of the Trump administration was let's help our own nuclear industry at home in a, in a big way. If, if the US Wasn't going to be part of it, it didn't mean it wasn't going to happen. It just meant it would happen without the U.S. so those are the three arguments that were kind of put forward. But you know, there hasn't been a lot of public debate about this. This is something that was carried out rather quietly behind closed doors. Everybody knew Trump was sort of up to it. But unless you spend your life, you know, studying nuclear proliferation and nuclear energy, say 99% of Americans would not have been aware this was, this deal was being hatch.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

So help me understand something. The United States gets in there early, freezes out Russia and China gets to make a bunch of money. It's a shot in the arm to our nuclear industry. But does that still encourage other actors in the region to pursue their own programs potentially with Russia and China?

[Michael Gordon]

It could. And it could, because you're sort of legitimizing the spread of nuclear technology. Here's how this could go wrong. One, other countries say, well, they do it, we want it and we want it with however we can get it with whatever nations we can get it and we're not going to adhere to the gold standard like UAE and maybe we'll do it with the US Maybe we'll do with other countries. That's one way it would encourage proliferation. Two, there's a provision of the agreement with the uae, the so called gold standard agreement I've talked so much about that says if there's an arrangement in the region that is less than the gold standard, less than what we, the UAE agreed to, we reserve the right to renegotiate, to try to renegotiate this agreement. In other words, the UAE can now come back and say, wait a second, we agreed to this, no enrichment, these very stringent provisions. So what's going to happen now? Will the Trump administration insist that the deal be contingent on normalization? Will it eventually amend this position and say, well, that's aspirational because It's a potential deal killer. And then the American nuclear industry won't get all the billions of dollars the energy secretary is talking about. And then the US Won't have exclusivity in Saudi Arabia in civil nuclear program that the Energy Department is touting. How do you square this circle? And right now the administration doesn't have an answer. And so this agreement, you know, I think the thing to look for in the weeks and months ahead is is this normalization requirement somehow diluted? Does it become a goal instead of a requirement? Because I think logically that's pretty much the most one can expect if you look at the current trends in the Middle east, what's happening in Gaza, what's happening in Israel. And there's another way this thing could potentially not go forward. In a sense, some aspects of it. Let's say the two year study is not completed during the Trump administration. Let's say it drifts into the next American administration. Well, please tell me who's going to be our next president? John Ossoff in the volatile American politics. Right. And if it's John Ossif, he's going to come in and say thank you. We don't want to do enrichment in Saudi Arabia. That's off the table. Sorry about that, guys. But you know, we built your two power reactors, but enrichment facilities not in the cards. So there's due to the vagaries of politics in the United States, there's some aspects of this deal are not exactly locked in. It could be a win win or it could blow up in everybody's face.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

The view from Israel when TODAY Explained continues.

[Michael Gordon]

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[Michael Koplow]

Michael Koplow. I'm the Chief Policy Officer at Israel Policy Forum.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

How excited do you guys get when Prime Minister Netanyahu is visiting Washington, D.C.

[Michael Koplow]

well, when Prime Minister Netanyahu is here and I believe this is going to be the sixth or seventh time since President Trump returned to office, it Always creates a lot of news. So I don't know that excited is the word, but it certainly makes me busier.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

Okay. And he's, of course, visiting the District of Columbia tomorrow to meet with President Trump. How tense do you think things will be compared to all those other visits?

[Michael Koplow]

I suspect this will be among the most tense meetings that they have had because there are a number of issues on the table where President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu are on different pages. The issue that they used to be on the same page about was Iran. And I don't think that is the case anymore. As we've seen the Iran war unfold, the Israeli view is still the view that they had at the outset of the war, which is that this is necessary to deal with Iran's nuclear program, with its ballistic missiles, with its proxies. And ultimately, what the Israelis wanted to see and what they still want to see is a different regime in Iran. President Trump may still share those goals, but it's pretty clear that as the war has not gone the way he anticipated, he's looking for an exit strategy. And his main focus is the Strait of Hormuz, which is not something that the Israelis care about at all. So I think at this point, when Prime Minister Netanyahu arrives at the White House tomorrow, he's probably going to try to convince the president that the original goal should be on the table, that the US And Israel should keep going. And President Trump seems to have a different view of things.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

And on top of that, insult to injury, not sure how you'd phrase it, but we have this new deal with Saudi Arabia that seems to have on some level taken Israel by surprise.

[Michael Koplow]

It absolutely took Israel by surprise. When the deal was announced on Wednesday. It was a deal to provide south Saudi Arabia with nuclear power and nuclear infrastructure. There was no mention of Israel. There was no mention of normalization. There's no mention of anything outside of the bounds of a nuclear agreement. President Trump on Thursday, following widespread criticism not only in Israel but in media outlets here in the United States, put out his Truth Social, where he said that the deal is absolutely contingent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords. Truth Social the civil nuclear deal. There will be no enrichment of material being made between the United States Department of Energy and Saudi Arabia, which pertains only to non military use, such as the ones that Iran and UAE and others already have, will be approved, but it's totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the very respected and satisfactory successful Abraham Accords. The United States is not opposed to the civil non enriched nuclear facilities. Thank you for your attention to this matter. President DONALD J. Trump and what's curious about that is that when the deal was announced, there was no mention of it and the deal was actually signed. So either the president is intending to change the terms of the deal after it's been signed, or he's willing to back out of it if this new condition is not met, or, and I suspect that this is the actual answer, he will secure some sort of commitment from the Saudis to examine joining the Abraham Accords at some point down the road when Israel has met a number of conditions and there's been progress toward a Palestinian state. And that way he can say that he has secured a commitment from the Saudis to do this eventually, and the Saudis can stay where they are, which is not wanting to normalize with Israel until there is real progress toward Palestinian statehood. And if that is how it unfolds, it will leave the Israelis behind. And I think this comes as a pretty big shock to them, given that President Trump's previous policy was that a deal between the US And Saudi Arabia would involve normalization. And that was also President Biden's policy. So Prime Minister Netanyahu is coming here not only with some discomfort on Iran, but I think some real discomfort on this Saudi nuclear deal.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

Was Netanyahu himself surprised by this deal? Do we know? You would think they're in cahoots.

[Michael Koplow]

I think he must have been surprised by this deal. It is true that Trump and Netanyahu have seemed to have had a very cushy relationship, not only during this term, but during President Trump's first term as well. But it's not a relationship of equals. And we've seen, particularly over the past few months, I think, in response to criticism here in the United States over the role that Israel and the role that the prime minister may have had in convincing President Trump to go to war. President Trump repeatedly talk about the fact that he is in charge, that Prime Minister Netanyahu is going to do what he says, that he is the decider and Prime Minister Netanyahu is not fine.

[Michael Gordon]

He'll do whatever I want him to do. He's very, very good man. He'll do whatever I want him to do. Without the United States, there would be no Israel.

[Michael Koplow]

Without me, there would be no Israel

[Michael Gordon]

because no other president was willing to do what I did.

[Michael Koplow]

So, yes, I do think they have a good relationship. But President Trump, at least publicly, seems to be signaling that he is in charge and he wants everybody to know that. So I think that Prime Minister Netanyahu undoubtedly is feeling some stress in this relationship, and when he shows up here tomorrow, he's going to do whatever he can to try and repair any risks that there are.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

Israel wanted this war, but hates this deal that the president may very likely complete with Saudi Arabia. Did they miscalculate somewhere in here? Because it feels very much like this deal is an outcome of this war.

[Michael Koplow]

I think the Israelis have miscalculated in a number of ways, and the biggest is that consistently since 2017 or 2018, you hear Israeli officials, political officials, security officials, even ordinary Israelis talk routinely about President Trump being the best friend that Israel has ever had and exhibiting a faith in President Trump that he will never do anything that will hang Israel out to dry.

[Michael Gordon]

This has been a great relationship because he's been the greatest friend that Israel has ever had in the White House.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

And he.

[Michael Gordon]

He respects me. I respect him. We always find a way to work

[Michael Koplow]

out our differences, and a lot of what they've done has proceeded on that assumption. And even though everybody is aware of President Trump's transactional nature, even though everybody is aware that he is relatively volatile, that he flips on policy issues all the time, the Israelis had this faith that they would always be an exception to that rule. And I think what we're seeing is that they're not necessarily an exception to that rule. And it's important to stress that when it comes to this Saudi nuclear deal, the problem for the Israelis is not just that it was signed on Wednesday without any hint of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia being part of it. The deal itself, even if. If there is a normalization component, is problematic for the Israelis because this deal is not as stringent as other deals that the US has signed. It may open the door for countries that have signed more restrictive agreements in the region, like the uae, to do the same. And ultimately, all of this is a bet that the trajectory of Saudi Arabia is going to continue, that it's going to continue modernizing, continue becoming more moderate and pragmatic, continue improving relations with Israel. If that's not the case, once you've handed the Saudis a nuclear program that's irreversible. People shouldn't forget that Iran's nuclear program started off also as a civilian nuclear program that the United States provided for it under the days of the Shah. So for Israelis, the normalization part of this is absolutely worrisome. But the deal itself is problematic, too. And I think that's where the Israelis are feeling panicked.

[Michael M. Grynbaum]

Michael koplo israel policy forum. Earlier it was michael gordon, wall street journal. Michael mwogdi produced today with michael de soto. Michael al saadi edited. Michael donatov was on fax. Michael tadashore and michael boyd were on the mix. I'm michael ramisvirum. This is today expl.

[Michael Koplow]

Sam.