
The investigative journalist Lucas Amin reports on how the tech company Palantir won a £330m contract with the NHS … and what happened once its software was introduced
Loading summary
A
This is the Guardian.
B
Today, how the world's scariest company cracked the nhs.
A
Today's markets move fast. Get the insights you need in 10 minutes with the Barclays Brief, a new podcast from Barclays Investment Bank. Through Sharp Dial and scenario based analysis, our leading experts analyze key market themes each week. So whether you're managing a portfolio or leading a business, the Barclays Brief podcast can help you make smarter decisions today. Stay sharp, stay brief. Find Barclays Brief wherever you get your podcasts.
B
When Palantir won its contract with the N.N.H.S. back in 2023, there was a fair amount of concern. One of the world's biggest tech companies, mostly known for its surveillance and military software, was promising to transform the UK's health service. Palantir was awarded a 330 million pounds contract to build a new digital platform that would seamlessly join up patient data and make the whole process of treating people easier, quicker, better. Now it just needed to convince its customers.
C
This really interesting thing happens in May 24th. All the top NHS data professionals and experts get kind of summoned to a conference or like a meeting, if you like. They were health service people, data experts, the people who are really charged with using the federated data platform and really making it work. And that meeting doesn't take place inside the NHS or at a conference center. It takes place inside Palantir's headquarters. That's not normal. Our sources who were at that meeting told us they'd never heard of that happening before.
B
Investigative journalist Lucas Amin began digging with his colleague Peter Geoghegan. He was determined to find out more about this meeting.
C
Just to enter the building, you need to sign a non disclosure agreement, which again was very new to a lot of the people going into that room. And what they described to us is this kind of classic Silicon Valley vista of table tennis and pool and a free bar and loads of salads and, you know, like cool tech stuff going on.
B
Cool tech stuff, you can picture it. But then the attendees who were standing around drinking and chatting got a summons.
C
They go downstairs to an auditorium. NHS bosses are on stage and Arseour says they basically got slapped down. They got a dressing down for not using the FTP. So they then said, okay, well, let us show you what it can do. And Palantir kind of demoed it and said, you know, this is how amazing our software is, this is how it works. Who's got questions? And somebody stood up and said what apparently a lot were thinking, which is that this looks absolutely rubbish and that we're already doing a lot of these things, and we don't understand why we need to migrate from a system that works to one that actually looks like it's, in some cases, inferior.
B
Why did they? And was it true? From the Guardian, I'm Noshi Nikbal, Today in Focus. What did Palantir actually do for the nhs? Lucas Harmon, welcome to Today in Focus.
C
Thanks for having me.
B
You're an investigative reporter for Democracy For Sale, and along with your colleague Peter Geoghegan, you've been taking a long, hard look at Palantir and its relationship with the nhs. You and Peter published your findings in the London Review of Books and then later in the Guardian. But where did your investigation begin?
C
There were kind of two key questions that we were set out to answer in this investigation. The first was how did the world's scariest company, as it's referred, to end up in charge of all of our health data in the NHS? And how did it win a £330 million contract to kind of rewire the health service? I first started looking at Palantir in 2023, when we were doing stories around the tendering of this contract that they subsequently won. You know, we read about who they were and how they were founded. It came up very much in the kind of post 911 CIA world. CIA was their first client and also their funder in the beginning. And it just seemed like a fascinating journey that this company had ended up in charge of our health data.
B
I mean, you talk about the CIA because Palantir did famously talk itself up as being essential to military and security services in the us, and it has big contracts with the Pentagon, with ice, with the idf. How did it grow its influence in the uk?
C
When Palantir arrived in Britain, it was a relatively unknown company. It didn't have many connections, it didn't have much clout. This would have been the kind of mid 2010s. And they win their first insignificant contract in 2015. That's kind of their first public contract in Britain. It was worth about 700 grand. And it was for the government digital service to do some kind of data analytics work within the Cabinet Office. And at that time, they were very much security services, industrial complex. They hired Mandelson and Global Council to reposition themselves so that they were no longer seen as a kind of shadowy military contractor.
B
So just to explain, Peter Manson, former disgraced ambassador to the us, had a. How do you describe Global Council PR firm? Consulting firm.
C
Global Council call themselves an advisory company. In practice, they were lobbyists. The company has gone into liquidation and they were very clever, very artful lobbyists. We know from our sources that Peter Mandelson was extremely interested personally in Palantir from the very beginning, and he was annoyed that Global Council wasn't making more money. And so Palantir rocked up and they ended up being one of Global Council's biggest clients.
B
Right.
C
They had a 30k a month retainer.
B
Wow.
C
And a big part of that sell was they were able to put Palantir executives in rooms with leaders from the Health Service, with shadow Ministers, with ministers, with everybody they needed to talk to. And Mandelson and Global Council were very, very smart in the way they operated. So they effectively took advantage of Britain's incredibly weak lobbying laws.
B
And what do you mean by that?
C
So, basically, in Britain, if a third party is paid by a company to talk to a minister or a Permanent Secretary, that counts as lobbying legally and that must be declared transparently. Everything else that happens is not considered lobbying for the purpose of the law. If you do a drinks party and some people just happen to be there, that's off the record. If you organize an event and you invite a whole group of stakeholders and at that event, Palantir execs happen to speak to everybody else who's in the room, that's off the record.
B
There's this extraordinary quote in the piece. I'm going to mangle it, but it says something like, if at some point you have to register this meeting, it means you've massively fucked up.
C
You have to really fuck up. Yeah. To actually register activity. That's what a former Global Council source told us.
B
Right.
C
They were organizing lots of kind of health policy lunches and events.
B
So they were clear that they wanted. They were targeting the nhs.
C
A former Global Council source told us. NHS was always seen as the Holy Grail.
B
It wasn't just Global Council and Peter Mandelson, was it? I mean, there were other names you should say involved. Could you tell me a bit more about that groundwork and how they laid it?
C
It's one of the most sophisticated kind of influence campaigns that I can remember reporting on. Also crucial to their kind of success was the hiring of this guy called Isaac Levito. And if you have a long memory, you'll remember that he ran Boris Johnson's election campaign in 2019 and he later run Rishi Sunak's 2023 campaign. So he was very plugged into the Tory side of it.
B
This is a very bulshy Australian guy. He's very, like, good at what he
C
does, very good at what he does. And the other really smart thing Palantir did was they started snapping up and poaching very smart senior people from within the nhs.
B
And this is key, isn't it?
C
It really is, I think, yeah.
B
So tell me about the kind of people they were taking from the nhs. Middle managers, doctors, scientists.
C
They took people with, with very strong levels of expertise in AI and in digital and in transformation.
B
Right.
C
All the places they were trying to hit.
B
So not only is Palantir poaching key NHS staff for its UK operation, it hires a UK CEO, former Conservative councillor and English aristocrat with quite the family history. Louis Mosley. Tell me about him and the role he then plays.
C
The UK is, we believe, the country outside of the US and China that has the best quality and quantity of the kind of engineering talent that you need to build software like ours. So Louis Mosley is famously known for being the grandson of Oswald Mosley, who's the leader of the British Union of Fascists. Now, there's absolutely no suggestion that Louis shares the politics that his granddad did make that clear. But he joined Palantir in 2017. He'd previously worked for Rory Stewart, actually.
B
Right, okay.
C
And he'd been a counsellor in Kensington. He's an extraordinarily well connected guy. He's very charming, very clever, very good at working a room.
B
So how did they start to land contracts here in the UK?
C
Looking back, it's the COVID 19 pandemic that really accelerated Palantir's ascension in Britain. And specifically in March 2020, Boris Johnson, Dominic Cummings, they held this summit which they called a digital Dunkirk. And Palantir was at that summit. Palantir said they were incredibly motivated by the urgency of the crisis and they would be happy to actually give their services to the UK for just one pound.
B
And what were they offering at that point for a pound?
C
So Palantir, what they offer is they're essentially a data analytics and integration company. And they say you've got all these different systems, all these different bits of information that can't kind of speak to each other. Imagine, for example, like your emails don't actually connect to your whatsapps, and that doesn't connect to, I don't know, your LinkedIn profile. So at an organizational level, they're offering to connect all those things which in the health service could be extremely valuable. And so that's how Palantir got their first NHS contract. They charged just one pound and it was the first time I'd ever heard of such a thing, because who, frankly, would sell their services to government for a pound. It just didn't seem to make any sense. I actually thought it was a misspelling. Well, it turned out it wasn't. And actually it was a sales tactic called land and expand.
B
Okay, tell me more about land and expand.
C
So land and expand means you and you get a toehold in an organization and once you kind of have that foot in the door, you then start to pump the price. And what Palantir have a kind of track record of doing is turning up in moments of crisis and offering their services for an extremely cheap price. And they did this in March 2020, just as we were going into lockdown. It was a health data contract and from there they became an increasingly important and expensive supplier to the NHS. That £1 deal became a million pound deal and then a £23 million deal. And crucially, this deal was no longer just about supporting the health service during the pandemic.
B
Right.
C
It was a wider contract to kind of help the NHS process its data and build out its information sharing systems.
B
So this was a way to show that we can do this, using the pandemic to show that they could actually streamline the NHS on a small scale at that point.
C
Yeah, but the big jewel in the crown that Palantir were always searching for was this £330 million deal to rebuild the data architecture of the health service.
B
Well, Lukas, as your investigation revealed, and as you said, the NHS was seen as this holy grail for Palantir. Just the idea of all that data from, you'd imagine almost every single person in the uk, how did they go about getting into the health service?
C
Effectively? This is what all your influence and your lobbyists are helping to do is to what they call tilt the tender.
B
And just explain the tendering process a bit for listeners.
C
A tendering process is the kind of process in which, as a government department, you say, okay, we want to buy this thing. Who are the suppliers that could provide it to us and who's going to give us the best deal? And what Palantir set out, via Global Council, to do, which is perfectly legitimate, is to influence that process.
B
Okay, tell me more.
C
The best reporting on this actually came from the ft, and they were able to show that the tender, which is kind of the specification of what this product should look like, actually included screenshots of Palantir's own software.
B
So it already showed there was a bias towards what they'd seen from Palantir as an example, to then give out to other companies saying, this is kind of what we want. Yeah, but actually, as they knew, Palantir already had that.
C
Yes, exactly. And Palantir slogans, you know, they often claim to be a single source of truth. And that specific phrase also popped up in the tendering.
B
Wow. Okay.
C
So it's very difficult for a competitor to actually compete against that.
B
We should mention NHS England says that it conducted a rigorous, competitive, fair and transparent procurement process over 11 months in line with public contract regulations where any eligible supplier could respond. So, Lukas, the really lucrative work for Palantir within the NHS was this thing. And listeners, please bear with the acronym, the fdp. The Federated Data Platform. Can you tell me what it is and why it's so valuable?
C
The Federated Data platform basically has three functions. Its first job is to try and join up data.
B
Right. Like your GP is not always talking to the place where you got your blood test, he's not always talking to the hospital to organize a surgery. Right.
C
And we've all kind of turned up with armfuls of paper showing what's happened to us because our clinician can't see it in front of them. So the first thing it's supposed to do is fix that. The second thing is, once you've got that data, Palantir is building a suite of apps that tackle specific clinical problems to help cut waiting lists or speed up cancer diagnoses. There are specific apps built that pull the right pieces of information together for that specific problem. The third thing is it's a platform for doing analytics and forecasting so that when analysts are kind of looking ahead to, say, a rough winter, and they're trying to figure out bed capacity or A and E intakes and stuff like that, they've got really rich, useful data to build that on.
B
We know that multiple governments have tried and failed to centralize and streamline NHS data. So I guess, Lukas, is there an argument that actually this was a good thing?
C
I think there's a very compelling argument that NHS information management needed reform. And there was also a terrible, tragic history of government failures and botched jobs in the past. Tony Blair was the first to try. They spent about 12 billion pounds trying to centralize patient data in a similar way to this. And we then had something called care data when again, there was this top down centralized approach. Let's put all the health data in one place. And. And in that case, what happened is the government ended up selling the records to private health insurance.
B
Ouch.
C
And public trust was just so badly damaged because people really care about the health Data. They don't want companies to know their most intimate secrets.
B
So, Lukas, ultimately, why did the NHS choose Palantir for this contract?
C
Well, I think they chose Palantir for this contract because the tender was effectively tilted in Palantir's favourite. And the very sophisticated influence campaign basically bore fruit. The rationale has always been they have the best product on the market and they can do things that no one else can. They have magic code, if you like, a secret sauce that British firms just can't compete with.
B
Aside from the civil liberty concerns, one of the most extraordinary parts of your reporting is that it uncovers the actual use of it. So at this point, doctors, nurses, clinicians within the NHS are being told that, okay, we have Palantir, we have whatever the software is called now you must use it. What did they find?
C
What we've seen is the rollout of the FDP began in April 2024 and almost immediately there were problems and there was resistance.
B
So there was this meeting. All these experts are giving a dressing down, irrespective of them saying that essentially this is quite rubbish, what happens next?
C
So then the rollout begins. And last month, the Health Department's top data official was in front of the select committee and he said 139 hospital trusts, which is two thirds of all hospital trusts, are now live. And by the way, that includes most of the important and big ones, okay? And he said this number, 139, that's the benchmark that shows us that this is an important piece of software, that it's needed and that it's wanted. The thing is, it jarred a lot with what sources were telling us, okay? Because they said that they were being strong armed by NHS leadership into going live on the platform so that the NHS could report on the success of the rollout.
B
So, hang on, just so I'm clear on this, Essentially they had to show that they logged in to the fdp,
C
they had to basically tick a few boxes in order to have what's called a live version of the FDP in their trust. But what they also said is that they don't use it.
B
They don't use.
C
Don't use it after all that, because it has no functionality. So we thought for a while about how we could evidence this and we ended up obtaining, under freedom of Information rules, the average weekly logins data for all the trusts that were supposedly live into a bunch of the most important apps that were on the FTP.
B
Okay?
C
And what we learned there is that of these 139 live trusts, actually usage was incredibly low. There were 54 trusts who hadn't even logged in to a single one of the eight apps that the NHS released data for.
B
Wow.
C
46 only logged into one of the eight apps that they were collecting data for. And what we saw is that only a very small minority of trusts were actually using kind of majority of the suite of tools that Palantir had built. And part of the reason for that is that different trusts are at different stages of their kind of digital journey. So some have really good systems and for them they would be downgrading to switch across to Palantir. So Lee's teaching hospital trust famously was ahead of the pack in private correspondence that was obtained under Freedom of Information. Leeds, teaching hospitals, NHS trusts, they said to the NHS England that they would actually lose functionality rather than gain it if they adopted Palantir's platform.
B
This is mind boggling. So according to your sources, Palantir built something that wasn't even as good as what some of the NHS already had in use. And Leeds wasn't the only trust that this was the case for. You also reported on Greater Manchester.
C
One really interesting point about Greater Manchester and the Care Board and this came up at Select Committee, is that not only do they match the functionality that Palantir have in terms of integrating information, but they say they can exceed it in ways that Palantir really can't hope to compete with. And that is because they have integrated GP data and they've integrated data from the local council. As it stands, Palantir doesn't really have the license, it's not within the terms of the contract to do that. It also doesn't have the social license to do that because they're not trusted. And this chap was telling the committee that they've worked for years in community to build that public trust that allows people to consent to sharing their records from their doctor and from their counsel. And so you're actually getting that full integrated picture for the first time, which
B
is what had been hoped for and needed the whole time.
C
That was the dream. Yeah.
B
But from Palantir's perspective, one could imagine that this giant tech company could say, well, hang on a second, we promised that we were going to speed up cancer diagnosis. We've built you an app just for that. And this is groundbreaking technology. And the fact that there's been this sort of refusenic attitude and taking it up, that's actually what's damaged the product.
C
One of the most interesting parts of the usage story is about this app called Cancer360. So Cancer360 brings together all the different bits of data that might be held about a cancer patient's journey, puts them in one place to make the clinician's diagnosis faster. Keir Starmer said it was groundbreaking technology. Louis Mosley bigged it up on X. And what we saw when we got the data, the usage data, is that only six trusts of the 139 that were live had bothered to log in even once in nine months. One of the reasons that clinicians are not using it, because our sources work in the health service and they use the FTP every day. It's been described to us as a glorified spreadsheet. Our source said, fine, if you don't know how to use Excel, this is probably going to be pretty useful. But for me, as someone who's worked in this field for decades, it doesn't change my clinical practice at all. And that kind of criticism is not confined to one app.
B
Lucas, what else did you find?
C
For a long time, NHS England has remained extremely upbeat and positive about the transformational benefits the FDP is having. One thing we did in our investigation is we managed to get sight of lots and lots of internal documents from within NHS England. And what they reveal for the first time is that at senior levels of leadership, they are acutely aware of all of the problems that that Palantir software has. They describe the software as slow and clunky. They admit it has a poor user experience within internal documents prepared for the leadership. They also acknowledge that Palantir system is actually up to 10 times slower at analyzing data than the current system they have in use.
B
But that's their whole cell.
C
Yeah. So it appears that we're paying for a downgrade. And what Palantir will say in response to this, and what they said to us is that you can't do a like for like comparison.
B
Right.
C
Because they have additional security measures embedded in the FDP and therefore it's not fair. Okay, but all I would point out is it wasn't us that was doing that comparison. This is NHS England saying it.
B
Lucas, as we found out last month, there are still ongoing concerns about Palantir's access to data. Can you tell me a bit more about that?
C
Yeah. So Palantir's line for a long time is that we're just a software company, we don't have access to the data, it's encrypted, we don't see identifiable patient information. And that's the NHS line too. It has emerged that Palantir have been given access, unlimited access to identifiable patient information in one specific context of the FTP.
B
Right.
C
And the Minister was forced to apologise for this last month in front of the Select Committee.
B
And what does that mean? What does that translate to, to the layperson listening to this?
C
Well, I think a lot of those early concerns that were dismissed as unjustified, it transpires they were justified.
B
And what did Palantir say both about that and what I imagine it considers the ongoing success of its product?
C
In a way, this is not a problem for Palantir. They haven't done anything wrong here in terms of this unlimited access to patient data that's on the nhs.
B
Right, Right.
C
They should not be granting them unlimited access. And so it's a mistake that the Minister had to apologize for. Palantir's line is, once again, we're just a software company. It's up to you how you use us.
B
And how have Palantir responded to your investigation?
C
When we went to Palantir with all of this information and right of reply, they came back and a spokesperson said to us, our software has helped to deliver 110,000 extra operations, that it's helped to deliver a 15% reduction in discharge delays and that it speeded up cancer diagnoses by 6.8%. Those three numbers were all familiar to me already because they're numbers that are published on NHS England's own website and that NHS England uses, it has a methodology to kind of measure the impact of the fdp. The thing is, very recently, last month, the NHS England actually had to admit that, that those statistics, they're not causational. They don't prove that Palantir's FDP is the reason why there's been 110,000 operations extra. They don't prove that Palantir is the reason there's a 15% discharge delay. It's basically a simple before and after and the other variables are not controlled for.
B
Coming up, will Andy Burnham get Palantir out of the nhs?
D
Today we'll attempt a feat once thought impossible. Overcoming high interest credit card debt. It requires merely one thing a SOFI personal loan. With it, you could save big on interest charges by consolidating into one. Low fixed rate monthly payment. Defy high interest debt with a SOFI personal loan. Visit sofi.com stunt to learn more. Loans originated by SoFi Bank NA member FDIC terms and conditions apply. NMLS 696891.
A
Christmas in July is back. Fresh pine, warm spice. All July Long save up to 20% on holiday fragrances, plus a free blanket with orders over $100.
C
No winter required.
A
Visit pura.com.
B
Lucas in your investigation, you and Peter set out to understand whether Palantir had delivered this promised digital revolution in the healthcare system. It sounds silly to ask now, but is it fair to conclude that it hasn't?
C
Having spoken to sources within the health service who have used the technology on a daily basis, it's just not delivering results. They describe it as a failure. We can see from the data there's very low usage and uptake and low functionality. So, yes, NHS England have been told from the very beginning that the software doesn't do the things it should. And I think the problem is, is that this product was sold to ministers and Palantir's influence operation targeted political decision makers and it doesn't reflect the technical needs of the health service.
B
And yet, despite all of this, the Starmer government were really pro Palantir's cause. They really seemed to champion it. And, you know, we had West Streeting, formerly Health Secretary, now Defence Secretary, claiming that the company was absolutely critical to the future of the nhs. Despite the anger, despite the embarrassingly low uptake, are there any signs that a Burnham government will do something different?
C
So, first of all, in the last three months, we've had two really influential parliamentary committees come out and say the NHS should use this thing called a break clause and basically pause its deal with Palantir before it will auto renews in February next year.
B
Right. So there's a deadline.
C
There's a deadline. And it's the first time any kind of parliamentary body has said, you should do this. We've got a new Health Minister, Yvette Cooper, Health Secretary rather. And my sources are broadly encouraged by the fact that Cooper is like a grown up, as somebody said Burnham himself, former Health Minister, at the same time, this big push around sovereign tech, the need for our tech to be British, because of the kind of risks of working with companies in the States who are very close to the Trump government. Go on. So I think there's a real chance that we could see that break clause activated. And by the way, if you want an example of a government walking away from a Palantir deal, Palantir. When Russia invaded Ukraine, they turned up at the Ministry of Housing and they offered their services for free.
B
So that's the UK Ministry of Housing and they were responsible at the time for managing this Homes for Ukraine scheme. But again, in a crisis.
C
Land and expand in a crisis. One year later, the deal's worth 4 million. Two years later, there's another 5.5 million on the top. The National Audit Office has a look and it says, that's not good value for money. And councils who use the software say, we don't like it. It's hard to use.
B
Right.
C
The mhclg, the Ministry didn't renew their Palantir deal while it was ongoing. They started developing an in house solution and then they just migrated off it into something in house and they blogged about it last month and they said, you know what? We've saved millions of pounds a year and it's easier to do our safeguarding checks and local councils prefer it.
B
So, Lukas, is there a credible chance that Palantir's days in the NHS are numbered?
C
The contract will renew in February 2027. Decisions about whether to work with another supplier will need to be taken well in advance of that. And realistically, early in this autumn will. So if we're going to see change from a Burnham government, they're going to need to be quite vocal and quite clear about that in kind of September, October, maybe November time quite fast.
B
Okay, Lucas, thank you so much for your reporting.
C
Thanks very much.
B
That was Lucas Arman. My thanks to him. Lucas colleague Peter Gagan wrote about this investigation in a Guardian piece titled I investigated Palantir's foothold in the British state and what I found should worry us all. You can read that@theguardian.com and that's it for today. This episode was presented by me, Noshi Nikbal. It was produced by Natalie Hatena. Sound design is by Ross Burns and the executive producer was Sammy Kent. We'll be back this afternoon with the latest and today in focus. We'll be back with you tomorrow morning.
A
This is the guardian.
E
Foreign.
D
Debt is one of the toughest opponents you'll face unless you power up with a SOFI personal loan. A SOFI personal loan could repackage your bad debt into one low fixed rate monthly payment. It's even got super speed since you could get the funds as soon as the same day you sign. Visit sofi.compower to learn more. That's s o f I.com p o w e r loans originated by SoFi bank and a member FDIC. Terms and conditions apply and MLS 696891 summer smells.
A
Like summer road trips, ocean breezes and long evenings under the stars. It's a feeling you want to hold on to restore your sense of place with Pura's new summer fragrance collection. We've captured the magic of the season in clean premium scents that transform your home into your favorite destination. Discover the art of Scentscap and bring the summer in. Visit Pur.com to explore the collection.
E
Most people don't realize how much of their personal information is being bought and sold every day. Data brokers are making billions, pulling details about you from public records and the Internet, then packaging and selling it, usually without your consent. That's how your information lands in the hands of scammers, spammers, even stalkers. It's why you get endless robocalls and why ads seem to follow you everywhere. That's where Aura comes in. Aura actively removes your data from broker sites and keeps it off. They also instantly alert you if your information shows up in a breach or on the dark Web. But Aura goes beyond data protection. With one app, you get a vpn, antivirus, password manager, spam call protection, Dark Web monitoring, and even up to $5 million in identity theft insurance, all backed by 24. 7 US based fraud support. Other companies might sell just credit monitoring or just a vpn. Aura gives you all of it together at the same price competitors charge for just one service. Start your free trial today@aura.com safety protect yourself now@aura.com safety.
Podcast: Today in Focus (The Guardian)
Air Date: July 27, 2026
Host: Nosheen Iqbal
Guest: Lucas Amin, Investigative Journalist
This episode explores how Palantir, a US tech company once infamous for surveillance and military contracts, became deeply embedded in the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), winning a major contract to modernize NHS data systems. Investigative journalist Lucas Amin shares insights from his investigation into Palantir’s strategies, the influence campaign that helped secure the NHS deal, the technical and social fallout, and questions over whether the promised digital revolution has materialized.
Palantir hired high-powered consultants and lobbyists, including Peter Mandelson’s Global Counsel, with a £30k monthly retainer, to infiltrate UK government and NHS circles (06:14).
They strategically poached senior NHS staff, and hired Isaac Levido, a prominent Conservative campaign strategist, and Louis Mosley, a highly connected former Conservative councillor and descendant of Oswald Mosley (noted, with political lineage clarified at 08:54).
Sophisticated lobbying took advantage of lax UK lobbying laws, enabling off-record networking and influence without the need for transparency (06:38).
“If at some point you have to register this meeting, it means you’ve massively fucked up.”
— Former Global Counsel source, quoted by Nosheen Iqbal (07:13)
Past UK governments failed at centralizing health data (e.g., Tony Blair’s £12bn initiative, care.data); public trust was eroded due to data misuse (15:07).
Initial roll-out: In May 2024, key NHS data professionals were summoned to Palantir’s HQ, signed NDAs, and were pressured to adopt the FDP. Practitioners criticized the platform as inferior to existing systems (01:35–03:26).
“Somebody stood up and said … ‘this looks absolutely rubbish and that we’re already doing a lot of these things, and we don’t understand why we need to migrate from a system that works to one that actually looks like it's, in some cases, inferior.’”
— Lucas Amin, recounting the meeting (03:03)
Despite claims that 139 trusts were “live”, usage data showed most did not actually use the new apps; some never even logged in (18:23).
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust, for example, told NHS England they would “lose functionality” by adopting Palantir (19:23).
"Of these 139 live trusts, … 54 trusts hadn’t even logged in to a single one of the eight apps."
— Lucas Amin (18:28)
In several regions, local NHS-developed data platforms were judged more effective than Palantir’s, especially due to better integration with GP/local data and higher public trust (19:38).
Palantir’s Cancer360, touted to speed up cancer diagnosis, was used by only 6 of 139 trusts in 9 months (20:54).
Many clinicians describe FDP tools as “a glorified spreadsheet.”
“It’s been described to us as a glorified spreadsheet. Our source said, fine, if you don’t know how to use Excel, this is probably going to be pretty useful. But for me … it doesn’t change my clinical practice at all.”
— Lucas Amin (21:32)
Internal NHS England documents (unreported publicly until now) show senior officials knew the software was “slow and clunky,” offered poor user experience, and was up to 10 times slower at data analysis than some existing systems (21:54).
Contrary to official statements, it emerged that Palantir was granted unlimited access to identifiable patient data in certain contexts; the government was forced to apologize (23:16).
“It has emerged that Palantir have been given unlimited access to identifiable patient information in one specific context … the Minister was forced to apologise for this last month in front of the Select Committee.”
— Lucas Amin (23:38)
Palantir and NHS England insist Palantir is only “the software company”; actual data governance is NHS’s responsibility (24:09).
Despite low uptake, the Starmer government championed Palantir’s role. Two recent parliamentary committees have recommended using a break clause to pause or terminate the contract before it auto-renews in February 2027 (27:56–28:12).
There is now appetite to revisit the reliance on US tech firms and consider “sovereign tech” solutions, increasing chances Palantir may be replaced (28:33).
“There’s a real chance we could see that break clause activated.”
— Lucas Amin (28:33)
A case is cited from the Ministry of Housing, where a Palantir contract was not renewed because an in-house system was cheaper and better liked (29:22).
Amin’s sources report the promised revolution failed to appear: functionality is actually reduced for many; usage remains low; and NHS England has been aware of these issues from the start (26:57).
“Having spoken to sources within the health service ... it’s just not delivering results. They describe it as a failure.”
— Lucas Amin (26:57)
The future of Palantir in the NHS is now politically charged, with major decisions looming by Autumn 2026 (29:49).
The conversation balanced investigative skepticism with care for technical and social nuance. Amin's tone was direct and clear, but always rooted in evidence and first-hand reporting. Iqbal, as host, pressed for clarity and context, grounding the discussion in the stakes for patients, clinicians, and public trust.
Despite Palantir’s high-profile contract and promises, this investigation uncovers a story of influence, questionable procurement, technical underperformance, low adoption by clinicians, and governance problems. As the contract’s break clause deadline approaches, the NHS and the government must decide whether to replace Palantir and return to homegrown solutions, closing a chapter on one of the most controversial public tech deals in modern British history.