Truth in the Barrel – Episode Summary

Episode Title: Devil's Cut | Foreign Policy Under Trump/Hegseth
Hosts: Amy McGrath & Denver Riggleman
Guest: Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution
Date: October 7, 2025

Episode Overview

This “Devil’s Cut” edition explores the evolution and effectiveness of U.S. defense strategy from the nation’s founding through today, focusing on the Trump/Hegseth approach to foreign policy and national security. Military veteran and co-host Amy McGrath interviews Michael O’Hanlon, renowned defense expert and her former professor, to dissect historical trends, the difference between grand and defense strategy, the impact of recent wars, shifts under current leadership, and the critical importance of preserving democratic values and strong alliances.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Framing the History of U.S. Defense Strategy

[02:05 – 04:50]

• Theme of O’Hanlon’s New Book (“To Dare Mighty Things: U.S. Defense Strategy Since the Revolution”):

  • The U.S. has historically been "assertive" in military and defense arenas, challenging myths of historic isolationism.
  • Early American actions weren’t always virtuous (e.g., territorial expansions at others’ expense), but the U.S. has consistently sought new ventures, “usually doing net good... but not always getting it right.”
  • Quote (O’Hanlon, 03:44):
    “We have dared mighty things. We have been assertive... not always doing that good and certainly not always getting it right.”

• Grand Strategy vs. Defense Strategy:

  • Grand strategy defines broad goals and theory (e.g., “containment” in the Cold War).
  • Defense strategy involves implementation: troop placement, alliances, operational decisions.
  • Quote (O’Hanlon, 05:56):
    “The containment idea was the right big idea, but it was not anything close to an implementation strategy... Implementation was defense strategy.”

2. Success & Failure: Grand Strategy Versus Defense Strategy

[07:03 – 10:39]

• Since WWII, grand strategy (allies, open trade, resisting aggression) has worked well overall.
• U.S. defense strategy has struggled—especially in unwinnable or extremely complex wars (Vietnam, Afghanistan), usually not from military incompetence but from overambitious or mismatched missions.
• Despite failures, the world avoided great-power conflict, saw democracy expand, and maintained global stability for trade and development.
• Quote (O’Hanlon, 09:11):
  “We have lost two wars—Vietnam and Afghanistan—in the sense that the side we were fighting wound up in power... And yet... the world has remained devoid of great power war, knock on wood, democracies have stabilized... it’s still a much better world than before.”

3. Peacetime vs. Wartime Defense Strategies

[10:39 – 14:12]

• U.S. is generally more successful with peacetime defense strategies: deterring big wars, managing small interventions.
• Wartime strategy often stumbles at the outset, but advantages in geography, resources, and industrial base help America recover.
• Modern peacetime defense should focus on deterring conflict, especially nuclear conflict, not just preparing to “win.”
• Quote (O’Hanlon, 13:30):
  “The purpose of our military... must be to prevent war, not to win it... In a nuclear exchange, it’s going to be pretty hard to identify a winner.”

4. Critical Case Study: Between the Wars and Strategic Isolationism

[14:12 – 16:29]

• The interwar period (1920s-1930s) saw true “quasi-isolationism,” but military planners innovated—U.S. Navy developed carrier/amphibious warfare that would prove decisive in WWII.
• Grand strategy was lacking, but defense strategists laid groundwork for future successes.
• Quote (O’Hanlon, 16:04):
  “Grand strategy in that period was poor. Defense strategy was developing... and technologies that got us prepared for World War II...”

5. Trump/Hegseth Era: Alliance Management and Military Ethos

[16:29 – 22:24]

• Mixed review of Trump administration:

  • Criticism over trade and some foreign policy disruptions.
  • Some hope: renewed but turbulent commitments to NATO and Asian alliances, high-profile visits by President Trump and Secretary Hegseth.
  • Quote (O’Hanlon, 17:25):
    “I do not support much of President Trump’s foreign policy... But I am encouraged... he wound up taking credit for pushing European allies to do more... and started to view NATO as something he believed in more than he had before.”

• Responding to the claim “America doesn’t know how to win wars anymore”—O’Hanlon rejects this as false, attributing recent failures to the impossibility of the missions themselves, not a lack of warrior ethos.

  • Cites Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), counter-ISIS campaign, Kosovo (1999) as examples of modern military success on their own terms.
  • Quote (O’Hanlon, 19:31):
    “I strongly disagree... I see a very tough, gritty warrior culture... the technical, tactical fighting ability, the lethality, the ability to win was there for all to see.”
  • McGrath underscores:
    “The military has always been lethal. We've never had a problem with that. But lethality doesn’t equal winning the politics of a war in the modern era.” [22:24]

6. Military in Domestic Policing and Democratic Norms

[23:49 – 28:51]

• Use of the National Guard and active-duty military for domestic policing under current leadership is concerning but not yet “alarming.”
• Key worry: erosion of public–military trust, especially if the military is drawn into controversial policing or repressive tactics.
• Press restrictions by the Pentagon and blurred lines in anti-drug operations (e.g., military attacks on “narco terrorists” at sea) raise red flags for democratic accountability.
  • O’Hanlon: supporter of urgent anti-fentanyl action but suggests arrests (for intelligence and humanitarian reasons) over lethal operations.
  • Quote (O’Hanlon, 28:28):
    “You get more intelligence when you detain and interrogate... I don't really like the idea of executing people first and then proving their guilt later.”

7. The Elements of National Power & the Health of American Democracy

[30:38 – 36:08]

• McGrath recalls O’Hanlon’s teaching: national power isn’t just military—it’s economic strength, energy, population, geography, and political values.
• From the early 2010s “bullish” outlook to increased student and national worry in recent years—rooted mostly in internal division and erosion of democratic confidence, not hard power.
• O’Hanlon remains optimistic about U.S. fundamentals but is most concerned about democratic backsliding, polarization, and the erosion of the American dream.
  • Quote (O’Hanlon, 35:24):
    “I think our technological, military, economic underpinnings... are still pretty solid. I wouldn't trade them for any other country's fundamentals. But I'm worried about our democracy and about our society.”
• McGrath stresses the importance of civic engagement and healthy democracy for sustaining world peace and alliances.
  • Quote (McGrath, 36:08):
    “If America isn't strong, if democracy at home starts to fray, the grand strategy that kept the peace since WWII falls apart.”

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On America’s Defense Character:
  “We have dared mighty things. We have been assertive... not always getting it right.” (O’Hanlon, 03:44)
• On Grand vs. Defense Strategy:
  “The containment idea was the right big idea, but it was not anything close to an implementation strategy... Implementation was defense strategy.” (O’Hanlon, 05:56)
• On Preventing Nuclear War:
  “The purpose of our military in dealing with other great powers that are nuclear armed must be to prevent war, not to win it.” (O’Hanlon, 13:30)
• On Military Professionalism:
  “The military has always been lethal. We've never had a problem with that. But lethality doesn’t equal winning the politics of a war in the modern era.” (McGrath, 22:24)
• On Domestic Use of the Military:
  “You get more intelligence when you detain and interrogate... I don't really like the idea of executing people first and then proving their guilt later.” (O’Hanlon, 28:28)
• On National Health:
  “But I'm worried about our democracy and about our society.” (O’Hanlon, 35:24)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• 02:05 – Intro to O’Hanlon’s book & thesis of American assertiveness
• 05:26 – Grand strategy vs. defense strategy—explained
• 08:04 – Evaluation of U.S. grand strategy success post-WWII
• 10:39 – Peacetime vs. wartime defense strategy distinction
• 14:12 – The failures of the interwar era; prepping for WWII
• 16:29 – Trump/Hegseth approach and current global alliances
• 19:31 – Rebuttal to “America can’t win wars” and recent examples
• 22:24 – On political aspects of military success
• 23:49 – Domestic military policing and civil-military trust
• 28:51 – U.S. military in anti-drug operations; intelligence vs. lethality
• 30:38 – Assessing national power: then vs. now
• 36:08 – The fragility of American democracy and call to civic engagement

Tone & Atmosphere

Expert, candid, and deeply respectful; both guest and host ground the discussion in historical perspective, academic rigor, and real-world military experience. The tone is serious but accessible, balancing optimism about U.S. strengths with grave concern for democratic backsliding and the perils of domestic division.

Episode Takeaway

The strength and future role of America are inseparable from its democratic vitality and alliances. Military effectiveness has not waned, but matching mission to capability—and aligning political leadership with democratic principles—remains as important as ever. O’Hanlon and McGrath urge listeners to stay engaged at home, noting, as McGrath says, “If democracy at home starts to fray, the grand strategy that kept the peace since WWII falls apart.”

Recommended Reading:
To Dare Mighty Things: U.S. Defense Strategy Since the Revolution by Michael O’Hanlon (Out January, 2026)