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Adelie Pojman Ponte
The telegraph.
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David Knowles
I'm Adelie Pojman Ponte and this is Ukraine. The latest today, as Donald Trump calls President Zelenskyy a dictator, we look at the conundrum facing to speak out and risk fraying American support or to stay quiet and not articulate their sense of betrayal. Later we talk about the strategic options available and dive deeper into the British plans of putting boots on the ground.
Adelie Pojman Ponte
Bravery takes you through the most unimaginable hardships to finally reward you with victory.
Francis Farrell
It's the worst carnage that this world has seen since World War II. Absolutely fascinating.
Adelie Pojman Ponte
We are with you not just today or tomorrow, but for 100 years. Nobody's going to break us. We are strong.
David Knowles
We are Ukraine is it's Thursday the 20th of February. Two years and 360 days since the full scale invasion began. Today I'm joined by executive editor for audio Francis Darnley and former tank commander and chemical weapons expert Hamish de Bretton Gordon. Later you'll hear from Francis Farrell from the Kyiv Independent. He has just spent an extended period of Time on the front lines. But first, over to Francis for the military and political updates.
Francis Darnley
Well, thanks very much, Adli. We left you yesterday with the reaction to President Trump's remarks which suggested President Zelensky was in some way responsible for the war. Zelensky and many European allies criticized those claims, which triggered the following salvo from the US President on social media. 1 I think that is worth quoting in full. Think of it. A modestly successful comedian, Volodymyr Zelenskyy talked the United States of America into spending $350 billion to go into a war that couldn't be won, that never had to start, but a war that he without the US And Trump will never be able to settle. The United states has spent $200 billion more than Europe, and Europe's money is guaranteed, while the United States will get nothing back. Why didn't sleepy Joe Biden demand equalization in that this war is far more important to Europe than it is to us? We have a big beautiful ocean, a separation. On top of this, Zelenskyy admits that half of the money we sent him is missing. That's not accurate, by the way. He refuses to have elections. It is very low in Ukrainian polls, and the only thing he was good at was playing Biden like a fiddle as we spoke about yesterday. That point about the polls is also factually inaccurate. A dictator without elections. Zelenskyy better move fast. He is not going to have a country left. In the meantime, we are successfully negotiating an end to the war with Russia, something all admit only Trump and the Trump administration can do. Biden never tried. Europe has failed to bring peace, and Zelensky probably wants to keep the gravy train going. I love Ukraine, but Zelensky has done a terrible job. His country is shattered and millions have unnecessarily died. And so it continues. Shortly afterwards, Trump said that he would probably meet Putin before the end of the month. Now calling Zelensky a dictator has triggered almost as much of a backlash among Western allies as the phone call between Trump and Putin did a week ago. Many, notably former individuals sympathetic for Trump and his project, have spoken out, and that includes, by the way, quite senior Republicans like Nikki Haley in Europe. Keir Starmer, the British prime minister, was one of the first to break cover with Downing street spokesperson yesterday, saying that the prime minister expressed his support for President Zelensky as Ukraine's democratically elected leader and said that it was perfectly reasonable to suspend elections during wartime, as the UK did during World War II. The Prime Minister reiterated his support for the US led efforts to get a lasting peace in Ukraine that deterred Russia from any future aggression. Now, Trump's outburst makes things difficult for Starmer, who in recent days has attempted to position himself as a bridge between the US and Europe, a role British prime ministers have often attempted to play, with varied success. Now, US Vice President J.D. vance was also quick to criticise Zelenskyy, saying, and I quote, the idea that he's going to litigate his disagreements with the president in the public square. This is not a good way to deal with President Trump. Of course the Ukrainians are going to have their perspective. The way to surface that is in a private discussion with American diplomats. He's attacking the only reason this country exists publicly right now, and it's disgraceful and it's not something that's going to move the president of the United States. In fact, it's going to have the opposite effect. Now, many have pointed out the apparent hypocrisy in that statement, but others have emphasized the fact that there is an uncomfortable truth at the heart of what Vance says. As the analyst Jessica Berlin writes on X Dear Europe, this is exactly what I and other Americans have been warning you about. Criticizing Trump just makes him lash out more. It is exactly the wrong strategy for dealing with him. Moral outrage is not a strategy if you don't know how to react to him. Ask American allies for comm support. Only two things matter in this white power and a win for the boss. Now, the way Putin has won around Trump, one can see the essential truth to that statement. European leaders, therefore, face a real moral dilemma. But outside of the question of how they handle Trump is the question of what they can do now for Ukraine's and their own security. The sense of urgency is captured in the following remarks by the Prime Minister of Does the world look uneasy? Yes, it is. Is there reason to believe it will be over soon? There is one message for my chief of buy, buy, buy. If we can't get the best equipment, buy the next best. There's only one thing that counts now, and that is speed. It's curious that more isn't being talked about about the most obvious thing that can be done to actually seize the $300 billion in Russian sovereign assets that the west has frozen, perhaps before Trump tries to surrender them. That would immediately give Europe leverage in negotiations. Indeed, that is a critical question here, not being discussed enough. Unless Europe acts in its own interests first before a US Russia deal is put forward, then the options it has now might soon be removed from it including military. Now, allegedly it is the European Central bank who have objected strongly to the move on seizing the Russian sovereign assets, which of course they will, because they're not politicians, they're economists. And so anything which can disrupt markets and the free throw of capital is almost certainly going to be analyzed by them as a bad thing. Ultimately, anyone who fears for Western assets invested in Russia and the idea that Moscow will then seize them if the west does make a move like this needs to see that Moscow would most likely do that anyway, if they really needed to. Now we'll be continuing to monitor the developments throughout today and over the weekend. Do as ever check out our live blog on our website. But before I just wrap up on politics, there are a couple of things I think it is worth diving a little bit deeper into. The first is to return again to this question of Zelenskyy's popularity and constitutional legitimacy following Trump's attacks. I mentioned yesterday that Zelenskyy's popularity has seen an increase since his response to Trump's demands, an increase of 5 percentage points since December, according to a survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Remember too, that two Ukrainian opposition leaders, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, both who dislike Zelenskyy, have publicly supported him, said his term prologation is a limit is legit until the end of the war and said elections are impossible now until there kind of ceasefire. As friend of the podcast Jimmy Rushton writes from Kyiv, if there were Ukrainian elections tomorrow, Zelensky would probably win. If he didn't, someone equally hawkish, that is Zaluzhny would Russia's real aim is to force Ukraine to suspend martial law, which would massively destabilize the country at a crucial time to Moscow's benefit. And as Professor Timothy Snyder, the Ukrainian historian, points out, if Trump wants to see elections in Ukraine, all he has to do is use the power he keeps talking about to get the Russian invaders off Ukrainian soil. Then martial law in Ukraine ends and elections will follow. I think it is just worth reflecting a moment to stress too, the impact that all of this is having on the United States reputation. As Shashank Yoshi, the defence editor of the Economist, quizzed yesterday, does anyone think that this president would actually honour Article 5? Presence of US military and nuclear sharing still has value to Europe, but its deterrent value is significantly reduced and falling. This is reckless, dangerous behavior by the Trump administration. As each day goes by, the anger, as I say, is growing here in Europe and beyond, something that will not be a positive for the US itself in the long term. Some of you have written in Talking about boycotting U.S. businesses in European countries, which I only mentioned to underscore the strength of feeling for our American listeners. Others are calling for greater scrutiny of Trump's business interests with Russia, something I know the author Craig Unger, has explored arguing that the president was bailed out repeatedly by Russian oligarchs over his career. Now, former counsellor in the United States Department of State Professor Elliot Cohen, who we hope to have back on the podcast again soon, has written a stinging piece in the Atlantic where he says, and I quote, the Trump administration seems to have some notion of the conduct of foreign affairs as being a set of deals chiefly with America's enemies, while administrating kicks to America's friends and its allies as a vision, it is, in some reasonable sense of the word, evil. It is also appallingly dumb, and one wonders that intelligent men such as Rubio, Waltz and Witkoff can bring themselves to articulate the demands that it impl. These policies will give aid and comfort to America's enemies, which will never be partners, shatter the alliances that have made us strong, induce fearful former allies to align with the Chinese and develop nuclear weapons and demoralise the men and women who have to implement this policy. People like Rubio know better. The level of sycophancy they show towards the president is shocking, but it conceals another source of future disaster in this administration. No one will contradict the president and no one will raise alarms about stupid and immoral policies. It's a good way to walk into brick walls in foreign affairs, as it is with regards to all manner of other policies. I knew a few of those who served in Trump's previous term. Many of them ended up psychologically damaged, people who had no doubt once believed in integrity and an idea of America and then sacrifice them. History will treat them with contempt and more important, they will never be whole again. Professor Cohen there, and we'll link to that piece in the show Notes to quote somebody else for years to come, there are many people on the right that are going to have to explain and justify how they fell into this trap of supporting Donald Trump, because this is not going to end well. The person who said those remarks won, Marco Rubio in 2016. But just to end with a reminder that for all of Russia's talk of wanting peace, its attacks continue across the front and in the air. It's been a little bit reduced on the latter in the past 24 hours, but Putin bragged yesterday that he was about to put thousands of more troops, especially in Kursk, back into the fray. Lest we forget, Ukraine still holds Russian territory. Ukraine's General Staff has refuted those claims that Russian troops have launched an offensive into Ukraine from Kursk, something which was widely claimed on Russian media yesterday. In fact, it seems that the only real movement on the front lines was Ukrainian forces advancing northeast of Kharkiv. So that's where we are, Adelaide, as we approach the third anniversary of the war on Monday. These are truly, truly historic times.
Hamish de Bretton Gordon
Thank you, Francis. What a compelling update you just gave us. And now I turn to our friend Hamish de Breton. Gordon. Hamish, good afternoon and thank you for joining us today.
Adelie Pojman Ponte
Thanks very much for having me, Adelaide. It's great to be back. I've been in the Middle east the last week. It's been interesting to watch things develop from sort of that area in perspective.
Hamish de Bretton Gordon
Yesterday, Francis was talking about potential plans which would see British troops on the ground. Can you tell us, Hamish, what your reaction are to this and what are some of the critiques that have been made of these proposals?
Adelie Pojman Ponte
Absolutely. And I don't want to repeat anything that Francis said yesterday, but I think it's very important to try and unpack some of this. Only earlier on today, and I think reported in the paper, we've had the reaction from the Kremlin to the potential of British and European troops being on the ground in Ukraine. And Peskov, sort of mouthpiece for Putin of not unsurprisingly, is deriding it and saying that there can't be European troops on the ground in Ukraine. Now, obviously, he is alluding to the fact that this would potentially create a trigger for Article 5, which you've been talking about. The big question that many people are asking is, is Article 5 today the same as it was yesterday from all that we've heard from Trump, would the Americans or would Trump rather. I'd like to separate what Trump is saying from perhaps what the American people are thinking. Would Trump trigger American forces on an Article 5 type basis if European troops are attacked in Ukraine? I think at the moment that is fairly doubtful. The importance of having British and European troops on the ground. Conversely, of course, is because the Article 5 thing, any force that is on the ground needs to have the conventional heft, the conventional grunt, to deter Putin, really, from threatening Ukraine once there is a ceasefire in place. And of course, you know, my view and lots of people's views, is that when Putin looked west on the 24th of February, 2022, very nearly three years ago, he didn't see a conventional force that he was concerned about. And again, we've discussed Putin reacts to strength and exploits weakness. But when it comes onto the sort of peace enforcement plan and policing any ceasefire, there seems to be a few plans around at the moment. Of course, the seven European countries met, this is where they discuss potential plans. And it would appear fairly strong view that Britain is offering to be a framework nation here for any forces on the ground. Today there's talk about European troops being on the ground to protect national infrastructure, which is sort of a new one to me, sort of makes sense. But they talk about particularly nuclear power stations, those sort of things which would infer a lot of anti aircraft type capabilities, air defence weapons if you like, to prevent any attacks on that critical infrastructure. I think hitherto we've looked at a more conventional type of peace enforcement for force, perhaps based around the jfc. It would appear that the main contributing nations at the moment would likely be the United Kingdom, France and the Nordic countries. And that sort of makes a lot of sense. Now also the vibe at the moment certainly in this country is about how, you know, whether we've got the force to do this. Lots of talk about conscription. I've just been on Channel 5 Jeremy vine lunchtime TV program talking about conscription and I'll come back to that because I think it's more clickbait than actual reality. And I know that Francis discussed yesterday and also the RUSI view of any force structures that would be involved and we're hearing lots of different figures and numbers are quite important here because the key thing about any peace enforcement force, peacekeeping force that is put into Ukraine, there are a couple of things here. First, it must endure. So the planning must be that it's going to be there for, let's say, two or three years. You know, it's going to be more than one year and hopefully less than three or four years. Two or three years. Now, an enduring force, the way that military construct goes, means that if for instance, you have a force on the ground of 50,000 troops, you actually need 150,000. Because the way that NATO deployments go is generally troops are deployed for six months at a time on these type of operational tours. So you need to have a force that is training and ready to go to replace the in place force, if you like. And once that in place force leaves, it needs six months of recuperation before it gets back on this cycle. So any numbers that are talking about, you need to basically triple them. So when it comes to the uk, there's lots of discussion about what size force UK could generate and a lot of quotes are purely about the army soldiers. But of course the British military is far more than just an army. We have a navy and an air force too. And they would all be involved, perhaps to a lesser extent, but I'll come back to that. But when we look at the figures that might be involved here, lots of people are talking about a British brigade which again the numbers and the size do vary a little bit. I think when Rusi was unpacking this, the Talk was about 20,000 British troops, which if you use the times three ratio that's 60,000. But actually the way these things work, although we have 70,000 soldiers, there are not 70,000 soldiers who are deployable on an operation like this. For a whole host of reasons, they're probably only about 50,000. Therefore in theory the UK couldn't sustain a force of 20,000 troops. But if it's based on a brigade framework, which is sort of likely, it's likely to be less than that. So what I'm saying here is the talk is of a force likely to be about 30,000 and it will be a mixture of infantry, soldiers, tanks, artillery, anti aircraft, air defence, drones and then supported by air air power. And I'll come back to that. So my view is, I suppose slightly different from RISI. If this structure is led by the UK as a framework nation of about 15,000 troops, it is probably sustainable. However, I'll just bring in here my point about conscription. I think conscription is a bit click based at the moment and it creates so many issues. I don't think conscription is something that the young, the Gen Z. There's also a report out Yesterday that only 11% of Gen Z would actually fight for Britain and turn up. I think that that is completely wrong. You know, my children at Gen Z and you know, all the people I know around them, you know, I'm sure wouldn't hesitate. And I think Gen Z, as they did in the First World War and the Second World War, if the requirement is there, they will turn up. But I say conscription is a bit of clickbait at the moment. A lot of people probably won't know we've got about 100,000 reservists, people like me who have served, people like Dom who have served. We're trained, we're experienced, actually we could be mobilized to fill any gaps because even a force of 15,000 that Britain would put there, a lot of those regiments and battalions will be shorter people. And the easiest and best way to bring them up to their right levels is to mobilise reserves, which does happen. It happened when we were in Iraq, it happened in Afghanistan, and certainly when I commanded the Royal Tank Regiment, we enter on deployments, we would probably have about 10 or 15% of reservists. So I am putting the conscription discussion really to bed, because I think that's where it should be. Just a final piece on this and I don't want to drone on too long and cover too much gran, but I do think a British force of 15,000 as a framework nation, however, it's absolutely crucial that these forces have significant intelligence assets to support them. I'm talking about satellite intelligence, signals intelligence, I'm talking about drones and aircraft and the like. You need those to see what's happening on the battlefield, to trigger any force that needs to go to settle down any incursion or to step up defense. If missiles and drones are fired at critical national infrastructure, that needs to be protected as well. And I think the final bit to this is the air power bit. Whatever Trump is saying, and I might give my own view and final thoughts on what I think he's saying, to make this force credible and endurable, there is going to be significant air power needed to back it up. Now, whether the NATO countries that are going to be part of this force have the heft to do that, I'm not sure. Of course, the one country that does have the heft is the us. And if the prid quote probe everything Trump is saying and them shifting themselves psychologically back the other side of the pond is that the US air power is still there as a backstop, then so be it, therefore things will be achievable. Adli, that's my take on the peace enforcement side. It undoubtedly will develop the final thing. It's not going to happen overnight, you know, from flash to bang. Once it's decided, it will take a few weeks for recce teams to get on the ground. I would say there will be a hell of a lot of planning going on at the moment. People in Whitehall, the Minister of Defence in the Elyse palace in the French Ministry of Defence and the Nordic, they will be working, burning the midnight oil to get all the fine detail ready, all the logistics and everything else to make sure that this can happen. But it will stay weeks, a few months to get it set up and effective. So that's why I think it's important that a decision is made soon so that certainly by mid summer, this Force will be in place if a peace deal is done relatively quickly, but it just won't happen overnight over.
Francis Darnley
Well, thanks for that, Hamish. I've got a question, if I may. I mean, of course, it's a big if. If there is some kind of deal that's put forward or in whether these forces would actually need to be put on the ground as some kind of precursor to a very bad deal being presented to President Zelenskyy and to the allied nations. But my question, Hamish, is, of course, we heard from Danielle Sheridan yesterday on the podcast version. She was talking to British troops. They were saying they were ready. They were engaged in NATO exercises in Romania, of course, on the Ukrainian bo. A clear statement there. But what's your view on Europe more broadly here? Because Britain might be ready to act, but it can't act alone. So it would need, surely, other countries. It would need countries from perhaps Jeff and the Baltics. It would also potentially need France. I just wonder what, in your view, coalition is the minimal required to make this viable?
Adelie Pojman Ponte
Yeah, absolutely, Francis, very good point there. I would say, as Daniel has visited the exercise in Romania and all the right noise is coming out. Yeah, they're ready. And of course, you know, British troops are always ready to go and march to the sound of the drums, as it were. I'm pretty sure that the French would also be ready. We've done an awful lot of interoperability training and work with the French over the years, and similarly the Nordic nations as well, particularly the Swedes, and more laterally, the Finns. So the talk was it was probably going to be based around those four nations, and the interoperability people will be saying, well, Sweden and Finland are new NATO countries, but actually they have been training with NATO for a very long time, which has made their integration that much easier. Of course, I think people would like to see the Germans and the Italians and others to be more involved, but, you know, the mood music coming out of their governments is perhaps they'd prefer to stay back and hold the coats, as it were. So, a long answer to your question, Francis. I think people would be pretty ready. I mean, we've been doing these NATO exercises for a long, long time. Admittedly, you have to go back to Bosnia and Kosovo at the end of the 90s when we last had a sort of peace enforcement mission on this sort of scale. It worked pretty well then. And everything I'm hearing, I'd be relatively confident that actually this force could be effective in place in a couple of months. There would still need to be a bit of what we call pre deployment training happening, which in effect in a sort of way is that's what's going on at Romania at the moment. But I think NATO has been preparing this almost since the 24th of February 2022. So I think we'll see a pretty slick operation and a pretty well drilled force that goes in, as you say, hopefully sooner rather than later. It won't go through unless the Ukrainians sort of agree with it because there is no way that a European force could operate in Ukraine without the full support and help of the Ukrainians anyway. So in sum, I'm pretty confident that it will be able to operate in a couple of months pretty effectively.
Francis Darnley
Just one final question before I hand back to Adli Hamish. I completely agree that there is possibilities here, plenty of possibilities, if it happens under the umbrella of NATO. But of course the concern is, is that what if the United States, as part of NATO, vetoes a NATO action at all, you know, as part of a, a peace settlement of some kind, that they, they say, no, you can't have any troops on the ground. And Europe says, well, actually we need to have troops on the ground if you're, you know, not good willing to provide air support and ARM Ukraine, etc. Etc. So my question is, do you think that it is possible for those operations that you've been describing, NATO operations, which was all coordinated by NATO high command, whether it is possible to transfer that training easily into other coalitions, so non NATO combat coalitions, like for example, Jeff, is it easily transferable or are we talking about something here that really it would almost be like starting from, from ground zero?
Adelie Pojman Ponte
Well, I mean, you ask a fantastic question there, Francis, and I'm sure it's, it's, you know, it's one that's buzzing around the mods in Europe. There is theory in practice here. In practice, one could see a European coalition operation, you know, happening. I mean, it's, you know, the standard operating procedures are the same. There is no reason why, you know, the Brits, the French and the others can't operate together. We spe common military language and we've all trained together. Hitherto, it's been the US Glue that has sort of held everything together. If Trump said, no, you can't deploy troops on the ground in Ukraine, then we're in a really, really difficult position. You can't have a viable peace enforcement force keeping the Russians out of Ukraine without European troops on the ground. So I think this is the absolutely worst case scenario that you're painting here. No doubt contingency planning will go in for that. The question, I suppose is could this force operate without the heft of the US military? Well, it might have to. Particularly those who seem to be in the Kremlin's pocket rather than others are saying, well, without the US there's no nuclear deterrent. Well, that is wrong. Of course. Britain and France have a nuclear capability that can be operated independently, as it were. And despite the fact that it's vastly inferior to the Russian capability, Putin and his lot are well aware that, you know, there's enough capability there to wipe Russia out, as, of course, Russia has the capability the other way. So worst case scenario, there will be planning for it in practice. And in theory we could operate without the Americans, but in reality, would we, would we be able to do that? I mean, it's a massive question and that's why I think it's so difficult. Trump is almost acting in a childlike way. And when you're dealing with grand strategic issues where so many thousands of lives at stake, when you're trying to negotiate with a child, it's pretty, pretty difficult and challenging. We just hope that there are steady hands behind some of the key players at the moment to make sure actually we can come to some sort of agreeable peace and can produce a force that will be able to make sure that that piece holds.
David Knowles
Thanks, Hamish.
Hamish de Bretton Gordon
I also have a follow up question. I'm sorry, because you wanted to put the conscription debate to bed and said it was clickbaity, but I actually have something to ask about that. I don't actually know what the status of the debate is in the UK about a national military service, a mandatory military service. It's something that no longer exists in France, but that has come back regularly in the public national conversation. Whether we should have that back. Some sort of like Macron has implemented a couple of years ago and for two years something that he called the universal national service, which is not frankly military training, but some sort of kind of nationalistic training for everyone around the age of 18? Obviously, some countries in Europe do have mandatory military training. My question is twofold. One, what's the status in the UK around that debate? And also, do you think that could be reignited alongside the conversation around conscription and with the prospect of sending troops to Ukraine for Europe's defence?
Adelie Pojman Ponte
Adli, really good question there. My sort of putting it to bed was very much just numbers games within the current British military. But you're absolutely right. I mean, this, you know, national service in the UK, I think, ended in the, in, in the 60s in various times, a bit like France. It's come back and there was a big push to reintroduce national service when, when unemployment was very high. It's always been an issue that the, the military, the British military have always opposed because actually, if you've got lots of unwilling volunteers being, you know, in inverted commas, then that, that chews up so much military manpower that it negates the reason for sort of doing it. But when you come on to the, you know, the threat environment we are at the moment, and the Finns and the Swedes have, have what I think is a really great national service. And for them it's seen as a really positive and good thing to do. And I think the debate in the UK is, is more around, you know, if we get involved in a, another European war fighting conflict where the conscription would be required to keep our forces topped up. Absolutely would do. In the first and second World War, I think there's no great strong desire in this country for national service. I think if push came to shove, people would join the military and fight for this country if the country's future was at stake. But actually going back to the days of national service, I can't see it. I personally think it would be a pretty good idea, but I'm an old soldier and my views are probably best kept to myself on this particular subject.
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David Knowles
Yesterday, Francis spoke again to Francis Farrell of the Kyiv Independent.
Hamish de Bretton Gordon
He's just returned from a stint embedded with troops at the front.
David Knowles
They discussed the likely strategic picture in the weeks ahead and reflected on morale amongst Ukrainian forces. This is their conversation.
Francis Darnley
Well, Francis, it's always a pleasure to have another Francis back on the podcast, let alone yourself, who, of course, listeners know very well. You and I spoke in Kyiv a few months ago about the. How do we put this? The direction of travel and the various different options that were available, the different pathways, as it were, in the months ahead. Where would you say that we are now? Following Trump's remarks last week in that cycle.
Francis Farrell
Yeah. Great to be here, as always, Francis. I think the recent remarks after the Saudi Arabia meetings, after the Munich Security Conference, in a way, we're just kind of readjusting to, I think, the darker version of Trump's foreign policy approach and approach to Ukraine that I think we had feared all along. When he was elected, there was a bit of hope at first with the appointment of some more traditional figures like Rubio and Kellogg as the envoy. And for me, the biggest amount of hope came from his comments not long after the inauguration about forcing the oil price down and forcing Russia to stop that way. That seemed like someone who understands that Russia is the one that needs to be stopped, and the way to do that is by shifting the balance of power, using the leverage that America has at its availability, and just starving Russia of the cash. That was great news, but we haven't heard those words. We haven't heard a thing about oil price. And now we're in a completely parallel, but, again, perhaps expectable reality where, again, we see him and his inner circle regurgitating Russian propaganda points, negotiating about Ukraine without Ukraine. You know, I don't want to call it now, but it seems like we could head to the direction of abandoning Ukraine. But before we get to that point, I think it's important just to see where the final question is. I would say, basically, you know, if we talk about the framework of a peace deal being an answer to the question, why would Russia stop? Or how would Russia stop? Which is what I always try and talk about. I think at this point, surely, having spoken to both sides and having understood that peace does require Russia to stop, the big question with the Trump team now is, are they even serious about trying to stop Russia in the first place, or are they just simply setting themselves, setting the whole process up for failure by speaking directly to Russia, by coming up with ideas that they know will be completely unacceptable to Kyiv, and then just being able to disengage from the process, or are we still slowly stumbling through this stage? Okay, we talk to them, we talk to them. We still don't really have a plan and could There still be a point where they feel the need to formulate a plan and actually take some action with some kind of pressure, or, in the less optimistic view, incentive for Russia to stop their advance on the battlefield. Now, what I talked about in my reporting back then was the idea that there's a very clear, I think, difference between the peace that Ukraine wants, which is one with security guarantees, or in other words, a hard deterrence against the future invasion, a piece without any of that. But it's just. Everything stops. It's just a ceasefire, a shaky ceasefire, most likely. And thirdly, a peace which is a compromised peace, a desperate peace where Russia holds all the power, Ukraine knows they could lose it all, and they are ready to start making, really, concessions that would now be unacceptable just for the sake of Russia stopping. And so for now, we see that Russia's language is still talking about those unacceptable concessions and Ukraine is still talking about the peace with hard deterrence. I think we could reach a point where Russia and Trump kind of. Of maybe move towards the idea of the shaky ceasefire, because Trump still wants that quick victory and Russia sees their interest in giving it to. To him, but really setting it up so that the threat is there for a future, a future invasion when Ukraine is inevitably weakened.
Francis Darnley
And then, of course, we get to the subject of the moment, which is what Europe will do or not do in order to secure that shaky peace, if indeed that. That. That's the line that events go down. I mean, do you think that there is the willpower in Europe and in, you know, Ukraine to agree to see that happen, see there being troops on the ground, or do you think that there is still just too much division within Europe for this to be something that is conceivable. And what does that mean, of course, for the way that Ukraine strategically approaches the next few months?
Francis Farrell
Yeah, it's a great question. Well, with that willpower, of course, it certainly was a big leap for the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, in your paper to come forward and say in very clear language that he is ready and the UK is ready, although there is an area of ambiguity that is still being maintained by everyone. And this is something I tried to ask Baltic foreign ministers when I was there in December, when it was probably really too early for this discussion, but now it is extremely relevant because the question is, it's one thing to deploy troops on the ground as part of a larger framework, which is exactly what the US and Russia have agreed upon in theory, but the chances of Russia agreeing not only to give up the momentum that they've got on the battlefield now, but also to give up the chance of taking more territory, which, remember, a lot of which they consider their own legally already in the future. And having European troops on the ground is something that they're not going to agree on. Lavrov has said it outright, and it's no surprise at all, especially when they feel like they're in the driver's seat at the moment, the US is coming onto their side. So. But the real question, now that we've moved beyond this very delicate question of are we ready to have troops on the ground or not, now comes the even more delicate question, are we ready to do something outside that framework? And what does that even look like? It's difficult to understand what it looks like. I think, was it about a week back, I think Dong painted a picture of what it could look like pretty well with. With brave action, just bringing brigades into Western Ukraine, maybe even now, before a ceasefire is even reached, showing initiative, showing strength, and most importantly, showing that political will or bravery. But for now, the ambiguity about the conditions in which troops could be deployed still seems to reign supreme. And until we actually are able to move past that, that, it's really difficult to say what could actually happen.
Francis Darnley
And of course, there are conversations as well about whether, if it's not necessarily boots on the ground, whether there might be able to be air support or something like that, an air shield that's produced that maintains some kind of degree of protection of Ukraine. But again, that's another conversation that's ongoing above that. And I agree with you that as you were speaking, I was thinking, it's obvious, isn't it? It's just so obvious that if a ceasefire is agreed on Russian and American terms, then the prospect of Europe being able to act decisively after that point, it's too late. It has to be before they have to get troops on the ground in before, or they have to put in their own stance before that, before a deal can be struck over their heads, which would negate having the support of Washington or wherever to agree to the prospect of them having troops in, in Ukraine as a protective measure. So it's this extremely precarious strategic moment for Europe, and you can see why President Macron has been so keen to get things moving quickly. But then, you know, again, we come back to that point of whether there is the willpower. But Francis, you've going from the very, very sort of high echelons of geopolitics and strategy. You were very recently with the Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines. And of course, this was before the revelations of Donald Trump's conversation with Putin. But nonetheless, you're there at a critical moment in the war. What were you seeing and what was the morale like there on the front lines?
Francis Farrell
Yeah, it was an interesting trip. Pretty intense one. About two weeks down there. And we were focused only on this southern part of Donetsk Oblast, which has been the area of. Of the heaviest fighting and the most movement for the past half year. Focusing on that, we were. We tried to really get a deeper picture on what was going on. So we were with lots of different brigades, some National Guard, some armed forces. We were with company commanders of infantry units all the way to FPV drones, to heavy bomber drones, to medics. It was an interesting time because when we arrived there in the last few days of January, you could see on the map this push to try and encircle Pokrovsk from the west, which might have involved actually moving into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which is a new Ukrainian region, to see fighting on its soil. That was out of control when we arrived, and it was brought under control by the time we left. In fact, I was with the commander from one of the battalions. You know, he was showing me the streams. He was showing me this little Ukrainian coal mine that the Russians had taken and that they were targeting with drones and artillery. And by the time I left, they'd actually retaken that coal mine, which is actually quite a rare thing for significant bits of territory to be retaken, even it's still a tactical level. On the other hand, though, for those listeners, I guess, who know the map, you have have further down, you have the city of Kurakhova, which was taken a month or two ago. Now, right next to the city, there's still this Ukrainian pocket of land that has been holding out despite being pretty much surrounded on three sides. Russian forces pressing in from a lot of directions brings up the same questions about why is Ukraine still fighting there when the equation for attrition is not great. You have some really, really good units holding the line there. You have Marines, National Guard, air assault forces, mechanized brigades with Western, Western weapons. But it's just not a very good place to stage a fight where when your enemy is bearing down from so many directions. We heard some pretty insane stories. There was one wounded soldier who came in, and he was in a surprisingly fighting mood for someone who'd just been on position for four days after being wounded in the face by a Russian FPV drone and tragically losing all of his comrades who were defending that position. So he was on his own and he was telling his commander that he was actually even still killing more Russians just through the entrance to his dugout. Just an incredible tale of survival on a personal level. Something, you know, one of these tiny little stories that could easily be a Hollywood movie. But he just kind of brushed it off. Crazy situation, but made it out his face. His wounds were a little bit infected, but there's still hope that he could save that eye. I think, you know, it's a reminder of, often the press speak to soldiers, they speak to maybe medics, artillerymen, drone pilots, and you can get some nice emotional quotes about geopolitics or morale or Ukrainian bravery. But the conditions that, that infantrymen are in on the very zero line, increasingly isolated and staying there for weeks at a time on average, is something on another level entirely. So it was an interesting trip because you saw one area of the front line near Pokrovsk actually stabilized while we were there. And if you look on the map, Russian forces are still quite, quite a long way away from getting that, that, that now typical, those pincers around, around the city, they've made it not even, I would say not even 180 degrees around the sea. So it might seem like a bold prediction, but I think in, in six months time, I think the crops could definitely still be holding out, which is, is something that maybe people didn't expect half a year ago when the Russians first got to the outskirts of that city, but further down, you know, now again we see that pocket closing up just in the past few days. And unfortunately that probably means on the ground a lot of chaotic retreats. But the hope is that they've learned from their mistakes and in this case they will be really retreating to better prepared, hopefully, fingers crossed, better prepared, better fortified lines where they can make a better defensive stand.
Francis Darnley
Now there's been a lot of reporting, Francis, that the Russians have not been able to push as hard in recent weeks as they had in the previous months. I wonder what their feeling, the soldiers you spoke to was of that assessment and your own perspective on that question.
Francis Farrell
When it comes to soldiers describing how the Russians fight, it's usually pretty much the same story all over. It's about these small infantry assault groups coming just one at a time, seemingly endlessly, where simply the aim is to get men up the field. Even if there's an understanding that, for example, if you send six men, maybe one or two if you're lucky on the attacking side will be able to actually survive and dig in. But that's enough for them to send the next six men in and one or two of them dig in and suddenly you already have a forward position and the Ukrainians are forced to move back. And that's how it works all the way across. The Russians do not have the force quality to conduct combined arms offensives, to conduct big breakthroughs through the Ukrainian lines, as overstretched as those defensive lines may be. So they stick to what is simple and what works. And that's what they still tell us about, you know, and of course, we will see, you know, intensity on some sectors of the front die down and stabilize. And it's a good thing when the Ukrainian defenders can get their defense in order. But we still know that the Russians are still managing to recruit tens of thousands of people. You know, I saw, I think, on Twitter, accounts of some of the first Russians who signed their contracts in 2025 already being reported de or missing. It's just this endless conveyor belt of contract soldiers. It's still getting. It is getting more difficult. And the Russians are always, of course, looking for alternative sources because they don't want to mobilize. And that could be a big decision for Russia if, if Ukraine continues to successfully just really churn through a lot of these Russian forces. But for now, I would definitely say that any lull of that sort is.
Francis Darnley
Certainly going to be temporary when things do ramp up again. If this is a temporary moment, do you think that there is a prospect of other major Russian offensives in the short to medium term, or do you think that in a sense Russia has sought to militarily put itself in the strongest possible position at the present moment and not necessarily succeeded in that? I think that's sometimes underappreciated, that Russia has not succeeded in its objectives in the major offenses at Latin Latter Half of 2024, early 2025. But they've thrown everything at that. They have not succeeded. And therefore, basically we're just only ever going to see these incremental gains now in the short or medium term? Or do you think that there is still the prospect that behind the lines Russia is preparing for other major offensives and there is still the danger of some major breakthrough, that the Ukrainian lines crumble? Or do you think that really we're only looking at these incremental gains?
Francis Farrell
First of the yeah, it's a good question. I mean, Zelensky was talking about Belarus, and there's always the specter of, of that kind of thing looming. Of course, Russia could choose Another part of the border to go across, like they did in Kharkiv back in May. In theory, yes. But it all comes down to. To the numbers game, the attrition war, first and foremost. And so if they see they have momentum and success in one area, you know, their campaign of overrunning southern Donetsk oblast, the remainder of it, which started back with Avdiivka a year ago and has pushed through to some of the quickest Russian gains we've seen, the quickest gains we've seen since early 2022, that has been a successful campaign for them. It has seen the Ukrainian defense in a worse state than Bakhmut or Chasiv Yar or Tourets or Kupiansk or anywhere else on the front line. And so I think for now they will plan to continue that as. As long as they can go, because when Ukraine can stabilize, they can fortify, they can consolidate as well on the defense. And that equation usually favors the defender if they are well prepared. But at the same time, Russia's always being good at probing the weak spots. And that's a natural kind of cycle of Ukraine's tendency to kind of chop and change battalions and brigades and fight fires. You strengthen one area, you weaken another area. And unfortunately, there are very few strategic reserves to be spoken of at this point, given Ukraine's overstretched manpower situation. So that's where we could see an opportunity for a new offensive open up for Russia. Whether they've identified that now, we can really cause problems by going after this part of the front line, which was quiet for a while, but because of that, they've really weakened it. A good example might be northern Kharkiv Oblast, just north of Kupyansk, where we haven't talked about it much, but they've managed to cross the river and make some gains there. It's very slow so far, but if they keep up the pressure and they see that area being weakened further, who knows?
Francis Darnley
That's very interesting. Now, my final question before giving you the chance to say anything that we've not talked about. Well, you mentioned and alluded to morale earlier when you were talking about your experience amongst the frontline soldiers. What do you think the impact on morale has been amongst Ukrainians and Ukrainian soldiers of the events of the past week, two weeks or so. Do you think it's been something? I mean, there's been all sorts of reports about increase in support for President Zelensky, but do you think that there will be Ukrainian soldiers who think, you know, we're in a really really bad situation here. Yeah.
Francis Farrell
I mean, again, I can't. I think it's wrong to compare soldiers and civilians, because I think, as you say, for soldiers, the continuation or end of the war has a direct consequence on their quality of life. On a physical level, you know, these people are drained mentally and emotionally in a way that no one sitting in Kyiv talking about burnout can really even begin to understand. So, of course, these are ordinary people, and they will have very conflicted feelings. I think a lot of people have said they're very tired, they want peace, but at the same time, you have a lot of people saying this lion, that if we just have a peace now and we have to fight again or our children will have to fight and we have to give up territory. You know, I just won't accept it because so many. So many of my friends died for this. You know, I think with civilians watching this from afar, I think it all depends on how they. How they approach this Trump phenomenon. From the beginning, there was really this consistent strain of, I wouldn't say wishful thinking, but hopeful thinking that, okay, he's the hard man. He's the hard negotiator. He's strong, but Biden was weak. He wants peace, so he'll push Russia to stop, stop. He'll get tough on. On Putin. And I think that mask has come off and. And some people are taking it better than others. But in general, I think, yeah, as you. As you mentioned, people have definitely been in support of. Of Zelensky drawing a line. You know, we're not going to continue to. To just flatter, flatter, flatter. But there's a reason that Ukraine's Maidan revolution is called the revolution of dignity. And I think how Zelenskyy has handled this, whatever criticism I might have of him on the. On the world stage saying no to this ridiculous resources agreement, saying now that Trump seems to be living in a disinformation space, that that's the kind of language that we need, and Ukraine broadly supports it.
Francis Darnley
Well, thank you, Francis. Your insights are always so valuable. Is there anything we've not talked about that you just want to. To mention?
Francis Farrell
Yeah, I think when people ask me about Trump, and maybe this is getting a bit. A bit too political, but his steps and his moves specifically regarding Ukraine have, again, not come as a surprise. This is the Trump that we, I think, were quietly quite fearful of for a long time. But the more scary thing is you can see how his approach to Ukraine has. Has been just one part of an overall clear display of his values, or lack of values when it comes to, you know, running completely roughshod over the idea of national sovereignty, thinking about annexing territories and states here and there, J.D. vance's ideological attack on Europe and a refusal to even guarantee European security and, and of course the consolidation of, of power in many big illegal fell swoops at home. I think that's what maybe should be paid attention to more. I think it's definitely time for, for that wishful thinking to be over on this continent here in Europe and, and action to be taken understanding what kind of period awaits us.
Francis Darnley
Francis Farrow, always a pleasure.
Francis Farrell
Thank you.
Hamish de Bretton Gordon
Let's now move on to our final thoughts. Francis, do you want to start for final thoughts there?
Francis Darnley
I just wanted to thank those listeners who filled out the survey that we put in the show notes. Apparently thousands of you of you have already done so, so that's amazing. But we are hoping to hear from you, where you're from, what you value and how you might be able to contribute to the podcast in the future. So there's a link in the show notes and do please fill it out. We're really, really grateful.
Hamish de Bretton Gordon
Following up on the survey that Francis just mentioned, I read and listen to a lot of things in French about Ukraine and about the invasion and I was just wondering who amongst our listeners is a French speaker? If it's worth me putting these links in my final thoughts on the show in the show notes, if that's something people are interested in, do feel free to reach out on the email or on Twitter. Hamish, do you want to leave us.
David Knowles
With your final thoughts and close the show?
Adelie Pojman Ponte
Adli, thanks very much. My final thought, and you know, I don't want to labor the point about Trump and everything that's been said there. I did say he is acting in a childlike manner, which is not what one would desire from the most powerful man in the world. But I am just hoping that his historics at the moment are very much aimed at galvanizing Western leaders to take full responsibility for the defence and security of Europe, which he feels that we have failed to do and relied too much on the US in the past. And if that is the case, and it appears Western leaders, European Western leaders are being galvanized, then hopefully that is the aim and that will be a good thing. However, if, as some people are suggesting, he is handing the trump cards to the Kremlin, then we are going to be in for a very difficult time. Let's hope it's a former. Thank you.
Hamish de Bretton Gordon
Thank you, Hamish. I would say that the British and the French tend to agree on more than we think they do, but that's a conversation for much later, not for this podcast.
David Knowles
The Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles to support our work and stay on top of all of our Ukraine news, analysis and dispatches from the ground. Please subscribe to the Telegraph. You can get your first three months for just £1 at telegraph.co.uk UkraineTest or sign up to Dispatches or Foreign Affairs Newsletter, bringing stories from award winning foreign correspondents straight to your inbox. We also have a Ukraine Live blog on our website where you can follow updates as they come throughout the day, including insights from regular contributors to this podcast. We also do the same for other breaking international stories. You can listen to this conversation live at 1pm London time each weekday on Xspaces. Follow the Telegraph on X, formerly known as Twitter so that you don't miss it. To our listeners on YouTube, please note that due to issues beyond our control, there is sometimes a delay between broadcast and upload. So if you want to hear Ukraine the Latest as soon as it is released, do refer to the podcast apps. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Ukraine the Latest on your preferred podcast app and leave us a review. It really helps others find the show. Please also share it with those who may not be aware we exist. You can also get in touch directly with us to ask questions or give comments by emailing Ukrainian podelegraph.co.uk We do continue to read every message. You can also contact us directly on X. You can find our handles in the description for this episode. As ever, we're especially interested to hear where you're listening from around the world. Ukraine the Latest was today produced by Phil Adkins. Executive producers are Louisa Wells and David Knowles.
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Podcast from The Telegraph | Episode date: February 20, 2025
This episode delves into the sharp political debates facing Ukraine, Europe, and the West as the war enters its third year. The panel confronts Donald Trump's inflammatory rhetoric about President Zelensky and US support, heated European conversations around conscription and military readiness, shifting alliances, and hard realities from Ukraine’s front lines. Listeners get both high-level analysis of strategic options and on-the-ground insights from soldiers, all against the backdrop of what may be a pivotal turning point in the war.
The episode carries a measured, urgent tone—serious, reflective, and driven by the sense of a historical crossroads. Debate is analytic and frank: no sugar-coating of political, military, or human dilemmas. On the ground, reports from the Ukrainian front emphasize both exhaustion and resolve.
This episode underscores a decisive, anxious moment for Europe and Ukraine: will Europe step up, militarily and financially, if US support wavers? Is it willing and able to act independently if needed? And can Ukraine sustain morale and defense under shifting international winds? As both high politics and gritty soldier stories make clear, the answers—coming sooner rather than later—will shape the future of Europe and the world.