‘Put Putin on trial’: pro-Kremlin hardliner turns on president & interview with Britain’s leading military expert

Summary

Ukraine: The Latest – “Put Putin on trial”: Pro-Kremlin Hardliner Turns on President & Britain’s Top Military Mind Weighs In

March 19, 2026 | Hosted by Francis Sternley & Dominic Nicholls, with guest Sir Lawrence Freedman

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Overview

This episode delivers frontline updates on Ukraine’s military situation and offers in-depth analysis on internal Russian dissent, Kremlin dynamics, and global strategic shifts. The highlight: a rare on-the-record call for Vladimir Putin to face trial from a once-loyal pro-Kremlin blogger, plus an extended interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of Britain’s preeminent experts on war strategy, discussing the broader context and blunders of the ongoing conflict.

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Key Topics & Insights

1. Military Developments in Ukraine

• Ukrainian Long-Range Strikes Escalate
  [03:50]

  • Ukraine continues successful strikes into Russian-occupied Crimea and southern Russia.
  • Sevastopol targeted: drones struck Russian air defense installations and manufacturing buildings.
  • Ulyanovsk & Staryza Russa (far into Russian territory) were also hit; satellite imagery suggests significant damage.
  • Russian air defenses are increasingly stretched: “There simply aren’t enough air defense forces” – Andrei Garolyov (State Duma, [05:20]).

• Is the Russian Spring Offensive Underway?
  [06:40]

  • Russian casualties “over 1,500” per day recently – double normal rates.

  • No major Russian territorial advances despite increased assaults, particularly around Kupyansk, Lyman, and Sloviansk.

  • Ukrainian tactics now focus on targeting Russian logistics and high-value equipment, not just manpower.

    Notable quote:

    “If this is a spring offensive, it’s failed or it is failing. It is staggering, the numbers of casualties and the gnawing for…well, the no land that has been gained.”
    – Dominic Nicholls ([52:09])

• Other Military Incidents
  [11:34]

  • Estonia reports first Russian airspace violation of the year by a Su-30 fighter.
  • Sean Penn visited a Ukrainian brigade on the frontlines, accompanied—mysteriously—by ex-presidential official Andriy Yermak.

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2. Global Security, Energy, and Political Tensions

• Iran’s War & Russia’s Gain
  [12:35]

  • Iran’s attack on the world’s largest LNG plant drove up gas prices by 35%, directly boosting Moscow’s coffers despite “sanctions easing.”

  • CIA chief John Ratcliffe confirmed deeper Russia-Iran intelligence cooperation, contradicting bland reassurances from US diplomats.

    Notable quote:

    “No, I do not take Vladimir Putin at his word.”
    – John Ratcliffe, CIA Director (relayed at [12:35])

• US and NATO Response Ambiguity
  [14:34]

  • NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte calls for allied support in protecting the Strait of Hormuz, but remains vague.
  • Trump’s advisories swing between declaring total victory in Iran, needing help, and dismissing need for support – no coherence.
  • VP J.D. Vance is notably silent; rumored trip to support Hungary’s Viktor Orban seen as direct US meddling in European elections.

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3. Dramatic Turn in Russian Domestic Discourse

• Pro-Kremlin Blogger Breaks Ranks
  [16:25]

  • Ilya Remislo, once a loyal “bulldog of the regime,” publicly calls Putin illegitimate, accuses him of destroying Russia, and advocates for his trial as a war criminal.

    Key Remislo quotes ([20:55]):

    “Putin should resign and be put on trial as a war criminal… His personalized, corrupt system is doomed to collapse as we’re seeing now… The army isn’t advancing and the war is going nowhere. There are massive losses. We are fighting over tiny territories that will ultimately give Russia nothing. This man has destroyed everything he could lay his hands on. The country is literally falling apart now.”

  • Remislo receives frantic calls from security contacts urging him to delete the post: “the system is panicking.”

  • Published on his Telegram channel, timed with government moves to shut Telegram down—perhaps “a last grenade at the regime.”

  • Hosts note such criticism of Putin personally is unprecedented since the Prigozhin mutiny. (“All mutiny, no bounty.” [21:16])

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4. Interview: Sir Lawrence Freedman on Strategy—What’s Been Learned?

[23:36 – 49:14]

• Current State of the War

  • Ukraine’s drone development and operations have “transformed the conflict.”
  • Russian offensives are stalled; Ukraine “can protect its interests more easily.” Europe is comparatively more united.
  • The Iran war hands Russia a potential budget windfall—“the gap in their budget likely to be filled this year”—but leaves Ukraine resentful over Western military equipment sent elsewhere.
  • Freedman is “not optimistic” Iran will draw closer to the West – regime’s position is still strong, global economy being used as “hostage.”

• Putin’s Strategic Errors
  [30:29]

  • “Every time a big decision has had to be made, he’s doubled down… He hasn’t actually given himself victory.”

  • Putin squandered Russia’s best chance to control Ukraine when Yanukovych was president, repeatedly escalated rather than accept limited outcomes.

  • Strategic losses: over a million Russian killed/wounded, economy damaged, Sweden & Finland in NATO, dependence on China.

    “If you just sort of stand back from a Russian strategic perspective… the economy will never quite recover from this… I don’t think this is a great strategic gain.”
    – Sir Lawrence Freedman ([32:55])

• On Deterrence, Escalation Fears, and Western Hesitancy
  [36:05–41:46]

  • Biden’s avoidance of “triggering” Russia led to “holding Ukrainians back at critical moments”—e.g., not supplying better equipment earlier.

  • Putin’s nuclear threats toward the West were “much less specific” than assumed; actual nuclear use was very unlikely.

  • Western leaders fell prey to what Freedman calls the “automaticity” of the escalation ladder, missing opportunities to push back harder.

    “We got consumed by our own fears… It’s easier for me to say that than the President of the United States, but there was a lot of frustration…”
    – Sir Lawrence Freedman ([39:52])

• Red Lines & Policy Advice to Europe

  • The West never set meaningful red lines for Russia’s attacks – support for Ukraine was not clearly made contingent on Russian behavior.

  • Now, Freedman advises Europe to lead in diplomacy, organize technical rather than leader-to-leader mediation, as the US (and Trump) is both distracted and amateurish in approach.

    “I think the Russians are probably as perplexed by Trump as the rest of us…”
    – Sir Lawrence Freedman ([45:20])

• Assessment: Ukraine’s Fortitude & The Kremlin Bubble
  [46:29]

  • Ukraine is in a “stronger position now than for some time”—innovative military leadership, successful drone use.

  • But ultimate decisions rest with “a stubborn” Putin—whose inner circle may be distorting the reality of the war’s (stalled) progress.

    “At what point does the reality of the war cut through?... He seems to rely on quite a narrow group of advisors… Who’s telling him? Nobody.”
    – Sir Lawrence Freedman ([48:45])

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5. Philosophical Reflection

[52:50]

• Francis Sternley references Jurgen Habermas, reflecting on how confronting the truth about societal crimes can catalyze collective change—a potential lesson for Russia’s future.

  “His life tells us about how transformative being confronted with the truth of a society’s sins can be both individually and collectively. That may well prove instructive in the years ahead.”
  – Francis Sternley ([54:58])

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Memorable Quotes

• “Putin is no longer one of us. He is a person whose interests are completely alien to both Russia and me personally.”
  – Ilya Remislo ([21:00])

• “Every time a big decision has had to be made, he’s doubled down. Instead of cutting his losses, he’s doubled down.”
  – Sir Lawrence Freedman ([30:29])

• “Ukraine is able to—they’re holding the line. In fact, they’re taking ground back down in the southwest… If this is a spring offensive, it’s failed or it is failing.”
  – Dominic Nicholls ([52:11])

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Timestamps of Major Segments

• [03:50] – Military news: Ukrainian drone & missile strikes, frontline assessment
• [10:09] – Analysis: Russian offensive, casualty numbers, new tactics
• [11:34] – International incidents: Estonia airspace incursion, front-line visitors
• [12:35] – Energy, Iran war, and shifting global alliances
• [16:25] – Discussion of Russian domestic dissent, Ilya Remislo’s open letter
• [23:36] – Interview: Sir Lawrence Freedman on strategic errors and war’s trajectory
• [36:05] – Deterrence debates and the nuclear threshold
• [42:19] – Critique of Western red lines and policy
• [46:29] – Ukrainian morale and Russian info-bubble
• [52:09] – Is the spring offensive happening, closing analysis
• [52:50] – Reflection on Habermas and the impact of historical reckoning

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Conclusion

This episode offers a rich blend of breaking news, in-depth analytical conversation, and rare insight into the evolving dynamic inside Russia itself. The direct and public criticism of Putin from previously loyal influencers signals potential cracks in his regime, while Britain’s leading military historian lays bare both the failures and the resilience in Ukrainian and Western strategy. The military situation remains volatile, but Ukraine’s innovation and morale are holding, and the ultimate endgame may be decided less at the front than in the closed circles of the Kremlin.

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Transcript

[David Knowles]

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[Francis Sternley]

I'm Francis Sternley and this is Ukraine. The latest Today as Russian casualty figures continue to rise, we consider where the Russia spring offensive has begun before returning again to the situation in Moscow with Vladimir Putin absent from the stage for several days and an explosive call for him to leave office by a formerly loyal supporter. We also consider the significance of the intervention by the director of the CIA as to the involvement of Moscow in Iran before speaking to Britain's premier historian of strategy about where we are and and the mistakes made by both sides.

[Dominic Nicholls]

Bravery takes you through the most unimaginable hardships to finally reward you with victory.

[Francis Sternley]

The Russia does not want peace.

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

If I'm president I will have that

[Francis Sternley]

war settled in one day.

[Dominic Nicholls]

24 hours. We are with you. Not just today or tomorrow, but for 100 years.

[Francis Sternley]

Nobody's going to break us.

[Dominic Nicholls]

We are strong. We are Ukrainians.

[Francis Sternley]

It's Thursday the 19th of March, 4 years and 23 days since the full scale invasion began. And today I'm joined by my co host and associate editor of Defence here at the Telegraph, Dominic Nicholls and later Sir Lawrence Friedman. But first, over to Dom for the latest in the military realm.

[Dominic Nicholls]

Well, thanks Francis. So two big things today, Ukraine's long range strikes have continued. And then there's that question, as you say, about has the Russian spring offensive started? News flash. If it has, and we're still trying to guess, then it is not particularly good. But anyway, we'll come on to that in a moment. So the long range strikes in Crimea last night, explosions were heard in the center of Sevastopol. Local residents said a building housing Russia's third radio technical air defense regiment was targeted there. Now later the telegram channel Crimean Wind said at least five drones had hit a bit building belonging to the Russian defense conglomerate Alma's Anti now that's a major state owned manufacturer of air defense systems S3 hundreds, 400 air defense, that kind of stuff. I don't know if those two buildings are the same location. Anyway, something big was hit in Crimea. Russian installed proxy governor there, Mikhail Razvosiev said 27 drones were shot down while approaching the city. He said one person had been killed and two injured. There's no way of verifying any of those statistics. Now elsewhere in Ukraine, the west of the country was hit. Last night the regional headquarters of of the sbu, Ukraine's State security service in Lviv Oblast was attacked causing damage there. Governor Maksim Koznitsky reporting that no casualties reported there. However, air alerts were activated across quite a large part of the west of the country. Turnerpil Ivano Frankeffs those kind of areas. Now then, these long range strikes that were happening in Crimea and also across southern Russia last night. Remember yesterday we reported Sergei Shoigu, former Defence Minister, current secretary of the country's Security Council he said no Russian region can feel safe as Ukraine ramps up these long range attacks. Well, that view was backed up today by Andrei Garolyov. He's a State Duma deputy and former army officer. He said yesterday it's impossible to cover everything. There simply aren't enough air defense forces. So it's a bit odd. They really are pushing this line about how vulnerable Russia is, which you've got to think well they can't be doing it, you know, just out of the goodness of their heart. They must be under some form of dur. What is the play here by Putin? Whether it's to ramp up the state restrictions we talked about Max, for example, or ahead of some mobilization, we don't know. But there's a continued sort of parade of voices talking about how vulnerable Russia is, which is strange. Now these all come out as reports trickled through yesterday of a strike earlier in the week by Ukraine on Russian aircraft manufacturing and repair plants. Now Ukraine's general staff said yesterday that the Aviastar aircraft manufacturing plant in Ulyanovsk city was hit on Monday that produces and services heavy transport and tanker aircraft. It's about 500km east southeast of Moscow. They say the strike damaged the shelter, aircraft parking areas and some aircraft as well, although battle damage assessment is very, very difficult now. Also reported by Ukraine's general staff was a strike on the 123rd aircraft repair plant in Staryza Russa, that's in Novgorod Oblast. This is on Tuesday. This is about 500Ks northwest of Moscow. It's up near St Petersburg, quite close to Estonia. As I say, damage assessment there is still ongoing as well. Difficult to tell. However, there's satellite imagery from the last couple of days which shows that last location with three holes in the roof of the hangar of the facility after the strike. So if the warhead functioned correctly then the the effects inside of three direct hits should be quite devastating. So long range strikes continuing seemingly. Well, stuff is getting through. Russia reporting they're bringing drones down. However, clearly some things are getting through and that question of where there simply aren't enough Russian air defense forces, how they're going to square that circle continues now onto that spring offensive. Yesterday There were over 1,500 Russian casualties, a huge number anyway, but much larger, kind of double the numbers of recent, well, certainly months if not years. So has a spring offensive started? It's no clear if it started, but if it has, it hasn't gone very far. Russia has made no significant advances at all. A staff officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the vicinity of Kupyansk, so in the east of the country said that Russian forces had intensified the number of assaults in that area from around two a day, two sort of formal assaults if you like, in the last week he was describing to about nine in the day before he was speaking. So like on a Tuesday also in the Donbass, a plans officer in a battalion, Ukrainian battalion operating there around Lyman, he said that the Russian military command obviously as we know, they view infantry as expendable. So pushing people forward in these infiltration tactics, therefore Ukraine has slightly shifted the focus and they've gone after the lines of communication, they've gone after the fuel points, the logistic nodes, the high end equipment, the sort of signature pieces, air defense, et cetera, et cetera, radars, which would shape of the battlefield if you like and which are really counted by the Russian high command. So they might view the people as expendable, but a few book air defence systems, they're not just going to brush off now that slight shift, if you like, in tactics, if not strategy, seems to be paying off slightly, which might account for the huge amount of activity by Russia, but no forward movement. Now go slightly further south and in the vicinity Sloviansk, Russia has intensified assaults there trying to merge the infantry on the ground with artillery and tactical aviation. So fixed wing and helicopter aviation, plus, of course, the use of drones. Reports from Sloviansk say that over 400 FPV drones are used each day, as well as fiber optic ambushes. So when these drones sit on the roads and wait to see what's coming along and then fly off and go and hit them. Added to that, the Ukrainian 11th Army Corps spokesperson, Lt. Col. Dmytro Zaporets, he was speaking yesterday. He said the Russian military command sees Konstantinivka, that's right at the southern end of the fortress belt, as a prime objective to be achieved before the holidays in May 2020. Probably pegged around the mayday parade, Russia's Victory day parade on May 9th. So he's saying that Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are going to be the objectives of Russia by summer. But the bottom end of the fortress belt is probably what they're looking at to try and get this, whatever this spring offensive is by Mayday, potentially. I mean, it's just not going anywhere at the moment. So it's very difficult to try and

[Francis Sternley]

be talking about that sector of the front years, literally. They now think they can take it by May.

[Dominic Nicholls]

I mean, yeah, we'll watch and report a lot of those. A lot of that reporting came from the ISW just then. Now, a couple more for me. Earlier this week, remember, we spoke about Hollywood actor who skipped the Oscars. Sean. Sean Penn. He won Best supporting Actor. But he wasn't there to pick up his prize. He had it legged it to Ukraine. We saw him meeting President Zelensky. Well, after that, he visited Ukraine's 157th separate mechanized brigade on the front lines of Donetsk Oblast. Now, that's quite strange in itself, although he does visit Ukraine a lot. However, what was even slightly odder was that he was accompanied by. Drumroll former head of the presidential office, Andre Yermak. No, just popped up with him. Interestingly, the brigade that he visited put out a load of social media about the Hollywood actor coming to visit them. Didn't say anything about Andre Yermak. He was just sort of in the background of the photos. If you remember, when he resigned last November, he said he was off to the front lines and we didn't know if that meant he's going to fight or he's. Well, quite what he was going to do. Anyway, the Defense Ministry made a statement in January because there was such speculation. The Ukraine's Ministry of Defense said in January that he had not enlisted in the army. So no one actually quite knew what he'd done or where he was. And now he seems to have popped up in the Donbass as a. I know. Fixer, translator, maybe a driver. We should try and get hold of him the next time we go out there.

[Francis Sternley]

But anyway, I can't imagine they're too happy in Kiev. His appearance in that photo.

[Dominic Nicholls]

Well, I wonder what his day rate is. Mr. Yermak, if it's like a couple hundred dollars, let us know because that's an absolute bargain. Now, lastly for me, Estonian authorities say a Russian Su30 fighter jet enters the country's airspace yesterday near Vandalou island without permission, loitering the area for about a minute. Now, this is about 20k's north of the mainland of Estonia. It's in the middle of the Gulf of Finland. It's pretty obvious it's an island. It's not going to move. Didn't take them by surprise. Estonia says that the NATO Baltic Air Policing aircraft currently operated by the Italian Air Force conducts an identification flight response. The Russian aircraft had no flight plan filed, no two way radio contact with Estonian air traffic services. The Foreign Ministry in Tallinn summoned the charge affairs of the Russian Embassy and issued a diplomatic note. This was the first. Remember, there's a lot of talk about this last year, but the first violation of Estonian airspace by a Russian aircraft this year. I doubt it's going to be the last. That's us up to date, Francis.

[Francis Sternley]

Well, thanks very much, Dom. Despite the easing of sanctions on Russia, gas prices have surged by 35% after Iran launch strikes on the world's biggest LNG plant. That's something being considered in much more detail on our sister podcast Iran the Latest. So do check that out if you want to learn more about that conflict and its consequences. For our purposes, this is bound again, at least in the short term, to benefit Moscow because of their role in potentially easing the global energy price. There is still a deafening silence from Washington in condemning their role in supporting Iran both before and during this war. Yesterday, the director of the CIA John Ratcliffe confirmed confirmed that Tehran is asking the Kremlin to share intelligence on U.S. military assets in the Middle East. He confirmed that as they are already widely believed to have done as well as effectively with his remarks rebuking US envoy Steve Witkoff for saying that he takes the Russians at their word when they say they're not providing assistance. No, I do not take Vladimir Putin at his word, he said during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on worldwide threats. The Financial Times also reports that further to James Kilner's reporting on Tuesday's Episode for us. Two vessels heading for Cuba carrying Russian oil are due to arrive next week in defiance of Trump's energy embargo, the first shipments in three months. All the while, as Dom predicted in his question to Finnish President Alexander Stubb on Wednesday, the war in Iran does now seem to have become a NATO problem, with its Secretary General, Mark Rutter, saying he's calling on countries to support U.S. efforts to open the Strait of Hormuz. The Whether he is sincere in that or whether he's just doing it to placate Trump and trying to avoid the worst of his wrath, it just isn't clear. As ever with him, it's always a little bit vague as to what his true intentions are, Mr. Rutter, but nonetheless, interesting to see that happen. I mean, do you expect that to continue, Dom?

[Dominic Nicholls]

Yeah, I do. I mean, Mark Rutter's got a bit of an open goal here because he's the Secretary General, which is a big post, but he's not a national leader. So he can make statements like this and sort of look at Donald Trump and say, kind of doing what I can, Donald.

[Francis Sternley]

It's not NATO's fault, it's the individual countries.

[Dominic Nicholls]

So he can, he can try and sort of keep. Keep NATO in the good books, which is obviously in NATO's interest. Yeah, but at the same time, he's got no power over the national governments anymore. He was prime minister for nine years and I don't think his country met the 2% spending time. But anyway, never, never mind, never mind. He's now NATO Secretary General, so you can make these kind of noises. It doesn't matter almost if he's ignored because he's made the. He's put his cards out there and that's what Donald Trump will notice now. He's got to play a case, a clever game, of course, because he doesn't want to be seen to be blaming the individual nation states. That's not what he's doing. I don't think he's actually trying to, you know, furnish his. His own career here. He's doing what he thinks he should do as NATO Secretary General, but he's threading a delicate path, I'd suggest.

[Francis Sternley]

Yeah, absolutely.

[Dominic Nicholls]

I mean, it was so obvious. And this is why I said this was the point I made to presidents, too. I can't see NATO not having to offer a comment here or the NATO Secretary General not having to offer a comment. And that comment is not going to be, no, Donald, you're on your own, mate. So, of course it was Going to be the other way around.

[Francis Sternley]

Yeah, absolutely. Particularly after he'd made so many efforts to get Trump to commit to Article 5, it seemed that he was going to have to come out with some kind of statement.

[Dominic Nicholls]

At least he got through without saying daddy this time.

[Francis Sternley]

That's very true. That's very true. Well, it's worth us pausing a moment and reflecting on the mixed messaging from US President Trump. He is simultaneously claiming to have won the war in Iran, that he's currently winning the war, that he needs help to win the war, and that he needs no help to win the war because he won the war last year by destroying Iran's nuclear weapons. I think I've got that right now. The silence from his vice president, J.D. vance, in all of this is also extremely telling. And while we're speaking of him, he is reportedly planning to visit Hungary in the coming days in a show of support for Viktor Orban, who, if the polls are true, could well lose on April 12th. Now, if so, that is a tangible example of the new US security strategy in action, directly seeking to influence elections in favour of their preferred candidates. That is a big step. That's not usually how these things are done. Now, while on Budapest, an update on the story Don reported on yesterday, with Brussels correspondent Joe Barnes reporting for the Telegraph, that restoring the Druzba pipeline at the request of the eu, despite that benefiting Moscow, is an attempt to unblock the 90 billion euros loan when EU leaders meet in Brussels later today. We don't know what conversations have been happening behind closed doors on this, but I would wager personally that it's very unlikely that Orban is going to unlock that 90 billion euros before the election. I think it gives him too much leverage in the electoral space at the moment in Hungary for him to be seen as giving way to Zelenskyy and giving way to the Europeans. I could be wrong. There could be immense pressure being applied on him, but it just feels with the mood music at the moment that that is very unlikely. But we will see in brighter news, especially given Spain's rather awkward stance with regard to NATO spending in particular. They were another one on your list, on your watch list, Dom of those who aren't paying up. Madrid has announced a 1 billion euro military aid package for Ukraine for 2026, coinciding with Zelenskyy's visit, which I think you reported on yesterday, but part is by the EU's SAFE programme. So we understand it will focus on joint production with the Ukrainian defence industry. But I just want to end on the state of things in Russia, the subject of so much speculation in the past week or so. It's been noted by experts that Putin has not been seen in public now for several days, including yesterday, March 18, when he usually makes some sort of comment on the annexation of Crimea. Now in Moscow, mobile Internet blackouts are still being reported very widely. Trucks with machines, machine guns spotted on the streets around the Kremlin, and Telegram still in the process of being forcibly phased out, as Dom's been focusing on now for several weeks. The latest development that's got tongues wagging today is an explosive post by Ilya Remislo, previously an ardent pro Kremlin blogger who's published a damning indictment of Putin and his policies. It's pretty explosive stuff, so listen to this. In a post to his followers, he calls Putin illegitimate and waging a failing war in Ukraine that's caused millions of casualties and wrecked the economy. He then argues Putin's more than two decades in power illustrate how absolute power corrupts. The Guardian's done an excellent profile on him, drawing attention to the fact that he was previously considered a bulldog of the regime, going after critics and smearing independent journalists, bloggers and opposition politicians, using his legal expertise to even take some of them to court. Now they have actually managed to speak to him after colleagues at the Guardian, where he's doubled down on his remarks in this post, saying from his flat in St. Petersburg, Putin should resign and be put on trial as a war criminal. His personalized corrupt system is doomed to collapse, as we're seeing now with his war in Ukraine and elsewhere. The army isn't advancing and the war is going nowhere. There are massive losses. We are fighting over tiny territories that will ultimately give Russia nothing. This man has destroyed everything he could lay his hands on. The country is literally falling apart now. Asked why he'd chosen to speak out now, he said the decision had developed gradually until he felt he could no longer remain silent. Putin is no longer one of us, he said. He is a person whose interests are completely alien to both Russia and me personally. I've come to the conclusion that it is both possible and necessary to criticize him, because otherwise none of this will stop and nothing good will come of it. He then added that other members in the community, by which I think he means the mill bloggers, thought the same way. He said he's been receiving frantic calls throughout the morning from contacts in the security services urging him to take down the post, which he says suggests that the system is panicking. I'm ready for any trial against me. He added, the time has come to somehow break this vicious cycle and speak out. I bear a certain responsibility as someone who for a long time supported this regime and helped it survive. Now, the last time something like this happened, and Milburgh has broke rank in this way, was around the time of the Prigozhin Mutiny. You gonna say it, Dom?

[Dominic Nicholls]

No. Go on, you can do it.

[Francis Sternley]

All mutiny, no bounty. And even then, they were criticizing others within the regime, not Putin himself. So this does feel quite significant. But just how indicative is it of a trend? It's just too early to say. But for now, I would highly recommend that he stay away from windows.

[Dominic Nicholls]

Well, it must be a ground floor flat, I suppose. Where does he publish this?

[Francis Sternley]

Well, he's published it on his Telegram channel, I believe, which presumably is gonna have to shut down pretty soon. So that could even be correlated with this, because presumably, if you close down your Telegram channel, you're gonna lose all of your followers, by which I think he had a minimum like 90,000 plus. So if he thought he was gonna lose all of those, lose his voice, potentially, maybe this is a last grenade, as it were, at the regime. Possibly.

[Dominic Nicholls]

Well, I mean, we know that, that Putin does allow every now and again a little bit of venting, controlled venting. I mean, these sound quite, quite punchy comments, to be fair, but they do every now and again allow someone to sort of lash out. And I wonder if that's something just as Telegram's about to go up in a puff of smoke. You know, he spoke to the. Was that exclusive in the Guardian in

[Francis Sternley]

terms of the interview that they have with him? Yes, I believe so.

[Dominic Nicholls]

Yeah. So it's not. It's not going to be seen anywhere in Russia. So I wonder if they've allowed.

[Francis Sternley]

Allowed a bit of leakage, maybe. Not sure I'd want to call the boss a war criminal, though. No, interesting. An interesting story and one, of course, we will continue to monitor. Now, today's guest is Sir Lawrence Friedman, professor of War Studies at King's College London from 1982 to 2014, and widely considered Britain's leading expert on military strategy. In his latest book on Strategists and Collected Essays, 2014, 2024, there are several dedicated to the war Ukraine. And in the interview you're about to hear, we talk about some of his insights on the mistakes made by world leaders on all sides, as well as his reading of the overall strategic picture. Four years into Europe's bloodiest war since the World wars, this is our conversation. Well, Sir, Lawrence, thank you very much for joining Ukraine. The latest. Again, I'm looking forward to hearing your insights very much. First of all, before we get into your book and the essays that you've written on Ukraine, I have to ask, what's your more strategic assessment of where we are in the war in Ukraine as 2026 properly gets going?

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

So until a few weeks ago, you'd have simply said in a far better place than at a similar time in 2025. I think the Ukrainians have held back a sustained Russian offensive that's actually been going for well over two years now. They denied Russia major gains. Russia did advance, but not sufficient to reach Putin's basic objectives, which is to show that he can control Donetsk even if the Ukrainians don't hand it over. I think the negotiation trackers was coming to an end or was petering out. But what's changed over the past year is that the US doesn't have that much leverage over Ukraine anymore because it provides it with so little, which is a bad thing. But it means that Ukraine can protect its interests more easily. And Europe, by and large, has stood up reasonably well. The Ukrainian development of drones over the past year has been extraordinary. All types, interceptors, ground based, short range, long range, whatever. And this has had the sort of transformational effect we were talking about is now sort of happening. I mean, it works both ways. Obviously, Russia has a pretty effective drones operation as well. But I think what we've seen over the past couple of months is that Ukraine has managed to push the Russians back a bit. This is not a full blown counteroffensive. I mean, we're talking about a part of the front which is very porous for both sides. It's pretty likely. And there's not a lot of people there. There's not a lot of settlements, not a lot of barriers. But what it has done is this is what President Zelensky claimed has disrupted Russian plans for their spring offensive, which no doubt will still take place. But it is disrupted. And the Ukrainians are making claims about possibly taking out more Russians than can now be recruited, as well as in February, recovering more land than with than was lost. So in that sense, it's not great in the sense that it's not a full blown counteroffensive. They're not liberating lots of territory. But it's certainly a lot better than it was and encourages the view that Russia really should look harder to cease fire rather than make these sort of outrageous claims that Ukraine must hand over territory. Russia has failed to Achieve. Now, the fly in the ointment is obviously the Iran war, and that's had a couple of adverse effects, one potentially positive, the adverse obvious one is there's a windfall for Russia. The gap in their defence budget and their national budget is likely to be filled this year. If it carries on like this, it won't be as pronounced as it was at least, and so that helps them. Meanwhile, I mean, the Ukrainians have had to watch while a vast amount of expensive kit has been used by the Americans, by the Israelis, by the Gulf states and so on, which they could have really used. I mean, the standard thing to point out is the 800 Patriots that were used in the first few days of the war when Ukraine was handed 600 for the last four years. So they're a bit rueful about that. And then I suppose, the slight positive, but we'll see what happens, is that Ukraine has now got a couple of hundred people in the Gulf advising. So I suspect this may turn out to be not the start, because it's already started, but actually a significant boost to Ukrainian defense industry. And although Trump is dismissive because he obviously can't bear the idea that he's dependent upon the Ukrainians for anything and is still prepared to play down Russian support for Iran, the Pentagon is interested, but most importantly the Saudis and Emiratis and even the Israelis. So in that sense, I think in the long term it could even be a positive, but in the short term, it's clearly not helpful. I don't think it makes a vast difference to what's going on on the ground. It will take a while before the impact feeds through.

[Francis Sternley]

Do you foresee any scenario in which the war in Iran could end in a favorable way for Ukraine and for the wider Western world? If, say, Iran is brought closer as a result of this to the United States or to other entities, that would mean it becomes an energy exporter and that would have presumably quite significant ramifications for Russia's economy. I mean, is that a scenario that's still on the table? People are pondering whether that would be possible maybe two weeks ago. It doesn't feel likely now.

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Well, you might have talked about it at the start, but I think as things have developed, you'd have to be very, very optimistic to see that coming soon. I mean, the moment the regime has held its ground. It clearly had thought about succession issues. Unsurprisingly, it did what anybody who'd looked at this issue knew it was likely to do with such a severe set of attacks which is to close the straight to formus attack with Gulf states. I think it feels at the moment it's got the upper hand. I mean, not it doesn't, I mean it doesn't in one set, it's losing vast amounts of facilities. Israelis and Americans have got command of the air and so on. So it's, it doesn't look, it doesn't look like it's, it's winning in that sense, but it's got the, it's holding the international economy hostage. So I think this is going to create enormous pressure to close it off quite soon. But you know, Iran will now want something in return. Rather than Iran being turned into sort of a bit of the West, I think they're going to be expecting some concessions from the U.S. i mean, my view remains that the regime is doomed or at least is a lot of trouble simply because it doesn't have any money, the currency's worthless and it can't provide basic services for its people. And it's desperately unpopular. But it can withstand this. So I'm not very optimistic in the short term here either.

[Francis Sternley]

I agree with you. Well, let's turn to the essays in your new collection. And running through, there are three, I believe, that focus predominantly on Ukraine and that's what we're going to talk about today. The first is called Strategic Vladimir Putin and Ukraine. You use that term and I'd be interested for you to unpack it for us, describing, as you say, Putin's fixation with Ukraine almost as soon as he began his second stint as president in 2012 led to calamitous errors of strategic judgment. Now, this was written several years ago now, but do you still agree with that assessment and what's your sense of where we're headed if that is a strategic error still?

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Well, I mean, so the reason is it's a strategic error and nothing can recover the that I don't think, unless there is a complete collapse of Ukraine, which I don't think is likely to happen, is that if you go right back to the start, which I put in 2013 when the Association Agreement with the EU was being mooted and about to be signed by President Yanukovych, Russia had the most pro Russian Ukrainian president it was likely to get, who'd promised not to join NATO, who preserved the status of the Russian language, all the sort of things he's complaining about since. Yet he undermined Yanukovych because Yanukovych felt he should sign the association agreement. And though in the end Yanukovych backed off because of the damage Russia did in a very short time to the Ukrainian economy. He undermined the government, which ended up with the revolution of dignity and Yanukovych eventually running away. And since every time a big decision has had to be made, he's doubled down. Instead of cutting his losses, he's doubled down. So a good example which I think is almost as important to date in the history of the war as September 22, when the Ukrainians began the month with quite a significant counteroffensive in Kharkiv. It ended the month with Putin annexing four additional oblasts in addition to Crimea. The next Lance Zapovitz and Kherson partial mobilization, changing the command structures and putting the economy more on a war footing, which kept him in the. I mean, it meant avoided a totally embarrassing loss. It hasn't actually given him victory. A madness. Even when there have been moments since then, since our essay was written. In fact, there have been other moments when he might have. For example, when Trump came in when he had an opportunity to get a pretty favorable deal, he couldn't bring himself to make the concession, which wasn't a big one, just to accept he wasn't likely to get much more territory. And the result, if you just sort of stand back from a Russian strategic perspective, they've lost, if you believe the numbers well over a million killed and wounded. Their civilian infrastructure has been deprived of funds. The economy will never quite recover from this. The demography has obviously taken another which is already going down. Sweden and Finland have joined NATO. European countries are now quite happy that Germany has revived as a major military power and he's wholly dependent upon China. I don't think this is a great strategic gain. Now he'll present it as NATO was after us and we've managed to survive. But that wasn't the case. And I think most Russians know that wasn't the case.

[Francis Sternley]

And that would presumably be an off ramp that he could sell at any point that he could say, look, we battered off and he hasn't chosen to do so.

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

I don't claim to be a close follower of Russia Russian opinion, but what one sees from Nevada and other groups is that most Russians really would. I mean, they'll support the. They'll support the government. I mean, they'll accept that Ukraine behave badly and are irresponsible and deserve to be brought to heel, but they really would like the war over and are very frustrated that it's still going on. I may now be facing more mobilization.

[Francis Sternley]

Well, indeed, that's something We've reflected on, on the podcast, at the end of the essay, you write, when the end of this war is discussed, it will only be the end of stage, especially if it involves partition. For Putin, there can be no lasting peace without a serpine government in Kyiv. Equally for Ukraine, it is hard to imagine a lasting peace so long as Putin remains in power. Do you still stand by that?

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Yep. I haven't changed my view. I mean, I think Putin's problem, and it explains the original strategic logic behind the invasion in February 22, was that it isn't good enough really to take the Donbas, especially now, because the problem has got even worse, because now you've got ruined territory. I mean, full of unexploded ordnance, cities that have been battered to pieces, barely economically active, depopulated, has to be policed, has to be defended. If there's no more than a ceasefire, and that's quite a burden. So if you don't have a supine government in Kyiv, then you've got a problem, because you know that there will be a revanchist element within Ukraine that will be wondering when they'll get a chance to recover their territory. So at least I suspect that. And I think that's why he's had a problem with accepting a ceasefire, because it doesn't really solve the strategic problem. It gets him out of the current losses, but it leaves them with a strategic problem which is exactly the same that was there four and a bit years ago.

[Francis Sternley]

Well, the next essay in the new collection is called Escalation, Red Lines, Risk and the Russo Ukraine War. This, I think, is my favorite of all of them because it really gets into the weeds of errors made by policymakers throughout this war on both sides, but particularly, I think, the Americans and the European with regards to the fear of atomic weapons and the escalation ladder. Perhaps you can just unpack for us what you think the defining error was.

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah, I think. I mean, it starts with a perfectly reasonable point that we can accept that if Russia was not a nuclear power, NATO, I suspect, would be fully involved by now. We have been deterred and we were going to be deterred. Deterred. Equally, they've been deterred by. From attacking NATO countries. So in that sense, nuclear deterrence works as you would expect. I think the pro. So I don't think it was ever unreasonable for Biden to say, we will support Ukraine, but we're not going to get involved ourselves. Where it went wrong, I think, was in assuming that there were particular things that could trigger an extraordinarily violent and disproportionate Russian reaction, that is potentially nuclear use. This went from Ukraine moving on to the offensive, Ukraine attacking targets in Russia. Well, all of these things has happened, but it MEANT that the U.S. worried about moving from defensive to offensive systems, worried about moving to long range systems, worried about authorizing attacks on targets in Russia. And you know, you can make a case that this was sort of became a sort of incremental slippage so that things that might have produced a mega crisis if they'd been done all at once didn't, because they all happened in sort of a sequence. It held the Ukrainians back. And I think it meant the wrong questions were asked. The Biden administration didn't ask at the start, what is it that we need to do to help Ukraine win, given that we're not going to be fighting side by side. So that if, for example, better equipment had gone in in the summer of 22, then Ukraine might have been able to follow up the Kharkiv offensive that September. But as it was, it sort of petered out, out because they just didn't have the capacity to follow through. So I think it was damaging. I mean, the other part of the essay is to point out that actually if you look carefully at Russian statements to be sure you have the sort of manic Medvedev comments which he threatens Armageddon at each stage. But Putin's actually been pretty cautious. He's been very clear about the circumstances in which, and even then he never quite specifies it, nuclear use might be considered. They always talk in much less specific terms. And it's basically if NATO starts fighting directly in the war. He's made claims, for example, when Storm Shadow started to be used against targets well within Russia, that, you know, the British weren't actually doing the firing or directly, directly responsible. So I think the other part of it, methodologically, I suppose the issue which I've always believed quite strongly, is that when you're looking at Putin, even with Trump, you have to look at what they actually say. And Trump, it's harder because he changes his mindset. And Putin tends to be quite consistent. I mean, he tends too consistent. He's very stubborn. But if you read what he says, then you can follow the line of this thought.

[Francis Sternley]

I think you make an excellent point in the essay about the escalation ladder, that the assumption is always in strategic thinking. It seems that one escalation only goes one way, that it spirals. But actually you say that escalation can be de, escalated as well, and so if there had been concerns, then there may have been. Could have been things, but there was never. There was always an assumption that you could never even take one step. You could never tiptoe and risk it.

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Yeah, I think there was an automaticity in it, which I think was. Is always misleading. I mean, these are big choices, and governments know their big choices, and they take them, by and large, I hope they take them carefully, even Russia. So I think we got sort of consumed by our own fears now, you know, I'll have to acknowledge it's easier for me to say that than the president of the United States. I mean, but, I mean, it's not a lone view of mine. I think it was. There was a lot of frustration, not only in Ukraine, but also with. In parts of the US Government that not enough was being done. A critical moment when a lot was done. And you don't, you know, compared with Trump, obviously, masses, but they held the Ukrainians back at critical moments.

[Francis Sternley]

Yes. And in the essay, you also say how a better approach would have been to start with the situation that Putin faced and the options available to him, by which, you know, using atomic warheads, would have been the least compelling. And I think that's a very important point, actually, to put pull out here is that everybody was so afraid, and I remember that time very vividly was so afraid to even talk about the risk of escalation because there was this sort of absolute fear that even to speak its name was to make it a reality, when actually, as you say, it's not the most compelling thing that

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Putin would consider the option was a pretty bad one. It doesn't necessarily solve your problem. And the Russians never actually threatened Ukraine with nuclear weapons. They threatened the west, but they didn't threaten Ukraine. Now, there was at one point some chatter that was picked up, the Russian generals talking about tactical nuclear weapons. And I think that this alarmed people even more. But the basic position had been established well before then. And, you know, in the end, they sort of got to the Chinese, and the Chinese made it clear to the Russians that they thought nuclear war would be a bad idea and so on. Put it in the greed.

[Francis Sternley]

Yes. Well, the final essay in the collection is called Beyond Deterrence, and this is also, I think, a very important one regarding the way in which Russia would set red lines that were crossed without consequence. But the west never laid any red lines down. It seemed that at every point, there was always a reluctance to do so. And you said the levels and forms of Western support for Ukraine have not Been made condition on Russian behavior. I mean, we're talking often about the war as it was. But do you think it's too late for us to try and set down some red lines now?

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

I think the war is in a very different stage to it was in the earlier stages. I mean, the front line is sort of fuzzy. The two big campaigns, in addition to the fighting on the ground, are the Russian attacks on. On Ukrainian infrastructure and cities, increasing Ukrainian attacks. And the Ukrainians are doing a lot of it themselves. I mean, these are their missiles and their drones, by and large. Not always, but a lot of them are theirs. So I think that point was more relevant early on. And the obvious thing would have been, if you attack Ukrainian cities, these are the things we will do. I mean, that was the obvious one and I may have missed something, but I don't recall that ever being said. It was deplored when they, when they did attack, but I don't recall any explicit warning that this is going to lead to a surge of Western equipment to Ukraine, for example, and they could have done that. Now, whether it would have deterred, I don't know. But it. We didn't even try and we've never. We sort of got in the position where because Russia is the aggressor, we assume it'll just carry on aggressing. And in a way, you can't say that bit of aggression is okay and a bit beyond that is terrible. It's all terrible. So it's quite difficult to find the language. But if you're trying to contain the conflict, which was the point about Biden's original policy, then saying there are certain things which, if you do, we will respond vigorously.

[Francis Sternley]

Well, I think it's fair to assume that no expert, even one as distinguished as yourself, would be able to persuade President Trump to see things differently. So I'm going to slightly change my question and think about it in terms of the Europeans. If you had the ear of every European leader now, Sir Lawrence, what would your advice be to them to move this war forward in a positive direction for them?

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Strategically, I think the policy is fine. I mean, I think the basic lines of policy are set and defined. We'll support Ukraine, we'll help with its financing, we'll back it when it comes to negotiations? I think we've been incredibly slow, particularly in the uk, I fear, to just sort out our own defence industry and procurement and so on. So we need to do a lot more with that. I thought for some time that the Europeans should begin to take a lead in the diplomacy as well. Now, Macron sort of started on this and got rebuffed by the Russians because obviously they prefer to deal with Trump than Macron or Starmer or Merz or whoever. But Trump's losing interest and he's got other problems now. So I think, and I wouldn't do it on a sort of leader to leader basis, I think the American effort has been pretty amateurish in terms of the way that they've gone about mediating. You could organize a very different one, which you're quite explicit that we're going to try and work out a deal with the Ukrainians. We'll provide technical expertise, the problems of dealing with this, of going through this. But we don't see it as our job to hold the ring between the Russians and the Ukrainians. But we do want to help. You know, we'll help you try to find a way out of this. Now, I don't think we're there at the moment, but I think we should be thinking about it because I think the Russians probably as perplexed by Trump as the rest of us and not quite sure what he can do and how to handle. I think the Russians still assume that Trump can persuade Ukraine to do things it doesn't want in a way nobody else can. I actually think that moment's probably passed, too.

[Francis Sternley]

So do you think to wrap up before I give you the floor for anything else we've not talked about? Do you think that Ukraine is in a stronger position now than it's been for some time?

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Yes. I mean, without wishing to overstate it, I mean, you know, Ukraine suffered terribly. It's lost a lot of people. It had a miserable winter. I don't think they look forward to an even longer war with any enthusiasm, but they've done remarkably well. And there is a confidence about their leadership, I think, at a variety of levels of command that I don't think one saw a year or two ago go, and that's important. The defense minister, they promoted a lot of younger people into key command positions who are technologically savvy and so on before. I think the drone warfare effort has been extraordinary. It may be overhyped at times, but even if it's overhyped, it's still pretty extraordinary. So I do think they're in a better position in the end. The key decision has to be taken in Moscow, Bill, and that's a problem because Putin is stubborn and because he doesn't want to admit that this has been a terrible mistake. So in that sense, I don't see a quick end, but if Putin made the decision, it could end quite quickly. And just there is another interesting question which isn't touched on in the book at all, but has struck me more over the last year and the Institute for the Study of War makes a point in of it, which is the extraordinary claims that are made by the Russians, particularly Gerasimov, which are just parroted by Putin, which constantly exaggerates the extent of Russian advances, which then becomes embarrassing when you get Kupyavsk in particular. And I just find it perplexing because it leaves open this issue issue going back to Putin being a bad strategist, how much he actually knows what's going on. I mean, he doesn't browse the Internet himself. He seems to rely on quite a narrow group of advisors. Gerasimov has been there forever. I mean, sure, he was moved, but he still seems to be around. So who's telling him? Nobody. And I think the issue is to some extent, at what point does the reality of the war cut through? Actually, despite all the claims, they haven't really done that much over the last year or two.

[Francis Sternley]

Well, thank you very much Sir Lawrence, for talking to Ukraine the latest and we look forward to having you on again soon. I recommend to everybody listening to read your essays on this subject and to continue to read your work, which we always do and it always provides so much insight. So thank you very much for your time.

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

I was very kind of you. Thanks a lot. Take care.

[David Knowles]

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[Francis Sternley]

Well, John, where do you want to leave listeners today?

[Dominic Nicholls]

Well, I am intrigued about this whole spring offensive thing. If this is what we are looking at, the casualty figures the last couple of days have been through the roof. 1500 plus. If that carries on for another few days, I think we should conclude that there is a Russian spring offensive ongoing, but it's not doing anything yet. Ukraine is able to they're holding the line. In fact, they're taking ground back down in the southwest following on from these limited counter attacks that we we've been reporting since the Starlink shutdown. So if this is a spring offensive, it's failed or it is failing. I think it will take a few more days to say it has failed. But it is staggering, the numbers of casualties and the Greece for the. Well, the no land that has been gained.

[Francis Sternley]

Absolutely. And we know those figures are almost certainly accurate because President Zelenskyy was showing off the technology the Ukrainians use only this week in Parliament. But because it's been far too long since we've referenced an obscure German philosopher on the POD over the weekend I was reading the Telegraph obituary of Jurgen Habermas, who's died aged 96. Widely considered in Germany the most important philosopher of the post war era. He sought to present a comprehensive general social theory which reached across the philosophy of language expounded by Wittgenstein. Yes, the corpus of Western Marxism, American pragmatism, the sociology of Max Weber, Dirkheimianism, functionalism and Kant and Schmidt, and the liberal political theorists such as Rawls. But don't worry, we're not going to get into all of that exciting stuff today. I wanted to mention him because we've done so much background on this podcast that reflects on what it takes for a country to change direction. And I think his life offers some insights on that. Habermas was 15 when World War II ended. Nazi society was the only one he had known. Then the Nuremberg trials began and the first documentary films about the concentration camps were screened. He said this in response our whole history was suddenly cast in a light that made all its essential elements appear radically different. All at once we saw that we had been living in a political criminal system. I had never imagined that before then. As a young student, Habermas felt that he had to find a way out of the spiritual ruins of Germany and articulate some kind of vision of a society where the Holocaust could never happen again. He became convinced that the spiritual fragmentation and alienation which in his view had given rise to Nazism were of a social and rational nature, arguing that people had to become the autonomous authors of their own opinions and treat others on the same basis. His ideas have been extremely influential in Western philosophy, but especially in Germany. But almost as interesting, I think, is what his life tells us about how transformative being confronted with the truth of a society's sins can be both individually and collectively. That may well prove instructive in the years ahead, but that's all we've got time for today. Thanks wherever you're listening from around the world. Goodbye from us for now.

[Dominic Nicholls]

Thanks everybody.

[Francis Sternley]

Ukraine the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles. Every episode featuring us in the studio maps and battlefield footage is now available to watch on our YouTube channel. Subscribe at www.YouTube.com Crainethelatest. There's a link in the description. You can also sign up to the Ukraine the Latest newsletter. Each week we answer your questions, provide recommended reading and give exclusive analysis and behind the scenes insights plus diagrams of the front lines and weaponry to complement our reporting. It's free for everyone, including non subscribers. You can find the link to sign up in the episode description. If you appreciate our work, please consider following Ukraine the Latest on your preferred podcast podcast app and leave us a review as it helps others find the show. Please also share it with those who may not be aware we exist. You can also get in touch directly to ask questions or give comments by emailing ukrainepodelegraph.co.uk we continue to read every message. You can also contact us directly on X. You'll find our handles in the description. As ever, we're especially interested to hear where you're listening from from around the world and finally, to support our work and stay on top of all of our Ukraine news, analysis and dispatches from the ground. Please subscribe to the Telegraph. You can get one month for free, then two months for just one pound at www.telegraph.co.uk Ukraine the latest Ukraine the Latest was Today produced by Rachel Porter. Executive producers are Francis Dernley, Louisa Wells and David Knowles.

[David Knowles]

My name is David Knowles.

[Sir Lawrence Friedman]

Thank you all for listening.

[Dominic Nicholls]

Goodbye.

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[David Knowles]

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[Dominic Nicholls]

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