B (2:34)

It's Tuesday the 18th of February, two years and 354 days since the full scale invasion began and today I'm joined by the Telegraph's Executive Editor for audio, Francis Durnley and Ilona Humileva, Secretary of the Economic Security Council of of Ukraine. I started with the latest on the military situation in Ukraine and Russia. Of course the big news today is on the diplomatic front with the meeting in Saudi Arabia between Russia and the US where they just finished holding actually so called Peace talks. The meetings, we're told, broke up about 30 minutes ago after four and a half hours of talks. Bloomberg are saying that they've discussed a possible Trump Putin meet. But the Russian representative there, Ushakov, next to Lavrov, said it is difficult to name a specific date. He said the talks went quite well, but then he couldn't really say anything else if he wanted to walk with confidence to any future Kremlin meeting not happening on the ground floor. Now, unsurprisingly, Russia has stuck to the usual negotiation script of demand the maximum, play the victim, don't give an inch. Talk this morning in Saudi Arabia of blocking Ukraine from joining NATO not being enough to secure peace. Any peace deal is impossible without addressing the wider security issues. Blah, blah, blah. These build on comments from the Russian representative to the UN Yesterday that Ukraine has irrevocably lost Crimea and in his words, the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics, as well as Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, despite obviously not holding all the land in those last four. This is new. Benza, Russia's UN Rep. He also reiterated the old Kremlin lying that Ukraine must conduct elections before the implementation of any peace agreements, continuing efforts to falsely portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate. And then just on that theme, in a statement today, Dmitry Peskov said Putin has made it clear on several occasions that he's willing to negotiate with Zelensky if the situation demands it. Nonetheless, any legal agreements would need thorough discussion taking into account the potential challenge to Zelenskyy's legitimacy. I mean, it's just rubbish. There's no challenge to his legitimacy. It's just a narrative that they're pushing. They're trying to suggest that it's an objective fact that Zelenskyy is illegitimate. We're going to hear more of it. We've said that before, so just buckle up, folks. This is just the start. Now more on all those negotiations and the wider diplomatic front from France is shortly. I'll just urge you, just remember this is a typical Russian Soviet mentality. Don't get despondent, folks, when you see these news headlines. Don't feel powerless. Just arm yourself with information. Now, speaking of that on the ground in Ukraine and Russia, minor moves by Russia to the west of Khurukov in the Donbas. No move in Kursk Oblast. I wonder if that came up in the chat today between Marco Rubio and Sergei Lavrov. We did. However, today get some more detail on that Ukrainian strike overnight Sunday Monday and the Ilsky oil refinery in Russia's Krasnodar Krai region. That's east of the Kirch Bridge. And also the. Oh, crikey, I've been practising this all morning. Kropontkinskaya oil pumping station just to the east of that. Now, the head of Ukraine's center for Combating Disinformation, that's Andrey Kovalenko, he said seven drones had struck the pumping station, the largest such site in the Caspian pipeline consortium, and that had led authorities to take the station and out of operation for a brief time. Russia's MOD today send their forces downed 70 Ukrainian drones overnight, including 24 over that Krasnodal Krai region, although no further details given there about what happened and any battle damage assessment inside Ukraine. Russian attacks against Ukraine killed two injured 26 civilians over the last day. According to Ukraine's air force, Russia launched 176 drones at Ukraine overnight. These obviously, as these quote, unquote, peace talks are going on. They were launched from the Russian cities of Orel, Bryansk, Kursk, Shatilovo, Milorovo and Primorsk at task as well as Russian occupied Crimea. It's clear that they're interested in peace. Ukraine's air Defence shot down 103 with another 67 brought down by electronic warfare or just decoys. But that meant that six did get through. Now there are more. In another report, more alleged executions by Russian troops. Ukraine Ukrainian ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets said yesterday that three surrendering Ukrainian prisoners of war in an unspecified location were executed after a Russian commander was seen giving the order to kill two of them. Again, we report these when we can. A couple more for me. A Ukrainian draft officer injured yesterday was injured in a violent attack in the city of Zhovka. That's to the north of Lviv, right over in the west of the country, whilst he was escorting two mobilized individuals to a medical evaluation. The individual, the man, was attacked with a knife or some other kind of bladed object. The suspects in the case got away, fled the scene. Investigators have launched inquiries. They believe the likely motive was to help one of the escorted conscripts escape the draft officer. But that's the latest in a series of recent attacks against military enlistment officers. Now then, Francis, as I say, I want to move quickly through the battlefield updates because you're in the spotlight today. European countries, we are told, have found themselves, quote, at a separate kids table in the negotiations on Ukraine because of insufficient investment in their defense. This comes from Armin Papage. Who's the chief executive of Rheinmetall, speaking to the Financial Times, an interview published today. Is that your reading of the current situation and what else is is the latest on the diplomatic front?

A (8:20)

Well, thanks, Dom. Many will argue that is indeed an accurate summary. But first of all, let's just pick up from where we were yesterday with European leaders dashing to Paris for that emergency summit to discuss their response to the approach adopted by the United States. So Keir Starmer, the British prime minister, had declared that London would be willing to put troops on the ground in the event of a peace deal, echoing similar sentiments by French President Emmanuel Macron and the Swedish government. But after that meeting, Olaf Scholz, Germany's chancellor, said that suggestion was completely premature, highly inappropriate, and that he was a little irritated. Indeed. Germany, Spain and surprisingly, Poland all signalled reluctance to deploy troops to Ukraine as part of that settlement, pledging support in terms of logistics and political support to countries that will possibly want to provide such guarantees in in the future. Those were the remarks by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Now, Scholz seems to be more outraged at the discussions about European security happening over the heads of the talks taking place between Russia and the US Than the fact that those talks between Russia and the US Are taking place over the heads of the Europeans. The Chancellor insisted that discussions on possible European troop deployments were being held over the heads of the Ukrainians and that possible peace talk being discussed. At the moment, they haven't even started. This is highly inappropriate, to put it bluntly and honestly. We don't even know what the outcome will be there. I think many can guess, Mr. Schultz. But anyway, many other countries, including the Netherlands, are also said to be undecided. So major splits remain. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutter was also in attendance, posting this morning that Europe is ready and willing to take a leadership role in providing Ukraine with security guarantees. It's ready and willing to step up to lead in providing security guarantees for Ukraine, ready and willing to invest a lot more in our security. The details will need to be decided, but the commitment is clear. Now. Bear in mind that Mr. Rutte is going to be split now divided between the Europeans and the Americans. He's going to be trying to keep the Americans on side while perhaps being sympathetic to the European position and crisis. So a very difficult maneuvering act he will have to be playing. There are real concerns, as the Financial Times report today, that Putin wants NATO troops removed from the whole of the former Soviet empire. Trump is, they think, likely to potentially agree to withdrawing U.S. troops from the Baltics and perhaps further west, leaving the EU vulnerable to a Russian army that NATO governments warn is preparing for a larger conflict beyond Ukraine. That, of course, being the view of many intelligence services, as we reported on the podcast over the past three years. As such, the German press are claiming that the EU is preparing a multi billion euro package, perhaps as much as 700 billion euros, to buy weapons for Ukraine. Officials say the plan will be revealed only after the German election on February 23rd. To avoid controversy, Berlin's Foreign Minister Baerbock hinted that a package of unprecedented scale is. Is coming. But again, we return to the perennial question to achieve what. What are Europe's objectives in Ukraine? As Franz Stephan Gady at the Institute for Strategic Studies writes, that's where Dom was last week. The first step surely should be to define our European objectives in Ukraine and access how vital they are to Europe's security. Only then can we determine what we are willing to risk. The second step is to outline a coherent operational plan, and the third to identify the required forces, the mandate in which they would operate and the duration of their deployment. We are working backwards. He goes on. The longer we delay this debate, particularly in Berlin, the more apparent it becomes that either Germany does not view Ukraine as crucial to Europe's security architecture, as its rhetoric suggests, or that there is genuine decision paralysis driven by fear of committing to a military mission without direct US military support. So big fissures remain, and it looks more and more likely that there will have to be some kind of coalition of the willing formed that is willing to be more decisive, though they would be acting for the good of Europe. I'm thinking here of countries like Britain. Britain would not be in the direct sense, conventional warfare sense, threatened in the short term by Russia. Certain countries on the eastern flank would be. And yet those countries may not be all of them willing to act as decisively as London might. That is a cause of, well, concern, but also may well be the reality that we are in here. But let's turn to the other major summit of the moment that taking place between the US and Russia in Saudi Arabia, formulating a peace proposal for the war over the heads of Europe and Ukraine. We've now had our first picture from inside the room where those officials met for talks. Sitting at the top of a long brown table are two Saudi officials sitting in front of U.S. and Russian flags. Pretty extraordinary in and of itself. Also in the room were Mike Waltz, the White House National Security Advisor, Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, and Steve Witkoff, the Middle east envoy. It's a striking image. It really feels it belongs to a different age. Great powers determining the futures of free peoples. At the stroke of a pen, Putin is ready to talk to President Zelensky if necessary, he said, which was good of him today, with Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesperson, saying Putin had repeatedly said that he is ready to speak about peace, but that Moscow's wider security issues must be addressed first. To give that quote in full, he said Putin himself said that he would be ready to negotiate with Zelenskyy if necessary, but the legal basis of agreements needs discussion. Considering the reality that Zelenskyy's legitimacy can be questioned. Pretty extraordinary coming from Moscow, but nonetheless speaks to their strategy here of undermining President Zelenskyy and his position and legitimacy in in Ukraine. Now, interestingly, the Kremlin also tried to dangle a carrot to act that they are behaving in good faith, they said. With regard to Ukraine joining the eu, it is the sovereign right of any country, but it is completely different when it comes to security issues and military alliances. Here we have a different approach that is well known. Clearly, Moscow favors the idea that if it has to agree to anything, it is the idea of Ukraine joining the EU at some point. But it would be presumably of a Ukraine that is more like Hungary and Slovakia politically than one that is as westward leaning as this current administration. And it bears repeating that EU membership is not something that until now has been considered as being at all likely. In the medium term, will that be something that is accelerated? Perhaps. But to say that there are no security aspects of EU membership is also inaccurate. There are some, and we'll of course be returning to that at some point very soon, I imagine. In terms of this summit, though, nothing else concrete has come out as yet. But the Telegraph yesterday published the details of Trump's demand for a $500 billion payback from Ukraine for its support in the war. It goes far beyond US control over the country's critical minerals. It covers everything from ports and infrastructure to oil and gas and the larger resource base of the country. As our writer Ambrose Evans Pritchard writes, the terms of the contract that landed at Zelenskyy's office a week ago amount to the U.S. economic colonization of Ukraine in legal perpetuity. It implies a burden of reparations that cannot possibly be achieved. The US will take 50% of recurring revenues received by Ukraine from the extraction of resources and 50% of the financial value of all new licenses issued to third parties for the future monetization of resources. There will be a Lewin on view of revenues in favor of the US that clause means pay us first and then feed your children, said one source close to the negotiations. Ambrose goes on this states that for all future licenses, the US Will have a right of first refusal for the purchase of exportable minerals. Washington will have sovereign immunity and acquire near total control over most of Ukraine's commodity and resource economy. The fund shall have the exclusive right to establish the method, selection criteria, terms and conditions of all future licenses and projects. It seems to have been written by private lawyers, not the U.S. departments of state or Commerce. And he wraps up by saying President Zelenskyy himself proposed the idea of giving the US a direct state in Ukraine's rare earth elements and critical minerals. On a visit to Trump Tower in September, hoping to smooth the way for continued arms deliveries, he calculated that it would lead to US Companies setting operations on the ground, creating a political tripwire that would deter Putin from attacking again. He probably did not expect to be confronted with terms normally imposed on aggressor states defeated in war. They are worse than the financial penalties imposed on Germany and Japan after their defeat in 1945. Most countries were ultimately net recipients of funds from the victorious allies. If this draft were accepted, Trump's demands would amount to a higher share of Ukrainian GDP than reparations imposed on Germany at Versailles. At the same time, he seems to be willing to let Russia off the hook entirely. We'll have a link to that piece in the show. Notes Essential reading I would say at the present moment, it really speaks to just the shift in the White House towards Ukraine, which is, as many have said, vindictive. Frankly, it is clear that this deal could never be accepted. Most likely, the Trump administration are hoping for two outcomes, either a lesser but still massively profitable counteroffer from Kyiv or an outright rejection. Will Trump use that as an excuse, then, to say that the US has been treated unfairly and cut them off? Many think so. Only a week ago, it was the Russian economy that was widely believed the Americans would try to squeeze further. That, after all, was what Trump suggested in his first week of office. But now, at least in the short term, the reverse looks set to happen. The ruble is stabilizing somewhat, the stock market has rallied, and analysts believe that Moscow will be able to avoid sanctions better because Trump has dismantled or crippled agencies that enforce them. And third, countries are more likely to be willing to work with the Russians without fear of consequences. Even if a sharp reverse were to occur in These talks, or further down the line, months of economic buoyancy have just been gifted to the Russians as a result of the White House's actions. That will sharpen the focus of European leaders as they will realise they cannot rely on, on the Russian economy being what ultimately brings this war to a close. Now it will need to be military and political actions, the two areas that Europe has been most hesitant to move on.

B (20:21)

Yeah, thanks, Frances. It's interesting, this stuff about the rare earth minerals that you were discussing there and Ambrose's article. I mean, I think a lot of the deposits are in Ukrainian land currently occupied by Russia. So I'd be very, very interested if there was any, any whiff at all out of these talks of the Americans trying to deal directly with the Russians over access to those minerals. Maybe one to keep an eye on. But just before we move on, Francis, interested in your thoughts on this? Now, you quoted Mark Rutter, NATO Secretary General, earlier on. It was on the sidelines of the Paris summit yesterday, but he was talking about, you know, Europe can do this, Europe is ready to do that, blah, blah, blah. He's the Secretary General of NATO, so why is he now assuming this position of speaking for Europe? Doesn't that just underline that there is no natural leader in Europe right now, especially with regard to defense and security issues? Doesn't that actually undermine in some ways that Europe doesn't have somebody able to speak for it and has to rely on the NATO Secretary General? It puts him in an awkward position, as you say. Where is he between Europe and the us but what do you think? Was this a slip up, do you think, by Mr. Rutter to sort of be speaking as if he was representing Europe?

A (21:39)

I wouldn't go as far as a slip up. I think that he's probably just trying to desperately reassure the United States and others that Europe is willing to act based on the conversations that he has had in those meetings. But I take the point and I agree that the fact is most journalists, politicians have taken those comments and run with them. And which really speaks to the fact that given NATO is now split because of the United States position, that there is, as you say, no natural leader that everybody is waiting to hear clarity from. So we look to NATO, we're looking at the European unionist, La von der Lyon, we're looking at Mark Rutter and that speaks to the, well, crisis that we are in. There is no natural leader of Europe at the moment and there is no natural coalition of leaders of Europe either. Can you imagine if, for example, in different circumstances. Britain, France and Germany all had a coherent, cohesive strategic posture that they were offering. What Mark Ritter would be saying at the moment would be listen to them. But instead he is the one that is posting the statements about what the European position may well become in the coming weeks. It is quite extraordinary and I wonder whether this is ultimately going to be sustainable. Somebody is going to have to fill this void of indecision by decisive action. Keir Starmer has made a first stab at it in terms of the question of some kind of post war settlement that involves troops on the ground. But there needs to be much, much clearer clarity very, very soon, I would wager from Europe in terms of who is leading this effort and what coalitions of powers are willing to act decisively to change the calculations that will be currently being made by Moscow, which will be very, very advantageous to them. Will it be Kaia Kallis? Will it be Ursula von der Leyen? Will it be Emmanuel Macron at last coming off the fence somewhat and acting as opposed to just saying the right things? These are the questions of the moment, but it's certainly based on the reactions of yesterday. It's not going to be led by Germany and it's not going to be led by Poland. It's going to have to be London, it's going to have to be Paris, or it's going to have to be a coalition of powers that have not yet formed. Perhaps, Dom, perhaps as you were saying yester yesterday, using Geoff as the foundation of some kind of new coalition of the willing. But it's a real precarious moment.

B (24:01)

Indeed it is. I would just caution, perhaps to don't write off Germany just yet. They've got elections in 10 days time. Be very interesting to see the outcome of that and what may come of it. But you're right, there's a job vacancy at the moment for some European to step up and be the talking head on all this. Now, in that vein, this morning I went over to the Institute for Government, that's a think tank here in central London, right next to St James's palace in central London, just a stone's throw from Buckingham Palace. But don't throw stones at Buckingham palace is my advice. Now, John Healey was there, the British Defense Secretary talked about a range of things. I won't go through it all, but just pull out a few bits and pieces. I think pertinent to this, he said, this is a quote from John Healy. The decisions that we make right now over the coming weeks will not only define the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine, but the security of our world for a generation to come. Ukraine has the lessons which tell us how we can do things differently in the future, as well as the imperative that tells us we must. European nations need to step up on European security, on defense spending, and on Ukraine, especially over the last year, we've been doing just that. So saying the right things. He was then asked about what the minimum credible force would be that the UK could provide for any peace deterrent force, or whatever you want to call it. I mean, peacekeeping is the shorthand, but of course it's a very loaded term when you say peacekeeping force. So I tried to stay away from it. But anyway, he was asked about a minimum credible force, and he said we need a security guarantee for Ukraine that is capable of delivering what President Trump has pledged that he says he wants, which is a durable peace. Interesting. This is British Defense Secretary almost talking as if Trump is his boss, which, take your pick, anyway, he carries on. That requires an end to the Russian attack and no repeat of that in the future. The European countries have to play a leading part of that guarantee, but require a backstop from the US because in the end, it is only the US that can provide the deterrence to Putin that will prevent him attacking again. The detail of that is being developed. Keir Starmer, Britain's Prime Minister, will discuss that with President Trump when they meet shortly. But the one thing I'm not going to do is discuss details of the work that we're doing. The discussions we're having with allies and with the us Thought that was really interesting. I mean, that absolute deference to the us, Possibly a reflection of military and political reality, but talking about only the US can provide deterrence to Putin. Now, there's a lot of talk in defense and security circles about how independent Britain's nuclear deterrent is when we're talking about deterrence. Let's cut to the chase here. Nuclear deterrence. Now, the firing chain for Britain's missiles is completely independent of the US industry. Not so, because we buy a lot of, you know, a large part of the boats from the U.S. and large parts of the missiles as well. But the actual firing chain is wholly within the gift of the United Kingdom. UK's nuclear deterrent is declared to NATO, and so therefore says that that Britain will, in extremists, use nuclear weapons to defend an attack on any country in the Joint Expeditionary force, because all 10 nations in the Joint Expeditionary Force are in NATO. So they've all agreed this mutual defense clause that an attack on one is an attack on all. They'll all come to each other's mutual aid, up to and including the British nuclear deterrent. So if I was allowed a second question to the British Defence Secretary this morning, but I was not only allowed the one, if I was going to ask a second one, I'd say, well, why doesn't Jeff have a mutual defense clause? Everyone's sort of signed up to that. In principle, you do it through NATO. Why doesn't Jeff have a mutual defence clause to which you can invite Ukraine and that would get away from the difficulties of the US or you know, a Bolshevik, Hungary, Slovakia, etc, etc, why doesn't Jeff have a mutual defense clause? If you're happy to do that under NATO, why not do it under the Jeff umbrella? And of course that goes up to and includes Britain's nuclear deterrent, which if you tell me, mod, that we are entirely independent of the United States in our firing chain and the decisions over the ultimate use of nuclear weapons, well, let's see it then. But this statement today from John Healey was very much couched in, you know, we'll only do it the backstop of the US guarantee from the us Only the US can provide deterrence to Putin anyway, one to continue discussing at length just on that, I said to him, here we go. So I said, if you listen to the signal rather than the noise from Munich and Ramstein, the Americans are saying they'll do China, they expect Europe to do Europe. Why is it still a priority for Britain that we tilt to the Indo Pacific and not Euro Atlantic security? This is the much vaunted admittedly started under the last conservative government about Britain's tilt to the Indo Pacific, which I think was there to flatter ourselves, suppose to catch the American's eye. Not sure they're interested, but it's more to do with Britain feeling brilliant on the world stage. But why tilt to the Indo Pacific and not Euro Atlantic security? He said, we're a nation that's made a commitment to NATO first, blah, blah, blah. He said on the Indo Pacific, the previous government confirmed that the Indo Pacific tilt had been delivered. We have commitments and partnerships which are profound in the Indo Pacific, from Aukus submarine and technology to GCAP next generation fighters to other arrangements. And we can do a contribution to the balance of regional security in the Indo Pacific, in particular to the US and other allies in a variety of ways, technology, industry, diplomacy and military training. We will provide a role fundamentally our first responsibilities in NATO. And that's where my focus is that's where the Prime Minister's focus is. And that was at the heart of the terms of reference to our strategic Defence Review that is ongoing, supposedly reporting in the spring, although I think that's been delayed. So very clear there. He didn't say it, but I think that's the end of the tilt. I think that, well, he said the tilt has been delivered. There's no more tilt. I think Britain is now focusing firmly on Euro Atlantic security. Good. It needs to happen and I think realistically that's all we can do. But I thought that was quite a, quite a. Not an admission. I think it's just a statement of the blindingly obvious. But I do hope the priority for the SCR is Euro Atlantic security and what we can actually do in our part of the world. And that I'm sure will be of more interest to the US in trying to send a carrier strike group to the Indo Pacific carrier strike group basically being shorthand for the entire Royal Navy. FRANCIS There's a lot riding on Prime Minister Starmer's to the US next week to go and visit Donald Trump. But one of the roles of any deterrent force that we're talking about, peacekeeping force, deterrent force, what have you, would be to actually keep eyes on what Russia is up to, movement in the ground, air and sea. Now, that might take a huge amount of troops, big number of troops, perhaps more than Europe is prepared or able to stump up. But you have also been looking at how the cyber domain and artificial intelligence might be able to play a role here. Would you like to introduce our guest?

A (30:47)

Francis thanks, Tom. Yes, I'm delighted to welcome our guest, Ilona Humilev, Secretary of the Economic Security Council of Ukraine. That was the institution established in 2021 to identify and counter internal and external threats to Ukraine's economic security. She's worked closely with the Parliament of Ukraine and the office of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. ILONA There are many in Europe who still seem to think that the danger from Russia is limited largely to conventional warf and therefore that as long as Article 5 holds, then European security is assured. But that seems to underestimate the evolving importance of hybrid warfare using AI and other cutting edge technology, which has been deployed now for many years by Moscow. And that's on top of the other acts of sabotage that we've covered on this podcast. So I wonder if I can ask you what are the most serious cases of that which we've seen in the Ukraine context and what might that reveal about the longer term dangers to wider Western security if Moscow succeeds with its ambitions for Ukraine. Welcome.

C (31:59)

Hello. Thank you very much for having me today and thanks a lot for the previous discussion. Very important to have these talks about the geopolitical changes and given all these possible decisions about ceasefire or peace talks or whatever, it is important to have in mind that the Russian aggression is not only in the conventional mode, it's also the hybrid dimension. And this hybrid dimension also demonstrates us that the Russian aggression is going on not only against Ukraine, but actually it's already ongoing, both against the US and the eu, against the NATO states. So for me it's very important to see that the hybrid aggression against Ukraine, for example, began earlier than the classical aggression. And even before 2014 we already faced some hybrid attacks, including economic coercion and including cyber attacks. If we are talking about the full scale invasion, the cyber attacks began several days before the actual attacks against Ukraine. And they covered our military sector, including the Ministry of Defense, but also some other sectors, including banking. So we saw that these attacks were used to make Ukrainians afraid of the aggression more, but also they were very much correlated with other attacks in other dimensions. So a very good example from my point of view is the attack against Ukrainian civil infrastructure. And actually there were a series of such cyber attacks during winter 2022, 2023, when there were also huge missile attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. For the. So we saw a real correlation between different dimensions of the aggression. And we also understood that some cyber attacks are not just some abstract attacks against Ukrainian militaries, for example, or some special services, but actually against the civil population. Another very good example of the severe attack is the cyber attack against Ukrainian largest telecom operator Kievstar, which took place last year. And actually it led to the destruction of about 40% of its supporting infrastructure. For you just to understand why it is important for Ukraine, it's not only about some communication services, of course it is important, but also this telecom operator is used by many people to achieve the information, to gain the information about raid alerts. So it's also the part of security infrastructure and that is why it was very negative for a big part of Ukrainians. What I also want to say is that we conducted a big research of the different attacks in different dimensions of the Russian Federation. And what we saw is that they are correlated first and that they are also sometimes committed against Ukrainian allies. For example, we saw a lot of situations when some European parliaments were voting in favor of of Ukraine and at the same day there were cyber attacks against such Parliaments, it's very political example, but there are a lot of other examples which are much less political. We also understand that cyber incidents have affected the global financial sector. So, for example, according to the International Monetary fund, they caused 12 billion in direct losses for the past two decades. So by telling this, I'm trying to say that, for example, the Russian Federation could also use these cyber attacks to ruin the adversary state, national economies, and actually it's their usual tactic, and maybe the last for the intro, but not least is that I think that in the European vision and in the US vision, like information domain and cyber domain sometimes are assessed not together, but if we look in the doctrine of the Russian Federation, so the information attacks and the cyber attacks are always interconnected. So there are even units who are working on both cyber and information attacks. That is why it is very important to assess and to address these attacks in a more complex manner as a part of the bigger hybrid warfare. And for me, it's also a very important argument just to demonstrate to those countries who are still not sure whether to support Ukraine and whether to take the situation seriously, because once again, cyber attacks are being organized not only against Ukraine, and the cyber warfare is already taking place against the NATO countries.

A (36:43)

Thanks, Lona. I'm going to ask a blunt question here, but do you think that there would ever be a situation where a hybrid attack, a cyber attack, would be enough in and of itself beyond, say, tanks rolling across a border to see Article 5 of NATO invoked?

C (37:01)

So my answer is yes, it could actually trigger the invocation of NATO's Article 5. And there were even several official statements from different NATO officials that cyber defense is part of NATO's core task of collective defense. And actually, the NATO has already decided that cyber attack could impact and could be as harmful as modern conventional attacks. But the question is, what criteria do we use to invocate the article 5? And the answer from NATO as of now is that they will deal with each situation on the case by case basis. So for me, it's not a perfect scenario because, yes, it gives you flexibility, but on the other hand, it does not draw any red lines for the aggressor states. So they don't feel that something actually will happen if they violate this approach. I think that a very good development was that in 2024 there was a decision to establish the NATO Integrated Cyber Defense center, and we'll see how it will work. But I think that it really could enhance all this network protection and could elaborate some common decisions and approaches. But for me, the Biggest question is to form some common position of NATO on this. And actually we have the decision that the cyber attack can violate the article 5, but still do not understand what criteria shall be. Matt, I also don't like the discussions when many people say that, for example, today the cyber attacks are not so severe as usual attacks. So for example, if you will look on the situation in Ukraine, of course like cyber attacks were not as harmful as missile attacks, but maybe in five years, given the development of technology, the situation could be very different. And in the international humanitarian law, there is a very sad joke that the humanitarian law develops not very fast and it's always late for one war. So my approach is to develop a little bit quicker and to be prepared with both political and legal decisions to meet the reality which we will face, I think like in two, three years.

A (39:18)

Well, let's get into that then. So what security guarantees for Ukraine would be possible that would be as it were, covering the cyber domain in a way that you think would be adequate to protect it as part of the conversations taking place at the moment.

C (39:35)

So first of all, I think that we can look at the already signed agreements, security agreements between Ukraine and some other countries. So most of them already have some part on cyber defense. Some of these agreements already have the understanding of even of cyber aggression. And it's very good. But I believe that it may be not enough, because if we are, for example, talking only about the guarantees for Ukraine, it's always good. But when we are talking about hybrid warfare, I think that it's not limited by state borders and it's more about elaborating and preparing some common answer both from Ukraine and the countries which will provide these guarantees. Because as I stipulated before, the cyber attacks are committed not only against Ukraine, sometimes they're committed even simultaneously against Ukraine and against some other countries. So the response also shall be very collective. As for the part of these security guarantees. So of course it's important to work together on the attribution of cyber attacks and make a clear political attribution, not only to some groups who are making these attacks, but also to the state who are backing these attacks. And I think that we like this approach in the international arena. And the other part of these guarantees is also depriving the Russian Federation and maybe some other countries which are helping of the instruments which make these cyber attacks possible. Because unfortunately, the Russian Federation is still using a lot of Western technologies against Ukraine and now also against the West. And I think that of course now there are a lot of talks concerning Sanctions as a part of some peace deal or whatever. But I believe that some sanctions against the Russian Federation, which deprive it from the access to the newest Western technologies, shall be very ongoing independently. On the some geopolitical developments in Ukraine.

A (41:34)

Thank you. And just a couple of other questions for me, if I may. I know that your expertise as well, beyond cyber security was the economic war, and I wonder if you can assess your reflections on the developments of the past week and what the ramifications of that might well be for the economic front in this conflict. Conflict. Do you see Russia as putting put in a stronger economic position by the decisions made by the White House?

C (42:00)

I think it's hard to say just now because like, we still lack a lot of details. So even talking about sanctions policy. So a lot of people are very unhappy with some statements from the US but still not so many people discussed the news from the last week when the US imposed new sanctions against the Russian Federation in the cyber domain. So it means that we still have some topics, even in the economic sphere on which we can work together. Maybe we shall find some different arguments as for the other developments. So of course, for me it's very important to understand that sanctions and export control shall not be just a part of the deal and shall not be put off the table if, for example, we have some kind of ceasefire, because having some sanctions against the Russian Federation and weakening its military complex is also a part of security guarantees for Ukraine. So I think that we shall be prepared to discuss sanctions and export control in a more broader vision than we were discussing before, because today there was a very good statement from the EU that the EU will proceed with sanctions notwithstanding the position of the US But I think that it's important to keep the Western coalition because to implement sanctions separately will be very, very difficult. So we shall look at this instrument using some more sophisticated manner and putting it as an instrument for Ukraine's security and also for some strategic achievements for the Western countries, including the U.S. as for the other economic questions which were raised throughout last week, for example, concerning the ideas of the new American administration about Ukrainian resources. So once again, I think that a lot of details are still lacked because in general, of course, it could bring some investments to Ukraine. It also could be some part of the guarantees, because I think that if the Russian Federation understands that the US has the economic interests in the Ukrainian development, they will be not willing to attack again. So there is some right ideas in this. But I also understand that Ukrainian economy was very much ruined by war and actually it will need a lot of investments to be renewed, and the Russian Federation shall somehow pay for this. So I think that we lack the discussion about this part of the question. So the Trump administration likes to speak about Ukrainian debt in this. And actually, so, yeah, we are very thankful to all other our partners for the help, and I understand that, that they may want to have some kind of cooperation more. But on the other hand, the Russian Federation did all this, and the Russian Federation caused the situation when the American taxpayers needed to invest their money into the protection of Ukraine and the European security, NATO security. So actually, I see now not so many questions to Russia, but I think that the Russian Federation needs to pay for everything, and I think that it will be a next step. I very much hope at least that it will be the next step of this discussion.

A (45:26)

Well, thank you, Elena, for your reflections on these subjects. One final question from me. We had Svetlana Moreonets, Ukrainian journalist based in London, on the podcast last week summarizing the reaction amongst Ukrainians to the decision by President Trump to speak to President Putin and the ongoing talks in Saudi Arabia. I wonder if you could just offer your reflections as a Ukrainian on what's happened and the direction of travel in the last few days.

C (45:54)

Of course, sure. So I think that first of all, of course, Ukrainians are those who want just peace, our main desire. Of course, we are the country who suffers this terrible war, and Ukrainians are being killed every day. So today we discussed some cyber attacks, which could be like part of war crimes. Yes, but actually classic war crimes are being done even when we are speaking now because there are attacks against the civil population each day. And of course, everybody wants it to be stopped. And I think that some peace process could be welcomed. On the other hand, as an international lawyer, I can also say that by peace talks, we shall not destroy the international order. And it's very important to keep some basic rules and preserve it, unless we'll just ruin the international law, not only for us, but also for the future generations. So that is why I think that some of the meetings are not very positive. Some of them are more positive, and we'll see more in the coming days. I think that also a lot of Ukrainians are now looking at Europe with more optimism. But on the other hand, I think that it's also a moment for the EU to become a more active player in the international arena. Unfortunately, I didn't see it yesterday, frankly speaking, because the results of the yesterday's meeting were a little bit confusing because there were no real decisions which were made and I hope that once again so we'll see some decisions in the coming days. But what I also believe is that we might see the situation differently. But, but the new American administration is doing everything very quickly and that is why we need to prepare all our proposals and the collective proposals, maybe from the eu, from Ukraine, whatever, also very quickly. Because if we cannot manage to prepare our position, which is also very basic, which is realistic enough and has some legal grounds, then somebody will prepare the answers for us and we'll just be looking on this. And I think that it's the worst situation. So I think that we shall make some conclusions from the last week and we shall work on the possible solutions and having in mind all the interests, especially of course the interests of the Ukrainian people, because I believe that some part of Ukrainian society still understands that we will not not gain everything, just for example, in 2025. But I also believe that we want to see some kind of justice in this process and bring injustice and rule of law, even some elements of this to these discussions. Is really crucial goal for both for Ukraine and our international partners.

A (49:12)

Say hello to Samantha.

C (49:13)

Hi there. Samantha built a SaaS platform that helps small businesses manage their workflow. But she needed a smarter way to reach decision makers. That's where ACAST came in. They helped me produce a professional audio.

B (49:25)

Ad which played to business owners and ops leads using their audience attributes targeting tools.

A (49:29)

Suddenly my platform was showing up in.

B (49:31)

The ears of the exact people I needed to reach. Now that's streamlined marketing. Samantha, what's your tip for scaling smart.

C (49:37)

Solve a real problem and make sure.

B (49:40)

The right people hear about it.

A (49:41)

Promote your business with podcast ads on Acast. Get started at go.acast.com advertise.

C (49:51)

Foreign.

B (50:00)

Thanks loner and thank you Francis. Let's start drawing to to a close there alone. I'll come back to you at the end if I may, for any any final thoughts you want to leave us with. Just a quick thought for me and I've been looking at that comment from John Healy this morning, Britain's Defense secretary talking about any post conflict guarantees and I'll read you the quote again. He said the European countries have to play a leading part of that guarantee but require a backstop from the US because in the end it is only the US that can provide the deterrence to Putin that will prevent him attacking again. I mean I think that is it in a nutshell. What is the backstop from the US if it's not a credible conventional force which you could Say Europe should be able to pony up if it's not a nuclear deterrent, which Britain has, France has, Britain's declared it to NATO. Don't think the French have. But what is this backstop from the US they're not going to put more troops in there. They got 50,000 in South Korea, I think. I think the US they're not going to put any more troops into Muracom. But they've got three brigades, I think. Please correct me if you know better than me. I think the US has three brigades in Europe at the moment, one of which is the 173rd Airborne in Italy. Another one is a striker brigade in Germany. But I think that one, that's the only heavy metal brigade that the US has on European soil right now. So in terms of any backstop, any credible conventional defense, the US have already ruled out putting troops on the ground. But even if they went the whole hog, I think they're only talking about three brigades. Please tell me if I'm wrong on that. And what do you think this backstop is that can only come from the US that cannot be found anywhere else? Because I think it is. That's dangerous territory. Back to what I said earlier on about Britain almost undermining, not, of course, not meaning to, but undermining the argument about an independent nuclear deterrent, if that's what we're saying. The only thing that Putin cares about. Francis, final thoughts, please.

A (51:49)

Well, thanks, Tom. And just to say I completely agree with you on that. It is simply extraordinary how many European countries seem to think that they do not have an adequate defense beyond what the United States provides, despite the nuclear umbrella, despite the number of forces combined that Europe can offer, despite the fact that Ukraine, one army has managed to deliver near fatal blows to the Russian army, let alone dozens. And yet you have defense secretaries, you have leaders who are stating publicly that they need the US for their own defense. What an admission, privately, let alone publicly. When you have a foe who's on the march, it is mind boggling, frankly. But I think it's also just important to register the concern beyond Europe. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, countries also very concerned about the direction of travel. And I know many of you in those countries have written in to express your concerns, your anger, your frustration, the events of recent days. We hear you, and I'm sure that soon we will be able to report in more detail about the maneuvers being made in Australia, in Canada, in New Zealand and elsewhere by the shift of the Trump administration in foreign policy. That implicates them too. So bear with us on that. And just related to that, if you check out Battle Lines this week, Roland interviews Michael Ignatieff, who served as leader of the Liberal Party and leader of the opposition from 2008 until 2011 in Canada. He's a former historian, a great biographer of the philosopher Isaiah Berlin. Read that a couple of years ago and we'll play a clip from that.

B (53:27)

Now Canada will be absorbed into, you know, a sphere of influence, and our problem will be that we will lose our political sovereignty, which matters a hell of a lot to Canadians, but it's not going to matter to others. I think the Europeans have an awful lot to worry about. They've made a historic bargain that began with 45, with the arrival of American troops, with Marshall Plan and all that stuff in which that generation of American leadership from Roosevelt, Truman onwards, understood a linkage between American security and European security that was dictated by the Cold War antagonism with the Russians. And now it seems to me if you had a sphere of influence in which they basically come out of the Ukraine war saying basically If Russia wants 25% or 20% of Ukrainian territory, that's kind of okay with us. I mean, that's basically what Hegseth said. This is where we are. I think this is also existential for Europe is that Europe after 1945 built its welfare states, the things that we're proudest of. I'm talking to you from Europe and I love it. They built their welfare states on basically transferring defense costs to the Americans. Now I think is going to change. And so the pressure to maintain the, the social commitments, the welfare commitments that Britain has made, that France has made, that Germany's made, it's basically social model of Europe will come under a tremendous amount of pressure from the sheer necessity of increasing defence expenditure. Thanks. Francis Alona, as our guest today, would you like the very final words?

C (55:15)

So, first of all, thank you very much for having me today and thanks a lot for you for your support to Ukraine. I believe that the coming weeks will bring a lot of changes and it's very important to hold our unity. So thank you once again. And maybe the last, last few lines about your final idea concerning what US could do actually and what unique power does the US have? I think that this is actually in the economic dimension, because if we're talking about the economic sanctions, that was what Ukraine was asking before the full scale invasion. So we asked to stop from invading Ukraine by imposing quick sanctions, and the US didn't do it back then. And I think that maybe some kind of of economic guarantees, some kind of real package of sanctions which could be a part of the guarantees actually is important part from the yes, and Trump administration has already noted that the current sanctions regime is effective maybe at the level of 2 points from 10 points. So maybe they can propose something else or we can make them propose something else. So by saying this, thank you once again for inviting and I very much hope that there will be both just peace and victory of the democratic world.

B (56:38)

Ukraine the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles to support our work and stay on top of all the Ukraine news, analysis and dispatches from the ground. Please subscribe to the Telegraph. You can get your first three months for just £1 at www.telegraph.co.uk latest or sign up to Dispatches, our foreign affairs newsletter, bringing stories from our award winning foreign correspondents straight to your inbox. We also have a Ukraine Live blog on our website where you can follow updates as they come in throughout the day, including insights from regular contributors to this podcast. We also do the same for other breaking international stories. You can listen to this conversation live at 1pm London time each weekday on Twitter Spaces. Follow the Telegraph so you don't miss it to our listeners on YouTube. Please note that due to issues beyond our control, there is sometimes a delay between broadcast and upload, so if you want to hear Ukraine the Latest as soon as it's released, do refer to Podcast apps. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Ukraine the Latest on your preferred podcast app and leave us a review as it really helps others find the show. Please also share it with those who may not be aware we exist. You can also get in touch directly to ask questions or give comments by emailing ukrainepodelegraph.co.uk we do continue to read every message. You can also contact us directly on Twitter. You can find our handles in the description for this episode. As ever, we're especially interested to hear where you are listening from around the world. Ukraine the Latest was Today, produced by Rachel Porter, Executive Producer are Louisa Wells and David Knowles, ACAST Powers the World's Best Podcasts. Here's a show that we recommend. Leadership used to mean having all the answers, but today's best leaders embody a more human approach. I'm Jack Myers.

A (58:54)

And I'm Tim Spengler.

B (58:55)

Tim and I have spent our careers inside media, marketing and culture and we partnered with the Acast Creator Network to start Lead Human to answer one simple question. What does it really look like to lead in this AI dominated world.

A (59:09)

The biggest tip for being a creator? It's a job.

C (59:12)

What I learned from Michael Jackson Here's.

B (59:14)

A man who understands precision. It's about answering the questions that are hard, not about answering a bunch of teed up questions that are fake. What we're looking for are real stories and practical advice that you can use with your teams right away. Subscribe to Lead Human with Jack Meyers and Tim Spengler wherever you get your podcasts. ACAST helps creators launch, grow and monetize their podcasts everywhere. Acast.com.