Zelensky strikes 'win-win' deal with Trump & Russia's nuclear arsenal in 'inevitable' decline

Summary

Ukraine: The Latest — Episode Summary

Episode Title: Zelensky strikes 'win-win' deal with Trump & Russia's nuclear arsenal in 'inevitable' decline
Podcast: Ukraine: The Latest (The Telegraph)
Date: February 26, 2025
Main Host: Adeli Pojman Ponte
Key Contributors: Dom Nicholls (Associate Editor for Defense), Francis Dernley (Executive Editor for Audio), Oliver Carroll (The Economist), Terry Virts (Retired NASA Astronaut), Fabian Hoffmann (Oslo Nuclear Project)

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Overview of the Episode

This episode dives into two major themes:

1. The landmark minerals deal between Ukraine and the United States under President Trump, and its broader geopolitical ripples, including possible implications for both a ceasefire and continued military support.
2. A thorough examination of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, its challenges in modernization, and what the shifting nuclear balance means for global security, with expert insights from Terry Virts and Fabian Hoffmann.

The hosts also share on-the-ground updates from Ukraine, analyze the latest political statements and negotiations, and reflect on Western resolve in the face of shifting U.S. foreign policy.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Military Updates and the Evolving Drone War

[02:50–13:13] | Dom Nicholls

• Russia's Drone Production Surge: Russia has ramped up its drone production from 30–40/day to around 150/day, with ambitions to reach 500. The explosive payloads are also increasing (now 90kg vs. the previous 30kg).
• Ukraine's Electronic Warfare Successes: Improved electronic warfare has led to a significant reduction in the threat from Russian satellite-guided glide bombs, once devastating against Ukrainian fixed positions.
• Casualties and Infrastructure Hits: Recent large-scale drone attacks across Ukraine have resulted in civilian casualties and targeted critical infrastructure, including major energy facilities.
• North Korean Aid to Russia: Satellite imagery and official reports indicate continued shipments from North Korea to Russia, including suspected munitions transfers via Rason Port.
• European vs. US Military Aid: For 2024, EU, UK, and Norway have provided Ukraine with $25bn in military aid—more than the U.S.—and supply a larger share of Ukraine’s military hardware.
• Shifting Western Rhetoric and Policy:
  • Trump emphasized repayment for U.S. aid:

    "The American taxpayer is going to get their money back. Plus." ([12:23])

  • UK's Defense Secretary John Healey:

    "We are faced with difficult decisions that force us to recognise that hard power is more important than soft power." ([12:48])

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2. Zelensky–Trump Minerals Deal: Details and Implications

[13:13–22:09] | Francis Dernley

• Deal Terms:
  • Ukraine to contribute 50% of profits from future mineral/energy development into a joint fund for Ukrainian projects.
  • U.S. will not gain rights to Ukraine’s existing oil or gas production.
  • The proposed $500bn repayment demand is dropped; future joint ownership agreements TBD.
• Ongoing Security Guarantees: U.S. will continue weapon supplies until a deal with Russia is reached. There are talks of U.S. backup for European troops to guarantee any future ceasefire.
• Diplomatic Outlook: Despite calling Zelensky a "dictator" recently, Trump is welcoming the Ukrainian president to the White House, betting on a settlement with Putin who, according to Trump, "wants to settle it and wants to get back to life now" ([14:26]).
• Skepticism About Russian Guarantees: Francis notes that any Russian ceasefire deal must have robust security guarantees, as there’s deep skepticism that Putin will honor agreements' spirit.
• European Military Presence: France is open to deploying troops with U.S. backing after a ceasefire; Italy supports only a UN-led mission post-ceasefire.
• A European Joke:

  "450 million-strong Europe depends on military backing of 340 million-strong US which bows to 140 million-strong Russia, which is being held in check by 40 million-strong Ukraine." ([17:34])

• Sanctions Erosion & Russian Economy: The ruble is rebounding on U.S. talks of potential sanctions relief. Many multinational companies have not exited Russia; their tax payments amount to nearly half of Russia's military budget.

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3. Tributes and Reflections

[24:23–27:52]

• The hosts reflect on a recent service at St Bride’s, the journalists’ church in London, honoring war correspondents.
  • Ambassador Zaluzhny (ex-Ukraine military chief, now Ambassador to UK):

    "In a total war, truth is also a battlefield. History shows dictators fear truth more than weapons." ([26:35])

  • Stephen Fry read from a journalist’s war memoir and a poem, to moving effect, highlighting the stakes in Ukraine.

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4. Expert Panel: Russia's Nuclear Arsenal and Western Deterrence

[28:41–58:23]
Guests:

• Terry Virts (NASA Astronaut, ex-U.S. Air Force F-16 nuclear-certified pilot)
• Fabian Hoffmann (Oslo Nuclear Project)

Fabian Hoffmann: Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal in Decline

• Current Strengths & Weaknesses:
  • Russia has ~1,700 deployed strategic nuclear warheads—largest in the world.
  • Struggles to modernize: tech is aging, with reliance on Cold War-era hardware; recent test failures (e.g., Sarmat ICBM explosion in 2024).
  • Sanctions bite: shortages of microelectronics and precision gear hinder modernization, despite some autonomy in military R&D.
• Opportunity Cost: Every ruble spent on nukes is money not available for conventional forces, impacting Russia’s warfighting on other fronts.
• Growing Vulnerability: Advances in conventional missile accuracy (e.g., cruise missiles) make even hardened nuclear silos less safe.

Terry Virts: The Changing Nuclear Order

• Personal Reminiscence:
  • The nuclear mission in the Cold War was "incredibly serious," involving rigorous psychological screening and two-person safety protocols.

  • "After we certified, the whole squadron would get together and watch Dr. Strangelove and drink beer. It was a serious thing, but at the end of the day, we were fighter pilots." ([35:55])

• Multipolar World:
  • The U.S., Russia, and China now all possess large arsenals; China is rapidly catching up.
  • North Korea’s advances have destabilized the strategic equation.
  • The lesson for small states:

    "What we’ve done in Ukraine by not defeating Russia has basically taught the world a nuclear proliferation lesson: if you don’t have nuclear weapons, get them, because if you have them, you can do what you want." ([38:40])

Nuclear Posture – U.S., Russia, Europe, China

• Types of arsenals:
  • U.S. (and potentially Russia): “damage limitation," aiming to preemptively destroy enemy nukes.
  • China (historically): focus on survivability and assured second strike.
  • France/UK: Reliable, but limited; neither have triads or non-strategic arsenals.
• Strategic Gaps and European Vulnerability:
  • If the U.S. backs away, Europe loses both strategic and tactical deterrence options. France and the UK lack the non-strategic ("tactical") nuclear capacity to match Russia’s doctrine.
  • There’s a "deterrence gap," risking Russian coercion, especially in Eastern Europe.

Terry Virts: Blunt Words on Trump & U.S. Policy

• "[Trump] is a mentally ill criminal... He is clearly on Team Putin. If you listed out all the things that Putin would want in an American president, you couldn’t even imagine what a dream Trump is. I think it was the worst week in American foreign policy history." ([50:29])

• Calls for Europe to "pull its head out of the sand," note economic superiority over Russia, and urges faster, stronger support for Ukraine.

• "Now is the time to step up pressure... Europe needs to wake the heck up. Please stop being so weak and timid, my European friends." ([52:19])

• Warns a postwar Russia will remain militarized; a ceasefire without major changes could leave Europe less safe.

China as a Pretext

• Virts critiques U.S. "pivot to China" rhetoric, saying there's no serious strategy to back it up, and that abandoning Ukraine undermines deterrence globally—including in Asia.

Fabian Hoffmann: European Defense Industry Needs State Support

• European defense production lacks the state-backed ramp-up seen in the U.S., especially in capital-intensive sectors (missiles, vehicles).

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Transactional U.S. Policy:

  "Gone is the idea of sticking up for friends and allies who have been invaded by a murderous horde hellbent on your eradication. This administration sees everything in the starkest and most transactional of terms." — Dom Nicholls ([12:14])

• On European Dependence:

  "450 million-strong Europe depends on military backing of 340 million-strong US which bows to 140 million-strong Russia, which is being held in check by 40 million-strong Ukraine." — Frances Dernley ([17:34])

• On Nuclear Proliferation:

  "If you have nuclear weapons, you can do what you want... The proliferation costs that our kids are going to pay because of America's weakness and Europe's weakness in Ukraine could potentially be the worst of all these terrible things we're talking about." — Terry Virts ([38:40])

• On Russia’s Arsenal Struggles:

  "Russia... still having a very powerful, very large nuclear arsenal, but they're struggling a bit with the upkeep and modernization of that arsenal. And that is really illustrated by the recent test failures..." — Fabian Hoffmann ([28:56])

• On the French Nuclear Pledge:

  "You can quite easily see how an existential threat to Berlin would probably also be an existential threat to Paris... But that might be different for Finland or the Baltic States..." — Fabian Hoffmann ([46:22])

• On the Trump Minerals Deal:

  "This is in relation to how much money the US has spent supporting Ukraine. So the American taxpayer is going to get their money back. Plus." — Dom Nicholls ([12:23])

• On State of Truth and Journalism:

  "In a total war, truth is also a battlefield. History shows dictators fear truth more than weapons." — Ambassador Zaluzhny ([26:35])

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• Military Updates & Drones: [02:50–13:13]
• Minerals Deal/Trump–Zelensky Relations: [13:13–22:09]
• Tributes to Journalists: [24:23–27:52]
• Expert Panel on Nuclear Weapons: [28:41–58:23]
  • Russia’s nuclear arsenal: [28:41–33:49]
  • U.S. nuclear posture (Terry Virts): [33:49–37:34]
  • Proliferation and world order: [37:34–41:39]
  • Doctrine & European vulnerability: [41:39–49:22]
  • Reaction to Trump & U.S. direction: [50:29–55:47]
  • Final panel thoughts: [55:47–58:23]

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Takeaway

This episode exposes the deepening fault lines in transatlantic solidarity, the new transactional approach of U.S. foreign policy under Trump, concerns about Western resolve, and the challenges facing Russia’s much-feared nuclear arsenal. Experts warn of rising risks: a "deterrence gap" in Europe, fraying Western unity, and the dangerous lessons being telegraphed globally about nuclear proliferation and credibility. The hosts and guests urge Europe to step up—not just for Ukraine, but for the security order that underpins their own future.

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This summary captures the episode’s essential arguments, key facts, quotes, and evolving geopolitical developments for listeners seeking an authoritative and engaging briefing.

Transcript

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I'm Adelie Pojman Ponte and this is Ukraine. The latest. Today we discuss Russia's increasing drone production and a North Korea delegation visiting Moscow. On the politics side, we talk about the minerals deal and the difficult negotiations on security guarantees. Then we have an interview with NASA astronaut Terry Virtz and Fabian Hoffman, an expert on Russia's nuclear capability.

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It's Wednesday 26th February, three years and two days since the full scale invasion began. I'm joined by Associate Editor for Defense, Dom Nichols and Executive Editor for Audio, Francis Dernley. As usual, let's start with you, Dom. Tell us what are the military updates of the day?

[E]

So Ukraine's air Defences shot down 110 of 177Drones launched by Russia in an overnight attack last night. Its air force said another 66 drones were lost, likely due to electronic warfare. Ukraine's air force said the drones were shot down over Kharkiv Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Chakazy, Chernihiv, Kyovrad, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Kyiv oblasts. Attacks across the country killed five civilians and injured 36 others yesterday, regional authorities said. This morning in Dnipro Petrov Oblast, Russian forces hit a facility owned by dtech, the country's largest private energy company. Engineers are working to get that back up and running now, Oliver Carroll, foreign correspondent for the Economist, said earlier today on Twitter. A few months ago Russia's drone Production was running at 30 to 40 a day. It's now 150. Ukrainian intelligence sources tell me Russia has plans to go to 500 a day with we shall see on that. The explosive payload is also increasing today you are seeing 90kg instead of 30kg. Now Oliver's comments made me think about drones and these drone statistics for a while. I could do with your help on this. Each day we are told how many were fired at Ukraine by Russia, how many were shot down and how many were lost. With that word lost explained as those that were lost to radar, brought down by electronic warfare systems or used to describe dummy drones without warheads that are used to try to get Ukrainian air defenders to use up valuable missiles and other ordnance deployed to bring these things down. Now my problem is how do they know the drones are dummies and have no explosive warhead such that they can be allowed to land harmlessly? Now of course we are mercifully seeing very few casualties from drones in the recent months, so I think a lot are dummies. But this has been niggling me for a while and I can't let it go. I think the term electronic warfare is used a bit generously and covers any drone that just didn't hit anything that made sense or was lost to radar and never heard of again. So called dummy drones may well be empty of explosives or just could be duds. We know Russian industry is starting to suffer shortages in the chemical compounds that make explosives, hence needing help from Iran and North Korea. But I think a lot of these terms are somewhat confusing. Anyway, what do you think? Now having said all that and possibly linked, I've seen reports today saying Ukrainian electronic warfare countermeasures are now so good that there is such saturation by electronic warfare at the front lines that the threat from Russia's satellite guided glide bombs has been massively reduced in the last few weeks. As a reminder, these glide bombs took old so called dumb bombs that are just free fall high explosives, added a seeker head at the front to pick up guidance information from satellites and fins at the back to steer it more accurately on onto targets. Now, they can't hit moving targets, but have been devastating against fixed positions such as buildings, trench lines and, as we've seen in numerous Russian attacks, houses, schools and hospitals. It seems recently Ukraine has been able to interfere with the signal from the satellite, meaning the glide bombs are not as accurate as they once were when first introduced about a year ago. There's still a massive bang when they land, but if they can't work through this electronic noise, Russia will have to deploy more bombs per target or shift perhaps to laser designation from another drone, although that link could also eventually be disrupted. Anyway, one to ponder now on the ground, Russia took back some of the ground about a kilometre at the most northerly part of the salient. Ukraine holds in Kursk Oblast. They had also moved a little to the southwest of Pokrovsky. They've been over the main road heading southwest from the town for a while now and had looked to have moved into the village of Kotolina. However, earlier today, Ukraine reportedly took it back. In a statement, the armed forces said paratroopers of the 25th Separate Airborne Brigade of the Airborne Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces cleared the village of Khalklyna near Pokrovsk, during the assault and recovery operations. So a lot of movement there. No other ground movement on the line to speak of now. Into Russia now. And the Kyiv Independent is reporting this morning that Russia's defence ministries say their forces downed 128 Ukrainian drones last night that had targeted several Russian regions and Russian occupied Crimea. Moscow said 83 drones were shot down over Krasnodar Krai, 30 over Crimea, eight over the Sea of Azov and another five over the Black Sea. One drone was brought down in Bryansk and another in Kursk oblasts. We are told the Russian coastline in the northeast Black Sea area got a bit of special attention last night from the unmanned systems forces with perhaps also an air kiss from Mr. Budanov with residents reporting explosions in the cities of Anapa and Tuapse, where the port, the seaport, was reportedly targeted, while the airport In Sochi, about 200 km down the coast from the Kirch Bridge, had to be closed due to a drone attack. According to the Independent telegram channel. Astra staying in Russia and a delegation from North Korea was in Moscow yesterday amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia. Russian and North Korean state media reported that Russia's Ministry of Foreign affairs consular department head Andrei Klimov and North Korea's ambassador to Russia met with a high ranking North Korean delegation. This is according to the Institute for the Study of War. South Korean media outlet Korea Junang Daily said on Monday that commercial satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs shows a 110 meter long vessel entering and leaving North Korea's raison port. That's right up in the northeast of the country, just 20 km or so down the coast from where North Korea, Russia and China meet. The satellite imagery also showed a line of containers on the pier at Reson Port next to the docked vessel, and that vessel is thought to have been active there last Thursday and Friday. The Institute for the Study of War have previously reported back in November 2023 that North Korea likely used raison port to transfer munitions to vladivostok. That's about 100ks up the coast, so it seems like that's carrying on Couple more for me Adli. There's an interesting report in the Wall Street Journal citing European officials. The Journal reported yesterday that European Union countries, the UK and Norway, provided Ukraine with military assistance worth approximately US$25 billion in 2024, a figure that is more than than that provided by the United States over the same period. An unspecified Western official also told the Wall Street Journal that Europe supplies about 25% of Ukraine's military hardware, with the United States currently supplying about 20%. Interesting in the context of who needs to step up when in the case of any withdrawal of US support or diminishing of US Support. Now then, Adaly remember Monday's attack on the Russian Consulate in Marseille when three plastic bottles were lobbed into the consulate's gardens, two of which exploded? Well, two staff at France's main state research research agency have admitted to it. Prosecutors have said today the bottles contained a cocktail of nitrogen and other chemical substances. No one was injured and no damage was reported. But the two suspects, it transpires, are employed by the national center for Scientific Research. One is an engineer and the other a chemist. It's just appalling. Disgraceful even. You'd think a chemist and an engineer would have made a better job of it. No, I'm only joking. No, I in no way condone attacks on Russia. Now just finally, Adli, two important comments we need to make note of in the last 24 hours that I think will set the course for the next few years. First, referencing the mineral deal that Francis will talk about in a moment. Donald Trump said last night the American taxpayer is going to get their money back. Plus, this is in relation to how much money the US has spent supporting Ukraine. So the American taxpayer is going to get their money back plus. So gone is the idea of sticking up for friends and allies who have been invaded by a murderous horde hell bent on your eradication. This administration sees everything in the starkest and most transactional of terms. This isn't even an attempt to recoup some of the money spent supporting Ukraine. That phrase money back plus shows Donald Trump sniffs an opportunity to make a profit out of Ukraine's misery. Now, as I've said before, that may be a perfectly respectable position for a country to take, but don't then claim to be the leader of the free world, an idea that is based more on values than cash. The second phrase we need to take note of. On the BBC this morning, defending the UK's increased defence expenditure announced yesterday at the expense of the overseas development budget, Britain's Defence Secretary, John Healey acknowledged times have changed and said we are faced with difficult decisions that force us to recognise that hard power is more important than soft power. Now, I served 23 years in the army, I, I'd walk on parts in every punch up this country decided to get involved in during that time. But not once did the defence budget go up like this and never did a senior minister, especially from the Labour Party, say hard power is more important than soft power. Where this all goes, we don't know. But the geopolitical snow dome has certainly been shaken and the Times, Adli, they definitely are a changing.

[D]

Thank you, Dom. And now Francis, over to you for the political updates.

[C]

Thanks, Adli. As we predicted in yesterday's episode, a few hours after our broadcast, Ukraine agreed to a US proposed deal for the rights to its mineral wealth after Trump backed down on his most extreme demands. President Zelensky is set to sign that deal, Interestingly, in Washington D.C. as early as this Friday. More on that in a moment. It is a very different deal than the one that was tabled as and we discussed last week and which would have seen Ukraine become, in essence, an economic vassal to the United States. Now, the draft deal does not commit to Ukraine using the profits from its natural resources to repay the US up to $500 billion. That was a key demand of Trump. Instead, kyiv will contribute 50% of the funds raised by future developments of minerals and energy reserves to a joint fund that would be used to invest in projects in Ukraine. The size of the US stake in the fund is not included in the deal, but the Financial Times has reported that terms of joint ownership deals will be thrashed out in follow up agreements. The US Will also not gain the rights to any of Ukraine's existing oil or gas production. Now, speaking to reporters in the Oval Office, let's last night he confirmed that there had been a deal finalized, saying that the US has given to Kyiv the right to fight on. They're very brave, he said, but without the US and its money and its military equipment, this war would have been over in a very short period of time. Critically, he said, the US Supplies of weapons to Ukraine would continue until we have a deal with Russia. The US Was open, he said, too, to striking a minerals deal with Russia. I'd like to buy minerals on Russian land too, if we can, he said. The rare earth, they have very good rare earth, they have very valuable land that isn't utilized. So something like that could take place. Now, as I say, despite him calling Zelensky a dictator less than a week ago, Trump is about to welcome him back to the White House. He said, I hear he's coming on Friday. Certainly it's okay with me. He if he'd like to. He then added, I spoke with President Putin. I think he wants to settle it and wants to get back to life. Now. Evidence would suggest that this is the belief underpinning the actions of the new US administration that Putin will meaningfully embrace an off ramp if it's offered. Now, I know I stress that word meaningfully all the time. The reason I do so is because, and you can call me cynical, I think it is entirely possible Putin will agree to all sorts of things, maybe even a ceasefire, but not follow through on them in the spirit in which they are agreed. Hence why the security guarantees being in place are so vital. I'm not one of those who think a ceasefire in the short term is impossible, just one which Russia will agree to and will mean it will never be able to resume its efforts to totally subvert Ukrainian statehood. So what is the latest on the guarantees? Well, France's finance minister, France's finance minister, not France's finance minister, said he believes the US has agreed to provide backup for European troops to help maintain peace. Once a ceasefire is agreed between Ukraine and Russia, the uk, Germany, France and other European countries are willing to send troops to guarantee a truce. Eric Lombard told Bloomberg, where he's attending a meeting of 20 finance chiefs. He said, and I quote, if we want a ceasefire to be respected, we need a US backup. I believe the Americans have agreed to to do that. Now Lombard was in Washington with President Macron this week, so he is well placed if what he says proves accurate, that is highly significant indeed. Meanwhile, Italy has said that it will only send troops to Ukraine once a peace deal is reached and under the orders and under the auspices of a UN operation. A government undersecretary said, and I quote, sending European troops for a military cordon in Ukraine is a hypothesis that France has long supported. Italy, though, does not consider it the most effective solution. As far as I remember, there's never been an international imposition force between two armies of this magnitude. There are more than a million armed soldiers on both sides. An international mission with UN helmets in a situation of peace would be a different issue. Italy has done peace missions like this many times. I think Italy is saying publicly what many nations are thinking privately. Hence why you can understand the Ukrainian joke doing the rounds at the moment describing the current situation. 450 million strong Europe depends on military backing of 340 million strong US which bows to 140 million strong Russia, which is being held in Czech by 40 million strong Ukraine. Now, despite the more positive mood music in some quarters due to the minerals deal, and there's even talks of ceasefires being signed, it is important to underscore that the philosophy underpinning the Trump team's approach is still fundamentally at odds with most other western countries. Yesterday US Vice President J.D. vance posted, during my Senate campaign in 2022, I met a Ukrainian American. He was very angry about my views on the conflict and my desire to bring it to a rapid are abandoning my country and I don't like it. Sir, I replied, your country is the United States of America and so is mine. I always found it offensive that a new immigrant to our country would be willing to use the power and influence of their new nation to settle the ethnic rivalries of the old. Now, that idea that this is an ethnic rivalry and not about the fundamentals of democracy, statehood and independence is extremely revealing and vastly at odds with the mentality in the Cold War. Also yesterday, Trump's pick for deputy defence secretary declined to say whether Russia invaded Ukraine when asked by US Senators. He instead told lawmakers at his confirmation hearing that he did not want to speak out of turn and undermine the president's negotiations. So again we see that negotiations are predicated on the idea of conceding certain fundamentals, certain truths. Can that really end? Well, another alarming thing, as I mentioned earlier in the week, is the sanctions regime on Russia looking set to erode yet further the ruble strengthened for the seventh consecutive session on Wednesday after Trump said the lifting of sanctions imposed on Russia over the war could be on the agenda at some point this morning. The ruble is up 0.4%. The Russian currency has gained about 24% against the dollar, mostly on expectations of better relations with the U.S. we have to be honest that said about the loopholes in the current sanctions regime. Ed Conway at Sky News, of course, has underscored this again and again. How Russia is still gaining access to many vital materials for its war effort and vast sums of money. A new report by b4ukraine also underscores the fact that contrary to public perception, there was no mass corporate exodus from Russia following the invasion. As of November last year, almost 1600 multinational corporations still operate in Russia through local subsidiaries. Now, the amount of tax that they bring in, 60 billion in taxes paid in 2022-2024 equates to nearly half of Russia's entire 2025 military budget. That is not to say sanctions don't matter. They do, and we've discussed that many times. But there are already huge holes and the EU is still becoming more dependent in some areas, like fertiliser. But what will happen to Russia's strength if that only increases as part of some peace deal, especially one which increases economic ties States a recovering, mobilized Russia with a sharpened war economy ready to fight, Many will ask, is that really a good legacy for future security?

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Thank you Francis. And now we'll go to our final thoughts. Dom, do you want to start?

[E]

Yeah, sure. Thanks Adli. I would like to say a few thank yous if I may. First, thanks to everyone who gets in touch. We do really mean it when we say we read every message, but it's it's a pretty lean organization here and I'm afraid we can't reply to all of them. However, thanks to Rob from Bing, I hope I've pronounced that correctly. Bing in Australia, who said he and his wife went to Sydney on the third anniversary of the start of the full scale invasion. Or the third and. Or the yeah, start the full scale invasion to attend a commemoration outside St Mary's Cathedral alongside Ukraine's ambassador to Australia. And thank you Rob for the pictures. Thanks also to Brandon and Julia in California. Julia, please do send us feedback on the new AI translation of the pod. And good luck with your bakery Blue Blue Bakery. The blueberry croissant thingies do look amazing. And to Elizabeth, Global Politics student, University of Auckland. Thanks for getting in touch. The POD barely has enough cash, I'm afraid, to cover Francis's grooming products. Unfortunately we can't take on an intern, but do have a look at the Telegraph career site. It has all sorts of information about media career opportunities, apprenticeships here and so on at the Telegraph. We've put a link in the show notes and thanks, thanks for getting in touch, Elizabeth. Thanks, everybody.

[D]

Thanks, Dom. Before I move on to Frances, Frances and I were at St Bride's the Journalist Church in London this morning for a service commemorating journalist or dedicated journalist covering the war in Ukraine. Frances, do you have any thoughts on that to share with us today?

[C]

Well, thanks, Adley. I won't rise to Dom's remarks. I would say though, that I don't think I've ever put any gel in my hair and at times Dom's look suspiciously glossy. But yes, we were at St Bride's this morning on Fleet street, the journalists church where David's funeral service took place back in October. It's a special place and this was a special service organized by the church and by the Ukrainian Embassy, dedicated to journalists covering the war in Ukraine. Ambassador Zaluzhny was there, former commander in chief, of course, of the Ukrainian Armed forces, now the ambassador to Britain. And he underscored that in a total war, truth is also a battlefield. And to quote him, history shows dictators fear truth more than weapons. That felt especially pertinent given the falsifications of the historical record we've seen so brazenly spoken by world leaders in the past couple of weeks. The actor and writer Stephen Fry was also there and read an extract from a journalist's war memoir and a moving poem by A.E. housman which included the line here dead lie we because we did not choose to live and shame the land from which we sprung. Simple words, but words which summarize for many what is at stake amid all the noise. A free country. And a final word, just to reiterate what Dom said a moment ago, thank you for sticking with us the last three years, it's what's kept us going with our reporting. We couldn't do it without you. So thank you.

[D]

Thank you, Francis. Yes, it was a very beautiful service indeed. And St. Bright is a very special place, obviously for us at the Telegraph and in this podcast, but for the journalist community in London as well. They've got an amazing choir. So if you're ever visiting London, I really recommend you go to a concert or to a service there just to listen to them. And they're beautiful, beautiful voices. Last week, Francis sat down with friend of the podcast, NASA astronaut Terry Virt and doctoral research fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project, Fabian Hoffman. They discuss the neglected subject of Russia's nuclear capability and the changing nature of the Western deterrent. Plus we hear Terry's candid reaction to Washington's foreign policy shift under Donald Trump. This is their conversation.

[C]

So, Fabian, if you could just summarize for us the state of the Russian nuclear arsenal, as it were, given the, well, years now of Western sanctions on it, what have been the implications of that?

[B]

Sure. So Russia right now still has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world. We have approximately 1700 deployed strategic nuclear warhead on several types of delivery vehicles, most notably intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Like every nuclear weapons state, actually, pretty much Russia is struggling with modernizing its arsenal. Arsenal. Right. It's still the technology, a lot of the technology that is used in these delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads has its origins in the Cold War. And nuclear weapons states right now they have to move away from that and they have to modernize because they're really hitting the limits of what their nuclear arsenals can do. And that's not easy. That's expensive and that requires expertise. And that expertise also can get lost over time. And that happened with a lot of nuclear weapons states, including Russia. So Russia right now, they are, they're still having a very powerful, very large nuclear arsenal, but they're struggling a bit with the upkeep and the modernization of that arsenal. And that is really illustrated by the recent test failures that we've seen for the next generation Sarmad ICBM that in fall 2024, even though the missile system should have been operational in 2018, had a traumatic catastrophic failure where it just exploded. And that's, of course a bit tricky now for the Russians because really their existing capabilities, their lifetime comes slowly but surely to an end. But the next generation capability does not yet appear directly on the horizon. Sanctions probably play a role in all of that. Russia was quite dependent on Western technology, in particular microelectronics, but also for precision engineering. So these technologies being cut off, the supply, not being available definitely hurts Russian missile programs. That being said, traditionally speaking, right. Nuclear weapons states, they have made an effort to keep their nuclear weapons programs a bit more autonomous compared to their conventional weapon systems.

[A]

Right.

[B]

Given that this is the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty. So we would assume that Russia has paid more attention to not becoming too dependent on Western technology in this area. But of course, the exact details are very difficult to get from, from looking at the outside.

[C]

Thank you. That's really interesting. Now, of course, people will be listening to this and say, well, even if you've got a handful of nuclear warheads that are viably usable. It doesn't really matter whether you've got an arsenal of them or a handful because it means you have a deterrent. Right. And that of course, is relevant to the conversations that no doubt will be taking place in Europe at the present moment. So I wonder, what are the implications for Russia of these upkeep issues? Is it financial predominantly? Is it about strategic standing? What does it mean? Why is this something that is actually quite serious?

[B]

Yeah, so first of all, it's a significant opportunity cost. Every dollar that they have to, to invest right now into, into their nuclear upkeep and modernization is money that is not available for, for other parts of the armed forces. And you know, during peacetime you can probably handle that quite well. But Russia has now been engaged in a full scale major conventional war in Europe that is highly attritional in nature for almost three years now. And so this money that they have to keep investing in their nuclear arsenal, that probably hurts elsewhere, we can be pretty sure about that. And then the other thing, and this is a bit more a medium to longer term trend. So this is not directly related to the war in Ukraine, but nuclear arsenals, by and large, they have become more vulnerable recently due to a bunch of technological developments. And that's of course, that's the case for China, for the United States, for the uk, but then also for Russia. And that is of course problematic, especially if you believe that, you know, your nuclear arsenal may not be as robust anymore as it has been in the past. So the survivability of the nuclear forces. But even though it's not, you know, I would not say it's undermined, not at all. But there is reason to question the survivability more and more. And you know, if you calculate in terms of worst case scenarios, which nuclear weapons states typically do when it comes to their nuclear weapons, that is of course not very good news. So Russia will have to deal with that. Right. They have to think about how to keep their nuclear deterrent credible and they have to keep investing money into it. And that's challenging over the coming years and decades.

[C]

Well, Terry, you've been listening to this and of course I don't want to tell your age, but talking about the Cold War and the legacy of the Cold War, you're a man who flew F16s, of course, in that period and beyond. I wonder, what are your reflections on this question and talk to us about what you know from your time in the armed forces.

[A]

Well, I remember talking to Harry Truman about, you know, what are we going to name this thing? And you know, I came up with the term Cold War, but. But no, I, I was an F16 pilot before I was an astronaut and I did a lot of different missions. Basically all the different missions the F16 could do and one of them was nukes. So, so I was based in Germany and this was right at the end of the Cold War. But we still had the nuclear mission and it was incredibly serious. Now we're fighter pilots, so we're not necessarily the most serious guys. But the nuke mission was a very serious thing. They had this thing called, and they still do personnel reliability program that everybody in the US Government who's involved in nuclear weapons is basically, they keep an eye on you. If you go to the doctor for a cold, you know, you're off nuclear status. They're very serious about that. Nuclear weapons in general or what's called two person control, by the way. Everything that I'm saying, I verified is on Wikipedia, so I'm not talking about anything classified. But two person control means, you know, one person can't go launch the nuclear codes. F16 is a single seat airplane. So the way we did that was that the, our crew chief, our maintenance mechanic, they were also certified on the weapon. So both the mechanic and the pilot would have to open these things called cookies that had the secret code in them and, and get the bomb enabled. So unless the mechanic was on board with enabling this bomb, and I think Fabian might talk about the B61. It's a bomb we've had for many, many, many decades and it's the one we still have. We would have to certify. So we'd have to go stand before the colonel and salute. And I had a town, actually it was pretty ominous. You know, I, I had my town and I would have to stand before the colonel and tell him everything about it. And you know, the, the river with the bridge that you could see and, and every detail of the attack, you'd have to tell him that you had no qualms that if you were given the order that you would actually do what you, what you were told to do. So it was a pretty serious thing. And then after, after we certified, the whole squadron would get together and watch Dr. Strangelove and drink beer. So it was like, you know, it was a serious thing. But at the end of the day we were fighter pilots. But we were. What's a part of what's called, or what was called the psyop, the Single Integrated Operating plan. And we called it the Master Blaster. But it was America's plan for every ICBM, SLBM, E52, everything was integrated into this one plan. And this guy came down to brief us, and he promised us. He's like, look, here's, here's your route. We had a, you know, a navigation route. He said, if you fly this route, we won't drop an ICBM on you, we promise. But just in case, they gave us a patch. So we wore an eye patch like a pirate. And the theory was if you're flying and back then, like, you had to actually be able to see in order to fly, otherwise you'd crash. So if a nuke went off and you got blinded, it would only blind you in one eye, and then you could move your patch to the other eye and continue your mission. They really didn't care. Some of the guys didn't have enough gas to get back home. They just had enough gas to get to the. Their target. So. But that was, that was my experience being nuclear certified F16 pilot.

[C]

So from those days, to today, then of course, that was a pretty bipolar Cold war world between Russia and, and the United States. I know that's overly simplistic in many ways, but let's, let's summarize it as such, but this feels like a more complicated one. Is that fair, Terry?

[A]

I absolutely think so. For sure, it was the US And Soviet Union. The US had France and England on our team, so to speak. France was good. Your, you know, your favorite country is Francophall. Francis. They were, they were always a wild card. Like, you know, are. What are they going to do? And I think that was to our advantage, having that strategic ambiguity. The Soviets had China, but the Chinese nuclear arsenal was very weak. India and Pakistan had nukes, but they were kind of focused on each other. So it really was a bipolar world. With what's happening today. China is already roughly at the 500 weapon, you know, Mark. I mean, how many more do you need? If, if 20% of them work, 100 major cities get destroyed. So. And they're. And they're massively expanding. They'll be well over a thousand in the next few years. So it's. There's a tripolar, you know, significant nuclear superpower world. And then the biggest thing is that nuclear, or North Korea rather, has nuclear weapons now. And that's a massively, in my opinion, destabilizing factor. And they don't just have one bomb. They have probably many 10 or 20 or. If Fabian can talk more about that. And they also have inner. They have missiles that can go thousands of miles and they use them and they blow up these bombs in, in counter to the test ban treaty. And then Iran is probably very, who knows? We don't know because Trump pulled out our inspectors. So we haven't had inspectors there because of our genius negotiator who pulled our inspectors out. But so between Iran and North Korea, and I'll say this real quick, I know it's a long answer. What we've done in Ukraine by not defeating Russia has basically taught the world a nuclear proliferation lesson that, A, if you have nuclear weapons, don't get rid of them like Ukraine did, and B, if you don't have nuclear weapons, get them, because if you have them, you can do what you want. So I think the proliferation costs that our kids are going to pay because of America's weakness and Europe's weakness in Ukraine, I think that it could potentially be the worst of all these terrible things that we're talking about.

[C]

I completely agree. And of course, of the proliferation cost as well as the economic cost. And Fabian, I wonder if you could speak to this and perhaps talk to us a little bit about the different stockpiles that are available for the various different countries.

[B]

Sure. If I may add something to the other one, right to the previous answer, I think the proliferation of nuclear weapons across different types of states, that's definitely one factor that renders today's nuclear environment very different from that of the Cold War. That being said, I think maybe even a bigger factor is technology, and there are many examples. But just to give you one, in the past, during the Cold War, if you wanted to blow up a nuclear missile silo armed with an ICBM that carries nuclear warheads, targeting planners had to assume that you would have to allocate your own nuclear weapons to that. And that is, of course, because, right. These missile silos, they're very hardened, reinforced structures. And the missile systems back in the days, they were not 100% accurate. So you needed a tremendous use yield of a nuclear warhead to reliably be able to blow up these heavily reinforced targets. Well, nowadays a Chasm cruise missile or a Taurus cruise missile, right, has both the range, the accuracy, and also the conventional warhead lethality to probably get the same job done, Right? So now nuclear weapons, they don't only have to take into account the enemy's nuclear arsenals when they assess the survivability of their own capabilities, but also the conventional arsenal. And that, of course, makes things a lot More complicated because now, you know, you not only have dual capable platforms like the F16, for example, which could fly nuclear and conventional missions, you also have somewhat dual capable munitions that, well, either can be armed with a nuclear or conventional warhead, or even if they're only armed with a conventional warhead, they can also fly nuclear or conventional missions.

[C]

Hmm. So can you summarize for us then? I know I'm, I'm asking here an extremely complex question, but in a broad brush sense, Terry made reference to the B61s. What are the differences, the major differences, between the different arsenals of, say, the key players here? So China, Russia, the United States, perhaps the United Kingdom. What are the big differences and what are their implications of those differences strategically?

[B]

Sure. So basically, we have two types of arsenals in the world. I would say the ones are the smaller ones that are really focused on survivability and what we call a secured second strike capability. So primarily speaking, their focus is on retaliating probably after absorbing an enemy first launch. China has traditionally pursued this route very, very rigorously until. Until recently. So. Right. The emphasis is not on a massive warhead count or a massive count of ICBMs, but rather basing modes that render them very survivable and really ensure that you have the capability to retaliate if push comes to shove. The other types of nuclear arsenal, and that is really only the United States that has pursued that in full force, and perhaps also Russia is what we would call a damage limitation capability. So the idea here is, right, and you've mentioned that in the beginning, Francis, that, you know, why, why do you need so many nuclear warheads when arguably, you know, a couple hundred or even a couple dozen might be enough? And that is because the United States decided, look, if, if push comes to shove, we have to credibly tell our allies that we're not only going to retaliate on their behalf, but we have to be able to preemptively destroy the Soviet nuclear arsenal. And again, right. The one way you do that is by launching your own nukes at the enemy nukes. And that means, of course, there are a lot more aim points than just a bunch of cities. Right? There are all these silos. There are all the bases for bombers and transporter erectile launchers. So you have a large multiplication of aim points, which means that at home you have a lot of multiplication of warheads and delivery vehicles. And yeah, so we have to see where it goes now. I mean, China might very well be going in the direction of deploying a nuclear damage limitation capability. North Korea would probably love to get there. I mean, the question is if they can. They have expanded the nuclear arsenal also quite massively, but, you know, comparatively to the United States, and it's still quite low. But.

[C]

Yeah, well, you've just explained there one of the questions that quite often get asked by people, which is why do you need so many? And so thank you very much for answering that. It brings me then, to the next kind of core subject, which is given the shift in the United States strategic posture that we've seen in the past week or so, what are the ramifications for Europe, particularly in that context, relating to the nuclear arsenal? I mean, we haven't yet got to the point where Donald Trump says that we won't protect you if worse comes to the worst. We're not quite there, but it doesn't feel like we're not that far off, given the remarks by Pete Hegseth where he said that America is no longer the primary guarantor of European security. So, Terry and I'll come to you, Fabian, in a moment with the same question. What do you think the ramifications are for this? What should Europe be doing given the seriousness of the situation, not only perhaps in the nuclear context, but more widely?

[A]

Well, I hope that Europe has finally, after, after a long time, is going to pull its head out of the sand and actually get back to arming itself properly, because Russia is, is there and Russia is not going anywhere. And the, the nuclear capabilities that England and France have are, are good and they're certainly dependable, but they're limited. They're not, you know, it's not America. They don't have triads. It's. And Fabian can talk more about that. Will Germany develop a nuclear weapon? Will Poland develop a nuclear weapon? Will Finland develop a nuclear weapon? Like I said, the lesson that America has taught the world, and specifically Europe, is get a nuclear weapon and you'll be good to go. And once you get it, don't, don't give it up, which is, which is a proliferation disaster for the future. If America were dependable as an ally, then that would not be necessary. But I'm afraid that there's probably discussions happening out of the public eye about, you know, should we look at this over the long term?

[C]

Fabian, what do you think?

[B]

Yeah, I would say two primary ramifications. The first one, neither France nor the United Kingdom deploy a damage limitation capability. So basically, what they can offer the European allies is that they are going to retaliate on their Behalf, if push comes to shove. Right. That is the extended deterrence product that they can supply. And you know, in the case of France, for example, I think this might be quite credibly credible, for example, for Germany or the Netherlands or Belgium, because it's quite easily, you can quite easily see how an existential threat to Berlin would probably also be an existential threat to Paris, if not right in that moment, then very, very soon. But you know, that might be different for Finland or the Baltic States or Romania. Right. Because there's just a massive geographical distance. And of course Macron will tell you that. Oh no, it doesn't matter. Right. Like we, we see the European interest as vital across the whole continent, but it's really, really difficult to convince your, your allies of that. The other ramification probably is that Europe would be losing a lot of options at what we call the non strategic nuclear level. So. Right. Sometimes it's also called the tactical nuclear level. So it's not about city busting, going after the enemy's population centers, but deploying smaller yield warheads across smaller distances, sometimes for battlefield effect, sometimes for signaling purposes. Right. For escalation management. And what Russia has are, is a very well thought through doctrine and also an arsenal that really enables this non strategic nuclear use. Neither France nor the UK have developed a large arsenal for that purpose and they also haven't really thought through the doctrinal implications of that. And without the United States, which again, they have both, they basically have a non strategic nuclear arsenal and have fought through those doctrinal implications better than the nuclear weapons states in Europe. I think we could see a quite dangerous deterrence gap emerging where Russia could believe that by escalating to the non strategic nuclear level, they could create a certain level of coercive leverage because they believe us Europeans don't have the proper options of responding. And of course France and the UK they could address that. Right. They could build up and diversify their nuclear arsenals. They, they could adapt their doctrines. But there's of course two questions. The one is the political will. Do they have the political will to do that? And then the other one is the finances. We've talked in the beginning about Russia. They're struggling with modernizing and upkeeping their nuclear arsenal. And the same of course is kind of the situation for France and the UK which also dramatically have to build up their conventional forces forces. And while doing that, it's probably quite difficult to also invest a lot of money in the nuclear side of things.

[C]

I think what this conversation speaks to is that once you pull at the thread of Article 5 of NATO solidity, very quickly, things can begin to unravel. And that has what has happened, and you speak about the deterrence gap, then that's going to be, I think, a core issue that no doubt is being discussed behind the scenes at the moment and is very concerning. But, Terry, you're quite possibly the first American that we've had on the podcast since the news broke last week. And I just wonder if you can summarize your thoughts. You're a man, you've worn uniform many times. You've of course, been very prominent by being a NASA astronaut. What were your reactions to the decisions made by the Trump administration? And my second additional question on top of that is, is there will be some in Europe who will think, well, you know, Trump's got two years before he begins to be weakened because he's only going to have, you know, another couple of years after that. Then maybe we'll get somebody else who's back in the, in the, in the more Biden fold or Obama fold. Let's just wait this out. What would you say to those people? So, two questions to you.

[A]

Well, I'll answer the second one first. I mean, I hope we have that time. The, the pace of damage and the scale of the damage that's been happening is pretty spectacular. I think we'll have that time. I believe in America. I would remind our European friends that less than 50% of Americans voted for Trump. So it's not, and, and there was, and some of those didn't really want to. They kind of held their nose and voted for him. So America is not completely gone yet. But, but at, at the core of Trump, and I think this is super important to understand, he's a mentally ill criminal. He's been adjudicated not only as a felon, as a rapist, as a sexual assaulter, as a liar in his businesses. He, he has profound mental challenges as a, as a narcissist, his ego and also moral challenges. And he showed last week that, I hate to say that America is one of the bad guys, because we're not. But he certainly has thrown his, his, himself in with the bad guys. He, he is clearly on Team Putin. If you listed out all the things that Putin would want in an American president, like, you couldn't even imagine what a dream Trump is. So I, I can't overstate what a bad week last week was. I think it was the worst week in American foreign policy history. But I also don't think that that's going to be the case forever. And the bottom line is Europe. You guys need to wake the heck up. I'll put it that way. You know, Ukraine doesn't need America. Your Europe, your economy is what, 10 times, I don't know, the GDP?

[C]

15 times I've heard cited Russia.

[A]

I'm here in the great state of Texas. If Texas were a country, it would be the 8th largest country in the world. Economically, Texas is bigger than Russia. You guys could be kicking Russia's butt. And by the way, it's a lot cheaper to just defeat them. And they are on the verge of defeat. I mean they're, they're, they're moving equipment with donkeys. Now. I just saw an email today that Ukraine destroyed their 10,000th tank. And in, in Ukraine. So stop being so weak and timid, my European friends and I love you and I just got back from Europe a few days ago and, and help support Ukraine. Had you actually started your artillery and missile production lines three years ago when you had the chance, this would be a no brainer. And the Russian economy like now is not. What Trump is doing is giving giving Putin a lifeline. He's literally coming in at the last minute to save the, you know, he's saving the damsel in distress. Now is the time to step up pressure. And, and, and another thing that Fabian had had mentioned this, but the Russian economy depends on war. I don't think Putin can survive. I don't think he can stay in power without having war. I mean he has put that economy on a no kidding war footing. So guess what? If the war stops in Ukraine, they don't overnight go from 40% of the federal budget down to 5% of the federal budget spending on the military. They're going to require some type of military action. And you know, Estonia, you know, you know who your neighbor is to the east. So my, my, my advice to Europe is please step up, please pull your head out of the sand and stop being so timid and, and work together and don't be divisive because unfortunately my country is not in the next short amount of time, is not going to do what it needs to do. I hate to say that, it pains me incredibly to say that, but it's the reality.

[C]

Well, thank you for your honest thoughts there, Terry Fabian. We're coming to the end of our time now. I wonder if there's anything that we've not talked about in the time we've had together that you think is important listeners know.

[B]

No, I, I think you Know what, what Terry said really resonated with me and probably a larger part of the European electorate. It's that we should have started ramping up our production with the beginning of the war dramatically. We haven't done that. And so the. Right, the second best day to do it is today. And you know, it just, it has to happen. And I think a main issue is that in Europe we're still not seeing the amount of capital, state budgets, right. State capital flowing into the defense sector that is needed. Our manufacturers, they actually have quite effectively ramped up production, often to the, to the best extent that they can on a business level. Right. And that was quite easily done for less capital intensive industries, like, for example, drone production, like artillery shell production. But when it comes to these really capital intensive industries like missiles, ships, tanks, infantry, fighting vehicles, that's really, really difficult to do for the manufacturers alone. And here what they would have to rely on is some state capital flowing in, as, by the way, you know, happens all the time in the United States. And that's quite, quite interesting because in the US you know, the defense manufacturers there are a lot more privatized than our defense manufacturers here in, in Europe, and yet they receive a lot less aid from state actors than their counterparts in the United States. I think this is just, you know, one of the key switches that finally, finally has to flip and then we can see a ramp up in production, hopefully.

[C]

Well, thank you, Fabian. Thank you, Terry, for your time today. Terry, is there anything that we've not talked about that you just want to want to say or if you said it all in your, in your last remarks, you didn't mention your words last one.

[A]

Yeah, I have that mental defect that I tend to say what I think I'll say this. The, the big, you know, one, there's a few catnips to the MAGA crowd in America. And one is, you know, America first. Let's not spend our money in other places. And the other one is China's our big threat. And let's pivot the China. But I've never heard any strategy for how to pivot to China. And what does that mean? Are we going to put armored brigades in Taiwan? I mean, are we going to do these things? And China requires ships and B21 bombers. That's not at all what we're spending in Europe. And so it doesn't make any sense. What they're saying is that we have to stop supporting Europe so that we can support China. Well, there's no strategy to take our assets from Europe and actually help Taiwan. That's not at all what's going to happen. In fact, there's not really any strategy at all. So I would just make that point. If you hear this kind of dog whistle coming or gaslighting or I don't even know what the term is coming from maga, if you just ask the question, well, what's your strategy for China? And the big strategy for China is we, we've told China that hey, we're not going to support Ukraine to stand up to Russia. So why would China think that we're going to stand up to them to take over Taiwan? So I think that China is used often and I think that the press and that would be you, Francis and their Telegraph colleagues need to hold the Trump administration to account when they say things like that.

[C]

Of course that has ramifications in Europe too because of this so called tilt to the Pacific, which was an extension of the hand, you know, to help America out in the, not that necessarily needed it, but you know, to help America out in the East. And yet now of course it's been sort of thrown back in Europe's face.

[A]

I'm afraid that Europe is going to tilt to the Pacific. I mean if America is not a dependable ally, why wouldn't, you know, you tilt the China? They would be dependable. And by the way, we're, we're threatening to take money from our friend, $500 billion worth of minerals or whatever. Everything about that is so disgustingly wrong. It's just the, like I said, it was the worst week in American foreign policy history. We didn't talk about that one. So I'll throw that out there. Threatening Ukraine to take their minerals just as a payment for previous services rendered is, is, is evil.

[C]

Well, Terry Fabian, thank you very much for your time and an interesting conversation. I look forward to hearing listeners reflections on it. Thank you both.

[A]

Thank you. Yeah, thanks so much.

[D]

The latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles to support our work and to stay on top of all of our Ukraine news, analysis and dispatches from the ground. Please subscribe to the Telegraph. You can get one month free and then two months for just one pound at three ws.telegraph.co.uk the latest deploying cutting edge technology, we also release Ukrainian and Russian versions of this podcast. These translations retain our voices and delivery so that it can reach listeners in every, every region of Ukraine and in those parts of Eastern Europe where Russian is still widely spoken. Links to those can be found in the podcast description to this episode. We regularly have a Ukraine Live blog on our website where you can follow updates as they come in throughout the day, including insights from regular contributors to this podcast, and we also do the same for other breaking international stories. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Ukraine the latest on your preferred podcast app and leave us a review as it really helps others find the show. Please also share it with those who may not be aware we exist. You can listen to this conversation live at 1pm London time each weekday on X Faces. Follow the Telegraph on X, formerly known as Twitter so that you don't miss it. You can also get in touch directly to ask questions or give comments by emailing ukrainepodelegraph. We do continue to read every message. You can also contact us directly on X. You can find our handles in the description for this episode. As ever, we're especially interested to hear where you are listening from around the world. Ukraine the latest was today produced by Alexis Ademora. Executive producers are Francis Durnley, Louisa Wells and David Knowles.

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