Podcast Summary: Unhedged — “What’s a central bank supposed to do?”
Podcast: Unhedged
Date: September 4, 2025
Host: Katie Martin (A), Robert Armstrong (C)
Guest: Brendan Greeley (B), financial historian and former FT reporter
Main Theme: Why central bank independence matters, a historical tour of central banking and the dangers of politicizing the Fed.
Episode Overview
This episode unpacks the significance of central bank independence amidst threats of political intervention, specifically examining recent moves by Donald Trump to influence the U.S. Federal Reserve. Katie Martin, Robert Armstrong, and guest Brendan Greeley discuss the origins, evolution, and role of central banks while wrestling with the implications of political interference in monetary policy.
Key Discussion Points & Insights
Introduction: Why Does Central Bank Independence Matter?
- Framing the Problem: The hosts highlight recent political maneuvers aimed at the Federal Reserve, especially efforts to undermine or control its leadership.
- “Why is independence important at a central bank? Is it important?” — Katie (00:36)
- Brendan Greeley joins as the resident central banking historian (PhD candidate at Princeton, former Fed reporter for Bloomberg and FT).
The Early Days: Central Banks as Political Tools
- Origins of Central Banks:
- Sovereigns established central banks to control banking power and finance wars. Central banks were designed as instruments of government policy.
- “If we look at the original charter of the Bank of England in 1694... it offers a purpose: towards the carrying on the war against France. That was it.” — Brendan (05:56)
- American History:
- The U.S. resisted a central bank due to the structure of state-level banking and a wariness of concentrating power.
- State-chartered banks issued their own banknotes, leading to a chaotic monetary system.
- Key early banks in America (e.g., Bank of North America) also driven primarily by wartime financing. (08:38)
Notable Quote
“War is turning into a real theme here, isn’t it?”
— Robert Armstrong (11:31)
The Birth of the Modern Fed & the Role of Liquidity
- Banking Panics and the Birth of the Fed (post-1907 crisis):
- The federal government created the Fed to provide liquidity, particularly to rural banks and farmers.
- The Fed’s initial mission: “just to make sure that country banks can get dollar bills when they need them... There’s nothing in there about unemployment or inflation.” — Brendan (13:03)
- This was a political move to counteract the free market’s failure to serve certain populations:
“There’s already a decision in the creation of the Fed to protect a certain group of people who are not being served by a very free market.” — Brendan (13:37)
The Fed Becomes Political by Design
- From Farmer Bailouts to War Finance:
- The 1930s saw the Fed become even more political, with Mariner Eccles' reforms strengthening the Board of Governors to make the Fed answerable to Congress.
- The Fed played a significant role in financing WWII by buying Treasuries to keep debt costs low—early quantitative easing (QE). (16:11)
“...the Federal Reserve says we’re going to buy Treasuries not to finance the war but to keep the price of debt down.” — Brendan (16:11)
Independence: The Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951
- Birth of Modern Independence:
- Post-WWII, the Fed asserted its independence from the Treasury, refusing political demands to cap interest rates.
“Truman even sort of publicly said, ‘look, I talked to the Fed, they’re going to do it.’ And the Fed hadn’t come out and say, ‘Nope. We talked to Truman and we told him no.’” — Brendan (17:16)
- This event (the “Fed-Treasury Accord”) is cited as the genesis of modern central bank independence.
- “That is a formula that works pretty well, and we should keep doing that. And that’s what we’re worried about when we talk about Fed independence.” — Robert (22:42)
- Post-WWII, the Fed asserted its independence from the Treasury, refusing political demands to cap interest rates.
Limits and Flaws in Central Bank Independence
- A Qualified Defense of the Model:
- Independence only “worked as long as the great moderation worked”—a period from the 1980s to the financial crisis when inflation and macro volatility were subdued.
- The Fed often self-defines its mandates, sometimes ignoring the explicit credit and lending objectives set by Congress.
- “The Fed grades itself on homework it assigns itself.” — Brendan (20:50)
Notable Quote
“...if we were to reform the Fed, this is not the way we’d go about it.”
— Brendan Greeley (21:50)
Current Crisis: Political Pressure and the Danger Ahead
- Concerns Over Politicizing the Fed:
- The Trump camp’s campaign against Governor Lisa Cook is described as unprecedented and dangerous, with political actors “sullying” officials and using intimidation to influence policy (04:09).
- This method threatens to turn the Fed into an arm of the administration, undermining its legitimacy.
“Trump is actively turning it into Trump’s bank. That’s new, that’s different, and it’s a little terrifying.” — Brendan (25:39)
- Call for Democratic Process:
- Brendan stresses that any legitimate reform to central banking should happen through Congress, with public debate and consensus, not backroom firings or intimidation (24:25).
- “If we wanted to change the structure of the Fed, what we'd do is follow the same democratic process that Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Mariner Eccles followed when they rewrote the Fed act in 1933 and 1935.” — Brendan (24:25)
The Broader Lesson: Where’s Congress?
- Macro Takeaway:
- The current fight over Fed independence points to the broader issue of legislative abdication: Congress should own this process, not the executive.
“We should spend a lot more time... saying, where’s Congress?” — Robert (25:14)
- The current fight over Fed independence points to the broader issue of legislative abdication: Congress should own this process, not the executive.
Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments
-
On central bank function:
“It’s like gravity. It’s as close to gravity as we have in finance. What is gravity in finance? It’s the Fed funds rate.”
— Robert Armstrong (05:27) -
On the evolution of the Fed:
“The Fed’s first job was highly political, was to protect farmers from seasonal bank failures. And the second job... is carrying on the war against the fascists.”
— Brendan Greeley (16:34) -
On current political attacks:
“The idea that we would sort of arbitrarily shorten the terms through blackmail of Fed governors and install people... that seems to be how he [Trump] styles himself—[an autocrat].”
— Brendan Greeley (21:50)
Important Timestamps
- 00:36–02:16: Introductions, framing question: why central bank independence matters
- 05:56–08:38: Bank of England origins; central banks as tools for sovereign borrowing/war
- 13:03–14:19: Early Fed as liquidity provider for rural banks and farmers
- 16:11–18:04: The Fed as war financier/early QE in WWII
- 17:16–19:42: The Fed-Treasury Accord and modern central bank independence
- 20:42–21:50: The danger of politicized Fed appointments and the shortcomings in the Fed’s current approach to its mandate
- 24:25: Defense of democracy and legislative change (not executive overreach) in Fed reform
- 25:39: Final warnings about loss of democratic legitimacy, the necessity of congressional oversight
Tone and Style
- Conversational, witty, full of historical anecdotes.
- Brendan is rigorous but accessible—a mix of scholarly and anecdotal knowledge (with wry asides about the repetitive nature of wars spawning central banks).
- Robert and Katie offer both lighthearted joking (“It’s like gravity!”) and serious concern about current events.
Conclusion/Takeaway
Central bank independence has been won and lost throughout history, usually in response to crises—especially wars—but its current form is the product of deliberate postwar design. Politically-motivated efforts to control the Fed undermine both its effectiveness and its democratic legitimacy, threatening broader economic stability. Any reform to the central bank’s role must occur through open, democratic processes—not executive pressure or intimidation.
Final Notable Line
“Normally it’s the academics who tell you... everything will be fine. The academics are not saying that this time around when it comes to the Fed.”
— Katie Martin (25:57)
[Episode ends with the regular Long/Short segment and some light, humorous banter.]
