UnHerd with Freddie Sayers: "How the internet killed institutions"

Episode Date: February 19, 2026
Guest: Anton Jäger, Lecturer at Oxford University, NYT columnist, author of Hyper Politics
Host: Johnny Ball (contributing editor at UnHerd, filling in for Freddie Sayers)

Episode Overview

This episode explores Anton Jäger’s concept of "hyper politics" amid the collapse of legacy institutions and the rise of chaotic, individualized digital engagement. Drawing on recent Western history, Jäger and the host discuss how the internet, social media, and post-2008 economic stagnation have repoliticized society while also eroding the organizations (parties, unions, churches) that once gave political energy structure and continuity. The conversation spans from the roots of this transformation in the financial crisis through Brexit and the Trump era to emergent movements of both left and right, asking: Why is so much activism failing to produce meaningful, durable change?

Key Concepts Explored

1. The Meaning of "Hyper Politics"

[02:16 – 04:15]

• Definition:
  "Hyper Politics, in the most succinct definition would be a process of repoliticization without reinstitutionalization." (Anton Jäger, 02:17)
• Characteristics:
  • High engagement: More voting, protest, activism, political violence since 2010, accelerating post-2020.
  • But without corresponding strength in institutional or organizational life (unions, parties, civil society).
• Novelty:
  • "A situation in which more and more people are politically active and politically engaged, but they're not doing so in institutional context." (Anton Jäger, 03:35)

2. The Drivers and Nature of Today’s Political Upheaval

[04:15 – 08:53]

• Not just a feeling—quantifiable:
  Record voter turnout (esp. 2020, 2024 US elections), unprecedented protest numbers.
• Origins:
  • The 2008–09 financial crisis as a “first spark" for public anger and anti-establishment movements.
  • Widespread use of the internet and social media reduced the costs (and friction) for organizing, venting, and activism.
  • "It is now possible for millions of people to go online and basically air their opinions or send them into the digital ether." (Jäger, 07:28)

3. Crisis of Institutions: Then vs. Now

[10:55 – 17:45]

• Contrast with the 1920s–30s:

  • Then: Mass parties, dense civil societies—even extremists required organizations (e.g., Nazi paramilitaries).
  • Now: Even massive events (e.g., right-wing marches) are often organizationally thin—participants connected by internet, not shared institutions.
  • "The people who were there last summer don't share an organizational prehistory in a specific institution... it's not as if they're going to be acquiring membership cards." (Jäger, 15:04)

• Example:

  • The “Reform pub” in a former Conservative club—symbolizes the hollowing out and rebranding of old institutions, not real rebuilding.

• Shift in party membership culture:

  • 1950s Tories: mass organization, millions of members.
  • Now: Parties as personal vehicles. Membership is "low-cost and exitable."

    “The type of party membership that became predominant in 2010s... was a very optional, let’s say exitable or with low, cheap exit costs…” (Jäger, 20:10)

4. From Mass Politics to Post-Politics to Hyper Politics

[22:21 – 30:25]

• Mass Politics (20th century):

  • High engagement & institutionalization; parties/unions embedded in social life.

• Post-Politics (1990s–2000s):

  • Low engagement, low institutionalization; decline in voting, union/party membership.
  • Reasons: Economic (deindustrialization, neoliberalism), cultural (individualization, distaste for rigid institutions), political (outsourcing power—quangos, central banks).
  • "The famous phrase in the 80s and 90s, we’re in office but we’re not in power.” (Jäger, 29:21)

• Anti-Politics (early 2010s):

  • Populist backlash against technocratic and unaccountable elites; parties like Podemos in Spain, Corbyn’s Labour, Bernie Sanders in US—but still seek institutional routes.

• Hyper Politics (current era):

  • Explosion of activism and sentiment—but an “abjuring” of organizations:

    "[The difference...] is that with the realization that it's much more difficult to institutionalize... you get a different reflex, which is, we're against representation altogether." (Jäger, 33:10)

5. Why Does the Right Dominate Hyper Politics?

[34:48 – 42:07]

• The contemporary Right wins the race for hyper politics due to structural and tactical advantages:

  • Lower expectations:
    “The right just enjoys a structural advantage… It is the party of order rather than the party of progress.” (Jäger, 35:00)
    • Voters judge right parties less harshly for failing at big systemic promises.
  • Access to private funding:
    • “There is an access to private funds on the right which isn't as self-evident on the left.” (Jäger, 37:08)
    • Example: Elon Musk funding UK right-wing marches.
  • Greater internal discipline:
    • "The right has had a bit more intellectual and political discipline.” (Jäger, 39:25)

• Limits of digital-only politics:

  • Figures like Farage and Melanchon can go far with digital, personal politics but lack durability without solid institutions:

    “This hobbyism... only gets you so far. And then you need to draft all kinds of local councillors... And then it turns out you’ve generated candidates with AI… If he wants to turn the party into a real alternative… it’s not something you can do in one media cycle or one electoral cycle.” (Jäger, 41:03)

6. The Fate of Leader-Centric, Digital Activism

[43:44 – 47:29]

• Short-term success, long-term danger:
  • Digital-first “movements” (e.g., Five Star in Italy) can flare up but rarely consolidate; they go extinct or lose relevance.
• Hybrid model needed:
  • The winning recipe is a combination: classic organizing + modern digital reach.

    “It’s the people who go for the genetic hybrid that I think have the brightest future precisely because they can… bet on both horses.” (Jäger, 45:32)

  • Example: Mamdani’s campaign (digital and door-knocking, unions, volunteers).

7. Left vs. Right: Membership, Identity, and Stamina

[48:59 – 51:09]

• Political patience and the left:
  • “I’m an advocate of political patience, particularly on the left…I think the argument for thinking long term…is very important.” (Jäger, 49:03)
• Dangers:
  • Over-personalized movements collapse when the figurehead leaves (Melanchon, Corbyn, Wilders).
  • Over-democratic, bottom-up parties risk inertia and sectarianism—must find “a midway option between institutional sclerosis and complete personal[ism].” (Jäger, 52:08)

8. The "Working-Class Turn" of Today’s Far Right

[53:08 – 57:50]

• Far right now attracts significant working-class support, unlike historical fascism (which was mainly middle-class).
• But: Relationship is shallow, not institutionalized through party membership.

  “Because these working class voters vote for these parties does not mean they’ve necessarily become members.” (Jäger, 54:13)

• Despite appeals to labor and protectionism, right-populists’ actual worker policies are limited or hollow.

  "There is a kind of rhetorical workers politics without an actual workers program..." (Jäger, 57:41)

9. Rebuilding Collective Power in a Fragmented Era

[58:18 – 63:32]

• Jäger’s view is cautiously optimistic:
  • Not nostalgic for mass-party church-like discipline or for 1990s technocracy.
  • “The repoliticization we’re seeing is good. The question is, how do you reinstitutionalize…?” (Jäger, 59:53)
• 21st-century mass politics:
  • Proposed model: "Concentric circles" of engagement
    • Looser, digital-affinity supporters (e.g., mobilized at election time),
    • More committed base for ongoing activism,
    • Militant cadre for organizational durability.
  • Example: Belgian Workers Party—roots in old mass-party model, but strong digital outreach and flexible membership.

Memorable Quotes & Moments

• On the new politics:
  “Hyper Politics… a process of repoliticization without reinstitutionalization.”
  —Anton Jäger (02:16)

• On the hollowing out of movements:
  “They might follow the same influencers, they might listen to the same podcast, they might be in the same telegram channels. That makes them easy to mobilize... but as the march ends, they then disperse. And it’s not very clear what kind of ties remain after that.”
  —Jäger (15:11)

• On party membership today:
  “Type of party membership... in the 2010s also in the left, was a very optional, let's say exitable or with low, cheap exit costs..."
  —Jäger (20:10)

• On the expectations gap between left and right:
  “Salvini... had all kinds of wild dreams... None of this came to pass. But they've not been punished by their electors in the same way because... the base doesn’t expect the same of the right as it does from the left.”
  —Jäger (36:11)

• On digital-only parties:
  “If you go for complete liquidity, you’ll be swept up in the next wave and then you’ll be gone. And that’s the story of the five star movement.”
  —Jäger (45:32)

• On the future:
  “You can't step in the same river twice and you cannot clone a dinosaur... the repoliticization we're seeing is good… The question is, how do you renounce institutionalize[d] [politics] and accept that people will not go to church as they did in the 20th century, both on the left and the right?”
  —Jäger (58:49)

• On a possible way forward:
  "It’s this organism that operates at different speeds, namely the looser and then the part time and then the full time members, that to me seems like a very promising way of reinventing mass politics for that new era."
  —Jäger (61:19)

Key Timestamps

• 02:16 — Definition of hyper politics
• 04:15 – 08:53 — Evidence and causes of heightened political activity
• 10:55 – 17:45 — Comparison to 1930s/party institutional weakness
• 22:21 – 30:25 — Shift from mass, to post-, to anti-, to hyper politics
• 34:48 – 42:07 — Why the right succeeds; structural and financial factors
• 43:44 – 47:29 — Limits of digital activism, need for hybrid models
• 48:59 – 51:09 — Membership fluidity and leadership dependence
• 53:08 – 57:50 — Far right’s "working-class turn"; limitations
• 58:18 – 63:32 — Reimagining mass politics for the digital age; Belgian Workers Party example

Conclusion

Jäger argues that the internet, social media, and two decades of economic and political strain have fundamentally changed how citizens relate to politics—amplifying activism while leaving the institutions that previously channeled discontent weaker than ever. Enduring change, he suggests, will require rebuilding organizational life, but in ways that accept new norms of flexibility and digital engagement, rather than simply trying to “clone a dinosaur.” The most promising future lies in hybrid forms that combine the energy and reach of the digital era with the durability of structured, collective participation.

Host's parting question:
"Do we all just go and join a union, join a political party, get involved?"

Jäger’s answer: Not nostalgia, but reinvention—embracing both new and old ways of organizing, and finding adaptable, multi-layered forms for collective life in the chaotic environment the internet has wrought.