Jake Sullivan: Trump has handed Iran victory

Summary

---

UnHerd with Freddie Sayers

Episode: Jake Sullivan: Trump has handed Iran victory

Date: June 19, 2026
Guest: Jake Sullivan (Former US National Security Advisor, Kissinger Professor, Harvard Kennedy School)
Host: Freddie Sayers

---

Overview

In this episode, Freddie Sayers interviews Jake Sullivan, former National Security Advisor under President Biden and a key architect of the original Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA). The discussion centers on the newly announced US-Iran “deal,” brokered under President Trump, which halts the recent US-Iran war, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, and promises vast financial relief and reconstruction funding for Iran, all while deferring nuclear issues for future negotiation.

Sullivan critically examines the key differences between the original JCPOA and the current Trump administration agreement—arguing that the new deal represents a considerable strategic win for Iran. The conversation dives deep into political strategy, regional security (especially the implications for Israel), the consequences for US foreign policy, and the likely long-term effects on global energy markets and geopolitical stability.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Context and Significance of the New "Iran Deal"

[02:01-04:10]

• The episode opens with Sayers establishing the recent dramatic shift in US foreign policy: From talk of war with Iran to an emergent peace agreement.
• Jake Sullivan’s credentials: Lead negotiator for the JCPOA, long-standing adviser in US-Iran diplomacy.
• The new deal’s core: Suspend the war, reopen Strait of Hormuz, begin negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, but with Iran making no immediate nuclear concessions.

---

2. Financial Terms: "A Massive Windfall for Iran"

[04:10-10:10]

• Sullivan compares payment terms between the JCPOA and the new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU):
  • Previous Deal (JCPOA): $2B unfreezing after nuclear concessions, tightly controlled.
  • New Deal:
    • Immediate unfreezing of ~$24B in Iranian assets.
    • Immediate waiver of oil and petrochemical sanctions (potentially $60-100B in the first year).
    • An eventual $300B fund for "reconstruction and economic development" in Iran, should a nuclear deal emerge in phase two.
• “We’re essentially paying the Iranians to open a strait that was open on February 27 before we got into this in the first place.”
  – Jake Sullivan [06:45]
• Political framing: Sullivan stresses this deal gives Iran far more rewards for fewer commitments, especially compared to the detailed, phased approach of the JCPOA.

---

3. The Structure of Negotiations: An "Agreement to Make an Agreement"

[11:20-13:56]

• Sayers highlights the vagueness in the MoU: only a “commitment to negotiate” on nuclear matters, versus highly technical, detailed JCPOA terms.
• Sullivan notes the document’s phrasing—specifically, the US acceptance of Iran’s “nuclear needs”—marks a significant shift.
  • “That phrase ‘nuclear needs’ is essentially an acknowledgment by the United States of Iran’s claim that it should have a civilian nuclear program. That...is a big give to Iran right there.”
    – Jake Sullivan [12:45]
• The JCPOA previously required significant Iranian concessions before sanctions relief. Here, Iran receives extensive up-front benefits just for opening negotiations.

---

4. Why Does Iran Insist on Nuclear Capabilities?

[13:56-16:59]

• Sullivan outlines three reasons for Iran’s unyielding stance:
  1. National pride/scientific achievement (deeply embedded in Iranian identity).
  2. Strategic leverage/hedging: Retain the option for weaponization if needed.
  3. Historical continuity: Pre-dates the Islamic Republic; originated during the Shah’s era.
• “They are not going to move off this negotiating position, period...It is better to make a compromise on this point to secure an agreement that blocks them from getting a nuclear weapon.”
  – Jake Sullivan [15:58]

---

5. Incentives and Risks: Iran’s Leverage, US Concessions

[20:11-22:27]

• The host notes Iran’s pattern: pose a nuclear threat to gain concessions.
• Sullivan agrees broadly, elaborating Iran is willing to accept inspection and restrictions—so long as it preserves some nuclear infrastructure and gains economic benefits.
  • “The Iran nuclear program was in a box when the deal was in place. And then Trump pulled out of the deal and they began moving forward again.”
    – Jake Sullivan [21:16]
• Likelihood is, any future deal will closely resemble the JCPOA, with phased limits, inspections, and time-bound concessions.

---

6. Potential Improvements or Setbacks over JCPOA

[24:04-26:07]

• Could the new deal deliver more for more? A longer moratorium, deeper inspections? Sullivan is skeptical, especially given Trump’s tendency toward “phase one” agreements that rarely progress further.
• Notably, the US is offering broader sanctions relief and more money than ever before, for possibly less in return.

---

7. Israel’s Position and Regional Implications

[26:07-32:12]

• Netanyahu historically urged US military action against Iran; finally succeeded during Trump’s second term.
• Sullivan explains Israeli pressure, Trump’s perception of operational success, and why the resulting deal actually leaves Israel with less security and fewer options (“ties their hands with respect to Lebanon and Hezbollah” [28:37]).
• Sayers notes the MoU repeatedly references Lebanon—a deliberate inclusion by Iran to restrict Israeli operations.
  • “It’s repeated over and over...Basically, Iran beating home the point that the end to this standoff...has to be accompanied by an end to military operations in Lebanon.”
    – Jake Sullivan [30:26]
• Sullivan predicts that as Iran’s deal is so advantageous, it's unlikely they would abandon it over limited Israeli strikes (unless the deal’s explicit terms involving Lebanon are breached).

---

8. Critique and Assessment of Trump’s Military Doctrine

[34:08-37:09]

• Sayers describes Trump’s “shock and awe, brief, surgical war” model, which initially appeared effective in Iran.
• Sullivan strongly contests this, stating taking out Iran’s Supreme Leader escalated the crisis from a limited raid (like against Maduro) to existential regime change for Iran—prompting Iran’s unprecedented shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz.
  • “Now it’s an actual, proven card [the Hormuz shutdown]. And, frankly, it’s a card Iran knows it can play over and over again in the future, too.”
    – Jake Sullivan [36:45]

---

9. Why Did Iran Not Close the Strait of Hormuz Before?

[37:09-38:53]

• Iran had always been cautious about shutting the Strait, weighing high risks versus uncertain gains.
• The US attempt at regime change made those risks justifiable for Iran—now, having successfully closed the Strait and extracted concessions, Tehran may use this tactic again.

---

10. Energy Geopolitics: Who Actually Suffers?

[38:53-41:21]

• Sayers—citing expert Helen Thompson—suggests the US is now more energy independent, and might have viewed Hormuz closure as more damaging to China or Europe.
• Sullivan agrees in part, but notes the US still felt economic pressure at the pump, reinforcing the power of Iran’s leverage.
  • “Despite the fact that, yes, we are more resilient than Europe...we are not immune. And that the leverage of the closure of the Strait squeezed us too, and caused President Trump to decide, I gotta do a deal.”
    – Jake Sullivan [41:15]

---

11. What Comes Next? Sullivan's Prognosis

[41:21-44:39]

• Most likely: Peace holds—both Iran and Trump have incentives to avoid renewed conflict.

• Risks: Israeli military action or US domestic backlash could upset the balance, but seem contained.

• Sullivan foresees open-ended, slow-moving nuclear negotiations with Iran flush with resources, strengthening Iran’s regional position.

• Potential global impact: If oil prices fall, Russia could feel heightened economic pressure, offering some possible upside for the West.

  • “I do worry that the ways in which it strengthens Iran's hands may end up coming back to bite us down the road. But I don't think it's going to return to full scale war between the two countries in the near term.”
    – Jake Sullivan [44:15]

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• "This deal is really just pretty much an unalloyed win for Iran...the United States basically lost this war."
  – Jake Sullivan [10:10]

• “It’s an agreement to make an agreement.”
  – Unherd Host [12:01]

• “The phrase ‘nuclear needs’ is essentially an acknowledgment by the United States of Iran’s claim that it should have a civilian nuclear program. That is a big give to Iran right there.”
  – Jake Sullivan [12:45]

• “If you take an action which says to Iran, this is existential, this is regime change, there is no limit on the escalation that the United States will undertake, then Iran is going to throw everything they've got at defending themselves, and that includes shutting down the Strait of Hormuz.”
  – Jake Sullivan [35:31]

• “Now it's an actual, proven card. And, frankly, it's a card Iran knows it can play over and over again in the future, too. That to me is a huge setback strategically...”
  – Jake Sullivan [36:45]

• “I do think these negotiations will basically be open ended...I don't think you're going to see a comprehensive nuclear deal. I think that will just drag indefinitely.”
  – Jake Sullivan [42:46]

---

Timeline of Important Segments

| Timestamp | Segment | |---------------|--------------------------------------------------------| | 02:01–04:10 | Introduction/context; Jake Sullivan’s credentials | | 04:10–10:10 | Financial terms comparison; “windfall to Iran” | | 11:20–13:56 | Nuclear commitments (or lack thereof) in the MoU | | 13:56–16:59 | Rationale for Iran’s nuclear insistence | | 20:11–22:27 | Iranian leverage; effectiveness of inspections | | 24:04–26:07 | Could the new deal be better/worse than JCPOA? | | 26:07–32:12 | Israel’s role, Lebanon, and regional implications | | 34:08–37:09 | US doctrine, “shock and awe” strategy, miscalculation | | 37:09–38:53 | Why Hormuz wasn’t closed earlier; new risks | | 38:53–41:21 | Oil/energy politics; impact on US, EU, China | | 41:21–44:39 | Predictions; will peace hold? Will Iran gain power? |

---

Conclusion

This episode offers a nuanced, insider’s analysis of the dramatic US policy turn on Iran under the Trump administration. Jake Sullivan assesses the new Iran deal as a decisive Iranian diplomatic victory—enriching and empowering Tehran, with risky long-term consequences for US interests, regional stability, and the future of nuclear diplomacy. Still, Sullivan (and host Sayers) find some solace in the likely cessation of hostilities and the faint prospect of collateral geopolitical benefits.

---

Transcript

[Jake Stauch]

Jake I'm Jake Stauch, co founder and CEO of Cervel. We built Cervel to automate the IT work that slows companies down. Onboarding password resets, access to applications. My laptop stopped working. While employees wait for help, their real work is put on hold. IT desperately wants to automate this work, and that's why they need Serval. You just tell Serval what you want to automate in plain English and it's built. No drag and drop workflows, no expensive consultants. Employees get unblocked and IT teams go from drowning in tickets to building what actually matters. With Cerval, IT becomes the AI engine powering the entire company. This is a new way to run it. We guarantee you'll automate 50% of all tickets and we'll prove it to you in a free four week pilot. Go to servil.com acast that's serval.com/acast.

[Grow Therapy Advertiser]

The pressure to have a summer worth posting about is real. So is financial stress, social exhaustion, and the anxiety that sneaks in right when things are supposed to feel good. Grow Therapy can help with that. Whether it's your first time in therapy or your 50th, grow makes it easier to find a therapist who fits you, not the other way around. They connect you with thousands of independent licensed therapists across the US Offering both virtual and in person sessions, nights and weekends. Whatever challenges you're facing, Grow Therapy is here to help. Grow accepts over 100 insurance plans. Sessions average about $21 with insurance and some pay as little as $0 depending on their plan. Visit growtherapy.com acast today to get started. That's growthherapy.com acast growtherapy.com acast availability and coverage vary by state and insurance plan.

[Unherd Host]

Hello there and welcome back to Unherd. We've taken a break for about two weeks, but it feels like there's a whole new American foreign policy already. The last few interviews we were doing were talking either positively or negatively about the fact that the hawks inside the Trump administration appear to have won the argument we had John Bolton on. We were speaking to people like Joe Kent who were dismayed that war with Iran went ahead despite the promises of the more isolationist foreign policy of that administration. Well, here we are just a few weeks later and that appears to have upended once again. The war is going to be suspended. A memorandum of understanding will be signed by Iran, the United States. And it all sounds weirdly reminiscent because those of us who have memories longer than three months will know that there was an Iran deal before. And in fact, it was something that President Trump talked a lot about in both of his presidential campaigns. He said it was a terrible thing. So I think it's time to really look at the old Iran deal compared to what now looks like might become the new Iran deal. And there's no better person, really, in the world to help make that comparison with us than Jake Sullivan. Jake was the National Security Advisor under President Biden, but before that, he worked for both President Obama and Hillary Clinton when she was Secretary of State. And he was literally one of the first people to negotiate with the top Iranian officials about whether a deal could be done. So he knows an awful lot about it. I will say. He is not a Republican. He will be, I suspect, oppositional to this movement by the Trump administration. But he is now in academia. He is the Kissinger professor of Practice at the Kennedy School of Government. He also runs a fantastic podcast called the Long Game with his former deputy, John Finer. And he joins us now. Welcome to Unherd.

[Jake Sullivan]

Thank you so much for having me.

[Unherd Host]

Let me start with the obvious question. As someone who actually has negotiated an Iran deal, how does this new Iran deal compare?

[Jake Sullivan]

Well, what's really interesting about this deal is that in its substance, it's basically a deal to open the Strait of Hormuz, and we can talk about the terms of that which are not favorable to the United States and are very favorable to Iran. And then it's a deal to negotiate over Iran's nuclear program. Actually, Iran doesn't make in this deal any commitments with respect to its nuclear program other than it will maintain the status quo while the negotiations are ongoing. And otherwise, the major nuclear questions, level of enrichment, type of inspections, disposition of the stockpile, those have all been deferred to a negotiation that the document says will take place within 60 days. I am deeply skeptical that that can be done. But essentially, what you're looking at here is a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz with a massive financial windfall to Iran, and then a commitment to negotiate a set of nuclear issues that at present are completely unresolved.

[Unherd Host]

Let's just pick up a couple of those themes. The massive financial windfall to Iran, because this is really giving me kind of weird memories of 2015, 2016, when the Republicans were talking about these plane loads of cash going to Iran. What are the sums involved and how does it compare to. To the sums in the previous deal?

[Jake Sullivan]

This reference to the pallets of cash was a $400 million payment, which was an international court judgment that the US had to pay. And the reason it had to be paid in cash is because we had very tight sanctions on Iran. And you couldn't do it through the banking system, so you could only do it that way. That's $400 million million with an M. Then there was an additional $1.7 billion transfer of funds. So total of about 2 billion. Okay. Just to open the Strait of Hormuz, the Trump administration has committed to unfreezing somewhere around $24 billion in Iranian assets. And the terms of the deal say Iran can use that for whatever purpose it wants, to include rebuilding its military, by the way, or funding its proxy groups. So in addition to the 24 billion, there is also a term which says immediately the United States will waive all sanctions on oil sales by Iran and petrochemical sales by Iran, which is an additional tens of billions of dollars over the course of a year. So you're talking here in sum total about, call it 60, 80, $100 billion in financial windfall over the next year to Iran compared to a. A relatively modest amount with respect to those direct payments. Now, the JCPOA also did unfreeze Iranian assets similar to this, but it did so once Iran had made a series of nuclear concessions. It didn't do so to get the Strait of Hormuz back open when, frankly, it was open before Trump kicked off this war. So we're essentially paying the Iranians to open a strait that was open on February 27th before we got into this in the first place.

[Unherd Host]

The number you haven't mentioned There is the 300 billion, which is an even larger number. So I'm just quoting from the text of the Memorandum of Understanding. United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least, at least USD 300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. So that's an even bigger number.

[Jake Sullivan]

I think it's important to understand this deal in two phases. Phase one is US Ends its blockade. Iran opens the strait. For that, we're paying. What I just said, just for that, we're paying the frozen assets and the oil sales and the petrochemical sales. That's not even yet having Iran make any real commitments on the future of its nuclear program. Then there's phase two. And what phase two says in this deal is you. Yeah, Iran will talk about all these issues on its nuclear program, but whatever it agrees to there, what it's going to get in return is two things beyond this windfall it's getting for opening the Strait. The first is a $300 billion fund for reconstruction of Iran, basically reparations. It's kind of interesting that President Trump signed the MOU at the table at Versailles. It's like the new Treaty of Versailles, except for it's the US that's committing to pay reparations, interestingly. And then it also says the US Will lift all sanctions, all sanctions nuclear related, non nuclear related, including the primary embargo that has been in place on Iran by the United States for decades and stayed in place throughout the Iran nuclear deal. So he's making a commitment to give this $300 billion fund and on top of that, to also suspend a much broader range of sanctions than the Iran nuclear deal the JCPOA suspended. And all of that will happen with once there is an actual nuclear deal. And there's an open question as to whether they will actually be able to negotiate a nuclear deal. Because if I were Iran, I'd be thinking, I got plenty of sanctions relief right now. This MOU also says that after 60 days, Iran can charge fees for ships going through the Strait of Hormuzik and work out with Oman, a kind of scheme for charging fees beyond 60 days. So it'll get a windfall from that. And then of course, it'll get these frozen assets. So maybe that Ron just says we're happy to park at the table for months or years and not actually do any kind of deal, because as far as we're concerned, we're already getting paid huge just for opening the Strait.

[Unherd Host]

It's worth saying there will be people on the political right as well as the political left who would take that quite happily. I mean, a lot of people will be reading their newspapers or watching the TV feeling, yes, well, good. I'd rather there is a deal, a no deal. My stocks will go up, my petrol or gas prices should come down. And if it's a bit of a fudge and kicking into the long grass, then that's still better than nothing.

[Jake Sullivan]

So two things can be true at the same time. That this war is over. Good. It should be over. It should never have started. That this deal is really just pretty much an unalloyed win for Iran. True. Both of those things are true. And I'm not advocating for going back to war. I think we shouldn't go back to war. But I think we have to recognize that the US actually could have gotten all of the statements Iran made on its nuclear program in this deal before it went to war. And it wouldn't have had to pay to reopen the Strait of Hormuz because the Strait of Hormuz wouldn't be closed. So in a sense, we have ended up in a worse position today than we were before the war started. But to folks on the left, folks on the right, frankly, just ordinary Americans and ordinary citizens around the world who don't want to suffer the economic consequences of continued war. Ending the war is a good thing. And I'm not arguing against that. I am just making the case that the result of ending the war is a significant advantage for Iran. And frankly, it indicates that the United States basically lost this war.

[Unherd Host]

I want to go into that further. But just the final thought on this. I mean it's a one and a half page or two page document so there isn't that much meat to get into. I mean the former deal was 150 plus pages and was highly technical. But just so our viewers and listeners get the vibe the mood of this memorandum, this is the sentences about nuclear. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledged the critical importance of the nuclear issue. They express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them. So in law, I believe that doing a kind of contract to do a contract or a deal to do a deal is sort of disallowed. It almost sounds exactly like that. It's an agreement to make an agreement.

[Jake Sullivan]

That's exactly right. But there's some interesting phrases in this paragraph that I think we should zero in on because this is not just minutia. This is real substance. One of the things this paragraph says this is paragraph 8 is the two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear needs. Now that phrase nuclear needs is essentially an acknowledgment by the United States of Iran's claim that it should have a civilian nuclear program. That that is a big give to Iran right there. Because keep in mind that the Trump administration part of the reason it wouldn't do a deal before this war started is it was arguing Iran should have zero enrichment. It has no need for enrichment. 000. It is now conceding that Iran can have an enrichment program. Now in the JCPOA in the Iran nuclear deal we also acknowledged that we said they could have a very limited constrained civilian enrichment program with massive verification and inspections to ensure that they weren't breaking out for nuclear weapon. And we argued at the time that you were not going to get Iran to surrender entirely on this issue and that we shouldn't go to war because even after going to war, you're not going to get them to surrender on the issue. This paragraph and this concession by the Trump administration is essentially, in my view, a vindication of that proposition that in the end, Iran is going to come out of this with a limited nuclear program, as it did in the Iran nuclear deal, and that the whole question will be, can we verify its compliance with limits on that so it can't get a nuclear weapon.

[Unherd Host]

So why did both you and now it looks like the Trump administration give in on that point? To most people who know less about it, it would feel like one of the largest oil producing countries in the world, whose whole economy is based on selling its oil. Is not a country that you think has huge needs for a nuclear program. Why is it just a kind of pride status issue for the Iranians? Why do they need a nuclear program or don't they?

[Jake Sullivan]

Taking a step back, it's not clear to me that in some existential way Iran needs a nuclear program. Okay? They use the phrase nuclear needs, which the Trump administration has signed off on. What I would say is it's a reality that they insist upon having this. And when you negotiate deals, you have to accept certain realities because the alternative is the kind of war we just saw. And then you're right back to where you started. So I'm not arguing they actually need this. What I'm arguing is this is a negotiating position they have. And our judgment was they were not going to move off this negotiating position, period. Now, why do they want a nuclear program? I think there are really three reasons. One, there is a certain narrative of national scientific achievement associated with it. They have had that uranium symbol, that nuclear symbol on their currency. So their people are very proud that they are a country that's mastered the nuclear fuel cycle. So. So it's a matter of dignity and national pride. That's one, two, I think it is a hedge. I think they want the option if in the future they wanted to convert peaceful nuclear energy into a race for a bomb, they wanted to buy the option to be able to do that. And I think that's what the hardline clerics and the IRGC want to have available to them. And then three, they started down this path, frankly, of a nuclear program even back during the Shah. In fact, the Tehran Research reactor, one of the nuclear reactors in Iran, was supplied by the west to the Shah of Iran. So this program has been around a long time, even before the Islamic Republic came into existence. And so the idea of giving anything up like that in the face of pressure from outsiders is an affront to the national identity of the people of Iran. So you take those three reasons and you basically get an outcome in which Iran will make concessions, will make compromises, but will not completely surrender its program. We said that back in 2015. The critics said we were wrong. We could get them to go to zero. Trump tried to get them to go to zero. He bombed them, he blockaded them, and in the end he is acknowledging the same reality that we acknowledged a decade ago, which is it is better to make a compromise on this point to secure an agreement that blocks them from getting a nuclear weapon.

[Grow Therapy Advertiser]

The pressure to have a summer worth posting about is real. So is financial stress, social exhaustion, and the anxiety that sneaks in right when things are supposed to feel good. Grow Therapy can help with that. Whether it's your first time in therapy or your 50th, grow makes it easier to find a therapist who fits you, not the other way around. They connect you with thousands of independent licensed therapists across the US Offering both virtual and in person sessions, nights and weekends. Whatever challenges you're facing, Grow Therapy is here to help. Grow accepts over 100 insurance plans. Sessions average about $21 with insurance and some pay as little as $0 depending on their plan. Visit growththerapy.com acast today to get started. That's growththerapy.com ac acast growtherapy.com acast availability and coverage vary by state and insurance plan.

[Jake Stauch]

I'm Jake Stauch, co founder and CEO of Cervel. We built Serval to automate the IT work that slows companies down. Onboarding password resets access to applications. My laptop stopped working. While employees wait for help, their real work is put on hold. It desperately wants to automate this work. And that's why they need Servil. You just tell Servil what you want to automate in plain English and it's built. No drag and drop workflows, no expensive consultants. Employees get unblocked and IT teams go from drowning in tickets to building what actually matters. With Cerval, it becomes the AI engine powering the entire company. This is a new way to run it. We guarantee you'll automate 50% of all tickets and and we'll prove it to you in a free four week pilot. Go to serval.com acast that's S-R-V-A-L.com acast

[Jake Sullivan]

our trip up the coast was perfection.

[Grow Therapy Advertiser]

With my Sapphire Preferred card, we earned three times the points on gas, online, grocery and dining.

[Jake Sullivan]

It was amazing.

[Grow Therapy Advertiser]

Chase Sapphire preferred the card that's preferred for a reason. Cards issued by JP Morgan Chase Bank Any member FDIC subject to credit approval

[Jake Sullivan]

to Reply Finding great candidates to hire can be like, well, trying to find a needle in a haystack. Sure, you can post your job to some job board, but then all you can do is hope the right person comes along. Which is why you should try ZipRecruiter for free at ZipRecruiter.com Zip ZipRecruiter doesn't depend on candidates finding you, it finds them for you. Its powerful technology identifies people with the right experience and actively invites them to apply to your job. You get qualified candidates fast. So while other companies might deliver a lot of hay, ZipRecruiter finds you what you're looking for. The needle in the Haystack. See why 4 out of 5 employers who post a job on ZipRecruiter get a quality candidate within the first day. The smartest way to hire and right now you can try ZipRecruiter for free. That's right, free at ZipRecruiter.com Zip that's ZipRecruiter.com Zip ZipRecruiter.com Zip

[Unherd Host]

of those three reasons, the second one is the most convincing by a long way. It means that, you know, the fact that it's on a currency and supposedly the people have a sense of pride. I mean, you don't have much of a sense of pride when you're being bombed on a daily basis. I mean, I think it's more important to stop that. But it's clearly an ongoing sense that by posing a threat they get stuff. And as long as they're in the room and people are scared of them about the nuclear thing, they're going to carry on getting stuff. Is that too simplistic?

[Jake Sullivan]

Well, it's too simplistic in one first, completely agree that this is a matter of having an option, and with that option comes leverage. No doubt about it. And I didn't mince my words on that. I wanted to give you a full context of their mentality. But I agree with you that at the substantive core this is a critical piece. However, let's keep in mind they also were willing to sign on the dotted line on a deal that put restraints, verifiable restraints on their nuclear program for the long term, and in a sense parked this issue. The Iran nuclear program was in a box when the deal was in place. And then Trump pulled out of the deal and they began moving forward again. And so I do believe that they're not prepared to just give everything up, but they are prepared to do a deal for the long term that resolves the issue we actually have, which is not whether or not they have a centrifuge, it's whether or not they have a bomb. And I believe that a deal with inspections and verification measures that are tight and enforceable can, for the long term, keep them from getting a bomb. That's what we had. That's what Trump pulled out of. Now that's what Trump is basically trying to get back into. And the description of the terms of it is, even in this bare bones MOU feel in structure, a lot like the JCPOA.

[Unherd Host]

So you could see over the next 60 days, I mean, I doubt the Vice President, not 60 days, I doubt the Vice President is going to call you up and say, hey, Jake, will you come and recreate the jcpoa? But that is the substantive piece of work that took a long time. That will be the natural thing to fall back on. There is already a kind of framework there. And so would you expect chunks, or at least strongly reminiscent of bits of the JCPOA to come back in whatever new deal emerges?

[Jake Sullivan]

I would. I think it's going to take probably years, not just months and certainly not 60 days to negotiate all that out because of the sheer level of detail required to get to an ultimate nuclear agreement. But basically, do I think that there will be time boundaries, restrictions on enrichment? Yes, some disposition of the stockpile. In this deal, what Iran is committing to, or seems to be committing to, is just down blending the stockpile, diluting it in Iran, not shipping it out, which it did under the JCPOA. They actually shipped 97% of their stockpile to Russia. So out of Iran, out of their country here, they're doing less than that. And then some measures around inspection and verification to make sure they're not building capacity to be able to quickly break out to a bomb. That was the core of the jcpoa. That, in essence, is what is going to end up as the core of this deal. One of the things they have been discussing, just to be fair, is an actual kind of moratorium on enrichment for a certain number of years, which would go further than the jcpoa, because the JCPOA allowed for a very, very limited amount of enrichment for a certain number of years. But in the end, the basic structure is the same. There will be a time horizon on this. There will be a disposition of the stockpile and there will be some form of inspections and verification. And that's all going to feel like a version of the deal that Trump called the worst deal in human history.

[Unherd Host]

So it's possible that there's a moratorium. Are there any other points on which just to showcase how dispassionate and non partisan you're being, that you think this could actually be an improvement on the jcpoa?

[Jake Sullivan]

I think the biggest piece would be the actual moratorium. The timeline could be longer. We'll have to see. The JCPOA had various gates at 15, 20, 25, 10, 15, 20, 25 years. And the notion was always you negotiate follow on agreements. That's how arms control agreements work. They tend to go for terms of years and then you extend them or create follow on agreements to them. So we could see a longer time horizon for this, theoretically. Personally, I not sure they'll ever get to a deal, but if they did, you could have this moratorium. You could have a longer time horizon. I would actually be surprised if the inspection regime were stronger because of just the sheer strength of what was in the JCPOA on that. But they are talking about anytime, anywhere, inspections in a way that, you know, maybe tweaks that a bit. Theoretically, again, I don't think they'll get there. But on the other side of that, what's interesting is beyond the $300 billion fund, which is what the US would be giving for all this, which goes way beyond anything the JCPOA gave, the US Is putting on the table every sanction in our toolkit. And the JCPOA was much more targeted in the sanctions relief that it provided. So one could imagine what we used to call more for more that you get a little bit more in nuclear concessions on the Iranian side, for more gives in terms of sanctions relief on the US side. But again, it's key to say this is all theoretical because the way the US has structured its negotiation here, the odds that we actually get to a deal at the end of this, as opposed to just punting this indefinitely, I think, are quite low, especially since President Trump is pretty good at phase one deals. He's done it with China, he did it in Gaza, he's done it here. He does not tend to get to phase two deals. And I think the odds that we get to a phase two deal here at the end of the day are quite low.

[Unherd Host]

What is your view of Israel's involvement in all this? Because they were Credited or Netanyahu was credited with being the kind of final voice in Donald Trump's ear urging him to do those attacks on Iran. We understand that they're very unhappy about this potential deal for the obvious reason that you've just said, which is it leaves the threat of ongoing nuclear distantly on the table. What do you think they will do now?

[Jake Sullivan]

So first, it's interesting because Bibi Netanyahu has been trying to get American presidents to bomb Iran for multiple administrations. Obama, Trump 1, Biden, Trump 2. And this was the first time he was able to successfully prevail upon a president to do that.

[Unherd Host]

Could I just ask, does that include when you were working for Obama?

[Jake Sullivan]

Yes. You may recall that back then the prime minister went before the United nations with that cartoon bomb and the red line and stood up there and basically said, if they cross this red line, we need to strike. And he repeatedly advocated in the Obama administration that the US And Israel should take care of the Iranian nuclear program, not at the negotiating table, but through

[Unherd Host]

military action, I guess, including to you. So across those multiple administrations, you must have had a whole load of conversations with senior Israeli people and possibly Netanyahu himself, and he must have heard it a lot.

[Jake Sullivan]

It was strong and it got stronger over time. And it got particularly strong in the closing months of the Biden administration when Prime Minister Netanyahu basically said, look, Iran's air defenses have been removed. Iran's proxies are weaker, particularly Hezbollah. Now's the moment, now we could do it. And President Biden basically said, I continue to believe that Iran being in a weaker state means we have more leverage to do diplomacy. And that's what he told the incoming team. Rather than take military action, the Trump administration, I think, came in not really thinking we're going to go bomb Iran. In fact, President Trump ran on ending wars rather than starting new ones. But I think he found A, Israel having operational success at the start of the 12 day war and then him coming in and doing the strike on Fordo, he felt that worked for him. Then B, you have the Maduro raid, very high risk raid. And they managed to grab Maduro and his wife and bring them back to the US And I think Trump at the end of that, thought to himself, I can conduct military operations basically with impunity. And then C, you had the Iranian people out in the street in massive numbers and Iran and its security services mowing them down. And President Trump came to actually buy the idea that this regime was on its last legs and could be pushed over and that sequence of events meant that President Trump ultimately bought the argument that Prime Minister Netanyahu made, which is, we can do this, we possibly can produce regime change, but at a minimum, Iran is so weak we can bomb them into submission and they'll have to come out with their hands up. And that proved to be a terrible miscalculation. And now I think Prime Minister Netanyahu is in an awkward position cuz he's being attacked by his political opponents for essentially letting Trump do a deal that leaves Israel in a worse position that to a certain extent ties their hands with respect to Lebanon and Hezbollah. And he has really tied his fortunes to President Trump, whose approval rating in Israel is now falling as a result of all of this going on. So I do think we have to ask the question, will Israel be a spoiler? Will they try to generate some friction that makes this deal fall apart through continued attacks in Lebanon? And that's something that, that is a risk factor we'll have to watch for in the days ahead.

[Unherd Host]

Again, the text of the deal here, number one, paragraph number one, the United States of America and Iran and their allies in the current war, that is Israel, are signing this MoU. Israel is not signing this MoU, but they're sort of implied as if they are signatories. And it says very specifically ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. So if that's broken, the deal's torn up.

[Jake Sullivan]

Presumably, in fact, that first paragraph and words matter in these negotiations. The Iranians pay attention to every last word. It doesn't seem that our negotiators pay as close of attention, but in that first paragraph, I believe Lebanon is referenced three times. USA and Iran each mention once Lebanon. There are three references to it. It's repeated over and over again. Basically, Iran beating home the point that the end to this standoff over this trade of Hormuz has to be accompanied by an end to military operations in Lebanon.

[Unherd Host]

It gives them a way to get out if they ever want to. All it takes is one casualty in Lebanon. They can say this is breach of

[Jake Sullivan]

contract, deal's been broken. Now here's my view on that, though. I think Iran is getting such a good deal here that their incentive to move forward is pretty strong. I don't think they want this deal to break down. So I actually could imagine a world in which the Israelis take some strikes against Hezbollah targets. Iran kind of complains, maybe responds in some way, but fundamentally doesn't back out of the deal because backing out of the deal means an end to the oil waivers it means an end to the unfrozen assets. So what they're getting in this deal, I think is so strong that they have an incentive to make it stick. But by the same token, President Trump has an incentive to put a lot of pressure on Israel not to continue significant military operations in Lebanon, because that's there three times in a row in the span of one paragraph at the top of this deal.

[Jake Stauch]

I'm Jake Stauch, co founder and CEO of Cervel. We built Servl to automate the IT work that slows companies down. Onboarding password resets, access to applications. My laptop stopped working. While employees wait for help, their real work is put on hold. It desperately wants to automate this work, and that's why they need Serval. You just tell Servil what you want to automate in plain English and it's built. No drag and drop workflows, no expensive consultants. Employees get unblocked and IT teams go from drowning in tickets to building what actually matters. With cerval, it becomes the AI engine powering the entire company. This is a new way to run it. We guarantee you'll automate 50% of all tickets and we'll prove it to you in a free four week pilot. Go to servl.com acast that's S-R-V-A-L.com acast

[Grow Therapy Advertiser]

the pressure to have a summer worth posting about is real. So is financial stress, social exhaustion, and the anxiety that sneaks in right when things are supposed to feel Grow Therapy can help with that. Whether it's your first time in therapy or your 50th, grow makes it easier to find a therapist who fits you, not the other way around. They connect you with thousands of independent licensed therapists across the US offering both virtual and in person sessions, nights and weekends. Whatever challenges you're facing, Grow Therapy is here to help grow accepts over 100 insurance plans. Sessions average about $21 with insurance and some pay as little as 0 Eurodollars depending on their plan. Visit growththerapy.com acast today to get started. That's growthherapy.com acast growtherapy.com acast availability and coverage vary by state and insurance plan.

[Unherd Host]

Let's just try to be fair to President Trump here, because it looked for a while like he had invented a whole new kind of foreign policy which was sort of freak everybody out, get everybody unsure what's going to happen next, and then do these very brief, targeted, very skillful raids in foreign countries. You mentioned Maduro in venezuela but the 12 day war is another powerful example where everyone knew he didn't want to go to war, but he was going to use the full genius of the American military machine for a very brief period of time. And it's got to be said that the Iran war, at least when it started, looked like another such example. I mean, they took out the Supreme Leader. There was immediate domination of the skies as a military operation. It was fantastic. And Iran's ability to react looked very weak. They threw a few missiles in a few different directions and then apologized for it. And they were kind of all over the place. After a week of that Iran war, it looked like Iran was, was nowhere and it was a huge American triumph. Did you feel that for any of the time?

[Jake Sullivan]

I really didn't. I think the 12 Day War was complicated. You know, I had my misgivings about it, but I sort of said on the 12 day war, I'm going to reserve judgment to see how this all plays out with the nuclear program. Because it was targeted, it was limited, and they tied it off. It was done in 12 days. From the minute this war started, I knew it was going to go south because, well, I warned that it would before, but from the minute, because of what? You referenced taking out the Supreme Leader. If you just take out a nuclear facility and you communicate to Iran, we only care about that facility, we're not going to do anything further. Don't escalate and we won't escalate. You can get an end to the conflict. That's what happened last year. If you take an action which says to Iran, this is existential, this is regime change, there is no limit on the escalation that the United States will undertake, then Iran is going to throw everything they've got at defending themselves, and that includes shutting down the Strait of Hormuz. So to me, the radical departure from the targeted raid on Maduro or the 12 Day War was deciding to go for something not limited or targeted here, but full on regime change in Iran. And once the administration decided to do that, you were out of whatever emerging doctrine Trump was working through, and you were into a whole different dynamic. A dynamic that left Iran having to play the card it has held in its pocket for decades. Shutting down the Strait of Hormuz. Now that was a theoretical card, wasn't sure it was going to work or what the reaction would be. Now it's an actual, proven card. And frankly, it's a card Iran knows it can play over and over again in the future, too. And that to me is a huge setback strategically from the point of view not just of the US but the rest of the world to have Iran holding this card, knowing the power that it projects.

[Unherd Host]

Here's what I don't understand about the Strait of Hormuz. I'm glad we got to it because it's obviously central. Why didn't they do it before? Iran could have shut the Strait of Hormuz last year, two years ago, anytime peaceful, they didn't need to be attacked in order to do it. They're not known for their kind of good international neighborliness in any case. I mean, why now? And why not anytime in the last 40 years?

[Jake Sullivan]

Basically because they couldn't quite know how this would all play out, what it would mean for them. It was a risk to shut the strait, invite military action, invites a war with the United States and other players, and invites international condemnation and opprobrium. All of that are risks and costs that they'd be inviting on themselves. And they balance that against what the gain was of just shutting down the strait on a given Tuesday and concluded we're a little bit risk averse on something like this. They have been risk averse in general at direct attacks against others, which is why they make war on countries like the United States through proxies rather than doing so directly. But that risk aversion gets completely stripped away in a context where they think the stakes are existential the minute it becomes, hey, our entire revolutionary regime may be at risk of falling. We have to do whatever, even if it comes with some degree of risk. And that's what caused them to do this. Now that they've done it, I think their view is going to be, heck, this isn't so risky. We can just kind of, that's a switch we can turn on and off or a dialogue that we can dial up and down in the months and years ahead. And that's a scary proposition.

[Unherd Host]

We had Professor Helen Thompson on this show. She's a regular unherd contributor, one of the foremost oil and energy experts, and she put forward an interesting argument. I wonder what you make of it, which is actually America is very well positioned relatively to withstand the Strait of Hormuz being shut. So geopolitically, the people who it makes trouble for is China that relies on that oil much more than the US does. And in fact Europe, Europe always seems to be the kind of loser in any of these tumult. But the US is self sufficient in terms of oil anyway, so relatively it can withstand that kind of shock. Maybe that was part of the thinking. If we want to credit the administration with some geopolitical thinking, part of their thinking, okay, yeah, they might shut the Strait of Hormuz, but there are upsides to that.

[Jake Sullivan]

Well, I'll make a couple comments on that. First, there is a certain irony in the US Becoming more energy independent and that making us more likely to go to war in the Middle east rather than less likely. I thought the whole point of us getting more energy independent was that so that we could reduce our level of military activity in the Middle East. But the logic you're describing is since we're energy independent, we have a certain amount of impunity. We can go bomb a country like Iran because we're not going to suffer the economic consequences. That's kind of just a broad reaction. But on the specific point, it is true that the United States is more resilient and that the costs borne by the rest of the world economically are higher than they have been in the US that's particularly true with respect to gas lng. But oil still is a global market and prices at the pump for Americans still did go up substantially. And that was pressure on the administration. And then finally, don't take it from me, President Trump said yesterday, the quiet part out loud, he said, oh, part of the reason I had to end this war is because the global economy was going to take a huge hit and that was going to make us all suffer, including us. So he said himself, basically, the rising pressure of these bottlenecks and disruptions was coming home to roost, even for him, even for the United States. And that quote, for me, reinforces the point that despite the fact that, yes, we are more resilient than Europe or Southeast Asia or other parts of the world, we are not immune. And that the leverage of the closure of the strait squeezed us too, and caused President Trump to decide. I gotta do a deal.

[Unherd Host]

Final question for you, Jake, because I know we're running out of time. What is your best guess of what happens next? I know it's hard with an administration that seems to change its mind about things, but if you look at the underlying factors, looking ahead months, but even years, do you think all of this, the combination of the war and now the potential peace, leaves Iran and the rest of the world in a more hopeful place? Or do you think we're in a more dangerous place? Do you think war will resume or do you think peace will hold?

[Jake Sullivan]

I think peace will probably hold. I think it's in Iran's interest. As I've laid out. And I think President Trump has indicated he has no interest in going back to an extended war here. So I do think peace will hold. The two big risk factors on that are what Israel might do. But I think President Trump will work to try to manage that risk factor. And then if President Trump gets so much blowback from his right, from his hawks on this that he feels he needs to reopen the deal in some way. But I think he's kind of committed himself to it. So I think peace will hold. I think these negotiations will basically be open ended. Maybe they reach some interim deals about specific things like down blending the stockpile. But I don't think you're going to see a comprehensive nuclear deal. I think that will just drag indefinitely. And then that leaves a region in which Iran, I think is making a huge amount of money, is administering the Strait of Hormuz almost as part of its jurisdiction and collecting fees off of that. And I think that will over time make Iran more dangerous and more powerful and other countries will have hedge against that. And finally, I think President Trump will want to change the subject. So I anticipate something like action in Cuba or somewhere else in our hemisphere. But I think he's going to create new activity elsewhere which itself could be destabilizing. And finally, there's a big question for me here about what this will ultimately do to oil prices. If oil prices go down a lot, that's going to squeeze Putin, that's going to put more economic pressure on Russia. Does that create more opportunity to bring a just peace in Ukraine? We'll have to watch on that.

[Unherd Host]

So that's the potential upside then if oil prices go down, it improves the situation vis a vis Russia.

[Jake Sullivan]

Yes, of course, that was the circumstance before we got into the war. So going into the war and pushing oil prices up was bad. Now getting them back down, I think would be a good thing and could put pressure on Russia and I think they would feel it. You know, maybe I should just end by once again reinforcing. My view is it's a good thing, the war. The war is over. It shouldn't have started, it shouldn't continue. It's interesting to me though that we've ended up in a circumstance where we're having to pay so much to Iran to achieve that outcome, an outcome that basically existed on February 27th of this year. But being here now I think is a much better circumstance than a circumstance where you have open ended war between the US And Iran with the potential spillover effects of that. I do worry that the ways in which it strengthens Iran's hands may end up coming back to bite us down the road. But I don't think it's going to return to full scale war between the two countries in the near term.

[Unherd Host]

Jake Sullivan, thank you for your time today.

[Jake Sullivan]

Thanks for having me.

[Unherd Host]

That was Jake Sullivan. Over the next few days there will be a lot of people all over YouTube being very opinionated about the Iran deal or non deal. They will have all sorts of very strongly held views, but very few of them will have been in the room with Iranian negotiators for months on end talking about how to reach such a deal. So I feel like it was really interesting to hear there from the man who under Hillary Clinton, when she was Secretary of State under President Obama and then for four years as the 28th national security adviser of the US under Joe Biden, was the lead brain in terms of working out what US Policy should be towards Iran. Weirdly, I thought he was quite reasonable around the Trump administration. I mean, he obviously was critical of it, as you would expect from a Democrat. But the fact that he thinks it's a good thing that we'd have peace and I thought the fact that he thinks the piece will hold made me feel a little bit more optimistic about the world. I'll be interested what you felt. Let us know in the comments. Thanks to him and thanks to you. This was unheard.

[Grow Therapy Advertiser]

Oregon Parks make an Oregon Summer but what makes an Oregon park? Well, Oregon Lottery Gameplay helps no how matter no matter the game Megabucks, video lottery or keno funds from lottery games help support parks projects across the state, ensuring they stay safe, accessible and open for all. In fact, Discover State Park Scratches are in stores now. It's the perfect way to put a little bit of Oregon's parks in your pocket. The Oregon Lottery Together we do good things. Must be 18 or older to play Lottery games are based on chance and should be played for entertainment only.

[Jake Sullivan]

Comcast is delivering extraordinary experiences in live sports through the incredible broadcast and storytelling

[Grow Therapy Advertiser]

from NBC, innovative and personalized viewing features

[Jake Sullivan]

on Xfinity and Peacock, and the country's most reliable WI Fi viewers can enjoy every game changing play faster and more seamlessly than ever, all on a network built to deliver unforgettable moments as close to live as possible. The ultimate experience for the American sports fan. Learn [e-mail] sports with my Sapphire Preferred card, we took a trip to a desert Oasis, earning five times the points on Chase trip, traveled two times the points on all other travel plus 100

[Grow Therapy Advertiser]

hotel credit Chase, Sapphire Preferred. A car that's preferred for a reason.

[Jake Sullivan]

Cards issued by J.P. morgan. J's Bank, N.A. member FDIC.

[Jake Stauch]

Subject to credit approval terms apply.