
Tensions at the top of Israel’s security establishment escalate, as a public rift between the chief of staff and the defence minister deepens — raising questions about leadership and accountability in a time of war. Yonit and Jonathan break down what this clash reveals about Israel’s security apparatus. In New York, protests outside a synagogue leave local Jews unsettled and anxious about the city’s new mayor. Plus: Barak Ravid, one of Washington’s most connected reporters and a leading interpreter of Donald Trump’s political instincts, joins to discuss the president’s strategy and his unique approach to global affairs — and what it could mean for Israel in the months ahead.
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A
The bust up between Israel's military chief of staff and the defense minister rises, or maybe that should be sinks to a whole new level. There are protests outside a synagogue in New York that has Jews there worried about their new mayor. And we will speak to a preeminent Trump whisperer. Barack Ravid is our guest. It's unholy. I'm Jonathan Friedland in London.
B
And I'm Yanit Levy in Tel Aviv. Unholy. Tutu's on the news. Look, you normally don't like it when we talk about the weather, Jonathan, because you think it's a cliche for English man to be talking about the weather. I admit I want to talk about.
A
Because I love talking about the weather. That's the whole point. It's such a cliche. But it's true. We, we Brits do love talking about the weather. But go on.
B
This week it has been a crazy, you know, November here, heat waves now as I speak to you now, it's twice, I hope you're jealous a little of this. But it's 25 degrees in Tel Aviv, which is like 77 Fahrenheit. Last week it was over 30 degrees in Tel Aviv. I mean, if anyone's still trying to deny global warming, this is where we are. As I said, I think it's probably not the same picture in London right now. But you know, I could be sitting T shirts and tank tops as we speak.
A
Yeah, that would be a story obviously in itself if you did that for our recording. But the, no, I mean, obviously it's gray here and you know, bright, but it's a bright gray rather than anything else. But no, I, when I saw that last week that it went over 30 and I think into the mid-90s Fahrenheit, so 34, 35 centigrade, it can't be anything but jaw dropping. And I'm completely not envious of that because, you know, human beings need seasons and in November it just shouldn't be like that. In the Northern Hemisphere, our Australian listeners, different story. But here it shouldn't be like that. And it does. As you say, it says that this is a climate breakdown that living through. And I got a message from somebody saying is it going to be the case that before too long Israel is going to be having 40 degrees and 50 degrees even in what should be winter? Is it going to become like one of those, you know, people know about Saudi Arabia and other places where there are long stretches of the year where you cannot really be outside. You have to be in an air conditioned environment all the time. Is that going to be the thing for Israel? And you know, it's a small neighborhood, you know, you would have to say yes. And that does, you know, just boggle the mind a bit because it goes to a question of how habitable the, the country is going to be. So that's, that was my slightly gloomy take. Day to day you have to say, yeah, when it's 25 degrees and you can be in short sleeves. That's very appealing. But the, but there is a real question there and the climate breakdown is real. I don't know whether there's any room in the Israeli national conversation to talk about the climate crisis. My guess is there's not. There's just too many going on. But this is a nature, you know, nature doesn't follow political agendas or timetables. It's telling us loud and clear that we got to do something. That would be my take.
B
This is such a classic conversation between us. I come and I hope you're envious of just how, you know, summary everything is here and you just have to damper my mood with saying, but the future is really grim, isn't it?
A
Debbie Downer? DEBBIE Downer Yes.
B
I think there's a reason why climate change is becoming part of national security here in this country and perhaps even a little belatedly. But sure, this has to be taken into consideration in the decades that follow. For now I'll just enjoy the fact that it's summer in the middle of, at the end of November. But you sure are right about that. It has been Thanksgiving week in the United States, one of the very few American holidays I think we didn't import into Israel. It isn't really a thing here. But I think I will just pick up from that, the giving thanks part of this holiday. And the thing I wanted to give thanks for was really generally speaking, I think Hebrew culture, Israeli culture, and most specifically just a huge musician in this country and performer. Everyone you know, is in this consensus. I would even say that Jonathan Friedland has a bit of a soft spot for her and that is of course, Judith Rawitz. I see you nodding your head, sir.
A
Well, wistfully, because I had a sort of teenage crush on the whole idea of Judith Rawitz and completely just idolized her and her music. And actually I know that we're going to come on to talk about this, but she had not performed for a very long time. But I did her perform multiple times. There is a crazy story in which I actually introduced her on stage When I was a student in. When she did a show in London. A whole other story. I mean, nearly 40 years.
B
I think this is what our podcast this week should be about. What do you mean, a whole other story?
A
Okay, it's a whole other story. She did they and is a music promoter here, brought over a whole lot of Israeli artists, and they decided they needed somebody young to introduce them. And I was literally a university student, and they asked me to do it. And so the person on stage, you know, we joked the other day about me doing that thing on stage going, ladies and gentlemen, so and so, so and so. So I did, ladies and gentlemen, put your, you know, make some noise for you hooded rabbits. And so I have. Have that link to her. But the. So we have talked before about her, you know, song, Sheila Lom song without a Name. I. I don't know a more beautiful song that is more evocative of a particular kind of Israel. To me, it's absolutely associated with my own time there. Again, as a young man in the 80s. It can just take me right back there to the point where I have to play that because I don't want to wear it out. I'm worried it will lose that magical, transporting effect on me. That's how big a deal. Anyway, you haven't yet told us why you're talking about Yehuda Ravitz.
B
No, I mean, look, as you said, Yehudit Ravitz has left really just the genius of Israel's music. I think you called her, you dubbed her Israel's Joni Mitchell, really a huge star. About a decade ago, she decided to leave the stage. She thought at the time never to return. She talked about being weary of wanting the audience to forget about her a little bit. They never did. The war changed that. She realized that something about her music can help people, and she kind of took her guitar and started, you know, traveling between bereaved families in Israel and just singing to them. So that paved the way for her huge comeback. And that comeback is done in the most beautiful way because it is the comeback not only of her, but of this album. Children's songs, the canon of Israeli music for children. It's called in Hebrew, Hakeva Sasha. So I'll translate into English, the 16th sheep. I apologize. It doesn't really translate into English. Written. Written by the genius Jonathan Geffen, composed by another genius, Joni Rechter. Sadly, Jonathan Geffen is not with us anymore, but Yoni Rechter still is. And the original. The other original performance of this album from 1979 still are. So that's Judith Ravitz and David Broza and Gidigov. And they all returned to the stage. Most of them never left, actually, we should say. And this performance started in January of 2025 and was completely sold out. They are still performing. It's a beautiful thing to see these, these great performance. It' only nostalgia, Jonathan. It's not only the fact that. This beautiful fact in itself that like the grandparents and the parents and the children, three generations watching this, but it's also the fact that they are still great musicians in their, you know, late 60s, early 70s. And it is a sort of music to the soul of a country that really needs comfort. And I think it's a beautiful thing. I would encourage anyone to see it. Even if you don't, even if you don't understand Hebrew. You'd get the vibe of what this means. I'm giving you all of this just because I spoke to them recently, to the four, the great, fabulous four. I interviewed them recently and it's just, it was quite an experience for me.
A
Yeah. Now I was just gonna pick up one small thing there, which I love. This detail you mentioned of her beginning this re entry back into performing by playing for tiny groups, as you say, bereaved families apparently going to sort of diners and restaurants, family homes. Amazing. Just the other day you and I did on our bonus episode, I think for subscribers, we talked about Yitzhak Rabin and how he would write these handwritten personal letters as prime to bereaved families. There's just something about Israel being such a small country that the thing that we're just talking about now, Rabin writing handwritten letters as prime minister, the Joni Mitchell, the sort of poet laureate of the country, performing with her guitar to an individual family. These are things that are only possible really in a very small, intimate society. The idea of that, that somebody just, you know, who is nationally famous turns up at your door, as it were, with a guitar to sing to. Just those moments, these are just reminders that however, you know, Israel obviously has grown and it's, it's, you know, the population must be three times the size of the period I'm talking about when I was there. Nevertheless, those sort of familiar, intimate moments are still possible in a very small society. So lucky you to see that quartet reunited. That is quite something.
B
Indeed it is. So after all these wonderful stories, can we go on to the news this week?
A
And let's keep it a wonderful, edifying, elevated.
B
Entertaining.
A
Certainly entertaining. Yeah. This bust up between the Chief of Staff of the IDF and the Defense Minister.
B
Yes, a full blown feud between the two. It is, you know, all of it is happening still in the shadow of October 7th. And it has to do with the military's probes into the military itself and what happened to it in the days leading up to and on October 7th itself. We would go, we will go into the weeds of this, but I want to just generally say something about this whole affair and I think perhaps for the outside observer, the thing that would be quite maybe shocking is the fact that a government which took no responsibility for October 7th is criticizing the military for its own role. Now, of course, there's a lot to blame, of blame to go around. The military is at fault. Many of the top commanders already went home and left the military. But the top brass of the military did take responsibility and the government didn't. So let's perhaps, perhaps lay out what is happening here. Eyad Zemir was appointed to be Chief of Staff instead of Herzi Halevi in March of 2025. He is untainted by October 7th. He was, at the time he was Director General of the Defense Ministry wasn't part of the decision making process. He seemed at the beginning, Jonathan, to be quite beholden to this government. But very quickly there were arguments and he kind of showed a very independent backbone. I think that the sort of main argument was when the government wanted to go into Gaza City and he really drag his heels on this and in fact also the boots of the military. It was very clear that he doesn't want to go into Gaza City. And he said behind closed doors and someone made sure that it became public that he thinks that Israel should go to a hostage deal. So that was the beginning of this sort of skirmish between him and the government. The other thing we should notice in the background is it is the Defense Minister who does appoint the Chief of Staff. In times where the Defense Minister wasn't Netanyahu himself. Netanyahu never really gets along with defense ministers unless they are named Benjamin Netanyahu. So there were moments, for example, when Avigdor Lieberman was Minister of Defense in which he appointed Aviv Kochavi. And Netanyahu didn't like this. I'm saying all that because now Zamil was appointed with the agreement of Netanyahu. But now when there are these cracks, it does seem like Netanyahu's surroundings are saying, oh, it's all Israel Katz's fault for appointing it. The point of friction this time is the internal probe of the military. It has Been conducted by Sami Tuljiman, Lieutenant General, now retired. And following the the conclusions of this report, Eyal Zamir said, we're going to have some personal conclusions. Some of the generals were reprimanded. Some of them were discharged, the lieutenants or the officers still in military intelligence or in the Southern Command, and some who have already left the military. Eyad Zamir told them they will not even be doing reserve duty, which paves the way for some sort of rehabilitation of the military. And new appointments made by Zamir. And that's when Katz himself as defense minister froze these appointments and said, this will not happen. This is where we are. A lot of sort of accusations. And even Eyal Zamir himself saying on Wednesday, and I quote, we need a courageous, purposeful, transformative leadership that both recognizes failure and dares to drive change. That is an even veiled critique of this government. This is very much pretty clear critique.
A
Yeah. I think that last point absolutely does get to the heart of the matter. Obviously, there is a sort of personal dispute between the two men, different levels of ambition. You know, our friend, friend of the podcast, Amos Harel, noted the other day the immin of Likud primaries and how the defense minister is very keen to show how tough he is against those who, you know, do not share, as he would see it, the sort of political mission. And that was, you know, even this decision to close Army Radio the other day, which we talked about, that's all part of that, this idea that I'm taking on, you know, the, the military which has become seen as part, has become part of those, that list of deep state institutions which the Netanyahu right are suspic of. It used to only be the universities and the media. It's the law courts. It's now the military itself. So it's part of that political battle. And there is, you know, this personal motivation that Katz wants to shore up his own standing. Nevertheless, I mean, this is, you know, underneath it is, it's a serious business when the political and military echelons are pulling apart this way. Again, quoting Amos, he says the affair now threatens to pull in the entire army and disrupt efforts to learn the lessons of the war. To which you might say, you know, those efforts are not exactly universal. The big problem is that the upper echelon of the political echelon, meaning the prime minister and his immediate circle are pretty determined not to learn the lessons of the war and not even for the lessons to be taught. And that is this block they are putting onto a state commission of inquiry. And again, without using that language, which Chief of Staff Zamir has said that that's the investigation he wants. And that last phrase about saying a responsible leadership is needed is really a very direct sort of torpedo aimed at the Prime Minister. That is a big deal. So all I would say is on one level this can look crazy, absurd that you're into this situation where they're arguing about out a new investigation to examine the investigation that examined the investigations. I mean, this is becoming like sort of Russian dolls. But at the heart of it is a really serious thing, which is that every previous, we've said this before, every previous major security lapse or war has been followed by a serious independent judicial inquiry. Famously the Agranath Commission after the Yom Kippur War and the Kahan Commission after the Lebanon War of 80. Netanyahu is breaking that democratic norm. And here is the Chief of Staff reasserting it. And so, you know, it's easy to get lost in the weeds of this and the personalities of it, the ambitions of it, but at the heart of it is something really serious about the democratic governance of Israel. And on that seems to me I'm just offering my own opinion. Zamir is absolutely in the right on that.
B
Yeah. If we are on the issue of militaries, there's a report in the Telegraph that caught my eye this week and I think we should just mention it. A headline is British Army Stays Away from Israel's Gaza War Training. But there were a long list of countries that actually did arrive at this five day training of the idf. Among these countries, Canada and France. And I'm mentioning them because these are countries who on the political level have been really criticizing Israel. And of course both countries had a lot to say about the war was conducted in Gaza. The militaries of these countries go through a five day, you know, training by the idf. They, they discuss specific things. They talk about how drones can protect soldiers in, in a war field and they talk about how AI is incorporated. What I find interesting about this is again, we can say it's a bit of a double standard. Right. On the one hand you're saying, you know, Israel is definitely, you know, guilty, right? These countries say of, of, of terrible things that have been going on in Gaza. But still at the same time coming to these trainings, I think what it show that on the military level things are always more complex and perhaps the professional echelon distinguished from the political echelon does kind of see the complexities and not in this trying to say again that Israel is completely blameless in what happened in Gaza. I'm just saying that it's an interesting thing to note that this also happened when all of the critique of Israel is still continuing. Of course.
A
Yeah, it's certainly interesting. And, you know, just as an analog to it, even when the political leadership in this country were really at odds with, and have been at odds with, say, the Trump administration, the cooperation between the intelligence services continued as if nothing had changed, that they. There are deep relationships of trust. It's interesting that in the British case, that did not extend to taking part in this. And I would guess that that was partly a decision taken politically, that that would be difficult for too many people to swallow and cause a sort of political row that the government didn't want to have. But, no, your. Your point is, right. We should just note something that could have been a nomination for one of our awards. Even the decision that was taken politically about the upcoming elections and who's allowed to stand and who's not allowed to stand. This certainly caught my eye.
B
Yes. I mean, the story begins, of course, with Donald Trump, who said that he will outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood. Then Netanyahu coming back, back on this and responding. He said that Israel will complete the process of outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood and praise Donald Trump for his decisions to make these final preparations, outlawing the organization in the United States. Now, why is this important? Why is it relevant to the elections in Israel? Because ram, a political party in Israel, the United Arab Front, has its connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, to say it very generally in the very vast umbrella that is the Muslim Brotherhood. RAM is on the very, very, very, very moderate side of that, dealing, I think, rather even in a revolutionary way. Mansoor Abbas wanted to deal only with the sort of civil problems that the Arab Israelis have in this country. Just a reminder, he was, of course, part of the Bennett coalition. And what everyone read into Netanyahu saying this is essentially saying, I will work to outlaw this party from the next elections. Kind of a. A part of what we are beginning to see, an attempt to perhaps stifle the Arab Israeli vote. What I found very interesting is the fact that in 2021, Netanyahu Likud was very active in trying to set up a coalition with ram, with the United Arab Front. The only reason this failed is because of the veto that Bezalel Smotrich gave Netanyahu at the time. Interestingly, Benvir did not veto this move, and Netanyahu failed in setting up a coalition, leaving the room for Naftali Bennett to become Prime Minister and indeed have this coalition with Rahm ever since. It is Likud that is completely denied that they have had these discussions. I should tell you, Jonathan, in one of the more, I don't know, amusing circumstances in my studio, I remember Mickey Zor, then an MK for the Likud. Today he's a minister and a very outspoken one, was sitting in Mansour. Mansoor Abbas, the head of Ram, was sitting there as well. And Mickizor was condemning Ram and Mansour Abbas was laughing. And I asked Mansour, why is he laughing? He said, well, Mickey Zor was the main interlocutor that we had negotiations with while we were trying to talk about entering coalition with Netanyahu. So that is where we are. I think it is important to be watchful of what that kind of move that will be made to outlaw RAM in these elections.
A
I mean, so this is why I was thinking of this for our awards. It is a chutzpah for Netanyahu to talk about banning this party that he was doing all he could to bring into his own government. Mansour Abbas, the leader of ram, who by all, you know, really across the board, I think people regard him as a really effective and sort of impressive figure and also somebody who offers the prospect of a different kind of future for Israelis in which Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinian citizens of Israel play a full part in the democratic governance of the country. He does seem to be almost a kind of visionary or part of forerunner for the, for the sort of trailblazer for that. He himself, Mansur Abbas said, who is the person who legitimated me in Israeli politics, it's Benjamin Netanyahu. It was he who wanted me to come into government. He broke the taboo first. There had been a taboo on the participation of a party. With these historic links, it's complicated. You can get into the weeds of it. There are two different. It being Israel.
B
There are two different weeds of it. Come on.
A
There are two Islamist, but there are two different Islamist parties, the Northern League, The Southern League, 1:1. The one that isn't Mansur Abbas has much closer ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and it is, I think, already banned from participating. So, you know, I think these are vestigial sort of residual links between the Mansur Abbas version and the Muslim Brotherhood. So it's a real reach. But the other significance I thought was just going to say about it was let's say Netanyahu does go ahead with this. This has happened before where parties are banned and then it goes to the Supreme Court, who have to make a decision of on whether or not the ban should be upheld. And very often these bands are thrown out. So it's just a political stunt which you can make safe in the knowledge that the Supreme Court will of course.
B
Save you from yourself. Right. And then you can supreme the High Court of Justice. Right. So it's a win. Win for Netanyahu in any case.
A
Exactly. So you get to blame them. You also get to go around the world and say, oh, we've got this wonderful independent judiciary. We're the only democracy in the. In the Middle East. Meanwhile, you get support with your credit from your own base for trying to ban these parties. It's a test, because we know the whole story of the last few years with this judicial coup and so on. Is this attempt to weaken the power of the Supreme Court, this would be a sort of test case for that. Do they still have the strength to push back on a ban of a party like Rahm? So to me, yeah, I went right into the weeds. But I think it's a really interesting case and it's one that merits a chutzpah nomination. We will, of course, arbitrate on that later on when we do our awards. Shall I just mention something going on in the Jewish Diaspora that I think may be of interest? If you were in synagogue at Park East Synagogue, an Orthodox Upper east side shul in New York City last Shabbat, you would have been greeted by the presence of the commissioner of the New York Police Department, who is herself Jewish, Jessica Taylor Tish. She was there to apologize to the congregation for the New York Police Department's policing a few days earlier of protests pro Palestinian protests, which had gathered outside the synagogue chanting globalized the Intifada, death to the idf, and so on. And she said the police had failed in their duty. And, and she spoke interestingly, saying, look, obviously we, we had to defend the First Amendment rights of the protesters, but we also needed to have protected you. And this protest should have been allowed, but further away from the synagogue and that actually Jews praying there will have been intimidated, or Jews going there will have been intimidated. Now a lot of listeners will hear that and think, oh, my God, are you saying that people were doing these protests outside a synagogue just because people were going to pray? And Teshul, it's a little. It's a little bit more complicated delegate in that. Because what they were actually protesting at the synagogue was an event organized by a group called Nefesh. But Nefesh, that facilitates immigration, aliyah, immigration to Israel for North American Jews, they are not particularly funneling Jews to the west bank. But nor do they say, nor do they exclude the West Bank. They do showcase west bank settlements that say the protesters, is what brought them out out, and that's why they were there. I would just say about that. It's yet another example of how it's so. There is so not a kind of clear, bright dividing line between people who think they're protesting about Israel but end up protesting against Jews because they want. The protesters want there to be this clear division. There's anti Israel stuff, there's anti Jewish stuff. Here's an Israel thing happening in a synagogue. You end up standing outside a shul calling for the death of Israelis in the form of death to the idf. That's. It's just yet another example. This line is not as clear as the protesters certainly would want it to be. The reason this has all got political is, of course, New York City is about to get a new mayor on January 1st. Zoran Mamdani, we talked on the podcast already about how New York Jews, a lot of them were very fearful of this prospect. They voted him 2 to 1 numbers for Mamdani's opponent, Andrew Cuomo. And they will not be much reassured by Mamdani's reaction to this. On the one hand, they're pleased that Mamdani has renewed in office, keeping in office Jessica Tisch, this Jewish commissioner of police. On the other hand, a spokesperson for Mamdani said that the mayor believes every New Yorker should be free to enter a house of worship without intimidation, violation. Jewish community will obviously be pleased with that, but then says, and that these sacred spaces should not be used to promote activities in violation of international law. That referring to this effort to encourage or facilitate Jews to make aliyah, including to settlements on the West Bank. And that is the, you know, they will not love that, that use that. The suggestion that, well, look, it's your fault for hosting this aliyah event inside a synagogue.
B
Yeah, I mean, I, I would say two things about this whole affair. One is protests in a place of worship. Just generally, I think the world could refrain from that. I think. I remind you, we had Van Jones on the podcast a few months ago, there was a similar incident in which there were protests again next to synagogue. I think it was in Los Angeles. And he said that, like, don't. Just don't do that in front of a house of words worship. It's just not. That's the, that's the very clear line. And as you mentioned, the first response by Mamdani was basically, you quoted it accurately. It sounded like he was blaming the synagogue for the attack more than saying this should not be done. And for anyone kind of being quite nervous and trepidatious about this new mayor elect, that wasn't a great sign. He then kind of walked it back a little bit. This is, I think, a pretty concerning thing. I, I would have, you know, I had to put my chips. I would say that Mamdani would try to be, be, you know, as accept, you know, walking towards the Jewish community as much as possible just to show that this isn't, you know, something that they should be worried about. His election. He's not, he's not doing that. So that is a very interesting move in itself.
A
Yeah. And it's, it's something people have been noticing about him generally politically. Remember that victory speech he gave, which was also not exactly conciliatory. On the other hand, he's got a whole lot more political space than he had before because last Friday he recruited yet one more devoted admirer, namely Donald Trump. He visited Donald Trump in the White House and there in the Oval Office. Trump could not have been more effusive in his sort of enthusiasm for Mamdani. Calling him, you know, just praising him and seeming almost kind of smart, slightly smitten by him, allowing him to say.
B
Genocide in relation to Israel. Not saying anything.
A
Right, not saying anything. And when at one point somebody said, do you to Mamdani, do you still think Donald Trump is a fascist? And Mamdani was about to deliver some sort of tongue tied answer and Trump said, oh, don't worry, you can say it if you want to. It's easier, it's fine. Touching his arm, big smile. I mean, funny by Trump, but also just it suggested to me that he was sort of a bit, as I say, sort of not overawed exactly, but kind of dazzled a little bit by Mamdani and this young man's charisma. He seemed to be loving the proximity to another proven winner, which is how kind of Trump rolls. But the reason, the politics that, why it's worth mentioning is that there had been an assumption that Republicans would try and make Mamdani the face of the Democrats ahead of the midterm elections and make him a sort of villain. Donald Trump has undermined that. It also makes it harder, I think, for some of those Jewish community groups to say he', radical, extremist, 100 communist lunatic TRUMP called him in the past. Now that's a little bit harder because Trump has sort of made him somebody you can have in the Oval Office and praise. And as you. You've given a very real example with that point about the word genocide. So I think it's just got a little bit more complicated, but no reassurance. And there will be no there. There will be still some anxiety there.
B
We'll say. I was more interested in, like, Trump in this situation, by the way. You know, Trump was sitting down. Mamdani still stood up. I'm not sure if I was, you know, Mamdani's press secretary. And I assure you, I will never be. I don't know if I would like that to begin with. I think it proves a few things that Trump likes, as you said, the winner. He's. He likes the sort of strong man who won. There's one commonality between them. They're the people who suggest the very simple solution to a lot of complicated problems. And perhaps he also understands, you know, his youngest son, Baron, is out at nyu. Perhaps he also understands the sort of charisma that, that Mamdani has. And he's. It's not a bad idea for him to sort of share in that. That's, you know, I think he's, he has political smarts, Trump, more than we, I think, give him credit for. So that's how I would read that very chummy situation with, with Mamdani, sort of echoing the chumminess with MBS and the chumminess with Ahmed Ashara of Syria. It seems that Donald Trump, Trump likes this. This type of. Of people.
A
Yes, That's. I mean, I wouldn't necessarily put Mamdan in the MBS category, but. But I take your point. Now, I think we have this new story here, which is you have now, I think, all but ruled yourself out as the new press secretary for Zoran Mamdani. So those people who had thought that that was the obvious appointment for Mamdani to make, you need to think again. But no, I definitely am not one of those who underestimates Donald Trump's political smarts. He has them by the bucket load. And this kind of dark charisma, we saw that on show as well. Two charismatic men, both from Queens, I think, in the same room. But no, we will keep an eye on that because I think that's. That run in at Park E Synagogue. It won't be the last between the Jewish community of New York.
B
Sadly. Sadly, probably true.
A
New mayor, we should begin to welcome our guest. We've. We've sort of edged into the topic because we're talking about Donald Trump. There is so much to say about the relationship between the US President and the Jewish community, but also with Israel. And it's been to the fore over recent weeks and months. We have, I think, for a while wanted to hear from somebody who's developed a bit of a reputation for understanding and speaking quite often with Donald Trump.
B
Barack Ravid is a global affairs correspondent for Axios. He's also the correspondent for Israel's Channel 12 in Washington and a foreign policy analyst for CNN. Barack is also the author of Trump's Peace, which covers President Trump's first term. And I'm pretty sure that if we check the ratio of diplomatic scoops per journalists, he ranks very high on that list. Barack, thank you so much for being on Unholy again.
C
My pleasure.
A
We are very, very glad to have you here. I said earlier on in the episode that you have become something of a Trump whisperer, meaning you're known as someone who knows and speaks to him. Just your read of his involvement in his interest in Gaza as a issue. Now, does he consider it, given all the ceremonials and his greeting of the Knesset and Sharm el Sheikh, does he consider it now basically job done. And now underlings can deal with the details, but he's sort of done with it.
C
Yes and no. Meaning phase one is definitely done. The war in Donald Trump's mind and by the way, also in reality, the war is over. He does not think that it's going to resume anytime soon. He's not, as far as I understand it, he's not going to allow it to resume anytime soon until he feels or his people, especially Jared Kushner or Steve Witkoff, feeling that their plan is stuck and there needs to be some military involvement again. But I don't think we're there yet at all. So for him, phase one is job done. And now a lot of what you see is that every time, I mean, there was a lot of focus on Gaza, him personally and his people, then the focus shifted to other foreign policy issues. Over the last week it was Ukraine. So you saw how not only the attention shifted to other issues, but the action sort of died down on, you know, the Gaza stuff. And you saw much more action on Ukraine. Next week could be Venezuela and then Ukraine and Gaza will die down. That's how it works because it's a top down administration. It's very centralized. The number of people who are involved in the actual decision making is, is, and I'm being very liberal here. You can count it on like two hands. The number of people. So those people every few days focus on another issue. And right now Gaza is less of a focus.
B
Well, again, for the Israeli perspective, the one thing or the one question about Gaza is of course, how to demilitarize Hamas. How will that happen? Even the decision, the UN resolution is quite murky on the, the details. Do we know how this is going to happen? Are we optimistic about this? Should we be?
C
So the order of business was first passed, this resolution in the UN that authorizes the international Stabilization Force to operate in Gaza and empowers this so called Board of Peace to be in charge of the administration of the Gaza Strip. What is happening now? And it's, you know, there's not a lot of focus on it, but right now what the US Is doing, and through former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other countries, it's building this Board of peace because you need this Board of peace to be established so that the Board of Peace will be able to establish the Palestinian technocratic government. There are around 25 names of Palestinians that are being vetted these days to be part of this technocratic government, to run this technocratic government. Tony Blair over the last week has been running around between Israel and the west bank and Abu Dhabi and Doha and Cairo. That's the focus right now. It's very, it's a very technical and pretty boring, to be honest issue. And I think that's why there's not a lot of coverage of it. But this is where we are now. Once you have, once the Board of Peace is established, all the countries, or at least some of the countries that are part of the Board of Peace, and the Board of Peace will be something like, I think 15 world leaders will be at the top of this Board of Peace. Each of those 15 countries will somehow contribute to the international force in Gaza, either through sending troops or through funding it.
A
Of all people, who knows how difficult it is to get paramilitary organizations to disarm. It's Tony Blair. After his role in bringing peace in Northern Ireland, he really knows this. I mean, what is the understanding he and perhaps the Trump administration have of the sequence of this? I totally take your point about the Board of Peace coming first. But is it understood, understood that Israel has to withdraw from 100% of the Gaza territory? Perhaps once there is a Board of Peace in place and only then Hamas disarm? Or is it the other way around, that once Hamas disarmed, then Israel feels comfortable withdrawing from 100%? If that is the sequence, how realistic from your conversations, do you think the Trump White House thinks it is that disarmament could happen because Tony Blair, of all people, people, was somebody who, in the Northern Ireland context, really, I remember him cautioning that this is something that, you know, it's very, very delicate and very hard to get. And almost every other piece of the jigsaw has to be in place first before you get the disarmament. So how are they seeing the sequencing?
C
So I think what you said about Blair is very true. And I think this is why, if you ask Tony Blair, I'm not sure he will use the term disarm armament. He might use the term, for example, decommissioning of arms.
A
Yes.
C
Okay.
A
That is the Northern Ireland term. Exactly. That's right.
C
Which is, you know, not exactly the same. So I think what Blair and Kushner and Witkoff are trying to do with the Qatari, Egyptian and Turkish mediators is to get some sort of a deal with Hamas. They don't expect. Expect international stabilization force to fight Hamas. That's not the idea. Okay. It might have to fight some remnants, some offshoots, but not have, you know, go to war with 25,000 armed people. That's not the idea. So they're trying to reach such a deal. And actually, last week, there was supposed to be a meeting between the US And Hamas on this issue. Exactly. Problem was that, as we said before, it was sort of contingent on progress in the talks between Russia and Ukraine, which did not happen. And therefore, Wykoff had to cancel his trip to Turkey to meet President Zelensky. Therefore, his meeting there with Hamas leaders was also canceled. So that's part of the issue that it's a small group of people that deals with a lot of big files. And so it's slow, but the situation on the ground doesn't stop. Meaning it's not like everyone are waiting to see, all right, he's dealing with Ukraine this week, so let's not do anything for a few days. No, it's not the case. And that's. I think that's the biggest problem.
B
Yeah, it's a pretty thick portfolio that Wycuff holds for sure when we talk about. And again, you said that the Trump administration won't let. Essentially won't allow Israel to resume anytime soon the war in Gaza unless the circumstances change. We look at sort of the parallel, which is the agreement arrived at between Israel and Lebanon about a year ago that was still the Biden administration. And there Israel quite has a sort of freer hand to react or to, you know, if they see any sort of violation. Israel sees this violation. What happens on the ground if Israel thinks it should be attacking or should react aggressively to whatever is happening in Gaza over, over the sort of year or two in the future.
C
So I think what you see in Lebanon, and I heard it from several Biden people who were engaged in mediating the deal in Lebanon, that when they gave Israel the side letter with the guarantee that Israel would be able to take action if it's under threat, their interpretation of what is an immediate threat threat was very different than the Israeli interpretation. And the fact that the Biden administration was not there for the implementation of the deal. It was already a new administration. Trump administration, I think, sort of gave Netanyahu the ability to basically have his interpretation as the law of the land. And if Joe Biden or the Democrats were in power now in the US they will not allow Israel to bomb basically anything it wants in Lebanon, regardless of the question of whether there was an imminent threat or not. So the Trump administration allows Israel to do so. I think it also, the Trump administration also feels that in Lebanon, it's not his deal, meaning, so there's not, you know, whatever happens, you know, we didn't do this in Gaza. It's Trump steel. And I think after the president announced on the record that he brought peace to the Middle east after 3,000 years, they wouldn't hurry to let the war resume.
A
No, I mean, I think that's completely right. But so far, even if they don't want the war to resume, I'm not really detecting a difference in the green light. I take your point completely that Biden's deal, Lebanon, they think is Biden's deal. This is our one, we don't want the war to resume. But it seems like they're also giving a green light to now Netanyahu to go in when he wants to, to hit when he wants to. I think the estimate from Gaza in.
C
Lebanon or in Gaza.
A
No, I'm now talking about Gaza because the Gaza authorities say that more than 300 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire officially ended through Israeli operations. We know that obviously Hamas have hit Israeli forces too. But it seems like the Gaza deal is being Lebanonized, even if not officially, that the same principle holds, which is if you need to go in and hit Hamas, do it. We don't mind that there's this sort of green light, so long as it's not officially called a restart of the war that obviously Trump doesn't want, but freehand to do what it wants day to day. Yes, that seems to be true of both the Gaza case and the Lebanon case.
C
I'm not sure I agree. I think there's more restraints on Israel in Gaza. They have to go through the American, Americans for everything they do. And I think that sometimes they convince the Americans that it's justified or warranted or that just the Americans say, we're not gonna go to war with Israel over an airstrike in Gaza. And I think that the situation on the ground is definitely. It's not that there's peace in Gaza. Okay. But I think the situation has dramatically changed for the better, that the fighting has decreased significantly. There's much more humanitarian aid going in. There's no threat of famine at the moment. And you start seeing very slowly, but you do start seeing reconstruction activity, which is very important. And if the agreement continues to be implemented, which, by the way, it is being implemented very slowly, but it is. For example, if I told you a month ago that you'll have 26 out of the 28 dead hostages being returned to Israel, you would tell me, ah, it will never happen. And it did. So I think we're very, very close to returning all the dead hostages back. Back, which I think then it will open the door for the next phase of the deal, which Israel will have to take, you know, action to continue its redeployment in Gaza and withdraw some of its forces. That. That's. That's what's written in the deal. And if all the dead hostages are back, Israel won't have any excuse not to start doing it.
B
Yeah, I mean, it's just to pause on how unprecedented it is that really Israel needs an authority for everything it does to receive some sort of green light from the Americans. Everything it does in Gaza, including the sort of headquarters in Kiryat Ghat, the southern city in Israel. It is quite unprecedented. I do want to move to Saudi Arabia. And you reported just this week of a very tense conversation between Trump, President Trump and MBS right before they met with reporters in the Ofal office. Could you tell us a little bit more about what happened there? And if you had to bet your all the money in your pockets on when there will be a normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, is it just perhaps waiting for a new Israeli government and some sort of wording, of course, about the Palestinian state, or is it something else?
C
So Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Crown prince, when he came last week to the White House, the issue of normalization with Israel was not like number one one on the list of talking points between him and President Trump, but it was also not number 10. It was somewhere between, I don't know, three and five. And it came up during the conversation because Trump, the reason he wanted to end the war in Gaza is to open the way to the expansion of the Abraham Accords and especially to a peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This is why, by the way, I think we will not. But that's my personal opinion, that he will not allow the war to resume because then it undermines his bigger plan in the region. So Mohammed bin Salman comes into the Oval Office, they discuss some other issues and then President Trump says, okay, let's discuss the Israel issue. And Trump starts pressing pretty hard. I mean, it was a civil conversation. He didn't shout or anything. But you know, Donald Trump knows to be demanding and to push when he wants to. And he said, okay, I want you to do, do this. I want you to know as relations, when are you going to do it? When are you joining the Abraham Accords? And Trump was very assertive. That's what I heard from people who were in the room. And mbs, Mohammed bin Salman was also assertive and he pushed back and he said, Mr. President, joining the Abraham Accords is great. I'm all in favor of, of normalization with Israel, but not now because, and he said the Saudi public opinion has become very anti Israeli because of the war in Gaza and Saudi society is not ready for such a move right now. Things need to happen in order to change this reality. For example, a path, an Israeli agreement to an irreversible, credible and time bound path for a Palestinian state. And Trump didn't like it. He was irritated, he was disappointed. But as one of his advisors told me, Trump is a strong guy, but MBS is also a strong guy and he pushed back. It ended with, and this is sort of, I think people in the White House sort of tried to see the silver lining here, that MBS did not say no. He didn't say never. He said not now. So they think that sometime in the next year it might be possible to get there. I'm not sure. And you asked about if MBS can reach such a deal with the current Israeli government. I personally see zero chance of that. But I wish I'll be wrong. I just can't see how a government that has Smotrich and Benvir and people that are pretty similar to them in the Likud, how it can reach a deal with Saudi Arabia when one of Saudi conditions is something on Palestinian state. And people around mbs, they call Ben Smotrich, the lunatics. So. So I don't think they're gonna cut a deal with the lunatics.
A
So that does go to beyond Eat's point that he's probably waiting for a change of government. I want to ask you, though, about the relationships, the human relationships here, because we know with Donald Trump, these really matter what you. Your reporting there acted as a kind of corrective to this narrative that was gaining ground, which is he really quite likes dealing with mp yes, he likes the strongman. He likes a guy he can cut big, lucrative business deals with, you know, language of a trillion dollars and so on. And he's losing patience with Netanyahu, who kind of just gives him various headaches. You can't give him, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars or give the US what your reporting suggests is maybe it's not quite as simple as that. But how do you read it? Is there something in this narrative that, you know, Netanyahu is falling slowly out of Trump's favor and MBS and others, the Qatarist and others are rising? Or is that too simple?
C
I think Donald Trump has good relationships with several kinds of people, people that do what he says, people that he respects because either he sees them as strong leaders or. Or people that make a lot of money. For example, one of the people he admired the most was Sheldon Adelson, because he really made a lot of money on his own and he really respected that, for example. So I don't know what's going to happen between Trump and Netanyahu. They had ups and downs. I still think that overall they're in a good place. Meaning during the 12 day war with Iran, Netanyahu managed to do the impossible. And I'm not talking about the Iranian nuclear program. He managed to. With Donald Trump, you have two kind of drawers. People that Trump likes and people that Trump hates. Netanyahu was in the drawer of people that Trump doesn't. And he managed during the 12 day war to move to the other drawer, which is something that I don't think anybody ever managed to do. And he did it because I think Trump felt that the cooperation between them during the war managed to do things that he didn't think initially were possible. So I think that Trump still really respects Netanyahu. This is why you see him, him fighting for Netanyahu on his trial, something he definitely didn't have to do. And he does it because, A, he feels that he went through similar experiences so he can relate. And second, because I think he really has a good relationship with Netanyahu. That doesn't mean that when it comes to things that are important to Donald Trump, like ending the war in Gaza, he has any sentiment for Netanyahu. He basically called them and said, that's it. You need to end the war. If you don't end the war, you're on your own. But that doesn't mean that they had a fallout. It just means that there are certain issues that Trump wants something done, and if you're in the way, then you're a problem.
B
By the way, you said that he moved from the. That Netanyahu moved from the draw that people that Trump doesn't like to. The draw that he does like. Just to clarify, that is because. Because of the sort of historic mistake in air quotes that he made congratulating Biden and then that famous interview that Trump gave to you, or there's more recent reasons for him not to let Antonio.
C
No, no, no, no. I think there was a lot of baggage from the previous term. And I think even though during the presidential election campaign, they worked together because it was obvious that Netanyahu wants Trump to win. In the first few months, Trump still had. Every few weeks, he would rant about Bibi and he would say, oh, yes, and how he did it to me last time and how that. So there was still baggage. There was still. It wasn't completely gone. Trump's sort of like, suspicion or mistrust of Netanyahu was completely gone. But I think the war with the Iran dramatically changed the situation.
A
Is the relationship with Syria closer than Netanyahu would be comfortable with?
C
Bibi and his people didn't like the warm welcome that Ahmed Ashara got in the Oval Office. Obviously, they would rather not see the video of Donald Trump giving Ashara his perfume. And, you know, this whole weird scene, seen that for the Syrians was something that if you told Ahmed Al Shara before a year ago that he will be in the Oval Office getting perfume from the President of the United States, he would tell you, you're crazy. But it actually happened. So I think there's a lot of concern on the Israeli side that first, Ashara has a lot of influence right now and a lot of credit it in Washington to get the US to do what he wants. One of those things is to pressure Israel to withdraw from the parts of Syria that it occupied after the collapse of the Assad regime. And the second thing is the feeling that, you know, Ashara came back from Washington much more emboldened, and therefore it will be harder to negotiate with him. And he will be ready to do things, things that before he. Maybe he thought twice before doing. And now he'll say, you know, I don't have any problem doing it. For example, cracking down on, you know, Drew's militias in Syria, you know, and other things, his sort of like flirting with the Russians. All of those things that, you know, he might not have done several. Several months ago. But also on that, I think it's also shows that it's a classic Netanyahu behavior, that when your adversary or enemy is weak, you say, why would I cut a deal with him? He's weak, okay? And then you just. You stall and you don't cut a deal with him. And then when you're. And time passes and then your adversary, your enemy is not weak anymore because things changed and now he's strong, then you say, oh, you know, he's strong. I can't do a deal with him because he won't compromise. And I think Israel, sometime last summer, after the war with Iran, had a huge opportunity to get a deal with the new Syrian government, and he just missed this opportunity out of arrogance.
B
That's very interesting. For a moment, I thought you're talking about internal Israeli politics and not about external issues, but okay, we were talking about external issues. One thing that's coming up in our conversation, it's not specifically Middle east directly, but I mean, you have been obviously covering also the Ukrainian beat you in Zelensky. I think you interviewed him several times. And I wonder how, if you were sitting in his spot, how worried would you be that President Trump is ready to impose, essentially impose a deal that favors. Favors Russia.
C
So first, my Ukrainian friends really hate it when I say it, but it's just true. I really enjoy covering the Ukraine, Russia war, especially because after covering two years, the Israel war in Gaza, it's just, like, refreshing as a journalist. It's just a really real professional challenge, and it's just very, very interesting. And so every day that I can cover the war between Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine, to me is like a very, you know, a very challenging day. I think what happened is that, you know, after Zelenskyy's last visit to the White House, which was, you know, in mid October, which was pretty bad, everyone thought, oh, my God, that's it. Trump is going to crack down on him again. And then Trump came out to this meeting and said, okay, everybody needs to stop the war according to the current lines. And I was sure that this is something that he knows Putin's gonna say yes to. And then Putin Just said, hell no. And we got again into this rollercoaster of ups and downs in those efforts by the Trump administration to get a deal in Ukraine. And so then things seem to be shifting again towards the Ukrainian side. But, but then behind the scenes, especially after the deal in Gaza, I think Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who also started getting involved in the Ukraine, Russia conflict, said, we need to do the same thing we did in Gaza. Meaning it's not the same conflict. Obviously it's not. The parties are not the same, situations are the same. But the way to try and end the war, they wanted to do it the same way. Meaning. Meaning we'll put something on paper. It doesn't really matter how the first version looks like, because we know that there's going to be this ping pong game of things moving from side to side. We'll put it to one party, we'll see what they say, then we go to the other party, we'll see what they say, then we'll present it maybe publicly and we'll continue on moving from side to side until we feel that, that we're there. Witkoff and Kushner are going to Moscow next week. I don't know what they're hoping to get out of Putin. It doesn't seem to me that Putin is willing to move. But on the other hand, like in Gaza, you remember at a certain point, President Trump just put out a statement and said, both parties have agreed the war is over. Even though. So neither party agreed. Neither party said yes, but Donald Trump just said, oh, they said, yes, the war is over. And then not Israel, not Hamas, none of them had the guts to say, oh, actually, the President's not telling the truth. We never said yes. So they sort of like went along with it and it led to ceasefire and it led to the release of 20 live hostages and 26 dead hostages and humanitarian aid coming in.
A
You know, the historian Neil Ferguson talks about how there was foreign policy realism associated with Henry Kissinger, now there's foreign policy real estate ism, which is the Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff and Donald Trump approach. And it obviously paid dividends in the Israel Gaza case for exactly the reasons you've said. And it's really coming up against its limits within the form of Vladimir Putin and Russia and Ukraine. So it's really fascinating to see this kind of experiment. I said earlier that you are the kind of Trump whisperer. I meant the phrase quite directly, meaning that there is communication between you and Donald Trump. And I know that my co Host has a question that both of us have on our minds, but here goes.
B
I mean, I guess it's just the sort of, how does this work, Barak? Because of course, you know, we've both reported on administrations, talked to people inside those administrations. Clearly this president, and it works in a different way. And he just calls you directly. So I'm interested in like, just the sort of, even the mechanics of how this happens. And is it a dialogue when he calls or more of a monologue?
C
No, it's not a monologue. Look, he's a very accessible person. And, you know, when the White House says that he's more transparent than any other president, and I don't know if any other president, but he definitely very attentive and very open and very accessible to talking to reporters, which is something that Joe Biden was not. So I think that's a big plus. And I think it started with during the 12 day war between Israel and Iran. One of those days, I started seeing quotes from Trump. I can't remember if it was Brett Baier or John Carter Carl from ABC who tweeted it that President Trump told me. And I called one of Trump's press people and said, is he doing rounds of interviews? Can I talk to him too? And he says, no, people just call him and he pick up. So call him and he'll pick up. And I said, but I don't have his number. He said, oh, you're a good reporter. I'm sure you'll be able to get to get the number. And I made some calls and I got the number and I called him.
B
His, his own number. It's not 456-1414. The White House operator. Right. You know his actual number, so.
C
Yes, yes, yes. And, you know, and I, and since then we spoke several times. I, I, I, I try not to abuse it. It's not like, you know, I only try to call him when, when there's, I think something significant enough. And, you know, I'm grateful for every time that he picks up the phone, is willing to talk to me.
A
I've got to drill into the details. Sorry, is this like a millennium thing? Are you millennial about this in the sense you first text and go, is now a good time? Or do you literally just go straight to the call and he picks it up?
C
No, you make a phone call.
A
Amazing.
B
Just call.
A
Yeah, okay. No, that's how we are going to.
B
I have to tell you, Jonathan, I'm sure Barak is aware that there was an illustrator here in Israel that drew Barack and Trump talking to each other and each saying to each other, no, you hang up. No, you hang up. That was like one of the funniest moments. Barack Ravid, always such a pleasure to talk to you. Barack, thank you so much.
C
Thank you. My pleasure.
A
So it is time for our awards. We, you know, trailed them earlier on in this episode. Why don't we begin with the chutzpah Award?
B
I think ever crowded Chutzpah award nominations ever crowded.
A
I mean I think he may have got mentioned in this category last week, but there's been more. Nigel Farage, who opinion polls say in this country is set to be the next prime minister because he's part of Party Reform UK has been leading now for 150 opinion polls on in a row. So this is why he's a figure of even greater significance than before. As you know, the Guardian reported a whole series of people who had been at school, as in not university but high school with Nigel Farage some nearly five decades ago testifying to him, you know, harassing or abusing pupils from ethnic minorities, including Jews. And one pupil. These, all of these people have gone now on the record being named saying a Jewish pupil, now age 61 said that Farage had repeatedly told him Hitler was right, said the words gas them. And others have reported that he made the hissing sound in the ears of Jewish pupils associated there's a hissing sound associated with the gas channel chambers. Several of them now coming forward on the record to say this. Farage has been denying it throughout it was confronted by an interviewer about it. But what was interesting, people will know from seeing the movie all the President's Men, the notion of the non denial denial. He was asked directly did you ever racially abuse fellow pupils at school? And instead of saying no, he said that, you know, he hadn't done it directly or he hadn't, he said he had never directly racially abused anybody. He then said when asked if he'd done it, he said never directly did. He never really tried to go and hurt anybody. So suggesting I did it. But it wasn't direct, it wasn't designed to hurt. But this is the bit that I think merits a chutzpah nomination. He said that like to an interview as follows. Have I said things 50 years ago that you could interpret as being banter in a playground? That was the quote. I think that is the problem. If he said look, did I, you know, say some atrocious things 50 years ago? It seems I did and I apologize, end of story. But he didn't say that. What he's saying is now the Nigel Farisch of 2025, not a teenager, not a child, is saying that he considers approaching a Jewish people and saying, gas them, Hitler was right. And making a hissing sound to be playground banter. I think that means this is now an issue for the Nigel Farage of today that he says that it's a cause of regret to me that the, you know, mainstream Jewish organizations in this country have still not said anything on this. I think it suggests they're a little bit nervous that Nigel Farage is going to be prime minister soon one day and will hold it against them. Not a good look for those, for the Board of Deputies and other Jewish organizations, they need to be saying that to describe these things as banter is not acceptable. And these people who are speaking are victims of antisemitism who are still bearing the scars. They say they're still haunted by some of these memories. It's the place of the mainstream Jewish community, in my view, to stand with them rather than to say nothing, which is what's happening at the moment as we record. Maybe that will change after we record. Anyway, a Chutzpur nomination at the very, very least, I think for Nigel Farage.
B
Okay, I have my own Chutzpah nomination this week if I can. We're independent bodies, you and I. We can just, you know, decide our things. And I would nominate Peter Beinart for the Chutzpah award this week. Anyone listening to this podcast wouldn't be surprised that we are slightly opposed, to say nothing about diametrically opposed in our opinions. I mean, he, him and I, about Israel, uh, I'm, you know, to give you the Cliff Notes version, I'm a Zionist, he's an anti Zionist. This reminds me of, remember in Reality Bites, that scene where Ben Stiller and went on a writer on a date and he says to her, I guess you could say I'm a non practicing Jew. And she says, I guess I can say I'm a non practicing virgin. So I am a practicing Zionist. He is a non practicing anti Zionist or a practicing one. In any case, he decided to give a speech in Tel Aviv in the Tel Aviv University, which there were little rumblings of the rights in here in Israel, but at the end of the day, he this week gave his speech. The reason he's in the Chutzpah Award category in my nomination this week and not because of the speech itself, but because what happened after this is when he was hit by the backlash of his own base, the sort of pro Palestinian, pro BDS base. And he apologized for appearing in the Tel Aviv University. He said in his lengthy post that he let his desire for conversation override my solidarity with the Palestinians. It's embarrassing to admit such a serious mistake. I dearly wish I had not made this one, which has caused particular harm because international pressure is crucial to ensuring Palestinian freedom. What I say to this is either you come to Israel and you give your speech, or you don't come to Israel and give the speech. You did not only today discover the Tel Aviv is in Israel, so don't come do the speech, which by the way, I think many Israelis are opposed to. But still people came to listen to his speech. I think it's important that he can say, share views, even if I disagree with him. But come do the speech and then apologize for it. I mean, that is just in my eyes, it just seems ridiculous. I, I don't understand the logic of, of doing that. And I would also point out that I don't know, you know, he was accepted quite politely in the Tel Aviv University. If any of the students of Tel Aviv University had tried to give this speech in front of the crowds that admire Peter himself. People like, you know, pro BDS or things like that, I don't know if they would be accepted as politely as he was.
A
I think the funny thing about this is that obviously he's managed to anger both sides in this debate. So he's, he's one, one side are going to be furious that he went to Israel, the other side furious that he apologized so nobody will end up not happy. I remember when he's in an earlier.
B
Except me, who gets to have a Chutzpah Award nominee. That's so easy this week.
A
I'm happy you're, you're delighted. But I remember he wrote a piece a long time ago when, in a different period of his journey, when he wrote a piece called Advocating what he called Zionist bds. And he was suggesting that the, the, the correct position was boycott the west bank, the settlements, but don't boycott Israel itself. It would be Zionist bds. I remember the Zionists hated it because it had BDS in it. The BDS crowd hated it because it had Zionist in it. And so you end up alienating both sides. This is one of those sorts of moves. I think the odd thing about it is that he would say, I apologize for doing it is I'm somebody who's read his book being Jewish after the Destruction of Gaza. I've read that book twice. Because I went on his zoom call and I wanted to engage with him about this, this subject. And the book opens with an introductory note which draws on a story from our sages in which the thing you must do is speak with people you disagree with. And he quotes a story about Rabbi Meir and the rebel, notorious rebel Elisha. And nobody wants to talk to Elisha, but Rabbi Meir does, even if it means crossing boundaries, breaking the Shabbat of the Sabbath, the Shabbat to do it. And he, Barnaut, praises this person for going against the consensus and speaking to those who disagree with you. That was his position in the. In the book he is speaking about and that he wrote just a matter of months ago. And yet in this, with this apology, I think he's contradicted, in other words, his own position, which is you must speak to people, even those you disagree with. So, you know, as I did in that case, by going on Binance show. So I think he tangled himself up in quite a lot of knots here. We can put it like that. So we move to the mensch category, which I think is me, isn't it? Not me, you.
B
The bench.
A
No, it's me. It's me nominating the men.
B
So here we are doing it.
A
It's my turn doing it. So this week I was lucky enough to see a preview because it hasn't yet had its official press night. I don't think, as we speak of Paddington the Musical now, everybody, I think, loves Paddington Bear, you know, the musical. I think the jury may be slightly out on some of the songs, but we can have saved that for one of our show conversations about musical theater, which we have occasionally. But this show, I'm sure, will be a huge hit. Everybody loves Paddington, but it just struck me that, first of all, Paddington Bear ideal mensch, but its creator, Michael B. Bond, reading the program for the show, there was a reminder of the history, the origin story of Paddington Bear. And I'm sure lots of people know it, but it's that Michael Bond, the creator of the stories, brilliant stories as they were, saw this little bear on its own in Selfridges department store and immediately had a memory from childhood of seeing the Kindertransport child, children coming to Britain from Germany, from Prague, famously, with tags on themselves on there. And evacuees in this country had the same, but these sort of paper tags attached to their suitcase or to their own coats with their name. And that's what gave him the idea of a bear with one of those tags saying, please look after this Bear. And the story is really about welcome, welcoming a refugee, in that case, in the Paddington's case, from darkest Peru. But the Kindertransport we know. And so through doing that, Michael Bond has created this fantastic, you know, globally appreciated, adorable icon for generations of children. But he also, it came from a memory of the Kindertransport and for doing that, for sort of sealing that memory deep in British popular culture and in the culture, I think a mensch nomination for both Michael Bond and for his beloved creation, Paddington Bear.
B
I like the fact that our show today started with me describing a show to you and then you ending with describing a show to me. That's quite nice. It comes full circle.
A
It does.
B
That's nice. We will say our big thank you as always to Michal Porat and we will see each other next week.
A
See you then. It.
Episode: Army and politicians at war – and Inside Trump’s mind with Barak Ravid
Date: November 27, 2025
Hosts: Yonit Levi & Jonathan Freedland
Guest: Barak Ravid (Correspondent, Axios/Channel 12/CNN)
This episode delves into Israel’s current internal turbulence, examining:
The tone is characteristically wry, self-aware, and deeply informed, mixing personal anecdotes with pointed political analysis.
[00:26–09:16]
[09:22–15:59]
The Feud: The escalating conflict between IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and Defense Minister Israel Katz, rooted in post-October 7 accountability.
Jonathan’s Context: The friction is emblematic of a broader trend where the political right paints state institutions (now including the military) as part of a hostile “deep state.”
[15:59–18:16]
[18:16–22:38]
[22:38–30:13]
[32:32–64:04]
The ‘Board of Peace’: US, via Tony Blair and others, building an international stabilization force and technocratic Palestinian government.
Sequencing Dilemmas:
[64:20–72:22]
Nigel Farage:
Peter Beinart:
[72:22–74:36]
On Climate Change:
On Political Accountability:
On Trump’s Foreign Policy:
On Beinart’s Predicament:
The episode blends pointed analysis with their trademark banter. Whether reflecting on Israeli cultural icons, the nuances of diaspora politics, or the mechanics of US–Israel relations at the highest levels, Yonit and Jonathan remain witty, self-aware, and always illuminating—a must-listen for anyone trying to untangle the state of Jewish and world affairs in 2025.