C (3:24)

I don't know enough, Yonit, but I don't believe that's true. I think in the end, the leader of Hamas inside Gaza is Din Al Haddad, the former brigade commander of the Northern Gaza Brigade. When the war started, he's been promoted, I think, three times already. He's now the fourth commander of Hamas in Gaza since the beginning of the war because the other three were assassinated. He's a tough guy. He's a hardliner. He's not somebody who was willing to be flexible regarding the negotiations. So the fact that people outside of Gaza were eliminated, I don't think that it would change a lot regarding the outcome of the war unless there's a scenario where the remaining people fear for their lives and they say, well, we need to be flexible right now. But it doesn't seem to be the case to me. I think this is a sort of an excuse or explanation given after the fact. I don't think this is what actually happened. I think Bibi had a chance to do that. And Netanyahu wanted to make a statement to show that he could kill in Qatar, something that Israel never did before, because, as Netanyahu has said, Qatar is a complicated country with a complicated relationship with Israel. And yet the decision was made to strike. And I'm not really. I would remain suspicious about both the Israeli statements and the American statements about what exactly went on our colleague Barak Ravid just published. I saw that the White House was furious with Israel and that Israel only notified them at the last moment. If Barak says that he has great sources, I assume that's the case. And yet Trump is playing a dangerous and a strange game here. He may have supported it, he may have not supported it. He notified the Qataris, but maybe not on time. It seems as if Trump is inside the loop here. He's part of the decision to attack. I'm not sure that he was absolutely coordinated with Bibi or whether he was notified on time that this is what Israel was about to do. But for the time being, and we've talked about that many times in the pod in the past, I haven't seen anything to prove that there was a big difference between Netanyahu and Trump over the course of the war. They still see thinks quite the same, both regarding Hamas and perhaps even regarding Qatar.

B (5:55)

Yeah, the statements that have been coming out from Washington do suggest a president who wants to hedge his bets. So he is on the one hand saying, yes, I was in the loop, but on the other saying, I tried to warn them and didn't have enough time. On the one hand, saying, just to complete the thought, saying, this is not helpful for American or Israel, but. But on the other hand, it's always good if the Hamas leadership is eliminated. So he's trying to see which way the chips fall. I think depending on who has been killed, so he can be on the right side of the decision. But one thing I just wanted to ask you, Amos, is about the timing, which is that with actions like this, there's always two questions, why? And then why now? Obviously, there could be just a simple operational reason, which is they were all in one place and suddenly it was possible to eliminate these people culpable for October 7th. But the other view, which I think you've alluded to with the hostage families, says actually this was almost a fear that there could be a deal done. And so what better way to ensure there can be no deal done than by killing the people who would sign it? Which of those two motives, or maybe that's something completely other, explains the timing?

C (7:06)

I think probably the first is more significant because, again, I'm not so sure that Hamas is willing to go all the way. We saw Hamas being extremely unflexible most of the time. Recently they were willing to make some concessions because they fear this occupation of Gaza. But again, I doubt whether Hamas was willing to go all the way and actually reach a final deal. I think that this has to do with retaliation for the attack, the murder of six Israeli citizens two days ago. Was it yesterday? Actually on Sunday morning in Jerusalem. It has to do with the operational chance to actually strike at the Hamas leadership. And also, if you look at a lot from a wider perspective, it's an opportunity for Bibi to delay negotiations. But it's not as dramatic as may have been portrayed, as if they were just about to give us everything and we spoil it for everybody. It's always more complicated than that. It's a combination of reasons. It's not that Hamas were suddenly willing to it's true that they gave positive answers recently, but they were still not willing to go all the way. But now that this has happened, I think there's even less of a chance. It's unlike the way it has been presented. It's not as if pushing Hamas out of the way has changed everything and would allow an agreement to be signed soon. I think perhaps the opposite is true. The way I see it right now, I think that Bibi is still pushing for the operation in Gaza. The decision hasn't been made yet. It has to do again with the amount of green lights Trump is going to deliver, and then we'll see how this evolves. There's still some time, but look at the attacks. Look at the strikes, how many buildings are destroyed there. Look at the language used by Israel Katz, the Defense minister. All of this points to Netanyahu and the people around him pushing forward with the operation. And then one thing I should have said earlier is about the security chiefs, because all of these guys, mostly Eyal Zamir, but also to some extent, Barnea, the chief of Mossad and also the current chief of Shin Beth, are all in favor of a deal, and all feel that a deal is possible and that this should be the priority, considering the hostages situation.

A (9:36)

Is there a case to be made? Again, bird's eye view of this, that Israel is saying to the whole region, we have the control here. If you try and hurt us on October 7th, we're going to get to you anywhere you are. So it's in Qatar and it's in. Let's remember, Haniya was taken down in Tehran. If you're going to try and send missiles to us from the Houthis in Yemen, were going to take down the leadership of that terror organization. Just sending a message to everyone across the region, essentially, don't mess with us. Is there an advantage here in this move?

C (10:10)

Yeah, I think that's part of the issue. I think that it's very clear, and I think that Bibi is gradually falling in love with this notion that we can strike anywhere, that we can eliminate leaders everywhere, whether they're leaders of terrorist organizations like Hamas or Hezbollah, or questionable politicians, half terrorists, if you'd like, from Iran and Yemen as well. And this is one part. The other issue, which is quite prominent by now, is larger Israel, the idea of having broader or wider borders for Israel. You can see that happening already in Lebanon, in Syria to some extent. And of course, now this is what they're discussing in the west bank, annexation. Although the very quick and harsh response from the UAE means that they would have a hard time doing this. But both the message about wider borders, the wider Israel, the first leader to challenge the borders of Israel since 67. This is something that Netanyahu likes about the current events. And the second one is the one you mentioned about hitting, about assassinating and targeted killings, leaders all over the region. What Netanyahu tends to forget is that this is a game that could be played both ways. I think in the end, what we'll see, not Netanyahu himself, because he's protected very, you know, the security, the detail around him, security detail is huge. Sin Bet is providing a lot of protection. But I think we'll see ministers, I think we'll see ex generals, ex intelligence people and so on being at least threatened abroad. And there's also another implication which is important as well. I think that for a long time it was clear that the Gulf states are an area where nobody acts. This is what the Emirates wanted, what Qataris wanted, what the Saudis wanted. By going for Qatar for an operation in Qatar, we're opening the way for an Iranian and Hamas retaliation. And I think what Hamas would tell the UAE and others is that there will be an open season on Israeli tourists. If Israel is willing to do that, Hamas would try to retaliate. This could become dangerous for Israeli tourists as well. I'm not so sure whether all of this was discussed in the Cabinet before the decision to strike today.

B (12:36)

What I'm hearing is the idea that, yes, Netanyahu clearly has this sort of Martini doctrine anytime, any place, anywhere, that was fine in the eyes of many diplomats. We, when it was hitting Houthis in Yemen or hitting Hezbollah, different if Qatar is in Israel's sights. Qatar was meant to be somehow off limits, out of bounds, because Switzerland and the Middle east, it hosts America's biggest Middle east base. They've been trying to broker this ceasefire and hostage deal for two solid years. And yet it has been drawn in to, to the conflict twice now in three months, struck by the Iranians in June in retaliation for the June war, and now directly by Israel, and that somehow that is breaking the sort of unspoken rules of the game. Would that. And should it have factored in Israel's calculation? Or is Netanyahu right? He can hit wherever he likes, whenever he wants with no price to be paid.

C (13:35)

Well, I'll do something rare for me and I'll defend Netanyahu from you. I think in the end, Qatar is not Switzerland. Qatar has been supporting Hamas for quite some time. For their own calculations and reasons, but spending all that money on Hamas, they knew exactly what they were getting. And I think that Qatar should not be immune forever. And there's also the discussion whether actually Qatar contributed to hostage deals recently. It's true that they helped mediate some of the previous agreements, but we didn't see them actually delivering anything in recent months. And they have been playing a dangerous and an ugly game with Hamas for quite some time. So the actual decision to strike at Qatar, I'm not sure it's the end of the world. What I'm worried about is the fact that it's not helping us to progress in any way regarding the hostage deal, that it's, you know, these, all of these dangerous games are not leading us to the end of the war. They're actually, I think there's more of a chance of us being entangled in this forever war. It's not necessarily a bad idea from Netanyahu's perspective. I think it's very, very dangerous for the Israeli society at large. And of course, I may be obsessing over this, but I think the fate of 20 live hostages and also the necessary return of 30 bodies of hostages should be top priority. I'm also very concerned not only about Israel's situation on the international arena, but also on possible lives lost among Israeli soldiers. I think that this is, again, a dangerous gamble. I think we've seen the price we paid just a few days ago with four soldiers from a tank unit who were killed by Hamas. And I'm afraid to say that we'll see more of these cases the further we go inside Gaza under these circumstances.

A (15:35)

We're going to leave it there, we should say. Almost and I are both in Washington at a summit, the Mead Summit. It's the Middle East, American dialogue. So obviously you can realize, Jonathan, everyone was only talking about this today. Still a lot of questions open, as we can see as we're talking here a few hours after this strike. Amos, thank you so much for talking to us.

C (15:54)

Thank you for.

A (15:55)

And we will be back with our regularly scheduled episode on Friday.

B (15:59)

See you then.

A (16:00)

See you.