← Unholy: Two Jews on the News
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A
Foreign. This is an unholy special update hours after Israel unleashes a series of airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. It's been talked about for decades. It's finally here. I'm Jonathan Friedland in London.
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And I'm Yunit Levy in Tel Aviv.
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A
So Yanit, a very, very long night and stretching into a long day for you. I mean we're going to get into all of the implications and conversations about this with a real expert on all this. But just on the ground and where you are, just talk us through it.
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B
Israelis were all woken at 3am by sirens that were not because missiles were heading towards the country but because the state was warning Israelis and saying, listen, something is happening. What was happening was that at 2:30am about half an hour before that, dozens of Israeli planes were making their way towards Iran in an attack that Iran hadn't seen before and Israel hadn't perpetrated before. This is a large scale operation targeting specifically top officials in the security echelon in Iran, nuclear scientists, also nuclear sites and military sites. But particularly it looks, Jonathan, like this sophisticated Israeli decision to say, look, if we are doing this alone, we can't obviously go into the depth of the nuclear sites in a way that we could have if the United States was joining us hand in hand. But what we can do is target the brains of the operation. So that is what happened from 3:00am Israelis I don't think slept a wink since following this very, very closely. The attacks going on and on for a very long time from the Israeli side. And at this point that we're talking now, it's 5pm in Israel, 10am in Washington. Israel awaiting an Iranian response. There were 100dr. Launched towards Israel but they were intercepted. This is just the beginning. This could be an all out war between the two countries, dragging the whole region into it as well. But at this point that we are standing here now, I think it's important to say that the intelligence, the operation, the acumen, the tactics, the Israeli operation here is really breathtaking. Definitely reminding us of the operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Even more than that also I think we should point out when you think of the heartbreak of Israeli intelligence on October 7, this is a completely different, a completely different picture.
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A
Yeah, I mean just the shear sort of as a matter of technical military craft. It is as you say, astonishing and a huge intelligence dimension. I think we're going to get into that a bit with our guests. But to pinpoint exactly where these people were, possibly some suggestion, you know, there was a degree of coordination to make sure they were all there. And I think that way you've described, it's very effective that it is the brains rather than the sort of guts of the operation, which is deep in, underground and out of reach of Israeli conventional firepower. At least one thing to talk about is the why now? Question. There's, it seems to me, a series of sort of elements here. I'd be interested to know what you make of it from where I'm sitting. One of them is just the most obvious is that's been true for several months is the state of Iranian strategic weakness. So many of its proxies and allies that would normally be its retaliatory or deterrence power have been sort of hobbled, often very directly by Israel, whether it's Hezbollah in Lebanon, obviously Hamas crushed alongside with, you know, Gaza being all but destroyed. And the Houthis have made their own separate peace, as it were, separate peace with Washington, the fall of the Assad regime. There's all of that there. There's a sense, you know, I would guess that there's a domestic political element. We talked about it on the regular episode of the podcast that there was an attempt to or talk of a dissolution of the coalition. And one of the arguments that Netanyahu made in Israel was to say, well, now is not the time because we've got this security crisis with Iran. And, you know, at the time you thought maybe that's talk, but obviously that was relevant. And the notion, I suppose, that there is some kind of permissiveness, even if it's not explicit permission from the Americans, and therefore now would be a good time to do it. I'm just throwing out a few things here, but the why now? Question interests me a lot.
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B
Israeli officials of the military brass are saying on camera that they have accumulated enough information saying that Iran was very close to the point of no return. The head of IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir saying, we had no choice but to act. Israel, I think, ideally would not want to go alone. And the fact that it is doing it means that on that level, it thought that this is a moment that should be grasped. We should also say, and you mentioned that the proxies have been weakened, Iran's aerial defenses have been weakened. And the consideration on the Israeli side was to say if we need to do that, that moment would be now. Look, Israel, we should say, right? I mean, is looking at this with a lot of respect for the operation itself, but with also a lot of trepidation of what can be the Iranian response. Israelis schools are closed. There can't be any crowd gatherings. Israel is bracing itself for what can be a response, a retaliatory response like we have never seen before.
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Yeah, and, you know, a million, if not billion dollar question is how much capacity does Iran have to still rainfire on Israel? We know that a lot of its air defense capacity was crippled in those two episodes in April and October of 2024. So that's an open question, but not a question you particularly want to find out the hard way. As I said, we do get into this with someone who watches all of this from a very expert vantage point. And perhaps we should introduce our guest. For this special update.
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On this very dramatic day, we wanted to talk to Dr. Suzanne Maloney. She's one of America's foremost authorities on Iran, number one on our list when we want to understand what what is going on in this very dramatic day. She's the vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution focusing on Iran and Persian Gulf energy. Suzanne, thank you for talking to us. I think it's safe to say that the region has not ever seen a day like this. I can share with you that on the broadcast during the night, I kept looking at our Iranian expert on the network and his jaw dropped every time a new name came in. Could you first tell us the people who are targeted? Head of the irgc, head of the military.
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C
Who.
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B
Who are these people? What is the significance that they have been assassinated?
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C
Well, thanks so much for having me today. And it really is an extraordinary moment, I think, for Iran and for the wider region and the world as a whole. The assassinations of the senior leadership of the military bureaucracy are extraordinary. The chief of staff of the armed forces, the head of the Revolutionary Guard, key figures in the aerospace sector. These are really the individuals who would be coordinating any kind of response to the attack itself. And so, you know, they've been obviously immediately replaced. But the kind of knowledge that they brought, the familiarity in terms of the leadership dynamics, has been significantly disrupted. And one has to imagine that everyone who's left is kind of looking around the room and wondering who might be next, given that some of these individuals were assassinated in their own homes. So this is going to knock the regime off guard. And that only begins to think about the variety of ripple effects of what Iran has suffered over the course of the past 24 hours and what may be yet to come in terms of an ongoing military operation.
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Obviously, the attacks on personnel, on individuals, the elimination of these Individuals hugely significant as you just explained. What about the sort of hardware questions? This attack on Natanz attacks, which I think is the IAEA has confirmed that that was obviously hit but they say no radiation leak and the implication being that it hasn't gone deep, penetrated deep into the business end of the operation there. And similarly I think the installation at four down, not touched there is this sort of view that yes, this is spectacular. The elimination of this layer of top commanders, nuclear science is really significant. But if the goal of this is to prevent by military means the Iranian acquisition of a nuclear bomb, that physical process has not been touched because it can't be touched by the kind of hardware that Israel has. What's your read of that?
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C
Well, I think that's what's so interesting about the type of strike that was launched over the course of the past 24 hours. It was, you know, very sophisticated, multi vector in terms of both attacks from Israel, but obviously also commandos on the ground and what we now understand to be ostensibly pre positioned materiel which enabled them to take out additional air defense and other capabilities that the Iranians might have. I think what we're seeing is, you know, the Israeli military compensating for the limited capabilities that it would have to actually eliminate the program as a whole, but demonstrating, you know, this extraordinary sophistication and deep penetration of the Iranian, Iranian establishment. There are at least some reports that suggest that, you know, they, there was some complicity in ensuring that the key Iranian figures were in the right place at the right time. In fact, that it may have been a meeting that was precipitated by those operatives who were on the ground. And so I think this is, you know, going to create just a huge impact on Iran, but it will leave much of the nuclear infrastructure, at least for the moment, intact. And it does give Iran that option to try to race for a bomb, to, to lead the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, to take other steps to escalate on their side. And I think that I imagine that the designers of this operation have anticipated some of those next steps. And so it's going to be an important moment for both diplomacy but also to see what happens next in terms of the military campaign.
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B
Could we go sort of drill down on who these people were, particularly Solemi, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. When Qassem Soleimani was taken out January 2020, that was a big deal. He was the head of the Quds Force, which means he was a very charismatic man and very popular. But he's under him in Hierarchy. So this is a bigger deal. Obviously there's another list. The head of the Chief of Staff of the military. Could you go into a little bit who these people are and also maybe a little bit about these two kind of separate armies and the relationship between them, the Revolutionary Guards and the military itself and the significance of really taking down the top commanders in both organizations.
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C
Well, these are really experienced military officers who are part of the inner circle. And I would add to that also Ali Shamkhani, who had been the Iranian National Security Advisor, had been essentially tapped with managing the diplomacy around the nuclear issue and was someone with long roots both in the Revolutionary Guard, but also in terms of the civilian establishment as well. And that sort of array of leaders have been in the decision making positions really since the Iran Iraq War. Their careers and their view of the world was forged by that experience. And it was an experience which taught them that they were going to be under siege, they were going to be isolated, and that they needed to use every means at their disposal to defend the regime. We've seen, of course, you referenced Qasem Soleimani and the assassination in 2020. And there was, I think at that time a widespread assumption that this might disable or significantly degrade Iran's ability to manage its proxy, which is the role and responsibility of the Quds Force within the Guard. That didn't happen. There was probably some loss of charisma and loss of a central figure who had a larger political salience within Iran and around the proxy network. In this case, I think that there will be individuals who can come in and fill these shoes, just as there were in the case of Soleimani himself without significant disruption. But I think the real question that Iranian leaders must be asking themselves is who's next? They can find people in their homes. They're able to undertake an operation that was planned and apparently involved on the ground capabilities over a period of several months and it wasn't uncovered or disrupted in any way. And given what they saw transpire in Lebanon and the ability of wave after wave of different attacks to not just degrade individuals, but really take out an entire echelon of the leadership, I would assume that anyone is sitting in Tehran today in a decision making role has to be very concerned about where he will be tomorrow.
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A
So just two things. One is a very quick follow up on that point, which is about institutional know how and memory. So if you take out a whole lot of these people and you said there will be other people to step up in terms of knowledge of the Nuclear program. Are there enough people around who can just step into the jobs who know how to do this, or by what Israel have done, have they actually robbed Iran of its, you know, intellectual capacity to advance towards a nuclear bomb?
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C
I would be hesitant to presume that's the case. There were several, we know of at least several key nuclear scientists who have been eliminated as a result of, of this operation. And of course that builds on a long campaign that Israel is presumed to have undertaken covertly that has resulted in the assassinations of other scientists as well. But this is a program that has three decades under its belt and it has built a significant infrastructure. The loss of key personnel will have some implications, but whether it would actually disable Iran's ability to sustain the program, I would, I don't see evidence of that yet.
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The one question that is hovering over Israel today is what kind of retaliation is Iran planning? The Supreme Leader already promising harsh retaliation. We saw Iran attacking Israel twice, April and October of last year. What do you think we might see this time in response to really this huge large scale attack against Iran?
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C
Well, I think we've already seen a wave of drones from Iran that were taken out by the Jordanians. And I think that, that, you know, suggests that the Iranians don't have better options ready to go. Now that doesn't mean they can't in some way tee up those options. We've seen them launch waves of missile attacks and they can do that today. But we don't know to what extent some of that capability has been disabled by the operatives on the ground. We know that they have taken out air defense systems. They may have taken out launchers as well, which would reduce Iran's ability to do that. The next line of defense, of course, is Iran's proxy network. I imagine that we'll see more activity once again from the Houthis. But obviously the key players in Iran's network have been degraded significantly, both as a result of the war in Gaza, but also the spectacular success that Israel had in decapitating Hezbollah over the course of the latter half of 2024 and reducing its arsenal. So Iran doesn't have tremendous options in that respect, but they do have a very diverse network of militia groups that they can call upon both in the region and outside the region. And my guess is that it would be reasonable to anticipate some small scale terror attacks not just in and around Israel, but also potentially elsewhere in the world. The third line of defense or response will be, I think, on the nuclear front, what they do to try to preserve the program, but also looking for an opportunity to deter further attacks by, you know, demonstrating their capabilities. And, you know, I think that the option of a nuclear weapon unfortunately becomes much more attractive to the Iranian regime as an existential defense.
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I mean, just that we must come back to that point. Just. John, your point about responses beyond the region, we should perhaps mention the Israeli diplomatic missions around the world, including in this city, have closed. I know that Jewish community organizations in the diaspora around the world are already at a heightened state of alert and are now increasing because, of course, Iran has previous when it comes to avenging what it sees as attacks on it from Israel by attacking Jewish diaspora targets, famously the, the attack on a community center in Buenos Aires in Argentina in 1994. So that's all in people's minds. But look, a big sort of, it's political, but it has a, has a material consequence which is the, the involvement or not of the Americans. And there's a lot of confusion around on this. So we have on the one hand a statement from Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying this is unilateral by the Israelis, US Forces not involved. And you know, as if to say to the Iranians, no reason for you to hit Pakadas. You have the words of Donald Trump just hours before this operation saying, we've got talks. We don't want the Israelis to come in. That could blow it all up, could blow it rather, we don't want that. And yet afterwards, the president himself briefing, telling the Wall Street Journal, we, you know, we were in the loop. We knew what was going on. And praising the operation to a reporter today, saying, you know, this is excellent and they'll be, we, you had to hit them hard. And Iranians had a chance to agree a deal before this. There are these talks coming on Sunday. So what is it? Was this Netanyahu defying Trump? Was this coordinating with Trump in order to put a pressure on the Iranians ahead of these talks? Heaven knows if they'll go ahead on Sunday. How do you read it? Because there's a lot of pointers in many directions.
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My read is that the administration did have some, at least some awareness of an operation that was going to be undertaken. They obviously could see the movement on the ground, and that is what precipitated the decision to remove some personnel and dependents from the region. And also I believe that the commanding general of centcom, General Kurilla, canceled testimony yesterday. So I think that they had very clear understanding that there was something that was not just theoretical but in fact, specific and imminent. They may not have had all of the details of the operation itself. And so there may be truth in both the denials as well as in the suggestion by the president that he in fact was aware. But I think in either case, it's almost irrelevant in the sense that for what happens next, in the sense that I think the Iranians would have presumed American complicity irrespective and would have held the United States responsible for an action that Israel undertook solely of its own discretion. And I think that the president, seeing, at least for the moment, what appears to be a very successful operation, was going to try to take credit for it and try to depict it as part of his own master plan. And so what the reality looked like, we may not know for some time. But I do think, at least for the moment, the US Strategy is going to try to capitalize on the disarray in Tehran. I am not optimistic that there will be talks on Sunday. I'm not optimistic that there is a diplomatic pathway in the near term. But Trump will understandably see this as serving his own strategy. The pressure that Iran is now under is much more significant than anything the regime has experienced probably since the 1980 invasion by Saddam Hussein. And so this is an existential moment. And that is the time where they might be prone to considering their diplomatic options.
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B
I'll just add to that piece of the puzzle. First of all, that Trump said after the attack to Fox News to Bret Baier. He said the US Will defend itself and Israel if Iran attacks. It doesn't sound like someone who has been duped. He posted two months ago, I gave Iran 60 day ultimatum to make a deal. They should have done that. Now they perhaps have a second chance. We have to say the Israeli officials are saying not only that the United States was in on it, it was also in on the Rus that there was no intention actually to meet on Sunday. The whole thing was a diversion tactic. As we sit here, I think we don't have all of the pieces of the puzzle, but I'm very interested in what you said in your answer to Jonathan's question. I think it was about the fact that now it will make the Iranian regime even more close to or trying to rush for a nuclear weapon, which is of course obviously the opposite what Israel wanted. Let's talk a little bit about that. I mean, what we will see in your opinion is actually again, the opposite of what Israel intended to begin with.
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C
I think it's a real possibility. I mean, this is an existential moment. The regime has sacrificed hundreds of billions of dollars over the course of the past decades to ensure that they have this nuclear program. But they have never, as far as outside intelligence agencies have been able to assess, made the decision to build and deploy a bomb. I think that we are now in a dangerous moment where that is going to be. The risk reward ratio has been changed dramatically. And especially for a regime that considers its own survival as the most existential aspect of their security, the temptation to push toward a nuclear weapon, I think will be very great because they've seen that, that their proxy network has been degraded, that their missiles are ineffective, that they haven't been able to deploy other means to defend their own territory, and that Israel has incredible capabilities. It has deployed it time and time again. And so this is, I think, a very risky moment for the world.
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B
We hear the words of Netanyahu himself. He's saying to the people of Iran, this is a day of liberation from tyranny. You also see again, taking down the sort of top echelon of the military. Israel can say this out loud, of course, but these sort of, I don't know, maybe envisions this change of regime change in Iran. How likely is that at all? At the point that we are in, obviously there is a huge layer that is connected to the leadership. It's not an easy thing to do. Is that even a reality or just a pipe dream?
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C
I think we're really in uncharted waters. I would generally say that the idea that we can from, without, from external, prompt or precipitate regime change, I tend to be very skeptical about. This is a regime that's been in power for 46 years and very well entrenched in multiple generations. And there really doesn't appear to be any competing political grouping that could actually move in to even encourage defections from the current system. But we are in a very, very different moment. And I think that that question is going to be again on the minds of the leadership, that this is more precarious than anything they've faced since the early days and months of the Iraqi invasion in 1980. That was an existential moment. The regime managed to consolidate itself and but used the conflict really to further entrench itself into society and consolidate its institutions and really build the staying power that is enabled it to stay in power for all those years. And they will try to do that once again here. But this is also a moment for political entrepreneurs. The Supreme Leader is 86 and there is no clear successor to him. And succession has only happened once in the 46 year history of the Islamic Republic. And so, you know, there is going to inevitably, you know, Iran is even within the regime. There are disparate views and there will be those who are thinking about whether there is an exit strategy that might involve some shift in approach.
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B
You're a top professional. I just wonder, you know, after decades of following the region, this is, has definitely been a surprising day. Is it also a good day in the sense, is the world a safer place now, or actually the other way around?
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C
I hope the world is a safer place. I think we'll wait to see what the Iranian response is. There's always been a sort of debate among experts about whether Iran escalates under pressure or whether Iran folds under pressure. You can point to historical episodes, whether it's the 1988 shoot down accidentally by an American warship of an Iranian civilian airliner that led to the decision by the Iranian leadership to accept a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein and the end of that war. You can also point to other scenarios in which they have responded with escalation as a result of being placed under pressure, including back in 2019 when they targeted Saudi oil infrastructures and tanker traffic in the Gulf. And so I think this is a moment in which we'll see where the Iranian regime is at this point in time, whether they're capable of responding in a way that drives the situation in an even more dangerous direction, or whether in fact, they will accept the punch in the nose and wait and live to fight another day.
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A
Suzanne Maloney, thank you so much for this really, really valuable and insightful update for us. We are very, very grateful.
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C
Thanks so much for having me.
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B
That was Dr. Suzanne Maloney talking to us on what is a dramatic, if not historic day for the region. Something tells me that we will have another special episode soon. But for now, we are saying our goodbyes and our thank yous to Michal Porat and we'll see each other soon.
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A
Jonathan, See you then. Shabbat Shalom, Yoni.
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B
Shabbat shalom.