← Unholy: Two Jews on the News
Unholy: Two Jews on the News
Talking peace, making war - with Jake Sullivan
01:19:54
Please note that an (authentic!) alert sound is heard twice throughout the episode. Watch us on Youtube: https://youtu.be/UdhHLAquwgs Follow Unholy and learn more about the pod: https://unholy-podcast.lovable.app/ The fourth week of the war with Iran finds both sides insisting—loudly and contradictorily—that peace talks are either underway or nowhere in sight. In the meantime, Iranian missiles continue to hit civilian neighbourhoods across Israel, while rolling news blurs day into night, tracking both the war itself and the political manoeuvres that show little sign of slowing down. And in London, another antisemitic attack raises uncomfortable questions about double standards when it comes to hatred directed at Israel. This week, Yonit and Jonathan sit down with Jake Sullivan, who puts it bluntly: this war should not have started. Sullivan lays out three reasons why the decision was flawed, argues that Donald Trump’s “appetite grew with the eating” from the 12-day war to the c...
Loading summary
Transcript88 lines
- [00:00]
A
Hello there. We just wanted to let you know in advance of this week's episode that during the episode you will be hearing a couple of times the preliminary alert that comes just before a siren. They caught the Israeli wing of the unholy operation Mid recording. So if you are in Israel, don't worry, this is just a recorded alert. And if you live outside Israel, well, then you're going to get a glimpse of the soundtrack of Israeli life. These last four weeks,
- [00:35]
B
the single biggest thing that has changed is Donald Trump has decided that the application of American military power is an intoxicating thing that can generate quick results with relatively little cost. And first, that was true with respect to the 12 day war last year. From his perspective, this, I think gave him the confidence to then execute the Maduro operation, a very high risk operation that from his perspective also worked out okay. And then the appetite grew with the eating. And I think he thought at that point, hey, we can go back at Iran and they aren't going to fight back very hard because they've been so badly weakened. And I can rather rapidly and decisively achieve some set of operational objectives and then declare victory. And it has not turned out that way this time around. So I think he is stunning stuck here.
- [01:43]
C
It's unholy. I'm UNIT Levy in Tel Aviv.
- [01:46]
A
And I'm Jonathan Friedland in London.
- [01:48]
C
And this episode we will bring you a conversation with Jake Sullivan, former US National Security Advisor, the voice you heard at the top of the show. We have a lot to talk about. Jonathan, it's day 27 to give you my last couple of days in headlines. A cluster bomb weighing 100kg fell very close to my house. We had to obviously cancel our vacation plans out of Israel because all flights were canceled and sirens have been going nonstop since this morning on Thursday. How's your day?
- [02:23]
A
Yeah, it doesn't compare to that. And, and I know that we're going to talk quite a bit about life during wartime. In this episode, we'll get into the geopolitics and the strategy with, you know, former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, obviously. But just right now, I mean, you know, obviously you and I are in touch when we're not recording the podcast and the, the, the cluster bomb so close to your home. I mean, for people who are not living through this and a chunk of our listeners we know are outside Israel, obviously. Just explain to us what, how that works, what happens, how you, how you know about it, the sirens, where you are at the moment, the time it happens. Do you have time to get down into a safe room, etc.
- [03:03]
C
We should say just now that we're talking, it's kind of midday on Thursday, pretty early morning Washington time, I mean, midday Israel time on Thursday. This day has been, has seen really a, an uptick in the number of sirens and alerts. Last time we talked, I said, I told you that in about 24 hours, hours we had something between seven and eight sirens and alerts. Of course, also during the night. That is, I think we're up to around 10 now. And this is only since this morning. So clearly a decision made and attempts made by the Iranian regime to shoot more at Israel. Just on the strategic level. Before we get into the personal how it feels, because we've been talking about that a lot, I would say it's either because they feel like Trump is indeed going to hit the brakes and it is trying to hit the Israeli home front as much as possible possible, or they want, they think that the war will actually intensify and they want to signal that this is that they have the ability to take it up a notch. Look, it hasn't been, I think this is an understatement, very easy for weeks in this country and it is taking a toll on everyone. I think it's safe to say nerves are pretty much rattled at this point. We talked a lot about the fact that there is what is called a preliminary alert. Many areas, by the way, not in the north, because the shooting in the northern part of Israel comes mainly from Hezbollah. And then there's a very short time span and then there are only sirens going off in other places. You have a sort of preliminary alert of a few minutes and then the sirens that signal that you need to go into a shelter very quickly. Recently, because of the sort of frequency heightened, I think that there actually have been a few alerts with no sirens. I can just tell you, Jonathan, from this morning, I have been in two different random shelters in Tel Aviv because I had to go into, there was no time to do anything else. Just to say something about the amazing hospitality by these people that you walk into their shelters in their buildings, they don't know you. But they're very, I mean, in my case, perhaps very slightly different. But generally speaking, they, you know, they're very hospitable, very kind, very nice. It's not a, this is completely wartime. It feels like a war. That is how it is. You asked, I think a while ago. I'm sorry, my brain is a little bit of a mush how it feels like when that kind of 100 kg fall very close to your house. You hear it. It's definitely sounds differently than other sounds. It was very clear that it was nearby. Thankfully, the people living in the street of my neighborhood entered the shelter. Other four, I think, or five hit wounded, not severely, a lot of damage, just unbelievable amounts of damage created by this.
- [05:57]
A
And did that, did that cluster bomb hit a building? Did it land just on empty ground between buildings?
- [06:02]
C
It landed on the street between buildings, not directly on a building. So perhaps that is also what helped, you know, in that situation, the fact that there are thankfully aren't casualties, but it really is. I mean, I'm sorry to say it, it kind of feels like a Russian roulette. I mean, obviously you take precaution and you, you go into a shelter in a safe room. This is no joke. Right. You take it very, very seriously. As I was Dr. Do this podcast here in Jerusalem. There are people on the side of the road stopping because that is what the, the instructions are when there are sirens blaring. So, so you do everything you can. But at the end of the day, these are huge bombs that Iran is launching these cluster bombs and other types of bombs on the central Israeli cities. This is what they want to do to cause as much damage as possible. And that is what it feels like.
- [06:52]
A
Yeah. And one point that I think often just gets skipped past in international media coverage is that every one of these bombs is aimed at civilian targets. So these Iranian bombs are aimed at residential neighborhoods. There's no pretense that it's a aimed at a, you know, military site and it went astray. Now, I know people will say plenty of the Israeli and American bombs have also hit civilians. But the official justification, the narrative is this was aimed at military installation X, Y or Z with the Iranians. There's not even tens. It is aimed at civilian targets. I just wonder about when you're. Maybe people don't talk about this when they're in the shelters, especially when you're with strangers. So, you know, I'm prepared to imagine that it's the last thing people talk about, but I'm just wondering how Israelis square their own daily lived experience where you are. You have just this morning, as we speak, had sirens seven or eight or nine times with the official position that has come from Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu from the start. Actually, 95% of the Iranian arsenal has been taken out. It's all gone. We've won, it's over. They've got no military hardware left and you're hearing that as the sirens are blaring and as the bombs are falling, it just seems to me either the Iranians brilliantly hid a whole lot of their arsenal or that 90% figure was wishful thinking. Let's put it at its most generous, wishful thinking by the American and Israeli leaderships. But I'm interested to know though, those people in Israel who are under that bombardment, do they, what do they think of the fact that they were told that this threat had, 90% of it had been taken away?
- [08:25]
C
I mean, first of all, you have to understand that the talk in safe rooms and in shelters is definitely goes to where did it hit? Do you, did you hear? Oh, it's right next to my neighbor, mother, sister, et cetera. That is the only discussion going on. But I think what we need to notice before even what the politicians promise their respective citizens is that obviously the ballistic arsenal that Iran has is unbelievably dangerous. And I remember asking the former head of the Israeli Air Force, Amikam Nolkin, a few weeks ago, I said, is the ballistic missile program that Iran has is that is an existential threat for Israel? And he said it's an insufferable threat for Israel because if Iran shoots at this way and clearly it has the ability to do so, then life becomes insufferable. Now there are others in Israel who say, look, if Iran had 9,000 ballistic missiles like this, it would be an existential threat for Israel. I think it's for many people. And again, the support for this war is still very high in this country, notwithstanding everything I just described. I think people do realize that this as it stands is not a situation that the country of Israel that wants to live a normal life can stand. I hope I answered your question.
- [09:44]
A
It's just the over claiming, I think that went on in a way Israelis, the public, we've talked about it so many times in different contexts, including immediately after October 7th. The resilience of the public is now something really well documented and very well established. We know that. But the leadership did of the country didn't prepare the public for this. They said on day one, 90% is gone. So either this is 10% of an arsenal much bigger than was ever imagined, or the Iranians are brilliantly stringing out this 10%. But it just means that, you know, are your, are one's leaders telling one the truth given the, the huge claims that were made? Donald Trump is still making, he's still saying this war is won. Iran has nothing left. They're desperate, they're begging, they've got, they're beaten. This war was over days ago. It just, none of it fits with the reality that every Israeli is living through right now, hour by hour by hour. So that was really my only observation. I thought we should say something about the sheltering because an extremely telling, fascinating poll came out, I think from channel 12, which essentially said support for the war really high, up to around three quarters, 73%. I think for those people who have a shelter of their own, direct shelter. And then the numbers almost flip. For those people who do not have a shelter, it comes down to around 23% there. Now that's, you know, and obviously, you know, numbers in between for people who have access to like a collective shelter shelter. I know this points to a sort of wider issue. Why don't you say something about how the experience that people are having in terms of shelter is affecting their view of the world.
- [11:30]
C
So we're going to have a pretty extensive bonus episode about this, about the types of shelter and kind of the history and go into that in depth. But I think we should say this. There are kind of, at the end of the day, about 45% of Israelis who have a safe room in, in their own home. Obviously, this makes protecting yourself during a siren or an alert more accessible and easier. That is about, As I said, 45%, 33% of Israelis don't have a shelter at all that is close enough to them to get in the span that you need to protect yourself during an alert, which means they need to who, you know, sleep in places like underground railway stations or parking lots or someone else's shelter. And everyone in between has either a shelter in their building or a very close public shelter. Those are the statistics. And as you mentioned, a pretty fascinating poll that we published Last Thursday, Channel 12. And again, as I said, the support for the war, generally speaking is still pretty high, over 70%. But you see the correlation between the people who have an easier, more accessible shelter, we call that a safe room or a mamad, that is higher in, in the support. And the people who absolutely don't have a shelter very close have, say they're the disapprove of the war much more so it would be 73% of the people who have shelter near them say they approve and 51% of people who don't have near nearby shelter say they disapprove. I mean, that is the, the statistics. You know, someone made this joke saying once when you said, I met someone, your parents would ask, what do her parents do now, your parents will ask, does she have a safe room in her own apartment? So that is the sort of Jewish joke going around.
- [13:20]
A
I saw that gag and I thought, just bringing it together, the Israeli and the Jewish in a single gag. Actually, Jewish parents are still Jewish parents, but they'll obsess about something different. But just one thing to explain to everyone when we say safe from mamad, how safe is a safe room? What's it made of?
- [13:36]
C
Yeah, so it's. The room itself is inside an apartment. It's, you know, from kind of reinforced concrete. It's built differently than the other rooms. But the important thing is it's in the apartment and not sort of a shelter underground you're building or a public shelter. The shelter. The actual shelters are considered safer. But of course, this kind of room is better than anything else. Yeah.
- [13:59]
A
Because it's close at hand, which in the middle of the night makes a big difference. We'll get into all of this, obviously, in that bonus episode for subscribers. I mean, the news events of the week, it's been dominated by Donald Trump's sudden announcement that peace talks were underway. He just surprised the world and the markets by saying, we're now talking with the Iranians. They called me, I didn't call them. He said, they initiated it. The markets reacted exactly as he would have expected, as indeed somebody who placed a very big bet expected. And the oil price went down and the markets were ready to say, okay, this thing is drawing to a close. The details have been tremendously murky, though, because as we covered, I think in our update episode earlier on in the week, the Iranians immediately said, well, you know, we're not talking to anyone. And there's been this different version back and forth. More details have coming to light as the week has gone on. The Pakistanis are saying they are playing a kind of mediation role, talk that J.D. vance will be the lead negotiator. So there is some sort of momentum there. And I did notice as well that Israel said it, it had taken the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, who had been named by the White House, I think, as the interlocutor, they'd taken him off their target list along with another Iranian leader. So signs that this is at least serious or real. The question is how realistic and what prospects it has for success.
- [15:24]
C
Yes, I mean, I think the worry here in Israel amongst the kind of defense echelon would be whether or not we are seeing a framework of a deal. But the details themselves, as you say, are murky. Now, the main and an example given again and again is the Gaza deal, which ended the war. But still Israel is rightfully concerned about the fact that, for example, Hamas has not been demilitarized in ways that Israel would have hoped at this point. Now back to Iran. I think that the main kind of point that Israel is looking at is the stockpile of enriched uranium. And if this at the end of the day ends without that either being taken out, taken out or destroyed, what does that mean for what this war was all about? And I think that Israel also believes that if this kind of halts for weeks of negotiation, the chances of returning to a full blown war are very, very low. On the other hand, I remind us both, and we did this, sorry, we did this urgent episode when Trump did press pause on Monday, there is still an actual option that all of this is on the way to thousands of Marines still heading to, to, to the region and this war actually intensifying, particularly if the Iranians are not here to play ball with the, with the negotiations. So we still kind of don't know where we are at this time.
- [16:55]
A
And the Iranians will certainly be mindful of that possibility because they have had this happen to them twice before where they've been in talks with Washington. It happened in June last year, it happened in, you know, this month. They're in talks and then suddenly the Americans or Israelis will both strike. And so therefore, you could imagine they will be thinking, hold on, is this a ruse designed just to allow give Americans more time to prepare and as you say.
- [17:25]
C
Well, we should say that in these negotiations, I think, think the past negotiations, the other side did not feel like the Iranians were making any progress. And even now they are. What they are doing is kind of, you know, reaction, reacting. Not in a way that would sound like you are welcoming a negotiation.
- [17:39]
A
Oh, yeah, no, I think they, they're making it seem very much as if they are in the box seat and that they hold quite a few cards, they've got leverage just to go for a triple E, mixed metaphor, and therefore they don't particularly need talks. That's the vibe they're giving. That's the sort of stance, the posture they're trying to adopt. It's quite interesting. There's Donald Trump briefing out, saying, speaking, saying the Iranians are desperate and meanwhile they are trying to cast him as the one who is desperate. They put out a video saying, you're Mr. Trump, you're fired, as if mocking him and saying, he's the one. And you're quite right that the Israelis felt they, and the Americans, I think, felt there wasn't progress. Others involved in the nuclear talks, for example, the Omani negotiator, certainly the British government, felt there were new proposals on the table in terms of the nuclear deal. And it may be that we end up going back to whatever it was they were talking about in any kind of talks. Nevertheless, that point about leverage, there are questions there for particularly Washington to answer. Just at one point, the waiving or easing of sanctions on Iranian oil, which suddenly allowed the Iranians to sell their oil again on the open market. Some estimates Democrats in the United States estimating that has handed Tehran $14 billion into the Iranian war chest. You know, they have shown with the Strait of Hormuz, this extraordinary chokehold they have on the global economy and the missiles are still firing. The reason why a lot of people are really skeptical about this war is they think it has made Iranians look. I underline the word, the word look, because underneath it may be a different story, but it's made it look to the outside world as if they have some serious deterrent power and that they are not afraid to use it. And that is, you know, in the, in going into a negotiation, it's not obvious. They are going into it as this sort of broken, weakened party that was, I think, originally envisaged. I think we just have to consider that the war planners here, Netanyahu and Trump, did not envisage this going the way it has gone. I think they thought this was, was going to be much easier and that the Iranians would fold within a few days and so far ready to be proved wrong. It may all turn out very differently. But right now, four weeks in, it's looking as if they underestimated what they were dealing with.
- [19:55]
C
Look, it's very clear that the Iranians took a hit, obviously to their leadership, to their infrastructure, yes, to the ballistic missile program. And the jury's still out on how this ends. But if it does also take the nuclear program other steps beyond the war in June back, that that would be, I think, a very good thing for the region and for the world. Anyone who expected the regime to crumble in two days is for sure disappointed. But I think that we are not kind of seeing yet the, the end of this or the ramifications of, of this war completely. Yes, it's definite that they were badly hit. And it's also definite that the, the kind of character that this regime still holds is such that we'll mock everyone publicly. Again, I would say the jury's still out on the results of the war, I will want to point out, just because I'm tying this back into sort of internal Israeli politics. We were talking a lot about the fact that this is an election year. Elections are slated for the end of October, actually 27th of October 2026. If Netanyahu had thought that Iran was a clear success, very quick and very strong, very successful, he would still have the option this month to pivot for early elections to early elections in June. That option is now closed. There will not be early elections in June. Just to explain a little technical detail here, you need three months for elections in Israel. So this is the last month that could have happened. So obviously Netanyahu is thinking this as well. But as I said, I think it's very important. We are four weeks into this war, believe me, right here and where I sit, we feel every day and every hour very clearly and still I think that we should perhaps pause judgment on what exactly this war has achieved thus far and will achieve from this moment.
- [21:49]
A
One last bit of the politics of this around the world, there has been a huge attention paid to this perhaps offhand remark that Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, made in which he said, look, we had to go then because we knew the Israelis were going to and we knew that the Iranians would retaliate by hitting us. Therefore we had to go into it, which fed the narrative which, you know, we've talked before on the podcast. There are a lot of people with hostile thoughts in their head who seize on that to suggest there it goes, Israel slash the Jews dragging America into war. My view has always been Donald Trump is big enough and ugly enough to look after himself. The idea that he's a sort of poor little supreme superpower dragged into a war is absurd to me. He can make his own decisions. But there is that narrative, as I say, it's thrilling. Anti Semites around the world, that view, I think it's sort of playing rather differently.
- [22:42]
C
It's pretty clear that this claim, which by the way, I think is easily debunked by the fact that the United States can make its own decisions and of course the President can, as you said, make his own decisions in most powerful country in the world. Just to remark that this is not. That hurting, this kind of claim is not hurting Netanyahu in his own base in election year. Right. That he is the all powerful leader that that has the ear of the American president to an extent that this would happen. You don't hear him debunking it in, you know, in, in there was one interview for Fox News where he laughed and he said, of course the president can make his own decisions, but it's not an issue here because for his own base case, it's not, you know, it's not bad news.
- [23:25]
A
Yeah, it plays to, it plays to that image which is in of him being strong. And yeah, that's always going to work. We'll get into all of this, of course, with our guest, the former national security advisor to Joe Biden, Jake Sullivan. That's coming up. Also, we'll have to, of course, talk to him about the war on the other front, which is with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Lots going on there. But I want to go back your need to something you said a earlier, which when we were speaking about how, you know, life during wartime and you, you sort of mention it as an aside that when you have to seek shelter in a public shelter, you know, it's a room full of strangers. It's not quite that way for you because obviously people recognize you. And I often go out of my way to explain to people who are listening to this outside Israel, they may not quite fully absorb what it means that you're the anchor of the nightly News on channel 12. It's the most watched news channel. People turn to the news in Israel in very big numbers, perhaps more than in other countries. And they definitely do that during moments of crisis. I've had people say to me that, you know, they would really love to hear you explain what that is like. That particular thing, which is the country does look directly to you at those moments. If they switch on the TV at 8 o'.
- [24:40]
C
Clock.
- [24:41]
A
And I've had people say to me, they try and scrutinize your face. Does she look worried? Because if she looks worried, then I'm worried. But if she looks calm, then I'll be calm. And I've said it's a bit like the kind of air steward on a plane. There's the plane's vibrating a bit and they look at the steward. If the stewards are calm, it's okay if not. But you're that for a whole country. You've mentioned how you're having to sort of manage the flow of information to your own children so they don't get too rattled. But you're doing that simultaneously as you're doing it for the whole of this country that's going through this. So in a way, I'm relaying to you a question that I get from other listeners who when they talk to me about the podcast that's one of the things they often ask, what's it like for your. Not just like everyone else in the shelter in the middle of the night, but being the bearer of the news to a country that is kind of living on its nerves at the moment.
- [25:31]
C
I mean, I could write a book about this, obviously, I think, and perhaps
- [25:36]
A
should
- [25:39]
C
I think that to me it has always been very important. I've been doing this for 23 years and I always thought that in a country that is so stormy and threatened like this country is, the important thing is to be very calm, level headed and contained with your emotions. That was true long before this war. And I think the more extreme the situation becomes, the more I try to do that. It isn't always easy, even on a human level. And you know, when you think about this war in Iran and I have to. The example that comes to my head, Jonathan, is when the first round started in April of 2024. And we should say officially my. Of course my slot is PrimeTime television between 8:00pm and 9:30pm but news in this country is so relentless and when it happens and it breaks, it will be at all hours and it will take over the broadcast network of Channel 12 and I will be there. So it would be 6pm or 6am or 3 in the morning. And I remember a call I got, it was Saturday night and my boss called me at, I think it was 8 or 9pm he said, hundreds of drones, hundreds of Iranian drones are making their way to Israel. We need you to be in the studio. And it was a moment in which being a human being completely clashes with what you're doing as a journalist, because a human being would stay at home and protect their family in a moment that we knew nothing about what it would look like. But I drove to the studio and so, you know, I can talk a little about what goes through your head, but I think that the key to this is to be as prepared as possible to know all the information that you can and again to exude calmness, you know, in every form that you can. This has been. These have been crazy two and a half years. There were moments where I felt that I couldn't go on air because the news was so terrible. But I think that that saying to Israelis and I think that is where my role is perhaps different from the role of anchor people around the world, of anchors around the world. It's not only the information, it is an emotional journey because news in this country is almost an existential tool for people, almost a survival tool even, because everyone is watching the news. It's comfort and solace. It is not only giving the information, but kind of giving an emotional underscore that says, we're going through this together. We're in this together. I'm not reporting the news. I'm living it. Everything I'm talking about is happening to me. My children and I are in a safe room or in a shelter. That is just the way it is. And I remember this moment. I always thought it's important that the viewer doesn't know if I had a bad day, if I fought with my mother, if I'm tired. And this is actually a conflict where I keep getting messages from people saying, you look tired. And it upset me at first because I said, well, you're not supposed to see that I look tired. I'm supposed to pretend like I'm very, you know, awake. And then at some point, I kind of let go. It's been 27 days. And I said, I look tired because I am tired. And that's just the way it is. A few days ago, I sat with one of my friends here at the network, and he said to me, remember how after, right after October 7th, we were on air for four or five hours? The evening news was four or five hours for months. And he said, how did we have the energy to do that? And I said, first of all, it was the beginning of the war, and secondly, it gave us something to do. And I think that's also important on the personal level. You have a role in this that I hope is an important one. And I think that gives you meaning to continue to do it, even though it's not always easy.
- [29:13]
A
I think that what a lot of listeners will be thinking when you say about it's important.
- [29:18]
C
By the way, you hear this, right?
- [29:19]
A
I do. I can hear that right now.
- [29:21]
C
This is the preliminary alert that we have been talking about that says as we speak about my role and what this country is going through, that we need to go to a shelter, which we will do, and then come back to our conversation.
- [29:37]
A
We'll pick it up then. Good luck. We're now back. You may have to go off again at a moment's notice. But the question I was going to ask is, because I think listeners will wonder it, you said you have to exude calm. Whatever else is going on, what does that do to you? Are there moments when you cannot be calm, when the cameras are not on you? In other words, can you be a regular Israeli who's going through all the stress, stresses and strains at some other point when the camera is not on you and you're not the bearer of news and if so, how and where do you do that?
- [30:09]
C
Well, you know, that person on the news, it's not an act. I mean, I am, I hope even in real life, quite common, level headed and you know, emotions contained and all that. So I don't know if there are moments of whatever sitting and crying, not, not that I can think of. But I do have moments. Look, I can remember this moment where again I was off air, I was at work. But I realized, and you know how sometimes in this business you know things before other people do because the information comes and I got the information that the Bebas family was not alive. And I remember I couldn't breathe and I had to step out of the studio. It's in the vicinity of Jerusalem. So, you know, everyone who's lived in Jerusalem knows Jerusalem has better air than Tel Aviv. There's good air outside and you can breathe in and breathe out. And I remember I had to sit to myself, this is going to be the way we live now. Every day you are going to be hit by something that will break your heart and you just need to know that. And so it's a lot of that kind of going on. But to, to answer, I think I don't really have a moment maybe perhaps that's a problem we should address. But I don't really have a moment where, you know, things break down.
- [31:26]
A
Well, I know that your viewers, and that means really the country are very grateful to you for what you do car sort of acting as this sort of vessel you carry. There's so many of the emotions the country feels and you have to convey them. And that's part of the backdrop to the conversations you and I are having all the time. We should talk about things going on elsewhere in our world before we get to our guest.
- [31:49]
C
Perhaps there are a lot of other things and important things happening in the world. One of them, and we mentioned this in our episode at the beginning of the week, but I think we should dive into, dive into it more deeply. And that is an anti, a horrific anti Semitic incident in what you called, I think rightfully so, the most Jewish neighborhood in the world, Golders Green in, in London. And I want to talk about that and I also generally want to, to ask you if, I mean we've talked a lot about anti Semitism flaring up in recent years and the reasons for that, but I wonder if the Iran war changed that in any way in the sort of level even on the level of the fumes, has that changed?
- [32:34]
A
Well, it seems to have changed it in a big way in the sense that there's been this, I mean, there was the rising tide of antisemitism and anti Semitic incidents all over the world anyway. But literally since the beginning of March, there's been a violent attack on either a synagogue or a Jewish school or a Jewish target in all points of the globe. And there have been several claims of responsibility from groups linked to Iran. So it may not be, it may be something else. But what at the moment the counterterrorist police and others are pursuing is the theory that this really is Iran's retaliation for attacks on Iran, is that it always said it would lash out and it is hitting out at Jewish targets. You know, there's this talk of sleeper cells in different places, Iranians in other countries or allies of Iran who can be, you know, operationalized, who can be sent into, into action. So, for example, on the 6th of March, that's just days after this began, four men were arrested here in Britain, in three of them in London, one in Hertfordshire, suspected of hostile reconnaissance, meaning gathering information on potential targets, synagogues and individual Jews. The police in Holland are pursuing the theory that in at least one of the two attacks, one was a synagogue, an explosion outside a synagogue in Rotterdam, the other was a bomb that struck a Jewish school in Amsterdam. They're pursuing very explicitly, they're saying we are pointing the finger at Iran. We. That's the investigation they're pursuing. There's a group, new group that has proclaim, you know, on online, claimed responsibility. So that's what it seems like. But the effect of it, you know, the cause may be this move by the Iranians on the chessboard. The effect is a threat to the daily life of Jews all over the world. So three synagogues were the target of gunfire, a gunman opening fire on three synagogues in Toronto. A day after that, a synagogue in Liege in Belgium targeted by a bomb. 12th of March, somebody drove a track, a truck packed with explosives into the entrance of Temple Israel in Michigan, then Rotterdam, then Amsterdam. Then two brothers investigated in France for plotting what the police there called a lethal and anti Semitic attack. This is going on every single day. Those two, by the way, found inside their car a semi automatic loaded weapon and a bottle of hydrochloric acid. These people mean business. So far they seem to have been thwarted. But in London, they did succeed in setting fire to four ambulances associated with the Jewish charity Hatzole. A couple of things about that One, an ambulance. I mean, it strikes a synagogue, a school. Nobody gets used to that. But an ambulance is such a sort of, you know, a symbol of the most innocent possible target. An ambulance meaning a vehicle that only exists to save lives. And this was a targeted attack, arson. Once the flames hit these oxygen tanks, the ambulances carry immediate explosion debris everywhere. It went right next to a synagogue building next door. That's. That, obviously, emotionally strikes a chord. I've also been trying to wonder, why is it this one really cut through? I got messages from people in the United States saying, really so sorry about this attack. And I was thinking, but you've just had this thing in Michigan. You know, why are you sending this message to me? And I think it's partly the point about the ambulances as a symbol, but also I found something poignant in the fact the speed with which Jewish organizations here in this country have had to clarify this ambulance service is not just for Jews. This helps everyone in the neighborhood. It's a Jewish charity, but its users are not just Jews. They're people of all faiths. And as if somehow it would be resented if ambulances, for heaven's sake, are used, you know, for a Jewish charity. It's a Jewish charity. It's very visible in this area, the area I live in London, as you know, a large haredi community. They're very visible. The last people you would think of would be attacked. Novice. This did strike some kind of chord. It's been reported around the world. As it happens that very night, there was a gathering of the Community Security Trust, their annual fundraising dinner. They're the big charity in this country combating and monitoring anti Semitism. We've had Dave Rich, who's their policy director, on the podcast, I think, a couple of times, so you can imagine the atmosphere there of Jews gathering oddly in my life. This has happened a few times now. I was at a Jewish wedding hours after the Bondi beach massacre. I found myself in rooms full of hundreds of Jews after attacks on Jews. And this has happened. There's a kind of atmosphere, this sort of resilience, determination to go on. In a strange way, there is an echo in the conversation we've been having about you there. The strangers meeting in bomb shelters and the kind of resilience and the ruefulness. And this is our lives now. And there's some of that. Some of that is not the same. Not saying it's the same, but there is some of that. When Jews are gathering in the hours immediately after some kind of attack like
- [37:49]
C
this, you Know, it's really interesting because I thought you wrote a beautiful column that we mentioned, I think, last episode as well, about what happened. And you talk there, you say, you know, this is what we Jews live with now, incidents of antisemitism through the roof, borne out by both the statistics of our daily experience, coupled with the knowledge that we face a murderous threat that can strike at any time and in any place we gather together. Coping with that is hard enough, you write, but what has made it harder is the response among many we would once have looked to as allies, those we might have expected to show empathy for a besieged and threatened minority who have instead offered a cold shoulder or worse. First of all, I recommend our listeners read this column in its entirety. Can you talk a little bit more about that?
- [38:34]
A
Yeah, I mean, I, you know, hearing it back, I mean, I, you know, that idea about we would have expected to show empathy. I mean, the sad thing is, in a way, a lot of people no longer do expect to get empathy from the people I'm talking about. There are the progressives, the left, historically, people who are anti racist. And a lot of those people, I mentioned in the column that there was, you know, a video posted by some, someone who's been, you know, garlanded for their work against racism, describes herself as a social justice advocate. She posted a video about the Michigan synagogue attack, outraged by the, in scale of the police response. And she said, look at that police response. That's, that's power right there. That's privilege right there. Meaning the Jews got special treatment. Resenting it. Resenting it. Resenting that. The, yeah, and, you know, the. I, the other example I gave was the deputy leader of the Green Party here in Britain who had attended a rally the day of this war. So February 28, March 1, where people were carrying the flag of the Iranian regime. I stress there are two flags. People will have known that. Now there's the old predecessor Khomeini flag of Iran, associated some people with, you know, Persia and the Shanton. And then there's the flag that's very much of this regime. And here's the deputy leader of the Green Party standing at a rally surrounded by those flags. And so what does that, you know, how, how does that message land when Jews are going through seeing, you know, buildings where there's bricks, through windows, there's bricks, blood red graffiti. That's, that's what had happened when I wrote the column. And then 24 hours later, 36 hours later, it's four ambulances set on fire. There's Just this sort of, you know, and I see it myself in the social media reaction when I write a column like this. Straight away, you know, I've, I've detailed only the antisemitism, but straight away, people have to come back and start saying to me all the things that Israel is doing that are bad, as if, you know, I'm not aware of them, as if I don't talk about them. But, sorry, what's the connection exactly, between four ambulances in Golda's Green? Why does it in any way soften the wrongness of that, reduce the iniquity of that? If Israel did X or Y in the west bank or in Lebanon and so on, and then others say, ah, but Netanyahu all the time says he's acting in the name of all Jews. Israel acts in the name of the Jewish people. All right, if you disagree with them on that, it doesn't mean that you then and have to say, I'm going to hold all Jewish people accountable for whatever is enraging you in the Middle East. So people looking straight away for some kind of mitigation, some sort of exculpation somehow to try and reduce, rather than just saying, this is awful, we've got to oppose it. And there are people who are allies, you know, and a former Labour Cabinet minister responded to my column and said, I'm very moved by your column and I'm going to post it on social media. Can you remind me of your handle on X? Because I highly hardly use X now. So I told him a few hours later, oh, my God, the responses I've had for supporting you. The responses I've had. Unbelievable. Because. And I said, now you know why I don't go on X very often? Because. Because I'm very, very aware of that and I know that's what happens all the time. So in a way, I'm afraid people have got more used to that. They've got more resigned to the idea that the historic movements of ally of allies, you know, they're not really there right now because they just can't see past their. I'm being. This is the charitable reading. They can't see past their anger at Israel and therefore anything to even remotely linked. It's sort of fair game. And that's the benign reading. The, the less benign reading, extremely charitable reading. Be worse. Yeah, it would. It is.
- [42:30]
C
Well, sadly, I think it's safe to say we will be returning to this topic.
- [42:35]
A
Yes. You think, as Aaron Sorkin would say. I think so too. I think it's very likely. For now though, we should introduce our guest. We wanted obviously to talk about the war that is four weeks in and to do that with somebody who has absolutely been in the room where those decisions get taken, who knows this, these dilemmas and this sort of situation very, very close up.
- [43:02]
C
Jake Sullivan was National Security Advisor to President Biden. He held top positions at the State Department and the Obama White House and played a key role in negotiating the Iran deal of 2016. Today he is the Kissinger professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order at the Harvard Kennedy School and importantly, the co host of a podcast. I highly recommend you listen to the Long Game with John Finer. Jake, welcome back to Unholy.
- [43:25]
B
Thanks for having me. Once again. It was great to be on before and I'm, I'm, I'm glad to be back.
- [43:31]
C
You know, we obviously are talking on the cusp of quite turbulent four weeks which look different from the US and from Israel and from, from the UK but at this moment in time, if you'd have to, I don't know, think of, analyze, guess where we are heading. Is it to in fact a deal or an intensifying of this war?
- [43:56]
B
Wow. That is the billion, maybe the trillion dollar question in a way. And frankly, I'm not even sure that the main protagonists have an answer to it, let alone those of us sitting on the outside who are trying to speculate as to what they may do. I think basically President Trump has put himself at an intersection and has given himself options. One option would be to take an off ramp to declare victory and essentially to say the deed is done. We've degraded Iran's capabilities, we've set them back. We're going to somehow, by hook or by crook, get an agreement where Iran allows the strait to reopen and we'll move on. That, I do believe is a possibility. Now Iran has a vote in that as well, which we can talk about. But he has also set himself up with the physical capability, including the movement of U.S. forces to the region, to be able to escalate this conflict by initiating a ground operation of some kind, whether that's an operation on an island, whether Kharg island or another island off the coast of Iran in the Persian Gulf, or whether it's on the Iranian mainland, up to and including a special forces assault on one of the nuclear facilities to try to resolve the nuclear material. So he's put himself at this intersection. I think he's testing what Iran is prepared to do in the way of a, a diplomatic deal that may be more indirect than direct in terms of how it ends up playing out. And I think the coming days, honestly even the coming hours, will be critical to determine which direction he takes off of this intersection. And my guess is he's hearing from senior officials in the Israeli government that now is not the time to stop. He's also hearing that from some senior people in the Gulf, particularly in the uae. But he's gotta be hearing from some voices inside the Trump White House saying the risks and consequences of going deeper into this thing outweigh whatever benefits, you may think. So a lot swirling in his mind, and I think he hasn't made a decision.
- [45:58]
A
I'd be fascinated to know which of those two camps you would be in if you were advising this president, you've advised a president, but if you. Would you be saying, finish the job, or would you be saying, time to take the off ramp. But let's say clearly you were one of those advocating the off ramp scenario. Has Donald Trump made the right moves to make that possible? I'm just thinking of something you told us when you were with us earlier, where you said your impression of Trump was that you liked peace and he liked deals, and has he put himself in the right place to get a peace deal?
- [46:34]
B
Look, a lot has changed since the last time I came on this podcast, and the single biggest thing that has changed is Donald Trump. Trump has decided that the application of American military power is an intoxicating thing that can generate quick results with relatively little cost. And first, that was true with respect to the 12 day war last year. From his perspective, and if you recall going back to the beginning of that 12 day war, in the early days of it, the White House was quite standing standoffish about the Israeli military operation, sort of saying, this is Israel, it's not us, kind of waiting to see how it would all play. He was still, I think, at that point, more in the deal and peace phase of his second term. Then as he saw that operation meeting with some degree of operational success, he thought, oh, I can actually come in, hit four, do and finish the job and then call it. And that's how it played out. This, I think, gave him the confidence to then execute the Maduro operation, a very high risk operation that, from his perspective, also worked out okay. And then the appetite grew with the eating. And I think he thought at that point, hey, we can go back at Iran and they aren't going to fight back very hard because they've been so badly weakened. And I can rather rapidly and decisively achieve some set of operational objectives and then declare victory. And it has not turned out that way this time around. So I think he is stuck here, and he is stuck in a circumstance in which the objectives at the start of the war, which have never been entirely clear, but certainly seem to include some form of rapid regime change, have not borne out where Iran has retained some baseline capability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has retained some baseline nuclear capacity to reconstitute its program if the war were to end today, and where the options to try to resolve all of that are not great. So I think this is why President Trump's in a difficult position, because declaring victory after a few days may have been pretty straightforward. Declaring victory now in the very complex environment we find ourselves in is much more challenging. And yet in the range of imperfect choices, I think it is a better choice, from my perspective, than upping the ante by putting US Forces on the ground into combat against Iran with uncertain objectives, uncertain results, and a real risk of a loss of life that could only drag us deeper into this thing as it goes forward.
- [49:07]
C
If there is, and it's a big if. But if the stockpile of enriched uranium is somehow destroyed, taken out, whatever the outcome is, first of all, what are the chances that happens, in your opinion? And would that be an outcome that would allow this president to say victory?
- [49:25]
B
Look, President Trump, at the end of the day, thinks of these things in terms of production value. And the production value of an operation that disposed of in whatever way the enriched uranium under Isfahan would give him a better narrative on the nuclear program than he would otherwise have. But there's some huge open questions on that, Yonit. Number one, is all of that material at Isfahan or is some of it elsewhere? Number two, even if you got all of the 60% enriched uranium, does Iran still have access to some of the leu, or has all that been destroyed? We don't know the answer to that question either. And the answer to those two questions are critical for determining whether or not such an operation would actually truly set back the Iran nuclear program in a massive way. And since there isn't a clear or easy way to get answers to those questions, all of this would remain somewhat murky and in doubt even if the war ended at that point. So I can see the appeal of him wanting to go do that. But think about what his military advisors will be telling him in the context of that operation. They'll be telling him first, this is highly risky because it's going to take Time. It's going to take a large number of forces on the ground and.
- [50:44]
C
Sorry, this is the preliminary alert for Israelis. We've been hearing this a lot. Now I'll have to leave our. Sorry about this. You need a conversation. You need if there's a siren. For now, there isn't, but that's just the alert that there might be.
- [50:58]
B
You never have to apologize for something like that. Okay. I mean, we know that. I think one of you said at the beginning the war looks different from Israel than it looks from the United States or Britain. And this is a way in which that is absolutely, absolutely true.
- [51:11]
C
This is true. I can continue until there's a siren.
- [51:14]
B
So, yeah, so I was just saying that his military advisors are gonna be telling him this is risky just on the face of it, from the point of view of exposing our forces, whether it's us alone or US and Israel on the ground. It's also risky in terms of the actual technical specifications of trying to dispose of this material. It's stored in these casks. It has to be gotten at in some kind of underground tunnel or chamber, and then it either has to be extracted or neutralized. None of that is straightforward. So I think the risks associated with such an operation are very real and the benefits are there, but they are somewhat speculative because there's so much uncertainty about whether this actually would resolve the problem or not. And I think that's the kind of. Of weighing that the president has to be going through right now about whether he would authorize such an operation.
- [52:11]
C
You know, I'm thinking, Jake, to the fact that we had Amos Arel, the military analyst of ours, a good friend of our podcast on, and he said, I can hold two thoughts in my head at the same time, that I don't trust the leaders making the decision. But I think the decision to go to war with Iran was justified. Israelis support this war. They see the unbelievable ballistic arsenal that Iran is shooting at civilians, targets. Obviously you're not a supporter of this president, but could this have been the right decision made at the right time, even as critical as we are, the way that it is run. But when this is a country that makes its threat to Israel, to the United States so clear, when this is the arsenal they have, couldn't have been a justified decision.
- [52:57]
B
I do not believe it was a sound decision to start this war now. I do not. Number one, I have yet to hear at least an American official state plainly what the purpose and objective of the war is. I've heard seven or eight different explanations Shifting explanations ranging from Secretary Rubio saying, well, if we didn't do it, Israel was going to do it, so we had to do it. Two discussions of regime change, two discussions of the nuclear program, two discussions of the ballistic missile program, and so forth. So it is hard to know what you're doing if you don't know why you're doing it. And I don't think the United States of America, and I'm not going to speak for Israel, had a clear answer to that question. And that to me is just not a sound basis upon which to proceed. Number two, from the US Perspective, and again, I'm not going to speak for Israel, I believe you cannot go to war without an imminent threat unless you get the support of the Congress. And we had every opportunity, this administration had every opportunity to go get an authorization from Congress and through that, the informed consent of the American people and chose not to do it. And I don't think that that is right or justified either. And then, number three, it strikes me that a big part of the reason that Israel and the United States ultimately decided to go to war is they genuinely believe that there could be the possibility of a rapid collapse of this regime. And I don't think that was based on sound analysis either. And when you add all of those things up, I think it puts us in a tough spot. Now, I will make one further point and it kind of goes to the arc of this from 24 to the 12 day war to today. I think there were a lot of people in the Trump White House and around Prime Minister Netanyahu who essentially talked themselves into the idea that Iran was a total paper tiger, that we had been wrong for all these years to be worried about a big massive attack against Iran because Iran wouldn't fight back or couldn't fight back, and that we kind of had total freedom of action to go do what we needed to do. And I think that was wrong. And we are seeing that the consequences of that wrong analysis in that Iran has been able to effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz. Now, from Israel's perspective, a weakened, destabilized Iran that's holding the strait at risk is probably not as significant a strategic issue as it is for the United States of America, which has global responsibilities, exposure to the consequences of the closure of the Strait in really profound ways, as does its far flung network of alliances around the world. And so for all of these reasons, I think it did not make sense. And I still haven't heard a good answer to the question, even if the war ends. Even if you get the heu, even if blank, blank, blank at the end of it, Iran is not going anywhere. It does not appear that you are going to have a benign regime in place at the end of this thing. And therefore, its incentive to ultimately seek nuclear weapons, its incentive to try to build up its missile and military capabilities in the future, is going to be quite significant. And the only real answer to that is, well, we'll just keep hitting them. I think the phrase is mow the lawn, which is basically a recipe for indefinite war against Iran without a real kind of sense of what a strategic endgame looks like. So my read on this, based on that kind of social, sober calculus, is that it was not a wise decision for the United States of America to go to war at this time. Israel has its own calculus, has its own risk appetite, has its own cost benefit analysis that is not the same as the United States's and that I can't speak to well just on that.
- [56:52]
A
I mean, my starting point is the same as yours. I'm a skeptic of this war and have been from the start. But the question that is thrown back is, well, what would you then do about containing this regime that clearly has hostile intent, eliminationist intent towards Israel and a serious arsenal? They put that to me as a hypothetical, but to you it was a real question. You were sitting there in the White House and I take your point about the difference between the United States calculus and the Israeli calculus. But in a way, just as an advisor, what would anyone concerned about Israel's safety agrees with you that, that doing this kind of doing it this way was wrong. What is or was the right way to somehow deal with this clearly malign actor on the world stage?
- [57:35]
B
So when we left office In January of 2025, it's kind of crazy to think it's less. You know, it's just a little more than a year ago. It feels like at this point, it was a lifetime ago. Iran was at that point at its weakest point since the 1980s, perhaps since the revolution, and got even weaker after the 12 Day War. Now, you can take that in two directions. One Direction is, well, they're weak. Let's just keep hitting them militarily. The second option is we actually have a lot of leverage to drive a hard bargain to get a good deal when it comes to the nuclear program. Now, I do not believe that Iran is gonna surrender its ballistic missile capabilities through diplomacy. I just, I don't think that's viable. I do think that we could have put their nuclear program in a box for the long term through negotiations over the course of the past year. Now, we tried in the Biden administration to get back to nuclear diplomacy. We got close a couple times, never quite got there. One of the big reasons why is the Iranians were sitting there thinking, wait a second, we had a Democrat do a deal, then we had a Republican come along and pull out of it. If you do a deal, why won't your successor just pull out of it? That is not a challenge Donald Trump faced. Donald Trump was the guy who pulled out of the deal. If he had done a deal with Iran, I think Iran would have done it and would have done it even as recently as a few weeks ago. Would it mean that they entirely surrendered their right to enrich uranium as they see it, their so called right to enrich uranium under the npt? I don't think so. Would it have meant that we could have had a verifiable lid on Iran's nuclear program for the long term? Yes. And that to me is the single most significant thing that we could have achieved to make sure Iran is not an existential threat to Israel, the United States or anybody else. Now, when it comes to the missile program, Israel spent close to two weeks last year taking out a huge amount of Iranian ballistic missile capability. Iran spent months building it back so that within less than a year, Iran was in a position to say, we've got a bunch of ballistic missiles that we are currently firing. And I think that should be a lesson to us that, that you cannot simply deal with a missile program solely by saying we're going to go bomb every missile every time one gets built. Because that is a recipe for endless war. You deal with it through effective deterrence. And here the United States and Israel have shown that they can hold Iran at risk in terms of its air defense and air supremacy over Iran at any point. And the US And Israel have also shown that they can defend effectively against Iranian ballistic missile attacks in joint operations. And so my view is that you design an effective deterrence strategy which keeps the threat of force on the table as necessary, but does not immediately move to the military option. Because I think it is a recipe for basically perpetual conflict in the region with all of the attendant consequences. So that's what I would do. I'd do a nuclear deal and then I would work to have a sophisticated strategy of deterrence of Iran when it comes to their conventional military capabilities as they threaten the rest of the world. And I'd keep putting pressure on the proxies, as Israel has done over the course of the last couple of years. But again, here too, an idea that you're going to fully resolve all of the proxy issues through some kind of surrender from Iran, I think has been a fanciful notion. And that is going to also have to be an ongoing aspect of statecraft and strategy by the US and Israel on a going forward basis.
- [61:14]
C
Which leads us to the Lebanon question, which obviously has flared up as well, not surprisingly. I think what was surprising for the Israeli public was the fact that it was told that Hezbollah was weakened. We have completely overrun them and they still pack a punch. And I wonder if you think that, that in that regard this will end in a deal. It's in parentheses, more complicated for the Israeli Prime Minister in an election year to do that. But is that also heading after this round to some, you think it should end with another deal similar to the deal that the Biden administrat administration reached in November of 24?
- [61:53]
B
I do. I think that is a superior alternative to what is being floated, which I think is completely beyond the pale of Israel basically conquering Lebanese territory and saying this is now ours. I do not think that is an acceptable outcome.
- [62:11]
C
I don't think the majority of Israelis think that either.
- [62:13]
B
Right. Right now. Okay, so let's start with that stipulation. At that point, I think ultimately you need the capacity to hold at risk the threat coming from the north and be able to exercise through military operations the capacity to take out imminent threats as they arise. But you ultimately also need a deal, you need a ceasefire that can hold. And you need over time, as frustrating as it is and as slow as it is, to try to build up the capability of the Lebanese state to handle this challenge. And I think there were movements in that direction that actually have been quite disrupted by the launch of this war and Hezbollah's decision to get into it. It has become more complicated rather than less complicated for actors in Lebanon who also would prefer not to have Hezbollah have this kind of stranglehold, to have freedom of maneuver to put pressure on Hezbollah. So yes, my view is we've got to get back to some kind of deal there, as imperfect and uncertain as that is is. And that would never take away the capacity for Israel to make decisions in its own self defense against imminent threats emanating from Hezbollah or from across that contested border with Lebanon. But it would say there is not just a purely military solution to this challenge. It has to require ultimately the blending of the military action we have seen with some kind of strategy that results in a durable deal.
- [63:45]
A
And it sounds like you are there joining those critics, including internal critics inside Israel, who believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu's big failing is that he has only focused on the military answers to Israel's long term problems, rather than blending political and military or using military advantage to leverage then a political solution. But I just wanted to ask you about the regional picture and whether two things could be true at once, which is on the one hand, Gulf states are telling we read Donald Trump to finish the job, you know, MBS in Saudi Arabia apparently sending that message to Washington. And on the other, they are thinking that once this is over, they will, as one diplomat put it this week, have to diversify, meaning they will have to pivot away from their relationships with the US And Israel and instead start looking at other alliances, including most centrally, China. Some people are thinking it's one or the other that the UAE and the Gulf states are all in on this war. And some are saying no, they're backing off, thinking this war only brings us trouble. I just wonder if both things are true at once. What do you think?
- [64:54]
B
Both things can be true at once. But just imagine sitting here in the United States of America if you're being told on the one hand you gotta go take all the risk to finish the job and clear, including putting US Men and women at risk to do it. And number two, when it's over, we're going to diversify and go off to your biggest strategic competitor. Not a great bargain for the United States of America, I must say. Okay. So from my perspective, the argument finish the job is only credible if you can fill in the of where we are today and what the finished job looks like. I just don't see exactly what that is. And so I get if you're sitting there in the UAE or Saudi Arabia, I fully understand their perspective. Having a wounded Iran emerge from this, having proven it can hold this trade of Hormuz at risk, not great that they'll be able to apply various forms of pressure and coercion on those Gulf states going forward, they don't like that. So I get their impulse to say finish the job. But when you're the actual actor who has to undertake take the military operations or the blend of military and other operations to do that, that's a whole different kettle of fish in terms of diversification. I'm not sure I fully understand. I get also the impulse of, well, we got a hedge and balance and so forth. I think that's happening a lot in the world right now, by the way, this is the wages of, in my view, the way the current administration is practicing its foreign policy, it is leading many countries in many places to say, fundamentally, the US Is as much a disruptive actor as a stabilizing actor. And therefore, we need to balance and counteract American power and American influence by deepening our relationships with other players. We contended with this to a certain extent in the Biden administration. We saw certain countries in the region looking to deepen, for example, their military relationships with China. And we pushed back against that and said, if you want to have a deep military relationship with the United States or a deep tech relationship with the United States, you can't have it both ways. I will be very interested to see if one, two, three years from now the wages of all of this are these countries actually shifting more in China's direction, which would be quite ironic given that it's the US that's putting all the skin in the game right now to defend them and to deal with a big threat that sits across the Gulf from them.
- [67:20]
C
Since we are zooming out a little bit and trying to see what the effects of this. And again, we don't know how this. So the jury's still out, right? I mean, the Iranian regime just needs to survive. The United States and Israel actually need to win the war. So we don't know where we are right now. We mentioned China, so let's go on that. China's looking at this and thinking what to themselves, when they see the American power, what are they thinking?
- [67:42]
B
I think they're thinking three things. First, they're thinking, the United States of America is risk accepting, militarily capable, and wow, that's actually kind of impressive operationally. I do think that. I think they have to look at it and say, okay, there's a strategic competitor, a potential future adversary that knows how to achieve tactical military objectives and is prepared to go for it. Number two, they're thinking, hey, this is pretty cool. We were making our biggest strategic gains when the United States was tied down in war in the Middle east for all those years in Iraq and Afghanistan, in they were finally moving to elevate emphasis on the Indo Pacific and on competition with us. And now look at this. It's like the Godfather. Just when you think you're out, you get pulled back in. We're back in the Middle east in a big way. I think from China's perspective, that's all to the good. And then there's a third thing, which I'm not totally sure, about. But I think Xi Jinping is looking at this and saying, huh? Donald Trump is out saying that since 1979, Iran has been a big problem for America. And I'm finally the guy to deal with it. 47 years. I'm finally the guy to deal with it. Well, something else happened in 1979. 1979 was the year that the United States shifted its recognition from Taipei to Beijing. So for 47 years, this problem of Taiwan, from Beijing's perspective, has sat there in the US Relationship with Taiwan. So maybe Xi Jinping is thinking, okay, I get it, you got a problem for 47 years. The way to deal with it is bold military action. And the rest of the world will kind of maybe not be thrilled about it, but we'll let it happen. Is it possible that this actually increases the chances over the next few years that China makes a move on Taiwan? I think the jury's out on that. But it's a question that is well worth asking.
- [69:47]
A
It's that precedent, actually, which is worrying a whole lot of people further afield. I'm sitting here, obviously, in Europe, where people are calling this operation epic fail. Jonit's point is right. We don't know yet. It could turn out to be a great success. And people will say four weeks in was the wrong time to judge it. Fine. But right now, given, and you've made it clear, you question the soundness of this decision, but would you advise European nations, even with those misgivings, to join this war? Because they absolutely rely on still the US for their security and they need to keep on side with this administration. Should they bite their tongue, put aside their worries, and join in for their own strategic interests long term.
- [70:31]
B
When you say join in, do you mean like actually join the offense, military operations against Iran, or.
- [70:38]
A
That's what Donald Trump would like, that he would like them to send naval capacity.
- [70:42]
B
Right, this straight up, Hormuzz, he's got
- [70:44]
A
a whole menu of requests which changes day by day. But they're not all in at the moment. They're really keeping back because they think this being unfolded here, but maybe they should make a different strategic decision for their own sake.
- [70:57]
B
Look, I'm skeptical of the idea that of going and telling a European leader, hey, you don't think this war is a good idea, but join it anyway just because you rely on the US I don't love this. That. What I do think, though, is if you're sitting there as a European leader, you can have deep misgivings about the war and also think the idea of Iran as a hostile actor playing this leverage roll over a choke point of the global economy is problematic. And we need to come up with some kind of strategy to think about the Strait of Hormuz for the long term term, where we don't feel it can be held hostage at any given moment for any given reason, and basically try to develop some strategy, whether it's part diplomatic, maybe it involves some display of naval capability from Europe. I'm not sure exactly what it would look like, but I would say I would think of that as running in parallel to what is happening with the US Israeli military operation. Be thinking we should take a role here in trying to ultimately say, however things play out in this conflict, Europe has a stake in the long term viability of open and free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and we're going to do whatever we can to help bring about a more stable future. That's where I would be putting my energy if I was in Europe, but I would not be prepared to pay the protection racket of, of, hey, nice NATO you have there. If you want to keep it, you better start dropping bombs in Iran. I think that's a mug's game from the point of view of Europe.
- [72:35]
C
I mean, there's so much more to talk about, I think, Jake. But I would want to say something about your podcast, if I may, the Long Game, which I am a fan of. You know this. I want to explain why it's so good. It's a serious podcast with serious people. Obviously you, John Finer, people who sat in the classified meetings and briefings day in and day out and can really sort of pull back the curtain and tell the listeners what goes on in these conversations. And I guess first of all, I'm recommending all of our listeners listen to it. And I think in a world in which everything is seen in this country through the lens of good for Netanyahu or not, in your country seen through the lens of good for Trump or not, you always have this really serious and insightful debate and I was walk away from the episodes learning something. I'm asking you all this to say, I mean, you were in those rooms where it happened. The life of a podcaster to round out our conversation. Do you like it?
- [73:35]
B
Actually, I find it quite enjoyable. It's fun because you really get to think through all sides of an argument. We have this segment we call Red Team, Blue Team, where we actually will debate both sides of a given issue, sometimes as American policymakers, sometimes as Iranian policymakers, like who's making which case to the supreme leader. And it's fun to kind of work through all that without the actual responsibility of having to own the consequences of what we are saying. On the other hand, there is something, I don't even quite know how to put it, that's just. It kind of keeps me vibrating, like somehow I should be doing something about what's happening in the world, but I don't really have any control over it. And my whole nervous system is not entirely reset. So I still feel a lot of the stress of the old job, even though it doesn't really translate into me having any capacity to influence the events as they're unfolding. So it's a little bit of a mixed bag, but. But we're having a lot of fun. It's a little more nerve wracking than I thought to actually host. I was saying this before we got on that. I used to think hosting was so easy. You just ask the questions and the guest is the one that's having the difficult task of answering them. But actually asking questions is hard. Coming up with a way to guide a conversation so that listeners are actually really learning something. So you're drawing the best out of your guest. This is a real skill and I feel like I'm on the, the learning curve on that. But it'll take me quite a while to actually be really good at it.
- [75:08]
C
I think you hit the ground running, but that's just my opinion.
- [75:12]
A
But the vibration thing, I heard that from so many people who've been in government that they're still thinking, they're still preparing the briefs at 5am and then somebody tells them you're not doing that anymore. But no, I completely get it.
- [75:25]
B
Just one point on that, Jonathan. So I was skiing the day that the war broke out. I was on the, you know, I went out on the ski slopes that day and I was totally distracted the whole day. I couldn't have a fun day skiing because I was so focused on, okay, you know, what are the permutations, what's all gonna happen. It's like, wait a second, what? Nobody's asking me, so why can't I just have fun skiing? But of course, I just, I couldn't because my wiring was still set on, you know, your head's gotta be in the game for the outbreak of these hostilities. It's a funny, funny. It's a funny dynamic. And hopefully that wiring will get reset here at some point along the way.
- [76:02]
A
Well, you say, nobody's asking you, we're asking you. And we're very, very glad we did. That was hugely insightful. We learned a lot from it. Jake Sullivan, thanks so much for talking to us on Unholy.
- [76:14]
B
Thank you guys for having me.
- [76:19]
A
It is time for our awards. Shall I get going first with a chutzpah nomination?
- [76:26]
C
Knock herself out.
- [76:27]
A
It relates, actually I will. It relates to the story we talked about, actually, the terrible attack on those Hatzola ambulances. A chutzpah nomination for a politician in this country, a mayoral candidate. Chris Parry, a candidate of the Reform UK Party, that's the nationalist populist party in this country, led by Nigel Farage. He was talking about a group called Shomrim, which actually is a sort of volunteer group who act as. As security guards. As guards, as the name suggests, in often ultra Orthodox Jewish neighborhoods. They work alongside Hatsola, the group who run those four charity ambulances that were targeted in an anti Semitic attack. Just again, part of the landscape in Jewish areas. This politician described them as cosplayers and then in a really bizarre reference, he likened them to Islamists on horseback. I don't think anyone got the reference difference there at all. But the point is he was slagging off, slating a group of people, volunteers who protect their community against hatred and racism. Chris Parry, who was once a rear admiral in a previous life, then stepped down after his remarks had got a wider hearing. He had said on social media, remember, these cosplayers have no more jurisdiction or legal authority than ordinary citizens. They're a community organization, not a legal entity. It's the same with Islamists on horseback. But if it offends you, I'll remove it. Anyway, he's out. He was a mayoral candidate in the area of Hampshire and the Solent and he apologized for his clumsily worded post. That was for an earlier post. Anyway, he's gone. A chutzpah award for him.
- [77:59]
C
Well, Mensch, I think this week will also be in your territory, but I think we, you know, in light of our conversation earlier in the show about antisemitism, we can't not give the Mensch Award of the Week to King Charles ii, third King of Great Britain, Northern Ireland and other realms and commonwealth. But I think he deserves this award because he this week accepted the role of patron of the cst. You explained what the CST is essentially important security organization for the Jewish community. In the announcement he said that his, you know, the monarch's long standing commitment to promoting tolerance, inclusion and interfaith understanding. I think we talked a few times, times on this podcast of him being a true friend to the Jewish community in the UK and thus actually true friend to the Jewish community all around the world. I think that is who I would want to give the Mensch Award to this week. I don't think you'd argue he has
- [78:55]
A
had many awards and decorations in his life. He is the bearer of many titles. But I'm sure it will bring him extra pride to know that he is officially Unholy's own Mensch of the Week.
- [79:08]
C
We have he and a Mensch that is something to be in this life.
- [79:11]
A
I think he might put it the other way around. It's. It's, you know, Mensch comes first in my book. So. Yes. So we are at the end of our show. Mention again. If you've stayed with us till now. It really does help either way if you rate and review us. If you're watching this on YouTube, do it there. It just helps gets the show to more people, especially if it's a generous review. We do like that it's a rate review, etc. And of course subscribe. And we have our thank yous.
- [79:37]
C
A huge thank you to Michal Porat this week and all weeks and we shall see each other soon. Jonathan.
- [79:43]
A
See you then.