Transcript
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On today's episode, I'm joined by Rob Arnott. Rob is the founder and chairman of the Board of Research Affiliates. Over his career, Rob has endeavored to bridge the worlds of academic theorists and financial markets. During that journey, he's pioneered several unconventional portfolio strategies that are now widely applied in the investment industry as over $156 billion are invested in strategies that were developed by his firm. Most notably, he developed what's known as the Fundamental Index, also known as Rafi, which weights companies on business fundamentals rather than market capitalization. Over the past 20 years, the fundamental index strategy has exceeded the return of the S&P 500 by 2% per year, with the Magnificent Seven now comprising 33% of the S&P 500. I'm always looking for sound investment strategies that don't rely on the continued outperformance of just a few of the market's biggest names. During this episode, Rob and I cover the source of the Fundamental Index's outperformance, how to calculate the equity risk premium, why short term forecasts are impossible to project accurately, but long term forecasts are not where Rob believes we're at in the value cycle, the next strategy and why companies that get removed from an index tend to outperform those that get added, and so much more. With that, I bring you today's episode with Rob Arnott.
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Since 2014 and through more than 180 million downloads, we've studied the financial markets and read the books that influence self made billionaires the most. We keep you informed and prepared for the unexpected. Now for your host, Clay Fink.
Clay Fink (1:47)
Welcome to the Investors Podcast.
Clay Fink (1:49)
I'm your host, Clay Fink and today I'm happy to welcome Rob Arnott. So Rob, thanks so much for taking the time to join us today. I really appreciate it.
Rob Arnott (1:58)
Thanks for the invitation. Looking forward to this.
Clay Fink (2:01)
So you pioneered what's referred to as the Fundamental index, which has been this really unique approach to indexing that adds alpha by really adding more of a value tilt to it is the way I see it. So how about you talk about what the fundamental index is and how it's performed since you launched the strategy?
Rob Arnott (2:22)
Sure. The genesis for the strategy was the aftermath of the dot com bubble. A dear friend of mine who ran a company called the Common Fund that managed Commingle University Endowments. He also served on the New York State Pension Board and several other boards and he was just beside himself. He was very distressed because money was pouring into index funds and index Funds had a 4% position in Cisco at a time when Cisco was a tiny company and that subsequently went down 90%. You had the whole dot com suite of companies down. Well, Nasdaq was down 80% in that bear market. And so it was the crash of the dot com bubble. He came to me and he said, there's got to be a better way. I had long thought that indexing by market cap is a great way to match the market because the market is cap weighted. But on one level, a not so clever way to invest because any stock that's overvalued relative to its future prospects is going to be overweight in the portfolio relative to a fair value weight. Any stock that's undervalued, destined to outperform, is going to be underweight because you're tying the weight to the price. Now, indexers have heard that criticism since the launch of the S and p back in 1957, and they always had a ready retort to that. They said, of course we overweight the overvalued and underweight the undervalued. But unless you can tell me which is which, you haven't said anything useful. Well, it turns out that acknowledging that you're overweight the overvalued mended weight the undervalued and doing so because you're tying the weight to the price. If the price doubles, your weight doubles. There's a missed opportunity there. One of the originators of the capital asset pricing model, Jack Treanor, he was a dear friend, wrote a paper in the Financial Analyst Journal why valuation in different indexes work, and it was inspired by fundamental index. He pointed out that you don't know if stocks are over or undervalued. Fair enough. But you do know that some are overvalued and some are undervalued. You do know that with cap weighting, you're overweight the overvalued and underweight the undervalued. Take any other weighting scheme. If it ignores price, if it ignores market cap, a stock that's undervalued might be over or underweight, and the result is that the errors cancel instead of magnifying. And he also pointed out that the price action of a stock stocks can come into favor. And if the fundamentals don't match the price appreciation, then watch out. There could be mean reversion. The market's constantly changing its mind on what a company's worth. So a stable anchor like the size of its business will lead to a rebalancing alpha. And that's the cool part, it does have a value tilt. Growth stocks are deemphasized down to their economic footprint. Value stocks are re emphasized up to theirs. I mean, Chevron's a huge company, but it's not huge. Market cap Nvidia is a big company, but it's not an enormous company. And it's priced as if it's truly spectacularly enormous. Current pricing is about 30 times sales. Scott McNally from Sun Microsystems back in 2002 was questioned by Congress about his stock having cratered. And his comment was we were priced at over 10 times sales. If business is steady, that means we have to deliver 100% of the total revenues of the company in dividends to shareholders over the next 10 years to justify the price. And that assumes that the company has no expenses, that the shareholders are paying, no taxes. He said it's preposterous for a company to be 10 times sales. What were the investors thinking? And he was actually vocal in 99 and 2000 that his stock was way overpriced. Currently you have Nvidia at 30 times sales. Is that justified if it's got stupendous growth over the coming decade? If 10 years from now it's going to be 30 times its current size, then maybe. But absent that, it does make sense to weight it lower. So with Fundamental Index, an idea I'd been playing with for in the back of my mind for at least a decade was why not weight companies by their sales? Why not weight them by their book value? And so we tested a whole array of measures. Sales, profits, cash flow, EBITDA, book value, dividends, number of employees. Where McDonald's would be one of your largest holdings, it didn't matter which measure you used. We found it added about 2% per annum. It did introduce a value tilt because if you're weighting companies on their fundamental size, you're de emphasizing growth, you're reemphasizing value. Now these are better companies for sure, but it's in the price. The market's already priced in the quality of the business. And unless it exceeds lofty expectations, it's not going to help you. The value stocks, troubled companies with headwinds. It's not going to hurt you unless it underperforms bleak expectations. So it does have a value tilt. And the result is that when you compare it with the cap weighted market, Fundamental Index wins over long periods of time by about 2% a year. If you compare it with value indexes that are cap weighted, you get the same drag from the cap Weighted version. And so relative to value indexes, we find that the outperformance is relentless. In the US in the last 17 years, Rafi would have beat the Russell value index 14 out of 17 times. The global index against MSCI acqui. Value outperforms in 15 out of 17 years. I mean, that's astonishing consistency. And it all comes about not because of the value tilt. The value tilt is a consequence of fundamental weighting. And yes, value does have a little bit of an alpha, but the big alpha comes from rebalancing, from concentrating against the market's constantly changing opinions.
