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On today's episode, we'll be exploring the book Thinking Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. Kahneman is a Nobel Prize winning psychologist whose research helped shape the field of behavioral economics and transformed how we understand decision making. At the center of the book is the idea that our minds operate through two systems. One is fast, intuitive and automatic, and the other is slow, deliberate and analytical. Most of the time we rely on the first far more than we realize, even when the stakes are at their highest. For investors, this matters deeply. Many of the biggest mistakes in markets are not driven by a lack of information, but by cognitive biases like loss aversion, overconfidence, and our tendency to not think hard about the difficult but important questions. In this episode, we'll break down several of Kahneman's most important insights and connect them directly to investing. And at the end of the episode, I'll share some of my thoughts around the recent sell off of software companies and more recent news related to Constellation Software. So with that, I hope you enjoy today's episode.
Clay Fink (1:14)
Since 2014 and through more than 190 million downloads, we break down the principles of value investing and sit down with some of the world's best asset managers. We uncover potential opportunities in the market and explore the intersection between between money, happiness, and the art of living a good life. This show is not investment advice. It's intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. All opinions expressed by hosts and guests are solely their own and they may have investments in the securities discussed. Now for your host, Clay Fink.
Clay Fink (1:56)
Hey everybody, welcome back to the Investors Podcast. I'm your host, Clay Fink. On today's episode, I'll be discussing Daniel Kahneman's book Thinking Fast and Slow. This book is a masterclass in explaining the inherent biases that we all have as humans, as it was based on decades of experimental psychology research, much of which was conducted by Kahneman and Amos Tversky. In their research, they relied on controlled experiments that tested how people make judgments and under uncertainty using simple problems and decision scenarios. And these experiments revealed systematic and repeatable errors in human reasoning rather than just random mistakes. Daniel Kahneman has a Nobel Prize in Economics and has popularized several ideas on the subject of behavioral finance, such as loss aversion, overconfidence and cognitive biases. And although the book is not tailored to be read by just stock investors, I feel as if it was written just for us. So Warren Buffett once stated, success in investing does not correlate with iq. Once you have ordinary intelligence what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing. That might be a shocking statement to some, especially since Warren Buffett is probably one of the most intelligent investors to have ever lived. To help illustrate this quote, I'd like to tell a story about Buffett. Each summer, the boutique investment bank Allen Co. They hosted a week long conference in Sun Valley, Idaho. It might be a stretch to call it a conference. It's probably more like an extravaganza with these lavish parties and a lot of fun activities included. The event features Hollywood celebrities, Silicon Valley's most well known entrepreneurs, and names that everybody would know. In Alice Schroeder's excellent biography, the Snowball, she told the story of how Buffett got invited to this party in July of 1999. Buffett actually attended the event each year and brought his entire family as it was a beautiful area and a good opportunity for him to catch up with a lot of old friends. But in 1999, the mood was different. It was the height of the tech bubble and there were new faces at the table, such as heads of technology companies that had grown rich and powerful almost overnight. And then you had venture capitalists there too. Buffett, on the other hand, was this old school investor who just didn't get caught up in the speculative frenzy around companies with unclear earnings prospects. Some dismissed him as a relic of the past, but Buffett was still powerful enough to give the keynote address on the final day of the conference. During his speech, he would quickly become one of the least popular people in the room as he explained in great detail why the tech fueled bull market would not last. He studied the data and the warning signs and considered what they might lead to. This was the first public forecast that Buffett had made in probably 30 years. At this point, and to some, Buffett was just spoiling the party. He received a standing ovation after the speech, but in private, his ideas were dismissed, claiming that he had missed the boat. This speech of Buffett's would be kept under wraps and wouldn't be revealed until a year later, after the dot com bubble had burst, just as he said it would. Buffett takes pride not only in his track record, but also in following his own inner scorecard. He divides the world into people who focus on their own instincts and those who follow the herd. Now these Silicon Valley entrepreneurs at the time, they were likely to be smart people. But despite all of that intelligence in the room, most of them just could not resist the emotional pull of the crowd, which ties right Back to the original quote I shared from Buffett Long term investing success is not about being the smartest person at the table. It's about having the discipline to stay steady when everyone else is losing their minds. The other part about that quote from Buffett is the part about controlling the urges that gets other people into trouble. These comments transcend just the avoidance of unprofitable tech companies trading at ridiculous valuations, as there's a long list of things that can get people into trouble. This is where temperament comes into play. Buffett has stated, you need a temperament that neither derives great pleasure from being with the crowd nor or against the crowd. So investing is a field where it can be really easy to do what feels good. It feels good in the moment to buy what's hot and what's rising in price, and it doesn't feel good to buy what's unloved and distressed. But what feels good does not necessarily correlate well with success in investing. The other thing about temperament that I wanted to highlight is how each of our investments are underpinned by by some sort of story we tell ourselves. And too often people cling to stories that they think are true because they desperately want them to be true, and not because it actually reflects reality. So Morgan Housel he calls these appealing fictions. An appealing fiction happens when you're smart, you want to find a solution, but you face a combination of limited control and high stakes. Appealing fictions can also make you believe just about anything. Whether we like it or not, investing will always have some sort of element of forecasting to it. This element of uncertainty will always exist. So one way to think about maximizing your odds of success is trying to align your forecast with reality as closely as possible. If your story of the future is a financial fiction and has a low likelihood of actually playing out, then you're just setting yourself up for trouble. Part of this is also recognizing that we all have an incomplete view of the world. The world is just too complicated to fully comprehend all of the moving pieces. We don't know what we don't know, and we're perceiving the world around us through a very limited set of mental models. Daniel Kahneman once said, hindsight or the ability to explain the past gives us the illusion that the world is understandable. It gives us the illusion that the world makes sense. And even when it doesn't make sense, that's a big deal in producing mistakes in many fields. In investing, that illusion can especially be dangerous because markets have a way of humbling even the most confident narratives. We look back at what happened and we can convince ourselves that the way things played out was just obvious, when in reality the outcome could have easily gone the other way. The best investors are the ones who stay humble and about what they can't know, constantly testing their stories against reality instead of falling in love with them. And I think that's what makes this so tricky. When we run into something we don't fully understand, our brains don't like leaving that blank space there. We want an explanation, and we want the world to feel coherent. So we fill in the missing pieces with a story that makes sense to us based on our own experiences and perspectives. But those experiences are always limited, and that means our explanations often leave out things we can't see or don't even realize we're missing. In a world as complex as investing, those blind spots are everywhere. And the stories we tell ourselves can feel like clarity when they're really just comfort. So let's dig in here to some of the ideas that Kahneman discusses in detail in his book. One of the interesting things about behavioral economics is that when we look at other people and how they behave, it can seem obvious to us that some people are behaving irrationally or they're just making decisions that we ourselves would not make. But when it comes to our own actions, we can have a really hard time making some of those same decisions. When we're an outside observer, we don't have all that emotional baggage that comes with making that decision that the other person is grappling with. The irony here is that ideally we would be better off being able to make these right decisions for ourselves because we actually have to deal with the real consequences of those decisions, Kahneman writes in the intro. It is much easier, as well as far more enjoyable, to identify and label the mistakes of others than to recognize our own. Of course, I'm no expert when it comes to this, like Kahneman is, but I just fall for many of the same biases and mistakes as everybody else. But one helpful method of dealing with really difficult or painful decisions is is to imagine one of your close friends or siblings being in the exact same situation that you are in. And then ask yourself, what would you tell them to do? What would be the obvious decision for them to make? Sometimes if we take a step back and look at the situation as if we were an outside observer, we can see things a bit more clearly. Because in the moment we have all of these emotional attachments that would lead us to do things that would really look foolish from an outsider's perspective. Kahneman opens up the book by discussing System one versus System two thinking. System one thinking is your mind on automatic mode. If I said to you, what is one plus one? Your mind would automatically say two. You didn't need to consciously think about it or think through the steps. System 1 thinking is fast, intuitive and effortless. System 2 thinking, on the other hand, requires a deeper level of thinking. If I say what is 17 times 24? The system one part of the brain would not be able to tell you the answer immediately. We can think of System two thinking as slow thinking, as it requires a sequence of steps to solve the problem. Rather than being fast and effortless, it's slow and requires deliberate effort. Hence, you can see why the book is titled Thinking Fast and Slow. The System one part of our brain is pretty much active whenever we're awake. Perhaps it's detecting spatial awareness of where things are at and what we're seeing, reading the words that pop up on our TV screen or driving our car down the road. System two is also active while we're awake, but typically it's in a comfortable, low effort mode. But when System one runs into some difficulties, it calls upon System two to support the tougher problems. This arrangement works well because System one is generally very good at what it does. Its model of familiar situations are accurate and its initial reactions to challenges are swift and generally appropriate. However, System 1 has biases and systemic errors in specific situations. There are a couple of different examples here in the book, but to help illustrate how what is going on in our minds might not match with reality, he shares a classic illusion where it shows two different lines where one line has arrows that are pointing inward and the other line has the arrows pointing outward. We can obviously see that the line with the arrows pointing outward are longer. But if we were to actually pull out a ruler, then we would see that the length of the lines is actually the exact same. The important takeaway from this isn't that there are these visual illusions that can trick our minds is that not all illusions are visual. We also have cognitive illusions. For example, let's say we bought a stock for 100. The stock price dropped to 50. Now we're sitting on a 50% loss. It's very possible that we have these inherent biases telling us, I made a mistake in buying this, I'll sell when I get back to even, or, this is an amazing business, surely it's going to recover and reach new highs. This sort of thinking can potentially prevent us from seeing reality for what it really is, such as if the investment thesis has fundamentally changed or the future prospects of the business are considerably different than what we originally proposed. The question of cognitive illusions is whether or not they can be overcome. Kahneman explains that the research he has seen on this is not encouraging because System one thinking operates automatically and cannot be turned off at will. Errors of intuitive thought are often difficult to prevent, and constantly questioning our thinking would be impossibly tedious, and System two thinking is too slow and inefficient to serve as a substitute to System one in making these routine decisions, the best we can do is compromise, learning to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high. A somewhat remarkable aspect of our lives is that it seems that we rarely get stumped. We occasionally face the 17x24 example, but these dumbfounded moments can be rare. The normal state of your mind is that you have intuitive feelings and opinions on just about everything that comes your way. You like or dislike people long before you know much about them. You trust or distrust strangers without knowing why, and you feel that a company is bound to succeed without analyzing it, kahneman explains. Whether you state them or not, you often have answers to questions that you do not completely understand, relying on evidence that you can neither explain nor defend. And when I read this, I feel like he's talking directly to me. So often I form an opinion about a company in my head without actually having done the real research behind it. And although I might not really tell anyone else what my opinion is, it's still there in my head, and I'm sure many of our listeners can resonate with that idea as well. Kahneman then reasons that if a satisfactory answer to a hard question is not found quickly, then our System one thinking will find a related question that is easier and will answer it. This method of answering one question in place of another is referred to as substitution. Kahneman pondered how people manage to make judgments of probability without knowing precisely what the actual probabilities are, and he concluded that people must somehow simplify this impossible task. When people are called upon to judge probability, they can judge the probability of something else. When faced with such a difficult question to share some more concrete examples here, someone might ask you how happy you are with life these days. It's a tough question because your mood varies throughout the day and each day is different. Your mind might answer this question by asking itself what your mood is right now, in this moment. It's a much easier question to answer and directionally would oftentimes be correct. But answering a question through substitution can also lead to some serious errors. Another example of substitution is using the classic example of why 90% of drivers believe that they're better than average. Answering the question on whether you are a better driver than average can be a difficult one because it requires an assessment of the average quality of drivers. Instead of seriously responding to that question, respondents instead ask themselves if they are a good driver, to which 90% of them are going to say yes. The mental shotgun approach makes it easier to generate quick answers to difficult questions without imposing too much work on System two. As of the time of writing, the market is currently experiencing a bloodbath in the software space. Most notably, I hold Constellation Software in the two spinoffs, and the market has totally given up on these names. Other software companies that are down significantly from their highs include companies like Adobe and Salesforce. With a lot of software names selling off, I think there are plenty of angles to look at. This one might say that the market is very momentum driven at the moment, so money is flowing out of software companies into the AI names and momentum traders are, you know, playing that momentum.
