B (2:39)

And it is 5:30am here in San Francisco.

A (2:44)

Talk about dedication of Israeli tech delivery.

B (2:47)

Right. I have a full day of conferencing ahead of us, but I would never miss this. So I'm basically pulling an all nighter and this is perfectly fine because there's nothing that I'd like more to do than speak with you right now about Iran's latest and kind of the aftermath and what's happening right now on the ground in terms of the economic warfare. As talks have started reportedly in Islamabad between the US and Iranian officials, we're going to use the time that we have today to focus on the Iranian economy in order to understand its current fragility and gain a perspective ahead of a possible resolution or further decline.

A (3:23)

So I think last couple of weeks we focused a lot on the global economy, the Israeli economy and this sort of economic warfare that Iran is pursuing. So depending on where the conversation in Islamabad goes, one scenario is it goes sour and then the question is how do you cripple the economy all the way through such that the Revolutionary Guards and the administration, the regime does not have the means through which to pursue further war and subjugate the population. On the other hand, there is a positive scenario here in which Iran, through an agreement that's acceptable to the us, to Israel, the international community wins its future back. And then the question is how does it build what used to be a formidable economy? I think we have the best expert in the world to cover this with us today, Miyad Maliki from the foundation of Defense of Democracies. Miyad was a senior executive in ofac, which is the choke point manager of the American Treasury. This is since 1973, the area in which the American treasury sort of specializes in blacklisting and understanding how to leverage financial tools to quite simply fight the bad guys. So Miyad was there designing the maximum pressure sanctions against the Iranian regime. So I think we have with us today one of the best experts around the world to understand the foundations the Iranian economy in whatever scenario it is about to pursue. Following the conversations in Islamabad.

B (4:52)

Okay, so as usual, we're going to take a quick look at the week's pressing news, our big shorts. But first we're going to go to the latest update on the Windex, the what's your number index that tracks the performance of publicly traded Israeli based or founded companies. Let's kick things off with this week's Windex. Jonathan, how's it looking?

A (5:11)

So Windex is back in the green outperforming both Nasdaq and S and p by almost 2%. It's been a bad week for S and P and Nasdaq. We're talking before what I would refer to as the Trump bump yesterday. His declaration of the negotiations kicking off was really well taken by Wall street, obviously. I don't know if you saw the insider trading in and around that announcement. So about five or six minutes before the announcement from the White House, we saw a $1.5 billion position entered by a number of investors on the s and P500 and on the decline of oil. So very interesting. So you know that is the Monday to Friday week, so it doesn't include that Trump bump. Notable movers on the green is your very own lemonade, up 16% on the week. Nova Measurements, which continues to grow. Really one of the most exciting companies. I love this kind of nerdy Rehovot Israeli tech company that continues to beat its own records and now again at peak market cap, historically discovering new highs every week or every, I would say month. What a year for them. And obviously elbit that rebounds continues to grow 5.7% this week alone. Last year they doubled in the last quarter. They're about to grow by 50%, which is really remarkable. Rafael and Iai Israel Aviation Industries are now openly discussing the float of 30% of their market cap in the Israeli Stock Exchange and hoping also for a dual listing at some point later so they can also join the Windex. Any thoughts about the green?

B (6:43)

Yeah, you know, we've been speaking week after week about a lot of like sector specific greens. So we had the defense sector and so forth. And I think this week is the first in a while that we see kind of three different engines of growth. I like that it reinforces kind of the diversification of Israeli tech.

A (6:59)

Not sure how far that credit goes. Like two, three, four more weeks of where we are right now. Does that change? But at least for the time being, I think it's a very robust take from Wall street on Israeli companies. Honestly in the red, not a lot of big movers. It'll be interesting to ICL Israel Chemicals down 8.19% this week. I think a bit of fear is a real economy. Right. This is the company that generates phosphate out of the Dead Sea and has some incredible also global holdings in this critical space for fertilizers and other other industrial processes that are critical. I think the market is trying to understand do they benefit from the rising prices and the choke point in Hormuzzi or do they lose on Israeli connectivity, potential ability to hold off on exports of goods from Israel and so on. That concern may have tilted. An interesting one to watch. But overall, the remaining reds are on the 1.2percent single digit low. So no big news there.

B (7:57)

All right. Well, usually, you know, instability is usually good for pricing, kind of the scarcity and so forth.

A (8:03)

Yep.

B (8:04)

But in reality, as you say, if supply chains are going to be getting disrupted, that upside is going to definitely be getting eaten by logistics and access issues. And the market reacts to that uncertainty. All right, big shorts, big shorts.

A (8:20)

So, you know, there's such an overwhelming dominance of the Iranian story on the Israeli economy today. And so the first big short is clearly the negotiations again, the talks that started this morning in Islamabad. A couple of thoughts. Curious to hear your kind of take on that. First, the fact that it is in Pakistan, not in Turkey, not in Oman. Very interesting choice. We know that Pakistan is the CIA territory. The American intelligence services have very strong ties with Islamabad and they are sort of neutral to that effect. There has been great anger in Saudi Arabia against Pakistan. The two countries have a valid security pact that basically says if one is attacked, the other must protect. So there is some tension in terms of Pakistan's role in the region, but the Americans chose Islam, Abadabad, Iran comply. That's an interesting dynamic for me. Israel likes to fight its wars like a cheetah. Right. That's the Ben Gurion approach. You go straight for the kill. You do it fast so the economy can continue and so on. America fights its war like a Kamado dragon.

C (9:24)

Right.

A (9:24)

It moves slow. It's a superpower. It sees the elephant, it moves slow, it bites it, you know, introduces its venom and then just walks silently next to it as it starts to crumble. And I think what we're seeing right now is superpower dynamics. The blow for three, four weeks and now halt. You're weakened, your immune system is weaker. Now let's see if you're willing to give us, you know, change your positions. Can we get a better deal? And if not, we'll just walk next to you and not give you the antidote. And so I think this is a crucial week for the Israeli economy, for the world's economy, depending on how these conversations in Islamabad end in the next 72 hours or so.

B (10:03)

Yeah, I think you hit the nail on the head between the cheetah and the Komodo dragon. Because in Israel, these talks, they hold the risk that the negotiations themselves are going to become just a tool of economic warfare. Are these talks signaling just to Calm markets while continuing to shape realities on the ground? Or is this actually part of a formative strategy, even if it does take time for a different outcome?

A (10:25)

Yep. Second big short, I think, has to do with Qatar. I spent last week a few days in Switzerland meeting some of the people from the region, not officials, not from the government side, business people that are sort of intertwined with the economy of the Gulf. I heard, I would say, near hostility towards Europe, insult the retainer diplomacy that worked so well for Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood axis, if you will, against Israel in the campuses, in the mosques in Europe, in European capitals where they've invested near a trillion dollars over the last 15 years. All that soft power and the on the payroll that works so well for Qatar in the hostage crisis in Israel, in enabling Hamas and so on, have all gone deaf. They clicked the button and nothing happened. And so I think there is a reality emerging in which we are seeing the end of Qatari money to the Muslim Brotherhood, to European, you know, real estate, government shortages and so on. Specifically, for instance, in France, in the uk, The Qatari QIA has such an immense, you know, portfolio of holdings. I think it's also going to impact some of the LPs, the limited partnerships that the Qatar holding company has in American VCs. And most definitely this is going to cause a rupture within that movement. I think Qatar is going to recalculate and recalibrate. It doesn't have infinite money, it's going to have to invest it internally. And this insult and the breaking of a strategy that worked so well for 20 years and culminated in Israel is now in need of a restrategizing from Doha. That's going to be, I think, a difficult path for them to take.

B (12:04)

And if Qatar does actually scale back, who do you think will fill that vacuum? There's a kind of a few players on the sidelines that I could probably point that.

A (12:13)

So I think that really depends on how the war ends. I mean, is Iran going to be a positive player? Is there going to be a different regime? It doesn't look like it right now. But is that the scenario? If that's the scenario, then I think an American, Israeli, uae, India, right. What I call the India through Ethiopia axis. I've seen we discussed MBZ in the last few episodes. Over the last few episodes, his leadership, his incredible step forward is going to be very interesting to watch once hostilities end. I think he's demonstrated that he is truly the most consequential Arab leader of our century thus far. And so I would hope between the uae, between Israel and the US we can kind of come up with the right incentive structure for the region. That depends on which Iran we get at the tail end. I will say one kind of thing that worries me is that we have incredible diplomatic opportunities emerging from these dynamics. Even if the war ends right now, in a settlement that not everybody's going to be happy with the next three to five years, they're going to introduce those opportunities. They meet a dwindled, almost anorectic Israeli diplomatic core. We have the likes of Michael Eisenberg and Ron Dermer and some incredible individual individuals, the leadership of the prime minister, the relationship with the White House. But to realize these opportunities, Israel needs robust institutions on the diplomatic side. Those will have to be rebuilt in order to realize what I consider an era of three to five years of opportunities that if we won't realize, will be missed for yet another kind of 20, 30 year window.

B (13:46)

Absolutely.

A (13:52)

Last week, Israel indicated its focus in the war may be shifting towards creating conditions for regime change in Iran. Meanwhile, President Trump threatened over the weekend to strike Iran's oil and energy infrastructure, which might be necessary to pressure the regime, but may also have long lasting consequences for Iran's future economy. Days later, as we now know, the President has put forward an ultimatum that was met with Iranian obstinance, only to have been met yesterday. With the prolonging of the ultimatum and what seems to be an ongoing conversation right now in Islamabad that may deliver, may or may not deliver an end to hostilities, we're seeing some indications from the Iranian side of greater willingness to be flexible around issues that on the Thursday four weeks ago in Geneva were considered a taboo to answer these difficult questions on how does the Iranian economy sort of deliver that moment of better negotiating cards to the west, to the US To Israel? And furthermore, is there a scenario in which if there is a positive agreement and eventual regime change, the Iranian economy starts realizing its potential to do that. We're glad to welcome Miyad Maliki. Miyad, who was born and raised in Iran, served in the Air Force and centcom, which is the central operator of American power these days in the region. Before joining President Trump's Treasury Department. During Trump's first term, Miyad directed the maximum pressure campaign against Iran, as well as America's exit from the jcpoa, that is the Iran nuclear deal signed under President Obama. As the architect of the US Sanctions against Iran, Miyad maintained for years that while military force can weaken the Islamic Republic, it's only through the economy that the Regime can be toppled. Mihad, thank you so much for joining us today.

C (15:39)

Thanks for having me on.

A (15:40)

So, Miyad, you spent a decade thinking through how to weaken the Islamic Republic, but you left the US government in August. Do you wish you were still there in government now to see this war through from the inside, as this is really a culmination of a lot of your work for the last decade?

C (15:56)

Sure. I don't want to suggest that the work on Iran's sanctions is somehow finished. It never really is. Sanctions are most effective when they're applied consistently and persistently, keeping the market close against the kind of sanctions evasion that we've been fighting for years in the case of Iran and other countries or jurisdictions that have been subject to U.S. sanctions. But I'll be honest, you know, I'm grateful to be outside the building right now. It means that I can sit down with you and share my personal views in a way that I simply just couldn't do it from, you know, sitting behind the government desk. Now, just to really set the stage for our conversation, I just wanted to pause for just a moment on the neat and kind of touch on the nature of the threat that this regime has posed. Because unlike what you sometimes hear in D.C. think tank discussions, there was never a stable status quo with this regime, not even when we had a nuclear agreement with them. You know, in November 2023, this is what didn't get whole lot of press coverage in the US But Iranian backed hacker groups hacked a water system in the state of Pennsylvania. It led to a major disruption in flow of water throughout the state. And it took the US government months to really understand the depth of the damage and the fact that the IRGC was behind it. Second, the rogc. Iran has been building out drone facilities in Venezuela in our backyard. And then as far as the Strait of hormones, in 2019, they dropped sea mines in a strait of 4 mos, severely damaged 4 vessels in a strait of hormones. So it's an ongoing threat that is posed by the Iranian regime.

A (17:36)

Take us behind the scenes. You were involved in crafting these sanctions through OFAC and through broader government activity. How do you go about understanding what cripples the IRGC and sort of conditions for making sure the pressure is applied against the areas that cripple the regime, the subjugation, while kind of leaving the capacity, civilian capacity to survive and kind of balancing that? I think if I'm totally off, let us know. Balancing that with the odds that Iran, which is a sophisticated country, will evade sanctions.

C (18:10)

Sure. You know, when I arrived at Treasury Department in 2017. The strategy was crystal clear from day one. President Trump and his senior advisors had looked at a jcpoa, the Iran deal, which you mentioned earlier, and called it exactly what it was. A deal that gave the regime nuclear legitimacy, delayed the nuclear program. Crucially, the deal provided sanctions relief, some direct, some indirect, without really addressing any of the underlying problems. So the logic was straightforward. Get out of the deal, reimpose the sanctions that had been effectively weakened, and then go beyond that and cut off every source of funding to the regime. The goal was to fundamentally alter the cost benefit equation for the regime, make it expensive enough for the regime to continue that type of behavior in a way that it would face internal pressure and face kind of a collapsing economy. Now, as far as sanctions evasion on a petroleum front, we had significant success. Just very quickly for your listeners. It took us about two years to get out of the JCPOA, and yet by the end of 2019, I think mid-2020, we brought Iran's petroleum export numbers down to below 100,000 of barrels a day from over 2 million barrels of day. During the JCPOA. You saw the same effect on the petrochemicals, same effect on metals. And that was a holistic approach to putting pressure on the importers of Iranian petroleum, such as China at the time, Russians were importing petrochemicals and Indians, but also sanctioning some of those actors that were involved in transportation of oil. And then the other part of the campaign which was very successful was the cutting the funding of Iran to the terrorist proxies. At the end of President Trump's first term, Iraqi Shiite militia groups were complaining about not getting their salaries in full. Lebanese Hezbollah Nasrola was going around begging for donations and very open about the financial pressure that Hezbollah was facing at the time. It was a campaign that was really successful. And then we had the Biden administration that came in and they had a different approach, which was set of negotiations and potentially going back to the jcpoa. They called it a longer lasting deal. That's what they wanted to get. But I guess it was a good lesson for folks back then to learn that the Iranian regime is not a regime that you can get a deal that is good for US national security.

A (20:44)

So walk us through where we are today. Just a quick overview of the current state of Iran's economy. Also curious to know the mechanics of it. Right. Are you sitting at OFAC with this big data set? Right, Big data, AI whatnot and kind of watching, or is this A lag, like every 90 days you get the data of the previous quarter and you understand the impact.

C (21:03)

Yeah, so that's a really good question. But I'm going to address your second point. You know, Iran's economy is extremely opaque. It's very difficult to understand the state of economy in Iran. No one in Iran's government actually has the right numbers. And the reason for that is because of this state of corruption in Iran's economy. Government comes up with numbers. Inflation, unemployment, those are not real numbers. You have a black market when it comes to foreign currency exchange rate. That seems to be the closest you can get to understand the set of economy in Iran. And that is a number that we looked at because that's how you could tell how rial was doing. And Iran's economy today is really in just free fall. Now I can give you a quick picture. The rial lost 60% of its value after the Israel Iran war last June. Inflation spiked. The chronic energy shortages were forcing blackouts before the current campaign even began. By December 2025, the real had hit a historic low of 1.4 million to dollar meaning Iran's currency has lost roughly 20,000 times its value over four decades of Islamic Republic rule. There are 200 million barrels of Iran crude oil that are currently sitting on tankers at sea. That is a record high. It represents roughly about 13 billion in oil inventory that Iran can't find buyers because secondary sanctions has made purchasing it a designation risk. And Iran has an estimated 100 to $120 billion in frozen sovereign assets sitting in accounts across at least seven countries. And that's the financial picture regime that dispense is foreign exchange reserves on proxy wars, nuclear program and the RAGC networks.

B (22:50)

So Miyad, the Revolutionary Guard as you mentioned, is still the regime's main kind of instrument for keeping its grip on power and repressing dissent. And that means that regime change is going to require also breaking the irgc, which is a benefactor of the economy as you just said, because of the sophistication, I would say of the IRGC, of functioning like a state within itself, state with its own economy. What do you think the US can do to disrupt this economy of oppression?

C (23:18)

Right. You know, the RGC isn't just as you said, a military organization. It's an economic empire. IRGC affiliated foundations, engineering arms are estimated to control, you know, somewhere between third and over half of Iran's formal economy. You know, Khatam Al MB, a construction arm which is the IRGC's main engineering vehicle, has built Refineries, railways, dams, natural gas lines, controls Iran's international airports. You know, RAGC controls banking. They own the largest banks in Iran, the Sepah Bank. They control bank melee. They've used these banks for their operations. They control telecommunications sector, they control agriculture sector. Jointly with the Supreme Leader's office. They have really a significant presence across Iran's pharmaceutical sector and real estate. So the regime has really blocked a meaningful privatization in Iran's economy since the 80s to really allow ROGC to grow and maintain control of Iran's economy. So you have an organization, a terrorist organization controlling the economy in Iran. And it takes me back to the discussion on the JCPO and Iran deal. You know, the JCPOA folks who were negotiating the Iran deal really closed their eyes to the reality, which was the ROGC was going to benefit from the deal. And you can't cut a deal with the Iranian regime without providing some kind of a relief to the irgc. As a matter of fact, a very key detail of the Iran deal is a footnote in the text of the deal that didn't get whole lot of attention. But I bring it up every time I talk about the jcpoa. It was a footnote that basically told foreign financial institutions that you don't really need to do due diligence about your client inside Iran, meaning you don't really need to know who your client in Iran is or who they're connected to. That Footnote didn't say ReGC, but it was about nothing but the ReGC. Now the central bank of Iran has been designated as a terrorist organization. We designated in 2019 because of how it was involved in the funding of Lebanese Hezbollah. It was another indication that the RAGC Quds Force was using Central bank of Iran for transferring funds to Lebanese Hezbollah and qf. And also you look at Iran's oil company, National Iranian Oil Company and Ministry of Petroleum. Both are designated as providing support to terrorist organizations. In this case the irgc. Good source because of the control that IRGC maintains over Iran's oil sector and also the revenue that is generated by National Iranian Oil Company going back to funding the rogc.

B (26:02)

So when we talk about kind of closing the Strait of Hormuz, obviously that is disruptive for the rest of the world. Is it also ending up hurting the Revolutionary Guards because they depend on those oil exports to pay salaries?

C (26:13)

Absolutely. I think this is an often overlooked irony. I mean, it's a very key point that you raised. You know, the IRGC's economic empire really depends fundamentally on oil exports, revenues Quite frankly, the entire regiment. Iran's a corrupt economy, only relies on the oil revenue more than anything else. Now, as you said, IRGC controls Iran's major oil infrastructure. When oil can't move, whether because of sanctions or because Iran itself is threatening to close this rate, the IRGC feels it too. I would argue that the Iranian regime and IRGC will be more economically pressured as a result of Iran's closing of his strait of mosquito than any other countries in the Persian Gulf or globally. Because if you look at the extent that Iran relies on its oil export, it's really unmatchable throughout the Persian Gulf. The difference here is it's not a democracy. They don't really care as much about public opinion in Iran. Iran's economy can get worse and they just can't care less as long as they have a win out of this war with the US and Israel. And the win for these guys really mean not to lose and continue to exist after the end of this military campaign. But yeah, I mean, they're probably economically suffering more than any other country out of what's going on in strait of hormones. The result of what they're doing in straight up hormones and the economic pressure that they're going to have to deal with later on is going to lead to protests in Iran. And that's why I'm optimistic about the Iranians actually toppling this regime.

B (27:44)

So on that point, would you say that that will be kind of pivotal to actually see regime change? Is that like a breaking point that you would define and may the US is not even pursuing this at this point or is that kind of, do you still see that as a, a goal?

C (27:58)

That's a great point. I think the US government, the US Administration, they didn't start this campaign with a goal to remove the regime or to bring about a regime change in Iran. I think the regime change would be a byproduct of the military strikes. At least I think that's the way they're looking at it now. The reality is the regime change in Iran isn't a single event. I think it'll be a process and the process that has already started. What Iranian regime has really failed to do is to understand that the most critical centers of its economy, the oil rich provinces, port and terminals that give Iran access to the Persian Gulf for commerce, they're far away from Tehran, where the Supreme Leader's office is, where the headquarter of RHSC is. And what folks haven't paid attention to is the fact that these provinces in Southern Iran are economically very unprivileged. They're not doing great. The salaries to these employees are disrupted or interrupted. Very often there's significant level of grievances in those provinces. And when Iran comes out of this war, when the regime faces the reality of the economy that is way worse than it was before the beginning of the strikes, its offensive capabilities are significantly degraded. So Iran's not going to have whole lot of leverage to cut a deal that would be really serving its survival, give Iranian regime some major economic relief. I think what you're going to see is some kind of a round of protests and defections taking place in those provinces, whether it's Khuzestan, Hormuzgan Province or Bushehr Province. That's really what I think would be the breaking point for this regime.

A (29:42)

So a conclusion of the war, let's put aside the enriched uranium stockpile. Is it in or out? But a conclusion that leaves things as they are. And Iran remains under sanctions, heavy sanctions, crippled. And again, it's hard to promise or to identify when that happens or you kind of see if you will only one direction. There's. It's not going to be able to survive absent of access to capital. And under the existing sanctions regime, is there a viable way out for the regime? Even if they do have the 460 kilos of enriched uranium, that enriched uranium

C (30:19)

doesn't really give them some kind of a meaningful leverage they can't really access. The enriched uranium stockpile is buried under rubbles. And putting that aside and coming back to your point, I don't think regime is going to find a way out. If this campaign is over, their offensive capabilities are significantly disrupted and destroyed, as is the case and is becoming more and more a reality for the regime. I don't think they're going to have a way out out of their domestic issues, which is very overblown.

A (30:51)

Yeah, that's the point.

C (30:51)

Yeah. We're not just fighting some terrorist militia group. We're not just fighting Hezbollah or Hamas. We're fighting a government that has a major responsibility to feed its people, to run economy, to run an education for its kids, for his Iranian children, to run a health system, to run a major oil sector. It has a lot of responsibilities and layers and layers of his political leadership been removed. And now you have an RGC operating like legs of octopus, like the head is being cut off. A lot of folks are trying to look for signs of a regime change now. I don't think the air campaign was seeking to achieve a regime Change during the bombardment and strikes. I think the campaign is weakening the regime, setting its economy even in a much worse position or situation. The regime is going to be at more odds with its people at the end of this campaign than it was before. The gap between the regime and its people has just increased significantly. I would argue that the regime has about 10 to 15% of supporters in Iran and that's a part of the population that is being paid by the regime is receiving political rent. But you have 80, 85% of the population that clearly opposes the regime. And that's really a recipe for the toppling of the regime. Then I think that's coming so the

B (32:12)

day after, the day after, more into the future beyond kind of the necessary short term requirements that you just laid out. You know, going from a state of emergency into a real economy is going to require rebuilding infrastructure and opening the markets and attracting foreign capital, capital and foreign investors. And where I'm standing now, it's hard to even imagine. But how do you think in a post regime Iran even convince foreign investors that any transitional government is not going to fall prey to chaos like Iraq or to civil war like Syria?

C (32:44)

Yeah, I mean, I would argue and I think that's a very real concern. But having born and raised in Iran and studied Iran very closely, I think it's a major disservice to compare Iraq and Syria to Iran. There's an absence of that sectarian. There are definitely different ethnicities in Iran. Azeris, Beloch, Kurds and Arabs. In southeast Iran, however, there is a strong sense of nationalism. I would argue that the Islamic Republic that came out of 1979 was and is the chaos that we saw in Iraq and Syria and Iran is moving away from that. I think Iranians now have grown as strong sense of appreciation for democratic values. I think Iran's economy is frankly one of the most promising economies in the region. It has the ingredients for a major economic growth. Massive hydrocarbon reserves, world class human capital, one of the youngest populations in the Middle East. A geographical position that is the crossroads of trade routes connecting Europe, Central Asia and South Asia. Four decades of suppressed consumer demand that will explode as soon as the economy opens. And for the region, a stable, open Iran would be really a transformation. And for the West, Iranian oil is one of the best quality oils that you can find in the market. It can really be a stabilizing energy supply. I grew up listening to Jon Bon Jovi and Guns n Roses and we had these VHS players that were illegal and my dad would hide it. And bring it out every Thursday night and we would watch Hollywood movies. It's a very pro west country. And I think that they got a taste of an Islamic revolution, a non secular government, and they're ready to move on from something like that very quickly.

A (34:38)

For me, maybe one last question, Miyad. As you kind of think through the impact of this scenario of a democratized Iran that realizes its financial potential, grows to be top 10 global economy and flourishes, are there players in the region that don't like that? Is it Turkey, is it Saudi? Are there players in the region that sort of have an interest in Iran? Obviously not being as strong as it were four weeks ago, but also not being free to pursue its own goals as a member of the family of nations and grow its economy and realize its potential?

C (35:12)

I think the reality is none of these countries around Iran that could be concerned about a stable, successful democracy in Iran. They don't enjoy a significant level of influence within Iran to slow down a transformation or political transition in Iran. We all think about this issue as we look at what Iran did in Iraq or in Syria. As Iraq and Syria were going through political chaos and transformation, while Iran was enjoying significant level of influence within, the Shiite populations in Iraq leveraged that influence very well to cause chaos. And the main reason that it did it was to oppose US Efforts to establish a democracy in Iraq right next to Iran. Same thing in Syria. Iranians have been doing it, leveraging their influence to cause chaos and trouble. I don't think any of these Gulf states or Turkey or let's say Pakistan, China, they have enough influence, social influence, economic influence in Iran to really slow down the process of a political transition in Iran, if that's what you're asking. I think Iran is the country, the nation. The Iranians are careful with foreign influence that Iran has suffered from foreign influence for hundreds and hundreds of years. And I think they're in the right. As soon as this regime comes to an end, I think the Iranians are very well positioned and prepared to start the process of democratization.

B (36:41)

One last question, if you will. You do sound optimistic and you're leaving me feeling much more optimistic than when I came in. But what would be just to dampen it, what would be a wrong way to end the war?

C (36:52)

One thing that I've always asked my government colleagues. I want you to implement policies that serve US national security interests, even if it's short term interests that we want to address. But in the long run, keep in mind, nothing could be more damaging to our national security strategically than empowering this regime and living it with more resources, legitimizing this government and this regime when in fact domestically Iranians do not view this regime as being a representative of Iranians needs and wants. And the worst way that we can end this campaign would be some kind of an agreement that we reach with elements of this regime that would provide them with an off ramp that includes some economic incentives and also legitimizing what they've done, what they've been doing domestically. I hope we don't come out of this campaign empowering this regime so it continues to exist and oppress the wonderful population that it governs so poorly.

B (37:57)

Miyad Maliki, thank you so much for joining us today.

C (38:00)

Thanks for having me.

A (38:01)

Thank you. Wow, that was so comprehensive. You know, hearing from a person who was there within and how that crosses two administrations, it's really great. What my main takeaway here is his point of, you know, however this concludes it's better to have Iran with 460 kilos of highly enriched uranium without a lifeline to the IRGC than an IRGC controlled Iran without the 460 kilos and with full access to the economic markets. I think it's a very clever and sober perspective on where we stand right now as the negotiation starts in Islamabad.

B (38:43)

Yeah. And it's definitely not one that you can just kind of gather just by reading headlines.

A (38:48)

Yep. And I think that's a great segue to the words of the week. Right. They connect also to your number from the beginning of the episode as you're in San Francisco, as Israeli tech continues to deliver. The words of the week belong to the one and only Jensen Huang, the founder, the CEO of the world's most valuable company. That's Nvidia. Last week he spent time in his annual conference sharing mind blowing innovation that's going to lead to humanoid robots, that's going to lead to data centers in space. And subsequent to that he was asked questions about Nvidia, where it is right now by the press. And here's what he had to say about the Israeli R and D center during war. We have 6,000 families in Israel. It was amazing. He said 6,000 families, not employees. We have 6000 families in Israel. I'm quite worried about them. I know that they're worried about themselves. And our company still continues to operate really well. People are still working really hard. That doesn't change that we're quite concerned about them. I am 100% committed to Israel. I mean, could there be any better vote of confidence in Israeli tech during war than hearing that from one of the top people who really design the future. And at this space, Yael. I may include Nvidia as a Windex company soon as he is inching towards being considered an Israeli founder at this point.

B (40:14)

You know what, next week I'll let you get them in.

A (40:17)

Yeah, Windex is going to perform well next week if they did that. All right, listen, that's it for today's show. Thanks for waking up Yael and being such an amazing professional in everything that you do. And thanks to our listeners for tuning into Arc Media's what's your number? We hope you found it interesting. If you did, be sure to like subscribe, rate, review, you know the drill. Most importantly, share it with others so we grow our community and we find out what is interesting for you. If you want to make suggestions or share your feedback with us directly, reach out to us at what's your Number? @arc media.org.

B (40:57)

What's your number is an ARC Media podcast. Arc Media's executive producer, Adam James Levin Aretti. Our production manager is Brittany Cohen. ARC's community manager is Ava Weiner. Sound and video editing is by Liquid Audio. Our theme music is by Midnight Generation. I am Yael Usner Levi.

A (41:13)

I'm Yonatan Adiri. I'll see you back here, Yael, next week in Tel Aviv. Yep, hoping that no further changes to Ben Gurion Airport occur. This podcast offers general business and economic information and is not a comprehensive summary for investment decisions. It does not recommend or solicit any investment strategy or security.