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A
Foreign.
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B
You are listening to an art media podcast.
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A
So, Yael, what's your number?
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Yonatan My number is 10.2 million and that's the number of people living in Israel today. Fresh statistics just ahead of Independence Day, which as you know is in two days, Israel officially crossed the 10 million mark. It's a pretty staggering milestone for a country that started about 800,000 people in 1948. That's 12x growth if we're going to look at it like a business in under 80 years. And what's even more interesting is of course the composition. It's one of the youngest populations in the developed world and with about a quarter under the age of 14. And we've spoken about this a lot on this podcast about the dual economy. On the one hand we have massive long term growth engine, labor force, consumption, innovation, all the things that you love to talk about, and rightly so, but on the other, it really puts a lot of pressure on infrastructure, housing, education, everything that also needs a rehaul. So this is a good time, Independence Day, to kind of take stock of what we've built and where we've come, but also the complexity of sustaining it. Yonatan, what's yours?
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A
Mine is 0.3, as in 0.3 barrels of oil required to generate $1,000 of GDP growth globally. This is known as the oil intensity. It is down from 5.3 in 1965. That means the world is significantly less dependent on oil for its economic growth. That is very, very important in terms of the perspective for today's conversation as Americans, Iranians are now heading for Islamabad for yet another round of negotiations. Imagine this negotiation when the world is dependent on oil at 5.3 barrels for a thousand dollar production. That is quite an inferior position for the Western world for sure.
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B
So it's not going to stop the global economy, but it's certainly going to shake it. I'm going to take the win because you know, we need Independence Day. Good vibes. Come on.
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A
Yeah. La dim ze simcha. Kids always win.
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B
Exactly.
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A
You got the win.
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B
Let's go, let's go.
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A
All right. It is 6pm on Monday, April 20, here in Switzerland, on my side.
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B
And it is 7pm here in Israel. I'm recording this just an hour before the first siren of Yomazikoron. That's Memorial Day. And in a moment at 8 o', clock, the entire country will come to a standstill. Traffic stops, conversations pause, and for two minutes there's a shared silence that's really hard to explain. And Very, very unique just to Israel. Unless you've experienced it, I'm sure many of our listeners have. It's a day that's really woven into the fabric of Israeli society, into life here, especially in these past almost three years of almost consecutive war, really. So it really is a day that grounds everything else we talk about, including this podcast. And then almost abruptly we go right into Yom that's celebrating Israel's independence.
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A
Look, this design by the founding fathers and mothers of attaching through one week Holocaust memorial and the Independence Day is very meaningful, I think. You know, I look at my four kids as they go through this cycle that I went through as a kid. A very formative experience from a narrative perspective. Yeah. So we'll be checking in today with the latest around the Straits of Hormuz and the economic dynamics of the current state of affairs in Iran with again Miyad Maliki, a senior fellow at the foundation for the Defense of Democracies, who in his latest piece for Foreign affairs asserts that the straits are more of a weakness for Iran than a weapon. I think it is interesting to hear Miyyat as again the parties are heading towards Islamabad for the last round of negotiations. Who's going to patiently wait it out? Is Iran's clock running faster than Donald Trump's clock? I think this is what we're going to try to assess with Miya today on the episode.
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B
But first, as usual, we're going to take a quick look at some of the week's pressing news, our big shorts and of course the latest update on the Windex the what's your number index that tracks the performance of publicly traded Israeli based or founded companies. Okay Yonatan, how's it looking this week?
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A
Very strong green performance for the Windex. The overall the market went into new highs. Almost all 51 Windex equities are in the green. It's ceasefire boom if you will. To be specific, The Windex gained 6.76% this week, beating S&P by 2%, falling a bit behind Nasdaq which also had a stellar week. Lemonade Pagaya, which is a fintech company via and Etoro are up at least 20% on the week. Embattledmonday.com is up for 12% and Palo Alto Networks up 7%. Surprisingly, the one closing today's review is one of three equities in the red is Elbit 5.5% in the red decline and by the way, soon to become public Rafael, hopefully soon to become that's at least the rumor is now looking at a $24 billion three year delivery pipeline, half in export, half for the Israeli Defense Administration. But talk about robust sales for Israeli defense tech during the war.
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B
Yeah, it's a very interesting divergence between kind of the rotation between money moving out of the war winners, quote unquote, into peace optionality. Not that fintech consumer and mobility have anything to do with peace per se, but it is a interesting shift in how the market has responded to the ceasefire.
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A
The beauty of the free market,
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indeed. All right, let's go to our big shorts. So our first big short continues from last week's episode about the shekel, the very, very strong shekel. And just as the episode was aired last week, the shekel broke below 3 Israeli exporters immediately warned that the currency strength is now eroding profitability at scale. The industry groups were calling it, and I'm quoting, a structural hit to margins. The Manufacturers association of Israel publicly warned that under a three shekel dollar is a death blow to export profitability. So the bank of Israel, though, interestingly enough, is holding its line saying, guys, there's going to be no intervention from us. It's framing the appreciation as driven by capital inflows and tech strength rather than any kind of market dysfunction. So what you have now, and we spoke about it in the last week's episode, but it's kind of rolling out now, is really a split reality. A currency that signals confidence in Israel's macro position, but at the same time is starting to bite into what we see and feel as the real economy's competitiveness.
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A
I think what we have here, and we framed it last week as good and bad and ugly.
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B
Right.
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We're not enjoying the good that much. And I think that's what I would keep my eye on because ultimately a strong currency even in Israel, which is export driven and dependent on exchange rate for tech salaries, is a big win for the middle class and the lower middle class. But for that to happen, we need to be able to kind of unlock the central position that food importers, car importers have in Israel that enable them to block the good from reaching the pockets of average Israelis. That is now taking shape. Chancellor Yaron, Chancellor of the Central bank, is set to keep an eye on that. And I would expect the next interest rate decision to reflect the level of centrality in the Israeli local market for consumption. That is kind of impeding on all of us being able to enjoy the reduction in the cost of imports. That kind of gets stuck there with the importers since they are very, very Very centralized in the country.
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B
All right, Yonatan, the second big short is especially for you. It's an ongoing story we've been following closely here on the podcast and that's shipping company sim. Lots of drama this week because there's a convergence of a few things happening at once. I'll just present them and you talk us through it. So the CEO has stepped down. The company's in the middle of a complex ownership transition and that restructuring period has already triggered a labor disruption and operational friction within the ports themselves. So what you're seeing is a shipping company sitting at the intersection of leadership instability, geopolitical capital structure, and of course, real world logistics stress.
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A
Let's add to the fact that you know. So the company has been in an ownership struggle. So a couple of offers for the shareholders were floated in the last, I'd say 12 months, one of which was led by Eli Glickman, a management takeover that failed. That is why Glickman is stepping down. And the group that won is Israeli supreme private equity group femi, led by Ishai Davidi, one of Israel's really top top businessmen over the last 30 years, creating incredible returns for his LPs, deciding to join hands with Hapag Lloyd, German shipping giant. And so that some of the difficulty, remember, Zim has a golden share owned by the state that says it needs to hold a certain amount of its ships ready and available for the Israeli government and so on and so forth. I will add one sort of geopolitical complexity here. When the deal was signed pre Iran war, it was raised, and rightly so, that a quarter of Hapac Lloyd is owned by none other than Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
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B
And maybe the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia gets a new color now post war or in midst of war, I should say there was a lot of voices in Israel kind of criticizing the deal because of that. And maybe their tune has changed.
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A
We'll see. We'll need to follow that. Ultimately, at the end of the day, Israel is heavily, heavily dependent on its ports and on its freedom to navigate. Specifically, the Mediterranean is roughly 90% of grain import. Everything. We really, really depend our ports. And so Zim was always this kind of fallback default position.
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B
All right, let's go to the long play. For decades, the Strait of Hormuz has been seen as one of the most powerful geopolitical weapons in the world, a choke point Iran could use to pressure the global economy. But really, in the last 24 hours, that assumption is being stress tested in real time. The US Confirmed it has intercepted an Iranian cargo ship as part of its naval blockade. With the US President calling it enforcement and Tehran calling it piracy and threatening retaliation at the same time, Diplomatic efforts are set to continue despite it all, with the vice president, J.D. vance, expected to lead another round of talks even as Iran signals it may not show up under the pressure. So the question really isn't theoretical anymore. Is Hormuz actually Iran's ultimate leverage, or is it the pressure point that exposes its deepest vulnerability? And we are lucky to be joined once again by Miyad Maliki. A senior fellow at the foundation for the Defense of Democracies, he also served from 2017 to 2025 as the Associate Director of the Office of Foreign Assets control at the U.S. treasury Department. Miyyad, welcome.
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C
Thanks for having me.
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B
So you just recently wrote a fantastic analysis in Foreign affairs that said that for Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is more of a weakness than a weapon. Very contrarian to mainstream media at this point. So saying that Iran's economy would actually suffer more than that of other countries if there is a sustained closure of the Strait, explain that case.
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C
Sure. You know, the conventional wisdom so far got it exactly backwards. Iran relies on is Strait of Hormuz more than any other economies in the Persian Gulf. And the closure of Israel for MOS causes more damage to Iran's already very ill and collapsing economy more than any other economies globally. So, and the numbers are pretty straightforward. And it's a strategic mistake that Iran has made in the past 47 years of Islamic Republic. For 47 years, they've been threatening the world with closing the Strait of Hormuz. Strait of Hormuz is all they had to threaten the world that we're going to close this trade. And then they had the nuclear program, which has started using it to blackmail the international community for sanctions relief and as a way to continue to do other bad things that we're doing, but then use this one as a leverage to bring the west to the table to cut deals. But they didn't realize they were not looking for exit for their own economy out of Estrada for mos. When Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Gulf countries, they listened to Iran's rhetorics for the past, you know, 47 years. And they actively invested in finding ways around Australia for MoS. Now, they could have done a better job. They could have moved much faster. They could have come up with better and more efficient ways. But we saw that Saudi Arabia, for example, was able to use that exit and same with Emirates with UAE to be less dependent Economically on the flow of commerce in the Strait of Hormuz. So where Iran found itself to be the day that it decided to cause trouble in Strait of Hormuz, they're looking at 92 to 96% of its oil export passing through Strait of Hormos. That loads almost entirely from Hawk island, which is in the north side of Persian Gulf beyond straight of Hormuz. And oil and gas accounts for 25% of Iran's GDP. That's regime's own numbers. It's probably way higher. And that doesn't include petrochemical and metals, which I'm happy to get into in a second. Also relies on the strata for most of the most part. And 80% of export earnings come from oil and gas for the government of Iran. So at the end of the day, it was an economy on the verge of collapse, pre war. And then the decision they made to go after the flow of commerce in Australia four months, they really brought that economy to the full collapse.
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A
Miya, do you think that part of what we're seeing in the break between Peseschkian, the irgc, Iraqi, like a bit of a dynamic that we also saw publicly on display, has to do with the economic strain that Iran is feeling given the sort of blockade on a
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C
blockade that has evolved the irgc, the arm of oppression of Islamic Republic, they really think they can deal with a domestic economic collapse and failure. Meaning they can go on the street and they can crack down on protesters and they can keep things calm. And also, they're not economists. They don't know the numbers. They don't look at the numbers. They don't really care about the numbers. All they see is these guys are going to negotiate in Pakistan with no leverage. And they think if they keep this trade closed just for another week, they can be in a better position as far as, you know, leverage to negotiate. The Ministry of Foreign Affair folks, they see the numbers. One person who went in the last round of negotiations with Iran to Islamabad was Emmati. He's a Central bank of Iran governor. He's a regime guy. He's a part of the inner circle. But I know for a fact that he knows where Iran stands economically. He went with a couple of his advisors to Islamabad, and the advisors that he took with him made it very clear to me that he understood that the only thing Iran needed right now was cash. Because they went to discuss the freezing of Iranian frozen assets or funds in restricted accounts in Oman, Qatar and probably Iraq. Because Hemati knows the economy has collapsed. It's in deep recession. And the only thing that can save them right now is getting those cash out of those accounts. So I think there's some level of departure as far as understand economic understanding between the IRGC and the regime, the core of regime political side that you can hear some of those discussions coming out of Iran right now. But then at the end of the day, the Iranian regime as a whole knows that if they win the war of narrative right now, they might be able to win in Pakistan. And how they can win that is to continue to drag their feet with a straight or foremost, the more they drag their feet, the more that narrative is going to become bolder and stronger, translating into political pressure on President Trump to really agree to some kind of compromise at the negotiations table in Pakistan.
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B
So taking that narrative and the power of that narrative together with the fact that you said yourself over 90% of Iran's trade flows through Hormuz, they really have short term leverage, even though, as you argue it's mutually destructive. And in the long term, this is not any sort of leopards. Can't they still then weaponize this pain in the short run?
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C
It's not just 90% of the oil that goes out. The blockade, which was a very smart move by the Trump administration, also disrupt the flow of imports to Iran. Some of those imports are critical and Iran runs on very short inventory. Domestically. One of them is gasoline. So Iran produces around 105 million liters a day of gasoline. It needs somewhere around 130 to 135 million liters of gasoline a day. But then their production capacity hasn't really increased. So you're looking at about 30,000 million liters a day of deficit in gasoline production or gasoline inventory. And every time Iran faced gasoline shortage or they had to increase the price, they had domestic uprising. It's an economy that heavily relies on land transportation and it's an economy that runs on gasoline. Iran was importing about 60 million liters of gasoline a day. That was the best gasoline import day. So if they can't keep up with that import, it's also unclear how much reserve gasoline reserves they have domestically. I've seen different numbers, but it seems to be very low. So even if they have 20 days of gasoline reserves, you're looking at around another 20 days that they can keep going if the gasoline is not coming in. And then they're going to have a major problem.
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A
I think it's important for our listeners to understand that while Iran is a gas producing country, the refineries are limited to the extent that, you know, it has to import refined gasoline, which is sometimes counterintuitive, and beyond the gasoline, which
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B
is hard to say because there really isn't anything beyond the gasoline that is critical to the economy. But a recent New York Times piece pointed out actually that, you know, despite it all, in recent years Iran has managed to conduct trade with more than 170 nations and that all the non oil trade reached $109 billion over the past 12 months. Kind of importing smartphones, tractors, auto parts, and even kind of making their own, adapting to the situation by producing more goods domestically, stuff like cars and steel and iron. So putting the gasoline aside, if we can maybe hypothetically at this point, it is still adapting.
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C
Iran still relies on importing catalysts for its metal production. Same with petrochemicals. You take those out, the production is going to drop very quickly. Auto manufacturing relies on the importing of technology and parts that still can't produce domestically. Quite frankly, that's what they do with the oil revenue that goes and gets stuck in China because they can't repatriate the majority of the revenue from oil because of the banking sanctions. They send oil to China, 90% of the oil, probably more than 90%, goes to China. The revenue get stuck in Chinese bank accounts because those financial institutions don't want to touch that money. They don't want to send it anywhere. And then the Iranians use those money, those funds that are sitting in China, to import goods that they need. So as a matter of fact, that really became a major roadblock in their domestic production capacity because they were just, they had to use that money to import things and they had that money available and they kept bringing in auto parts and catalysts for their petrochems and as a matter of fact, their solid fuel for their missiles. These are chemicals that they bring from China using those funds. So as much as everyone thinks that the Iranian regime took the direction of creating an economy that can resist sanctions and war, they've done the opposite. They've created an economy that is unable to continue without having to rely on essential goods and services coming from outside Iran.
- [20:10]
B
And to push you a bit more on the narrative part, because that is also another lever, I think, that is not spoken about too much. Iran is suffering deeply, slowly. So isn't there also a scenario where the political pressure on the United States, the narrative building against the United States and its allies is building faster, gets more momentum than the economic collapse inside Iran? In other words, how long is going to be before you think the patience runs out in the rest of the world.
- [20:37]
C
You know, that's a billion dollar question. I agree with your point. I think the speed, the pace of political pressure here in the US and in the west is in a much faster pace than Iran's economic, not economic collapse. So that has already happened. But the realization inside Iran and the regimes actually feeling the pain of it, the clock is moving much faster on the US side. It's unfortunate that I think that the narrative, the way that it's been really highlighted and boosted in the media, is moving the US Government to just trying to get out of this as opposed to just finish it once for all. I have the opportunity sometimes to talk to CEOs of big corporations, some of them that are affected by this and some of them, some of the banks, you know, what they're saying is, hey, we took the hit. We don't want this to happen again. Just finish it, just stay in it. We already under the pressure. If it takes another two weeks, four weeks, six weeks to just check this Iran's issue once for a while, I think that the CEOs of major corporations are just willing to take the hit for it. But you also have the issue of airliners in the U.S. you know, that are facing a fast moving clock on jet fuel and the high season is coming, the summer is coming. And I think that's another issue that might really change the decision making here in the White house in the U.S.
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A
miyad, is there a point where if we kind of think through how it ends, Right. Let's assume that tomorrow they reach some level of an agreement, then negotiate further. Do you anticipate a dynamic in which the sanction relief is blanket and is not conditional and so Iran can kind of snap back, if you will, faster? Or do you anticipate that the exit from the crisis will be some conditional easing of sanctions in return for fulfilling certain conditions? Because some of the reports, especially obviously from Iran, relate to some kind of a blanket removal of the sanctions. You've had such an incredible experience in this space. Can you elaborate a bit on how you think this unfolds in a positive scenario? Sure.
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C
I mean, you hear some reports from Iran that there would be some kind of a blanket sanctions relief, that they would receive relief of primary and the secondary sanctions. That means not just US Entities and US Companies will be open to go to Iran, but also secondary sanctions on foreign actors, foreign governments, foreign entities to start doing business with Iran. That is very detached from the reality, but that's kind of a type of messaging you get from Iran because they have a foreign exchange market run by the psychological messaging and narrative as opposed to the economic numbers and factors. You know, it's interesting, every time US goes through rounds of negotiations with Iran, you hear from Iran, this type of messaging, that hey, we're about to get a deal, we get a deal, it's going to be a full sanctions relief. We get a deal, we're going to get $50 billion released. And they do that because domestically they need those taking a day at a time relief. Right now what's going to happen here if you move towards some kind of an agreement, you know, that would include some kind of a sanctions relief for the Iranian regime, I have no doubts that those sanctions relief would be offered in a way that they're reversible to the way tied to specific steps that Iran takes on whatever agreements we reach on whatever topics. So for example, if it's related to Iran's uranium enrichment, if Iranian agrees to no enrichment at all, then I think as soon as those highly enriched uranium are out of the country, Iran will receive some kind of a financial incentive, some sanctions relief incentives. When Iran allows inspectors to start going into Iran and inspect nuclear sites, then there would be another round of sanctions relief. So it would be phase by phase, something very close to the jcpoa. That's how usually these sanctions relief packages are negotiated. Right now, even if there are sanctions relief that are offered to Iran as an off ramp for some kind of agreement, we go back and look at the jcpoa. That's the best case study to look at the Iran nuclear deal. If you look at the essential goods, the prices and availability of food items or agricultural commodities in Iran, the jcpoa, despite the very robust sanctions relief that it provided to Iran, didn't really translate into any kind of major economic relief domestically. And there are different elements of that. The most important part of it is just the way that Iranians economy, Iran's economy is structured. It's very opaque, it's very corrupt and there are a lot of pockets that you have to fill before you get to the ordinary Iranians and you see the effect on the day to day Iranian economy. Two, the international financial sector, financial institutions and businesses, they make the decisions not based on some short term agreement. They look at 10 years, 20 years ahead. If you recall, as a part of the Iran nuclear talk agreement, US Administration officials at the time, some European officials were actually traveling encouraging investments in Iran to get the JCPOA to be working for the Iranians economically. And they still couldn't they still couldn't get whole lot of investments in Iran. They couldn't really get Western reputable businesses get into Iran's economy because of the risk that comes with this regime. So it would be a phase by phase type of agreement under sanctions relief. And it wouldn't really, if we have this regime, the same regime in place, it wouldn't really turn into significant ostensible economic reforms or changes in Iran.
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A
And maybe just a quick point to your thoughts on Secretary Besant's point a couple of days ago about the fact that Iran has hit its neighbors in a way that is now making Qatar, UAE more forthcoming in discovering and sharing certain bank accounts with the U.S. do you anticipate that some of that vulnerability will increase as well? Where the funding and financing of the Iranian leadership are in the Gulf, banks will be more willing to share those with the US Administration.
- [26:47]
C
That's a really good point. Yes. I mean the Gulf nations, the Gulf countries are going to be way more cautious with Iran right now after what Iran did in the straight of four months. Listen, they fired more missiles and drones at UAE than Israel or any other targets. And UAE is their economic lifeline. They took over most profitable economic sectors one after another after Iran Iraq war was over in the 80s and the Iranian businessmen, the businesses that were owned by ordinary Iranians, they found no space and room in Iran to maintain economic activities because regime was taking over everything. So they moved their money to Dubai. So Dubai became kind of an exile for Iranian businesses. Now who moved to Dubai regime right after the Iranians moved their businesses there because they found the opportunity to use these businesses as human shield to engage in sanctions evasion to the point that it's very difficult for UAE to understand what part of the Iranian money and business activities in Emirates are tied to the Iranian regime. And one part of it is just ordinary Iranians having moved their businesses there. So now they're becoming way more careful. They're putting in measures that would really avoid the Iranian regime at least expanding its activities in uae. And with everything else that happened during this war, Iran's going to have to rely more on jurisdictions such as uae and they're just not going to have that anymore to the point to the way that they had it before the war. So it's just going to make things way worse for them.
- [28:22]
B
So bottom line, if it does become a prolonged standoff, who do you think blinks first with your knowledge of everything you just said? Is it Iran because its economy literally cannot breathe without Hormuz or is it, the US and its allies, because of, you know, the narrative building, as you said, the American constituents and so forth. And also because the global energy markets and political pressure is going to make this maybe too costly to sustain in the short term.
- [28:44]
C
At least on one hand, I think President Trump has shown to be very persistent with Iran. We've seen that he's just not giving up. But at the same time, you know, I'm in D.C. i see the buildup of resistance or objection to the continuation of this war, of this conflict, and there's a lack of realization that we're very close to be done with this regime. But again, at the same time, again, it's very difficult to predict who's going to blink first. Unfortunately, the US Government and the west might end up being the one blinking first, because that's always been the case, historically. Iran in 2014, 2015, was so economically vulnerable that we could have gotten a deal that was way better than the jcpoa. But just because the administration at the time was running out of its political clock and that we're getting close to the end of the term, they rushed and caught a deal that just ended up not sticking and not being a good deal. So I think we might repeat the same mistake here, and the US Government might blink first. Some of it is because of the political pressure here domestically. We have a midterm election coming up here, and President Trump ran his political campaign on economy, and now he's finding himself having to answer more questions about this state of economy right now than anything else. So it's possible that we blink first. And it's also our allies and partners that are putting that pressure on the US Government. So, unfortunately, I think we're taking a direction that we might blink first. I hope not.
- [30:19]
B
Miyad, thank you, as always, for such a thoughtful analysis. We will definitely be speaking again.
- [30:25]
C
All right, thanks for having me. This was great. I always enjoy having these conversations with you.
- [30:29]
A
Thanks, Miyad.
- [30:30]
B
Thank you so much.
- [30:36]
A
It's always a pleasure to hear, you know, from a person who kind of sees through all the bullshit. He knows all the numbers. He's been there for a decade. All those people online, the influencers, people who have become, you know, experts in one day for the ins and outs of Hormuz or the overall Iranian economy and its fragility. It's great to have Miyad set everything in place for us, for our listeners. And I think the thing I take away from the session today is that the split in between the diplomatic, as they're called, the suit wearers and the weapon holders is truly becoming an interesting split. And in that context, I find it very interesting that this week, as Abbas Aragchi, the foreign minister, notified the world that the Straits of Hormuz are now open on X Tasnim, which is the formal sort of news outlet for the regime owned and operated by the Revolutionary Guards, immediately went on to publicly scold Arakchi. I don't remember ever having seen that in Iran. And here are the words of the week that come out of that bad and incomplete tweet by Aragchi. An incorrect ambiguity creation regarding the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, our country's foreign minister wrote in a tweet just a minute ago. Literally it was just a minute before that. Following the ceasefire in Lebanon, the Strait of Hormuz will be fully open for the passage of commercial ships for the remaining durations of the ceasefire period. This was a very stark, very aggressive position taken by the weapon holders of Iran. I really hope we're not going to fall into that scam. We know all too well from Hamas, the regime is the regime, whether or not it wears a suit or a weapon. The repression, the betrayal of their citizens, giving up on trillions of dollars of growth that could have served everyday Iranians in the service in the hope of obtaining a nuclear weapon and wiping Israel off the map. You know, it doesn't matter if you're wearing a suit or a weapon if you're part of that regime for sure.
- [32:35]
B
That's it for today's show.
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A
Thanks for tuning in to Ark Media's what's yous Number? We hope you found it interesting. Share it with others. If you have any questions or suggestions, feedback, please reach out to us either via Instagram or our social media or easier on what's yous Number at@ark media.org.
- [33:00]
B
What's yous Number is an Arc Media podcast. Arc Media's executive producer is Adam James Levin. Already production manager is Brittany Cohen. ARC's community manager is Ava Weiner. What's yous Numbers? Interim Executive producer is Beth Perlman. Sound and video editing is by Liquid Audio. Our theme music is by Midnight Generation. I am Yael with Listener Levy.
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A
I'm Yonatan. I hope I join you back in Israel. Let's hope that the negotiations fare well and they can fly out of here later in the week.
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B
Oh gosh. I will be here waiting for you.
- [33:32]
A
All right, see you next week.
- [33:33]
B
Bye bye.
- [33:38]
A
This podcast offers general business and economic information and is not a comprehensive summary for investment decisions. It does not recommend or solicit any investment strategy or security.