← WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
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- [00:02]
Al Murray
Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com we haveways.
- [00:25]
James Holland
On WhatsApp no one can see or hear your personal messages. Whether it's a voice call message or sending a password to WhatsApp, it's all just this. So whether you're sharing the streaming password in the family chat or trading those late night voice messages that could basically become a podcast, your personal messages stay between you, your friends and your family. No one else, not even us. WhatsApp message privately with everyone Abercrombie's vacation.
- [00:55]
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- [01:23]
James Holland
Price reflects Discount this episod brought to you by State Farm Knowing you could be saving money for the things you really want is a great feeling. Talk to a State Farm agent today to learn how you can choose to bundle and save with a personal price plan. Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there. Prices are based on rating plans that vary by state. Coverage options are selected by the customer. Availability, amount of discounts, and savings and eligibility vary by state.
- [02:00]
Harold Nicholson
What a grim interlude in our lives. The government may decide to evacuate Kent and Sussex of all civilians. If, as I hope they are orders instead of advice, then those orders will either be go or stay. If the former, then you know what to do. If the latter, we are faced with a great predicament. I don't think that even if the Germans occupied Sissinghurst they would harm you, in spite of the horrid dislike which they feel for me. But to be quite sure that you are not put in any humiliation, I think you really ought to have a bare bodkin handy so that you can take your quietus when necessary. I shall have one also. I am not in the least afraid of such sudden and honourable death. What I dread is being tortured and humiliated. But how can we find a bodkin which will give us Our quietus quickly and which is easily portable. I shall ask my doctor. Friends, my dearest, I felt so close to you yesterday. We never need to put it all in words. If I believe in anything surviving, I believe in a love like ours surviving that. That was a letter by Harold Nicholson mp, part of the Ministry of Information, in a letter to his wife the the writer and gardener Vita Sackville west on 26 May 1949. And obviously a bare bodkin is a euphemism for a file of something deadly.
- [03:21]
Al Murray
Harold Nicholson stories are fantastic. I recommend to anyone they're this amazing snapshot into the, you know, the machinations of the time, politically, diplomatically, all that, but also into the mind of really extraordinary people. The idea.
- [03:35]
Harold Nicholson
Dramatic.
- [03:36]
Al Murray
Oh, yeah, exactly. Those orders will either be go or stay. Yeah, the idea that you need to use a euphemism when writing to your wife about taking your own life. It's quite funny, isn't it?
- [03:47]
Harold Nicholson
Well, it is, it is and it's melodramatic and again, you know, writing to his wife but sort of of, you know, the whole thing sort of cloaked in euphemism. I mean, you know, I'd hate to be humiliated. I mean. But it also underlines, I think, the kind of terrible panic they're all feeling.
- [04:04]
Al Murray
Giant, gigantic sense of flux. Literally everything's up in the air, isn't it? No one knows how any of this is going to fall and all of the ramifications are total.
- [04:13]
Harold Nicholson
They're preparing themselves for the worst.
- [04:15]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. And that could be anything because their imaginings about what's going to happen if London is bombed, for instance, is that the mob will rise up against them is what the ruling classes are also worried about. They're thinking about that too.
- [04:28]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah.
- [04:29]
Al Murray
They're thinking about the possibility of a revolution or something as well, in which nice people like the Nicholsons will get swept away in the first sort of wave of it.
- [04:38]
Harold Nicholson
Say forever, you know, say goodbye forever. For their rose garden.
- [04:42]
Al Murray
Exactly.
- [04:44]
Harold Nicholson
And their castle.
- [04:46]
Al Murray
Exactly. They have to sell their castle, you know, as we saw in the last episode. And welcome, by the way, to. We have ways of making you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland, our Five Days in May series. We've settled on five days, haven't we, Jim? It's five days in May.
- [04:57]
Harold Nicholson
It's five.
- [04:58]
Al Murray
Where we're trying to go as deep as we can into the sort of high politics and decision making that surrounds the Dunkirk evacuation. Those of you who are long term listeners will remember that for the 80th anniversary in 2020, I think it's from episode 141 to 148, something like that. We did look at some Dunkirk stuff before, but we wanted to. We wanted to look at the sort of. This kind of high drama, this. Some of which, as we've just seen, borders on melodrama and certainly the way people express themselves at the time. But where absolutely everything is up in the air, all the certainties that were in place on the 9th of May, even the morning of the 10th of May as Winston Churchill came into government, it's all gone. Everything's up in the air. The Empire is up for negotiation, as the Italians have made clear. You know, the survival of the British army is completely on very thin ice. Everything's up for grabs. And. And it's. Whether the Germans can grasp it or not, or whether the British can actually find their way out of this situation is what these five days are about, right?
- [05:59]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [06:00]
Al Murray
I mean, it's the most important five days, you said last time, in British history, since 1066. I'd say it's more important than 1066, because 1060, long, long time ago. Who cares? Right? It's my. As you know, it's my general attitude to things. A long time ago. Who cares?
- [06:16]
Harold Nicholson
We all need to care about this one.
- [06:18]
Al Murray
Yeah, you can you. There's a fork in the road here and there are an awful lot of people in Britain who are thinking of. Of taking the other fork in the road and you can see why all their certainties has been shattered. So you can see why in our previous episode, Lord Halifax, you know, who is a highly respected British statesman and for. Is the Foreign Secretary. And it's interesting, he's not in the Commons, so he's slightly detached from the regular grind of British politics.
- [06:43]
Harold Nicholson
Yes. And he's now actively starting to think of alternative ways out of this battle.
- [06:48]
Al Murray
He's looking at the other fork in the road which could so easily have been taken, is the thing. They don't know what's going to happen next. So we are. We're having a day of prayer, aren't we, Jim? That's the point.
- [07:01]
Harold Nicholson
Well, the King is. But. But. But the Germans aren't.
- [07:03]
Al Murray
No, no, the Germans are not.
- [07:05]
Harold Nicholson
So the halt order continues. I mean, amazingly so. Having. Having enforced the halt order on the Panzers on the afternoon of the 24th of May, Hitler then gives von Rundstedt, complete author, the order whenever he sees fit. So he goes, right, I've sorted this all out now, now it's up to you. The outrage along the German units ranged along the canal line, which those who listen to the first episode will remember is, is the sort of defensive position that runs from the River Aar into Le Basset Canal to the, and this is the south of the lozenge. So the, the BEF and the French first Army in a kind of lozenge shape extending kind of from Dunkirk and this is the southern bit. And von Bock who's the commander of Army Group B is absolutely incensed. You know, he abso senses that there is this golden opportunity to completely pinch off this lozenge and encircle the whole lot, lock, stock and barrel. And he can't all the time of every passing hour that they're not doing anything. The British and French are able to, British particularly are able to move into Dunkirk and start preparing this perimeter. And there's a very useful perimeter there which is yet another canal, the Burgu Canal which runs around sort of go goes goes is about sort of five miles in, something like that. Very sort of neatly encases the whole of the Dunkirk and the beaches extending north eastwards into Belgium. So you know, this is a really, really, really bad decision from the point of view of Hitler and, and the.
- [08:35]
Al Murray
Germans given von Runstedt's attitude to blitzkrieg. And we're using that word advisedly, we're using that word with oven gloves on one because we know perfectly well that that's really a Nazi propaganda word and there's kind of no such thing involved. Runstead is an example of how there's really no such thing. Giving that decision to hold up the Panzers to Von Runstead means they will be held up longer. Because he doesn't buy it. He thinks the things too. He's old school. Risk, he's old school, he thinks it's too risky, it's too hot headed, it'll result in, you know, being over, kind of failure. Yeah, exactly, overreach. And so Hitler's sort of double bound his army by first of all having stopped them and then deferring the decision to restart to someone who's disinclined to do so.
- [09:18]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. And the reason why Von Bock is so furious is because his infantry divisions are 50 miles away and they've got to advance on foot, whereas the Panzers are on the Le Basse Canal and kind of basically there. So all they've got to do is kind of, you know, put into first gear and press the throttle and off they go and so instead of, you know, so suddenly they can become the hammer and, you know, and von Bock's infantry divisions the anvil. But it's turning out to be the other way around. And that's ridiculous.
- [09:48]
Al Murray
It is ridiculous. And thank God it's one of those, you know, as we said a moment ago, this is the. The decision point in the survival of Western civilization. So we've got to be grateful for this. On this day of prayer. We have to be grateful for this chaos amongst the enemy and thankful to Hitler in his own weird way.
- [10:05]
Harold Nicholson
Thank you, Fiora. A phrase I never thought I'd say.
- [10:11]
Al Murray
We've gone there, but.
- [10:15]
Harold Nicholson
But it's interesting because. Because General von Kluger, and who's full commander, and von Kleist, you know, who have both originally suggested the order in the first place, you know, the halt to kind of just buy a bit of time, are also now think it should be rescinded immediately, but it's not happening.
- [10:29]
Al Murray
We've all had buyers remorse in our life, haven't we? That's what that is.
- [10:33]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Anyway, it doesn't happen, of course. What's even more galling is that the number of units that have already made it across the canal line have been told not only to halt, but to come back. And early on 25 May, Guderian visits the Waffen SS Liebstandarte Division and then finds them crossing the River Aar in defiance of the order. Gondarian crosses too, and eventually finds the commander Oberg Dietrich, remember him?
- [10:56]
Al Murray
There's an alarm bell.
- [10:57]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, yeah. In the ruins of a castle on a worldplace hillock called Mount Vatton. And when Gondarian asked him why he was disobeying orders, Dietrich points out that Mount Vaughten commanded very strong position, that the task of crossing the isle would be very much harder if it was enemy hands. And of course, you know, Kadarian says, yeah, fair. Fair enough.
- [11:12]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah.
- [11:13]
Harold Nicholson
So they defy it a little bit, but they don't divide completely.
- [11:16]
Al Murray
Yeah, they bend the rules. But that's Guderian style, isn't it? Isn't it?
- [11:20]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, exactly. But. And Von Brauch, who is the filmmaster, Von Brauch, who is the commander in chief of the army of the. Okh. The Oberkommando Dahera, he is commander in chief of the army because he always bends to Hitler's will. And, you know, he's a fairly weak character. And there's been a couple of times already in this war where, you know, he's gone in with grim determination to kind of be defiant and come out a quivering wreck, you know, shout in spittle and shaking. And there's another moment now because on the 24th, on the afternoon of the 24th, he gets summoned to see Hitler and obviously it's his opportunity to point out to the Fuhrer the lunacy of this halt order and to explain in very, very clear terms a golden opportunity to finish off the battle and destroy the BEF and win potentially the entire war. But when he comes back, Halder yet again finds him shaken and humiliated and you know, he finds himself on the receiving end of another tongue lashing. And commander in chief tries to put across his arguments but failed Holden notice in his diary apparently again a very unpleasant interview with Zafuhrer.
- [12:27]
Al Murray
It's spectacular, isn't it? And it's Hitler exerting his authority, isn't it?
- [12:30]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, he's the lance corporal, he's a working class man who's now in charge of this Prussian aristocrat and he's giving him what for. It's a mixture of don't screw with me, don't you know, I'm, I'm your dirt to me, spite, ego, class, war, the whole thing all wrapped into one. But you know, in the process of doing it, potentially a war losing decision.
- [12:50]
Al Murray
Yeah, definitely, yeah. Anyway, Halder in the meantime has been working out how to get around the halt order. So this is what they all start doing basically. And Justice Guderian and Dietrich, how do we, how do we work our way around this? And he issues a message to army groups A and B, expanding onto directives into the May 24 Army High Command order. So he basically says we can carry on the attack towards Dunkirk, Cassel, Este Armentieres and Ypres Ostend. So not Canal line but the northern.
- [13:21]
Harold Nicholson
Half, which does shut army group.
- [13:22]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah. Which basically closes things off for the BEF and it's a go ahead. So carry on chaps, rather than a new order. And it's not a Fuhrer order. It doesn't contradict anything von Runsted said or Hitler said. And then amazingly von Runstead says no, I'm not having it because he obviously thinks it's just that it is not worth Hitler finding out about this and.
- [13:45]
Harold Nicholson
Me getting, me getting in the do.
- [13:46]
Al Murray
Do the bollocking and the sacking that will be coming my way. There's no doubt that everyone, everyone certainly knows by now that this is what happens if you defy Hitler's will, which is after all the point but how.
- [13:56]
Harold Nicholson
They'Re just absolutely blowing a gasket himself. You know, he goes, this is a complete reversal of the plan. I wanted to make Army Group a hammer and Army Group B the anvil in this operation. Now, B will be the hammer and A the anvil. As arm B is confronted with a consolidated front, progress will be slow and casualties high. I mean.
- [14:16]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah. I mean, what's interesting is that Paris and London are both sixes and sevens, but so are the Germans too. You know, there are moments in the war, we've talked about this, where actually no one knows in the west, in London and Paris, that the Germans are having this problem. No one knows about it. It's just this mysterious halt. No one knows what's going on under the surface.
- [14:38]
Harold Nicholson
No, of course not.
- [14:38]
Al Murray
And of course not. But the sort of state of funk that both sides are in kind of match each other in a weird way.
- [14:44]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [14:46]
Al Murray
It's indecision. Allies are panicking at the prospect of defeat and the Germans, in a weird way are panic at the prospect of victory. That there's a peculiar thing that's putting the halt on them, grabbing their.
- [14:56]
Harold Nicholson
They're panicking that victory is in their grasp. It might be snatched away with them by. By recklessness. That's what they're thinking. But actually the. The irony is. And actually this, this mirrors what Halifax is doing. In a weird sort of way, the caution is the rec. Is the recklessness.
- [15:10]
Al Murray
Exactly. Well, it's Hitler's personal recklessness. That's actually what's the cause of this, of the caution. That recklessness, one way or another, is the problem, but it's just. It's manifesting itself in a completely different way, which is that he's yelling at.
- [15:23]
Harold Nicholson
People and showering them in spittle.
- [15:24]
Al Murray
Exactly. The recklessness has popped up somewhere else, but it's just as decisive.
- [15:29]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. So anyway, Halder urges von Brauch to try again to persuade Hitler. Von Brauchitsch does, but Hitler's having absolutely none of it. And von Rundstedt, along with his chief of staff, General Georg von Sodenstern, are absolutely determined to keep the halt order in place throughout the whole of Saturday 25th May. But this isn't just differences in military ideology, this is just pure bloody mindedness, isn't it?
- [15:52]
Al Murray
Yeah, well, and him thinking, you know, I'm not going to contradict the fear now it's too late.
- [15:57]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah.
- [15:58]
Al Murray
Here's a marked contrast, isn't there? That is that the Germans can't decide stuff without on the ground without political say so the Allies generally, it doesn't really work like that.
- [16:08]
Harold Nicholson
Well, up until this point the Germans have. And this is the decision of Guderian to kind of push on Sedan rather than where von Kleist wants him to cross. And crossing the Ardennes Canal when von Kleist has told him to kind of hold fire and he just does it anyway. And that's very much the German tradition that those on the ground are best placed to make decisions. They've got to be the right decisions, of course, but they are given the kind of latitude to make those decisions. This is the first big interference I think of the war and it's the first big interference of Hitler properly micromanaging. But you know, what it shows is Hitler's complete lack of military understanding. And this has proved even further with his complete indulgence of Field Marshal Goering, you know, commander in chief of the, of the Luftwaffe. And on the 23rd, Goering's on his train, Asia, when he hears the news that the enemy is now almost surrounded and you know, he wants to have the Luftwaffe are in at the kill.
- [17:03]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [17:04]
Harold Nicholson
So he thinks, you know, this is a great opportunity, I must speak to the Fuhrer at once. And he then rings Hitler and tells him that his Luftwaffe could, could set the Channel ports ablaze and destroy the British troops trapped in the encirclement. And Hitler goes great, well crack on then. You know, don't need the armies. You know, the armies can halt and be secure and the Luftwaffe can, can finish off the BEF and the French.
- [17:23]
Al Murray
Yeah. And in that process he's setting the Luftwaffe, which is run by an actual Nazi party member, by a high up Nazi. He's setting the Luftwaffe against the army. So it's the Hitler management in large, isn't it? Basically, if the Luftwaffe win this, then, then the army can sweat about it. I mean it's.
- [17:40]
Harold Nicholson
So now, so now it's all on. The Luftwaffe is going to finish it all off. But General Yodel, who is the chief of staff of the okw tells Major Gerhard Engel, who keeps a diary at this time, and he's a, he's a career officer and he's on Hitler's staff. He, he tells them that, that, he says confidentially that that Luftwaffe has bitten off more than it can chew. But Goering doesn't think so. Our air force, he tells Milk, who is Milk, we all know, is the second in command, is to mop up the British and persuade the Fuhrer to hold the army back. And Milk also immediately expresses his concerns. You know, forts at the limit of most of his fighter units range, because they're not all up on the coast, they're miles away. They're still in Germany.
- [18:19]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [18:20]
Harold Nicholson
They've already been involved in very, very heavy and intense fighting. And you know, maybe this is too much. And Goering just brushes him aside. He goes, the army always wants to act the gentleman. They round up the British as prisoners with as little harm to them as possible. The Fuhrer wants them to be taught a lesson. General Castelring, who is a Flieger corps commander, Fleeger Corps ii also is concerned about these orders. Bombing Rotterdam, he says, is one thing. Destroying the Channel ports and the British is quite another.
- [18:46]
Al Murray
Yeah. And he. Well, and he's concerned about Spitfires. Isn't I pointed out to goings into modern Spitfires had recently appeared, making our air operations difficult and costly. He's thinking we're biting off more than we can chew here. But it's too late, isn't it? Because Goering has Hitler's ear in a way that none of the soldiers do. None of the generals do.
- [19:04]
Harold Nicholson
Nope.
- [19:05]
Al Murray
And it offers Hitler an opportunity to play people off against one another. We know how clueless the Luftwaffe are about the state of the British air effort later. You know, as we've discussed in our Battle Britain episodes, we know they don't really know their way around any of it, but they know fighter range is a bad thing and that the Spitfires of turning up, they know they might be outmatched. And it's interesting people getting their. Their caveats in early. Even people like Kesseling, who later in the war.
- [19:30]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, yeah.
- [19:31]
Al Murray
Brook no argument with the Fuhrer.
- [19:33]
Harold Nicholson
Well, it's absolutely amazing. And two days later Geringer turns up at Felson at Hitler's tactical headquarters on the German Belgian border rather. And Gerhard Engel, this, this aid on Hitler's staff follows them as they walk through the. Through the woods. And there's a photo taken at distance and you can see Goering wearing one of his great big capes and things. His sort of like dove grey cape. Engel writes in his. In his diary impression, Goering successfully stirred it up against the army. Fuhrer emphasized repeatedly the political liability of the Luftwaffe in contrast to the army. So they're all pitching against one another as well. You know, it's just sort of. It's just amazing.
- [20:12]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah. On the Allied side of the hill, what's quite clear is that British and French commanders, certainly the people on the ground have begun. Have. Have they know which way it's going. They're accepting the inevitable. And they're starting to think not in terms of how do we defeat the Germans, but how do we basically mitigate the situation we're in and they start cooperating. I think it's quite interesting, isn't it, that while the governments, the cabinets are drawing up their own, are dealing with their own sort of panic and funk about what's happening, the soldiers on the ground are going, okay, what do we do? So early on the 26th, Gort sees Blanchard. He's reconciled to the decision that they're going to have to fall back to the coast, but he's actually helpful in drawing up lines of withdrawal so they're starting to cooperate properly.
- [20:52]
Harold Nicholson
Blanchard is 1st Army Command, French 1st Army Commander.
- [20:55]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [20:56]
Harold Nicholson
So in this lozenge that we keep talking about, you've got the BEF in the first half of the lozenge, and then to the east of them you've got French First Army.
- [21:04]
Al Murray
Yeah. Blanchard's not one of the sort of 900 year old French general types, is he?
- [21:08]
Harold Nicholson
No, he's. He's still getting on a bit.
- [21:10]
Al Murray
Yeah, because they're all very, very old, aren't they? I mean, this is part of their problem.
- [21:15]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, no, he's pretty old. He's born in 1877.
- [21:18]
Al Murray
All right, so he is. Yeah, so he is basic.
- [21:20]
Harold Nicholson
He's another 60 year old getting on for 70.
- [21:22]
Al Murray
Yeah, I mean, he needs to be in bed with a cup of cocoa.
- [21:25]
Harold Nicholson
He's 63, isn't he?
- [21:26]
Al Murray
He needs to be in bed with a cup of cocoa and a rusk.
- [21:29]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, a cup of cocoa and a couple of digestives.
- [21:31]
Al Murray
Exactly, exactly. So on the night of the 26th, 27th 1 and 2 Corps who leave rear guards at the frontier defense, they swing back into the center of the corridor while French first Army prolongs the line. So they're reorganizing themselves and.
- [21:45]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, so how the lozenges is going? So you've got holding a northern line, holding a south, and then the eastern end of it is folding in on itself and going back to Dunkirk. That's how it's working.
- [21:54]
Al Murray
Yeah. That following night, the bulk of the BF is to fall behind the river lease with rear guards covering the new line until the night after that. So they're going to fight by day, fall back under the COVID of darkness.
- [22:04]
Harold Nicholson
That's a pretty good plan.
- [22:05]
Al Murray
Yeah. Gort's shorter people. So what he wants to do is, what he decides to do is use villages, towns, high points and Use them as strong point redoubt. So places like Hasselbrook, Cassel, those places in that bit of Flanders that when you, if you go on the Eurostar to Paris, you look at the left hand side of the train, there's Cassel with its windmill on it. That's one prominent feature in that stretch of Flanders. Even though they're cooperating, Gaut isn't saying anything about evacuation to Planchet. No, is he? Although, I mean, what else is he going to do? It's obvious, isn't it? You know, they're not going to hole up there forever and break out. That's never going to happen.
- [22:40]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, but, but meanwhile Gort's chief of staff, Lieutenant General Henry Powno is, is, you know, making the preparations for the defense and working out how to do this. And we mentioned the, the burgoo all the way going down to Fern and then on the way to Neu Port, which is sort of 12 miles, 15 miles from Dunkirk, something like that along the coast. So it's a very obvious natural barrier. And the canal is what, about 15 yards wide, something like that. But it's got quite steep banks.
- [23:08]
Al Murray
It's plenty.
- [23:09]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. You know, tank's not getting across that. You, you know the only way you're going to get across it is to bridge it.
- [23:13]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [23:13]
Harold Nicholson
So the British are making their defenses on the other side.
- [23:16]
Al Murray
You've got dikes and irrigation canals and.
- [23:19]
Harold Nicholson
And you've got the infantry on the canal line. That's basically how it's working. And so what happens is as infantry moves up, they're told to abandon their, you know, take their. Those who are going straight onto the beaches, get told to take their vehicle straight to the beaches. Those who are abandoning them. There's a mass of abandoned vehicles of Burgu for example, where they're all sort of butchered and sand poured into the petrol tank and all that kind of stuff.
- [23:40]
Al Murray
But it's defensible because. Because it's cut up by canals and rivers and stuff.
- [23:45]
Harold Nicholson
Yes, it's very low lying and you.
- [23:47]
Al Murray
Can see the other is the other thing.
- [23:49]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. And the British have opened the sluice gates.
- [23:50]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [23:51]
Harold Nicholson
So it's, it's starting to bog down.
- [23:53]
Al Murray
Yeah. It's not the worst place to be having to do this kind of defensive stand.
- [23:58]
Harold Nicholson
Well, you know, all these irrigation channels, you know, they're easy to flood, which is what they're doing. And that makes it of course very difficult for Panzers to move, which is doubly why this was such a bad decision to have the whole order.
- [24:09]
Al Murray
Yeah. So Gort puts General Ronald Adam in charge preparing the port of the perimeter. He becomes a major player in the army when he becomes adjutant General later in the war. War. And so he's relieving him of his commander, 3 Corps, which is understandable because these core numbers are there. They're not really important anymore, are they, at this stage of the situation? We're looking at battalion actions now, really brigade and battalion actions. People hanging on where they are in the defensive element and then everyone else bugging out as best they can, as coherently as they can. So you don't need to be thinking in terms of core anymore. And he sends in with a BF's Quartermaster General and a bevy of other staff officers to help. So they get organized. And Adam is a great organizer. He's the right, right man.
- [24:47]
Harold Nicholson
He's definitely the right man for the job.
- [24:48]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [24:48]
Harold Nicholson
But by this point, you know, Dunkirk's already being bombed and bombed quite heavily. This is the start of the Luftwaffe's attack to try and destroy the bef. The Panzers might not be coming, but, but you know, they don't know much about that. And if you're, if you're Gort and Pownall and Ronald Adam, you're just thinking this is an absolute first class shower. And Pownall writes in his diary, it is all a first class mess up. And events go slowly from bad to worse. Like a Greek tragedy, the end seems inevitably to come closer and closer with each exceeding day and event. I mean, it's hardly someone with sort of, you know, flush with optimism, is it?
- [25:21]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah. There's no, there's no miracle on his horizon, is there? Yeah, yeah.
- [25:24]
Harold Nicholson
Anyway, that was more of a kind of precursor to the yes to our day of prayer. So maybe we should come back after the break, don't you think?
- [25:31]
Al Murray
Yes, we'll take a break and then we will return with a day of solemn prayer.
- [25:38]
James Holland
This episode is brought to you by Amazon Prime. From streaming to shopping, prime helps you get more out of your passion. So whether you're a fan of true crime or prefer a nail biting novel from time to time, with services like Prime Video, Amazon Music and fast free delivery, prime makes it easy to get more out of whatever you're into or getting into. Visit Amazon.comprime to learn more.
- [26:06]
Harold Nicholson
Put us in a box.
- [26:09]
Al Murray
Go ahead. That just gives us something to break out of the because the next generation 2025 GMC terrain elevation is raising the.
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Harold Nicholson
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- [26:36]
James Holland
McCrispy strips are now at McDonald's.
- [26:39]
Al Murray
I hope you're ready for the most dippable chicken in McDonald's history.
- [26:42]
James Holland
Dip it in all the sauces. Dip it in that hot sauce in bag. Dip it in your McFlurry.
- [26:47]
Al Murray
Your dip is your business.
- [26:48]
James Holland
McCrispy strips at McDonald's.
- [26:56]
Al Murray
Welcome back to. We have ways of making you talk where finally, James Holland and I are about to engage in a day of national prayer. Aren't we, Jim?
- [27:03]
Harold Nicholson
We certainly are. And I mean this, frankly. It can only help, can't it?
- [27:07]
Al Murray
It can only. It can only help. And what's the harm in it? That's the other thing, isn't it?
- [27:11]
Harold Nicholson
No harm in it at all.
- [27:12]
Al Murray
No harm in it at all. So the King calls for this National Day prayer and which. Which happen. But what's interesting though is the Cabinet are getting on with politics even though it's the weekend. Right. Which they don't normally do.
- [27:23]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, so. So, I mean, you know, this is a 247 kind of situation. Very much so. So, you know, weekends are meaningless, frankly. And there is going to be a big service at Westminster Abbey which the King's going to attend and which, you know, all the Cabinet are expected to attend to the Prime Minister and all the rest of it. But first, you know, but that's not till 11 o' clock or something. So the first wall cabinet of the day is at 9am in the Cabinet Room at number 10, which is at the back of the building, overlooking, with windows, overlooking the garden. It's that classic room with the picture of Robert Walpole, the first Prime Minister, above the fireplace. The Prime Minister sits in the middle in front of the fireplace. Did then, does now. So lovely sense of continuity. But also present there are the chiefs of staff. And I should also hasten to add that Churchill isn't living at number 10 at this point. Chamberlain is still living there because Chamberlain's been there for a bit. And one of the things that Churchill was anxious to do was to make not ingratiate himself, but kind of make very, very friendly overtures to Chamberlain, you know, recognizing that Chamberlain is a titanic figure in British politics, that he deserves some respect. And he says to him, you know, stay as long as you want, basically.
- [28:29]
Al Murray
Well, and because Churchill, he might be a Conservative, but he's not. He's not loved by the party at all. And so Churchill needs to clutch people to his bosom. That the party can tolerate. And although Chamberlain no longer can be Prime Minister, he's still very much the leader of the Conservative Party. And. And Churchill's got to be completely sensitive to that, hasn't he?
- [28:49]
Harold Nicholson
Yep. Yep, he has. And also attending this war cabinet are the chiefs of staff. And Churchill begins the war cabinet by telling them that the previous evening he's received a letter from his personal representative in Paris, who is Lieutenant General Sir Edward Spears, who is a. Is a Francophile, who's a great old friend of Churchill's, was a senior liaison officer for the French during the First World War. I was brought up in France, actually. He's British completely, but. But he's French, totally bilingual. He's also the guy who later on becomes the kind of sidekick for de Gaulle.
- [29:22]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [29:23]
Harold Nicholson
Anyway. And he reads out Spears's letter, and Spears is warning the French are deeply pessimistic, that the Weygard plan has been completely cancelled, that Blanchard's first Army has lost all its heavy guns and had no armored vehicles. Refugees are hampering movement. The Belgians, he warns, are about to capitulate. And actually, this isn't terribly unexpected because they're being pushed back and once they've fallen back into the sea, there's obviously nowhere for them to go.
- [29:49]
Al Murray
Yeah. It's like a run on the pound, isn't it?
- [29:51]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. And there's a psychological effect, but there's also a practical headache, which is, for Gort, means that, you know, he's literally just managed to create a continuous line on the northern part of that lozenge that we were talking about. And that bit between the coast and the British troops is now in danger of going and needing plugging, and that's going to need further rejigging of his troops. So that's another major headache, you know. And as Churchill points out on this morning, evacuation is now looking like the only option is the truth of it.
- [30:19]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [30:20]
Harold Nicholson
And he says this being the case, there is a good chance of getting off a considerable number of the bef.
- [30:25]
Al Murray
Yeah, he's whistling there. He doesn't know that, does he?
- [30:28]
Harold Nicholson
No. Privately, he's thinking, if we get 50, 000, we've done well.
- [30:31]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [30:32]
Harold Nicholson
And no one is expecting that. No one is expecting more than 50, 000 out of 300,000 plus to come out.
- [30:39]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah.
- [30:40]
Harold Nicholson
He then tells them Churchill then tells them that Paul Reynaud is shortly going to be arriving, he's the French Prime Minister, and that the Cabinet should be prepared to hear from him that the French aren't going to carry on. So they've got to be ready for that. The Prime Minister then announced that he's previously asked the Chiefs of Staff to prepare a document about what Britain should do if the French were to drop out of the war.
- [30:59]
Neville Chamberlain
What are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably Italy? Can the navy and the air force hold out reasonable hopes of preventing serious invasion? And could the forces gathered in this island island cope with rage from the air involving detachments not greater than 10, 000 men?
- [31:16]
Harold Nicholson
Kind of apocalyptic stuff.
- [31:18]
Al Murray
That is not a good prognosis, is it? That's the thing. I mean, I. I think. But I mean, I think what's interesting there, though, is because we've often, We've often talked about this before and I think when we're looking at this in this kind of. At this kind of close off. We talked about this before, like. Yeah, but there's. That it's never going to happen. The Germans can't pull it off. We all know that sea line, when they actually get to writing it down, is basically nonsense. They don't have a N. They don't have the. They don't have the capability to pull this off. But, but at this point, those things which we know are certainties, no one's sure of that because no one really knows what the German strength is.
- [31:53]
Harold Nicholson
We're just going through this, going through this process by process, by war cabinet, by war cabinet. Are you not feeling a little bit scared? I am, you know, I know what happens and I'm already feeling quite tense and just thinking, yikes. Jesus, when you put it like that, you know. Anyway, so the Chiefs of staff then make some comments and then, then Halifax speaks up on the broader issue. We have to face the fact that it is not so much now a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany, but as safeguarding the independence of our own empire and, if possible, that of France. So, in other words, he now believes the Nazis are unbeatable. That's basically what he's saying. So in this connection, with this in mind, he then tells them about his meeting with Signor Bastianini the previous day, and he says that Mussolini's principal wish was to secure peace in Europe.
- [32:40]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [32:41]
Harold Nicholson
And this would mean peace under German domination. Churchill.
- [32:45]
Neville Chamberlain
No, we could never accept that.
- [32:48]
Al Murray
This is such an interesting moment, isn't it? Because Halifax is right, isn't he?
- [32:53]
Harold Nicholson
No, because he's. Nazis are beatable.
- [32:56]
Al Murray
No, but, but from Halifax's point of view, it's easy because. Because after all, history has not been kind to that faction and, and fair enough. But from his perspective, looking. He's right, really, isn't he? No.
- [33:11]
Harold Nicholson
I don't think he is. Because the Nazis are beatable and, you know, Britain has the world's largest empire and the world's largest merchant navy and has. Still has many assets and has a. Has the world's only air defense system and it has to be tested.
- [33:25]
Al Murray
But only one of those factors is going to be any use in the immediate to draw the power of the empire. And that's going to take ages, isn't it? And so you're looking at. You're in a very brittle, febrile situation where it feels like the whole house of cards is falling in, as we said earlier, everything up in the air. And, and Halifax is thinking, that'll take 10 years. Are we, are we ready for that? Are we? And, you know, he's been Viceroy in India, so he knows how touch and go India actually is as an imperial asset. Perhaps. Maybe he's coming at it that way. I am. Obviously I'm playing devil's advocate to an extent here, but you can see why he thinks this. I think you have to try and get into his head and see why he thinks this.
- [34:00]
Harold Nicholson
I can see why he thinks it, but I don't think he's necessarily right. That's the point. I don't think he is right. I think he's wrong. Yeah, but, but anyway, so, so, so Churchill then says, not not only could we never accept it, we must ensure.
- [34:12]
Neville Chamberlain
Our complete liberty and independence. I am opposed to any negotiations which might lead to a delegation of our.
- [34:18]
Al Murray
Rights and power for Halifax.
- [34:21]
Harold Nicholson
Already this is quite irksome because he's, you know, we might have to negotiate a little bit. You know, we might have to get, you know, we're in a right tight spot and if we want to safeguard our future, they say, you know, fighting on is maybe not the way. What the. Maybe the way is to kind of, you know, maybe we should have a conversation about Malta or whatever, you know, but that's ab. Not on Churchill's radar. And, and this is why. This is the start of a split of a, you know, of how they should approach and deal with the situation. And what's really interesting is none of the other War Cabinet members or the chiefs of staff either agree or disagree. They just, they just go, okay, right, fine, you two have it out.
- [34:56]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [34:56]
Harold Nicholson
Then they, they discuss an 18 page a memoir which has been prepared by the chiefs of staff, entitled euphemistically British Strategy in a Certain eventuality. And I've got an original copy of this. It's just. It's just absolutely amazing.
- [35:10]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [35:11]
Harold Nicholson
And Chamberlain then asks if it's possible to ask the French whether Italy could be bought off. And he says, this might at least keep matters going. To which Churchill says, I agree that.
- [35:20]
Neville Chamberlain
This point is worth bearing in mind.
- [35:24]
Harold Nicholson
But as Halifax then glances through the document, what he does is he reveals his own lack of military understanding, I think, because Britain's ability to carry on, he says, depends on whether air superiority could be established over the Luftwaffe. And Cyril Newell, who is the chief of the air staff, so, you know, he's a member of the chiefs of staff, goes, no, that's not cases. Depends on Britain preventing the Germans from achieving such air superiority as would enable them to invade this country, you know. Halifax then blunders again because he says, if France collapses, I assume that the Germans would no longer need large land forces. They will then be free to switch the bulk of their effort to air production. Production. What effect would that have on the crucial question of air? And I think he's being really naive here about Germany's relationship with the Soviet Union and also the difficulties of switching from one type of war production to the other. It doesn't just work like that. That would at least give them a huge amount of time.
- [36:14]
Al Murray
Yes, but he. He's not the only. He's not the only politician in Western Europe to not understand how any of these things work.
- [36:20]
Harold Nicholson
But I'm still saying that's why he's wrong.
- [36:22]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah, yeah. No, I just think it. I think it's. It. It. Because so often, and I think we. We talked about this earlier, about how, you know, the. Britain and France have agreed to this alliance and agreed to sort of, you know, a direction of policy that when it comes undone, they haven't done plan B, they haven't got a plan C. D. They've done absolutely no contingency planning in this situation. What will actually happen if France goes up? They've done none of that. No one's. And this is. This shows very often how politics, even in the clinch like this, can operate on very much on a sort of surface understanding of things that politicians. They don't know the stuff that's in front of them. And Churchill's coming at this. He doesn't want. Yes, he wants to fight on, but he's also thinking, I don't want to lose the British Empire. He's an imperialist. He's thinking in those terms. Halifax is thinking in terms of how do we get out of this fix right in front of us right this minute?
- [37:12]
Harold Nicholson
But I think he undermines his argument in this. This war Cabinet meeting by making some false assumptions and I think that that's going to hurt him.
- [37:20]
Al Murray
Yeah. And no one knows that, no one has taken seriously that the Germans are going to go to the Soviet Union next because they've been so staggered by the fact that the Germans had done an allegiance with the Soviet Union. They don't know. They don't know which way the wind's blowing at all in. In that diplomatic.
- [37:33]
Harold Nicholson
No, but at the moment, the Soviet Union is propping up the German war effort.
- [37:36]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah.
- [37:37]
Harold Nicholson
That's the point, you know, of course, Soviet fuel that is powering the Luftwaffe, etc. So. So then Halifax suggests that in the last resort, they could have maybe asked the French to put some of their factories out of gear. And. And Chamberlain, even Chamberlain, who is Halifax's great friend, says, says since the terms of their peace, which the Germans would propose would inevitably prevent their fulfillment, this is completely pointless. And Churchill said, I agree.
- [38:00]
Neville Chamberlain
It has to be expected, moreover, that the Germans would make the terms of any peace offer as attractive as possible to the French and lay emphasis on the fact that their quarrel was not with France, but with England.
- [38:12]
Harold Nicholson
So what you suddenly see is a clear split emerging suddenly this Sunday morning, this day of national prayer, between Churchill, on the one hand, who's anxious not to become involved in any kind of dialogue with Italy or Germany under any circumstances. And Halifaxi believes that it's at the very least worth considering, you know, so the progression from this point is either fighting on or suing for peace. That's the stark choice.
- [38:35]
Al Murray
Yeah. And then they have to go pray. You wonder what they're thinking when they're on their knees at the service at Westminster Abbey.
- [38:42]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah, Because.
- [38:42]
Al Murray
Because that's also that. That's not a long cabinet meeting, is it? It starts at 9. They have to be at the service for 10, don't they?
- [38:48]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. So it's all over 9, 45.
- [38:50]
Al Murray
So it's a pretty punchy bunch of arguments being hurled around and then go do the formalities. And it's extraordinary, isn't it?
- [38:56]
Harold Nicholson
King and Queen turn.
- [38:57]
Al Murray
King and Queen with their masks.
- [38:59]
Harold Nicholson
It's accompanied by Wilhelmina, the Queen of the Netherlands, who's just had to evacuate from. Yeah, from Holland. Yeah.
- [39:04]
Al Murray
And then Churchill stays the first 10 minutes. He's never really a religious man, Churchill.
- [39:09]
Harold Nicholson
No, no.
- [39:09]
Al Murray
Slips out and goes to meet Reyno.
- [39:11]
Harold Nicholson
And then he goes off there. Meanwhile, after the Service Halifax, then returns straight to the Foreign Office where he's visited by Bastinini. They get no further than they had the day before. And then soon after this, Churchill is lunching with Reyno at Admiralty House. And the French Prime Minister, unlike Petan or Wegan, was an Anglophile and he hadn't come to say that they were going to throw in the towel, but did make it clear that the writing's on the wall and he says that personally he was never going to sue for peace, but a time might come when he's forced to resign and he now reveals to Churchill the depth of Petain's and Weygan's defeatism. And that's a big problem because the military and the political have now merged. You know, Petain is a senior, he's a field marshal, is now in the. In the French government and he is actively pursuing an armistice at this point.
- [39:55]
Al Murray
Yeah, he's eyeing the exit. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [39:58]
Harold Nicholson
And even Reyno is admitting that, you know, it's too late on land.
- [40:01]
Al Murray
But it's interesting, isn't it, because Churchill says, well, you know, as soon as the north of France is cleared up, the Germans aren't going to turn south, but they're going to begin attacking Britain. Raider disagrees. And what he says is amazing.
- [40:12]
Harold Nicholson
The dream of all Germans is to conquer Paris.
- [40:16]
Neville Chamberlain
Whatever happens, we are not prepared to give in. We would rather go down fighting than be enslaved to Germany.
- [40:22]
Harold Nicholson
Well, quite right.
- [40:23]
Al Murray
Well, quite right. But that's also quite a thing to say to a country that's about to go down and be enslaved by Germany, isn't it?
- [40:30]
Harold Nicholson
Well, yes. I think what he's trying to suggest is that we've got your back and we're still with you, but by the way, we might evacuate the bef. So Reyno now remains at Admiralty House while Churchill returns to Downing street for the second War Cabinet of the day. And at this second cabinet, Halifax is much more bullish. So since the morning session, he's read all the Chiefs of Staff's aid memoir, in which the following scenario is envisaged. Most of the BEF lost France making peace of Germany, Italy entering the war and Europe from Norway to Africa, ivory in German hands or under German domination. Britain could still hold out, but only if the United States gave full financial and material support and if the Royal Navy and RAF managed to maintain a control over and around the country. So, you know, from where Halifax is, he's not a military man, but he's seeing the whole thing, kind of sort of crumble to dust on the continent. That seems like a pretty bleak scenario. And at the back, in an appendix, are the estimates of Luftwaffe strength and that of the RAF. And on the 17th of May, the RAF had just 491 fights, fighter planes, so Spitfires and Hurricanes, but also including obsolescent defiance. In contrast, the estimate is that luftwaffe still has 4, 500 aircraft. Now, as it happens, they've. They've massively overestimated that. They don't.
- [41:44]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [41:44]
Harold Nicholson
Naval comparisons are much more favorable. 319 of all types of warship for the Royal Navy compared with, you know, around 100 for the Kriegsmarine in a media environment. But the Italian Navy does have 400 vessels of all kinds, which then rather redresses the balance. But, you know, what they don't know is that, you know, the Italian Navy don't have radar. They don't have, you know, they do know that they don't have any aircraft carriers, but they don't have any radar or anything like that. It's pretty sobering stuff. And it's understandable that Halifax believes they're completely staring down the barrel. And their survival seems to, to him, to depend on so many ifs, inverted commas, eventualities, that the chiefs of staff have missed any cause. And none of these eventualities can be remotely guaranteed. He knows that Churchill's always been something of a warmonger and. And, you know, he just doesn't trust his judgment on this. It's the truth of it.
- [42:32]
Al Murray
Yeah, because people don't trust Churchill's judgment. Churchill's judgment in the last decade has been all over the shop.
- [42:38]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. You know, so he now says very starkly that he favors and approached Italy. It's no longer saying, well, you know, we could do this. He's going, I think we should. And Churchill says he doubts very much anything will come to it. But to sort of mollify Halifax at this moment, he says, well, you know, perhaps we should sort of consider it then. So then the meeting breaks up. Halifax goes to see Reynaud at the Admiralty House and discuss a possible buying off of Mussolini, while Churchill and the rest of the War cabinet follows. Some 10 minutes later, and about 4pm, Reynaud finally leaves for Paris. So he goes down to Croydon, flies from there, and Churchill reconvenes another War Cabinet at Hamilton House. And by now, the argument between Churchill and Halifax is becoming more heated. So Churchill points out that Britain is in a very different position to France, which it is. First, he points out Britain still has her navy and her air force powers of resistance. And secondly, France was likely to be offered reasonable terms, but Britain would not. Not be.
- [43:34]
Al Murray
And he says if France could not.
- [43:36]
Neville Chamberlain
Defend herself, it is better that she should get out of the war rather than drag us into a settlement which involved intolerable terms.
- [43:43]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. But he also pointed out that he was very wary about going cap in hand to Mussolini with the French, as Reyna has suggested before Britain had been involved in any serious fighting, you know, and they haven't really. You know, one has to remember it's only kind of nine divisions that involved in the BF at this point. Yeah, no, eight, I think it is, because, you know, first Armit hasn't got there yet and the 51st Highland is to the south and, you know, they're not even involved in fighting at all.
- [44:06]
Al Murray
But the scale of the undertaking to then get involved. And you can see where Churchill. You can actually see in this, where Churchill's thinking will end up going, in terms of fighting the war on the. On the German periphery, that you fight them in North Africa and you fight them in Greece and you fight them everywhere else. Yeah, you can see the strands of that thinking in this approach, strategic approach.
- [44:27]
Harold Nicholson
Got. We've got troops in Egypt and Middle east. We can. We can control the Suez Canal and, you know, yeah, that's good for Australia and New Zealand and Africa and, you know, our dominion forces, and we'll get them up there quickly and, you know, we don't need to throw in the tower yet at all. And Halifax also disagrees that Hitler wouldn't necessarily ask for outrageous terms. He said, he says, we might say to Signor Mussolini that if there was any suggestion of terms which affected our independence, we should not look at them for a moment. But he didn't see any harm in trying an approach.
- [44:54]
Al Murray
Here's where I now can't get my head into how Halifax thinks, because up to this point, that whole list of eventualities and everything, those, Those all in this situation, complete sense, I think, need American backing. We need, you know, all those things they do. But this is where he is. I think he's plain wrong, which is that up till now, there has been. Every agreement Hitler's embarked upon has turned out to be a nonsense and a thing that he's prepared to go back on and the thing that he's prepared to tear up. So whatever terms you might get, I mean, via Mussolini, but whatever guarantees you might get via Mussolini about what Hitler might do, you just can't. You cannot accept. Accept that. You know, that's like thinking that you can Do a deal with Putin right now, you know, that's where. That's where I have to go. No, you're absolutely, completely wrong. And even looking at it from your perspective at that time, the thing, you know, you know, at that point.
- [45:46]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah.
- [45:46]
Al Murray
Is that you can't do a deal with Hitler. Right.
- [45:49]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah.
- [45:49]
Al Murray
All the other things. All the other things are in the balance and the things you can weigh and things you can understand about how the politicians think, but that one is plain wrong.
- [45:56]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. So what's interesting is that neither Chamberlain, Atlee or Green would say anything during the. This discussion. They're just taking it all and there's. They're looking at these two sort of, you know, giants kind of sort of sparring of one another. And Churchill clearly recognizes at this point that he needs to start treading a bit carefully, because if the majority of the War Cabinet agree with Halifax, he's going to be obliged to go along with it.
- [46:14]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [46:15]
Harold Nicholson
In fact, if Chamberlain sides strongly with Halifax, Churchill's position is going to be very difficult because the former Prime Minister, who is the one man who has actually personally dealt with Hitler.
- [46:25]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [46:26]
Harold Nicholson
But is also a great friend of Halifax. Halifax, you know, Attlee and Greenwood, they're new to government, they don't have the same authority. And Churchill at this point is only 16 days into the job. You know, his position is far from secure. Just disabuse yourself of any notions of Churchill at the back end of the summer of 1940, with all these great speeches out of the way, or at the end of the war, or even in the middle of the war. You know, this is him being the new boy. And Halifax stance seems at face value, reasonable. Yeah. They're completely in the mire. Where's the harm of just exploring this? But Churchill knows that to try and argue with Mussolini is you're kicking the door ajar only for it to be blown wide open, that it is a very, very much the thin end of the wedge, that once you get into these talks, it's very difficult to back down from them. And what happens if the French find out?
- [47:15]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [47:16]
Harold Nicholson
You know, that hastens their end. That causes even more problems, you know. So as far as Churchill is concerned, there is absolutely no point in considering, you know, for him, it's a kind of you fight on and die in the process, and you either succeed or you don't, but, you know, you cannot surrender. And so he says, at this point.
- [47:33]
Neville Chamberlain
Herr Hitler thinks he has the whip hand. The only thing to do is to show him that he cannot conquer this country.
- [47:40]
Harold Nicholson
But he does recognize form of concession to Halifax is now needed. So he tells the Foreign Secretary that he wouldn't raise any objection at all to some kind of approach being made to the most Mussolini. And the phrasing he uses is intentionally vague because in reality he has no intention of making any move whatsoever. And Halifax has already discussed a joint draft of Reynaud, which he now reads out. Greenwood suggests that Mussolini might demand Malta, Gibraltar and Suez. Chamberlain crucially said he suspected the Italian leader would demand more than that. And as part of a general settlement with Germany. And the meeting ends with the five men agreeing that Halifax should overnight prepare a draft communique to Mussolini, but not send it to yet.
- [48:20]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [48:21]
Harold Nicholson
And that evening, Churchill dines with his old friend Anthony Eden and Tiny Ironside, even though he's just sacked him at Cigs and replacing with Dill and also with Hastings Ismay, who is his military advisor. And he knows then that Calais is about to fall and that with it, all of the 30th Brigade that he's just sent over there, and which he'd refused to evacuate, plus the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment will have to surrender. And earlier, at 6.57pm, the signal had been given for the Royal Navy to begin operating Operation Dynamo, which is the evacuation of Dunkirk. So much of the BEF is surely, from the perspective of the evening of this national day of prayer, going to follow the Calais garrison into captivity. It is inconceivable that at this point, that it could be anything else. And the worst news from France, the harder it would be to prevent Halifax from getting his way. So that night, Churchill, who loves his food and his, in his drink, barely touches his. His plate or his drink. And afterwards, he stands up with a sad expression on his face and he.
- [49:21]
Neville Chamberlain
Says, I feel physically sick as well.
- [49:24]
Al Murray
He might as well.
- [49:25]
Harold Nicholson
He might. God, the tension. Are you not feeling it? Are you not kind of enthralled? I mean, it's absolutely amazing.
- [49:32]
Al Murray
I am. I'm absolutely, completely. But what I'm also. What I'm also finding really interesting is trying to put yourself in. Trying to put oneself in Halifax's shoes. He's not suddenly behaving like this. He's not, you know, this is a conclusion of the way he thinks about the world, isn't it? And the things he wants to save and the things he thinks, the deals that can be done. And, you know, he's a statesman of great experience and renowned.
- [49:55]
Harold Nicholson
It's just.
- [49:55]
Al Murray
It's very, very interesting because it's so easy to Say, well, because of the way things turned out, he was wrong. That's the, that's the trap, isn't it?
- [50:04]
Harold Nicholson
Yes, but Churchill's perspective is it is better to die and go down fighting than it is to surrender. And I completely agree with him.
- [50:12]
Al Murray
Well, crucial part, the crucial element I think in all of that is Chamberlain going, no, there's no deal to be done with these people because after all, his political career has been destroyed by trying to do deals with dictators in Europe.
- [50:25]
Harold Nicholson
Yeah. And not least Mussolini, I mean, you know, he's met Mussolini. Mussolini is there at Munich.
- [50:29]
Al Murray
Yeah, exactly. Not least Muslim. That's the important part is this is a triangular relationship with, with, between the Western, Western powers. And what are Italy going to do next? So often the question. And you know, because he's a weathercock, isn't he, Mussolini? He goes where the winds but blowing. I mean, after all, they do come into the, into the war, don't they, once they think it's won?
- [50:48]
Harold Nicholson
So a massive opportunist, his greed won't be able to resist the urge to kind of push Britain further than, you know, is reasonable.
- [50:54]
Al Murray
Well, anyway, that concludes our national day of prayer.
- [50:58]
Harold Nicholson
I'm just going to head down to the village church to just sort of have a moment of quiet contemplation and consider those terrible events. I've been quite traumatized by it, I've got to say.
- [51:06]
Al Murray
Well, fair enough. We plead to the Almighty you return for our next episode, which will be the next of our five days in May, Black Monday. I.
- [51:19]
Harold Nicholson
Well, I would argue and I, I, you know, I would argue this is the closest Britain comes to losing the war. Monday the 27th of May.
- [51:26]
Al Murray
Well, we, we hope to see you for the next episode, if you want to listen to these in a lump, of course, without any adverts and all in one one exciting torrent of doom and gloom. You can subscribe to our Apple Channel, become officer class, join our Patreon that we have ways of making you talk, Patron. And of course our festival. We have ways Festival in September 12th, the 14th. We will see you there. Anyway, we'll see you in a moment. Monday. Cheerio, Cheerio.