Peleliu: A Pointless Victory (Part 2)

Summary

WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk Episode: Peleliu: A Pointless Victory (Part 2) Release Date: December 3, 2024

Hosts: Al Murray & James Holland Guest: John McManus

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1. Introduction

In the gripping second installment of their deep dive into the Battle of Peleliu, hosts Al Murray and historian James Holland, along with guest John McManus, continue to unravel the harrowing events of one of World War II's most contentious and bloodiest battles. This episode, titled "Peleliu: A Pointless Victory (Part 2)," sheds light on the intense combat, strategic missteps, and profound human cost of the battle, blending expert historical analysis with poignant personal accounts.

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2. The Devastating Casualties of the 1st Marine Regiment

The discussion opens with a stark portrayal of the 1st Marine Regiment's brutal experience on Peleliu. James Holland recounts, “As the riflemen climbed higher, they grew fewer, until only a handful of men still climbed in the lead squads. These were the pick of the bunch, the few men who would go forward no matter what was ahead” (00:51). The regiment faced unimaginable losses, with over 56% casualties in just eight days—a figure likely underestimated as rifle companies suffered upwards of 75% losses (03:32). These staggering numbers highlight the ferocity and futility of the conflict, echoing the grim realities of World War I's trench warfare.

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3. Harsh Conditions on Peleliu

Al Murray and the team vividly describe the island's harsh environment, which compounded the horrors of battle. John McManus paints a bleak picture: “We're talking jungle on the low levels, lots of vegetation...As you push on up the Uma Brogel, then it's basically exposed coral” (06:23). The coral terrain provided little cover, making soldiers highly vulnerable to enemy fire. The oppressive heat, relentless insects, and poor sanitation turned the battlefield into an unbearable hellscape. James Holland emphasizes, “This is hell on earth” (07:48), underscoring the extreme physical and psychological strain endured by the troops.

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4. The Marines Versus the 81st Division

A significant portion of the episode examines the interplay between the Marines and the incoming 81st Division from the U.S. Army. James Holland explains the cultural and operational differences: “The Marines tend to be very young...the 81st Division guys are older, in their late 20s” (09:46). This age difference influenced combat effectiveness and adaptability. The 81st encountered the seasoned, battle-hardened Marines, leading to initial tensions. Colonel Robert Dark of the 321st Infantry was baffled by Marines like Chesty Puller who positioned their command posts perilously close to the front lines, a strategy he found reckless (11:48).

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5. Leadership and Strategic Missteps

The episode delves into the controversial leadership styles that contributed to the protracted and bloody battle. Chesty Puller, a legendary Marine commander, epitomized aggressive tactics, often pushing his men forward relentlessly. James Holland critiques this approach: “Sometimes valor can be a debt on some levels when you have somebody who just decides...the next frontal attack can make it happen” (27:04). The division commander of the 81st, General Mueller, adopted a more measured approach, focusing on completing objectives without being bound by rigid timetables. This contrast highlights the clash between Marine expeditionary zeal and Army operational patience.

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6. The Pointlessness and Aftermath of Battle

A central theme of the episode is the futility of the Battle of Peleliu. John McManus poignantly states, “It's the pointlessness of it, isn't it? It's a complete pointlessness of it” (31:10). Despite the enormous loss of life—over 6,500 casualties in the Marines and 2,500 in the 81st Division—the strategic value of capturing Peleliu has been widely questioned. James Holland reflects, “It really did have excellent leadership in K Company...but, but also, I think we tend to forget that it's really...the 81st is every bit as embedded in this story as well” (35:46). The battle's outcome left many questioning the necessity and the high human cost involved.

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7. Personal Reflections and Eugene Sledge's Insights

The episode culminates with a moving reflection on the personal toll of the battle, particularly through the lens of Eugene Sledge's memoir, "With the Old Breed." Al Murray shares a profound quote from Sledge: “Something in me died at Peleliu” (24:32). This sentiment captures the deep psychological scars left on soldiers, as they grappled with the relentless violence and loss. The hosts discuss how such experiences resonate with veterans of later conflicts, illustrating the enduring impact of combat trauma.

John McManus adds, “Dr. Sledge dealt with that much of the rest of his life and yet emerged on the other side as such a fundamentally decent person who did so much good in the world” (36:20). This highlights the resilience and enduring humanity of those who survived, despite the unimaginable hardships they faced.

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8. Conclusion

"Peleliu: A Pointless Victory (Part 2)" offers a sobering examination of one of World War II's most controversial battles. Through detailed historical analysis, personal anecdotes, and critical reflections on leadership and strategy, Al Murray, James Holland, and John McManus shed light on the immense sacrifices made and the questionable strategic gains achieved. This episode serves as a poignant reminder of the human cost of war and the complexities of military decision-making.

Notable Quotes:

• James Holland (00:51): “As the riflemen climbed higher, they grew fewer, until only a handful of men still climbed in the lead squads. These were the pick of the bunch...”
• John McManus (31:10): “It's the pointlessness of it, isn't it? It's a complete pointlessness of it.”
• Sgt. Francis Heatley (20:26): “...incredible, you know, utter emptiness, created a hole in my soul as though life no longer had any meaning.”
• Eugene Sledge (24:32): “Something in me died at Peleliu.”

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Join the Conversation: For deeper insights and additional content, consider joining the membership club at patreon.com/wehaveways. Explore more Goalhanger Podcasts at www.goalhanger.com.

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This summary aims to encapsulate the essence of the podcast episode, providing a comprehensive overview while highlighting critical moments and reflections shared by the hosts and their guest.

Transcript

[Al Murray]

Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com wehaveways she's made up her.

[James Holland]

Mind to live pretty smart, learn to.

[John McManus]

Budget responsibly right from the start.

[James Holland]

She spends a little less, inputs more into savings. Keeps her blood pressure low and credit score raises. She's cutting debt right out of her life. She tracks her cash more on a spreadsheet at night. Boring money moves.

[John McManus]

Make kind of lame songs, but they.

[Al Murray]

Sound pretty sweet to your wallet.

[James Holland]

BNC bank brilliantly boring since 1865. As the riflemen climbed higher, they grew fewer, until only a handful of men still climbed in the lead squads. These were the pick of the bunch, the few men who would go forward no matter what was ahead. They are the bone structure of a fighting outfit. They clawed and clubbed and stabbed their way up. The rest of us watched.

[John McManus]

We're not a regiment. We're the survivors of a regiment. That of course, isn't an anonymous marine from the 1st Marine Regiment. Upon leaving the line, we were no.

[Al Murray]

Longer even human beings. That's another anonymous Marine, the first Marine rescue.

[James Holland]

I don't know where that guy comes from in America, but I'd be interested to investigate.

[Al Murray]

If only I knew. He's anonymous.

[James Holland]

He didn't tell us he's anonymous.

[Al Murray]

Exactly.

[James Holland]

So my quote was from Russell Davis, who wrote a fascinating book called Marine at War, A Memoir. And he was in the 1st Marine Regiment. It's this obscure little memoir published probably in the 50s or 60s, but it's really interesting.

[Al Murray]

Welcome everybody to. We have ways of making you talk usa, where again, we are talking about the Battle of Peleliu Part 2. And I'm sure if you remember that by the end of part one we were all on a proper downer.

[John McManus]

We're looking to cheer ourselves up.

[James Holland]

We're looking to cheer ourselves up any way possible.

[Al Murray]

An eventual victory, I mean, that's a spoiler, but. But you know, in the end it was always heading that way. But this is. I mean, the thing that characterized our last chat was really how there's only one way for this to go, isn't it? And that's for it to descend into a meat grinder. The Japanese are completely determined to die trying. Not even win or die trying. Just die trying. The mindset is very peculiar. And then we've had some questionable decision Making as well throughout. So we only covered the first sort of fortnight, didn't we, last time, if that?

[James Holland]

I mean, we covered maybe a little over a week in which basically the 1st Marine Regiment is destroyed. And so Davis is sort of telling us what that looks like in a way as he's watching these guys who grow fewer and fewer in number going up the, those craggy ridges we discussed last time, what's called the Umar Brogall and you know, the network of Japanese defenses and caves in there. And it's just fewer and fewer people carrying the fight who will continue to go forward or at least able to, I guess.

[John McManus]

But it's only eight days, isn't it, that they're on, on the island, the 1st Marine Regiment. And yet in that time they're sort of 56% down.

[James Holland]

Yeah. Which is in a way is an underestimate. It doesn't even show you how bad it is in the rifle companies, which are, you know, of course, suffering most of the casualties. So in most of the rifle companies it's 75% and upward and they're calling out anybody else they can to throw into the mix. And so it's the sort of quintessential example of how bad Peleli was because the 1st Marine Regiment goes in over strength as Marine combat units tend to be during a major invasion. And then within that eight days, it might as well be 80 days. In a sense, it's, it's like World War I trench meat grinder kind of stuff where pretty much everybody's hit.

[John McManus]

I still think there isn't sort of somehow an ongoing perception that it doesn't matter how bad it was in World War II, it's not quite as bad as the Western front in the first World War. And I really hope over the last, I don't know, this year's worth of podcasts, we're disabusing people of that fact because that isn't the case at all. I mean, 70 plus percent losses in your fighting capability, I mean, that's almost sort of German level losses at casino. And that's a byword for kind of just real mismanagement, frankly. I mean, what today, anything less than 30%, you'd be thinking you're combat ineffective, wouldn't you? And rightly so.

[James Holland]

Absolutely. And so you put it on the other side, invert that 70%. I mean, Mike, gosh, you know, just imagine that. And Jim, I think that's a great point because it also leads us to the reality that World War II often was a Terrible meat grinder like that, including, of course, famously on the Western Front in 44 and 45, too. And in Italy, as you know so well, Jim, too. But also that Allied victory is not necessarily inevitable in a way that combat manpower is at a premium, even though we do have the advantage and the probabilities on our side, as we've talked about so many times, the logistics and, and all that. I mean, how many guys are we going to get to go forward like this? Like Davis was talking about, That's a, That's a diminishing asset. You know, that that's very, very difficult thing to put your finger on, but it, but it's there. And, and when you see a unit like the 1st Marine Regiment, which I would argue is among the finest combat regiments that we have in the armed forces at that point in time, when you see them destroyed in eight days, can we recover that and reconstitute that? And if so, how long is it going to take? It's not until Okinawa that they can get back in the game on any level. And that's. So that's September. They're lifted from the line. Okinawa is April 1st. You know, it's a heck of a long time, isn't it?

[Al Murray]

Yeah. I mean, the thing, the distance from the beach up to the Ombud is only a couple of kilometers as well, isn't it? So we're not. We're talking about, you know, intense close, the combat aside, but the size of the battlefield from. So from where they've landed up to the heights is no distance at all. That's the other thing to remember is these are tiny spaces that this is going on in, that entire regiments are being written down.

[John McManus]

Yeah. And also I think we should sort of paint a picture of, of what we're talking about here. I mean, we're talking jungle on the low levels, you know, lots of vegetation, albeit vegetation has been smashed by the war. You've got a airstrip which is just. And a building which has just been littered with chaos and detritus of war. And then as you, as you push on up the Uma Brogel, then it's basically exposed coral. I mean, there isn't really any soil. There's nowhere to hide, really. Again, we've talked a lot about, when we talk about Italy, about the exaggerated blast effect when you're on stone or very thin soil. That's absolutely the case here. And coral, of course, can be incredibly hard. So when it splinters, it's incredibly jagged and lethal, making the shell fire, mortar Fire. Even worse. It's swelteringly hot. There's lots of insects. It's very easy for any, even the slightest wound, pustule, whatever, to go septic and go bad. Keeping any sense of keeping yourself clean is just impossible. You know, if you've got to defecate it, there's not really many places you can go. You can't bury it, really, because. Can't bury anything, you know, so that's the stench of, you know, the heat of the dead and the defecation and the sweat and everything. I mean, the whole place must have just stunk to high heaven.

[James Holland]

Oh, it had to be awful.

[John McManus]

It is a picture of hell. I mean, there's awful fighting and there's awful fighting, and this is about as bad as it's going to be.

[James Holland]

Yeah, this is hell on earth. I mean, you know, we did our series on Hurtgen, and that was obviously terrible. And the tree bursts were a problem and all that. I would argue maybe the coral bursts are worse in part because we can't dig in here.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

The soil is such. We can't get in. And also on the UMA broke, all those ridge lines, they're hard to just walk over, much less fight over. And so keeping your footing is a real problem, you know. So imagine that in addition to everything else. I mean, I don't know how they gained any ground. It's.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

You know, to Al's point. Yeah. It's perilously close to that airfield, which is why, you know, we have the idea that we've got to take it, because the concern is if the Japanese are looking down the, you know, the barrel, their guns at the airfield, that they'll be able to just negate anything that happens there. Similar to Guadalcanal, I suppose, is the concern. Yeah. When the Japanese control Mount Austin and whatnot, it makes Henderson Field a little bit problematic at times. We're worried about that at Peleliu, which is a valid concern, but it perhaps goes a little too far, you know, and having to take every inch of this island, I mean, you know, in those kind of circumstances. So they pull out the 1st Marine Regiment on September 23rd. But the rest of the division, 5th and 7th Marines, stay in place in addition to their artillery and all that. But they bring in finally, you know, we had left off, I think, talking about how Geiger overrules Rupertus.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

And they bring in two regiments from the 81st Division from the US army, the 321st and the 323rd. They're a little bit different socially than the Marines, who tend to be very young, 19, 20, 21 or whatever, you know, volunteers. Now, the majority of the 81st Division guys are volunteers in. In their reserves or. Or just randomly assigned there or whatever, but they're older. They tend to be in their late 20s, about a decade or so older. That is a big difference in combat. So they are stunned at what the Marines look like.

[John McManus]

Can you just explain to me why that is significant, John?

[James Holland]

So, you know, I mean, as we know, combat is a young person's game. And, you know, to be even 20 years old sometimes can be old, you know, in some respects, but the physicality of it also, the mindset of invulnerability that guys have when they're around that age, you simply have to have that in order to get people to go forward. And whatever the naivete, the impressionability, when you're a little older in your late 20s, maybe you're married by then, maybe you have kids, you've had some life experience, and maybe you're not as much a dairy daredevil. And really, that does matter. So you're still young, especially by our standards, you know, as. As older guys. Now, these are young people, of course, but, you know, 28 is different than 19, and so a lot of these Wildcats, that's their nickname, are in that sort of age range. Now, there's plenty of young guys, too, don't get me wrong, especially in the rifle companies. But the 81st tend to skew older. And one of the great impressions they have when they get to Peleliu is. Is just how they can tell. These Marines are very young, but they look a lot older. And, you know, and that's just from the fighting they've been through for the next, you know, for that first week or so.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

And they're kind of stunned. You know, they. They look at and they think, oh, my God, you know, what have we gotten into? Is a very deep sense of foreboding as these rifle companies, you know, take their place in the line. And in one instance, the colonel, the 321st, a guy named Colonel Robert Dark, he's absolutely shocked at how far forward chesty Puller's command post was, because, you know, in. In the army, you just simply wouldn't put your command post so far forward that it's basically like a company command post on. On some levels. And so he has this circular conversation with Puller. It's like, wait, so your command post, I want to know where that is. And Puller's finally like, it's right here, right here, far forward. And Dark is like, wow, this dude is just out there.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

He thought it should have been about a thousand yards back.

[John McManus]

But does he think he's nuts?

[James Holland]

Yeah, he does. He thinks it's absolutely nuts. And from Puller standpoint he's like, well this is just the way we operate. And Puller, we know how valorous he is. And it doesn't make Dark not valorous. It means they go about it differently. Dark's view is you've got to have some cohesiveness to your regimental command post and you can't be right up with the front fighting Puller's views. You got to be right up front all the time to see precisely what's on, going, going on. And, and it's odd because Puller so far forward and yet he doesn't seem to grasp quite what's going on as he just throws his regimen against this like eggs on a wall, in a way against the. Umar Brogol Polar, of course by then is completely exhausted. Yeah, he's had a wound that hasn't healed in one of his legs. He's just, he's been through it here.

[John McManus]

Massively, which isn't very much a nature of the bad hygiene on the, on the island and the conditions and the climate and all.

[James Holland]

Yeah.

[John McManus]

You know, any sore is going to that kind of thing.

[Al Murray]

So what, what then do the 81st achieve though? That's the. I mean, well, you have a little.

[James Holland]

Tension at first because they're. They're given some of these crazy frontal attack orders and because they're under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division under reparatus.

[Al Murray]

Right.

[James Holland]

And so the, the MO is all right, let just send people forward to capture the OMA bro, all, you know, cave by cave, ridge by ridge, whatever it is. But I think it's K company. 321st is just simply not down with that. You know, they' officers are like, we're not sending our people forward to be slaughtered this way. And, and there's officers who are relieved over this and, and the company fails in its objectives. The 7th Marine Regiment, some of them have to come in and deal with this. And so you end up with some army Marine tension initially and I think repaired US reaction is just classic. He's like, there, see, that's what I told you. These are the cats, not the wild cats, you know, and, and he's like, like that's why I didn't want him here in the first place. And it's like, dude, lighten up, you know, I mean, come on now. So it's, it's. So the Marines, some of them who were inclined to be this way, made a lot over that for generations. I mean, I knew some of these guys who were like, yeah, you know, it got so much worse for us when the army came in because they screwed up this up this. And, and actually when you look at it as a, as an historian, it's such an outlier because for the most part when those two regiments come in, they improve the situation immeasurably and they gain ground and the two sides fight very well. It's this moment of tension with one company for one really difficult objective. Yeah, but that's the culture Rupertus had created in his division, unfortunately, to where some people were going to seize on that. Overall, I'll tell you, those two regiments of wildcats go in and fight like wildcats because they have to, to survive. And they don't fight much different than the Marines. I mean, it's very similar.

[Al Murray]

Well, yes, because the terrain is what it is. What can you do differently? It's not like you can outflank anything, is it? I mean, it's not possible, is it? You're going to have to try and crack the nut the same way, right?

[James Holland]

Pretty much, yeah. And of course, the one thing that the 81st has a little bit more artillery than the Marines and so they can make use of that somewhat. Now the Marines had already been disassembling, especially some of their 75 millimeter pieces and sometimes through pulleys and whatnot, had moved them up to have point blank shots at caves. And. But this is also becoming something of an engineer's war too, in that, you know, you're dealing with caves. So to have people with satchel charges, to have, you know, flames, you know, to fire the caves with with gasoline and light them up and, and then if you can get tanks anywhere in this mess, which the Americans do, you know, depending on where we're talking about, and self propelled guns and all that. So the armies usually, usually has a little bit more firepower to bring to bear. And, and so, you know, the 81st will have some advantages. About, about the only thing they do much different than the Marines as things unfold is it's kind of odd, but they're gonna fill up sandbags and then sometimes literally physically push them forward as they attack, like crawl forward with sandbags in front of them in order to try and protect themselves from machine gun fire and other firepower. It's it's very odd and very ponderous, as you might imagine, but that's. That's one little difference. But for the most part, infantry's infantry here and. Yeah, you know, they're all in the same mess.

[Al Murray]

Yeah. And at night, because the Japanese very aggressive at night, aren't they? That's one of the things they're prepared to be.

[James Holland]

Yeah, the infiltrators.

[Al Murray]

Yeah. Their mindset is defensive during the day, but at night they're trying to stir the Americans up. So you do get people infiltrating, right?

[James Holland]

Yeah, that goes on all night. It's something that's happened in the Pacific War. And I think this is one of the weaknesses the Americans have, is they. They've tended to cede nighttime to their enemies, both Europe and Pacific. In the Pacific, the Japanese are much bigger on night infiltration than are the Germans, typically. So they're going to send people out there individually. In some cases, though, I should point out too, the. The Japanese are parties that are emerging in the caves, are looking for water or food or, you know, so they're out there scrounging around for that out of desperation. Not always to attack the Americans, but some of them, of course, are trying to sow terror among the Americans or they're doing their whole suicide attack thing here and there, but it's something you'd have to worry about pretty much all night long. So you're not really in a foxhole per se. You're kind of in a. In a kind of coral enclosure, maybe, I'll put it that way, where you stacked up, if you're lucky, you stacked up these rocks or whatever around yourself. And, you know, the other thing too is there's. There's vegetation out there. And, you know, Jim mentioned insects and other natural wildlife that's moving around out there, too. And you can imagine how quickly in your mind you would think, oh, gosh, that's a Japanese infiltrator coming for me. So, yeah, sleep deprivation, we've discussed that before. I think that's a big part of the mix here. And so it's just. There's no break the tension. The fear is going on 24 7.

[John McManus]

And you just can't get forward because they're in their honeycomb network of tunnels and caves and stuff in the Uma Brogel. You just can't get close. Is that the problem? So. So just days after days, nothing's happening. No ground is being taken. Because I suppose the question is if, you know, by the beginning of October, so. So two weeks in you've reduced the Japanese to 900 yards by 400 yards, then why the heck can't you just see the whole thing off? And. And, you know. But they don't. You know, they don't goes on until November. So what the heck's going on here?

[James Holland]

Well, this is only my opinion. This is a kind of an American cultural weakness in a way. Okay, well, we've come to this island. It's a small island, and we have to take every bit of it, and we've got to annihilate every last Japanese, and that equates to victory. And the battle won't be over. We won't be victorious until that happens. So earlier in this war, a couple months earlier, the Japanese cultural weakness had led them into a disastrous move in the battle of Guam. If, when, after the Americans invaded and they had set up their beachhead, the Japanese decided, you know, honor dictates that we have to attack and annihilate that beachhead. And that was part of their culture. And they're playing right into American hands there because they're just slaughtering you with their firepower. And one of the reasons why the Americans win at Guam is they basically eliminate most of the effective Japanese combat manpower within that first two weeks. Because of that, in this case, we flipped the tables here. The Japanese are using our own cultural predilections against us of, you know, tidying up the battlefield, seeing it through, totally grabbing an objective, whatever it be. Now, you know, on Bougainville, we understand we only want part of this. This mess of an island. We're not going to where they are, you know, elsewhere, way across the jungle, but a smaller island like Peleliu and Angar, as we saw, too, we've convinced ourselves we've got to have every last inch of this place. And in the case of Palu, we're concerned initially with them being able to menace the airfield. But, you know, by October, I. I don't think that's really in the cards anymore for the Japanese. And they've lost a lot of their guns at this point. They're heavier guns and whatnot. You know, I think you're better off taking your chances with that rather than sending people up there and everything this means.

[John McManus]

Well, quite. Because they cut. But also, I mean, the Japanese aren't going to be resupplied. So, I mean, what they've got is what they've got.

[James Holland]

They aren't. They're done.

[John McManus]

They're done. So why don't you just pull back? Go on the defensive and sit it out.

[James Holland]

That's what I personally think they should have done. But I think it also comes from this idea of completeness, of completely taking an objective, completely eliminating that that equates to victory.

[John McManus]

Yeah, but you'd still do that by the middle of November whether you're attacking or not.

[James Holland]

Yeah, absolutely.

[John McManus]

Because they're going to run out of food, aren't they? I mean, they just are.

[James Holland]

Yeah, we're often not patient enough for that.

[John McManus]

Then you could pull a whole load of people off the island, save a huge number of lives. I mean, this is incredible. Quote, isn't that I, I mean, incredible, you know, utter emptiness, created a hole in my soul as though life no longer had any meaning, says Sgt. Francis Heatley of the 321st Infantry. I mean, crikey, I mean, you know, you just, you know, these are people that are just, you know, they're rock bottom, aren't they?

[James Holland]

It's awful. And you know, the rest of the 1st Marine Division is just worn down to the nubs too. Including famously, of course, the 5th Marine Regiment of which Gene Sledge is a part. You know, I mean, he's in this until I think mid October or a little bit beyond, you know, that month that might as well be years, some levels, you know, and so. Yeah, but, but also I think we tend to forget that it's really, you know, in terms of days logged in combat on the Peleliu, the 81st Division either fights as many or more than the 1st Marine. The 81st has to see this thing through to completion, which they are really the sole group doing that by the end of October.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

And like Heatley said, that's what this means to him. They're in this pocket, you know, this 400 yard, 900 yard pocket that's getting smaller by the day. Why do we need to do this?

[Al Murray]

You know, it's crazy, but I suppose if you've got people like Robertus in charge, you know that attitude, push, push, push, push, push. Super vigorous victory. You're not going to sit back, shorten your lines and wait for the Japanese to starve. Are you just not going to do it?

[James Holland]

No. And he had, remember he had said this ought to be a three day battle and.

[Al Murray]

Yeah, yeah.

[James Holland]

Once we're a week or two into this, it's certainly not going to be that. So each day he's thinking, okay, this will be the day, this will be the day. Yeah, yeah. And I, I think that General Mueller, the division commander of the 81st, has a different attitude Of I'm not going to worry about the timetable. I'm going to worry about completing the job. And of course, that's a little bit of a difference between the maritime nature of the Marines and the littoral nature of the army in that the army words about land operations and however long it takes, it takes. Obviously, the Navy can't operate that way because they don't always want their ships staying in the neighborhood and being vulnerable. So the Marines, a little bit of that is rubbed off in the Marines too, that expeditionary type of approach. So maybe that enters into the equation a bit too, but it's. It just doesn't head in a good direction.

[Al Murray]

Well, we're going to take a very, very quick break. For more. We're on a downer again, boys. We will see you in a second. Welcome back to. We have ways of making you talk usa we're talking about the battle of Pellews, part two of our two parts. I said just before the break that we're on a downer. Ego, ladies and gentlemen. Murphy, the regimental mascot dog, was killed enraging the soldiers. You know, even the dogs, the dog's got it.

[James Holland]

Even the dogs aren't safe here. I mean, how awful is that?

[John McManus]

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[James Holland]

When Murphy gets killed, it's devastating to many of these guys. They were fighting mad after that. They wanted payback because, I mean, Murphy was revered in the division and.

[Al Murray]

Shocking, isn't it? So after October 18th, first Marine divisions withdrawn. And you talked about Sledgehammer's book a moment ago. He says his takeaway, his final analysis when he leaves Peleliu is 30 days of severe, unrelenting, inhuman emotional and physical stress. Proof that I could trust and depend completely on the Marine on each side of me and on our leadership. It's interesting. He thinks the leadership are okay. Proof that I could use my weapons and equipment efficiently under severe stress and proof that the critical factor in combat stress is duration of the combat rather than the severity. And he puts it all, he puts his ability to survive it all down to boot camp, down to his training, that the training is the thing that has prepared him, has inoculated him against the consequences of battle, and that having done Peleliu, he can do it again because of this training and preparation. That's a remarkable thing for a man to conclude from this, isn't it? Yeah.

[James Holland]

And he gets a little perspective, too, because he, after the operation, he's having a conversation with one of the Guadalcanal veterans who I think has also been at Cape Gloucester, too. Yeah. And, you know, Sledge, like, well, was that just a normal thing? Was that easier than. And then the guy looked at him like that was absolutely horrible. You know, those. Like. Okay, that's what I thought, too. I just wanted to make sure that. That kind of thing. Yeah, I mean, that's. And I think. I think it's a great point, Al, about boot camp. I mean, again, this is partially what makes Marines special, is that more intense introductory training, less forgiving and whatnot. Again, this tends to skew younger, of course, for people who can deal with that, especially in the context of large armed forces here In World War II, Sledge had wanted war and he had gotten it, you know, and he had been prepared for it, at least on that level. Not. Not, you know, you can never be fully prepared. But in the leadership, I think he's talking about primarily like Andy Haldane, his remarkable company commander, and. And the XO who takes over for him. And it really did have excellent leadership in K Company and any of the other units around them. But of course, Sledge is. Is forever damaged by Palu. You know, remember, he says, what is the quote? Something in me died at Pelelu. I mean, right there, that just gets your attention, doesn't it? It's like. Like, wow.

[Al Murray]

And interestingly, in that same passage, he quotes Robert Graves. He compares his experience to first World War infantryman's experience. He says, you know, we learned. We learned the same stuff they learned. And. And to actually hear that parallel out loud, given we were talking about it earlier, earlier on, is. Is very interesting. So they're withdrawn on the 18th of October, and they've suffered 6,526 casualties.

[John McManus]

I mean, that's huge for a single division. When you think the kind of, you know, fighting strength is under 10,000, probably, isn't it maybe a bit more in a Marine division? I'm not sure. But I mean, it's something like that, isn't it? It's like nine and a half thousand actual fighting troops.

[James Holland]

Yeah, roughly. And think of how all that, how that has to be rebuilt. And the Marines can't just say, oh, here's the next parcel of draftees. There's got to be more volunteers, and they've got to go through boot camp and they've got to be prepared. And so that takes time. So the 1st Marine Division is not back into combat until Okinawa on April 1, 1945. And they needed every single day that they could, and they'll have a much better commander by then. Pedro de Valley, who's, I think, a terrific division commander. Rupertos is a tragic figure in that he's going to end up rotating home. And while he's home is when he suffers, I think, a heart event.

[John McManus]

He dies in sort of March or March 45, I think, doesn't he?

[James Holland]

Yeah, like the early months of 1945, really not long after this. And I'm sure this experience probably didn't help his health at all, the stress of it and all. And I think. I think maybe he had this condition, whatever it was, it was diminishing his ability to think clearly, maybe, and to operate as well as he could have. But it's, again, a kind of a sad cautionary tale. And we'd all agree, I think, that Chesty Puller is one of the most valorous people we've ever talked about. But sometimes valor can be a debit on some levels when you have somebody who just decides, you know, the next frontal attack can make it happen, because we've got courage, and that all carry the day. I mean, courage versus firepower. We all know what wins.

[John McManus]

It's not the pep talk you want, is it?

[James Holland]

No, it isn't. And it's not going to help our morale, is it? And. And I don't care how tough you are, you're in the wrong place at the wrong time, you're going to get zapped.

[John McManus]

It does seem to be a peculiar thing, particularly of the. Of the Marine division, that they have these uninspiring pep talks. I remember I was talking to Dick Jessa the other day. You know, we had him on the podcast a year and a bit ago. He was talking about his time on Iwo Jima. The night before Iwo Jima, he was out on deck on their lst. The company commander said, I wanted to look around you, and tomorrow night, half of you are going to be dead. Great.

[James Holland]

You know, let's go. Yeah, that sounds wonderful.

[John McManus]

I mean, how could it? And I said to Dick, well, that's hardly going to kind of give you a lift. He said, well, that was just the Marine way. And I was thinking, well, it's a rubbish way.

[James Holland]

It is, it is. I mean, it's best left unsaid in relation to some things, isn't it?

[Al Murray]

He didn't say the dog was gonna die as well.

[James Holland]

Yeah, that would have really. They wouldn't have gone in then. That's where we draw the line, Al the dog guys, we're not going in.

[John McManus]

It's frustrating, though, isn't it, to be? I mean, I think One of the, one of the things about this battle, and, you know, I kind of feel the same way when I think, you know, at least on San Pietro, the Texans, they achieve what they need to do and they kind of do it. And there's a point to it, you know, it's like crossing the rapid O. It doesn't work because there's lots of cock ups and things don't go very well and you just feel terribly unsatisfied kind of reading about it and hoping against hope that if you read about it again, it will have a different outcome. And it's kind of the same with Peleloo, that you just think, what were you thinking? You know, this is, this is September 1944. The end is in sight. It might still be a little way away, but it is in sight. You know, you need to marshal these young men very carefully. There's no need to slaughter them on a, on a bit of dried up coral in the middle of the bloody Pacific. You just don't need to do this, you know, Come on, guys, just think rationally, clearly, move whatever kind of sort of weird divisional unit kind of thing that's going on here and just step back a couple of steps and look at this with a little bit of clarity. So, and hopefully next time we read about it, it'll be okay. They'll take the airfield and call it quits or does not even bother in the first place. But of course, it never is.

[James Holland]

Well, it's one of those times. And as a story, and you, you wish you had a time machine to go back and just grab Coll there and say, all right, now you're not doing this. What are you thinking here? Get a clue.

[Al Murray]

It is an interesting thing though, because regimental culture, you know, as such, you know, unit culture demands the idea that you tell your Marines they're better than anyone else, Right?

[James Holland]

Yep.

[Al Murray]

And demands that as a necessary part of the process of training people, inspiring them. But there's no point. You don't have to prove it like this. Like, at what point? You can believe it up to a point or invest in it up to a point. There has to be a point at which this idea that you're better than everyone else to the point where your units are being destroyed, then the idea is not working anymore. It's not a useful idea anymore. Right.

[James Holland]

It's self defeating. I've called it the fatal weaknesses of strong men. I mean, that's exactly what it is. I think Puller is the prime example. Yeah, the exact prime example. He's like, all right, my guys are Superman. They can do anything. Well, no, they can't do anything. They can do a lot. They're amazing guys, but there's some limits to that.

[John McManus]

But it's the pointlessness of it, isn't it? It's a complete pointlessness of it. I mean.

[James Holland]

Yeah.

[John McManus]

You know, supreme sacrifice, you know, unbelievably courageous kind of acts of bravery, people taking huge hits. The war is riddled with these. But there can be few other places or few other battles where the sacrifice is less required than on Peleloo. Yeah, yeah. Where if you just not bothered in the first place, or if you're gonna bother with it, just taking a step back.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[John McManus]

You know, so many lives would have been saved.

[Al Murray]

Yeah. Yeah.

[James Holland]

Use it for a good purpose.

[John McManus]

Because the bottom line is those Japanese troops are going nowhere. I mean, at the end of the battle, you know, when final resistance collapse on the 27th of of November, there's over 11, 000 Japanese dead at Peleliu. But they're going to be dead whether you've flame thrown them, blasted them, whatever, because they're going to starve.

[James Holland]

Yep.

[Al Murray]

And it's sort of 300 prisoners, isn't it? So.

[James Holland]

Yeah, most of those guys are laborers, very few infantry prisoners from Nakagawa's regiment. He, of course, burns the colors and commits seppuku. Yeah, it's the same old thing there. And yeah, so the. The 81st fights for what, five weeks or so to. To end this battle. And that's the part that I wish was in our popular memory more, is it's always the Marines at Palau, the Marines this, the Marines that. And obviously they're a huge part of this, but the 81st is every bit it as embedded in this. This story as well. And they actually, as I said, probably fight more days there.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

Seeing this through. The other interesting wrinkle, too, from. From our 21st century standpoint, the 81st Division encounters what I would term are basically like IEDs. In some of the. The really difficult terrain toward the end. It is incredibly similar to what insurgents of the 21st century do in terms of like, wiring up ordinance and using it for that purpose. I mean, in World War II sense, we'll call it booby traps, but it really. It's like an ied.

[Al Murray]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

And in one case, like an entire squad is basically destroyed. And these guys had known each other for years, had trained together and now fought together. And they saw, you know, just how, you know, dismembered some of them. Were, and, and how some of them, you know, are living their last moments. And you know, so I mean, yeah, we fixate on September when the, when the invasion happens and how bad that was, but this was still horrible to the end for the 81st Division encountering that kind of resistance to snuff it out, that's what it took.

[Al Murray]

The Allies have all the advantages that the wars weighted in their favor on a blank sheet of paper. And the other thing is this is completely different to northwest Europe, isn't it? Germans do surrender in the end, some of them kill themselves. But you don't have this absolute last round thing that you, the Japanese are doing to you. There's a point where they go, actually, you know what, we're done here, we're fine, it's all right. I suppose if you're Japanese here, your back is to the wall, there is nowhere to go but, you know, surrender.

[James Holland]

But the cultural expectation is you will fight to the end and that it's dishonorable not to do so. And also the strategy is such that you should be doing that because you're supposed to inflict damage on the Americans as much as possible and that will help Japan, which there's a great deal of truth to that, I think. And yeah, and of course, remember too, these are, these are really good combat soldiers on their side. Nakagawa's people. Yeah, that's a, that's a first rate regiment and they've been trained well and they are willing to fight. They know one another well and obviously that matters too.

[John McManus]

I mean, yeah, let's not forget. I mean, you know, it's just as wasteful from the Japanese perspective. I mean, pointless and kind of unnecessary and ridiculous.

[James Holland]

It really is, it's so sad.

[John McManus]

And even once Americans have got the island, it doesn't really, you know, it's like, so what?

[James Holland]

I know. So, yeah. The Marines suffer about 6500 casualties. The 81st Division suffers 2500, but 79% of them were infantrymen of the, of the killed and wounded. So that told you who was sacrificing, you know, those rifle companies in the 321st, the 323rd, they end up just fighting there along the, the crags of that Japanese pocket. There's all these nicknames that the, the Americans have for the various battlefields. Old Ball D, Five Sisters, the China Wall, Walt Ridge, the Wildcat Bowl. And we know one where that comes from. I mean the, the Wildcat Bull Repaired us probably didn't want that, but yeah, that's what they do. Be nicknamed. And all these places are, you know, there to this day as these horrifying kind of museum pieces to what happened in 1944 on this awful place. Gosh, it's.

[John McManus]

Wow. Well, in the new year, we'll be moving on to the Philippines, so. Okay.

[James Holland]

Yeah, that'll be a much more upbeat feet share ourselves. You know, the scope of that will be much larger. I mean, these are enormous operations.

[John McManus]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

And you know, and of course they're. They're almost all army and so it's a completely different. Different thing. Administrative also.

[John McManus]

I just think the Philippines battle is. Is. I mean, I think Paleo is very interesting in a morbid sort of grim way. But, but, but Philippines definitely is. But we should. We should end with Eugene Sledge, don't you think?

[James Holland]

Think I think we should. He says something in me died at Peleliu. Perhaps it was the childless innocence that accepted his faith to claim that man is basically good. Possibly I lost faith that politicians in high places who do not have to endure war savagery will ever stop blundering and sending others to endure it. Boy, if that isn't true, I mean, think about that. Yeah. You know, that, that, that quote has aged well, I think in the 80 years since. And of course, we all know Dr. Sledge's son Henry, who has going publishing a book of his own next year. Quite interesting because for everything that's in with the old breed, there's about, you know, 60% more that never made the cut. And so there's a little bit more to explore there, including Henry's own recollections too.

[John McManus]

Well, I thought it's fascinating. I've just read it. I thought it was great. It's really, really interesting. And he's. He's done a really, really good job on that. We've also got my great friend Aaron Young's book on Peleloo coming out at some point, and he's been writing a lot about that and doing a lot on the Japanese. So I think when those two books come out, it might be worth revisiting it and looking at it from a kind of, you know, a fresh perspective.

[James Holland]

I think so. Because especially. Yeah, that like you said, the Japanese perspective too. The more that we can get of that, the better because their role in these battles sometimes is anonymous because almost all of them died. And yeah, it's. It's very difficult to pinpoint there. And I don't know of too many instances where the Americans captured diaries of Paolo. They did another place which. Which really sheds light on the Japanese perspective, especially in New guinea, not as much here, because this really was a snuff out kind of thing. And, you know, in terms of what, what Palu contributes in the, in the subsequent war is not much. One small thing is that, you know, the one, the Indianapolis goes down in the summer 1945. Some planes flying from Palu do find a few of the survivors, but other than that, we don't get much.

[Al Murray]

It has no role in the war.

[James Holland]

Not much. I mean, it really is a tertiary kind of airfield. And the, the consensus is it really didn't need to be taken. And that only adds to the tragedy, this whole thing. And of course, we end up invading at Leyte, not Mindanao, you know, in the fall of 44, in October, even as the Peleliu fight is going on, of course, we've invaded Leyte on October 20th. And so, you know, Halsey was right, I think, in retrospect to urge that we should call this off. It's really quite sad. And Nimitz never addressed this the rest of his life. He was not a big post mortem kind of guy anyway. He didn't write memoirs. He felt that that was self serving and he didn't want to say anything bad about anybody else. He had such contempt for that. But he never quite explained himself as to why he went ahead with this. And MacArthur never really addressed it either. I guess he didn't want to touch that radioactive beast. And so it ends up in this sort of netherworld of our historiography. I guess it's very well known, especially for the Marine point of view, but I think maybe in this larger kind of command context, there's a lot that's unsaid or unexplored or unknown, probably will always be that, I think, unfortunately.

[John McManus]

Well, thanks, John.

[Al Murray]

Yes, thanks, John, for taking us through that.

[John McManus]

Amazing.

[Al Murray]

Yes. And it is, it is that bizarre business of it coming to nothing in the end. I mean, how you, how you swallow that as a soldier or a Marine has lost his pals and seen his units torn to pieces and your friends killed around you, it must be very, very difficult to then go. And then we didn't use it for an hour.

[James Holland]

That's the horrible part. But, you know, I think it's, it's the one way that maybe a World War II veteran could relate to some of the guys who fight in later wars, especially Vietnam, similar valor for just incredible things that they accomplish, say, hanging on to Khe Sanh in 1968 or something, only to give it up, that maybe you could relate in a way of saying, yeah, I know what it's like to fight so hard and lose on my best friends for something that in the end didn't bear the fruit that we would have wanted. And I think in that sense, maybe paleo is a little bit of a harbinger for some of our subsequent battles, even lasting into the 21st century, that you could relate on some level. And I think maybe that's what Sledge is talking about when he talks about, you know, sort of that. That losing faith somewhat that all this will lead to some higher purpose and that, yeah, there are people above you who know what they're doing and can. And you know, and that's not always true, of course, is it? And man is basically, well, how could you come away believing that after experiencing something like Pelu, much less later Okinawa, which arguably is even worse for. For Sledge and the others who fight there? I mean, you know, wow, it's. It gives you a lot to chew on mentally, I think, and it certainly does. I think Dr. Sledge dealt with that much of the rest of his life and yet emerged on the other side as such a fundamentally decent person who did so much good in the world. World. It's an amazing guy.

[John McManus]

Well, that was certainly the. What Dick Jesser was saying. Having survived Iwo Jima, he just had his damacy moment was when he. He looked down over. Over the body of a dead Japanese and saw letters and just thought, well, I've got letters too. And suddenly realized it was a commonality rather than a massive difference. And he just suddenly thought, I don't want to be at war anymore. I don't want to any ever go. I'm going to be anti war the rest of my life. And I also, when I, if I do get home, I want to do some good. And he became a professor of behavioral science at the University of Colorado and stayed there on the. On the staff for 70 years.

[James Holland]

70 years. Wow.

[John McManus]

Yeah.

[James Holland]

He dealt with. I don't know what would have been harder for him, Iwo Jima or dealing with students for 70 years. I don't know.

[John McManus]

Well, I know, but, you know, very, very smart, lovely, amazing guy. I mean, just incredible.

[James Holland]

Yeah, an amazing guy. Wow.

[Al Murray]

Well, thanks, John. That was a fascinating chat. And thanks also Jim. Thanks everybody for listening. Listening. We will see you again on we have Ways USA very soon. Cheerio.

[John McManus]

Cheerio.

[James Holland]

See ya.