← WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
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- [00:02]
A
Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com we haveways. More than 100 war veterans yesterday commemorated the sinking of the German battleship Bismarck on 27 May 1941 in one of the most epic naval battles in modern history. Accompanying the veterans at the Imperial War Museum in South London was Heinz Stieg, rescued from the water after the Bismarck, which was launched by Hitler and said to be unsinkable, went down. Harry Cuffling, 82, from the Isle of Wight was one of the men who dragged Mr. Stig on board the crews of the Dorsetshire, the German sailors were huddled together in a crowd, he said. The sea was very rough and they looked extremely cold. They couldn't talk. We felt no animosity towards them. It's human nature. Mr. Stig said he wanted to do the same after the Bismarck shelled the British battleship HMS Hood, which sank in just three minutes. There is never any great feeling of joy or celebration when a ship is sunk because a ship is a beautiful thing, but I remain thankful that the men of the Dorsetshire could come to my aid, he said. Sir Ludovic Kennedy, a sub lieutenant on HMS Tartar during the battle and author of a book on the sinking in the Bismarck, paid tribute to what he called his band of brothers. He described the naval engagement as one of the most memorable, important and dramatic events of the Second World War. The damage she could have done to us and the whole war effort was incalculable. That was why she had to be eliminated and she was eliminated by a good share of luck, skill and courage. The fate of the Bismarck proved that the era of the battleship was over, he added, killed by air power and left as dead as a dinosaur. George Bell, 77, who was a 17 year old captain's messenger on the Dorsetshire at the time, told how he watched the Bismarck capsize. I remember seeing her turn over completely. All you could see was a huge keel lying in the water before it went under. Leslie Sayer from Colchester, Essex, who flew a Swordfish biplane on a torpedo mission against the German warship, said, we were apprehensive, concerned and bloody frightened in that order. And that's from The Guardian on 23 May 2001. Well, welcome to we have ways of making you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland for our, well, our aftermath. The legacy of the sinking of the Bismarck. Yes, we've covered the pursuit, the Swordfish attack, the actually rather disturbing sinking of the ship and the sort of making sure she was dead. Approach of the Royal Navy under Admiral Tovey. I found that really hard to, you know.
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B
Yeah, it's pretty grim.
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A
I might have a nightmare this evening, Jim.
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B
Hope not. But the whole thing's all over in an hour and 10 minutes. I mean that's, that's, that's the amazing thing, isn't it?
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A
Yeah, yeah.
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B
And there's actually quite a lot in that little report to unpick I think. But, but, but first of all let's, let's go back to the Dorsetshire because yeah, it is the Dorset, you remember the Rodney and the KG5 have gone, they're low on fuel, they've already outstayed their, you know, their fuel welcome and they've turned, turn. So it is left to these cruisers, Norfolk and Dorsetshire particularly and a couple of destroyers which are still around to kind of do the picking up. And Dorsetshire is the ship mainly responsible for it but not until at least an hour after the sinking because they've got to kind of sort themselves out. They've got to check everything's okay anyway. Rafts, ropes, scrambling, nets are all lowered over the edges and they can see the men in the water and many men are struggling because their fingers are frozen, they can't grip properly. A midshipman, Joe Brooks, goes down with one of the lifelines and he tries to get a bowline around. A German who'd lost both arms was gripping the lifeline with his teeth. I mean, oh God. And the ship rolls and then both men go under. Brooks never sees him again. That's it.
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A
God.
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B
We mentioned Herbert Blum. He's reached Dorsetshire's bow but then sucked under by a wave and felt himself under the keel and he comes up on the other side. I mean, can you imagine how terrifying that would have been? And then he thinks, oh you know, I'm safe. But then the waves carry him away so he thinks oh my God, I'm toast again. And then at last the Maori turns up and picks him up.
- [04:22]
A
So Dorsetshire, she rescues 80 or so people and the Maori another 20. But there's still hundreds more in the water who need to be helped and hauled up. And Dorsetsch's navigating officer, Lieutenant Commander Durant spots a smoky discharge on the water two miles away. So, and he thinks it's a U boat, so they've no choice. Captain Martin on the Dorsetshire has no choice but to ring down for full speed. And on Maori Commander Armstrong issues the same order. And they're away and they leave the men in the water.
- [04:54]
B
This is a really, really awful, awful moment. I mean it's just, it's just terrible because you know there's men already on the nets and they're still just gripping to the nets but they can't wait for them to come up. They've just. And they either manage to call up while the ship is going but it's getting at 20 plus knots. You know, most of them just fall off.
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A
That's that.
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B
And they disappear with the cries of the German prisoners in the water knowing that that's that they're going to be consigned to a watery grave. I mean terrible, terrible fate. Absolutely horrendous. And all of them die except five men who are miraculously found by U74, 7pm that night. So can you imagine, they've been in the water for you know, nine hours.
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A
It's unbelievable, isn't it?
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B
But with the sinking of the Bismarck I think, you know, you can say that the lion has caught the jackal. The Prinz Eugen by the way manages to dodge British ships and does reach Brest on the 1st of June. Yeah but and this is the key point, no major German warship ever cruises into the Atlantic ever again.
- [05:57]
A
And the next time the Prinz Eugen slips her Moorings is February 12th the following year with the Scharnhorst and Eisenhower was the Germans throwing the towel in the Atlantic with their surface fleet. Which is another story to be told another time and, and one that's wreathed in controversy itself but actually is, is it's them giving up. They know they can't do it because of what's happened to Bismarck. They know that. They know the game's up but it's not, not the end of the saga, not really.
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B
Well because there is of course there's an inquiry called an inquiry because of the sinking of the Hood which is.
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A
Very much in the Nelsonian mode, which is they've not been Nelsonian enough according to Dudley Pound, Admiral W Pound that he wants wake Walker and Captain Jack Leech of the Prince of Wales court martial, doesn't he? For not pursuing the Bismarck aggressively enough.
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B
This is just absolutely extraordinary, you know, and this is for not pursuing the Bismarck of the sinking of the Hood. Toby when he hears about this is absolutely appalled. Yeah and replies very, very tersely that as far as he's concerned the conduct of both men has been absolutely exemplary and They've done precisely what he wanted them to do and he didn't want them to be specifically, didn't want them to pursue it, so he's having no part in it whatsoever. And Pound goes, well, okay, well, if you don't do it, then the Admiralty can order the courts martial. And to that, Tovey replies that if Pound insists, he would lower his own flag as Commander in Chief and attend their trial on their behalf. And after that, notes Tovey, I heard no more about it.
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A
Wow.
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B
Pound doesn't come out terribly well, does he? Out of. Out of the war, really.
- [07:34]
A
Had Pound been in Tovey's command, he'd have probably ordered exactly the same stuff, demanded exactly the same things. If the captain's under his command, it's just. He's not been in that, he's not in that situation. He doesn't, he's not dealing with the odds as Toby finds them in front of him, is he?
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B
No, no.
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A
So maybe in a different job he'd have performed differently. But yes, it's not, it's not great, is it?
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B
No. Anyway, we should, we should look at the consequences of the loss of the Bismarck. Well, you know, what, what does this mean? Because, you know, we've been building up to this moment and making great play of it, or certainly particularly I have, saying that it is this crucial turning point in the, in the, in the war in the Atlantic. And I really genuinely believe that to be the case. I think, I mean, you've got to the point where Britain is not going to lose the Atlantic war by this point doesn't mean, say, you have still got two long years of pain and turmoil ahead till the end of May 1943, when the U boats are finally defeated. But even so, this is a major turning point. They've got the point where they're not going to lose.
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A
Yeah.
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B
And it's also true that, you know, there's always been this argument that the threat of marauding German warships still ties down quite a lot of naval forces and other forces. And this is the argument. But I was sort of thinking about this afterwards. I'm not entirely sure this is true. And let me try and explain why. Because the Home Fleet is always going to be the Home Fleet. I mean, you know, it's always going to be strong and it's always going to be operating within the vicinity of the, of the British Isles. So you're not tying that down because that's already going to be there anyway. And I would also argue that RAF Coastal Command is also. That's the whole point. I mean, you know, the clue is in the title. So they're always going to be there.
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A
Yeah.
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B
And Bomber Command don't do anything other than they continually mine access ports and German ports, whether it be sort of Brest or San Jose or whatever. But they tend to do so when the poor weather prevents them bombing the continent. So, you know, it's. It's a kind of an alternative target rather than one where they're having to dive, diverge from their stated aim of destroying German cities or whatever. So I'm not sure that they do tie down the British particularly well.
- [09:38]
A
Well, this is. I've been. I've been pondering this because. Because I've been looking at the Channel dash. You know, Prinz Eugen is then tied down by the air Force in Brest for seven months. Scharnhorst and Eyes now, you know, they've been there since the end of Operation Berlin. Since they've been on raiding, the RAF has kept them holed up. The navy aren't involved in it. Well, the submarines picketing Breast occasionally. But basically they're holed up by Coastal Command. If you think of it only in terms of the Navy. Yes, they aren't tying the navy down, but the British are fighting a 3D. Big war strategy. This is big war written as it ought to be. This is, in fact, this is the British way of war, where what you do, you use all your assets at your disposal, you use your technology. I mean, one of the interesting things is Bomber Command use Oboe for the first time attacking Brest. So they're using all the latest stuff all the way because they know exactly where the pinch point is with the German naval effort.
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B
Yeah.
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A
Which is to keep these surface ready. You don't need to use the Home Fleet to do that because Coastal Command, Bomber Command, you know, they're all work, they're working effectively in concert. Right, right. So they tie down a British air effort and sometimes you'll read, sometimes you will read that, you know, the air effort on Brest, they don't hit it that often, but they're in and out of dry dock, these ships. Every three months, essentially, an armor piercing bomb will go through the bridge or something on one of these big battleships.
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B
Cause yet more damage.
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A
They have to start again and they reach the point, they reach the point where the crews are sent back to Germany and they use the ships for training, for training new crews up.
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B
Yeah, but my point is, I don't think it's tying down lots of British resources keeping. Keeping those ships in Brittany because They're going to be there anyway.
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A
If you just think of it. Tying down the. Do they tie down the navy? Well, yes and no.
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B
Not really.
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A
Well no, but when they, when they come out the navy then does everything it can to stop them. Right.
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B
But that's sort of the job of the Home Fleet. I mean the Home Fleet is there whether they're in operations or whether they're in Scapa Flow.
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A
But this is like thinking about the Battle of Britain forgetting that the Royal Navy are in the picture too, isn't it? You know.
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B
Yeah.
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A
The defense of British waters is a 3D effort. It's not just surface ships, you know, and I think, yeah, basically the Admiralty's eye of Sauron is on them every now and again. You know, they have to keep an eye on them and check on them and you know, formulate plans for what happens when they emerge. But yeah, the Germans are bottled up and it's. This is the price of not having a strategy. Having some ships but not a strategy. Having some ships that are not a fleet, that don't constitute a navy in a coherent way. That's what it comes down to.
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B
Well, yeah. And I think the one thing we can be completely agreed on is that whatever their pre war strategy been, however woolly it is now in complete tatters.
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A
Yeah.
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B
Their pre war plan, the Z plan, remember that from way back when when we were doing Battle of the Atlantic and Yeah. Admiral Carls and all the rest of it and you know we're going to have this surface fleet and it's going to maraud in the Atlantic and all the rest of it, you know, that was based on surface raiders marauding Allied shipping in the Atlantic and this is just no longer possible after sinking the Bismarck. It's, it's, it's in tactics. There's nothing they, the Germans just simply don't dare it. It's not even a question of not even daring it. They physically can't because all their ships are penned in and damaged every two minutes.
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A
Yeah.
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B
You know, and they also, they just can't cope with the loss of a second battleship. You know, it's the only one other one they have, the Scharnhorst. And of course they're also struggling with the endless technical problems plus damage just by being in these French products you've already touched on. So you know, they've got themselves into this terrible bind that they can't get out of. And of course all Germans know of these ships.
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C
Yeah.
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B
You know, so, so if you build them up and build them up and build them up and then they get sunk after nine days of. On their first operational sortie. That's not a great look, is it?
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A
No.
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B
So.
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A
Well, because they've, well, they've tried to play the naval power as prestige game which the British have been playing all this time. They've tried to engage the British on, on the British's own terms and, and they can only fail really because, you know, the catching up you've got to do if you want to flee a fleet the size of the Royal Navy is essentially impossible, isn't it? If you're Germany, it just can't be done.
- [13:32]
B
And also we like to view events not in isolation. So let's just think about this. This is the end of May 1941. Crete is happening at the same time, you know, so this is bad news for Britain, you know, mixed news for the Germans, I would say. But Operation Barbarossa, the largest land operation in the history of the world, is less than four weeks away.
- [13:55]
A
Yeah, yeah.
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B
You know, so, so what is the point of Barbarossa? Well, the point of Barbarossa is to crush the Soviet Union quickly and then turn back west to destroy Britain and eliminate the threat of the usa. But a main part of the plan was to eliminate Britain, is to attack Britain's sea lanes.
- [14:09]
A
Yeah.
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B
And now they can't, or they can't do it as effectively because they haven't got enough U boats. So they sort of, they can give it a go. But this means a total switch of, of pre war strategy, a change of tactics and this at a time where they're very ill placed to make this sudden dramatic switch because the onus now is going to be on the U boat arm, but they've neglected it, remember. And you know, 563 ships have been hit by U boats in 1940, but only 501 in 1941. I say only 501, but that's less than, than in 1940 when Britain was at its most vulnerable.
- [14:49]
A
Yeah.
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B
And so the successes are actually going down, not up in 1941. And it's interesting to look at u boat production. 1938, nine are built. 1939, 18 are built. 1940, 50 are built. In 1941, 199 are built. So you see this sort of shift.
- [15:08]
A
Of emphasis, they're getting the message.
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B
But it's worth just reminding everyone that the boat, the BDU, the U boat arm, begins the war with just 3,000 personnel. So you can't just click your fingers and suddenly increases.
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A
No.
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B
And at the end of May 1941. It's the previous year's production figures of new U boats that are important. And so what you suddenly have at the end of May 1941 is a hiatus at the very moment Barbarossa is being launched. Britain's sea lanes are under little threat in the big scheme of things.
- [15:43]
A
And it's sort of the U boat army is also, it's a, it's, it's sort of a one man band, isn't it? The size of Donitz's headquarters and all that. You know, it's not, it's not a serious part of the German war effort. It's not been taken seriously enough.
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B
I really think that this is a, this is a really, really important moment. Not, not just in the, in the, in the naval war, but, but, but in the second World War as well.
- [16:06]
A
And interestingly, as you've pointed out, at the same time as things are going very, very badly elsewhere, events are happening thick and fast at this phase of the war. Setbacks, apparent setbacks for the Allies are thick and fast. But this is a big setback for the Germans. No two ways about it.
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B
No two ways about it.
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A
Although is it even a setback because this is inevitable. They're not, they're not being knocked off their perch here, the Germans. This isn't a, a moment that could go either way, the sinking of the Bismarck, is it? This isn't a situation that might have a dramatically different outcome because of the way the Admiralty is and the British are fighting this defense of their own waters campaign in 3D with air assets and with, and with capital ships. There's no other outcome for the Bismarck. So in a way it's not a turning point for the, the Z plan is a turning point for the Germans when they get it wrong in terms of prioritizing capital ships over U boats. Right, that's the turning point. Not this, this is the sinking of the Bismarck. The end of the surface fleet.
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B
The.
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A
Channel dash in February the following year are the fruit of the turning point rather than the turning point.
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B
Yeah, I take your point, I take your point. But I just think it's. March through to May are really, you know, as we discussed when we were doing our Atlantic series, we talk about how Britain has sort of getting its shit together. I mean, you know, it has, it sorts out the port directors with those, the dictators that come in to organize the ports. It's completely reimagined its inbound and coastal transportation system and how it's going to logistically continue it sorted that out it is spending considerable amount of time and money on, on new technologies such as the cavity magnetron. You then have this moment in march where those 3U boat aces are killed or captured. Then you have this. And it is the moment where, yes, the naval strategy, the German naval strategy is already in tatters, but it is the moment where that is spelled out crystal clear for all to see that this strategy has no possible hope. And so I just think it's such a big, important marker, you know, because psychologically the loss of the Bismarck is so enormous. Yeah, psychologically the loss of the Hood is enormous, but it's an emotional one rather than a material one. Whereas the loss of the Bismarck is emotional and material.
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A
And I think what's interesting as well that you could, you could, you could say is compared to the First World War, these naval encounters, you know, because Jutland is finally, finally they get to have a proper battle. It's essentially kind of inconclusive. Although again, that's the thing. This is, this is the thing that's argued about, isn't it? But, but this is a naval encounter that is conclusive for the Royal Navy. A victory, no two ways about it, and proof for all the admirals who've been chomping at the bit to get stuck in that getting stuck in works, that the risks are worth taking on. Because after all, they've all been told that they've got to fight. They're going to fight this long sort of attritional war where they contain the Germans. Here's an opportunity to kick the seven bells out of them, you know, because that's how the battle's fought, isn't it? That's the thing we've been talking about, is going in within a mile and firing torpedoes right at the end. It's very interesting this, isn't it? Because if you are of a mind to rethink the war in terms of, well, what's the absolute priority? Well, it's shipping. If you're going to win this war one way or another. Shipping is what then. This is. They're taking care of business.
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B
I was saying a future war is also about shipping and about underwater cables and the sea and everything.
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A
This is taking care of business. So Crete in the end, well, you know, it's a, it's a disaster for the army but not for Allied strategy. You know, what I mean is that this is, this is the fruits of two strategies ripening and coming into play. And if you're embarking on Barbarossa and you haven't sorted out your sea lanes or the Allied sea lanes particularly, is what's going to happen is Lend Lease is going to go bonkers. And that requires, for the Soviets, that requires control of the sea to stop that stuff. Getting the Soviets. Forget about it, basically. Even before you were held up outside Moscow. Yep, you've had it.
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B
Yep.
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A
Right. Well, there we go.
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B
Should we take a break now before we look at the loss of the controversy of the loss of the Hood?
- [20:19]
A
Yes, okay. Why not? We'll see you in a second. Welcome back to. We have ways to make you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland. And so let's talk about the Hood because. Yes, I think it's not unsurprising that the loss of the Hood has attracted so much controversy, really. Because, because she symbolizes so much and was used to symbolize so much that was sort of her function in peacetime was. She was symbolic. Yeah, she was a hard power symbol. She was a national, national prestige symbol. She was a sign of the modernity and power of the British Empire and all and all that stuff. So in a way, it's not unlike, I don't know, Princess Diana dying in a car crash, which is impossible for some people to accept. Right.
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B
I thought I'd look at one piece. There's a very good piece of work by Dr. Eric Grove, who's sadly no longer with us, but he's a great naval historian of recent times and hugely respected around the world. And yeah, very considered piece about this whole controversy about armor and deck armor and all the rest of it. So just to explain, again, just so that people are understand this, you have your arm around, around the ship's size because for the most part you're sending shells in and they're, they're creing in. They're not plunging in. So your deck, you do have deck armor, but, but obviously a battle cruiser of, of, of like, like Hood and, and Hood is unique, by the way.
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A
Yeah, yeah.
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B
There is only one battle cruiser on this model. It is a cruiser. So the idea is that it's, you know, you have, you have great gunfire, you have, have great speed, but it's a, it's a little bit of a payoff. I mean, she kind of is a battleship, but she's not classified as a battleship. But there are points of weakness. And one of the points of weaknesses is because of the original design that was designed in the First World War, and which is why there is only one, because they actually thought, well, actually now we've built this, this ship actually Maybe we, this isn't the way to go.
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A
We need to move on. Yeah.
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B
But the end result is one that's enormous, biggest in the world at the time. Very kind of, you know, it's ascetic, her ascetic lines and obviously is this statement of British naval power because she's not having to fight a war, she's just going around in her with her naval squadron, cruising the world, which is why everyone, everyone knows about her. But just because she's the most famous ship in the Royal Navy doesn't mean she's the best ship in the Royal Navy at the time. She's just, she's significant because of her fame. Anyway, it's worth just going through this because she's not really a battlecruiser in the traditional sense. Her design is completely recast after Jutland, which was fought on the very day Hood had originally been laid down, which is 31 May 1916. And after Jutland, the changes to Hood are so extensive that a completely new keel, completely new keel is laid on the 1st of September that year, 1916. So design work continues, taking full account of the inputs of the Grand Fleet and the final legend. And the final design for the Hood is not approved until a year later, at the end of August 1917.
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A
Yeah.
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B
So the naval constructors in charge of the project were Stanley Goodall and Al Atwood, working under the very distinguished director of Naval construction, which is the dnc, Sir Eustace Tennyson Dyncourt.
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A
Right.
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B
And the new Hood that emerges after Jutland combines the speed of a battlecruiser with substantial protection, better than the standards of almost any contemporary British battleship. And it's worth just pointing that out right there and then.
- [24:01]
A
But then though, this is the thing, this is a First World War design ship, but responding to the, the things they're discovering as that war progresses. And so she's, she's going to be the best protected ship in the fleet. And they start, they have started to figure out the effect of plunging fire at long range. So they need greater horizontal protection. So she needs better protected decking, or deck, essentially.
- [24:27]
B
Yeah.
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A
So In August of 1918, they had an extra inch of protective steel plating to add to the tops of the magazines. And in the following year, May 1990, and after the war, the horizontal plating covering the downward sloping sides of the main protective deck are thickened with 100 tons of extra armor at the expense of some of the, of the secondary battery. Because this is like, if you want more armor, you're going to have less speed. Or if you want more armor and you want to retain your speed, you got to lose armament. And if you know it's like the iron triangle for armoured fighting vehicles.
- [24:57]
B
And just to reiterate, for those who haven't heard the earlier series, whole part about plunging fire is you do that at distance because when you're firing at long range, you're lobbing the shell up. So it is the angle at which it is coming down is steeper than if you're at close range where it's a much more gentle trajectory. So plunging fire is when it's coming from long distance and when you're out that long distance and you're advancing towards the enemy, that is the zone of vulnerability. Yeah, the zone of invulnerability is as you get closer and the shells become shallower as they're fired. So I think it's just worth just reminding people of that.
- [25:31]
A
And the Board of the Admiralty keep essentially keep tinkering with the hood, don't they, with the design? So on the 17th of July 1919, they want more measures to guarantee the safety of the magazine from explosions, they say. So they decide to increase the thickness of the horizontal protection over the magazines to 6 inches aft, 6 inches of steel and 5 inches forward.
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B
That's a lot.
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A
Well, when we talk about tank armor, you know, it tends to be. I don't know, what is it on a Tiger? It's sort of 100 millimetres or something.
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B
120 millimeters is the front of Churchill, which is the thickest around.
- [26:05]
A
So the 6 inches are 5 inches forward. And a general thickening of the main deck in the area of the five and a half inch guns, which is another 70, 470 tons. So again, that has to be balanced by what they call deletions elsewhere, because if you put the weight of one thing up, you're going to have to lose something else. So they get rid of the torpedo.
- [26:25]
B
Tubes and this is the nub of the matter. Well, this is. They shift. Should have done. That's the point.
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A
Right.
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B
The obvious thing to do is to get rid of the torpedo tubes. But because she is a cruiser, she's got a battle cruiser, she's got these torpedo tubes. And right at the time this is seen, this, this design is a. Is seen as a disaster waiting to happen because the torpedoes have to be stored near the tubes. And the point about these tubes, it's okay having below water torpedo cheese because it's deep in the, in the ship. If you've got above water Torpedo tubes which sort of fling them out from the sides. That means your torpedoes are near the top. And the problem is, is, you know, they're absolutely stuffed full of explosives, so if they're hit, it's boom. And there's a very strong argument saying you don't really need torpedoes in such a huge ship because that's what light cruisers are for and it's what destroyers are for. Yeah, go back to Vines. Tribal class destroyers beetling around with their torpedoes, for example.
- [27:24]
A
Yeah.
- [27:25]
B
But the Grand Fleet says, no, no, no, no, we need to retain them because we need to develop techniques of long range torpedo fire. So they've all been factored in and, you know, we want to use these for noting Browning shots and to create confusion in the enemy line at the beginning of an action. And Admiral Henry Oliver, chief of the War Staff in London, also thinks that torpedo tubes are indispensable for close range action at night or in poor visibility. But the problem is, what that means is you're trying to do everything with one ship and it's like, what is it? Is it effectively a very fast battleship with huge guns, or is it something much more versatile? Is it the equivalent of the TSR2, the first multiform jet plane, or is it something that is quite specific? So the doubts of both Dynko and Admiral Tudor, who is the controller, are overruled. And above water tubes are included in the Hood's design between the upper and the forecastle decks, rather than on the main deck to minimize the effects of any explosion. So this is the little sort of compromise to this. And Dyncourt thought that this is nuts. And he writes, it is considered that the fitting of these above water tubes involves a very serious risk of total loss. In the event of the explosion of a torpedo taking place, the upper strength girder of the ship would undoubtedly be destroyed for a considerable distance from the point of the explosion. So despite this warning, and this is the Director of Naval Construction.
- [28:54]
A
Yeah.
- [28:54]
B
No immediate action is taken. So the debate just sort of rumbles on as the work on Hood continues. Then on 2nd December 1918, the side plates that were an important feature of the structural strength of the ship had not yet been cut. So at this point, the Director of Naval Construction, who again is still Tennyson Dynko, points out there would be no difficulty in dispensing with the above water torpedo tubes in Hood. The risk involved owing to the explosion of one of these torpedoes is undoubtedly a very serious one and might result in the crippling of the most important unit in the fleet. And he warns that no protection that can be provided for the heads would be of any value against a direct hit. So in other words, he's saying, I'm telling you here in writing, this is not worth the risk.
- [29:43]
A
This is a terrible idea.
- [29:45]
B
You know, whatever advantage it might have of having torpedoes, it's simply not worth it when you're, when, when you're putting them on. On such an enormous and expensive ship.
- [29:55]
A
Yeah, well, and then, but, but he's ignored. I mean, it's extraordinary, this Controller of Naval Instruction, Admiral Tudor, ignores this advice and he's, he basically, he thinks, well, he's swayed by the extent of the work that's been done.
- [30:09]
B
They've done it already.
- [30:10]
A
And, you know, this is a ship that's had a new keel, so will this, will she ever be finished? Must be part of the thing that's driving this. Do we keep having to change our minds?
- [30:19]
B
Yep, yep.
- [30:20]
A
And so he writes in red ink, in view of the progress of the work, the above water tubes etc, should be completed in the hood. And they carry on, they carry on arguing. In July 1990, they get rid of the forward pairs of torpedo tubes, but the rear ones by the main mast are kept for ongoing experimental purposes. But the idea is karma. War fitting.
- [30:42]
B
We'll get rid of them.
- [30:43]
A
Yeah. They remove the 3 inch mantles for protection. I mean, the problem with this, you could just see this, can't you? That.
- [30:53]
B
Oh, we forgot to change it back again.
- [30:55]
A
Yeah. To Dane Court. It looks like he's won because he's, he's got them, you know, to, to, to say, all right, well, in time of wartime, we'll get rid of them, but they're still there anyway, so as far as he's concerned, you know, in wartime she won't be blown in half, but actually she's completed with four half torpedo tubes but without the extra protection. So. Worst of both worlds.
- [31:16]
B
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [31:17]
A
And the consideration is that it would cost another 10, 40 tons of plating, which would again affect the drafts, speed, fuel consumption, strain on the engines, all that of the ship. She'd be a foot lower in water, which makes it more difficult to bring into port. Difficult docking. Dane Court explains all this. The controller. And the Controller decides nothing further to be done at present. It's not the war park it, kick the can, gets kicked down the road, which, in which. In the matter of defence procurement, when you're working on big expensive projects, that never happens, but in this instance it did.
- [31:54]
B
So the issue is raised again in 1927, by which time she's done her world tour, of course in 1923, 24, by which time it's thought that cruisers should have torpedoes.
- [32:05]
A
Yeah.
- [32:06]
B
So it's recommended that the existing tubes be retained but with a war fitting and the four forward tubes also put back. It's like. No, you've got the bows, then you've got the two forward guns, then you've got the superstructure, you've got two funnels and then you've got the main master back which is about two thirds of the way down the ship and the, and the torpedo tubes are right by, down by the decks.
- [32:28]
A
But you can see what's going on in the gym, isn't it? As the navy's being restricted in its spending, they well forgot if there's torpedo, you know, if we've got two torpedoes on her, then we don't have to build a destroyer or something. There's that kind of thinking. If we could get a machine, if we get a ship that does everything, we need fewer ships.
- [32:44]
B
You've absolutely hit the nail on the head.
- [32:45]
A
Yeah. It's trimming and it's not going to work.
- [32:48]
B
No. And by, by the end of the 1920s there's a new director of Naval construction who is Sir William Berry. And again he warns the presence of these above water tubes involves a serious risk of total loss. There's that phrase again. Total loss. In the event of an explosion of the torpedo taking place, the upper strength of, you know it's going to be destroyed. You know, it's almost word for word what, what, what Dynko has. Thompson. Dynko has said, said a few years earlier and despite this, the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff.
- [33:16]
A
Yeah.
- [33:16]
B
Who is none other than Rear Admiral Dudley Pound, decides the threat is very small, if not negligible. And so on balance he feels that having torpedo tubes would be of value and a greater benefit than the small risk from having them where they are. Because there's new 21 inch long range torpedoes now available that could travel 13,500 yards at 25 knots. There's obvious problems with these. It's all very well having long range torpedoes, but when are you ever going to use them and when are they ever going to hit in anything? Yeah. At that range, I would argue they're not. So they decide to go with them, increase the mantlets, which would be an extra 30 tons and this is the only extra armor added. And even so, hood is still 42,752 tons. So adding even a Little bit more armor is a problem. Then there's a refit in 1932 and this removes all the second battery guns and replaces them with anti aircraft armament and that reduces the weight by 300 tons. And you know, great, that's all well and good and everything but Hood never actually receives long range torpedoes, just the standard 21 inch. So the whole reason why Pound said that they should stick with it is never fulfilled. So four per side is hardly a serious contribution to their armament is it? In the big scheme of things?
- [34:34]
A
No.
- [34:35]
B
And the truth is in May 1941 they're still there. Four 505 pound charges of TNT on each side just forward of the main mast. And of course this is pretty much where the first shell that probably hits Hood because it's not from the Bismarck, it's from the Prinz Eugen. It's an 8 inch shell which enters from the starboard and hits support side. And this strike is seen by Captain Alfred Phillips from HMS Norfolk. And Phillips had previously served on the Hood and immediately thinks oh my God the torpedoes. And is relieved when he sees no large explosion. Yeah but this single shell, this 18 shell does cause quite serious damage and it starts extensive fires breaking out particularly in the, in the, in the ammunition compartments. And this means that the torpedoes at the very least would have been starting to get hot. Yeah, yeah, yeah because they're still there. And just, just to remind you that is four torpedoes each with 515 pounds of charges of TNT. So that's 2,060 pounds worth of TNT. That's a lot of TNT.
- [35:48]
A
Yeah and not where you want it either.
- [35:50]
B
No. And then the fatal 15 inch shell from Bismarck hits in the same locality somewhere near the main mast according to the only recorded observer who saw it. And the result is the catastrophic explosion that we see in the same spot. And Stanley Goodall a ship designer who had been who we mentioned at the beginning at the time wrote such an explosion could break the ship's back. Already weakened in this neighborhood by earlier damage with the force on the after bulkhead of the engine room due to the ship's back speed of 28 knots and the low reserve of buoyancy in the after part of the ship, this portion would rapidly sink. And I would argue that it seems very likely and I'm in complete agreement with the logic of Eric Grove's argument that if you've got £2,000 of TNT already warming up from an earlier shot and you suddenly get hit by a 15 inch shell the chances of that then detonating and Causing a catastrophic explosion which breaks the back of the ship. Which is after all precisely what happens is quite high.
- [36:49]
A
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But the board of inquiry that then, I mean convenes in June doesn't reach the same conclusion. But then I suppose there's an awful lot of people who don't want to, you know, admit they got the design wrong.
- [37:01]
B
Of course. Well they're not going to admit that, are they ever.
- [37:03]
A
Exactly, exactly. But Blake and his colleagues plump for the idea of a penetration of the aft magazines but maintaining of the useless torpedo tubes with all that TNT at best didn't help and may have been responsible. So they, they don't know and cause it's imp. It is, it is impossible to know is the truth. Eric Grove, I mean what he says is what really happened to the Hood is still a mystery. What could have been eliminated was the threat from the useless torpedoes. The Hood was an obsolescent ship with an old fashioned armor distribution. She had other weaknesses, notably the defective Mark V Dreyer fire control table that could not cope with the rapid approach angle used by Admiral Holland as a result of his recognition of his flagship's relative weakness to long range plunging fire. The Hood was also reputedly in poor structural condition. I mean because she's old, isn't she? By this point? Yeah, more than more than 20 years old. And they wear out ships, you know, even made from the finest steel. To send her into action with an explosive chargeable than £4,000 of relatively unprotected TNT against her main strength girder increased the odds against her and the 1,419 men on board to an unacceptable degree. Whether or not they actually caused her loss. The Hood's controversial torpedoes were an Achilles heel she could well have done without. It's of course it's not conclusive because it can't be, but it does sound like loading up odds against yourself. Those torpedoes. And she wasn't discovered of course. The wreck Wasn't discovered until 2001. 19 July in 2001. Discovered by a team led by David Mearns lying in irming a basin of the Denmark Strait about 1 1.7 miles down 270 miles from Reykjavik. And they used an Ocean Explorer 6000. They found her in 39 hours. But after six years of research and planning. Incredible. Yeah. And what did they find, Jim?
- [38:50]
B
Well, you know, not all the questions are conclusively answered, but the main results of this really frankly extraordinary expedition and adventure and discovery of the of the Hood is that the initial discovery showed Confirmation that the Hood was destroyed by a large conflagration explosion in after magazines.
- [39:08]
A
Yeah.
- [39:08]
B
So though it's true there's no smoking gun or anything like that was found, the damage fits what one would expect from a conflagration explosion of 112 or more tons of cordite and you know, £4,000 worth of TNT.
- [39:26]
A
Yeah.
- [39:27]
B
You know and it seems fairly conclusive that a shell from the Bismarck was, was the one that, that killed that, you know, that killed it basically. There's also confirmation that the Hood had definitely been in the midst of her final 20 degree turn to port. Prior to this many people doubted that this final turn to port was ever executed, but it was. So that's, that's, that's clear. There's also discovery that there was catastrophic damage to Hood's bow as well as the aft section. So the rear section by bum behind the main mast. And this was the main surprise of the expedition team because the mechanism for the bow's detachment was hotly debated with two different, very different possibilities ultimately being drawn. So when they find it, they find it in, in three sections basically. There's the middle sections, the bow separated and then the, the rear bit, the aft bit bit separated as well. And one is that the forward magazine explodes and the other is that the bow detached due to stress and implosion. Hmm. But, but there's no record of a, of a shell coming in and the forward bit. So I've got to say it's got to be the latter. To me, David Mearns firmly believes that the second explosion of equal or greater strength to the one that originally broke the ship's back occurred in the ammunition spaces near the forward turrets and the conning tower. But I don't know, you know, he says there's evidence of a bird's eye view of sonar image which shows that the debris field associated with the forward hull break is larger than that of the stern brake. Debris field.
- [40:43]
A
Yeah.
- [40:44]
B
A much better understanding of why so few crew survived the sinking. Because it was so quick.
- [40:47]
A
Yeah, it was instant.
- [40:48]
B
You can see that flame, whatever flames going up is also spreading that way as well.
- [40:53]
A
Yeah. And every, yeah, you know.
- [40:54]
B
So the scenario for the, for the loss from, from his ex, from his discoveries is just before six o' clock Hood was in the midst of a, of a 20 degree turned port and one or more 15 inch shells from Bismarck penetrated and detonated in one of the aft magazines. This instantaneously spread to the other rear magazines of the ship which suffered a massive conflagration stroke. EXPLOSION and this caused massive damage to the surrounding areas of the hull and broke the ship's back, which is obviously its keel.
- [41:21]
A
Yeah.
- [41:22]
B
As the stern detached, a large proportion of the adjacent area of the hull was wrenched apart and collapsed. The detached stern sank first, followed shortly by the damaged adjacent areas. The ship's forward momentum likely assisted in the collapse. The damaged rear areas then help pull the bow under for its rapid descent. And during its plunge, either just before or just after leaving the surface, the bow suffers a massive internal damage from an internal explosion. Subsequently, the bow detached and a notable air of the forward hull broke apart in the process. So it might be an explosion, but it does. But it doesn't seem like it's caused by a shell. That's the point.
- [41:58]
A
Yeah, yeah.
- [41:59]
B
So it might be the consequences of the conflagration hitting that forward magazine. It could be anything.
- [42:04]
A
Yeah, yeah. It could be anything. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [42:06]
B
But yes, the catastrophic nature of the dual explosions and the rapidity of a sinking account for why there were so few survivors.
- [42:12]
A
Yeah. But I mean, 112 tons of cordite. I mean, I mean, I think you could. It is amazing that anyone survived. I think what you can say is everyone was killed instantly and had no idea that, that they even faced death. Right. Beyond the fear, the intensity of being in combat.
- [42:31]
B
Right, Yeah. A large proportion, certainly, for sure, incredibly shocking. It's a very good website, which is hmshood.org.uk and if you go to the the Hood Today bit, there's lots of photos of the expedition and you can see what Hood looks like at 1.7 miles down. And actually this was all part of a Channel 4 documentary which I remember watching, and they took back Ted Briggs, who we mentioned a few times. And yes, series in the previous series is the Last Survivor and. And you see Briggs flinging a reef over the site and. And it's incredibly, incredibly moving really, to see that. And Ted Briggs had an incredible career after, after the Hood because he then served on HMS Hillary in the Mediterranean of the Channel. He was at Sicily, Salerno and D Day and then later served in Korea and he didn't finally leave the Navy until 1973 and he then went on to become President of the HMS Hood Association.
- [43:23]
A
Amazing.
- [43:24]
B
He finally died in 2008, so, you know, I'm glad he had a long and fruitful life, but I mean, just amazing. So, yeah, so that's, that's the Hood.
- [43:32]
A
Right.
- [43:32]
B
And they recovered her bell and they also put down a plaque with everyone's name. So there is Now a war grave, official war grave. And they brought back the ship's bell, which is now Portsmouth.
- [43:41]
A
And then the wreck of. The wreck of the Bismarck was discovered a few years, well, earlier in 1989 by Dr. Robert D. Ballard and team, which also included James Cameron's brother.
- [43:54]
B
Yeah, well, Ballard is the same guy who discovers the Titanic and they used.
- [43:57]
A
New remote underwater cameras and James Cameron has made a film about it which is fascinating, well worth watching.
- [44:04]
B
You can scan it on YouTube.
- [44:05]
A
They discovered that she's largely intact, although the gun batteries are gone and spread because they fell out as the ship plunged down upside down. Isn't that amazing?
- [44:14]
B
Yeah, because it turns over. It turns over. They literally just fall out.
- [44:17]
A
And there's lots of hits on the wreck, plenty on the side that have had little impact because of this armor. Armor waste.
- [44:24]
B
Yeah. It's amazing because you could, because on the film, on the expedition, Bismarck, the James Cameron film, you can see all these shots where these hits have pummeled against the side of the, you know, the waist armor. And what you get is it sort of looks like a splodge of paint has been chucked at a, at a, at a wall or something, you know, so you see the dent and then you just see this sort of surrounding spray of, you know, presumably explosive and bits of metal flying everywhere.
- [44:47]
A
It's incredible.
- [44:48]
B
And they're all over it. And also you can see where the. I mean, the other thing that was absolutely clear was the shot on the bridge that had come from the Dorsetshire. They were analyzing this and you could see the inside of the bridge. It was just absolute carnage, I mean, total carnage. And their conclusion was that no one in there could have possibly survived.
- [45:06]
A
Yeah, yeah.
- [45:07]
B
So there are accounts of Lucians, you know, saluting as the shit went down and all that kind of nonsense. Unverified, of course, but. But it's almost certain that him and Linda were killed right at the beginning. And they also bring back several, several veterans. And I've got to say, it's very moving, isn't it? I mean, it's a really fascinating film. I'd really urge anyone who's interested in this to, to look it up.
- [45:29]
A
Yeah, yeah. Because just as nearly no one survives the Hood, it's not very many men who are rescued from Bismarck.
- [45:35]
B
Yeah, he's 114, something like that. 12, something like that. Yeah. Yes. It's not very many.
- [45:41]
A
Well, there we are. We've sunk the Bismarck. We've looked at the Hood's torpedo tubes. We've. This has been an absolutely Fascinating trip into naval history, Jim. It's been really, really interesting. I'm going to read some more chapters from Ludovic Kennedy's perspective Pursuit and they'll be up for Patreons if you want to listen to that. Yep, it's a fantastic account. Really, really exciting to read, if nothing else and hopefully for you to listen to. We will have the channel dash soon as a sort of postscript because I think, James, you made it clear that this is the end of the Kriegsmarine Campaign. German strategies in tatters. It's a major turning point in the war for the Royal Navy.
- [46:17]
B
Major turning point.
- [46:18]
A
Or is it? Had the point been turned long before, what I would argue it's Plan Z is when the is the turning point and the Germans count themselves out of being able to do anything sensible at sea. Anyway, thanks very much for listening, everyone. You can subscribe on our Apple Channel, become officer class or go to our Patreon where you can join us for livecasts, ask us questions in person on the live cast. You can get ticket offers because we have ways fest Sex is Hoving interview. Not unlike the KG5 coming over the horizon that fateful morning.
- [46:52]
B
With the Rodney.
- [46:53]
A
Yes, with the Rodney alongside her. Anyway, we'll see you very soon. Thanks for listening, everyone. Cheerio.
- [46:57]
B
Cheerio.
- [47:14]
A
Foreign.
- [47:21]
C
It's Dominic Sambrook here from the Rest Is History and Gordon Carrera from the Rest Is Classified. Now, over the last month or so, the regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been pushed to the edge, having seen the largest protest for a generation ripping across the country. Tens of thousands of people have been killed by the Ayatollah's forces since the uprising began. And a lot of people outside Iran are asking, is this the beginning of the next Iranian revolution? And Gold Hanger is covering every element of this on the Rest Is Classified. David and I have looked at the role of intelligence agencies in this conflict. With the Internet blackouts and so much unknown, we've been looking at whether spies are best placed to judge whether the regime is truly at risk of falling. Now, on the Rest Is History. We have been looking at the origins of the the Iranian regime at the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which saw the fall of the last shah and his replacement by the rule of the Ayatollahs. Now, given that the last Shah's son is being touted abroad as the man who might, just might, save Iran, you can't understand what is happening now without understanding what happened back then at the end of the 1970s. But it's not just our own two podcasts that are covering Iran. If you want to know whether Donald Trump's military buildup in the region means it's likely he's going to wade in and force regime change, here Alister Campbell and Rory Stewart cover the latest developments in the Rest is Politics. And our dear friends at the Rest is Money have been looking at the economic collapse, the corruption and the impact of the sanctions that have been eating away its social cohesion in Iran over recent years and have pushed so many people onto the streets. And on Empire, they've been looking at the similarities and differences between 1979 and today. How is it that a country that less than 50 years ago forced the Shah out of power is now seeing crowds chanting Long live the Shah? So whatever happens next, to the people of Iran and to all those brave souls who've turned it on the streets to protest, stay tuned to Goal Hanger for all the context and the answers and the analysis that you need, find The Rest is history. The rest is classified Empire. The rest is politics. And the rest is money. Wherever you get your podcasts.