WW2 British Tank Myths

Summary

WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk

Episode: WW2 British Tank Myths

Hosts: Al Murray (A) & James Holland (B)
Date: October 22, 2025

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Overview

In this episode, Al Murray and James Holland tackle the pervasive myths about British tank design and production during World War II. They challenge the common narrative of British tank inferiority, examining how doctrine, industry, and circumstance shaped armored fighting vehicle development. With historical insight and trademark wit, they explore the evolution from the Matilda II to the Comet, and ultimately argue for a more nuanced view of Britain’s armored warfare achievements.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Personal Connections & Regimental Identity (00:41–06:50)

• Al describes attending a somber commemoration for sappers lost at Cromwell Lock, reflecting on regimental affiliations and the sense of 'tribe' within military units.
• James notes that deep historical interests often grow into personal affiliations, relating his own fondness for the Sherwood Rangers to Al's airborne connections.
  • "We like affiliations, we like being part of a club. It's why ancient man organized himself into a tribe." (B, 05:51)

2. The British Tank Reputation: Myth vs Reality (06:54–11:17)

• Al introduces the widespread idea that British tank procurement was 'crap,' then sets out to debunk it—focusing on three pivotal models: Matilda II, Churchill, and Comet.
• Discusses Matilda II’s impact and battlefield successes, especially at Arras and in the Western Desert, and how its perceived shortcomings were due to changes in enemy tactics, not design.
• Churchill tank’s slow start, eventual successes, and its critical role in taking out Tiger 131.
• The Comet as an efficient, modern design—a "Centurion in waiting"—with core components derived from the Cromwell, allowing rapid crew retraining.
• On the Comet: "It's a Cromwell rebooted and it's a centurion in waiting... It's that perfect blend, isn't it?" (A, 08:15–09:10)

3. Tanks are Born of Doctrine (10:01–12:54)

• British tanks tailored to interwar doctrine:
  • Infantry tanks (e.g., Matilda II, Churchill) designed for supporting infantry assaults.
  • Cruiser tanks (e.g., Cromwell) intended for rapid exploitation.
• Criticisms of specific tanks (like Matilda’s speed) miss the point that tanks were designed for specific roles.
  • "Tanks can only be born of doctrine... you make a Tank to suit the doctrine you've arrived at." (A, 10:13)

4. Interwar Industry and Financial Constraints (12:54–16:07)

• Vickers and commercial tank exports preserved design expertise while Britain prioritized other arms (navy, air force) before tanks.
• Development of vehicles like the Universal Carrier owed much to Vickers’ interwar models and export business.
• "Britain is the leading armaments exporter in the world in the early 1930s." (B, 12:50)

5. Strategic Priorities and Production Choices (16:07–19:45)

• Tank production consistently ranked behind air power in strategic value. Churchill was willing to sacrifice tanks for aircraft if necessary.
• Delays and design choices resulted from the need to prioritize other war industries, not incompetence.
  • "Even after the fall of France... your strategic priority for now has to be air." (A, 14:02–16:59)

6. Comparing British and German Procurement & Myths (19:45–21:41)

• German tank production also hampered by its own priorities and the absorption of Czech industry.
• Myth of German superiority contested—British critics rarely highlight German supply or production misjudgments in the same way.
• "No one goes, 'Oh, the great German aircraft scandal.' They don't view it like that, do they?" (A, 20:43–21:12)

7. Tank Boards, Industrial Integration & Allied Contribution (21:41–24:49)

• British tank design incorporated input from both military and industry ("tank boards" and "tank parliaments").
• Collaboration with US industry (Sherman tanks, engine production) was a sign of efficiency and integration, not British inadequacy.
  • "By the time they're making these decisions, the British tank industry sits within the Allied system." (A, 22:49)

8. Not Just Armor: Quality Steel and Engineering (24:17–26:40)

• British steel quality, led by firms like Vickers and Vulcan Foundry, compared favorably to German and Soviet production—resulting in superior resistance to projectile strikes.
  • "Soviet tank crews... say that we love the Matilda II because the steel doesn't flake." (A, 25:29)

9. The Transition to Main Battle Tanks & Overcoming Old Doctrines (26:40–29:23)

• Development bottlenecks arose from having separate infantry and cruiser tank lines—leading eventually to the unified "main battle tank" concept (Centurion).
• Shifts in engineering limitations—abandoning prewar constraints on size and weight as the war progressed.
• Bailey bridge "Class 40" weight limitations dictated design up to a point, later abandoned as operational needs changed. (B, 27:29)

10. Production Numbers and Adaptability (28:08–29:34)

• British adapted available vehicles (Valentine, Sherman) into specialized types (DD, Firefly) in large numbers, demonstrating flexible and practical use of resources.
  • "The British tank effort, industrial effort will be, well, we'll take a Sherman, we'll adapt it and we'll turn it into what we want..." (A, 28:42)

11. Allied Production Strategy and War-End Surprises (29:34–31:55)

• Near war’s end, both UK and US misjudged tank/ammunition needs because Germany did not capitulate as expected.
• Rapid adaptation to shifting requirements (e.g., need for DD tanks in Normandy, or reaction to the unexpectedly quick end of the war in August 1945).
  • "What happens though at the end of 1944 is they realize... they've start to run out of tanks. Both the Americans and the British thinking, 'Shit, actually we thought the war was going to end sooner.'" (A, 29:34)

12. Reframing the Myth: A Nuanced Take (31:55–32:47)

• Weapon system evaluation must account for industrial policy, doctrine, materials technology, and overall coalition strategy, not just battlefield specs or raw numbers.
  • "Production of weapons is never just… has it got a big gun… there's a whole so many factors going into it." (B, 31:55)
• The British tank story is one of adaptation, practical prioritization, and ultimately, successful integration into a winning Allied effort.

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Memorable Quotes

• On historical affiliation and regimental identity:
  "We like affiliations, we like being part of a club... I think that that still holds."
  — James Holland, 05:51

• On the doctrine-first nature of tank design:
  "Tanks can only be born of doctrine… you make a Tank to suit the doctrine you've arrived at."
  — Al Murray, 10:13

• On the myth of universal British tank mediocrity:
  "The traditional story is that British tank procurement is crap… we're no good at it. We never get it right."
  — Al Murray, 06:59

• On interwar industrial context:
  "Britain is the leading armaments exporter in the world in the early 1930s."
  — James Holland, 12:50

• On integrated Allied production:
  "By the time they're making these decisions, the British tank industry sits within the Allied system."
  — Al Murray, 22:49

• On adaptation and industrial flexibility:
  "We'll take a Sherman, we'll adapt it and we'll turn it into what we want. Which doesn't say to me that British tank production is kind of like a headless chicken that doesn't know what it's doing."
  — Al Murray, 28:42

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Key Timestamps

• 00:41–06:50: Remembrance, personal affiliations, and military 'tribes'
• 06:54–11:17: Challenging the myth of bad British tanks, spotlight on Matilda II, Churchill, Comet
• 10:13: "Tanks can only be born of doctrine..." (A)
• 12:50–16:07: How industry and military priorities shaped tank design choices prewar and early in WWII
• 19:45–21:41: Comparison with German procurement, shared limitations
• 24:17–26:40: Advances in British steel/alloys, and impact on tank resilience
• 27:29: Bailey bridge and class 40 explanation (B)
• 28:42: "The British tank effort... will be, well, we’ll take a Sherman, we’ll adapt it..." (A)
• 29:34–31:55: Shortfalls and changing needs at the war’s end
• 31:55: "The production of weapons is never just... there’s a whole so many factors going into it..." (B)

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Conclusion & Tone

The episode is an engaging, lively, and deeply informed challenge to the received wisdom around British WWII tank production. The hosts blend analytical depth with banter, contextualizing technical details within the mosaic of British strategy, doctrine, and Allied cooperation. The upshot: British tank design was defined by doctrine, industry, and strategic pragmatism—requiring a far more generous and nuanced assessment than popular myth allows.

Next episode preview: The hosts tease an upcoming deep dive into the Siege of Malta—a pivotal and dramatic episode of WWII.

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Transcript

[A]

Thank you for listening to. We have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com we haveways welcome to. We have ways of making you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland, of course. Jim in the Holland bunker in Wiltshire.

[B]

Yes.

[A]

And me here in West London. And Jim, the other day I went to Bovingdon, right.

[B]

You feel very happy there, don't you? That's one of your happy days.

[A]

I do really, really like it. Although I also went to commemoration for the sappers lost at Cromwell Lock. And I wore my red beret, my maroon beret for the first time.

[B]

How did you feel about that? Did you feel somber or did you feel proud? Or did you feel sombre and proud?

[A]

Somber. Extremely somber. It's a very moving occasion. So what happened is 50 years ago, some guys from 131 Parachute Squadron, Royal Engineers, and they're commandos now, they were ta, so reservists, they were on an 80 mile water exercise down the Trent, 80 mile long on a weekend, and they got to the lock at the Cromwell Lock, which is near Newark, and the lights were out on the lock and they didn't see the weir and they went over the weir and 10 of the guys were lost.

[B]

Oh, my God.

[A]

It's just absolutely appalling. Right? And the ceremony was very, very moving because, you know, you had one guy in particular who was a, you know, contemporary of my father's, of the colonels who came up and, you know, said, ah, Colonel, and saluted me, which. And so it's the first time anyone's done that. Right. Which I found very like.

[B]

Did you salute back?

[A]

Of course I did. You know, it wasn't a saluting occasion sort of occasion because there was the brigadier, there was all sorts of people there. Right. Just a little subtle one, you know, but yes, I did. Yeah.

[B]

Okay. But did it. Was there a moment where you thought, do I do this or not?

[A]

Yes, there was. Yeah. Yeah, there was a moment where I thought, do I wear the beret or not? And actually driving, then it's a two and a half hour drive up from here, all the way up, I'm thinking, do I wear the beret? And I thought, well, no, you're their colonel. Because 299 who are my squadron, are kind of the equivalent now to 131. Because everyone got rerolled then they needed some more Parachute engineers and all that, or airborne deliverable people.

[B]

So these are your people now.

[A]

Yeah. And I was very much reminded of when we were in Arnhem. Do you remember, we were in Arnhem and we went out drinking in the square in Arnhem and you said to me, this is your crew, this is your tribe, these airborne people.

[B]

Yeah, it was.

[A]

And I sort of thought, you know what. Yes, to an extent. Apart from the fact I've not done P Company, you know, I'm not a Walt here. I'm not saying this is, you know, anything I've ever done, but I did feel that kind of resonance.

[B]

You're right. But, you know, they asked you to be their honorary colonel.

[A]

Well, exactly. So on the drive up, I'm thinking, when I've got. And I brought the beret with me, I've got to wear the beret, right? And then I pull up and I literally arrived one car after my parents and dad's there in his Avri coat, right, with his beret on and his. And a couple of medals. And I thought, well, I've got to wear. I've got to wear the beret now. Five arrived with the Colonel and then he did this whole thing of after you. You are senior, of course.

[B]

Was it slightly for gritted teeth or was it with pride?

[A]

No, no, he loved it. He loved it. But it was. It was very, very interesting. It was fascinating because it was about commemoration. But post war, not our patch, not. How do you think about that? There were grown ups there who, you know, or lost their fathers in, right? And they were a Scottish troop, they're out of Glasgow. And so there was a. Also commemoration in Glasgow as well, to these guys and their officer, the guy who'd been their officer in Glasgow. So it was. It was a trooper sappers in Glasgow and Dad said their headquarters was in Kingsbury in North West London, near Wembley, right. And they had a troop in Birmingham and a troop in Hull and a troop in Glasgow, as far as I remember. Right. And the Glasgow guys, he said, you know, they were. They were hundreds of miles away from us. They kind of did what they wanted and they were really independent.

[B]

You can see how that would play out, wouldn't you?

[A]

Yeah, yeah, exactly. And, you know, they're all paratroopers and they're all, you know, young, tough lads. And he said that it was very moving, what the officer said. He said as he went round, because he'd recruited all these boys, as he went round to the families to console the families, he felt that actually they were consoling him as much as he was consoling them as they talked about their loss. And it made me think of. I remember you. You talking about when you were writing about the Sherwood Rangers, about how, you know, the colonel's wife had basically been running this. Writing to everyone and running the families at home and. Yeah. Myrtle Kellett, keeping them on track, keeping an eye on people. And that pastoral care that comes with a regiment, that was really reminded of that. Bill talking about that on Sunday really reminded me of that idea. And the brigadier gets up and he talked about how, you know, it's the reserve now. I still think of it as the ta. Right. Just because that's what we always call. What it was always called. People forget about the army reserve, and sometimes in the army they're not taken particularly seriously. But you've got people who are juggling that service, doing it around their lives and their families and how complicated that can be for people. Yet still they do it. Yet still they show up and the army draws on them, particularly when they're in theater now. They really draw on the reserve in a way they were never really supposed to. I was really struck by that. And then at the end of it, the RSM is a fantastic bloke. He said, I've got to go home. You know, we've got twins. And my mum just said, yeah, I remember him coming and pointing at dad said he'd just come home and go to slee sleep. And he was no help in the house at all. RSM said, maybe I will have a kit. But it was. It was a really interesting occasion. I was very much reminded, though, of what you'd said when we were in on. And, you know, this is your. My tribe a bit. It's from talking to dad and then. And having grown up with it around and then having read so much about airborne forces, I do sort of feel, in a strange way, kind of at home with it.

[B]

But you're a champion of them as well. But this is why we support football clubs and cricket teams and, you know, and why we have favorite regiments and favorite squadrons and favorite ships when we're studying the Second World War. Because we like affiliations, we like being part of a club. It's why ancient man organized himself into a tribe. You know, on a very basic level, I think that that still holds, you know, and, you know, my interest in the Second World War is. Is richer for having that association with, in my case, a Sherwood Rangers or something, you know, or the Wessex Division. Yeah. And you've got the airborne, you know, and airborne sappers and I mean, it was just. It was. It was wonderful that weekend in Arnhem and it was wonderful seeing you there. You were like a pig in the prov. You were very happy. Everyone wanted a piece of you. Everyone was talking to you. But we're also talking about Arnhem. I mean, I know you'd be very happy talking about publand. Well, they weren't really asking you about publand. They were talking about Arnhem and Contemporary Ops and moaning about the current army and all the rest of it. And we had. We was necking the beers, weren't we? It was great evening.

[A]

Yeah, it was fantastic.

[B]

You know, I also feel, because the show had raids, I now feel affiliation with the Royal Armor Corps, I have to say.

[A]

Yeah, yeah. Well, so which is where we started. So, Bovingdon.

[B]

Right, yeah. You had fun that day, didn't you?

[A]

Yeah, I had a lot of fun and went to film a thing about three tanks. So the Matilda 2, the Churchill in many variants, and then the Comet. Right. And the pitch of the film, one leans into hyperbole, of course, is that the traditional story is that British tank procurement is crap. Right. We're no good at it. We never get it right.

[B]

Well, anyone who says that obviously hasn't been in a Comet or a Cromwell. That's all I'd say.

[A]

Yeah, well, yeah, exactly. And yet when you look at the Matilda 2, you know, that's turned round in a very short period of time from when the commission to delivery within three years and they deliver the thing. And it's decisive on the battlefield and not just at Arras. The Arras counterattack is always wheeled out as sort of like a moment where the Matilda 2 makes a difference, but it's very, very well encompassed and does really, really well in the desert. Until the Germans, basically, because of the Matilda two, wise up to using flak guns as anti tank weapons and switch to standing off with anti tank weapons at greater range of the desert, which of course you can do in the desert, because in the desert what you're not contending with is close country, which is what all these tanks have been designed for anyway. And then we looked at the Churchill and how, you know, the Churchill gets off to a bad start, but by night, certainly by the time it arrives in Tunisia, it's ready to rock and roll. And. And it's a Churchill with a six pounder that takes out Tiger 131. So there's. There's your. Which is best top trumps moment if that's the way you insist on approaching tanks, Churchill wins in that encounter. And then the Comet at the end of the war, which is like a complete, totally the complete package. And basically it's a kind of centurion in waiting. It's a Cromwell rebooted and it's a centurion in waiting. And you know, tanky opinion.

[B]

Yes, it's that perfect blend, isn't it? It's like if, if it had two parents, that's what it would come out as.

[A]

Yeah, cool.

[B]

I can, I can really see both your parents in you.

[A]

Well, it's interesting because so we look at this and the interesting thing about the Comet is it actually, it is essentially the box in the center of it and what suspension is. It's a Cromwell. And so retraining the crews, they only really have to retrain them on the gun because it's a different piece of ordnance. But the driving, the rest of it is all exactly the same as the Cromwell. So when crews are converting to the Comet, I mean, it's interesting because when the battle of the Bulge happens, they're taking out their training on Comets and they're put back into Cromwell's.

[B]

But it's a bigger chassis, isn't it?

[A]

It's slightly bigger. The core box is the same but with a 17 pounder, not a 17 pounder. So it's a new gun, 76.2 millimeter gun. It's not a 17 pounder. The projectile, the warhead is from the 17 pounder. Right.

[B]

So it can do armor piercing. Discarding sabot.

[A]

Exactly. But the case is from a three inch gun. And they build a new gun, they rebore a barrel, but they call it a 77 millimeter or a short 17 pounder because they don't want yet another piece of ordnance that's a 76 mil gun on their inventory. It's interesting because at the tank museum they said, we got to admit it's us who got this wrong a while, a long time ago and said it was a 17 pounder. It's not. It's a completely. It was a completely new adapted piece of ordnance for the Comet.

[B]

It's a very good looking tank, isn't it?

[A]

It's a very good looking tank. And that gun can also fire a higher explosive round in a way that the 17 pounder couldn't quite set. The high explosive round with 17 pounder wasn't up too much Comets, the full package. But what's really interesting is here you have three tanks, right? Tanks can only be born of doctrine, right? Because you make a Tank to suit the doctrine you've arrived at, right. And then they can only really be born of what engineering is capable of and then what money people are prepared to invest in it and then the engineering is tied up with who has experience in building what. And so what is so fascinating And I got, I got right into this because I thought why is there this sudden bloom of excellent British types from the. Because the Cromwell is a really great cruiser tank. There's no two ways about it. For the Great Swan, it's entirely suited to that.

[B]

It's so manoeuvrable. And I've said this before, but that time I went driving in a Cromwell. It is breathtaking. Not only its speed, the speed with which it can move from a starting position in forward or reverse and it can do 360 degrees on a, on a sixpence. It's absolutely incredible. And it's breaking speed is really quick. It's just like you're hurtling through this forest, suddenly it'll stop and it's like boom. It's like oh my God. It's unlike anything else.

[A]

Well and it's built to the doctrine. That's where you have to start the doctrine. They in the inter war years there's this bifurcation, there's the idea of an infantry tank and a cruiser tank. The infantry tank is to support the infantry firing on fixed positions. You know, once you've got across the trenches or whatever, which is explains why the Churchill is so long, right. Once you've done that then the cruiser tank comes through the gap you've made and he gets into the enemy's rear and smashes up the rear and then you encircle and destroy. Right. So these tanks are built to deliver to doctrine. The doctrine is what's leading the argument for the type you end up with. So if you look at a Matilda and go, well it can't do this or it can't do that. It's not very fast. No, it's not, it's not meant to be. So, so what? Right. Whereas what it's meant to be is very well, the crew are meant to be very well protected. It's about survivability. And the two pounder when that when it's delivered is the best anti tank weapon in the world. Right. So it's got the best anti tank weapon in the world and the crew extremely well protected. You know what else, what else is required from this tank? Right? What is really, really interesting is in the interwar years the development of a tank industry because, after all, there's no money. Money's going to the navy, Steel is going to the navy, you need steel. So who's keeping this thing going? So you've got the Carden Lloyd designs, which are Sir John Carden and his partner, and Vickers are building tanks commercially for the rest of the world. There's restrictions from the government on who they can sell them to, but they're selling them into India, to Belgium.

[B]

Britain is the leading armaments exporter in the world in the early 1930s.

[A]

Exactly. And the army might not be buying any tanks, but Vickers are making and selling them all over the world. So there is a repository of expertise at Vickers, and Vickers are being tickled along by the government to keep this expertise going. And because it's commercial models, you get people saying, well, the suspension doesn't work and Vickers have to fix it. There's this very peculiar thing bubbling under in the 20s. That's why when the universal carrier basically appears, it doesn't really change for the rest of the war, because that's along the lines of the tankette, the light vehicles that Vickers have been churning out in the interwar years to complete everyone's satisfaction and they've had 20 years to fine tune and get it right. Whereas the Matilda, for instance, is from this standing start, essentially. And of course, and we've talked about it in the Battle of Britain series, you get this moment where the British government goes, okay, air is our. After the Navy, the air defence of Britain is our absolute strategic priority. We don't need tanks. We don't. We're not going to need them. The French are churning them out in large numbers. We'll need them eventually, but they're not really very important. And so when people say, oh, the British tanks are crap at the start of the Second World War. Well, yes, because the British are meeting their strategic requirement as they've assessed it through industry, through doctrine, given what they think the war is going to be like. So the Matilda is actually what you're going to get, if that's your thinking, and is also best in show. It's the best tank in 1940, 1941 in the world. No two ways about it. The doctrine might not be right, which is why the tank might not be able to deal with a German blitzkrieg, perhaps, but the tank in itself matches the doctrine, the engineering. And what is so interesting is you get this burst of innovation around tank design right at the end of the 30s, where suddenly the taps are on, there's a bit more money, they know they're going to need some tanks once air has been paid for. Production council in 1940, when the war comes, the production council say, right, there's one A and there's one B and one A is things we've absolutely got to have now. And air is 1A, right? Tanks go to 1B further down the list and you even get a moment where Churchill says to Beaverbrook, you know, if it comes to a choice between hampering air production and tank production, I would sacrifice the tank. So when people say, oh, you know, the British are crap at tank production. Well, no, because they're prioritizing other things. Their strategic priorities are what they are. Even after the fall of France, your strategic priority, or especially after the fall of France, your strategic priority for now has to be air. Right. I think the whole story of, like, say, looking at, you know, some of the cruiser tanks that are produced in sort of 41, 42 that are using, they're using in Greece in 1941, for instance, which. Those terrible, terrible tanks with lots of Vickers guns in it, or Covenanter. You look at those types, they're the product of a different way of looking at war because you're expected to find a different fight, a different war, but you've laid down the tracks of industry, you can't turn them round easily. If you look at one tank type and go, oh, look, tank procurement's rubbish. You've got the wrong end of the stick.

[B]

Well, that was because David Fletcher, he was David Willie's predecessor at the Tank Museum, he wrote the Great British Tank Scandal. Yeah, the Great Tank Scandal. And. And, you know, he was very down on it, wasn't he? But I suppose he's a product of that age where everyone was down on the British war effort.

[A]

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[B]

The whole point was we were rubbish. We were kind of, you know, and we were high band because we couldn't have big turrets because it had to fit on the road loading gauge of the railways. And, you know, because our platforms are higher, therefore you can't have anything wider than the wagon and, you know, that goes back to the Celts or something and chariot width or something. I mean, it was just, you know. But that really held sway for a long time. But I think largely because it fitted with the narrative that Britain was just a bit rubbish in the war.

[A]

Well, and you can argue that, right? But then what you can also argue is that the British, they spend all this time trying to figure out basically which engine to put in the tanks and to deliver enough horsepower what you.

[B]

Really want is a Meteor.

[A]

And when they finally settle on that and they get production of the Meteor away from the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply takeover, then you get this very interesting moment where they go, right, okay, we're settling on these three types that we're going to build, Cromwell, Comet and Centurion. And they will come online at the various stages in the campaign. We'll be able to turn down production by the end of 1944, and we're expecting the war to end on the 31st of March 1945, and by the autumn of 44, they're even. They're thinking ahead to how do you carry on manufacturing tanks safely, keep jobs going, but also how do you turn back to civilian production with those factories? Those are the things that are guiding how these types are built and developed. We'll take a quick break and we'll come back. This episode is brought to you by ebay. Buying parts for your car, you'll know that will it work Feeling. But on ebay, buying parts is different. EBay's free returns means if it doesn't fit or if it isn't what you expected, you just print a label, drop it off and get your refund fast. No haggling, no stress, and at least 30 days to return any eligible item. Millions of parts, free returns, eBay things people love. Eligible items only exclusions apply. Hi, it's Gary Lineker here and I want to tell you about a fantastic new quiz book from Goal Hanger, the team behind the smash hit podcast the Rest is Entertainment. The Rest is. The Rest is Politics. The Rest is classified. And of course, the Rest is football. The Rest is Quiz is packed with over 1000 brilliant questions to test your trivia knowledge against your friends and family. And from 1st of October to the 31st, you'll be able to pre order a copy from Waterstones for half price using the code REST2025 REST2025 capital R that is pre order your copy of the Rest is Quiz by Goal Hanger from Waterstone using the code REST with a capital R 2025. Now, welcome back to Weird ways to make you talk where we're getting deep into tank stuff. The thing is, is the tanks from 1942 are the product of of your priorities before the fall of France, right? This is the thing. Before the fall of France, tanks are the penultimate priority in your procurement. Navy first, Air force second, Cinderella service the army last is how it goes. And then tanks lower down than that because you know you're expecting to hold the Germans.

[B]

Because who needs tanks anyway?

[A]

Because who needs tanks anyway? The other thing is, the Germans are also prioritising their industry in different ways according to their different strategic requirements. They're fight war. They're then caught out by the success of blitzkrieg itself, if it even exists.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

These are the things to bear in the factors to bear in mind. Plus, also, no one builds tanks before the war, apart from Vickers. There's a shadow factory set up to go with the Vickers factory. Can't deliver because no one's learned how to do it yet.

[B]

Well, it's not like the Germans are building a whole load of them. Half their tanks are coming from Czechoslovakia when they start the Blitzkrieg, for example.

[A]

Exactly. That's one good reason to get your hands on Czechoslovakia, isn't it? It's because they build lots of tanks that are arguably as good or better.

[B]

Yeah. I mean. I mean, there's T35. What are they called?

[A]

T35, 36s. Aren't they that Rommel with a big Christie suspension? Yeah.

[B]

His seventh Panzer Division. And, you know, they're not building a huge number and, you know, their Panzer 1 is A. Is 6 foot high and it's got a brace of machine guns. It was rubbish.

[A]

Yeah. I mean, and if you look at German procurement in contrast, you know, with the Battle of Britain, the Blitz helping out the Italians, and in the Balkans, the Luftwaffe goes into Barbarossa smaller than in May 1940, than the start of Falk Elbe, because they've got their own procurement priorities wrong and fought a different war to the one they were expecting to fight. Right. But no one goes, oh, the great German aircraft scandal. They don't view it like that, do they?

[B]

No. I mean, it does seem odd, doesn't it? Because the Matilda is absolutely perfect for the age in which it's operating at the start of the war. But, I mean, there's no point us building lots and lots of tanks if the Americans are building them in their zillions and there's plenty of them. I mean, there it is. Why would you. It makes no sense at all. Let's concentrate on something that the Americans can't provide us and that we can provide the Americans. Such as six pounders, for example.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

You know, I just. I don't. I don't really get this. And this whole idea that it's kind of, you know, we're constantly begging from the Americans and it's all lend lease. I mean, it's. That's not how it works.

[A]

Well, the War Office with its tank boards. They form these tank boards which have people from industry as well as soldiers on. And there's the tank parliaments that Churchill sort of holds. And what you end up with at the tank parliaments is basically all the armoured division guys have been absolutely nailed by the guy running the RON arm corps. And so they just sit and agree with everything he says at the meetings and they get nothing out of those. But the tank boards have got people from industry at them who are able to say, well, we can do this or we can't do that. This is what we're capable of in terms of production. And the conclusion is they reach this conclusion that basically we need the horsepower, we need to deliver the right amount of armor and the heavier weapon. And the minute you put a 17 pounder in something or a bigger gun, it's heavier, so you need more horsepower. And the Liberty engine, which goes into the Centaur, which is the thing just before the Cromwell, which is basically a Cromwell, but not with the Meteor in it, the engine's unreliable and also it's made abroad and they want control of the number of engines they're making that they can provide. The Merlin is like, by this stage, it's essentially cheap as chips. It's easy to make. They're really good at making it.

[B]

Got the machine tools, got the workforce, know how to do it exactly, and.

[A]

They know it works with a. With the chassis. They know that that's the chassis. They're going to then stick with that style and they know it will fit on a train and all this sort of thing. It's because of the Sherman, because of the Sherman, go well, we'll buy Shermans until those are ready. And that's not the British unable to make a tank, that's them having the luxury of a much bigger integrated industrial system. We're not on our own, is the other thing. By the time they're making these decisions, the British tank industry sits within the Allied system. And I think you've got to come away from looking at the Covenant and going, well, that's a dog, you know, because in the background as well, you have the development of the Valentine, which is over 7,000 made, right, and which people train on. And the other thing to remember is so much of this is about preparing for Normandy, preparing for the really big showdown in Normandy. And there's a whole. There's a part of the British army that does. All it does for four years is train in Britain. So it's going to go through several tank types until. Until the tank types mature and they know that they need the tank types to mature for the summer of or the spring of 1944. You know, that's why you have Valentine DDs, because they're getting their heads around the concept. And yet the Valentine is seen as, you know, not part. Not a success story, but it is a success. You don't make 7,000 of something if you don't think it's working for you. It's the fact it's in the background. It's used for training more than anything else. I just think this all needs reframing.

[B]

Yeah, I agree with that. I agree with that. I think people have just been looking at it the wrong way, haven't they? And what about things like sort of quality of steel and stuff? Because there's been quite a lot of chat about that in the last year or so. So it's saying that, you know, German steel quality goes down and so you might have a King Tiger, but actually it's 120mm steel, is worth a 90 millimeter of steel on a British tank or something.

[A]

Yeah, you get into that. The British are well ahead of everyone else before the war.

[B]

And this is down to people like Oliver Lyttelton, isn't it?

[A]

Yes, that's right. But you have manufacturers like Vulcan Foundry who make trains and they build them. They build them a tilde too. They're giving them a tilde two. And they've got this steel called Hycron Hykra.

[B]

How do you. How do you spell that?

[A]

H Y Kro is a tank arm, and that's the English Steel Corporation, who are a subsidiary of Vickers, by the way. And it's an alloy cast iron and it's got nickel, chromium, molybdenum. So they're using that in the engine cylinder liners. Right. So your engine steel is better. It's not just the armor, it's the. The whole thing. And you want a tougher engine that will survive.

[B]

Well, cylinders are always, always a weak point.

[A]

Exactly.

[B]

They get worn down and that's when you get the gaps in the rings and stuff and then it burns more oil and, you know, the performance goes down and so on. Because the compression's not as good.

[A]

Yeah, exactly. So this molybdenum, Chromium. Molybdenum steel, Hycro, doesn't flake when it's struck or is less prone to flaking than other armored steel. Soviet tank crews of the defense of Moscow in 1941 basically say that we love the Matilda 2 because the steel doesn't flake. The turret, which is cast on the Matilda 2, amazing effort, amazing thing to have done, doesn't flake when it's struck by a high velocity projectile in the way that the turret of the T34 shatters. Because British steel is that much better than Soviet steel. All that innovation is going on that's all pre war. And you know, Ford Motor Company are also, they're also experimenting with steel alloys and are figuring out better ways to, you know, cast irons that are easier to mold and easier to cast. You know, that's all been going on during the 30s. So once the British have figured out what the doctrine is, what the tank is to go with the doctrine and then how to build it, once they do that, they deliver Cromwell, Comet and Centurion and in fact Churchill. Because the thing about the Churchill is by the time they ironed out the problems with the design, which is, you know, rushed out.

[B]

But the Churchill's designed for the job, isn't it? I mean.

[A]

Yeah, exactly. It's doctrine, doctrine leads. So maybe the doctrine's wrong, but the doctrine is perfectly good if you think your strategic effort is going to be fought in a first World War style by holding the Germans fixed positions, walking speed and then a cruiser tank, you know, to exploit. But one of the problems they find of course is that because you're producing two different types of. This is one of the issues that's thrown up by having infantry tank and a cruiser tank. The one factory can't help the other. You can't pool expertise across the board. Which is why in the end the main battle tank, which is, you know, a single type in the form of a Centurion, is where you end up going. But by the time they've done that, they've abandoned the rail gauge loading, they've abandoned the Bailey Bridge, 40 ton limit. They've abandoned the things that are set before the war because they've decided war is different now.

[B]

Yeah, we should just explain the whole thing about the Bailey bridge is that the Bailey bridge is the standard class of the most common, easiest Bailey bridge. Well, the lighter they are, the easier to get across. But the standard one which is suitable for tank and armor is the class 40. And the class 40 can take 40 tons. So if your tank is 30 tons, that's fine. It's also 30 tons with a bit of extra, plus crew, plus extra, you know, logs on the side and, you know, whatever, you're still within the limit. Anything bigger than 40 tons, you've got a problem. Which is why, you know, going forward a lot, it's very difficult to justify a Pershing or, you know, something equivalent like a Tiger or something, because you're not going to get across the bridges.

[A]

Yeah, exactly, exactly. By 1944, you know, there's 2,223 meteor tanks produced, but you're also buying Shermans to meet the shortfall because you don't need, you don't need to build things. So it's not that we can't build them, it's that we don't need to.

[B]

We don't need to. And we can use our factories to build other stuff.

[A]

Because we need to build other stuff. You know, we'll license the some products the Americans to make.

[B]

Well, and also we need to keep the US Armed Forces in supply with 31% of their total supplies in the ETO European Theatre of operations. Often forgotten.

[A]

Exactly. So you've got 2,223 Meteor engine tanks are produced, 1062 Churchills, 280 Valentines produced for Soviet requirements. That's what's left of the Valentine offer to the Soviets in 1944. Then you've also got some light bits and pieces and then 4102 tank adaptations, which is the Firefly, the DD tanks, and that's 3000 of those, 3266 are on Shermans. Because we'll use the chassis, we'll use the Shermans because we got them. The British tank effort, industrial effort will be, well, we'll take a Sherman, we'll adapt it and we'll turn it into what we want. Which doesn't say to me that British tank production is kind of like a headless chicken that doesn't know what it's doing.

[B]

Well, it can't be, because if they can adapt a Sherman tank, then you've got the wherewithal and the kit and industry and the machine tools to be able to make that happen in numbers. Yeah, it's absolutely fascinating.

[A]

Yeah. But what happens though at the, you know, at the end of 1944 is they realize they haven't bought enough, they haven't planned ahead enough and they start to run out of tanks. Both the Americans and the British thinking, shit, actually we thought the war was going to end sooner. Yeah, we've talked about this for that moment after Overlord where it should have ended by any reasonable stretch of the imagination, the Germans should be throwing in the towel and they're not. And so you end up with shortfalls in ammunition and shortfalls in and the supply end of things can't keep up with the advance because the Germans should have quit.

[B]

Amazing. You then have the opposite problem, which is they're then all geared up for the war going on into 1946, because the Japanese. And it doesn't. It's all over in August and they're not ready for it. They're not ready for the sudden dramatic end of the war in August that then produces all sorts of problems, particularly in the usa, where they haven't been winding that they've been winding up their production again and they suddenly have to stop it.

[A]

Yeah. The thing is, the American industry, what it's been able to do is incredible. You know, the M3 Chrysler produce a pilot of that seven months after it's commissioned the first production model 11 months after its first commission.

[B]

I mean, amazing.

[A]

It's amazing. Why would you go, you know, we need to do what we need to do? Well, they're doing it for us because it's an integrated industrial view of things, rather than Britain on its own.

[B]

Well, yeah, and it's also. It's an integrated military effort, isn't it? That's the whole point of coalition warfare.

[A]

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And if the, if the Americans can give you 20,000 Shermans, you'll take them, right?

[B]

100%. Yeah. But you're also telling me about all these grants that are left over. We can do better than the grant. We've got Sherman.

[A]

Once the Sherman's online, there's 4,000 grants. Like, it's amazing the sheer scale of it.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

The interesting thing is you've got to place British tank production in the context of the pre war expectations, which are a repeat of the First World War, you know, and when you look at the Churchill, which is the product of that thinking, and the Matilda two, then they completely meet the requirement of that strategic thinking. And then when you look at what you're. What you're going to try to do next, then the Sherman meets that requirement, so you don't need to do it. And then the Cromwell comes in. Because you're also trying to keep. Industrial policy is so important in assessing these things. Just as you talk about how the Bren gun uses less steel than an MG42 to produce this is what's going on in tank production, that kind of thinking?

[B]

Well, yes, I mean, you know, the production of weapons is never just sort of, you know, has it got a big gun and, you know, what does it look like? There's a whole so many factors going into it and, you know, Whether it be a German machine gun or whether it be a British tank. I mean, you know, you know, and one is being too narrow minded if you think of it only in those terms. You know, there's a whole host of things. Your access to those materials, you know.

[A]

Doctrine, industry, industry's ability to engineer the thing that the doctrine requires. And then the end user, who's the soldier going, why is this tank so slow? Well, because the doctrine back. No. Anyway, I hope you've enjoyed that. Great stuff. Piece of Woolworth digression everybody.

[B]

Very much. Yeah. That's brilliant. Tons still to learn. That's the bottom line.

[A]

There's tons still to learn or just other ways to think about it.

[B]

Yeah. Thinking about things in a different way. That's exciting.

[A]

Yeah, it is. Yeah.

[B]

And you've had to plow through an incredibly dense book to get to that. But well done for doing so good because you're much more easily accessible. Regurgitation has proved very effective, I think.

[A]

Thanks, Jim. That's the service we aim to provide. Right, well, coming soon, Malta. The siege of Malta. Isn't that right, Jim?

[B]

Yes. Siege of Malta. One of my start points in the second World War. So I'm very excited about this one. That noble island fortress in the heart of the Mediterranean.

[A]

That's right. And if you like your drama surf hot, then the siege of Malta is exactly the place to get it.

[B]

Yeah. And there's heroes and villains and eventually Spitfires, submarines and Force K and amazing gunners and a George Cross, of course. And civilians. So it's got everything. Heroic convoys.

[A]

Well, thanks everyone for listening. We'll see you all very soon. Cheerio.

[B]

Cheerio.

[A]

And Doug, here we have the Limu Emu in its natural habitat, helping people customize their car insurance and save hundreds with Liberty Mutual. Fascinating. It's accompanied by his natural ally, Doug. Uh, limu is that guy with the binoculars watching us.

[B]

Cut the camera.

[A]

They see us. Only pay for what you [e-mail] Liberty. Liberty. Liberty. Liberty Savings Fairy, underwritten by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and affiliates. Excludes Massachusetts. When the Moore family ditched cable Internet and switched to Siddly fiber, they got so much more. Mr. Moore got more upload speed for next level gaming and live streaming to the masses with reliable service. Mrs. Moore is no longer her family's IT guru, leaving her more time to stream games into overtime.

[B]

Let's go.

[A]

And young Mason Moore got more done quickly uploading HD product demos and video conferencing without freesafe.

[B]

The numbers look good, Brad. You're on mute.

[A]

Switch from cable Internet to zibbly fiber and get more of what you love for $65 less per month than cable at ziblyfiber. Com.