Loading summary
Transcript51 lines
- [00:02]
A
Hi, everyone. Before we jump in, a quick thank you. Thanks to you, we're now a global top 1% podcast with listeners in over 190 countries. And now we've been nominated for a Webby Award, one of the biggest honors in podcasts. If you've ever gotten something out of the show, this is a great way to support it. It takes just a few seconds. Just click the link in the episode description and vote for three Takeaways. It really makes a difference. All right, let's dive in. Who's actually winning right now? The United States or Iran? Or is that the wrong question? Hi, everyone. I'm Lynne Thoman, and this is three Takeaways. On three Takeaways, I talk with some of the world's best thinkers, business leaders, leaders, writers, politicians, newsmakers, and scientists. Each episode ends with three key takeaways to help us understand the world and maybe even ourselves a little better. Today, I'm delighted to be with Elliot Abrams. He served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor. He also served as Special Representative for Iran. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome, Elliot, and thanks so much for joining three Takeaways today.
- [01:39]
B
Thank you. It's my pleasure.
- [01:41]
A
It is my pleasure. And thank you for your service in government as well.
- [01:46]
B
Thanks.
- [01:47]
A
Who do you think has the upper hand, the United States or Iran? And why?
- [01:53]
B
Right now, I'd say it's a draw. It's a war. So you can't say it doesn't matter who's winning or that it's wrong to think about winning. But it seems to me that there's a lot of damage done to Iran militarily and economically and to its leadership. They do have this asset of the Strait of Hormuz, but I really don't think they're going to be able to keep hold of that asset for very many more days.
- [02:19]
A
I will come back and ask you more about the Strait of Hormuz in a minute. What has Iran actually gained from this conflict? Conflict?
- [02:28]
B
I don't think they've gained anything. I think they've lost a lot. Not only in war directly, but they've gained, if you will, the hatred of their Arab Gulf, Arab neighbors. They've gained one thing, I guess, which is they've been able to show that they have the ability, at least for a while, to close the Strait of Hormuz, which people hadn't thought much about before.
- [02:52]
A
And what has this war cost the United States and the rest of the world?
- [02:57]
B
A lot. First, money. It has Cost billions of dollars. I don't know the correct number, but maybe tens of billions of dollars. Secondly, a blow to our economy, at least temporarily, through the rising gas prices. Third, and this is not a necessary element of the war, but it's happened because of the President's handling of the Europeans. It has cost us a significant downturn in our relations with our European allies. And it has left the feeling, I think, around the world of unreliable leadership
- [03:36]
A
in the United States because the United States did not advise or consult or involve any other country.
- [03:45]
B
No, I think, you know, you can make an argument that secrecy required that we be quite circumspect in talking to allies. I think it's more the way in which the President and others Secretary of War spoke about the war, the President's threat to destroy Iranian civilization, for example, whatever that meant. The apparent lack of what we would used to call anyway, of policy process. It seems as if policy is being made by a very small group of people. And that has some benefits, of course, in terms of secrecy. But it means that a careful look at options and dangers around the corner was probably absent.
- [04:33]
A
Iran didn't just focus on Israel, it struck across the region. What was the strategy, do you think, behind widening the battlefield?
- [04:44]
B
The only strategy that makes sense to me is that damage being done to the Gulf allies of the United States would lead them immediately to rush to Washington and say, stop it. Stop the war immediately. That did not happen, but it was not a crazy idea in the minds of Iranian leaders.
- [05:02]
A
But it has set many of the neighboring Arab countries against Iran.
- [05:08]
B
Yeah, I think it backfired. I think that certainly the Qataris and the Omanis, who had spent a lot of time and energy establishing decent relations with Iran, must have been shocked to be hit. Their greatest single piece of damage was the damage to an LNG facility in Qatar, which apparently cannot be repaired for five years and which will do something like diminish by 20% the amount of LNG they can export. And this is a country which I think no one would have called an enemy of Iran. So I think that it backfired. And they, at least in some cases, have been saying to the United States government, this regime in Tehran is too dangerous. You have to do something about it. You have to take it down.
- [05:53]
A
And as I understand it, the Iranians have fired more missiles and drones at some of the Arab countries than they have at Israel.
- [06:02]
B
Yes, particularly the United Arab Emirates. They had much more. Although, again, if we count by numbers, it's the Emirates. If we judge damage, I think It's Qatar.
- [06:13]
A
And why is the Strait of Hormuz so important?
- [06:16]
B
The Strait is important because so much oil comes from the Persian Gulf. Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yamir. And despite the fact that the Strait has been a problem in the past, only moderate efforts were made to get around it. For example, the Saudis have a pipeline that is capable of carrying about one fourth of the oil that goes through this strait. The Emirates have a smaller pipeline. Now you can't use pipelines for everything that goes through the strait, for example fertilizer, but you could use pipelines to get around all the oil. It just hasn't been done. Put it this way, the world oil market's about 105 million barrels a day and something like 20 million barrels were going through the Strait of Hormuz. It's a lot. So it's going to be revisited now for sure and efforts will be made.
- [07:14]
A
Has the war effectively given Iran greater control over the Strait of Hormuz?
- [07:20]
B
It has given it effective control today. That's partly just a matter of insurance. That is, if the owners of tankers can't get insurance except at, you know, ridiculous rates, they're not going to send their tankers through the strait, which one suggests, by the way. It raises an interesting question of why don't, let's say the Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Iraqis get together and provide insurance. But anyway, today they have effective control because of that. They may lose it depending on what the United States does militarily.
- [07:55]
A
I've heard that Iran is charging ships up to $2 million for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Have they essentially turned it into a toll booth?
- [08:07]
B
Well, if that's true, and 100 ships were going through each day, which used to be true, I mean, it was true a month ago, well, two months ago, $200 billion a day, let's say. That's a lot of money on a 30 day or 365 day basis. But the President has foiled that by saying the United States would not permit it, that we might blockade the straight or at least stop ships that we're paying. Now. It's easier said than done in a number of ways. And one of them is you can pay, I assume, by quite elaborate crypto paths. No one will find out. While you're saying, who us? We're not paying. But I think the Iranian effort to monetize the strait probably won't work.
- [08:55]
A
And why is that?
- [08:57]
B
Partly because it's an international waterway and I think there are an awful Lot of countries around the world, China to start, but all the major Asian economies, all the major European economies will be against it and try to prevent it. And partly because the United States, if we want to prevent it, would be able to do so.
- [09:16]
A
Let's talk about Iran's government. How stable is the regime right now? How popular is the theocracy?
- [09:25]
B
Well, first I wonder if it's still reasonable to call it a theocracy. It certainly was, I would argue, under the two supreme leaders, Khomeini first and then Ali Khamenei, who was recently killed. Today, the so called supreme leader is first of all absent and there's no real reason to think he's going to make an appearance. People say he's disfigured, but that would not presumably prevent him from, say, a radio address. And even if he becomes supreme leader, he is younger, he's not an ayatollah, and he is appointed due to the dynastic principle which this regime, the Islamic Republic, has railed against for decades. So I think that he will be much less legitimate and much less powerful. His father and his father's predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, were able to give orders, including to the Revolutionary Guard, and those orders were followed. This guy is, I think, not going to be able to do that. And I think power moves more towards the Revolutionary Guard. And it is much more, I think, of a military dictatorship than a theocracy. In that sense, I think the religious legitimacy of the regime is diminished, but it's still in power, fully in power, and it ends the war, I think, with complete control of the country. That's not to say that the population, people of Iran, support it, want it. I think there's a lot of riddance. They don't. But for the moment, if you will, the bad guys are in charge.
- [10:58]
A
How strong is the grip of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the irgc, inside Iran today?
- [11:07]
B
I think very strong. I would state one caveat, which is I don't think we have any idea how to judge when a regime is about to fall. If you think back, the fall of the Soviet Union, the fall of Ceausescu in Romania, the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, the fall of Mubarak in Egypt, Assad in Syria, how many of those were actually predicted? Zero. So I would say the same thing about Iran. But if you look at the country now, I think you'd have to say that the hold of the Revolutionary Guard Corps on the government, on the army, on the ministries and on the population is very strong.
- [11:47]
A
And why is that power so strong of the irgc?
- [11:52]
B
I guess there are two questions there. One is, why is the hold of the regime, the government, so strong? And why is the whole Revolutionary Guard so strong within it? As for the first, it's this sort of classic, very strong dictatorship. It's had, what, 47 years now to build the sinews of power throughout the country, in every ministry, in every part of the government, in every town, in the religious structures of the country, of Shia Islam in Iran. Why is the IRGC part of that? You know, I guess I'd say if you think of the old Soviet Union, that role was played essentially by the KGB and the Communist Party. This is a regime, in essence, without a Communist Party. So it's the IRGC that is, I think, the central nervous system of the regime.
- [12:42]
A
And did they also have a hold through payments?
- [12:46]
B
Yes. For example, there's a lot of corruption, which they're not really attempting to stamp out. It seems to be a feature rather than a bug. And the same is true, I would say, of the clergy. That is, to be in ayatollah is a way to live well. And there's a lot of money that goes into the religious structures, including a lot of religious foundations that throw around billions of dollars. Some of it, no doubt does some good, helping poor people, for example. But a lot of it, I think, makes for very cushy jobs for people in the clergy, which means you don't want to rock the boat.
- [13:21]
A
And you basically assess the probabilities of a more democratic government in Iran as very, very slim.
- [13:31]
B
Well, I wouldn't say that. I think. I'd say first, we can't predict when regimes fall. It would not shock me if the regime fell in a year because we know from the recurrent uprisings that the regime is very, very widely unpopular in the country. But whether the final uprising happens in a year or happens in 10 years, I just think we have no way to know the answer to that. But for the moment, they seem to be able to control the country. I think one has to add, how did they do that in January? By slaughtering tens of thousands of citizens. If you're willing to do that, and it's an interesting comparison. The Shah in 1979 was not willing to do that to maintain power. But if you are willing to do that, then you're likely to remain in power longer.
- [14:22]
A
How do you assess Iran's nuclear capabilities?
- [14:26]
B
Well, today I think they're very low. That is, I think the 12 day war of 2025 and this more recent war have hit a number of pieces of their nuclear structure, killed a lot of scientists, hit a lot of laboratories, hit pieces of their industrial base that are related to the nuclear program. So I would say today they're probably years away from the ability to build a nuclear bomb.
- [14:57]
A
Do you believe that this war makes a nuclear Iran more likely or less?
- [15:03]
B
I've heard people say that it's going to persuade the guys running the country, the IRGC people. You see, we really need a nuclear weapon because if we had one, they wouldn't have attacked us this way. That may or may not be true. I mean, Ukraine is attacking the Russians every day and Russia is a big nuclear power and it hasn't stopped Ukraine. So it isn't clear that that is a correct view. But of course, if they hadn't been trying to build a nuclear weapon, they wouldn't have been attacked in the 12 day war and probably in this war. So I think it's probably right that the people running the country will, if you will, make a mental note, we really have to get a nuclear weapon. But you know, after 2003, when we, the United States invaded Iraq, they put aside their nuclear weapons program for years. They might do that again while Trump is president and just say, look, we'll come back to this, but we have other priorities in the short run. I do think in the long run they want a nuclear weapon. That is the way they've behaved for decades. But that doesn't mean that they will try to build one immediately.
- [16:08]
A
What other threats should neighboring countries to Iran be most concerned about?
- [16:15]
B
Well, in the short run, the continuation or the enlargement of the kind of attack that Iran did undertake during this war, which were often on civilian targets. That is, they did try to hit military bases, but they also hit the Dubai airport. They did at the very end hit a desalination plant in Kuwait, for example, particularly the power plants. And desalination plants are quite vulnerable and I think are possible targets for Iran going forward. We also have to worry about their old weapon of choice, terrorism. I would say those are the two major problems we've already talked about, of course, keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed. But again, I don't think they can do that. Long term.
- [17:03]
A
Thinking about the end of this war, what do you think should be in the final terms?
- [17:10]
B
As an American, I wish we could get everything in our final terms, you know, our great wish list. But I think that's unrealistic. I think it should include no enrichment of uranium in Iran and a shipment out of Iran of the highly enriched uranium for which they have absolutely no need if they're not trying to build a nuclear weapon, followed by IAEA inspection, which are critical to prevent them from building a nuclear weapon. The only I'd add to that is some kind of limits on the ballistic missile system, because I think they were building so many ballistic missiles because they meant that to be protection for their nuclear program. No one will attack us, will attack the nuclear program because we would be able to counterattack so powerfully with ballistic
- [18:02]
A
what's the biggest risk that you believe people are underestimating right now?
- [18:07]
B
The ones we just talked about are pretty visible. I would think in the medium to longer run, there's a risk that China decides that Iran is actually a very useful ally, partly because of its oil, partly because of its poor relations with the United States. And if China were to decide to help Iran build a nuclear weapon or help Iran rebuild its military, particularly its ballistic missiles, that would be dangerous for the US and for Iran's neighbors.
- [18:39]
A
Elliot, what are the three takeaways you'd like to leave the audience with today?
- [18:46]
B
First, we've been through a long period of globalization or thinking that globalization will continue and will increase. I think the reaction to Covid and now to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will suggest to a lot of countries that there are many products that need to be produced at home and will lead to a diminution of the trend toward globalization in commerce. Second, I think we are all aware of the many Global Commons, the seas, international waterways, the Arctic. I think that idea is going to be weakened too. Things that have been considered as Global Commons will now be understood to be, well, maybe and maybe not Global Commons. And there may be things that countries will need to protect or attack a lot more. Finally, we are reminded that there is still such a thing as evil in the world. And I think that means for a lot of countries, for us more and more, for the Europeans looking at a Russian attack on Ukraine, the desire not to have to have big military establishments is not one we're going to be able to fulfill.
- [19:59]
A
Elliot, thank you. Thank you for your service in government and thank you for our conversation today.
- [20:06]
B
You're very welcome. Thanks for inviting me.
- [20:09]
A
If you're enjoying the podcast, and I really hope you are, please review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. It really helps get the word out. If you're interested, you can also sign up for the Three Takeaways newsletter at 3takeaways com, where you can also listen to previous episodes. You can also follow us on LinkedIn in X, Instagram and Facebook. I'm Lynn Thoman and this is three Takeaways. Thanks for listening.