Frenemies: China & the USA, a History

Summary

American History Hit: Frenemies—China & the USA, a History

Release Date: June 30, 2025

Overview

In this compelling episode of American History Hit, host Don Wildman delves deep into the intricate and often tumultuous relationship between the United States and China. Titled "Frenemies: China & the USA, a History," the episode explores the historical events that have shaped the dynamic between these two global superpowers, highlighting pivotal moments from the mid-20th century to the present day. With insights from esteemed historian Rana Mitter, the discussion provides a nuanced understanding of the economic interdependence, strategic tensions, and ideological divides that define US-China relations.

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1. Setting the Stage: The Balloon Incident

The episode opens with a historical vignette set in January 2023, describing a massive, steerable balloon traversing North American airspace. This balloon becomes a symbol of the mounting geopolitical tensions between the US and China, sparking suspicion and controversy over its purpose and origin. This incident serves as a contemporary entry point into the broader historical narrative of US-China relations.

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2. Post-World War II: Foundations of a Complex Relationship (00:00 – 11:13)

Don Wildman introduces the historical backdrop starting in 1945, the end of World War II—a pivotal year that marked significant changes in China's status on the global stage. Rana Mitter, St. Lee Chair in U.S. Asia Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, joins the discussion to provide expert analysis.

• China's Devastation in WWII (04:50): Mitter emphasizes that China was one of the most significantly devastated countries during World War II, suffering over 10 million deaths and massive infrastructure destruction.

  "China was one of the countries, perhaps the country in Asia on the Allied side, that was most significantly devastated by the experience of World War II." — Rana Mitter [04:50]

• Civil War and Communist Victory (05:55): The conversation shifts to the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists under Mao Zedong. Mitter explains how internal factors, coupled with Soviet assistance, led to the Communist victory in 1949.

  "The primary factors, the really important factors that changed China from a nationalist to a Communist government were internal." — Rana Mitter [19:43]

• Establishment of the People's Republic of China (11:13): Mitter details the formation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, and its implications for both China and US relations.

  "The People's Republic of China is a party state... ruled by a Marxist Leninist party that believes that above all, the Party's interests come first." — Rana Mitter [14:07]

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3. The Cold War Era: Hostility and Isolation (13:05 – 29:04)

The episode explores the Cold War period, highlighting how the US viewed the Communist victory in China as a significant setback in its containment strategy.

• US Debate on 'Who Lost China' (19:43): Mitter discusses the American introspection during the 1950s regarding the loss of China to Communism, clarifying that internal Chinese dynamics were the primary drivers of this outcome rather than direct US policies.

  "The question itself is based on a false premise because it makes an assumption that the most important thing in regime change... is what the United States chooses to do." — Rana Mitter [19:43]

• Korean War and Its Impact (25:21): The Korean War emerges as a critical event that solidified Taiwan's status and strained US-China relations further. Mitter explains how the war reinforced the US stance against Communist expansion in Asia.

• US Defense Agreements and Taiwan Relations (25:46): The discussion covers the establishment of defense agreements supporting Taiwan and the complexities surrounding US commitments without formal treaties.

  "The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979... does not give a treaty, alliance, or any sort of guarantee to Taiwan about its defense." — Rana Mitter [28:52]

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4. Rapprochement and the Nixon Era (29:04 – 39:12)

A significant turning point in US-China relations occurred in the early 1970s with President Richard Nixon's groundbreaking visit to China.

• Nixon's Strategic Move (34:12): Mitter elaborates on how Nixon leveraged the Sino-Soviet split to initiate a rapprochement with China, aiming to realign global power dynamics.

  "We cannot afford forever to leave China outside the family of nations." — Richard Nixon [37:36]

• Impact of China's Nuclear Development (38:24): The establishment of China's nuclear capabilities in 1964 added a new dimension to the geopolitical landscape, influencing both US and Soviet strategies.

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5. Economic Integration: Chimerica and Beyond (39:19 – 52:36)

The episode delves into the economic interdependence that blossomed between the US and China, particularly from the 1980s onward.

• Chimerica Explained (41:08): An economic analyst describes the symbiotic relationship termed "Chimerica," where China's manufacturing prowess and the US's consumer market became mutually beneficial.

  "One of the things you ought to have to remember about Nixon... he was also the president who took the United States off the gold standard." — Economic Analyst [41:08]

• China's Economic Reforms (40:39): The transition under Deng Xiaoping from a command economy to market-oriented reforms catalyzed China's rapid economic growth, further entwining US-China economic ties.

• Tiananmen Square and Its Aftermath (46:37): The 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre posed a potential rupture in relations, but economic imperatives soon re-solidified the partnership.

  "After the horror of Tiananmen Square, there are a few years when really human rights and freedoms in China were in the absolute deep freeze." — Rana Mitter [47:34]

• Globalization and Supply Chains (50:24): The episode highlights how globalization in the 1990s and 2000s entrenched the economic interdependence, even as political tensions simmered.

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6. Contemporary Relations: Tensions Amid Interdependence (52:34 – End)

The final segment addresses the current state of US-China relations, marked by both economic reliance and strategic competition.

• Economic Divergence Post-2008 (50:24): The Great Recession prompted China to accelerate its economic and technological advancements, leading to increased competition with the US.

  "China begins to reform in the direction of markets and links into what's happening in the Western world." — Economic Analyst [41:08]

• Modern Geopolitical Challenges (53:08): With rising tensions over trade, technology, and military presence, the US-China relationship enters a new, more contentious phase.

  "We're in another chapter, but it's quite a tense chapter and we don't yet know what the end point is going to be." — Economic Analyst [52:34]

• Future Prospects (54:00): The episode concludes with reflections on the uncertain future of US-China relations, emphasizing the need for ongoing dialogue and understanding to navigate the complexities ahead.

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Key Takeaways

• Historical Depth: The US-China relationship is deeply rooted in historical events, from WWII devastation and the Chinese Civil War to Cold War hostilities and economic integration.

• Economic Interdependence: The concept of "Chimerica" underscores the intricate economic ties that bind the two nations, despite political and strategic rivalries.

• Strategic Tensions: Contemporary issues such as trade disputes, technological competition, and military posturing highlight the frayed yet interconnected nature of the relationship.

• Future Uncertainties: As both nations navigate their roles on the global stage, the relationship remains dynamic, characterized by both collaboration and competition.

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Notable Quotes

• "China was one of the countries, perhaps the country in Asia on the Allied side, that was most significantly devastated by the experience of World War II." — Rana Mitter [04:50]

• "The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979... does not give a treaty, alliance, or any sort of guarantee to Taiwan about its defense." — Rana Mitter [28:52]

• "We cannot afford forever to leave China outside the family of nations." — Richard Nixon [37:36]

• "We're in another chapter, but it's quite a tense chapter and we don't yet know what the end point is going to be." — Economic Analyst [52:34]

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Conclusion

"Frenemies: China & the USA, a History" provides an in-depth exploration of one of the most significant international relationships of our time. Through expert analysis and historical narratives, Don Wildman and Rana Mitter shed light on the complexities, challenges, and interdependencies that define US-China relations. This episode serves as an essential listen for anyone seeking to understand the past and present dynamics shaping the future of these global powers.

Transcript

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[Narrator]

It's late January 2023. 18,300 meters. Some 60,000ft high in the skies over North America, a balloon soars on the jet stream. Now this is no ordinary balloon. It's enormous. A towering 200 foot high, luminous white inflation outfitted with propellers and rudders for maneuverability. It's a balloo that can be steered. It carries 16 solar panel arrays to power the balloon's payload. Suspended below it, a tech bay the size of several school buses, crammed with computers, sensors, antennas, all sorts of fancy surveillance equipment. Gliding steadily southeast, the balloon moves over Alaska's frozen tundra, the wilds of western Canada, eventually crossing the border into the United States. Riding its air currents over rugged Montana, pilots begin to notice the thing above. Circling it, photographing the behemoth. What is it? What's it doing? Who sent it here? As serene and peaceful as it appears, lofting through the air down below on earth, the balloon is creating a turbulent storm of controversy, the focus of suspicion and geopolitical anger between American officials who claim it is a giant militarized spy platform dispatched by China and Beijing, who played the denial game, declaring it's nothing but a weather balloon gone off course. Well, innocent or not, this high altitude colossus marks yet another flashpoint in a long, endlessly tense relationship between the US And China, a relationship as tenuous and troubled as it is economically vital to both superpower nations.

[Don Wildman]

Hey, folks, it's American history hit. Don Wildman here, your host. Welcome back to another episode in our Frenemies series. Today we're digging into the long and prickly relationship between the United States and China, an astonishing misalignment for the ages. Or is it? Over the centuries, as the United States has followed a zigzag course leading eventually to superpower status, China has transformed in its own remarkable way from once being a closed imperial civilization at the mercy of foreign powers to a modern, technologically advanced nation now asserting its own claim to global leadership. The US China relationship is one loaded with strategic tensions, historical resentments, economic interdependence and ideological divides. One of the most complex, consequential and volatile dynamics of our time. A geopolitical high wire act that may well define the next global order. So if you mean to understand where the modern world is headed, start here with this fraught and fractious history and to help us navigate what all has brought us to this point, we're joined by Rana Mitter, St. Lee Chair in U.S. asia Relations at Harvard Kennedy School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Professor Mitter, welcome. Honored to have you.

[Rana Mitter]

Don. A great pleasure to be with you and do just please call me Rana. I'm sure the listeners will thank you very much.

[Don Wildman]

We're going to focus this discussion today on 20th century events, really mid 20th century, on a time when this relationship was generally shaped by how the United States reacted to events unfolding within China, which is an unusual situation here. Most obviously, it begins with the Communist revolution led by Mao Zedong and against Chiang Kai Shek, which recreates the nation in a form contrary to American values. Then comes the alignment with the Soviet Union, the Cultural revolution of the 60s. It's a lot of stuff that we're going to discuss. We're trying to shape out a framework of what has brought us to this point. Much of this is about the Cold War, but when we're talking about China, it's a unique discussion because China is a unique country. It seems like a relationship driven by so much fear and understanding, but there's then that economic aspect of it which both relations rely onto. So where do you start in discussing this relationship in general?

[Rana Mitter]

I'm going to start, Don, in a year, which in some ways is a pivotal year for the entire world, and that is 1945. And no surprises here, 1945, because that's the end of World War II. I think history hit listeners will be very well used to that particular piece of history. We don't need to dive too much into why that is. But let's start with China in 1945. And as we do that, as you say over this conversation, going to stretch through the period of Chairman Mao, the Cold War, post Cold War, and towards the present day. So plenty to cover. But why do I start in 1945? The reason is, and again, this is something that people may not remember so much, that China was one of the countries, perhaps the country in Asia on the Allied side, that was most significantly devastated by the experience of World War II. Now, I say that because I think a lot of listeners will know it's well known the United States, British Empire, Soviet Union, the big three, as the allies during World War II. But I would say that big four includes China as well, which went to war with Japan first before the others in 1937. That's two years before the outbreak of the war in Europe. Then fights eight devastating years. And I say devastating in the sense of tens of millions, well, many millions, perhaps over 10 million deaths, 60 to 80 million people becoming refugees, the infrastructure of China smashed into pieces. So that's what China's like in 1945, when our story begins. On the one hand, it gets some of the benefits of being a wartime ally of the United States, the fact that to this very day, China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. People may sometimes ask, well, why is that? Well, the main reason is China is on the Allied side during World War II. So that's on the plus side. The minor side is that China is devastated. It's suffering refugee flight. Its railways, roads are bombed to pieces by the Japanese. Mines have been placed, not least by the Chinese themselves, retreating up the rivers, the great rivers of China, like the Yangtze. So that is the situation in 1945. But then we have to cover what comes next. The next three or four years are shaped by a vicious, brutal, deadly civil war between the two major parties that vie for rule over China at this point. The rulers when we start in 1945 are the nationalist, or sometimes spelled Kuomintang Party of Chiang Kai Shek. Chiang Kai Shek is the Generalissimo Militarist Leader. He's been in charge of China one way or another since 1928. But by the time we get to 1945, he's led his country through the devastation of World War II. You might say he's about to win the war but lose his nation because he then fights the other massive force that has grown up in China during those devastating years of World War II. Chinese Communist Party. Don't do the conversation. I'm going to keep saying CCP when I say that. That's short for Chinese Communist Party, so I'm going to be using that a lot during what we have to say. The Chinese Communist Party. Just take a moment to step back and think who these folks are. You started in 1921. This is a tiny little group of people. They're all men, pretty much all men at that stage. They meet in secret meetings in Shanghai, Beijing, big cities of China. They're reading Marx. They're inspired by the Russian Revolution. There aren't very many of them. They spend much of the next 20 years in ups and downs, including the famous Long march of the 1930s. Maybe a subject of another conversation, another day. And really, they look like they're not going places. They're trying to foment a revolution out in the countryside in the 20s and 30s. Doesn't go so well. Then World War II happens. The Japanese invade and they ally with the Nationalists under Chiang Kai Shek. And the eight years of the war against Japan is the chance for the Communists to grow and grow and grow, particularly out in China's countryside. They perfect techniques of guerrilla warfare. They grow their numbers, they form an alliance with the Soviet Union. By the time we get to the end of World War II, the Japanese surrender after the invasion of Manchuria and the atomic bombings, the civil war is set for the ccp and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai Shek struggle for victory. Don't want to spoil the ending for the listeners, but they may know it. In 1949, the Communists win. They win for a variety of reasons. Amongst them the exhaustion, corruption and essentially the loss of morale of the Nationalists who are fighting them. But also Soviet assistance to the Communists in China means that they're able to build up their own resources. Peasant revolution out in the countryside and the use of greatly improved military tactics that they've learned about during World War II. And they bring to deadly perfection in the civil war. So that gets us to 1949, 1st of October, when essentially the Nationalists are Forced to flee to the island of Taiwan, where they've been ever since, of course. And in central Beijing, at Tiananmen, the Gate of Heavenly Peace, Mao stands up. And around that time, not at that exact moment, around that time, he and various comrades essentially established People's Republic of China, Communist Party ruled state that still exists in China to this very day.

[Don Wildman]

Wow. It's so much the case of so much that happened throughout Europe in terms of the undoing of the imperial structures and governances and so forth. But certainly aligned with what has happened in Russia. The destruction of all that aristocracy, et cetera, is the same kind of thing that's happening generally in China, just on a much bigger scale. Because China is a massive population even then, right?

[Rana Mitter]

Absolutely. At that point, we're talking about 700 million people in the population today, of course, it's close to 1.3 billion. But as you say, the revolution, both the experience of the early 20th century, when there's a lot of revolutionary change in war, and then the establishment of the communist government in 1949, breaks down many of the old certainties, in particular the class structures. One of the things that the Communist revolution in general, and let's get him in the picture, Mao, Mao Zedong, by this stage, by 1949, the undisputed leader of China's Communist revolution. A lot of factional battles that go along the way to getting him to that position. But by 1949, there's no doubt he is the man in charge. And class warfare, destroying the old bonds, I mean, aristocracy maybe has gone by that stage because China already became a Republic in 1911 when the last emperor was overthrown. So the old royal families, the old imperial dynasties of China, are no longer on the scene, but the sort of economic divisions that meant you get a kind of rich bourgeois middle class and so forth. Mao and his comrades had their sights set on these guys. And in 1949, that is essentially where the class revolution begins. I know, Don, we're going to spend probably more time talking about US China relations, but this just sets the scene that this is genuinely an absolute overturning of Chinese society in a way that in some parts never gets reversed.

[Don Wildman]

The fact of it is there's so many layers and it's a wonderful aspect of it. It's painful in many regards, but there's so many layers that have to do with great affection, great alignment, and then a kind of feeling of betrayal, distrust. All of this stuff really feeds into this amazingly complex relationship that we're about to go into. More detail of, But I'm trying to sketch out at the top that, you know, watch out what's coming here, because for the next 50, you know, eventually 100 years, that's what's fueling this thing. There's a lot. When Nixon goes to China. Nixon is a former World War II guy. He has great affection and respect for what the Chinese have accomplished fighting the Japanese. Just like we did. All of this back and forth, just like with Russia, is going on in the same way for us. Let's nail down exactly what happens October 1, 1949. At that point, how much is the government of China like the one we know today? Have they created something that is the lasting structure? Don Dan Mao.

[Rana Mitter]

So the government of China, Don, that is established on the 1st of October, at least officially on the 1st of October, 1949, is in one important element identical to the party that exists today, and at least one other element almost entirely different. So let me say what those two elements are. The first one is that then and now the People's Republic of China is a party state. It is, in other words, a recognized nation state. But it is one that is ruled by a Marxist Leninist party that believes that above all, the Party's interests come first. The interest of the nation and the people, of course, matter. It's in the clothes of the name the People's Republic of China. But it is the party as the instrument of destiny that is going to get the people to the destination they need to go to. The father, in fact, of today's Chinese leader, Xi Jinping. His father was called Xi Jungxun, and he once said the party's interests come first or always come first. In fact, that's the title of a great new biography of Xi Jin Shin by the American historian Joseph Turigian. But that sentiment will be expressed by most of the revolutionaries who took part in that overturning of society. So that structure of a Marxist Leninist party that will seek information, seek input in terms of its policies, but when the line is put forward, well, this is the policy. There's no arguing with it. There's no democratic back and forth. This is the Leninist way of looking at things. The other element that has changed completely, though, which is perhaps. Yeah, no, I'd say it is as important is that the economic model that the party uses, its idea for how China is going to become prosperous, stable, make its way in the world between 1949 and now, that has changed massively. In 1949, essentially, what is set up is a partial copy partial adaptation of the command economy exemplified then by the Soviet Union. And China jumps on that particular bandwagon in the period in between. After that 1960s, early 1970s, China goes through the famous Cultural Revolution. That's also the time, as it happens, when Nixon visits. You mentioned Nixon, so let's just mention him there. But China's economy is much more inward looking at that point. And then from the 1970s, technically 1978, but actually probably even a little earlier, you get the period that's still ongoing today in which any Chinese you speak to will refer to as reform and opening, in other words, the bringing of markets and markets with a very strong international flavor to the socialist model. So one Leninist party system throughout the whole time, but at least three different economic regimes underpinning them. That's what's the same. That's what's different.

[Narrator]

I'll be back with more American history after this short break.

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[Don Wildman]

1949 and Ma's success is the turning point, of course, towards Cold War and our feeling of betrayal that they have now become the enemy. Basically. How much did the United States see that Communist victory as a failure of our own containment? Did we drop the ball here as far as the US was concerned, or did it just happen and we couldn't stop it?

[Rana Mitter]

Much of the 1950s in American policy circles was taken up with a debate, if you can call it that, on the question of who lost China. And even now, if you look at textbooks around that period, the question of the who lost China? Debate is still scribed. I think most analysts, now, certainly historians, would say that the question itself is based on a false premise because it makes an assumption that the most important thing in regime change, if you want to put it that way, or in changing the internal politics of China or any other country, is what the United States chooses to do. Now, don't get me wrong. The United States in the post World War II period was and is the single most powerful international force, much more so than the Soviet Union, as it turned out, in international politics. But the ability to use that simply to take responsibility, to either turn on or turn off governments or societies or even international markets, it's not that simple. And so in the case of China, I would say that on the one hand, most historians would say that the primary factors, the really important factors that changed China from a nationalist to a Communist government were internal. I mentioned some of them earlier. The US Is important. Of course it is, but, you know, that's not the key driver. But that wasn't the way that it looked in Washington and surrounding areas at the time. And just to give you a little bit more detail on the back of that, there are phases in terms of that development. So we're talking about the early Cold War. Let's get specific. In the lead up to the fall of the Nationalist government, Chiang Kai Shek's government, Harry Truman's government, which is what administration, which is the one in power at that time, to be honest, spent some time, but not the Majority of its time looking out on the China question, There's a heck of a lot going on elsewhere in the world that Truman and Dean Acheson and others have to deal with, including making sure that Europe isn't conquered by the Soviets and a whole question of reconstruction of Japan. So basically, pretty early on, the Truman administration thinks this government, the Nationalist government of China, is not going to survive. And they provide some loans, you know, a bit of armaments, basically say, you know, guys, you're on your own. You have to fight this out. And Trunhe himself was very unimpressed by the top Nationalist leaders he met. He really wasn't a fan of the kmt, the Nationalist government at the time. And it might have stayed that way. By the time the Nationalists are forced to flee to Taiwan, the Communists, brilliant military tactics, lightning, or they finally take over the whole of the mainland in a very, very short period of time, and they want to get to Taiwan. The reason they don't get it is the Cold War, because of course, the Chinese Communists also undertake a move which I think in retrospect, you have to consider whether or not it was really a wise one or not, which was to join in. Mao joins in somewhat reluctantly, with proddings from Stalin and from Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader, that China should join in with trying to take South Korea and make it part of a unified Korean peninsula under Communist domination. And we know that as the Korean War, by the way. It's not called the Korean War in China there. It's known as the Resistance to America war, which is one of the reasons it keeps getting brought out of the propaganda cupboard when needed. My point is this, that Truman at that point saw the question of Taiwan's survival under Chiang Kai Shek from no longer just being the kind of leftover business of a horrible civil war where, you know, the American Allies had not formed the Nationalists, to being the last outpost of an anti Communist government in an area where it looked like Communist domination in Northeast Asia with Stalin's assistance was going to go very successfully from their point of view. And so essentially, the Korean War saves Taiwan under Chiang Kai Shek during that. During that period. That then sets the scene for what, in retrospect, when we look back at that early Cold War period, even now looks like a really bizarre settlement, which is that for more than a quarter of a century between 1949 and 1979, there was no official diplomatic recognition between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Even the Nixon visit of 1972, which we'll get to. And people, I'm sure, remember that as a great historical event. That wasn't the opening of diplomatic relations. That was just the beginning of a rapprochement. So you've got more than a quarter of a century when two of the most important countries on earth are simply not talking to each other. And the reason for that, I'm going to spread the responsibility a little bit evenly here. Number one, is that the Chinese really shouldn't have tried to invade South Korea. They step back from that. They might have essentially been able to reopen diplomatic relations, perhaps with the United States early on in the 50s, even though they showed some reluctance about whether they wanted to. But I think it was probably a misjudgment for the Eisenhower administration, which followed on, and John Foster Dulles, the then Secretary of State, simply to decide that no possible diplomatic rapprochement with China was possible in the 1930s, 50s and 60s. And Nixon, to be fair, has to take his responsibility because he was vice President of the United States during most of that time. And much of the brutality and viciousness of the regime in China during the Cultural Revolution in particular, I think might well have been gone in a different path and a less violent path had the path between the US And China been more open at that time. But that's counterfactual. In reality, there was no diplomatic relationship between the two. And that sets our scene for a cold war where the US and China really aren't talking to each other.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah, just one of the smaller matters. Wrong term for it. But we have never had an official treaty with Taiwan to protect it. That has never been signed. We never did that. I've always been wondering if the United States sort of secretly, was this more of a problem than it was an advantage in preventing the domino theory from succeeding as far as they're concerned. I mean, where do we stand with Taiwan in the earlier days? That way?

[Rana Mitter]

Okay, so first of all, Don, there was actually, for a period, if not an official treaty, at least a defense agreement. This was under the Eisenhower administration in the 50s. And just to remind listeners, I'm sure, you know, history hit listeners are very experts, they'll know this. But reminder that during the time that the People's Republic was not recognized by the United States or indeed the United nations Until the early 1970s, the Republic of China, temporarily located on Taiwan, was the recognized China Chinese state. So during that time, even though it was only the state of Taiwan, any discussions about China had to be done with. With Taipei. So during that time in the 1950s, after a couple of what were called Taiwan Straits Crises, where it looked like the mainland might be trying to bombard the coast of Taiwan, maybe launch an invasion, you know, unclear. Mao was certainly keen to keep Taiwan on its toes. The Eisenhower administration found itself in this awkward position that you've outlined, that they don't really want to give a proper guarantee for the defense of Taiwan with Chiang Kai Shek still sitting in the President's palace, keen to start World War III maybe, and reinvade the mainland dies. And now people, they're not dumb. They're not going to let that happen. At the same time, they don't want to give Mao ideas that he can do anything he wants. So essentially, a defense agreement is agreed during that time by which the US Navy does provide protection around the main island of Taiwan, but importantly, it did not extend that to the two to the outlying islands, a couple of which basically sit so close to the coast of mainland China that you could see them. They're still there today. They're called Kinmen and mazu. And you can see the mainland from the coast and of the islands and vice versa. So those were not included. Now, just to flash ahead for a moment, when you get past the Nixon visit, you get the opening of full relations between the People's Republic and the US under Jimmy Carter in 1979, 1st of January. Many interests in Congress. This is Congress rather than the administration at this point. Many people in Congress think this is pulling the rug from under the Nationalist government, which is still in power in Taiwan. Chiang Kai Shek has died by that stage, but his son Zhang Jiguo is in power. So they passed the Taiwan Relations Act. That's initiative of Congress, but it's, you know, goes through and is ratified, and that still exists today. And it does not give a treaty, alliance, or any sort of guarantee to Taiwan about its defense. It's not like the U.S. japan Security Alliance. It's not like the U.S. south Korea Security alliance. But it does say the United States can make sure that Taiwan is able to defend itself. And that can be interpreted widely. Could be selling arms, maybe in some cases when you're pushing the envelope. Chinese side don't like this very much, but it could include military advice, assistance. You know, it's wide in interpretation, but that TRA, the Taiwan Relations act of 1979 is essentially what's there now as a means of acknowledging the fact that the Republic of China on Taiwan since 1979 has not been, from the U.S. s point of view. The acknowledged government of China.

[Don Wildman]

MAO's outlook on US relations during this period, this what looks like an isolationist period as far as the US is concerned. Was that an advantage to him during this? I mean, we're talking about decades of time here.

[Rana Mitter]

We are talking about decades of time and it's worth noting that during that time China was both connected and isolated from a whole variety of other countries as well. So during the 1950s, China has a strong alliance with the Soviet Union, which then breaks up in acrimony in the early 1960s. There's also the growth over that time up and down in relations with other Asian countries, particularly other countries in Asia that have just left the empires of European powers and are now seeking independence themselves. So China never lacks for people to talk to. But the United States for more than a quarter of a century is not really on that list. From 1949 up to the early 70s, Mao himself was not opposed to this sort of isolation. In other words, he was not sitting there from the documents in Zhongnanhai, the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party's governance at the center of Tiananmen Square in the center of Beijing. He was not sitting there kind of bemoaning the fact that, you know, he wouldn't get on the. He wanted to get on the phone when the Americans wouldn't pick up at the other end. He actually regarded it as important to use one of his own expressions, to lean to one side. In other words, make it clear that when China was taking the path of a revolutionary Socialist government from 1949, allying with the Soviet Union, which it did at that point, it was doing so in an absolutely wholehearted way. Now there had been attempts in the late World War II years, in the civil war years to try and have some sort of outreach to the United States. General George Marshall, no less, one of the great figures of the American military and diplomatic world, spent an entire year in 1946 in China Trying to sort out a deal between the communists and nationalists and left home, left China for home on 1st January 1947, pretty disillusioned, it didn't work out. But those attempts to try and bring the Americans in by the Communist Party, by the ccp, it's now fairly clear, were only there as a means of providing some sort of COVID in terms of the bigger agenda, which was a genuine deep seated and radical socialist policy. And in that context, not being connected to the United States was actually something that Mao actively wanted to embrace. It wasn't because he didn't treat The United States, seriously. One great phrase that he used during that period was that the United States was the most respected enemy. So it was a sort of. I think your series is called Frenemies. And while this perhaps isn't quite the same as being a friend, it is the idea that someone you're opposed to is not necessarily to be despised or taken lightly. You know, one can take someone seriously and respect them while being deeply opposed to what they. What they say. Now, for the first decade or so of the Cold War, the 1950s, really, economically, this isn't a disaster from the point of view of Mao and China because they're tied into the growing socialist world economic system. That means they're trading with East Germany, they're trading with Poland, they're trading with all these places that Soviet Union is in charge of trading with the Soviets as well. You know, Stalin is keen to get them pulled into that system. That becomes more difficult in the 60s when they're split up with the Soviet Union. There's a kind of acrimonious falling out between the two sides. But during that period, Mao nonetheless continues to make it very clear that he regards it. The ideological commitment of pushing back against the United States as well as the Soviet Union, which he regards as another imperialist power, is very, very important. The Korean War is perhaps the best example of how that happens in. In practice, basically, Mao, Greece started, or take part in it just a few months after the establishment of the People's Republic, which is a really weird time to start a new international war when you're setting up your own country. And in large part it was the ideological importance, as he saw it, of being seen to push back against American imperialist power, as he would have called it in the world. That meant that he felt he had to show willing and be part of that Korean War and the, as they would put it in China, resistance to America.

[Don Wildman]

In a sense, we've reached at this point, the end of part one of the modern relationship, which is really defined by the Cold War. It continues on, of course, but the 60s, as you've already mentioned, and we'll discuss in more detail now, is really about another period of time leading up to the opening up. So we can, in a sense, leave that behind at this moment and say, gee, there was a lot that happened. 1949, 50. Everything that went on in the 50s is amazing. But start. Things start to shift as the relationship with the Soviet Union changes. The big border crisis that happens in the 60s, the Tibet crisis, as far as, you know, the United States are concerned. These are massive stories that deserve their own episodes. So we can't sort of bog down in too many of them. But really why we're trying to sketch towards the 1970s what happens under Nixon. The opening of China in 1972 is really the result of a rift between the Soviet Union and China in one respect. Right. There's a moment of opportunity for the United States to slip in and kind of intrude on that relationship. Is that one very general way of looking at that moment?

[Rana Mitter]

Yes, it is. Essentially from about 1960 onwards, it's clear that for whatever reason in the Western world found it quite difficult to intuit what the reasons were. But for various reasons, the Soviet Union and China, the two great socialist powers of the world, had fallen out with each other. I mean, a lot of it was actually quite personal. Khrushchev and Mao simply didn't get on with each other. But then as American politics developed in the 1960s, a whole variety of things came together to make this an opportune moment for a reorienting of world order. First of all, let's not forget the one Asian issue that was, you know, really running like a. Let's not forget first of all, the one Asian related issue that was destroying large parts of American society at that time, the Vietnam War. Large numbers of, you know, young Americans were being sent fighting Vietnam and it was consuming politics at that time. And Richard Nixon, who in the mid-1960s is in the sort of political wilderness, he failed to become president in 1960, but he still looking for a comeback, he wrote, even today, actually really well worth reading a seminal piece in the journal Foreign affairs in 1967 called Asia after Vietnam. And it's a way of kind of projecting forwards as to what was going to happen next. And it's very long, well worth reading even now. But there's one sentence in it that's worth noticing where he says, we cannot afford forever to leave China outside the family of nations. That was one of the first indications for those who are willing to look that Richard Nixon, the archetypal hard right Republican foreign policy guru and politician, was looking for a shift. So as we all know, he got elected, became president 1969, and he brings in a guy called Henry Kissinger as his national security adviser. And there's a lot of discussion at high levels. Nixon is leading it. Kissinger is obviously very heavily involved about whether or not this is the moment to try and take advantage of, of the split between the Soviets and the Chinese. Can America wedge itself in the middle they're asking and essentially become the only power that is talking to both of those particular countries. And in doing so, is there some way that they can get to the end of this appalling war in Vietnam that's also very much on their minds. So the stars align. And Henry Kissinger, as you say, at first was not that crazy about the idea. He was a bit reluctant to say that actually it was possible to leverage China this way. But as we know, history tells that he was willing to give it a go. And this also coincided, we now know, with what you might call a thaw, along with a bit of turmoil in Beijing. The Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966. And again the outside world tries to work out what on earth to make of this extraordinary overturning of Chinese society. Violence, turmoil everywhere. But behind the scenes, we know that there were figures within the leadership who were reluctant to go down this very, very destructive path. Amongst them, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, the second in command, you might say, in some ways relatively moderate figure within the leadership. That's more complex than that. But let's say that. And he and others put forward the idea that actually it was the time to seek a rapprochement, seek a new closeness with the United States with which there've been no diplomatic relations by that stage for more than 20 years.

[Don Wildman]

So that is also represents an opportunity. But within China, where there is a rift between the leadership as well, that the United States wants to encourage, wants to take advantage of Zhou Enlai. I remember that feeling about Joe and Lai, that there was a sense of hope with this guy. He was kind of a cool guy, you thought from, from my little boy perspective, but that was the key. So on one hand we have a sort of geopolitical rift with Russia for one, but we also have this within. So that's the moment of chess playing that's really going on there. Boy, is it chess. I mean, this is such high level stuff. We don't really hear about this these days. But the, the Atchison's and all these Dulles, all these guys are playing this game that's really big, large scale is what's happening. We also haven't talked about the fact that in 1964 China becomes a nuclear power, which really tips the balance.

[Rana Mitter]

Yes, that's absolutely right. So China's nuclear program, which has been underway really for several years by that point, comes to fruition with the building and testing of China's first nuclear weapon, first atomic bomb. There's also actually, along with that, development of satellite systems. As well. So the idea of China as this technologically advanced defense power or security power becomes really important at that stage. I would say by that stage, the world's concentration really is on the US Soviet competition on nuclear weapons. The Chinese weapon, of course, is an addition, an unwelcome addition in many ways to proliferation across the world. But at that stage, it's still very much in the lower tier of players, certainly compared to the Soviets or the Americans.

[Narrator]

I'll be back with more American history after this short break.

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[Don Wildman]

Rana so much of the last phase of this relationship, the most recent phase of this reaching back to Nixon onward, is about trade, is about us becoming these remarkable trade partners where there's so much interdependence. How does this occur? How does this inform what had been so fractious and difficult? And are we still dealing with the same geopolitical realities of competing against each other even while we depend on each other? It's such an ironic circumstance, isn't it?

[Economic Analyst]

It is ironic, Don. So let's just take a moment to look at what you might call the decade and a half that comes between Nixon's visit to China, 1972, and perhaps Tiananmen Square, 1989, the killings around China's capital that many people of course, will know or indeed perhaps even remember. The Nixon visit was a genuinely epochal event. I won't go into huge details because it's quite well known, but I want to just put that as the start of the context, essentially the sign that the, the the thaw, the freeze between the United States and China was finally going to be breached. It took a few years for them to get to official diplomatic relations, but that was, you know, more process than reversing of, of course, by that. That stage. But what ends up, in some ways being just as important are the economic shifts, the tectonic plates that move in terms of the global economy under the surface in those years as well. Essentially, one of the things you ought to have to remember about Nixon, and not always remembered quite as affectionately in some terms, is that he was also the president who took the United States off the gold standard and essentially shook up almost to the point of destruction of the old Bretton woods economic system that had been set up after 1945. The whole variety of reasons for that, but basically he triggered that particular process that meant that the 1970s began to become a decade when all around the world, in different ways, in the United States, down in South America, in parts of Asia, in the United States, the move towards the internationalized, liberalized system of market economics, where currencies flowed freely and trade began to globalize in a big way, that really came into place during that period. Now, one particular domestic development in China we now know was very important in this, which was that even despite the fact that collective farms and communal and collective economics had been ruling the roost in China for 20, 30 years, there was still actually more private entrepreneurship, particularly in the countryside amongst the farmers. That had been acknowledged. A lot of it obviously, was the love that dare not speak its name, because saying you were running markets at a time of socialism could get you into big trouble. But, you know, these entrepreneurial farmers, and they were doing pretty well. And when it came to the time when Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader who essentially comes to supreme control a couple of years after Mao's death in 1978, says that market socialism is the way to go. The floodgates open and China's domestic economics becomes a really important part of. Rather, at that point, China's domestic economy starts to reform in the direction of markets in a way that has never stood still since then, but that then links into what's happening in the Western world, in the United States in particular. And as China's economy expands, it moves from agriculture to light industry and manufacturing made in China. The United States is Also, in the 80s, under the presidency of one Ronald Reagan, doing various things that also help to push China's case forward. Number one. Number one is that the Reagan administration really, really wants to push back against the Soviet Union. They're the bad communists. That means that Deng Xiaoping's China becomes the good Communists. And there's a lot of actually quite warm relationships between the two, even up to a certain amount of defense cooperation, which people prefer not to talk about these days, but happened under Carter, it happened under Reagan. Then, in economic terms, you have Reagan's decision, along with his economics team, to essentially make the United States into a big debtor nation. In other words, to create lots of credit and to use to suck in lots of exports from imports, from the US Point of view, from Japan, but also from China. So China's getting its market mojo back. Its peasants are moving into manufacturing and these sort of cities in the countryside, and the United States is becoming a huge global market to buy all of these goods. So everyone's happy. This is the situation that some economists and historians, one of them is the famous economic historian Neil Ferguson, have called Chimerica. In other words, the two economies becoming more and more embedded with each other. Now, the 80s is when this begins to take off. 1989 in Tiananmen Square, the horrific killing of student and workers after democracy demonstrations in the center of Beijing looks as if it's going to put, you know, the end on this particular period. But in fact, what we now know is that after a short period when it looked like the US And China might essentially be in the deep freeze because of this horrific event in 1989, actually the economies start to come together again and to fire on even more cylinders through the 1990s, thereby creating the Chinese economic miracle, in which, of course, input, productivity growth, hard work, labor in China continues to grow the economy. But American economic policies, also policies elsewhere in the world, but the United States is really crucial to this, are oriented in a direction that essentially looks to create supply chains and take a huge number of imports of cheaply made goods from China. At the same time, we also have to say there's one other phenomenon emerging which is of great relevance today. The beginning of the hollowing out of some parts of American manufacturing, which ends up not being able to compete in terms of cost or speed or automation, either with the cheapness of China or the efficiency of Japan. And all of these factors come together in the 80s and 90s.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah. Again, though, you know, this is the tendency of all Americans to sort of give ourselves the credit for the situation, when in fact, China is really in the driver's seat of this change. It's a worldwide role that they're playing, not just towards the United States, but we are, of course, the main market for them. I want to ask you the reaction to the Tiananmen Square, which in that year, I remember we're talking about the spring of 1989. So many of us who were youngsters at the time, remember the man in front of the tank, it was all these symbolic moments of like, oh, thank goodness for these people. They're finally breaking the bonds of oppression and so forth. And then it all happened so tragically and then went away. And it was largely because of this economic factor that the United States at the federal level knew that we had this skin in the game as far as the transformation of the Chinese economy. That really was the scale, wasn't it, at that point?

[Economic Analyst]

I'd say that that's broadly right.

[Don Wildman]

The scale in terms of a balance.

[Rana Mitter]

I'm sorry, broadly right, but with some.

[Economic Analyst]

Other thoughts that we should keep in mind, actually. I wouldn't underestimate how much the US continued to be in the minds of Chinese reformers as a role model all the way through the 1990s. One of the things that's less realized about China worth saying, I think, is that after the horror of Tiananmen Square, 1989, there are a few years when really human rights and freedoms in China were in the absolute deep freeze. And yet in the mid-1990s, say from 1993, 4 onwards, maybe for about 15 years or so, actually, even under China's authoritarian system, which was always there, there was more openness to political ideas that came from the outside world. You could discuss democratization, constitutionalism, and a willingness to actually embrace the outside world, again on the grounds that economic benefit might well have to come with being more internationalized. Just one very quick example, people may have forgotten 1998, less than 10 years after Tiananmen Square, President Bill Clinton of the United States and President Jiang Zemin of China debated live on Chinese TV as to whether democracy was a good idea or not. Now, you won't need me to say that they had rather different ideas about this, but the point is that this could happen live on Chinese TV inside a communist country at that point, because there was enough sense both of China getting its confidence back that it was heading the right way, and a feeling that engaging with the United States was something that was within the ambit of a shared enterprise. And many of the other things which have since gone on to become quite controversial, such as the US and China working together to get China into the WTO, the World Trade Organization, in the early 2000s, are also part of that period when it seemed that after Tiananmen Square being a horrific but perhaps not entirely predictive element of what was going to happen in terms of China's domestic politics, that there might be a second act in which the US and China could be closer to each other. There might be more democratization.

[Don Wildman]

That was a big moment when we were China most favored nation, you know, gets that status going. I mean, there were so many headlines, tension, relieving headlines, that thought, oh goodness, this is all finally over and we can all be friends and important friends. You know, I was living in California. I remember those container ships still coming to this day. We really rely on them. I want to bring this to the modern moment, to the modern tensions that we are feeling right now. Certainly under Biden times, there was the balloons are coming over. Oh my goodness. It's all kinds of scary things that the Chinese are doing to us. An illusion. Because the reality is we continue on in this interdependent way, but have we reached a real point of fracture or are we just in another chapter of this goes on and on? Let's just figure it out as we go.

[Economic Analyst]

I think we're in another chapter, but it's quite a tense chapter and we don't yet know what the end point is going to be. I would say that the moment we mentioned a few minutes ago, the entry of China into The World Trade Organization 2001, which happened with the support of both Democrats and Republicans, was probably the last policy moment in US China relations, wherein both sides were trying to get exactly the same thing in the 20 or so years since then. Although of course there have been diplomatic relations and some cooperation, particularly on climate change. For a while between the two sides, agendas were really different in many ways. I think the turning point, or at least an important turning point, we can now identify in retrospect, and that was probably 2008, the great financial crisis, when China looked at the near implosion of the Western liberal economic system and financial system and found itself thinking, well, maybe we can do better if we've been following this guidebook for the last 20, 25 years. But this is what happens when it goes wrong. Maybe we ought to go in a different direction. And that decade that followed the financial crisis was the one where China, you know, pumped huge amounts of credit into the economy, built all those skyscrapers and high speed railways and airports and all the kind of shiny new equipment that you see if you go to China, but also started pumping 2.4% of its GDP year on year into scientific research and development, because they knew that over time, you know, five years, 10 years, 15 years in, that would mean awful lot of graduates in China who can do math, an awful lot of places in the country that could take scientific research and then commercialize it and also make China's military one of the strongest in the world. So I would say that that set of developments that comes from 2008, when the US and China are finally really diverging, has led to where we are now. In other words, the reality that both sides are still hugely dependent on each other for tech cooperation in some areas, although not all in terms of investment and in terms of the global financial system, but are now heading in divergent directions where the success of one is seen essentially as being to the detriment.

[Rana Mitter]

Of the other and vice versa.

[Economic Analyst]

And that is a shift. But it's a shift that has really. Yeah. Something close to that.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah. I mean, and the other irony in general is that the world, never mind China, is now reacting to us in ways we used to have to read the world where there's a strong national figure, you know, a nationalist movement which is in charge of the country, and people are trying to read which way the US Is going to go by way of Donald Trump. It's really quite a reverse, isn't it? Because that's how we used to look at the world, and now they're having to read those same tea leaves for us.

[Economic Analyst]

Well, the word tariff, of course, has been heard more in US Politics perhaps in the last half year or so than in half a century before that. I think it's fair to say that we're on a journey. We don't know the end point of that yet. Both China and the US have raised tariffs against each other, lowered tariffs against each other, and we still, at the time of recording, have to wait for what it sounds like President Trump wants. And I suspect that President Xi is probably likely to agree to at some point, which is a summit meeting between the two. It may be that in the age of politics that's run by big personalities who basically take on very individual decisions, that maybe that's the next phase for the U. S. China relationship. It's two presidents who both think of themselves as the key actors, not just in their own countries, but in their hemispheres, who are actually going to sit down and have that conversation, where it will go. Well, I have to say, Don, that's probably for another episode of history hit.

[Don Wildman]

Well, we're calling you, and we need that information. Rana Mitter is a professor of US Asia relations at the Harvard Kennedy School. Please do yourself a favor and google this man's brilliant career, the many books and articles he's written. Thank you so much, Rana. Glad to meet you.

[Narrator]

Hey, thanks for listening to American History hit. You know, every week we release new episodes, two new episodes dropping Mondays and Thursdays. All kinds of content from mysterious missing colonies to powerful political movements to some of the biggest battles across the centuries. Don't miss an episode by hitting like and follow. You help us out, which is great, but you'll also be reminded when our shows are on. And while you're at it, share it with a friend. American History hit with me, Don Wildman. So grateful for your support.

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