The First 12 Days of the Civil War

Summary

American History Hit: The First 12 Days of the Civil War

In the gripping episode titled "The First 12 Days of the Civil War," hosted by Don Wildman of American History Hit, historian and author Tony Silber delves into a pivotal yet often overlooked period at the dawn of the American Civil War. This detailed exploration sheds light on the precarious situation Washington, D.C., faced in April 1861, the Confederate strategies that could have dramatically altered the course of history, and the Union's frantic efforts to defend the nation's capital.

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1. Washington, D.C. in Spring 1861

Don Wildman sets the stage in Washington, D.C., Spring 1861—a city still under development with Pierre L'Enfant's grand designs partially realized. The National Mall was a patchwork of muddy fields and unfinished structures, including the Capitol Building, whose dome remained encased in scaffolding. Despite housing 75,000 residents, the city was vastly underprepared for the impending crisis.

Don Wildman [00:34]: "Spring of 1861 here in Washington, D.C. still a developing metropolis... the streets linking it to the Executive Mansion are rough, uneven and dimly lit at night."

2. The Surrender of Fort Sumter and Immediate Aftermath

The Confederate attack on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, marked the official start of the Civil War. Major Robert Anderson's surrender after 34 hours highlighted the Union's lack of readiness.

Don Wildman [01:02]: "Confederate artillery let loose on Fort Sumter... Major Robert Anderson surrendered."

3. Vulnerability of Washington, D.C.

Contrary to what one might expect, Washington, D.C. was not well-defended. Tony Silber explains the Union's unpreparedness:

Tony Silber [03:20]: "DC was not defended at all. It was barely defended... the city was unbelievably vulnerable."

The Union army was scattered west of the Mississippi, leaving the capital exposed. Meanwhile, the Confederates, buoyed by secessionist fervor, were poised to strike.

4. Lack of Union Preparedness

Silber highlights the Union's reliance on state militias rather than a cohesive national army. The reluctance to maintain a standing army, rooted in the founders' fears of tyranny, left the capital defenseless.

Tony Silber [04:34]: "Lincoln was only in on the job as president for seven weeks... the states all had their own independent armies."

5. Confederate Intent and Missed Opportunities

Despite the Confederacy's aggressive stance towards capturing Washington, D.C., for strategic and symbolic reasons, they failed to execute a swift attack. Silber attributes this to delayed movements and underestimating the potential for Union reinforcement.

Tony Silber [17:02]: "The Confederates were moving troops north during those days, but they didn't move fast enough."

6. Critical Events of the First 12 Days

a. Virginia's Secession (April 17, 1861)

Virginia's secession was a profound blow to national identity and a strategic disaster, given its proximity to Washington, D.C.

Tony Silber [22:48]: "Virginia was the source of the original sense of unity... they voted in secret to secede on the Wednesday of the 17th."

b. Isolation of Washington, D.C. (April 18, 1861)

The severing of telegraph lines, destruction of bridges, and cutoff of railroads left the capital isolated and defenseless.

Don Wildman [24:18]: "April 18, Washington severed from the north... Washington is isolated."

c. The Baltimore Riot (April 18-19, 1861)

As Union troops attempted to transit through Baltimore, a secessionist stronghold, they faced violent opposition. The New York 7th Regiment's eventual arrival was crucial in preventing Confederate dominance.

Tony Silber [28:26]: "The mob grows... 20,000 by some estimates. It's incredibly violent."

Don Wildman [31:00]: "The New York 7th Regiment gets through on April 25th."

d. Arrival of the New York 7th Regiment (April 25, 1861)

The successful march of the New York 7th Regiment to Washington was a turning point that salvaged the capital's defense.

Tony Silber [33:36]: "They finally decide to go forward together... they get to D.C. the seventh."

7. Potential Consequences of a Confederate Capture of Washington

Had the Confederates succeeded in capturing Washington, D.C., the ramifications would have been catastrophic:

• Secession of Border States: Maryland and other border states might have followed suit, weakening the Union's position.

• British Recognition of the Confederacy: A successful capture could have swayed international powers like Britain to support the Southern states, fundamentally altering the war's dynamics.

Tony Silber [33:38]: "If the Confederates take Washington D.C., it would have triggered a whole bunch of other things."

8. Union Response and Military Mobilization

Lincoln's call for troops was met with overwhelming support in the North, rallying a unified front despite previous regional ambivalences.

Tony Silber [17:50]: "The response is overwhelming in the North... 'North Rose is one man.'"

However, the effectiveness of these militias varied, with states like Massachusetts and New York being well-prepared, while others lagged.

Tony Silber [18:55]: "Massachusetts and New York were fully ready... Pennsylvania was disastrously unready."

9. Reflections on Historical Significance

Silber emphasizes the critical nature of these initial days, arguing that this period was more consequential than commonly acknowledged. He underscores the narrow path the nation walked before subsequent battles and events solidified the war's trajectory.

Tony Silber [36:01]: "This was a consequential moment. This was much more pivotal than we acknowledge or accept today."

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Conclusion

"The First 12 Days of the Civil War" offers a compelling narrative of a nation teetering on the brink of division. Through Tony Silber's meticulous research, the episode illuminates the fragility of Union defenses, the aggressive ambitions of the Confederacy, and the frantic mobilization that ultimately preserved Washington, D.C. This episode serves as a poignant reminder of how close the United States came to a dramatically different historical path and underscores the importance of preparedness and swift action in moments of national crisis.

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Notable Quotes:

• Don Wildman [03:20]: "DC was not defended at all. It was barely defended... the city was unbelievably vulnerable."

• Tony Silber [17:02]: "The Confederates were moving troops north during those days, but they didn't move fast enough."

• Tony Silber [33:36]: "They finally decide to go forward together... they get to D.C. the seventh."

• Tony Silber [36:01]: "This was a consequential moment. This was much more pivotal than we acknowledge or accept today."

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About the Guests:

Tony Silber is a distinguished journalist and business executive, best known for his book "12: How the Union Nearly Lost Washington in the First Days of the Civil War." As president of Long Hill Media, he brings a wealth of knowledge and expertise in media branding and historical analysis to the discussion.

Don Wildman is the engaging host of American History Hit, where he brings history to life through conversations with leading experts, unraveling the stories that have shaped the United States.

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For more captivating historical insights, subscribe to American History Hit and never miss an episode as Don Wildman continues to explore America's rich past.

Transcript

[Podcast Host]

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[Don Wildman]

Spring of 1861 here in Washington, D.C. still a developing metropolis. Though Pierre L'Enfant's grand design of wide avenues and iconic landmarks has been laid out, much of the National Mall remains a messy patchwork of muddy fields, scattered trees and grazing livestock. The Capitol building remains unfinished, its dome still encased in scaffolding, while the streets linking it to the Executive Mansion are rough, uneven and dimly lit at night. The erection of the magnificent obelisk honoring George Washington, its cornerstone laid 13 years earlier in 1848, has stalled due to lack of funding. It won't be finished until 1879. Nonetheless, D.C. is home now to 75,000 people and growing as the nation expands west. But when news of the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter in South Carolina reaches Washington, everything comes to a standstill. For the next 12 days, this fledgling metropolis will be a twitching center of a nervous nation now teetering on the brink of civil war. Good day all. I'm Don Wildman, and you've clicked through to American History hit. We drop new episodes Monday and Thursday, unless you're a subscriber. Then you'll get us a day early with zero ads. Go to historyhit.com on April 12, 1861, Confederate artillery let loose on Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, instigating a Confederate takeover of a federal installation, thus making war with the United States of America inevitable. But 34 hours later, lacking adequate firepower, munitions and supplies, Sumter's commander, Major Robert Anderson, surrendered. Now, we've covered the Battle of Svart Sumter in a previous episode, number 183 for anyone keeping track. So we won't focus on those events now, but rather on the fateful weeks that followed. The book 12 how the Union Nearly Lost Washington in the First Days of the Civil War addresses this critical and confusing period and was authored by our guest today, journalist and business executive Tony Silber. Welcome, Tony. Nice to have you on the show.

[Tony Silber]

Thanks, Tom. Glad to be here. I'm excited.

[Don Wildman]

I have always wondered about this. In the days immediately following the surrender of Sumter it would have seemed so obvious that the Southern forces march right into Washington, take the place over. D.C. is a Southern city. It is a slaveholding city. At the time it was made out of Virginia and Maryland. Why did that not happen? Was it so well defended?

[Tony Silber]

No, it was actually, it was the opposite. DC Was not defended at all. It was barely defended. There were maybe 1100, 1200 local militia, many of whom were disloyal. And there was no United States army to speak of. There was probably a little more than 16,000 men in the U.S. army. And I say men deliberately. Right. They were mostly scattered west of the Mississippi on the frontier. So the city was unbelievably vulnerable. As you say, it was a slaveholding city and it was deep within hostile territory. What became hostile territory? Right. Maryland was surrounded on three sites and Virginia on the other. As to why the Confederates didn't march in, I mean, that's the question that's probably been debated over the last 160 or so years. There's a few reasons that I outlined in the book, but it is something that continue to be an open question and discussed.

[Don Wildman]

We'll drill down to the idea of that as we go here, but let's work our way towards it. The idea of a US military was so fundamentally different in those days. I mean, we didn't really have a standing army to speak of, little navy. The US relied, as you suggest there, on state and local militia. But hadn't Lincoln and Buchanan before him bulked up? I mean, didn't they anticipate the need for troops?

[Tony Silber]

Short answer is no. Lincoln was only in on the job as president for seven weeks. And I think there was a reluctance on the part of Americans, north, mostly north, but some south, that it would ever come to blows. I think the sentiment among the in the government, William Seward, Secretary of State and Lincoln and others was that just let tensions cool, temperatures come down and things will be all right. But more than that, it goes back to the founding of the country. And the founders expressed in the Federalist Papers and elsewhere, you know, were very adamantly opposed to a standing army. They thought it would could come to no good. So instead the states all had their own independent armies. Today it's the National Guard. So it's. There is some similarity, but the law was when a country is threatened, call up the National Guard.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah, and what about the Confederates? I mean, clearly they were readying for major action.

[Tony Silber]

Yeah, that's right. Also a great comparison because Confederates, starting with the secession. Well, during the secession winter, the Confederates One state after another seceded, starting I think on December 20th by South Carolina. But they all fancied themselves, declared themselves legally defined themselves as independent republics until the formation of the Confederacy in early February. So they all started raising militias, the embryonic version of a national army. And each state had these militias sort of in training, ready to roll, issued equipment, and especially South Carolina probably had somewhere around 5,000. Well, at the end of Sumter, have probably had 7,000 organized troops on the ground.

[Don Wildman]

It is a fascinating difference in the mindset of this country from the modern version, which has this huge military, massive military obviously, versus pre, this time in the 19th century and before, which is. There was no call for that. It was just a sign of tyranny. If you, if you had a federal army, the states should be worried because the monarch is going to come get you.

[Tony Silber]

That's right.

[Don Wildman]

That was the difference between the United States then and now. A lot of people feel the need to go back to that these days, but that's an important part of this conversation that, that comes up a lot. I imagine part of the challenge for the federal government at that time is that DC is really such a transient town. I mean, it's really purely a government center, not really a concentrated density like Baltimore or Philadelphia. All that permanent population comes after the Civil War and onward. How did you research what the city was like then? I mean, there weren't the kinds of records that you would need, I would think.

[Tony Silber]

Yeah, well, there was a US Census which helped described all kinds of things like ethnicity, total population, population of enslaved people, free African Americans, you know, and a variety of things. So you start with that, then it sort of comes down to anecdote. So, you know, there are, you know, as I was doing my research, I learned that this is an incredible trove of primary information there. I mean, people would write and write and write. Absolutely amazing. The newspapers themselves were really good at conveying day to day life in 1861. And that's one of the things I wanted to do in this book is put people on the scene. And so when you draw a contrast between the US army today and the thought of a national unified government today versus then is really striking. And I think it's hard for Americans to imagine essentially not having an army today. Right. I mean, in the last 80 years, since World War II, there's been an enormous military institution. So that becomes hard for Americans to imagine today. The U.S. army had four generals in 1861, and three of them were over 70. Right. So long past their prime. Right.

[Don Wildman]

Right.

[Tony Silber]

But to your point about D.C. you know, just unbelievable amount of information about it that you can write and, you know, super colorful, Stu. So, you know, what it comes down to is there was a permanent population. It was Southern, right. Southern sympathizers, Virginians, people who ended up migrating north and then stayed there. And then there was the transient population, the political population. And that was mostly, in many ways, it was Northerners. And so there was a real tension between those people and the sort of semi aristocratic affluent suners you're titled 12 Days.

[Don Wildman]

I mean, does that refer to the fear that people were having that after Sumter the attack Was coming? Were D.C. people fearful of that?

[Tony Silber]

The U.S. government, the military chain of command, General Winfield Scott and Lincoln and his people were became increasingly convinced that an attack was going to occur. I think north and south, the newspapers, the popular opinion, the conversation was all around an attack on D.C. and it really is a remarkable thing because today, in our own imaginations, it's very hard to conceive that, you know, the national capital would be deep within hostile territory and undefended. Yeah, but, yeah, Everybody, during those 12 days, the universal consensus was the first scene of the battle would be in. Would be in Washington, in or around Washington, possibly in Baltimore. Right. Again and again you hear this phrase, push the theater of war up to the Susquehanna River. So, yeah, I mean, everybody. And that's the other thing. You know, when we go back over this time, you know, it's easy for us to assume that, well, the outcome was what it was. Right. But that's not really the way it was then. You know, everybody on both sides anticipated a fight. And the calls for capturing Washington in April of 1861 were extraordinary. Right. I mean, all Confederates from all levels of government, including the United States Supreme Court justice, were urging Jefferson Davis to attack Washington.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah. What 12 days do you refer to in the title?

[Tony Silber]

As you pointed out, I start with the Sunday the 14th, and continue through the 25th, the Thursday, which is when the New York 7th Regiment arrived in D.C. and essentially saved it. It's a really a dramatic moment. John Nicholas and John Hayden Lincoln secretaries described it as an epoch which is like, that's striking. And yet that epoch is not considered really at all now. And I wonder why that is. And sometimes I think it's. Well, we tend to focus on the major battles or we tend to focus on the technological and social changes that came out of the Civil War and not on this period, which was really consequential and many ways pivotal.

[Don Wildman]

Was it as simple as People were packing up their wagons and their carriages and heading out of town. Were people fleeing the city?

[Tony Silber]

Absolutely. And it increased. On the Sunday In March of 1861, after the inauguration, the city was packed with job seekers. Right. It was the first Republican administration, and there were many, many, many jobs to be filled, and many people wanted those jobs. So the hotels were teeming with people. The White House was teaming with people seeking jobs. But in the second six or so of those 12 days, when it became much more and more clear that a battle might occur, people began fleeing. So I think on Sunday, that would have been the 21st, the train stopped. It had been that There were like four trains plus a freight train that came into D.C. every day, then departed, and there were no trains, so people couldn't get out. So before that, and, you know, the two or three days before that, the trains were packed. Everybody's trying to get out. It was a panic. It was chaos. It was very much like, you know, to use, I think it's an appropriate metaphor in some ways is the fall of Saigon. Right. I mean, it was just people were fleeing all their belongings and carriages and wheelbarrows and just trying to get out of the city.

[Don Wildman]

So if the Confederacy didn't have an attack plan in place post sumter, what was their plan immediately after?

[Tony Silber]

I think the Confederacy was, at that point was very much focused on adding territory, adding states, adding strength. And so in that context, Maryland became unbelievably important. And so I think Jefferson Davis most likely was. He's president of the Confederacy. He was most likely interested in an opportunistic approach. So I think he wanted Virginia and Maryland to team up and get Virginia to secede, which it came very close to. And then once that Maryland secession is secured, D.C. is not a plausible place to keep the federal government.

[Don Wildman]

Right.

[Tony Silber]

So, yeah, and not only that, it became much more likely in that event that the British would recognize the Confederate states, and that would change the entire tone of the war, the entire tenor, maybe even end it.

[Don Wildman]

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[Podcast Host]

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[Don Wildman]

Jefferson Davis has a famous quote as President of the Confederacy, all we want is to be left alone. I don't remember when that quote was said. Was it in the aftermath of Sumter?

[Tony Silber]

It was on April 29 in a message to the Confederate Congress. And it's interesting that that quote is what we all remember Jefferson Davis by and the and the political posture of the Confederacy. But during those 12 days prior to that, it was anything but. All we want is to be left alone. It's remarkable. I mean, you can go down, you know, I probably track two dozen sources of, you know, the opposite of that sentiment, including from Davis himself. Like with pre inauguration, he said, there will be no war in our territory. It will be carried into the enemy's territory. The British ambassador back then was called Minister to the United States. Lord Richard Lyons said, the apprehensions of the United States government for this city. The chiefs of the Southern Confederacy loudly declare their intention of attacking it immediately if the border states join them. Right. And you can be on that list. North Carolina governor, South Carolina governor, U.S. supreme Court justice John Campbell, railroad executives. Davis himself to the governor of Virginia said, sustain Baltimore, if practicable, we will reinforce you. John Bankhead Magruder, who was a fairly prominent US army captain, I think is what his rank was, later became a Confederate general, said, give me 5,000 men and if I don't take Washington, you may take not only my sword but my life. The Secretary of War of the Confederacy said, I would prophesy so that the Flag, which now flaunts the breeze here in Montgomery, will float over the old dome at Washington before the first of May. I, you know, I could go this probably. I have another half a dozen quotes right here. But yeah, that was their thing they wanted. They craved capturing Washington because they knew what the stakes were. They knew what was, what was on the line and the strategic value of Washington.

[Don Wildman]

And therein lies the dilemma. So why didn't they? Is this historical question. And the counterfactuals can fly. You know, if they did take Washington, all of the above would have happened. Those border states would have collapsed. The whole thing would have collapsed. England comes into the play, right?

[Tony Silber]

Yeah.

[Don Wildman]

And yet therein lies the dilemma. I mean, why wouldn't they, if they had such eagerness and such a mission in mind, take Washington D.C. the counterfactuals fly from there. You know, so many circumstances would have been different.

[Tony Silber]

I think what they didn't do was respond quickly enough, which is paradoxical because they were much better prepared to do it. They had these, this organized army in Charleston. They had president who was fire Secretary of War, who was a West Point graduate, who had all the advantages. And Lincoln, on the other hand, was not only had no executive experience at all, but had certainly no military experience. I think that the bottom line is that the Confederates were moving troops north during those days, but they didn't move fast enough. And we have the northern state militias to thank for that.

[Don Wildman]

Yes, exactly. So let's go through the events of how the actual. What is the actual response? Lincoln calls for northern states to send troops ASAP to defend this capital. What's the response and who's answering the call?

[Tony Silber]

The response is overwhelming in the North. I mean, it's overwhelming on both sides. On the one side, it's like deep, deep hostility and a conclusion that only one thing, that there's only one outcome, which is war. That's in the south and in the north, the state governors and the people were just put another way. The ambivalence of the prior 30, 40 years was swept away. It was washed away by a tidal wave. It became a unified country in the North. John Dix, who was a secretary of the Treasury, a very prominent American at that time, I think Governor of New York, said the North Rose is one man. Right. And then, you know, other observers said, well, anybody who saw the reaction in the north would recognize that the strong beating heart of this nation, and I'm paraphrasing, was not going to go down without a bitter, bloody, long fight. So that was the sentiment in the north, the problem was the militias were inoperative, they were farcical and that was the challenge. So from state to state to state, these militias weren't ready to fight.

[Don Wildman]

But some were more so than others, right?

[Tony Silber]

100%. Massachusetts and New York were fully ready. Rhode island, population 140,000 in 1861, was somewhat ready thanks to their very rich governor who funded a lot of themselves. Pennsylvania should have been ready, being the closest northern state to Washington D.C. but Pennsylvania was disastrously unready. Everybody else, they just recognized reality and pushed. The requisition dates back to late May.

[Don Wildman]

I saw something else that you had recorded another interview and you mentioned that New York was one of the most top military forces in the world at the time. That surprised me.

[Tony Silber]

Yeah, that was the New York 7th Regiment. It was a fascinating story. It probably has its roots in the War of 1812. But it became just to back up for one minute in the north, military organizations, militias became, you know, extravagance. The state governments wouldn't fund them, didn't want to fund them. They were looked upon by the rest of the societies in the north as extraneous, farcical, you know, unnecessary social clubs for men. But that was the overview. But there were some organizations, militia organizations in the north, especially in the big cities that were very active in the north during the decades of 1840s and 1850s, very often putting down riots. And it sounds very strange, but back in those days, the government wasn't equipped, local, state, federal government wasn't equipped to deal with these social conflicts and tensions that were constantly bubbling up.

[Don Wildman]

Sure.

[Tony Silber]

So they relied on the state militias, would put them down with lethal force. So The New York 7th had its roots in that kind of background, but it essentially was a social. It was a social club for very rich, very connected New York City men. And it took its job seriously and was ready to roll. It had 990something men in April of 1861, far more than any other regiment. The New York City regiments had to. And the Boston ones had to man up, staff up, recruitment to get double their size during that month. But 7th New York was ready. General Scott wanted the 7th New York. Yeah, it was probably the most respected military organization in the world at that point.

[Don Wildman]

It's because of the industrialization of the country really. You end up with these workers piling into these cities. And many of those militias are about keeping control of those workplaces, aren't they? I mean, to be on call for those factory owners and so forth. And that becomes more and more urgent as we move into the Gilded Age and beyond with unions and so forth. It's a fascinating difference. But New York, of course would have the most ready to go place because they had the biggest worker population. There is an unprecedented wave of patriotism at this time, which is interesting because politically it has been a very, very dicey time in America, obviously through the 1850s. This whole late antebellum period has moments like the Dred Scott decision, the Missouri Compromise has been trashed. It's all kinds of things are happening politically that are getting argued out in the papers and in debate societies and so forth. Suddenly Sumter is attacked and it is replaced with this wave of patriotism, as you say. Right, Absolutely. Yeah.

[Tony Silber]

It was, as I mentioned, it was the North Rose is one man. There's some incredible anecdotes, some of which I included in the book, where all the varied political observations and positions and opinions were just negated. Right. And they were ready to fight.

[Don Wildman]

Yep. You march us methodically through these days in the book. Let's point out a few interesting ones. April 17, Virginia secedes. This was a major moment, not just strategically, but also spiritually for this country. Virginia is where it all began. You know, when you're talking about George Washington and so forth. For that state to go is a gigantic blow to the national identity. It's also strategically directly across the Potomac River. I mean, at this point, a very small amount of water stands in the way of this attack. Talk about that day specifically.

[Tony Silber]

Yeah. Virginia was the source of the original sense of unity in the United States between North and South. Virginia was an industrial state, well, more industrialized, I should say, than the agricultural cotton based South Gulf states. Virginia had a military industrial base. It had the fifth largest population in the United States, although if you include enslaved people, they were fully a third of the Virginia population. So there was a long period of ambivalence in Virginia. I think Virginia was, if you started in March of 1861 when Lincoln was inaugurated, Virginia was essentially unionist. Part of the reason for that is because the, the area, the mountainous area that's now known as West Virginia was not a slaveholding center. And so they did not have this stake in slavery. And I should just make an interjection here that the, the war was fundamentally about slavery. And you know, this, this period and the research I, I, I found just underscores it. But so the governor, John Lecher, was essentially a secessionist and he formed a secession convention early in 1861, I think January, when he was Reinaugurated, the idea being to assess the impact of a regional president, regional being, quote, unquote, and decide what Virginia had to do. So this thing dragged on for a couple of months, not really moving anywhere. But after Sumter, and even more so after the call for 75,000 troops, the sentiment changed dramatically, and they voted in secret to secede on the Wednesday of the 17th. At the same time, they sent their militia forces both to Harpers Ferry and to the Washington, the Norfolk Navy Yard. The outcome being that both of those facilities were lost to the U.S. yeah.

[Don Wildman]

I mean, it is happening. April 18, Washington severed from the north. Telegraph lines are cut, railways are impassable. Six bridges are destroyed. Two railroads are cut off. I mean, for a week, Washington is isolated. Correct?

[Tony Silber]

Correct. It's, you know, it's very hard for us to imagine. I mean, here I am in D.C. i live in Connecticut, and, you know, just took the Amtrak down the other day and, you know, and we have Internet connection, we have text, we have phone, we have all those things. Newspapers, they didn't have all of that. They. They relied on the telegraph, they relied on the railroads. The newspapers would get there two or three days later. Right. So it's very hard to imagine, as for us today, that Washington, D.C. was incommunicado. It could not be contacted by the, you know, by somebody in New York or by somebody in Harrisburg. Completely cut off. The railroad. Bridges burned, telegraph wires cut. It was hard for people to get through. The trains ultimately stopped. Yeah, I mean, it's just in the dark, isolated, marooned.

[Don Wildman]

Well, never mind that. Getting troops there is now nearly impossible. I'll be back with more American history after this short break.

[Podcast Host]

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[Don Wildman]

Let's talk about the Baltimore riot. By 18th and 19th of April, these troops are trying to get to Baltimore from New York, from Massachusetts and so forth. But the railways have become very, very difficult. Obviously, for. For those reasons, something happens in Baltimore that is very inflamed. I mean, there's a huge riot having to do with the troops going through. And that's really important. This is. I just want to say this is one of the pressures that Lincoln is carrying into office, he realizes that there are these states like Maryland, who are the border states, Kentucky, all these border states along the way. If he loses them, he loses the war. In his mind, that's the grand strategy. And you see why it's so difficult for him, because even at this moment, as troops are trying to get through to the nation's capital to save it, there's a lot of people who, in Baltimore who are trying to stop them.

[Tony Silber]

Yeah, Baltimore was a fundamentally secessionist city. And it's, it's complicated to explain because Baltimore was also, you know, there was a description of Baltimore as the northernmost southern city and the southernmost northern city. So in the sense of in the north, in terms of its northern characteristics, it did have 25% of the population of Baltimore was foreign born, mostly Irish and Germans, who were the great migrants of that era. And it was an industrial city, it was a shipping city, transportation city. And so based on that, you'd think that Baltimore would be aligned more with Philadelphia, you know, New York City or Boston. But it wasn't because it was also a slave holding state. And they aligned emotionally and mostly politically with the, with their, what they called their sister states, the, the other slaveholding states. But so by the period that you're describing, Baltimore is ungovernable. It's a frenzy, it's out of control. And for days, the first half of those 12 days, it rose and rose and rose and it was a cauldron ready to explode. So when federal troops started coming through, it did explode.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah, exactly. I mean, let's talk about that. You're talking about the troops are on these trains and suddenly there are throngs of Baltimoreans, is that what you call them? Pressing in from both sides. This is a highly dangerous moment.

[Tony Silber]

Highly dangerous moment. And so it starts. It starts on the 18th, the Thursday, when these Pennsylvania troops, unarmed, uniformed, completely unready to fight, summoned to Washington anyway, John Hay called them the unlicked patriotism coming ragged into Washington from Pennsylvania. So they come through and there were with a couple of companies of US Federal troops. So they march. And back in those days, the railroads, you got off your railroad line from the north and then you had to cross the city and to pick up the one from the south. In some ways, it's similar to Penn Station versus Grand Central Station in New York today. So these troops have to cross the city. This is the 18th, this is the Pennsylvanians. And you know, they're harassed, they're taunted, some of them are attacked. One in particular is 65 year old African American man who sort of was part of the company. He was attacked and Nick Biddle was his name and he became, you know, in many ways the people in his company described him as the first, first time blood was drawn in a hostile situation in the Civil War. So that was on the Thursday, on The Friday, the 6th Massachusetts has a decision. They're on overnight Thursday to Friday, they're in Pennsylvania and they have to decide whether to take the train through Baltimore or maybe take some other route. They decide to go through Baltimore. They stop at a separate trade station coming from Philadelphia and they also have to cross the city. The plan being that the railroads cooperate on a shuttle and then haul them across, haul the train cars across the city on four storm tracks.

[Don Wildman]

Wow.

[Tony Silber]

Yeah. And so, but the colonel of the 6th Massachusetts did not want to do that. He wanted to march his men across. It didn't happen. That whole idea fell apart. And so this enormous mob shows up, it turns hostile. It grows, it grows and grows and grows from a few hundred to a few,000 to 20,000 by some estimates. And it's incredibly violent. Meanwhile, I think four companies of that six Massachusetts were left behind in the fiasco of whether to haul the cars across by horse or to march across. So these troops are cut off at the Philadelphia station and they have to march across about two hundred and forty men. And it's harrowing. Like four Massachusetts soldiers were killed then and more than 100 wounded and you know, maybe as many as, well, you know there'd be a number of Baltimoreans killed. That day is uncertain but the newspapers reported it as 12.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah, this is a frightening episode and largely forgotten by Americans that this is the, these are the conditions we're dealing with. This is the kind of strife that is even within a so called northern state when the time comes right. But somehow the 1st New York Regiment, the 7th Regiment gets through on April 25th. And this is the, the bookend of your book. They're the main force that needs to get there. How do they arrive in Washington?

[Tony Silber]

This is like a really colorful and long story. They, they leave New York on the 19th along with the 8th Massachusetts Regiment, travel separately to Philadelphia. The 8th Massachusetts is led by a colonel named Timothy Monroe, but he's a non entity. The real decision maker on the Massachusetts side is Benjamin Butler, who's a well known name in the Civil War. So they travel separately to get to Philadelphia. Butler hesitates. The New York 7th gets to Philadelphia maybe eight hours later. They're very anxious to get to Washington. D.C. but the railroad operator, Philadelphia, Wilmington, Baltimore Railroad decides that it's not safe. They conclude that the bridges have been burned and that you can't get through the city without, you know, massive bloodshed. So they come up with an alternative route. They could take a ferry boat down to Annapolis and there's a spur line in Annapolis where they can take a train to connect to the main line into D.C. but it doesn't work that well, it doesn't work that easily. First of all, when Butler, Butler gets there first to Annapolis and promptly the ferryboat that he's on runs aground. So he's stranded with 700 plus men on that ferry boat on the the harbor of Annapolis. 24 hours later, the New York 7th gets there. They spend three or four days jockeying back and forth with the Governor of Maryland and with each other, the New York seventh and the Massachusetts eighth and unbelievable waste of time. And then they finally decide to go forward together and they go the red. That spur railroad line is torn up completely. So they do this like sort of forced 24 hour march, repairing the tracks heading to the main line. They get there on the morning of the Thursday the 25th and you know, they're just anxious. I don't know what's going to happen. And ultimately General Scott's been running a train up and down to that, to that junction a couple times a day and they meet up, they get on the train and they get to D.C. that's the seventh.

[Don Wildman]

Wow.

[Tony Silber]

Butler stays in Annapolis.

[Don Wildman]

Amazing. If they had not pulled this off, I mean we've just touched on it. But I really want to lay this out. If the Confederates take Washington D.C. maryland secedes. The other border states probably don't stick with it. British realize that the Confederates are for real. They end up supporting the Confederates as an important trade partner for them. It is utter demoralization for the North. I mean we're not even in the war yet and this moment would have destroyed the whole effort. Fair to say that, right?

[Tony Silber]

Yeah, absolutely. And it's one of the things that mystifies me is that people don't recognize that. I mean people tend to say, well, Washington was vulnerable in 18, after the Battle of Bull Run in July of 1861 or during Jubal Early's incursion into Maryland in 1864. But the truth is the city was not vulnerable during those periods. It was well defended, it had a series of forts surrounding it. But it was vulnerable in April of 1861. And people don't recognize that that was at stake. And yes, you're right. If Merrill, you know, a secession of Maryland or an abandonment of Washington, D.C. would have triggered a whole bunch of other things. And it came very close, that secession almost happened. It really almost happened. And so, yeah, and as you say, the British had already warned the United States that they might have to recognize the Confederacy if certain things happened. So that was on the line. And as you point out, the British recognize the Confederacy, all bets are off that there's money flowing into the Confederacy, there's a potential war against the British, and that, you know, it changes everything.

[Don Wildman]

The amount of times that this country has walked the line, a tightrope, I should say, is extraordinary. And yet we wake up every morning these days, you know, with this sort of casual feeling of safety. It's extraordinary how this history, how often in the history we are at this point. In summary, it will be a couple of months, as it turns out, before Union troops and the Confederates finally do meet on the field at the first battle of Bull Rung, Manassas. And it turns out to be a disaster for the Federal troops. That's how badly organized they would have been after Sumter, let alone, you know, three months later when they finally meet in an official battle. There's so much luck involved in this war, so much strange fate. It's a very interesting angle on it all, isn't it?

[Tony Silber]

You know, what I would leave the listener with is that this was a consequential moment. This was much more pivotal than we acknowledge or accept today. And I was very fortunate to be able to write about it. There's probably more, you know, there's probably hundreds of thousands or a hundred thousand plus books written about the Civil War. There's probably more Civil War, American Civil War books out there than, you know, anything other than the Bible, you know, so. So that I found an area of the Civil War that was relatively uncovered and got to just dig into that was. Was a lot of fun. You know, William Seward said, there's always just enough virtue, but only just enough virtue in the republic to save it.

[Don Wildman]

Interesting. There you go. That's the perfect closing. Tony Silber is the author of twelve how the Union Nearly Lost Washington in the First Days of the Civil War. He's also president of Long Hill Media, involved in media branding, a big career. Thank you so much, Tony, for joining us. Really appreciate it.

[Tony Silber]

Don, it was a pleasure. Thank you.

[Don Wildman]

Hey, thanks for listening to American History hit. You know, every week we release new episodes, two new episodes dropping Mondays and Thursdays. All kinds of content from mysterious missing colonies to powerful political movements to some of the biggest battles across the centuries. Don't miss an episode by hitting like and follow. You help us out, which is great, but you'll also be reminded when our shows are on. And while you're at it, share it with a friend. American History Hit with me. Don Wildman so grateful for your support.

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