Vietnam: The My Lai Massacre

Summary

American History Hit: "Vietnam: The My Lai Massacre" Summary

Release Date: April 14, 2025

Introduction

In the gripping episode titled "Vietnam: The My Lai Massacre," host Don Wildman delves deep into one of the most tragic and controversial events of the Vietnam War—the My Lai Massacre of 1968. Joined by guest historian and archivist Christopher Levesque, Don navigates the complex interplay of military strategy, leadership failures, and the profound moral dilemmas faced by American soldiers in Vietnam. This episode unpacks the circumstances leading up to the massacre, the harrowing events themselves, and the lasting impact on American military policy and public perception.

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Setting the Stage: Vietnam War in 1968

Don Wildman opens the episode with a somber reflection on the Vietnam War's pervasive influence on American society. Growing up amidst nightly news reports showcasing escalating conflicts and mounting casualties, Wildman paints a vivid picture of the nation's divided psyche.

Notable Quote:
"Vietnam was never the right kind of war, if there is such a thing."
— Don Wildman [01:45]

Christopher Levesque provides historical context, explaining that by March 1968, the United States was grappling with the unsettling revelations of the Tet Offensive—a coordinated series of North Vietnamese attacks that shattered the illusion of imminent victory promised by military leaders like General William Westmoreland.

Notable Quote:
"While some American leaders in Vietnam had seen signs that something was coming, In March of 1968, many U.S. forces were surprised by the actual attacks."
— Christopher Levesque [04:49]

Charlie Company: Preparation and Deployment

The episode shifts focus to Charlie Company, a newly formed unit of the 23rd Infantry Division, trained hastily in Hawaii before being deployed to the volatile province of Quangai, South Vietnam. Despite receiving commendations for their training, Charlie Company's leadership was notably inexperienced due to the transfer of seasoned non-commissioned officers.

Notable Quote:
"We get really inexperienced soldiers in what are generally leadership positions."
— Christopher Levesque [06:05]

Don emphasizes the immense pressure on these young soldiers, grappling with guerrilla warfare tactics and the blurred lines between enemy combatants and innocent civilians.

Mission to My Lai: The Descent into Atrocity

In March 1968, Charlie Company is reassigned to Task Force Barker amid the chaos of the Tet Offensive. Their mission: to locate and engage the 48th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion in the village of My Lai (Pinkville). As they advance, the soldiers, already battered by prior engagements, face demoralizing losses—approximately half their strength reduced due to guerrilla attacks and booby traps.

Notable Quote:
"A typical day in their lives... would have been picked up by the helicopters, taken to a place, dropped off, and told to clear an area."
— Christopher Levesque [16:11]

Lieutenant William Calley, commanding the 1st Platoon, emerges as a central figure. His leadership style—overly accommodating yet lacking genuine authority—creates friction within the ranks. Captain Ernest "Mad Dog" Medina, the company commander, further exacerbates tensions by publicly berating subordinates, undermining morale and respect.

Notable Quote:
"Medina regularly called Cali demeaning nicknames like sweetheart, berated them in front of not just his own platoon, but the rest of the company."
— Christopher Levesque [18:25]

The Massacre Unfolds

On the morning of March 16, 1968, Charlie Company enters My Lai under the false pretense that non-combatant women and children would have left for the market, leaving only enemy combatants. Preceded by artillery fire intended to clear the area, the artillery inadvertently pushes villagers back into the village, creating a perilous environment where unarmed civilians and Viet Cong are indistinguishable.

Notable Quote:
"They think that because it's early in the morning, dawn really, the women and children will have left for market... and that will leave only the fighting few behind."
— Christopher Levesque [21:49]

Without encountering any resistance or enemy fire, the soldiers initiate indiscriminate killings. Lt. Calley directly orders the execution of prisoners, leading to the deaths of unarmed civilians, including women and children. One poignant moment involves machine gunners like Robert Maples and Harry Stanley refusing to follow orders to kill, resulting in confrontations that highlight the moral conflict within the ranks.

Notable Quote:
"I cut their throats. I cut off their hands, I cut out their tongue, their hair, scalped them. I did it...I lost all sense of direction."
— Vernado Simpson [31:44]

Intervention and Reporting: Hugh Thompson’s Heroism

The narrative takes a critical turn with the introduction of Hugh Thompson, a reconnaissance helicopter pilot who witnesses the atrocities from above. Disturbed by the massacre, Thompson lands his helicopter between the American troops and the fleeing civilians, confronting Lt. Calley and ordering the cessation of hostilities. His brave intervention not only saves lives but also prompts official reporting of the massacre.

Notable Quote:
"We need to get these people out of here."
— Hugh Thompson [35:04]

Aftermath: Trial, Media Exposure, and Military Response

Despite initial attempts by Captain Medina to cover up the massacre by misreporting casualties as enemy crossfire, the truth begins to surface through whistleblowers like Ron Rittenhour and investigative journalists such as Seymour Hersh. Major investigations lead to the court-martial of Lt. Calley, who is convicted of premeditated murder but ultimately receives a relatively light sentence due to political pressures and public opinion.

Notable Quote:
"He was sentenced to life at hard labor...within three days of his conviction, on March 31st of 1971, Calley was released to house arrest by President Richard Nixon."
— Christopher Levesque [51:10]

The episode highlights the profound impact of My Lai on U.S. military policies, emphasizing a shift towards an all-volunteer force and stricter adherence to rules of engagement to prevent such atrocities from recurring. The massacre also serves as a catalyst for widespread anti-war sentiment, galvanizing protests and altering the perception of the Vietnam War in American consciousness.

Notable Quote:
"After Vietnam, though, there is renewed focus. And part of the reason this can happen is because we get the all-volunteer force after 1973."
— Christopher Levesque [56:01]

Conclusion: Reflections and Legacy

Don Wildman concludes the episode by reflecting on the enduring legacy of the My Lai Massacre. He shares personal experiences, including a visit to Vietnam, underscoring the nuanced perspectives and the capacity for reconciliation despite the war's deep scars.

Notable Quote:
"It was an extraordinary trip of my life where I had nothing to do with the Vietnam War, except I watched it as a kid... But I went over there wondering how I would be viewed as an American."
— Don Wildman [56:27]

Christoper Levesque reaffirms the importance of remembering and understanding such dark chapters in history to honor the victims and learn crucial lessons about leadership, ethics, and the profound human cost of war.

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Key Takeaways

• Leadership Failures: Inexperienced and demoralized leadership within Charlie Company contributed significantly to the occurrence of the My Lai Massacre.

• Moral Conflicts: Individual acts of conscience, exemplified by soldiers like Robert Maples and Harry Stanley, showcased the internal struggles faced by soldiers in combat situations.

• Whistleblowing and Media: The courageous actions of Hugh Thompson and whistleblowers like Ron Rittenhour were pivotal in bringing the atrocities to light, despite initial military cover-ups.

• Impact on Military Policy: The massacre led to significant changes in U.S. military structure and engagement rules, fostering a greater emphasis on ethical conduct and accountability.

• Public Perception and Anti-War Sentiment: My Lai intensified anti-war movements and altered public perception of the Vietnam War, highlighting the disconnect between military operations and civilian understanding.

Further Listening

For those interested in exploring more facets of American history, "American History Hit" offers a wealth of episodes covering pivotal events, influential figures, and transformative movements shaping the United States from its inception to the modern era.

Transcript

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[Don Wildman]

Hi everyone, it's Don. Just jumping in with a gentle warning. The episode which follows contains some very distressing content. November 1970 Fort Benning, Georgia. A convoy of military trucks moves by on the wet pavement. MPs patrol the curb. In the distance, the cadence of marching boots echoes through the air. All of this is a reminder that we are standing on an army base, a place built for war. But here, as we face the stark and simple building ahead of us, war is not being waged, but it is being judged. Today marks the beginning of the trial of Lt. William Calley Jr. Accused of the premeditated murder of unarmed civilians at a small village called My Lai in South Vietnam. Today, there will be an American soldier, not an enemy, standing in the dock. It will be the United States army, which will decide whether one of its own committed an unspeakable crime within the building. Inside the courtroom, the wooden witness stand is, for the moment, empty and the courtroom still. Then, as the attorneys rise to present their opening statements, the jurors instinctively lean forward. The young prosecutor, Aubrey Daniel, takes a breath and begins. Your Honor, thank you. Gentlemen of the jury, I want you to know me lie. I will try to put you there. This is American history. It I'm Don Wildman. Today we'll discuss the not so Distant past, at least for some of us. Though I was but a youngster at the time, I can vividly recall the images of horrific fighting in a faraway land called Vietnam, while my sisters and I lived our normal childhood lives, going to school and playing sports and having family dinners at night. That war overseas was escalating, as was reported nightly on the news with body counts and footage of firefights in the jungle. It was a weird dichotomy here on the home front, one we lived with for years until it all came to a chaotic conclusion in 1975, with helicopters evacuating Americans from the roof of the US embassy. Vietnam was never the right kind of war, if there is such a thing. Victory and surrender would never be formalized. In the aftermath, the nation had to come to terms with both the courage and honor of those servicemen and women who sacrificed so much, but also with the difficult news of stunning atrocities committed by some US Troops in combat. Most notorious of all, the My Lai massacre of 1968, which is our subject today with guest historian and archivist Christopher Levesque, who teaches at the University of Western Florida, Pensacola, and the University of Charleston. Hello, Chris. Nice to have you on the show.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Nice to be here, Chris.

[Don Wildman]

The events at hand happened in March 1968. At this point, we're a few years into the buildup of US Troops in Vietnam. Nixon has taken the presidency. Lyndon Johnson is long gone. But on the ground in Vietnam, the US Is reeling from the Tet Offensive. Can you describe the general circumstances for the US military in Vietnam at this time?

[Ryan Reynolds]

In March of 1968, the Tet Offensive was underway, and it was a significant shock both for the United States military and the US Public. While some American leaders in Vietnam had seen signs that something was coming, In March of 1968, many U.S. forces were surprised by the actual attacks by the North Vietnamese army and the Viet Cong, which were coordinated throughout South Vietnam. One of the things that had been happening is that General William Westmoreland, commander of the Military Assistance Command of Vietnam, and the Johnson administration had been assuring the American public that the end was in sight, that a turning point was near, that the war would soon be over. And so when this large offensive throughout South Vietnam, which also penetrated the US Embassy in Saigon, occurred, it was a shock to the American public because it was clear that they had been misled about what was happening. So it's this sort of large scale offensive that was on television every night. US News media had expanded their nightly news coverage during the war from 15 minutes to 30 minutes as a means to cover it.

[Don Wildman]

Yep.

[Ryan Reynolds]

So this was a sort of a constant thing for the American people.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah. As I mentioned in the. In the opening there, I am one of those kids who saw all that happening on television. It was the strangest kind of television to watch for all of American, which is really what distinguishes this war for so many on the home front here. Everything that we're talking about is important to understand that context that you just gave us. Everything we talk about happens in the midst of this, you know, as a high, high drama is happening, both, you know, in Vietnam during a war, of course, but also at home. I mean, there's a lot of pressure going on here. We're going to be talking about a specific mission that is in reaction to the Tet offensive, just part of the operations, of course, but it involves a specific unit called Charlie Company, which is part of a larger unit. And we'll get into all of this. So let's take this one one step at a time. We're talking about a specific company called Charlie Company, which is part of a platoon, which is part of a brigade and all sorts. It's one of those small units that we have seen in the movies. Of course, they're on their way to Vietnam In December of 1967, having been trained in Hawaii. And this group of young men arrive there and are camped out in a province called Quangai. Right, right. It's just important to me to understand how this operation gets started for these guys so you can understand how they are thrown into the deep end, which is typical with these situations, isn't it?

[Ryan Reynolds]

In this case, Charlie Company is in a special type of a situation. They're a relatively new organization. The americal division, the 23rd Infantry Division, had been brought back into service in. In a hurry to meet the demands of Vietnam. Their training was taking place at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii. And so one of the things that happened is there a unit that is being brought together that's new as part of this division that's being sent to one of the most active parts of Vietnam. They're an average or above average infantry company. At the time, 87% of the non commissioned officers had graduated from high school, which is a rate 20% higher than the average for infantry companies on the line in Vietnam. 70% of the men in lower enlisted rates had graduated from high school, which is also slightly above average. It's both ethnically and geographically mixed demographically. So half of the soldiers were African American, which was pretty typical of units in Vietnam. And So one of the problems that we have is that with this background, there's little to set them apart as being the ones who are going to be responsible for this. The trick is that many of the most experienced non commissioned officers and other enlisted personnel had been transferred out of Charlie Company during its training. So you get really inexperienced soldiers in what are generally leadership positions. So you get privates first class and specialist fourth class in, in leadership roles. And so they're not as experienced. And that part of it, part of what is what explains why a unit that got high marks for training in Hawaii when it gets to Vietnam, is seen as deficient. And so they get to Vietnam in December of 1967. They receive their orientation training from instructors of the 4th Infantry Division's NCO Academy at LC Bronco. They get practical training for things like airstrikes and calling in artillery and requesting medical evacuation, how to maintain the radios, how to deal with civilians and enemy prisoners of war that they interact with. Basically don't abuse them, don't kill them, but keep them separate and silent and secure, but essentially don't be terrible, follow the laws of war. Their training, though, did caution them that because it's difficult to tell the Viet Cong apart from other civilians, that they have to be aware everybody is a potential enemy. They're also told that children are tricky to interact with because they seem innocent, but they might have been set up with an explosive device. And so they get one day of training before they're given their first mission. And their first mission is to set up the 11th Infantry Brigade's fire base at LZ Carrington near Duck Foe. And this was an area that had been dangerous, but at this point is relatively quiet. They set up the camp perimeter, they dig bunkers and do that type of thing. So they get about a month of settling in, doing some patrols and doing some training, but they don't fire their weapons. They lay at night to night, ambushes, looking for a single sniper in their area of operations. The trouble really, really begins four days before the Tet offensive.

[Don Wildman]

Wow.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And so four days before the Tet Offensive, they're taken out of their regular infantry battalion and sent to basically a scratch battalion called Task Force Barker. It's got a hodgepodge of infantry and artillery from the brigade, and they're given the mission to go after the 48th Viet Cong local Force Battalion near Quang Nai City. So they're given a very difficult job. They're not used to working together. And the reason this happens is that the 11th Infantry Brigade is waiting for its 4th Infantry Battalion to arrive. They're looking for a group to go send out to do this. And they also lose part of their. Their organization. They lose their headquarters companies from all of these smaller units before they're sent to task force worker Chris this is.

[Don Wildman]

Going to be a complicated conversation about military structure in some regard because we're talking about a group called Charlie Company. But I want the listeners to understand what I learned in prepping for this, that Charlie Company is part of a 1st Battalion, which is itself part of the 20th Infantry Regiment, which is part of the 11th Infantry Brigade, also part of the 23rd Infantry Division. In this smaller version, which is the company, they are part of five platoons, all led by a guy named Ernest Mad Dog Medina. So that gives you some sense of what's missing from the Vietnam movies and so forth, that this is. When you are in this war, you are part of an enormous structure. And I think that audiences that watch those movies don't have a real sense of what that must have felt like, that you are an integral part of a unit that is part of something bigger and bigger and bigger. And that is part of the problem with fighting these big wars is that you're sort of out of touch with who you're working for. You really are taking your orders from the officer right there, and he's in that vast chain of command. It's just an interesting context to imagine yourself in, right?

[Ryan Reynolds]

Yes. And it has a real effect on how this plays out.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah.

[Ryan Reynolds]

So they're taken out of their normal structure and put into this sort of ad hoc task force that's a battalion size. So it's basically three companies and some infantry companies and some artillery.

[Don Wildman]

How many men are we talking about?

[Ryan Reynolds]

The infantry companies are usually going to be about 150 men. So three of those.

[Don Wildman]

Okay, so that's part of the camp that they're living in.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Right. And one of the things that happens is when Tet occurs four days after they're put into this organization, they see things happening around them. They're not directly affected yet, but one of the things that happened is that the division headquarters in July is attacked. And one of the messages that that sends to the men of Charlie Company is that their home base, where they get all their supplies, where they're supposed to get their support from, has been attacked, even if they're not facing those types of firefights. And so one of the challenges they face is that they're supposed to be engaging this very effective Viet Cong unit battalion level unit that doesn't engage groups of more than 30 people that has a. A pretty fearsome reputation, but all they're encountering is snipers and booby traps.

[Don Wildman]

Guerrilla warfare.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Guerrilla warfare of the type that we, we normally associate with Vietnam.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah. Terrifying stuff.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And it. They take significant casualties despite not being in regular combat, not facing ambushes or anything like that. So by the time we get to the middle of March, Charlie Company has lost about half of its strength. Lieutenant William Cow's 1st Platoon has lost 27 of its 45 men.

[Don Wildman]

Wow.

[Ryan Reynolds]

So it's a much smaller fighting force that has faced an enemy that they can't come to grips with. And at the same time, as I mentioned before, they don't have the experience of war. Seasoned troops who had been to Vietnam, and the reason that they don't have that is that during their training in Hawaii, they found that many of those more experienced troops had been to Vietnam too recently to be sent back, and that's why they were pulled out of the unit. And, and Captain Medina, one of the things that he testified to later was that he had lost 70% of his company's strength during that and had to deal with the issue of replacements that were not as experienced.

[Don Wildman]

I mean, this is the craziness of this war is that they're. They're thrown into a land that is very scary. Very unusual environment for your average American to be in. What we're talking about happens over a course of about three months, two and a half months, really, from January of 68 until the middle of March. A typical day in their lives when they were doing their missions anyway, they would have been picked up by the helicopters, taken to a place, dropped off, and told to clear an area or confront the enemy in some. Some regard. That was how the operation was going on. Right. What we've seen in the movies.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Right. And so there are two types of scenarios here. The assault on My Lai was just what it sounds like. They're supposed to assault a village that has a Viet Cong force in it. But their, their typical pattern up to that was patrols.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And frequently what they would say is that they felt like they were being sent to wander around in the jungle waiting to be shot at.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah.

[Ryan Reynolds]

This is a pattern that developed. The idea was that American small units, platoons and companies would go out and go out looking for the enemy and wait to be attacked, would then either assault the people who are attacking or settle into a position and then call for support from artillery or airstrikes. The idea was to draw the Enemy out and then to. To punish them. But from the point of view of the regular infantry soldier who's just been told to go out and patrol, waiting to be shot at, that can have a pretty significant effect on their morale.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah, we mentioned leadership and some leaders who weren't so good. And, and you also mentioned William L. Calley. Explain to me where he sits in this story. As one of those leaders of a squadron or a company, he's the leader of a platoon. Platoon. I'm sorry.

[Ryan Reynolds]

So Charlie Company had three infantry platoons. Each of those should have had 60 or 70 men in the platoon, divided up into squads and then fire teams.

[Don Wildman]

Okay.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Callie was the commanding officer of the 1st Platoon and he had supporting non commissioned officers. His platoon sergeant was Isaiah Cohen. And so Cali was supposed to be in charge of this group of men. The problem for Cali was that they did not respect him. And, and his commanding officer, Ernest Medina, also did not respect him. One of the things that, that happened, that led into the effects of what happened at My Lai is that Medina regularly called Cali demeaning nicknames like sweetheart, berated them in front of not just his own platoon, but the rest of the company. And his platoon sergeant viewed Callie as not a particularly effective leader who he only followed due to Callie's rank.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah, he was kind of a people pleaser personality, wasn't he? He wanted to do. Do good, but too well. Like he was trying too hard.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Yes. And that goes back to when he was in elementary school. He was the kind of student who tried to anticipate his, his teacher's requests and needs. He was cleaning erasers and doing that type of thing.

[Don Wildman]

Right. We've all met those people and they, you know, while you can see they're trying hard, their heart is. It's also annoying as heck. And so you're like, ugh, you know, and that was kind of this weird chemistry with this guy. So there was no reason to kick him out of the role, but everyone kind of resented him for what he was doing and the personality quality that he had. Unfortunately, that translates as we'll see into some military choices that are really bad. March 15, 1968. They received new orders about a group of villages called My Lai, an area known as Pinkville for its color on the maps. This is a hotbed of Viet Cong activity. According to intelligence reports, which was a little, which were a little sketchy. Medina organizes this effort that they're going to go out into this area, but reminds the troops of their losses. And one particular one Sergeant Cox, a very popular leader, as opposed to a Cali. This guy had stepped on a landmine. Right.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Sergeant George Cox was killed by a booby trap, if I remember correctly. It wasn't just a landmine in the way that we probably think about a device designed for somebody to be stepped on. It was what we would call now an improvised explosive device, an IED that had been made out of an unexploded 105 millimeter artillery shell. Unexploded. Unexploded ordinance is a continuing problem in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. But what would happen is the Viet Cong would find bombs, whether they came from an airplane or artillery shells or mortar shells that had not exploded, and then make them into a mine.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And that's the type of thing that killed Sergeant Cox. And not only was he popular, but right before the mission briefing they held a memorial service for Cox. And at that memorial service, Medina re emphasized their losses and said that the company needed to be more aggressive in their pursuit of the enemy. So they have lost all these people. They have this event. They have a memorial service led by a chaplain and Medina telling them that they need to remember their losses and to be more aggressive.

[Don Wildman]

Right. So these are the preexisting conditions. When March 16 comes around 5:30am they are roused from bed to gear up. Nine helicopters leave their zone. More will follow. The key point here before we get into what happens is that the artillery fire, as you mentioned before, was used to clear the area. Typical strategy to try to clear the area so that they could land their helicopters and be not under fire. But it has a strange effect on the overall strategy, doesn't it?

[Ryan Reynolds]

It can. So artillery fire, in this case 600 meters from my Lai, which is one of a cluster of hamlets forming the village of Son Mai. And it they have their. Their barrage in preparation to landing. They come into land and they're expecting combat because they have been told that there are Viet Cong in the village. They've been told, based on intelligence, they've been told that women and children will be away from Beli at a marketplace.

[Don Wildman]

There you go.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And they're expecting to have an actual battle.

[Don Wildman]

Right. So they think that because it's early in the morning, dawn really, the women and children will have left for market as they normally would and that will leave only the fighting few behind and they'll be able to take care of them. The effect of the artillery is that it actually scares those villagers back into their shelters, back to the village, and they end up not leaving that area. So now you have unarmed civilians and supposedly the Viet Cong that are there together. And that's the situation that this company lands into, this platoon lands into.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Right? And so we get two platoons that initially land and they set up a security perimeter waiting for their third platoon to arrive. The idea is that the first two platoons, including Cali's first platoon, will then assault through the village and that the third platoon will provide rear area security and then eventually follow them. And their, their, their mission is to kill the people who resist, to kill livestock, to destroy wells and to level buildings. And Captain Medina has, has told them that everybody that's left in the village was either Viet Cong or, or AV at Concrete Sympathizer.

[Don Wildman]

I'll be back with more American history after this short break.

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[Don Wildman]

The blood is high, as you've said. This, this memorial service, all the feelings they have about everything, the urgency and the push that they've gotten from command, they arrive and how do things go wrong? Because they go very wrong.

[Ryan Reynolds]

They go wrong pretty quickly. One of the challenges is that the hamlet of My Lai, like many Vietnamese villages, was divided by hedgerows. And so as the line of infantry proceeds through the village, they become broken up into smaller and smaller groups where it's more difficult for them to be observed and controlled by their officers. And so their. Their typical process is going to be that as they move through a village and they take prisoners, they hold those villagers so that those villagers can be processed by an officer said, either keep this one as a potential enemy prisoner of war or let them go and keep them secure in this other location, away from. From any potential combat. And one of the things that happens is that as they get divided up and they start to gather potential prisoners, they get bogged down. And Medina orders Callie and his other platoon leaders to get their men back online and to continue to push through the village.

[Don Wildman]

Are they taking fire in any way?

[Ryan Reynolds]

They are not. They've received no fire. They kill a farmer shortly after they land who is waving his arms at them from a distance, but other than that, not posing a threat. And so they haven't been fired on.

[Don Wildman]

So the actions that they take, which will famously be told in trials and so forth, are unprovoked?

[Ryan Reynolds]

That's correct.

[Don Wildman]

Oh my.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Okay, sometimes they think they're provoked, but there aren't any shots fired at them. And they only recover three old M1 Garand rifles. So these are World War II or Korean War era weapons that they recover.

[Don Wildman]

Okay, well, I'll leave it to you to explain and illustrate what we're talking about. I mean, it's called the My Lai massacre for a reason. What happens over what period of time?

[Ryan Reynolds]

This is going to unfold over the course of several hours. They essentially are on the ground early morning and then everything is over by mid afternoon. So Give it a six hour period for all of this to happen. And the first real incident for us to think about is that as 1st Platoon is moving through My Lai, Callie comes across some of his men. One of them is forcing a woman to perform oral sex on him. And Callie tells the guy to get back to work. You get back to the process of clearing the village and capturing prisoners. And as he takes this guy with him, they run into Paul Meadlow, who is going to be one of the most famous or infamous figures of the My Lai massacre. And he finds Meadlo with a large group of prisoners and tells Melo to take care of them and then leaves. Shortly later, Callie comes back. He's frustrated because Medina has told him to get his men moving through the village and asks Meatlo why he hasn't taken care of these villagers. Now, their normal procedure would be to hold the prisoners for an officer to process to say let them go or keep them prisoner or whatever, but that's not what Callie meant. Callie ordered Meadlo to kill the villagers. Wow. Meadlo didn't really want to do this. He kind of resists. But Callie forces the situation. Meadlo fired three magazines from his M16 Cali, reportedly fired four or five magazines, killing this group of prisoners. There's another soldier there who has an N79 grenade launcher who does not participate because not only does he want, not want to kill villagers, he also doesn't want to use a 40 millimeter grenade in close proximity. Yeah, there's, there's a variety of issues there. And this is the, the first really real evidence of what is going to happen.

[Don Wildman]

The question will become how much are they working on orders? How much did everyone decide that this is how they're going to behave when they get there in the first place? One way or the other, extraordinary things are happening, as you're explaining. In the end, upwards of 500 civilians of this community are killed. And these are unarmed civilians, as you've said, including pregnant women and children. They are raped, there are gang rapes, grenades are thrown into buildings, they're torched, the homes and places are burned down. It's just an extraordinary thing to imagine happening unless you had already decided to do it. I mean, are we talking about mass hysteria here among these troops, or is this something that they came in with a plan for?

[Ryan Reynolds]

There's some disagreement about what the intent was and also about how many of the, the members of Charlie Company actually took part in killing people. Yes, many of the men who were there fired things or killed livestock, destroyed wells, burned buildings to make it look like they were taking part. But it turns out there may have been fewer than 20 individuals who actually killed or raped people in the line. Medina's briefing left some questions about what the intent was. Private Dennis Bunning later said that Medina had ordered them to kill everyone because all of the women and the children were supposed to be there. James Berkold summed up the general feeling among the company after the briefing, saying that although Captain Medina didn't say to kill everyone in the village, that he had heard other members of the company talking and that they were of the opinion that everyone in the village was to be killed. And that seems to have been the message that at least Callie took from their initial briefing.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah, much will come out later in the testimony at the trial, but here's one snippet here. Vernado Simpson, a member of the 2nd Platoon interviewed in a book quote, I cut their throats. I cut off their hands, I cut out their tongue, their hair, scalped them. I did it. A lot of people were doing it, and I just followed. I lost all sense of direction. That man, Simpson, later took his own life. I mean, it's an extraordinary thing to imagine. Of course, we've watched the movies. Everyone has sought to understand what happened in this world. That's why we've spent so much time explaining the circumstances before they get there. And while they're getting ready to do this, you try to make some sense of it in your mind, but it's almost impossible. I want to spend a little more time on Callie. I mean, as far as the story goes, later on told, how much was he actually responsible for giving the orders directly to. For this action?

[Ryan Reynolds]

Well, he ordered Meatlo directly to kill people. And then the major incident that sort of stands out beyond this initial killing was that a large number of villagers had been herded together toward a ditch, and some of them had been pushed into this ditch. One of them was a Buddhist monk. There were a large number of women and children, elderly men. There are no young men really in the village. And once they get to this ditch, Callie orders his men to open fire on the people that have been herded into the ditches. He gives them direct orders.

[Don Wildman]

Wow.

[Ryan Reynolds]

When some of them resist, Callie threatens to kill them. The one that really stands out is Robert Maples, who was a machine gunner. And when Callie ordered him to fire on the villagers in the ditch, he refused. Cali reportedly stuck his rifle into Maples midsection. Said he was. He would kill him if he didn't follow orders. And Maples pulled his sidearm on Callie and threatened to shoot him as well, saying that they were going to all die in Vietnam and that they might as well die. Then later, he said he didn't consider shooting women and children who weren't armed to be a legal, valid order, that he just simply wasn't going to do it. Another machine gunner, last name was Stanley, had also. Harry Stanley had also been ordered to fire on the villagers in the ditch. Refused to, threw down his M60 machine gun. And when Cali threatened to kill him, they were separated by other soldiers.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And so ultimately, some of the soldiers cooperated with Cali. Halle himself opened fire. So in. In regard to the larger numbers of people that were killed at My Ali appears to have been the. The prime. Prime mover, the perpetrator. And that's why he was ultimately convicted for. For murdering people in My Lai.

[Don Wildman]

Right. I want to talk about Hugh Thompson. He comes in on a helicopter and. And there's a very dramatic moment when they actually land the helicopter between the civilians and American troops. So there were those, of course, who saw what was happening, whose. Whose heads were above water. Here, explain Hugh Thompson's role.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Hugh Thompson was flying over My Lai in support of the assault of Charlie Company on My Lai and of Bravo Company on the neighboring village of Miike, where there was also a smaller massacre. Hugh Thompson flew an OH23 reconnaissance helicopter, which meant he was low to the ground, and his role was to mark potential enemies for the company to deal with, using smoke to communicate what was going on to helicopter gunships that were flying above him from his unit. As he did this, he can see people being killed. He marked a wounded woman with the idea that she would get medical assistance and observed Captain Medina walk up to the woman and shoot her. Medina later claimed that he thought that she was going to throw a grenade at him. But. So Thompson's observing all of this and is. He and the other pilots were getting relatively heated over the air about it, and he finally got to the point where he couldn't stand by and watch this to happen. And to understand why this happens, we have to really understand Hugh Thompson as a person. He came from a military family. His father served both in the Navy and in the Army. Thompson joined the Navy as a young man right out of high school, got out of the Navy, became a funeral director for a short time, and then in 1966, as the war is really ramping up, joins the army, was selected for pilot training, and was sent to Vietnam in 1967. In Vietnam, he had a reputation of being an aggressive pilot who believed in the Army's mission in Vietnam. And that's really important to remember. He had the respect of all of the other aviators there, and some of the things he did were risky. At one point, he captured someone, and because he didn't have room in his helicopter to have a prisoner, actually forced the guy to hold onto the skid of the helicopter to fly him back to base. So this is the type of person Hugh Thompson is. Thompson landed his helicopter, which is itself unusual, between Halley's platoon and people who were in a bunker, and approached Cali, got out of the helicopter, approached Cali and said, well, we need to get these people out of here. And Callie's response was, well, the only way we can do that was with a grenade. Before he had gotten out, Thompson had told his door gunners, Larry Colburn and Glenn Andreota, to cover him and that if somebody started shooting at the civilians to fire upon them. Whether he was serious in that or not is conjecture. But he confronted Kelly, who was a commissioned officer. Hugh Thompson was a warrant officer and sort of sit between the NCOs and the officers in rank. And he convinced the other helicopter pilots that were there who were flying overhead in gunships to land and evacuate the people from the bunker. He somehow convinced the people of the bunker to come out, convince the other pilots to land and take them off, away from. From. Be lying, saving them. And. And this is a really very strange thing for a helicopter gunship to land in what is supposed to be a combat operation. Yes. And then to fly away with civilians.

[Don Wildman]

Well, they had to be aware, as opposed to other missions they'd been on, nobody was firing at them. That's a really important point here. Right. I mean, he would have automatically been, what the heck is going on here? We're not taking any fire from anyone. And yet there's tremendous amounts of things going on on the ground, violent things going on. This is all out of whack for anybody who had any perspective at all.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Correct. And. And people further away could hear what the pilots were saying was going on, but did not report it themselves. Yeah, this is going to be an issue later.

[Don Wildman]

This is all over the next day, March 17th. There now becomes the issue of how does this story get handled by the military and how does it eventually come out?

[Ryan Reynolds]

Even before the 17th, Hugh Thompson reported the massacre to Major Fred Watke, and he reported it to Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, the commanding officer of. Of Task Force Barker, and Colonel Orin Henderson, who was the the commanding officer of the 11th Infantry Brigade. So we have this reporting structure starting to happen, but at the same time, we have people starting to cover it up almost immediately.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Medina flat out lied to the Commander of the 23rd Infantry Division, Major General Samuel Coaster, and told him that all of the casualties were from artillery. They also developed a narrative that they were killed in a crossfire. The number of people was downplayed so that when Wotke went to Barker and Henderson, he told them that it was 25 people. He didn't say they were killed in a crossfire because there had been no fire and no Viet Cong on site. But the focus was on Thompson's confrontation with Cali. And that allowed some of the senior officers in the brigade and the division to move the investigation that they did away from this idea of a massacre. And after that, it gets bigger.

[Don Wildman]

I'll be back with more American history after this short break. This episode is brought to you by Progressive Insurance. Do you ever think about switching insurance companies to see if you could save some cash? Progressive makes it easy to see if you could save when you bundle your home and auto policies. Try [e-mail] Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and affiliates.

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[Don Wildman]

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[Don Wildman]

The report is flat out declared false on April 24, 1968 by the commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade. It's really a year later when it starts to come clear. Right. In March of 1968.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Yes.

[Don Wildman]

It eventually becomes what is a Pulitzer winning, you know, news reports for Seymour Hersh very famously, who becomes a gigantic journalist as a result of this. That's when I became aware of it. I remember as a kid to understand that we're suddenly hearing the word massacre, which is something that we just hadn't heard before. Of course, Vietnam was controversial. Walter Cronkite was, you know, having questions about it. Dan Rather was on the news. It was all that kind of, you know, new experience for Americans to see the journalists covering this in not a supporting role any Longer, but rather a critical role because a lot of this stuff had been getting out through the bars of Saigon, I'm sure, and all kinds of information was being had. It officially gets out in October of 1969. That's when Seymour Hersh begins to publish. Chris, when does the news media officially start talking about this? When is it reported?

[Ryan Reynolds]

That's a little complicated. Initially, My Lai was reported as a victory by the New York Times with 128 Viet Cong killed and three weapons captured. The media starts to take notice when Callie's court martial is starting to begin, is becoming underway. There's an investigation going on.

[Don Wildman]

So the military had taken a different tack on this. They had already started to handle this internally.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Yes, but only because Ron Rittenhour, who had been friends with members of Charlie Company, even though he was assigned as a door gunner elsewhere in the division, found about it from people who'd been present.

[Don Wildman]

Okay.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And he talked to multiple people who had been at My Lai to verify what was happening, because it sounded like an outlandish story, like propaganda.

[Don Wildman]

Where is Ron Rittenauer? He's back in the States, isn't he?

[Ryan Reynolds]

He's back in the United States at this point, and. And basically, he had found out about this when Charles Groover had a beer with him and told him, we did something terrible at.

[Don Wildman]

Oh, I see.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And so he talks to all these other people and then writes a letter. But he only writes this letter after consulting with family and friends, who basically told him, well, you don't want to be involved in this. But despite that, he wrote a letter to 22 different officials at the Pentagon and in Congress, including the Secretary of the Army, Stanley Rezor, General William Westmoreland, who at this point is Chief of Staff of the army, and Congressman Udall, Morris Udall. And that's what ultimately gets things started.

[Don Wildman]

It's such an interesting lens, because that's an ex soldier talking to active soldiers, his friends. I mean, that says a lens because you're looking into the unease that. That soldiers had about what they were doing in Vietnam. And that speaks to the lack of goal, lack of objective, the missions that they were on. There was no sense of that in Vietnam, or at least there was less than there needed to be as far as, you know, what the US Military was doing in this country. And that comes down to the average, you know, grunt soldier, like, why am I being told to do things that I don't even understand what I'm doing? And that became a hotbed, you know, as much of a Protest as what was happening back in the United States, back in the. You know, the student populations and the protests and so forth. That was really the weirdness of this war. It started with Korea. Some of that was already happening in Korea as well, but really in Vietnam. That's what really creates the whole problem. The negativity of the whole mission that we had there. And a written hour is one example of these people who are talking among themselves. So he's the source of the information that then only snowballs. Right?

[Ryan Reynolds]

Correct. And his letter to these public officials led to two official investigations. One into the events at My Lai and one in two attempts to cover up My Lai.

[Don Wildman]

Mm.

[Ryan Reynolds]

These investigations, which took a year. So from November of September. October. November of 69 into 1970, where we start getting actual trials, resulted in charges for 14 officers and. And a few enlisted personnel. But, yes, it. It all starts with ridden hours letter.

[Don Wildman]

Right. And the photographs that were taken that day. Right, right.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And so Sergeant Ron Haberly was a combat photographer for the Public Information office. He was assigned to follow Charlie Co. On March 16, along with a reporter who was a specialist. And so they follow the company through My Lai. Haverly's got multiple cameras rather than weapons and ammunition. One of the cameras was an official army camera loaded with black and white film. And the other one was his personal camera loaded with color film and those cut. That color film that he kept personally was what ended up being published.

[Don Wildman]

It's gory stuff. Let's just say it. It's just.

[Ryan Reynolds]

They're gory stuff.

[Don Wildman]

It's hard to look at.

[Ryan Reynolds]

But he destroyed the really terrible pictures that he took that identified individual soldiers shooting at people. Yeah. And the reason he did that is he didn't want those photos to be used to identify individuals and to prosecute them.

[Don Wildman]

Right. We have no pictures of the people in the pit. You know, although. I don't know. Maybe we do, but we have.

[Ryan Reynolds]

We have a picture that. That looks like that. It to me reads more as people on a road.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Rather than people in a ditch, but it gives that same type of impression.

[Don Wildman]

So how does this then go to trial? We're talking about a court martial, right?

[Ryan Reynolds]

Yes.

[Don Wildman]

Why is it only Callie that ends up being tried?

[Ryan Reynolds]

He's first. He's not the only one who's tried. He's the only one who's convicted.

[Don Wildman]

Oh, okay.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Captain Medina was also tried. An enlisted soldier was also tried. But the reason it all falls apart is that at Captain Medina's trial, where he was acquitted, the judge, the military judge, Running the trial, the court martial, that no one who had testified before Congress but during the congressional investigations could testify at Medina's trial. And because there were essentially then no witnesses that could be used, there was a lack of evidence, and Medina was acquitted. Part of the reason for that is that the chair of the Armed Services Committee and the congressman who ran the congressional investigation refused to release the transcripts of the witnesses who testified in their investigation. All of the witnesses had testified in an executive session that was closed, so their testimony wasn't released. And this military judge said, well, if we can't have that testimony, we're not going to allow those witnesses. And that's where it all falls apart. That and the public mood was very, very against not only the trials, but Callie's conviction.

[Don Wildman]

What was he charged with?

[Ryan Reynolds]

Callie was charged with murder of. And the phrase they used was Vietnamese human beings. And he was eventually convicted of 22 counts.

[Don Wildman]

22 counts of premeditated murder.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Right.

[Don Wildman]

And no one else goes down because of this. Just him.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Just Tim. Two people do. Some people do get some reductions in rank, but not as the result of trials. Samuel Coster, the commanding officer of the 23rd Infantry Division, received reduction in rank from major general to brigadier general. He resigned his position as superintendent of West Point during the hearings. He was eventually cleared, but he kept that reduction in rank. And what he was. The thing he faced was that he and his assistant division commander, Brigadier General George Young, had not followed regulations and reported the war crimes allegations.

[Don Wildman]

Okay.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And so they faced reductions in rank and eventually soon retired from the service, even though they were cleared of things like having a cover up.

[Don Wildman]

I want to read a quote from Callie. I'm not sure where he said this. You can help me with that. My troops were getting massacred and mauled by an enemy I couldn't see, I couldn't feel, and I couldn't touch that nobody in the military system ever described them as anything other than communism. They didn't give a race, they didn't give a sex, they didn't give it an age. They never let me believe it was just a philosophy in a man's mind. That was my enemy out there. I suppose he's speaking more generally about the experience of being in Vietnam, but he applies that mindset in defending himself at My Lai.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Yes, and I don't remember where that quote came from, but it is the type of. The type of thing that he and other soldiers expressed regularly about the war. And Cali was not an especially introspective type of a person. Right but that was the feeling of most of the people who served.

[Don Wildman]

Tell me what he. What punishment he serves as a result.

[Ryan Reynolds]

In a lot of ways, it's not much. He was sentenced to life at hard labor, which is typically going to be somewhere like Fort Leavenworth, which is one of the prime locations for that type of a sentence. And that didn't really happen. So within three days of his conviction, on March 31st of 1971, Cali was released to house arrest by President Richard Nixon. Following that, Lt. Gen. Albert O'Connor, the commanding general of the 3rd army, used his own authority to commute Kelly's sentence to 20 years. And then Calley appealed this in district court and was freed on bond in February of 1974. And the. The judge in that case held that the pre. Pretrial publicity and the House of Representatives refusal to release testimony meant that Callie couldn't have a fair trial. And so while the army appealed to that ruling, the new Secretary of the Army, Howard Calloway, reviewed the conviction, reduced the sentence to 10 years. And this is part of the law. This is supposed to happen. What this does is that it makes Calley eligible for parole because at this point, he had served three years and four months. And army regulation made prisoners eligible for parole after they had completed a third of their sentence.

[Don Wildman]

Wow.

[Ryan Reynolds]

And so. But this isn't over yet. The fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling and returned Kelly to custody in June of 1974. Kelly appealed again in September of 1974. So he was released again. The full court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit overturned it. The army refused to put Callie back in prison for the last 10 days of his sentence. So at this point, In September of 1974, Cali is out, right? This would normally be the end, but it kept going because Callie appealed the fifth Circuit's decision because it meant he was still guilty. And it finally comes to a close, at least in terms of legal matters, when the Supreme Court refused to hear his appeal of the Fifth Circuit's decision in April of 1976. So ultimately, he spends maybe three and a half years total in punishment for killing at least 22 people.

[Don Wildman]

Geez, four or five hundred, we'll never know. It is a symbolic moment, of course, it polarizes the whole war debate at that point, galvanizing all the anti Vietnam War movement. But many people don't agree with the verdict. I mean, there is a general sense in America that he wasn't guilty of anything but killing Vietnamese, which, you know, even to that time we still didn't understand back here what was really going on. All those things, all those movies, all those, you know, all that media that would one day change the story for us had yet to come out. So the White House received, I read, 300,000 letters and telegrams in three months in support of Cali. So you can understand the qualms that were going on as far as the punishment of this guy goes. That's as far as the domestic side of things. Did the My lai massacre change U.S. strategy in Vietnam and afterwards in Vietnam?

[Ryan Reynolds]

It does not appear to have. We have changes to what's happening in Vietnam as a result of the election of Richard Nixon. He had promoted the process called Vietnamization, which involved withdrawing American troops and having the army of the Republic of Vietnam, arvn, do more of the work of defending South Vietnam. This led to a couple of changes in how we did things. Ultimately, we are toward the end of American involvement, just using air power. Congress starts getting to the point where they withhold funding for combat operations in Vietnam. And there are some combat refusals as a result of the Vietnamization policy, because not only are we still not having a. A strategy of holding territory, but nobody wants to be the last person to die in Vietnam. And so troops start refusing to take that hill or go on certain patrols. There's a famous revolt in the Navy where soldiers of the, I believe it was the Constellation, essentially held a strike, refusing to put to sea. So all of this is happening at the time. And the American public had been getting more skeptical of the war over the course of 1967, as casualties mounted and then really turned against it after Tet. After Vietnam, though, there is renewed focus. And part of the reason this can happen is because we get the all volunteer force after 1973.

[Don Wildman]

Right.

[Ryan Reynolds]

In a more professional type of military is that there's. There's more focus on not abusing prisoners, not killing innocent civilians. It's never going to be perfect, but it becomes something that more members of the military really, really look askance at. Yeah, they want to avoid that. And part of that is the perception of My Lai and other incidents in Vietnam.

[Don Wildman]

And a whole generation of future officers and leaders of the US Military comes out of this. Colin Powell, first and foremost, who speak of taking no action unless there's a way out. You know, unless you can clearly see the way in and the way out, which holds for a while. And then comes Afghanistan.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Right.

[Don Wildman]

We're there for 25 years, but they.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Get their way with Operation Desert Storm.

[Don Wildman]

Yeah, exactly. We see that enacted there. My own closure, for what it's worth, is that we went back in the 2000 to shoot a TV show. I have never been treated more kindly and more generously than by the average person in Vietnam, both North and South. It was an extraordinary trip of my life where I had nothing to do with the Vietnam War, except I watched it as a kid. But I went over there wondering how I would be viewed as an American. And it was a startling kindness that I met. It was extraordinary. Christopher Levesque holds a joint appointment at the University of West Florida Libraries and the UWF Historic Trust. He is an archivist, teaches classes of American history at the University of Western Florida, Pensacola and the University of Charleston. Nice to have you on the show.

[Ryan Reynolds]

Nice to be here.

[Don Wildman]

Hey, thanks for listening to American History hit. You know, every week we release new episodes, two new episodes dropping Mondays and Thursdays. All kinds of content from mysterious missing colonies to powerful political movements to some of the biggest battles across the centuries. Don't miss an episode by hitting like and follow. You help us out, which is great, but you'll also be reminded when our shows are on. And while you're at it, share it with a friend. American History hit with me, Don Wildman. So grateful for your support.

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