A (2:15)

the people on all those cruise ships that's been racing through there, through the mines and fire and everything to leave reviews on the straight of Hormuz. That's what I Want to see on that page is the reviews. But no, as of today, we're still under a ceasefire. Even though we knocked a big hole in a ship and, and took it and, and found apparently supplies for weaponry. They attacked us with drones, maybe or maybe not. 90% of this information we get is shaky. Is that a great way to say it? A lot of misinformation. Unverified is what I'm talking about. We either are or are not currently having peace negotiations with Iran. Depending on who you ask in Iran. Some people say absolutely, some people say not. Who knows? That's my headlines.

C (3:08)

I mean, one thing, one thing we're definitely learning is this blockade is solving nothing. There's nothing being solved right now by either side. These talks that are supposed to take place in Pakistan, the second round, both the US is saying they're not happening, but then other officials are saying. So it's. Both sides have now struck shifts and the escalation cycle is starting. So I don't foresee us doing any kind of meaningful negotiations whatsoever. And the problem is, and I kind of mentioned this the last podcast we discussed, we're now eight days from when Congress is supposed to decide whether we should be at war or not. The War Powers Resolution comes into effect. I don't think they're going to do anything. On the other side. There's a third ceasefire that we haven't really talked about, and that's the Israel, Lebanon. Within the first 24 hours, both have claimed that the other side has violated it. So that's on its kind of last leg at this moment.

B (4:05)

So let's say I'm on Polymarket and I'm betting which is less likely to be respected, another ceasefire or the War Powers Act? Where am I putting my money?

C (4:15)

Whatever is what the opposite of what Trump says. You'll probably, you're just probably going to get money that way because that's the other thing. And you can maybe that's kind of the big top line that a lot of people are really focusing on is this market manipulation is out of control. It's starting to just become blatant. We're starting to just see at specific times that directly impact when the market goes up or goes down. These tweets go out like everything's great. So the market, the oil market drops, massive investment, floods in everything, everything's falling apart, rises and then they pull their money and make huge amounts of money. And I know, I saw your post about this, Matt, where you were talking about how this is just overtly fraudulent behavior. It's absolutely wild.

B (4:58)

And if they're listening to this the day it came out, it's currently Wednesday. Leading up to Trump's Wednesday night deadline, what do you think that they can expect to see out of Trump tonight?

C (5:06)

He's going to lean on the fact that Iran has struck vessels. He's going to lean on the fact that the deals aren't being made, and he's going to find a way to escalate. It goes back to kind of what we talked about a couple episodes ago, where we are still flooding troops and material and logistics into the zone, and that means something's going to happen. You don't flood that much stuff in. You don't build that big of a hammer and don't start hitting nails when things don't go your way. And nothing right now is going Trump's way. In fact, they're so not going his way that the minute he says something, the exact opposite happens. And it's frankly a slap in the face to him. Every time he says Strait of Hormuz is open, ships start moving through and they get. They get hit by not just drones, but by Iranian gunboats. And that just shows that the United States was either unprepared or unable to defend the shipping through the, the Strait at that moment in time. And immediately that shut everything down. No one's going to trust anything anyone says. Whether it's Trump, whether it's the Iranians, doesn't matter. Both sides are now shooting at ships from the other side and third party ships. And we're just now in a complete kind of a stalemate. There's just no one's going to move. Nothing's going to move. And I think that's going to be the way it goes for the next few weeks. To break through that Trump is going to have to escalate, and it's going to probably be ugly, unfortunately.

B (6:27)

Well, we can get to that a little bit more in this back half of our episode when we talk more about current events. But if it's all right with you guys, I'd like to take a turn right now and take a little bit of a look at the origins of this conflict. And we've talked about this a little bit off the air. While both of you have a lot of career expertise and education surrounding the subject, I did write a paper on Iran's oil privatization in my freshman year of college, History of the Middle east class. So I think that makes me the reigning expert on the podcast. So I was hoping I'm just gonna

C (7:00)

Take my headphones off and call it a day.

B (7:01)

Yeah, yeah. If you guys want to sit this one out, I was hoping that maybe I could give a breakdown or get us started and you could tell me how right I am and if not, why I probably got it wrong for a good reason. Okay, so if I'm getting this correctly in my memory, it seems like a lot of our conflict with oil and the West, Conflict with oil surrounding Iran comes back to the early 1950s when Mohamed Mosaddeq, the leader of Iran at the time, chose to nationalize the oil industry, which dealt a very major blow to the, to, to the UK To British Petroleum and the US Decided to back the UK for whatever reason, which perhaps you can explain to me. Even though. Explain to the listener. I mean, of course, I understand it myself perfectly. And then the US Chose to back the UK and overthrow Mossadegh and install the Shah. And in order to back us. I'm sorry, in order to back British oil interests. Am I getting this correct so far? Would anyone like to expand? Okay, okay, yeah, somewhat. Fill in some. Fill. Fill in some of the gaps of my expertise, please.

A (8:06)

You know, I'm glad you brought this up because a big question I've got in the last couple of days is, or a statement that I've seen many times is people are having a hard time believing and they don't understand why Iran doesn't. Doesn't just give up. And they're like, why, why isn't, why aren't they just giving up? You know? So let's look at the history. We're going to go back before Mosaddegh.

B (8:29)

Okay, so it's not in the paper, but I'll allow. I'll allow it.

A (8:33)

Okay. Oil was discovered, I believe it was 1908, in Iran. And BP or the British, not BP in particular, but the British immediately went in and started extracting those natural. Those natural resources from Iran. And for over 40 years, Britain got very wealthy on Iran's oil while Iran lived in poverty. And the analogy that I like to use is that Britain and the United States did to Iran what Maduro did to Venezuela. It's literally the exact same thing. So Britain goes in to Iran, basically steals a lot of their natural resources. They're living in poverty. Iran was getting less than 10% of all the oil revenues that were generated in their country for 40 years. A little over 40 years. Then we introduce your guy Mosaddegh. He comes in. Muhammad Mosaddegh. He comes in and nationalizes Iran's oil and basically kicks Britain out. The response from the west, now this is where the US Comes in. Britain and the US Completely sanction and blockade all of Iran's oil. And that goes on for two years as Iran sinks further and further into poverty. And, you know, because now they can't sell their oil. They finally got their oil and now they can't sell it. So then the United States and Britain used the CIA and MI6 to enact a coup in Iran. They used all kinds of tactics, the propaganda, everything. They funded it and they installed the shah. Okay, The Shah was. What would you call them, a sympathizer to the west or a friend, friendly of the West. So Iran got their oil back, but then the west immediately sent in all the U. S. Companies to take it. So big US Oil companies went in and started producing all of Iran's oil, and it was basically still enriching the West.

B (10:51)

So they essentially set up a puppet government that allowed them to do what they'd been doing before Mosaddeq nationalized the oil industry.

A (10:58)

Yeah, and what was, what was called, sorry, Operation Ajax. That's what that was called.

B (11:03)

Yeah, checks out. It's in the paper, I believe. And but a question, I'm curious, what did that do for life in Iran? Because, you know, how did the shah differ as a leader? Mozaddak, aside from, just, if we can take a brief. Aside, aside from the oil industry, how did that change life in Iran or, you know, the experience of the peoples there?

C (11:23)

Well, within Iran, there was just this growing frustration that the oil wealth, as Matt was saying, was not benefiting the country. And it was the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. They effectively controlled the production of profits. And so in the early 1950s, that nationalization was seen as something that they were really happy with when the, the, the coup took place. From Washington, Washington's perspective is about stability, about keeping Iran aligned with the West. You have to remember this was during the Cold War and it was preventing Soviet encroachment. But from the Iranian people's perspective, this became about a colonialist empire trying to move in and take their. Their oil. The United States is no longer seen as neutral or even as a helpful partner because you have to understand, going back all the way to World War II, there was generally a favorable relationship between the United States and Iran. We weren't always adversarial. They helped us in World War II, helped us get equipment through their sector into the Soviet Union to fight the Nazis. So all of this kind of how we've Taken advantage of them, reshapes their views. And this is where the, the relationship within the Iranian people, not the, not the Shah, starts to move from cooperation to suspicion. They started to realize that the relationship was souring because the Shah was being seen as this, this puppet of the United States. Our military aid, our economic support, it wasn't actually helping the people, it was helping kind of a pseudo oligarchy. And it's interesting side note, where the military aid, that's why we saw F14s, USF14s being struck by US F35s and F18s. People were wondering, why are there US aircraft being struck by the US well, the Iranians under the Shah used to get military aid from us. And so that rapid modernization took place and unfortunately it didn't help anyone at the level of the, what we would call the middle class to lower class. It became such a problem that the Shah's regime started to have heavy, heavy handed approaches to maintain control. They built an intelligence service called the savak, which was built with US support tech. They monitored, they detained and often they tortured political opponents and things like that. So even though the Shah at the state level was getting stronger and growing closer to the United States, many Iranians viewed the Shah as this brutal product of foreign intervention, especially when they had just felt that they had, had gotten through this, this 1953 influence campaign by the United States. So by the 1970s that resentment was widespread and the economic inequality that was taking place kind of became the gasoline for the fire that was already, already burning. And that led to coup number two. And it was far, far bigger than, than the one in 1953, when the Ayatollah took power in 1979.

B (14:27)

So right before we get to that, if I can recap a little bit, you're saying that essentially while Iran was under the British thumb of the British, you know, starting in, as we were saying 1908, when, when they started drilling for oil there, that sentiment towards the US and allyship with the US existed pretty much into the, into the mid 20th century. And that sort of antipathy towards more than antipathy. But the seed of antipathy was planted with when US intervention came to back the British presence where we became aligned with those Western powers that were exploiting them. And then meanwhile, you know, in addition to that growing sentiment, you're seeing this installed puppet dictator essentially or, or at least this puppet government that is run by someone who's now increasing increasingly autocratic in terms of the way he's holding on to power is, you know, you now have within that time a generation of people growing up with that image of the US as well. Right. You're, you're in the time between these two revolutions. You have these people who are, whose suffering and the decreases in quality of life are directly linked back to the US So then tell me what happens during this, during this second coup.

C (15:36)

Well, before I do that, I just want to say something that's very key. U.S. history books love to paint the Iranians before 1979 as totally supporting the U.S. and loving us and everything. The distinction here is the Shah's regime loved us. So from our perspective, our news perspective, it seemed like Iran was very favorable to the U.S. but the people very much were not because they were being exploited and they felt exploited. So I just wanted to give that distinction before. If Matt wants to take us into the.

B (16:07)

I think that's important too. And even the language that we. Because occasionally we say we referring to the US military and I don't personally condone their actions. And also the way that you say we is different from the way I say we because I not served in military. But also when we say, when I say Israel, I don't necessarily mean the average Israeli journalist. I mean the state of Israel. So I think it is really valid as part of why I ask how, how did the. It's a valid comparison and a valid distinction. And it's part of why I ask how the quality of life and attitude changed at these different pivotal points in history.

C (16:40)

Yeah, for sure, because we matters. Because before the Ayatollah came into power, Israel Iranian relations were actually pretty good. The Iranians used to sell oil to Israel. So it was just. It is good to distinction to show that distinction because the US loves to paint this broad handed. Oh, it was the singular event and the, the rise of the. I told. No, there was animosity before then. So I just wanted to point that out.

B (17:03)

And so this whole time Israel has been created in the meantime and then Iran Mossadegh has been overthrown. But under the Shah, Iran is still selling oil to Israel.

C (17:14)

Yeah, they were a key player in countering the Soviets. They were very helpful encountering the Soviets up until 1979.

B (17:21)

Right.

C (17:21)

And it was like overnight the switch flipped.

B (17:24)

Well, let's talk about what happened in 1979, page three of my essay.

A (17:28)

Well, basically 79 is, is where we are today. Like so 79 had the coup, the Ayatollah took over. And ever since then it's basically been like it is now, sanctions, no investment of any kind from the west into their part of the world, isolating them from markets and technology. So basically, since 1979, it's been like it has been right now. It's been that for the last, what is that, 40, almost 47 years or whatever. So to sum it all up, and put a little ribbon on it, for 71 years, the west looted the country of their natural resources and left them penniless. And then when they took pack their country, we spent 47 years punishing them with sanctions and isolationism and refusing to let them participate in markets. And yes, they've done a lot of things. They've done a lot of terrorist attacks and, and all the things they have done. But it's important that we understand the history of how Iran became Iran. They just didn't wake up one day and hate the United States. In the west, that's not a thing. They woke up every day for 71 years with people stealing their resources to build their own superpowers while they were sitting there in the desert penniless. That is what happened to Iran. So I don't want to at all, for even a second to sound like I'm defending Iran. I'm saying this is what happened, period.

B (19:07)

You also don't have to defend the US And Iran. We're not taking a one position or the other. And you know, as much as I, as I, you know, defer to the authority of this paper I wrote in college, I do think culturally, I remember growing up and Iran being depicted in media as this, you know, sometimes even as this barbaric Islamic republic where these, these people are all religious fundamentalists. And you know, this is a dangerous country that breeds terrorists. And you know, this is just, just American media, news and entertainment in the 90s, just sort of Iran was in the same breath as a lot of countries that we were, you know, that we were demonizing at the time, obviously mostly Muslim countries. It wasn't really until learning about this after, you know, maybe, maybe in high school, into college, but what I actually read a couple books about this and learned, oh, you know, there's a direct reason that Iran is ruled by an Islamic republic. And also that that depiction is pretty much directly propaganda because, you know, Iran in the middle of the 20th century, it was a, had a. And, you know, it still does have a flourishing arts, culture and sports. And, you know, the Iranian cinema is very well regarded. Which is not to say that, you know, I ever thought these people didn't have culture. But you. The way that US media depicted Iran was as if it was a country that was stuck in the Stone Ages rather than a country where we enabled, you know, a revolution that. That, you know, where we enabled authoritarianism and then, you know, religious fundamentalism in a way that was hurting all that cultural freedom. I didn't. I didn't learn that, of course, until, you know, I started to research it for myself.

C (20:51)

Well, and I will say that to kind of counter that a bit there, the. The regime didn't do anything to help themselves. Right off the bat, you. If you want to. Their. Their goal was never to bridge anything. They could have had the opportunity to try to work with the US to right whatever wrongs, and they had no interest in doing that. And probably because it was just visceral anger. And I understand why there's visceral anger. We were looting them. But the first.

B (21:18)

You're talking about Khomeini when they, when they first.

C (21:20)

Yeah, when Khomeini. When k. Came out.

B (21:24)

I'm not defending Ayatollah Khomeini in this. I'm more saying that the way that I saw this conflict depicted, like, growing up was, oh, well, all these evil Iranian guys are like the Khomeinis. And that's, you know, that's why Iran's the enemy.

C (21:38)

I get what you're saying now.

B (21:38)

And only did I learn that, you know, not that many years before I was born. It was a. There, you know, all of this. They only had recently seized power due to, you know, a reaction to previous US Intervention.

C (21:51)

Yeah, and it's. It's. It's unfortunate because the Ayatollah was reactionary to a colonial position that a lot of countries had taken advantage of, of Iran. But he came out right off the bat calling us the Great Satan. And then he. They immediately seized those 440American, 44American diplomats and had them. They were hostages for a year. So they didn't really come out with the best intentions either. But I also will say that the United States has started. They had an opportunity to build a diplomatic bridge as well. And we just decided to kind of burn the. The relationship to the ground. When we went into the Iran Iraq war and we just started backing Iraq, we started giving them dual use, tech and intel. But it wasn't so clean a situation that we were absolutely helping Iraq because we would publicly oppose Iran, but we'd have limited covert dealings with them. So you kind of end up with this contradictory approach, which is the US Always tries to do this, where they try to have their cake and eat it too. The. The way we were. The reason we were trying to help or help Iraq was to contain Iran and prevent it from dominating the region. But later stages of that war, the United States just started directly attacking Iran. And so that pressure helped build this, build more animosity against the United States. And eventually the pressure built so much that it caused a ceasefire in 1988. But the, that's kind of the, the 1988 point is where you can kind of stick a pin in the timeline to where the United States moves from just kind of being an outsider with influence and things like that to they're just now directly involved in the Middle East. And then you cut to 91, and the US turns on Iran completely, or, excuse me, turns on Iraq because they were supporting Iraq. Then they turned on Iraq because Saddam Hussein, who they were supporting against Iran, decides to invade Kuwait. And Bush Senior does not take out Saddam completely for the singular reason that he wants to counterbalance Iran. So we're like having the, the US Absolutely is pulling puppet strings with Iran, with Iraq. And then we, we are surprised that when our puppets turn on us, when we aren't very good puppet masters.

B (24:08)

I want to actually ask, when you say we're surprised, are you being coy? Are you saying that the US Leadership is actually caught off guard or. So much as we should expect this and, and they have every right to, or they would expect it as well, and, you know, use it as propaganda, for example.

C (24:25)

Well, well, for us, hindsight is 20 20, so we can look back and go, well, this was obvious. But in it, from when you, you read the memoirs of, of thing, people like Condoleezza Rice or people who are in the room, Schwarzkopf, things like that, they truly believed that they were in the right by switching sides back and forth and controlling things. So they, they didn't think, oh, we're gonna, we're going to cause future problems. I don't, it's just like Donald Trump today. I don't think he foresaw all of the problems that were going to be caused with his, his, his war. It's just a lack of the contingency planning. It's just, you can't. And you see this all the time where it's, it's some form of Mike Tyson's, everyone's got a plan until you get punched in the face. And that's, that's kind of where we're at. And when we were supporting Iraq, it became kind of this epiphany for Iran where they learned that they cannot contend with the most military powers in the region. They cannot definitely contend with the military powers around the world. And at the time, the Soviet Union was still somewhat a thing. I mean, 91, they'd already fallen, but I'm talking kind of before that, after the Iran Iraq war. And this led to them developing proxies. They just said, we're not going to build tanks anymore. We're just going to use proxies, missiles and indirect strategy. And it eventually led to them using proxy forces to deploy to Iraq in 2003 to help the Iraqi Shia militias fight the US military there. And they brought the explosively formed projectile, which was extremely devastating. And so kind of, that's where the, the animosity comes from. We are fully responsible for our part of it. It's just. And so is Iran, so is Iraq. It's just there's just been a series of bad leadership, obviously out of Saddam Hussein, obviously out of the Ayatollah. And then we had just bad leadership coming out of the, the consistent, whether it was Desert Storm, Desert Shield, whatever, not. And there's just no way to bridge gaps because it was just always escalatory.

B (26:22)

Yeah. I have to imagine that for, you know, an Iranian yearning for an open society that's probably doubly insulting to, to, you know, if you're, if you're an enemy of the Ayatollah, if you're a citizen, you know, yearning for freedom under the Ayatollah and then also the U.S. you know, I feel you have. Anyone who has broken free from the, the messaging of the, of the Ayatollah's regime is also probably anti us at this point. And I can only imagine that, as you were talking about in the first half of the 20th century, even culturally, there was a lot of sympathy towards the US And Iran. But you have to imagine that, as I said, people growing up and experiencing people who experienced the revolution as children, for example, and experiencing the way of life completely change, whether or not it's rational, whether or not you blame. Well, hey, that's not, that's on the Shah or that's on Khomeini. And you know, of course they've done horrible things. I can imagine how the average citizen could easily have, you know, generations at this point of Disdain for the U.S. yeah.

C (27:31)

And I wanted to ask Matt, because it's kind of fascinating because originally they were using oil as, as a weapon somewhat. They had the oil strikes, I believe, in the 70s or whatever, I can't remember. But the, but now they're learning a new tactic. The straight Is their weapon almost like it's better than a nuclear weapon? I mean, what are your thoughts on that? Where they don't even. They don't even potentially need nuclear weapons. Their nuclear option is shutting the straight down. And how. I mean, am I. Am I on base with that? Where the oil is so critical coming through there that that's good for them? That's their. Their plan.

A (28:05)

No, you're. I mean, and what's bad is we've known this. Yeah. For, like, 30 years or long. Like, we've known this. This. You know, why didn't anyone else do what Donald Trump did? Well, this is why. Like, we've known this. This is, you know, but. Yeah, the straight of Hormuz, their geographic location in the world. And that straight is their ultimate weapon. And in the beginning of the war, every day, they were talking about how, you know, Iran's missile launches were dropping drastically. It's like, oh, look, they're not launching near as many missiles, and they're not, you know, drones. And I'm just sitting here, like, they don't have to. They have the one thing you don't have. They have the straight of Hormuz. They have all the ships trapped on one end. I mean, what else. What other weapon do you need is that? You know, what other weapon do you need? They have the ultimate mousetrap. They have the world's greatest mousetrap right there off their shores, and they don't. I mean, so all this talk about how many missiles they're firing, like, who cares? I mean, this war is about the economy for them. That's the only way they can win. They've known that for decades that this would always be an economic war. And we're fighting a military war with our, you know, unmatched strength. And we think we're winning, but we're not. We're in an economic war. We're not in a military war. That's. We just use our military for economic wars. That doesn't work well. So however this ends, it's not us winning. It's because, you know, getting back to where they started is not us winning.

B (29:46)

So let me ask you to draw. Oh, go ahead.

A (29:48)

No, I'm just saying, like, it's. It's like, hey, if we can just get the straight open. We won.

B (29:52)

No, right. Of course.

A (29:54)

What did we win? Like, that was open six weeks ago. I mean, hell, I could have opened the straight. I could have just declared it open with a scroll so the straits open. Like, it was already open. Who gives a Shit, like, you had

C (30:06)

more authority than Trump.

A (30:09)

But that is their weapon, and it, and it will always be their weapon. And that's the thing. Like, they don't, they don't need all that.

B (30:17)

So I'm curious, where does that power dynamic shift in the history. We're just talking about, you know, the history of this conflict and how we get there. How does the US Go from strong arming Iran to essentially being economically vulnerable to Iran in the modern era? Does that, a turning point happen after the Ayatollah takes over and like, essentially feels, feels like Iran has the. You said We've known for 30 years that Iran can do that. We've known for more than 30 years. Of course. But, yeah, how, you know, how do we get ourselves, if you can talk a little bit more about the historical progression, how do we get ourselves in a situation where we're so economically reliant on, on Iran? Is that because more of our goods come through the straight now? I mean, I know that so much. You know, the US Is not manufacturing. We're importing more than we were in the 50s or the 70s. Are we more reliant on that kind of shipping than we used to be?

A (31:11)

No. I would say the huge thing that changed the straight of Hormuz was one, the discovery of massive amounts of oil in Saudi Arabia, followed by the introduction of the petrodollar. That changed the straight informatives. Because now that the petrodollar, which, you know, everyone is suddenly so worried about, I don't know why, but now that, that once that became in existence, that made the straight of Hormuz a thousand times bigger than it was before there was a petrodollar. And that the petrodollar is really what gave the Strait of Hormuz its strength. And it's very ironic because you can use the stretch, you can use the straight against the petrol dollar.

B (31:55)

Wait, can you, can you explain this for listeners? What, what is the petrodollar?

A (31:59)

That's any, any, any oil that's traded in US Dollars is petrodollar. And so there was a time when all oil was traded in US dollars. And that gave the dollar a lot of strength, that helped it achieve its reserve currency, but it's not as important now as it was back then. You know, everyone's worried about the dollar and the petrodollar and, oh, what if we lose the petrodollar? You know, the dollar's place in financial markets is 10,000 times bigger than its place in the oil market. That is what maintains The US Dollar now, not oil. So everyone's freaking out about the dollar in oil, but the power or the influence of the petrodollar has shrunk significantly over the last few decades. But now that we have global financial markets, it's not really a huge deal because that's where the dollar lives and dominates.

C (32:48)

Yeah. And if I can just kind of piggyback on Matt with this idea of the petrodollar. I see a lot of people discuss the petrodollar as it's the ending of the petrodollar brics, which is the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and then a smattering of other countries is going to end the dominance of the petrodollar. People need to understand that it's no longer the petrodollar. It is the everything dollar. Everything is bought and sold in the US Dollar. Now, granted, it is going down largely because of Trump's policies. We are seeing a lower rate of dollar usage than we have historically since the United States became kind of the economic hegemon. But you have to understand that there's a subset of finance and lending that the United States does not even see. So we have the real world of the dollar, which is everyone's trading there. I want to, if Australia wants to. To buy US Cars, they use the dollar. If we want to buy Australian beef, we use the dollar. But there's a subset where countries like China, they. They want to buy something from Australia, but Australia doesn't want Chinese yuan. So they're like, no, we want US Dollars. So what ends up happening is China will look, and I'm derailing this, our whole agenda here. But this is kind of a. It's kind of a fascinating thing where you have Australia looking at China, say, we don't want yuan, we want US Dollars. So what the. What the Chinese will do will say, well, we don't have enough US Dollars on hand, but we'll write you an IOU in US Dollars. And what they've effectively done is created US Dollars out of thin air via an IOU and outside of the US Treasury's purview. So what happens is you have all of these IOUs. Japan wants Indian spices, but they don't want. But India doesn't want yen. They want US Dollars so they can spend it in the US So another IOU is written. That IOU market, that sort of. That sort of shadow market that the United States dollar is being used is something like four times the size of the actual dollar market. And that is why that is the absolute power of the US dollar where there is so much strength underlying these IOUs and people want their dollars, they want them paid, that if the physical dollar market fluctuates, that underlying kind of IOU dollar market, it stays the same and it's humongous, like an order of magnitude larger than the global economy. And that is why the US dollar likely isn't going to go anywhere anytime soon. So this idea of the petrodollar dying. Yeah, no, it's the everything dollar. And everyone has promised to pay each other in these dollars when they don't have them. And the US by proxy controls all of that. So it's a very powerful tool. I went off on a tangent there, but I wanted to kind of. It was a cool, it's a cool thing that I've read about the dollar. This, this I can't remember. It's like the shadow economy of the US Dollar being way bigger than the actual economy. And that's why it's not going to go anywhere.

A (35:52)

Yeah. And to piggyback off of that, when that doesn't happen, they just exchange whatever currency they receive for US dollars. So if some country sells something and receives, you know, the Chinese yuan, they just immediately take it and exchange it for dollars. They don't hold it. They get rid of it immediately and get their dollars. So I, I think what Chad's talking about is more prevalent than what I'm talking about, but it just further reinforces the point that there's nothing that you, you know, bricks don't even have a currency. I don't even know why we're talking about bricks. Yeah, it's a nothing conspiratorial type of bs. There's not anything that's going to shake the dollar down and, and dethrone it. We did more damage to our dollar than, than bricks.

C (36:38)

I keep hearing about the yuan or the renminbi unseating the same currency just depends on who you're asking. Unseating the US dollar, it's like the fifth largest currency. It's not even, it's not even close to the US like the Euro, it goes like Dollar does like 55 to 60% of all trade. Then the Euro does like 30% and then you have like the yen, the pound, and then you have, I think you have like. It basically depends on the quarter Canada's dollar and then the Chinese yuan. So this idea that the yuan is going to over unseat the dollar is nonsense. But understand that this kind of tying it back to the war in Iran. Iran is now leveraging their position with Strait of Hormuz to say you only pay us in yuan in an attempt to try to, to get at least some of the margins of the US dollar chip away at it.

A (37:28)

So there we wrap all those, all those YouTubers that, that make hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars a year. Talking about the fall of the petrodollar. Every one of them get paid in dollars.

B (37:42)

You don't think they're. You don't think they're getting it in Kroner?

A (37:44)

They're not asking Google, they're not asking Google for, you know, the Malaysian ringgit

B (37:50)

to dollar to US Dollar exchange.

C (37:52)

Yeah. You know who else gets traded for beaver pelts? Well, here's another reason. The dollar ain't going anywhere. Nowhere. You know who else gets the dollar? Cartels. Ain't no cartels receiving like check currency or the pound. The, the, the dark world of the like of things like cartels, unfortunately. Trafficking, human trafficking, it's all done in dollars. And I know crypto is trying to unseat that, but a lot of crypto is just people sitting on it as like it's gold or something. So. And like I said, we've, I've derailed this whole thing. So.

B (38:32)

No, I just want to loop back to beaver pelts because as much as Matt's, you know, talking down to that as an investment, furs are still selling, man, oh man. In the current economy, you're talking about assets that don't depreciate. I don't know. You could. There are currencies that could do a lot worse than putting your money into furs. Not that I ethically support it. I do want to do a little bit of research before we write that off as a part of the investment portfol. Yeah.

A (38:59)

This is about money. I don't know why you're bringing up ethics.

C (39:03)

No, he's, he's no joke.

B (39:06)

Ethics aside, I apologize for deranging of your assets. Should be beaver based. 60 or more.

A (39:13)

At least 5%. At least 5%.

B (39:16)

Yeah, I, you know, magnets, commemorative coins. But you're going to want to, you're going to want some first.

C (39:23)

Well, none of this is going to matter unless we win this war or unless this war comes to an end. There's just. I don't think there's a way to win it at this point. But.

B (39:29)

Yeah, well, I, I think we did win it because we've changed what the goal. And when I say we, I mean me, Donald Trump have changed the goal. Enough times that most people don't remember why it started. And I have a podcast about it and you could, you know, see a little bit of fuddlement in my own face when I try to search for the original messaging. So I could say I think they've won at least three times along the way. Haven't we decl victory enough yet? Yeah, the Straits open or was never closed or was never open. There's a ceasefire that there wasn't but we didn't and then we sent J.D. vance to Pakistan. So leave them there, say we won.

C (40:12)

Well, the problem is get out of there. If, if we're really. If, if we're trying to be serious about getting out of this mess, there just really isn't a qu. A clean win at this point. We just aren't going to have, we're never going to go back to what was the status quo. We're just going to have a lesser situation. We need to shoot for the least bad outcome essentially is what it is. And the problem is is both sides rightfully think they have leverage to force major concessions. Obviously the United States has the ability to, to inflict incredible violence but Iran has proved it can absorb several massive attacks, not just this one, but we've attacked them last year with their. On a nuclear strike. We attacked them with Israel or Israel attacked them previously in their 12 day war. This has all happened in a span of just 18 months roughly. And they've, they've discovered that they can survive. They can survive attacks from Israel, from the U.S. their, their Ayatollah can be killed but the regime itself survives and somewhat might get a bit stronger and more closed in because the Ayatollah was more of a. More of an aspirational leader for the future. Whereas the IRGC is just a regime survival tool.

B (41:26)

Is the rest of the world learning from this? Like are, are this exposing a weakness? You know you come at the US economically versus I mean obviously we understand that we are the military superpower but is this exposing what some of our weaknesses are to other countries in the world?

C (41:42)

Well, I'll let Matt answer this because I can tell you that yes there's, there's some military weaknesses but it's, it's not strategic enough that one thing that is eye opening from a military aspect. The straight aside the. We have shown once again that we can bear. Bring to bear pretty incredible firepower with pretty minimal loss. But the problem is the military aspect is only one pillar of going to war, the other being economic and then the third being the The. The people's will. And so I. And I think we're losing on those other two, which means we'll lose the war. But Matt might be able to speak to the economic side a bit more as to why we're losing that.

A (42:25)

No, I agree. You know, the US Has a history of the people not having the will, and it's because the US Has a history of going to war kind of against the will of the people that live in the United States. And if there's anything every other country in the world knows about the United States is that eventually U. S. Politicians fold prematurely because their job is more important than whatever their quest is in some war on the other side of the world. So I think that's pretty common knowledge around the world that the United States will, you know, fold to political pressure,

C (43:10)

especially if we're unilaterally going at it.

A (43:12)

Absolutely.

C (43:14)

So. And that just kind of makes me think about how we would actually get out of this. And I just don't think we have an administration that is willing to, I guess, humble itself to the reality of what is necessary to get out of this war, because we have to understand that there is not going to be an outcome that absolutely gets our maximalist demands, the demands that Trump has.

A (43:35)

And he.

C (43:35)

I think he's already starting to recognize that because he's already moved from absolutely no nuclear development forever and ever to now we're hearing, well, maybe just for 20 years. That was a pretty quick shift, a

B (43:48)

little bit of nuclear development as a.

C (43:49)

Yeah, and that's the thing is, like,

B (43:51)

when you see that board, you can make some nuclear.

C (43:54)

And that's the thing is, it's like, that was a quick turn. Like, he did that in a span of like, three days, where he was like, no nukes. Maybe nukes in 20 years. And now you see Iran, see the crack in the door, they're starting to see the ability. And we can actually, if we were smart, which we aren't right now, but if we were smart, we could slam that door shut if we were to bring on our allies and partners to our negotiations, because we just. We just aren't. That's. I think that's a big problem with how we're going at this, is that we are not only in the. The fighting itself, but now the negotiations. We're bringing too much emotion, both Iran and us, we're bringing too much emotion. And so we need the logical counterbalance of allies from Europe, allies from the Gulf states, and if Iran needs to bring in allies to help them Bring in the Russia, even though I'm really not a fan of Russia. Bring in China, bring in the Pakistan. And there's a little bit of a secret here. Russia was actually key in helping bringing Obama's joint comprehensive plan of Action across the finish line. So if we can get everyone in a room, we can kind of temper the emotions. Oh, yeah. And Israel has to be involved too. We have. Because there has to. They have to understand that for there to be a successful outcome for the United States, they. Whatever happens to them directly impacts our ability to have a positive outcome. So we need to constrain them as necessary.

B (45:19)

That seems like the least likely part of this, this path forward, though, to me. Israel seems to have intentions on transforming the entire region.

C (45:29)

Yeah. There's no. Understand that these suggestions I make about

B (45:32)

how do we get out of this. I want to say, by the way, I'm not trying to use sanitized news language.

C (45:36)

No, no.

B (45:36)

Try to create World War III to take over several, partner several nearby countries and using U. S. Firepower to do so. I don't see they're getting what they want with Iran in many ways. So I don't. I don't see Israel sitting down on the table. Correct me if I'm wrong, but that feels like one of the least likely elements in this path forward is that Trump, much like Biden before him, seems to continue to allow Netanyahu to shape foreign policy in ways that are counterproductive are going to prevent us from reaching any kind of deal. Is that, is that something that you can see reversing anytime soon or how, you know, how would you bring Israel on board for that?

C (46:16)

I would argue that. I think Donald Trump is probably going to have a limit to his tolerance of Netanyahu getting in his way eventually. I think it might be a long time, but I think eventually, as we have in the past, we'll have to drag Israel along. Whether. Whether that. What that looks like for Trump, I don't know. I think it becomes too much of an economic escalation. I think the strait of hormones becomes just too toxic.

B (46:40)

That's a really great look at the least bad way that we can get out of this situation. Which brings me to a segment that I like to call the least worst part of the week, where we highlight, if not the best thing that we've heard or the best news we've heard all week, some of the least horrible things that we've heard in the past week that relate to our topics here on the show or things that we think that you should know. Matt and Chad, either of you have a least worst story of the week that you'd like to hit me with?

C (47:10)

I mean, you started with beaver pelts. Go for it, Matt.

A (47:12)

You guys are going to love this.

C (47:15)

Yours was so good last time. Like, I don't even know why I go. You have such good ones.

A (47:19)

What do you guys think of meat raffles?

B (47:23)

New to me, new concept.

A (47:24)

Okay. Haven't formed an opinion in these polarizing times, the great people of Minnesota have found something that they can finally agree on, and that is meat raffles. And for the last, I think, 40 years, there's been a limit on how much meat could be given away in a meat raffle in Minnesota.

B (47:46)

I thought this was America.

C (47:49)

You're making me cough.

A (47:51)

This is great news, especially if you live in Minnesota. Okay, now, albeit has been, you know, influenced by inflation and the price of beef. The fine legislators in the state of Minnesota have gotten together and passed their signature piece of legislation this year. And that is to up the limit on the value of the meat you can give away in a meat raffle from $70 to 200 whole dollars. So you can get, like, at least eight hamburger patties now at a meat raffle. It's a huge story. Republican Jim Nash led. Led all of this. And he says this is probably the best feel good bill that we have going on in the legislature in years.

C (48:36)

Jim Nash on this show, the meat people.

B (48:39)

I've had ice in their state for months, standing on their corners at 30 degrees below freezing weather with an assault rifle, just trying to direct, like, defend the guy who runs the gas station down the block. Let me give away some fucking meat. Raise the limit. He's like, oh, this is a good tyranny story. Things haven't been feeling very good in your area for a while. That's. I love that attitude from a Minnesota Republican being like, yeah, this is like one of the, one of the better stories we've had lately. Yeah, bro. What's been going on lately? You've been in the news, dude, like nationally. We're. We're watching that stuff.

A (49:20)

I can't wait for Nick Shirley to go to Minnesota to investigate meat raffle fraud. I mean, you know that's coming.

C (49:26)

These people gonna get rolled up in that daycare investigation. They're gonna be like, oh, see, meat raffles lives.

B (49:35)

Yeah. Is that, is that, is that a conservative gripe of like, oh, the liberals are limiting the amount of. Of meat that you can give away.

C (49:43)

Mine is not nearly as, as good as this. It Never is. Like last week it was laser hippos. Now we got meat raffles and beaver pelts.

B (49:50)

This one's sounding more grounded somehow, but go on.

C (49:54)

All right, so mine is just lamely helping people, but the International Monetary Fund and World bank are actually doing something progressively here. They're moving to stabilize countries that are actually being hit by energy trade disruptions from this war in Iran before that pressure turns into something much worse before starvation and crop loss and things starts happening. And they've already Pre positioned like $150 billion in emergency financing for countries that need it for spikes in fuel. And we didn't talk about this, but obviously fertilizer being a big problem going through the Strait of Hormuz that's impacting farmers across the world. And there's a lot of people that are food insecure. And so what's happening is this, this is the imf, the World bank who get a lot of crap for being a part of whatever the quote unquote cabal, which is all nonsense. But what is different about this and why this is so good is because in past crises, whether it was the 2008 financial crisis or Covid, they were too late, they moved way too late and the system was already broken and people were already starving. And by the time they had gotten this, this funding to countries that needed it, there was already people dying and it was medication was being delivered, things like that. And they're already getting ahead of it. So it's just a, I was just really happy to see that. And it just proves that international bodies, they do work, whether it is NATO, whether it is the IMF for all the gripes that you have and China potentially controlling things like the, the World Health Organization, which is valid. The a lot of these bodies will do very good things such as this. And it's actually leading and I saw this is just kind of a segue quick headline. It actually stuff like this is leading to once again we're in 2026 hitting a year of the lowest level of extreme poverty poverty across the globe, despite the fact that there's these wars going on. So I thought that was some good news. Then maybe these people can get some money from the emergency funds and put it into raffle tickets for meat.

B (51:58)

All right, that's also important, Chad. I guess you're right. You slid NATO in there. You're not getting me signed off on NATO just because the WHO is doing good things. But I agree, let's end some poverty. No, I, I, I think that's excellent and you are not going to believe where my story sits.

C (52:14)

Yeah, do you got one this time?

B (52:15)

I got one.

C (52:16)

You should bring yours in. Have fun.

B (52:17)

I might be the only person who cares about this, so I'm going to use my platform to spread this. But the 2006 Wachowskis Film Speed Racer just got a 4K restoration and is in theaters and IMAX for a few days. And if you've never seen this film, I'm not just bringing it up because I love it. It's a cult classic and it's anti capitalist and not just in the messaging of the film. It also cost like $130 million to make and did not earn that much money back. So it's Kantai Capitalist in so much as they stole money from Warner Brothers. And it's an excellent movie that was so forward thinking that people are just catching up to it. But the reason that I mention it is because the plot of the movie would be so crazy that you may forget that the plot of the movie is about capitalist intervention. Messing with stock prices, intentionally manipulating markets for fuel cells for automobiles. And that's the central plot conceit is that they are trying to win car races to influence the price of the emerging fuel cell market. Because this is apparently a movie takes place in a post oil world, which is a thing that we talk about, that in a world without oil there will still be capitalism. So it's an examination of what capitalism would look like in a post oil world that just happens to be appropriate for seven year olds. So do yourself a favor and go see the anti capitalist masterpiece by the Wachowskis, Speed Racer. We'll be discussing it on the podcast for three hours next week. And that with our. With our meat raffled, with our winnings,

C (53:48)

with our meat winnings just up to

B (53:52)

my neck in $200 worth of frozen patties. That's been the least worst part of the week. And that brings us to the end of our podcast. Before we go, I want to let our listeners know where they can find us all for the rest of the week. Because some people are just clamoring for more Mr. Global. They're clamoring for more Chad Scott. They're trying to remember my name. It's Nat Townsend. Thanks so much for trying. Doesn't really seem like the focus here. I agree, Chad. Where can people find you on social media?

C (54:20)

So my personal handle for TikTok is @cpscot15. That's basically an extension of what you hear here as well as on YouTube. Confusingly I have a separate handle called CP Scott16 mainly because YouTube banned my last one for talking about Wagner Groove and everywhere else at CP Scott 15. But I also want to plug the fact that we have. And I know you hate the word plug, but I'm going to say it. I want to plug the fact that we have a. We have a, a specific dedicated TikTok for this channel. For American Power Podcast. We have a TikTok. Go check it out. It's at American Power Podcast that are awesome editors and stuff. Cut up the, the videos and put stuff that's relevant on that. So if you don't want to sit through us talking about meat raffles and beaver pelts and laser hippos, you can the real meat of what we're talking about there as well. So I, I encourage everyone to go see that.

B (55:14)

Don't counter program, watch the whole video. Yeah, but you're.

C (55:18)

Please come and, and give us a five star review. That really helps.

B (55:21)

I was going to plug. I'll, I will, I'll plug all our socials at the end. Don't worry. Mr. Global, where can people find you in the time between episodes? Everywhere around Worldwide.

C (55:32)

You just got nowhere.

A (55:34)

I'm like Carmen Sandiego. Like, I'm everywhere.

B (55:37)

Mm.

C (55:39)

He's on News Nation.

A (55:40)

There you go.

B (55:40)

Let me try that again. Mr. Global, what specific platforms can people use to find you and what are your handles on those platforms?

A (55:47)

My handles are Mr. Global and I'm on TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, Blue Sky, Threads. What's that one? There's another one. Substack. Yeah, I'm on substack.

C (56:01)

Are you LinkedIn?

A (56:03)

I'm on LinkedIn, although I don't know why.

B (56:08)

Networking opportunities in exciting new fields like tech and crypto, obviously, maybe.

A (56:15)

I love it when people. I love it when people look at my LinkedIn and they're like, you're not an expert. I'm like, look, dude, here's the thing. People at my level don't give a shit what their LinkedIn looks like. I'm not trying to get a job at McDonald's. Listen, I don't look at my LinkedIn.

B (56:28)

My LinkedIn gives you a perfect, A perfect picture of the person I was pretending to be for the last job I was applying to.

A (56:36)

All right?

B (56:37)

And the next time I have to apply to a job, that's for the kind of people, if you want to call them people who check LinkedIn regularly. If you see the. All I'm going to do is just change the entire profile to make it sound like I'm the person for the next job before they have a chance to research me. That's what LinkedIn is for. It's personal revisionist history.

C (56:59)

I'm over here.

A (57:00)

I have to say this so you

B (57:01)

can find me nat town LinkedIn.com nat and nowhere else.

A (57:06)

You guys know who Gary Vee is, right?

C (57:08)

Yeah, I know he is.

A (57:10)

Yeah. About a year ago, maybe two years ago, he said LinkedIn was going to be the biggest thing. He said it was going to pass everything.

C (57:18)

I remember that.

A (57:20)

And that's when I quit listening to Gary. I was like, okay, he's on the sauce.

B (57:26)

I thought you said that's when you quit.

A (57:28)

Link, he drank all of his grandpa's wine.

B (57:29)

Get rid of both of them.

C (57:31)

He's to social media what Kramer is to stocks.

B (57:34)

Whatever he does, Opposite gen alpha loves LinkedIn. They know that they're not going to. They're going to be working five jobs by the time they're 10 years old and they're into networking. And that's just what it's going to be.

A (57:47)

So on the rare occasion I decide to write a Forbes article, I. I do go to LinkedIn just to stick it on there. And every time I do it, I'm just like, what am I doing this for? Like, this is a complete waste of my time.

B (58:00)

Are you sticking it to any high school classmates at least?

A (58:03)

No, I mean, just put. Putting anything on LinkedIn. It's like, why am I wasting this precious three minutes of my life? Like, I could be composting or something. Like, I mean, I could be doing anything.

C (58:14)

That is a next episode Epiphany. We're gonna have to talk about that. Next time is composting, folks.

B (58:19)

You can follow me. Nattowson. T O W S E N on conventional spelling on Instagram and other social media that I use less frequently. Don't follow me on LinkedIn. I'd like you to use the time that you would have spent looking me up on LinkedIn to start a compost. And you're going to need it. We all got to be doing it whether or not they give us fees. In New York, they keep giving us fees and not giving us fees. Go start a compost and delete your LinkedIn account or just ignore it forever until you have to apply for a job again. Actually, don't give them the daily active users. So find me on Instagram and elsewhere. Attousen. You can also follow the podcast on social media. Follow us at American Power Podcast on TikTok and Instagram. And you can find our episodes on the findout media channel on YouTube as well as shorts from our episodes. Make sure you give us a rating wherever you go. Five stars, please, for Chad Scott and Mr. Global. Matt Randolph. I'm Nat Town. This has been American power from find out media. And remember, power corrupts, but American power corrupts Americanly.