The Massacre at My Lai | Interview | Rules of Engagement: How My Lai Changed the US Military | 5

Summary

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American Scandal — The Massacre at My Lai | Interview: Rules of Engagement—How My Lai Changed the US Military

Podcast: American Scandal (Wondery)
Host: Lindsey Graham
Guest: Fred Borg (retired Army lawyer, regimental historian of the Judge Advocate General Corps)
Date: September 9, 2025
Episode: 5

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Overview

This episode explores the profound and lingering impact of the My Lai massacre on the U.S. Army, its culture, and the broader military justice system. Host Lindsey Graham interviews Fred Borg, an army legal expert and historian, about the root causes of the atrocity, how the military reckoned with the events, and what changes were made (or not) to ensure such a tragedy could never happen again. Together, they explore issues of leadership, rules of engagement, legal and moral responsibilities, and the enduring human and institutional challenges of warfare.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Aftermath: How My Lai Shook the U.S. Army

• Moral and Institutional Crisis: The massacre at My Lai "nearly wrecked the U.S. army" by destroying public trust and morale. Graphic photos published in Life magazine made the atrocity impossible to ignore and deeply hurt the Army's reputation.

  “When I say My Lai nearly wrecked the Army, I’m saying that the war crime was so shocking that it really hurt the reputation of the army among the American people.” — Fred Borg [03:44]

• Catalyst for Change: The fallout forced the military to examine its practices, ethics, and leadership, becoming a pivot point in how the Army addressed war crimes and command responsibility.

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Root Causes of the Massacre

• Critical Failures Identified:

  • Leadership: William Calley’s poor leadership highlighted systemic failures in officer selection and training.
  • Racism and Dehumanization: Racist attitudes and dehumanization of the Vietnamese made such atrocities possible.
  • Flawed Intelligence and Training: Soldiers were sent in based on incorrect intelligence, and their training on the laws of war and distinguishing enemy from civilian was minimal to none.

  “The number one factor is poor leadership, as epitomized by William Calley… The real failure at My Lai… was leadership.” — Fred Borg [05:13] “You may not, you should not kill unarmed and unresisting civilians.” — Fred Borg [05:47]

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Rules of Engagement: Then and Now

• Vietnam Era Deficiencies:

  • Soldiers were governed by the Geneva Conventions but had scant, unclear, or poorly taught guidelines on targeting and use of force.
  • The “free fire zone” policy blurred the line between combatant and civilian, often with tragic consequences.

  “We didn’t have [rules of engagement] back during the Vietnam era… soldiers really weren’t sure how they should use force.” — Fred Borg [06:36] “This was a big mistake because often you’d end up killing civilians who… had bad luck to be there.” — Fred Borg [07:45]

• Evolution of Military Law:

  • Modern conflicts (Iraq, Afghanistan) have forced codification of rules of engagement: soldiers may only target those with demonstrated hostile intent.
  • Training is now more focused and recurrent, with lawyers (“JAGs”) advising on operations in real-time.

  “What the American military has done is said, okay, we’re going to have rules of engagement… you may not engage… unless that Afghan shows some sort of hostile intent.” — Fred Borg [11:25]

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Lawful Orders, Responsibility, and Whistleblowing

• When Obedience is Not a Virtue:

  • Soldiers are legally obligated to disobey unlawful orders, but the risk is immense—disobedience can be punished if the soldier is “wrong.”
  • Reporting war crimes was required but perilous; in 1968 there were no whistleblower protections.

  “Part of the problem is that it’s very, very difficult for a soldier to decide to disobey an order… What do you do when you get a clearly illegal order?” — Fred Borg [16:53]

• The True Hero: Hugh Thompson:

  • Helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson intervened to stop the massacre and reported it up the chain of command—then suffered vilification and threats.

  “I think Hugh Thompson is the real hero of My Lai… he did save many lives. But he did pay for it personally because of people who criticized him for what he did.” — Fred Borg [20:45]

  • Whistleblower protections have since evolved—but were nonexistent then.

    “At the time in 1968, I don’t think there really was any sort of whistleblower kind of protection.” — Fred Borg [23:06]

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How the Truth Emerged Despite the Cover-up

• Ron Ridenhour – The Relentless Investigator:

  • Former soldier Ron Ridenhour heard rumors, wrote dozens of letters to officials (one finally reached the Army Chief of Staff), and forced an official probe.
  • The episode highlights the power—and rarity—of persistence in the face of institutional resistance.

  “If it hadn’t been for Ron Ridenhour, we wouldn’t know about it.” — Fred Borg [25:56]

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Psychology of Atrocity: Bystander Effect & Dehumanization

• Groupthink, Banality of Evil, and Racism:

  • Social science experiments (e.g., Milgram) and Hannah Arendt’s writings explain how ordinary individuals enable or commit atrocities through conformity and dehumanization.

  “You tend to dehumanize the enemy… it’s easier to attack the enemy and kill the enemy.” — Fred Borg [26:19] “Dehumanization is always part of the war and you are never going to see it disappear.” — Fred Borg [28:31]

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Accountability: The Failures of Justice

• William Calley’s Conviction—But Justice Unserved:

  • Only Calley was convicted and received a trivial sentence; higher-ups acquitted or charges mishandled.
  • Borg rejects the description of Calley as a scapegoat:

    “He wasn't innocent. He's a murderer.” — Fred Borg [30:08]

  • The Army, says Borg, “just wanted to get the whole sordid mess behind it and move on.”

  “Justice was probably not done.” — Fred Borg [31:56]

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The Transformation of Military Legal Practice (JAG)

• Rise of the “Operational Lawyer”:

  • Before My Lai, lawyers were only marginally involved in military operations.
  • After, the JAG Corps began embedding lawyers with commands during planning and execution, ensuring compliance with the law of armed conflict.

  “Anytime a commander goes to war, lawyers go with him or her.” — Fred Borg [34:13]

  • Grenada (1983) marked a turning point where legal questions became operationally crucial and JAGs were recognized as indispensable in the field.

  “Grenada… is really the wake up call… you actually have to have your lawyers there, there on the ground with commanders.” — Fred Borg [34:54]

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Lessons Learned and Ongoing Challenges

• Education, Training, Oversight:

  • Constant, realistic training on law of armed conflict is now standard.
  • Early intervention and legal oversight are prioritized to prevent atrocities from repeating.

  “Every army commits war crimes… What you have to make sure is… you have [no] institutional flaw… that’s allowing these war crimes to occur.” — Fred Borg [39:59]

• Reflections on Modern Cases and Pardons:

  • Recent high-profile war crimes prosecutions (e.g. Clint Lorance, Eddie Gallagher) were legally necessary to deter crimes, regardless of subsequent presidential pardons.

  “What’s important to me is that the cases were prosecuted… to deter others from committing these sort of war crimes.” — Fred Borg [42:31]

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The Future of Warfare: Technology and Morality

• Dehumanization Through Distance—Drones and Future Battles:

  • The Russia-Ukraine war exemplifies a new era of drone-centric combat.
  • Technological distance may amplify “dehumanization” and lower the threshold for killing.
  • Law must continue to adapt to new technology and unintended consequences.

  “The technology takes you away from the face-to-face horrors of war… Without that… I think it gets easier to kill.” — Fred Borg [44:13]

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Leadership and Responsibility:

  "A better leader would have made sure that this war crime had not occurred." — Fred Borg [05:13]

• On the Limits of Training in Vietnam:

  "We didn’t do much in the way of training or education on obeying only lawful orders." — Fred Borg [07:55]

• On Hugh Thompson’s Stand:

  “He actually tells his gun crew in the helicopter, if you see Calley’s platoon…start pursuing some of these civilians, I’m telling you to open fire. I mean, this was shocking…” — Fred Borg [20:45]

• On the Army's Desire to Move On:

  “The army just wanted to get the whole sordid mess behind it and move on.” — Fred Borg [30:50]

• On Institutional Change and Prevention:

  “Maybe we can’t prevent war crimes, but we have to prevent something from My Lai ever happening again...” — Fred Borg [39:59]

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• [03:19] My Lai’s impact on the U.S. Army
• [05:13] Critical causes: leadership, racism, flawed intelligence
• [06:20] Rules of engagement during Vietnam
• [11:25] Modern approaches to distinguishing enemy from civilian
• [13:18] Lawful/unlawful orders and moral dilemmas
• [16:53] Reporting war crimes: then and now
• [20:45] The story and legacy of Hugh Thompson
• [23:54] Ron Ridenhour’s campaign to expose the cover-up
• [26:19] Psychology of atrocity: groupthink and dehumanization
• [30:08] Accountability: Calley’s conviction and military justice
• [32:25] History and evolution of JAG
• [34:54] Grenada and the changing role of military lawyers
• [39:59] Biggest lessons of My Lai; steps taken to prevent recurrence
• [42:31] Reflection on modern war crimes prosecutions and pardons
• [44:13] The rise of drones, future of warfare & dehumanization

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Conclusion

The My Lai massacre serves as a grim benchmark for the U.S. military—one that catalyzed changes in military training, law, policy, and ethics. As Fred Borg repeatedly underscores, the threats of dehumanization, command failure, and institutional inertia never go away completely. The legacy of My Lai is a stark reminder that constant vigilance, education, and ethical leadership are required to uphold the laws of war, especially as combat and its technology evolve.

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For those seeking to understand how My Lai happened—and how the U.S. Army responded—this conversation is essential listening.

Transcript

[Lindsey Graham]

Want to get more from American Scandal? Subscribe to Wondery for early access to new episodes, ad free listening and exclusive content you can't find anywhere else. Join Wondery plus in the Wondery app or on Apple Podcasts from Wondery. Hi, I'm Lindsey Graham, and this is American scandal. On March 16, 1968, American soldiers entered the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai. What followed was one of the most horrifying war crimes in U.S. history. Hundreds of unarmed civilians, men, women and children were gunned down in cold blood. Some were raped. But instead of confronting this atrocity, military leaders tried to bury it. And for more than a year, they succeeded. When the truth finally came to light, it shocked the world and raised a disturbing question. How could the United States army allow something like this to happen? And yet, despite the fallout, only one man was convicted of a crime, while dozens more went free. My guest today is Fred Borg, a retired army lawyer and regimental historian of the Judge Advocate General Corps. He's written extensively about how My Lai shaped military justice, and today we'll explore how the US Military confronted the legacy of this massacre and whether the lessons it claimed to learn still hold up more than 50 years later. Our competition is next.

[Fred Borg]

Foreign.

[Lindsey Graham]

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[Fred Borg]

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[Lindsey Graham]

Fred Bork, welcome to American Scandal.

[Fred Borg]

Happy to be here.

[Lindsey Graham]

So you have said that My Lai nearly wrecked the U.S. army. What did you mean by that?

[Fred Borg]

Well, I think if you put it in the context of the time, the country was increasingly opposed to the war in Vietnam. And if you remember your history, the TET offensive of January 1968 was a real shock to Americans. Walter Cronkite on CBS News was telling Americans that 500 soldiers had been killed in that week alone in the Vietnam War. And Americans had been told by Lyndon Bates Johnson and the Pentagon that we were winning the war. But it looked as if we were, in fact, losing the war. So by the time the American people learn about what happened at My Lai, this horrendous war crime, there was so much anti war feeling, which it translated into anti army feeling, that morale in the army just hit rock bottom. Particularly after photographs in color of the murders at My Lai were published in. In Life magazine. This was an unbelievable shock to Americans. They'd never seen anything like this before. And in those days, as you probably know or your listeners know, Life magazine was in everybody's household. So when I say My Lai nearly wrecked the Army, I'm saying that the war crime was so shocking that it really hurt the reputation of the army among the American people.

[Lindsey Graham]

So we know that there were many failures that led to the My Lai massacre. Poor training and leadership, low morale, flawed intelligence, and, of course, racism. What would you say are the most critical of these factors?

[Fred Borg]

Well, certainly the number one factor is poor leadership, as epitomized by William Calley, who was a substandard leader, should have never been commissioned as an officer. But again, at the time, we were so short of smart young men, in this case to be leaders that Cali was commissioned. And I think that the real failure at My Lai, sure there were many, was leadership. A better leader would have made sure that this war crime had not occurred, because you cannot, you may not, you should not kill unarmed and unresisting civilians. But Callie was the one who ordered his men to open fire and to kill them.

[Lindsey Graham]

So I suppose we have to delve into what the rules of engagement are, what orders are legal to follow or not. At the time of My Lai, what were the frameworks that governed how US Soldiers were supposed to behave in combat situations? And I guess, how did the army distinguish between a war crime and a lawful order?

[Fred Borg]

Well, during the Vietnam War, the law that applied was the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and those had been in effect since after World War II. And certainly we taught soldiers that they needed to make sure they only targeted the enemy, don't harm civilians. If you have to launch an attack, try to reduce collateral damage, that is injury to unarmed civilians. But that was pretty much all there was. Today we have what we call rules of engagement, and those are the commander's rules for how force may be used. We didn't have that back during the Vietnam era. And consequently, I think one of the problems at My Lai is that soldiers really weren't sure how they should use force. Now, if we're talking about war crimes, some war crimes are pretty easy to figure out. You can't kill prisoners of war. You shouldn't be shooting at unarmed or unresisting civilians. And then if we're talking about lawful orders, well, if a lieutenant ordered a soldier to kill a prisoner of war, every soldier should know that that's an illegal order. But what about an order to shoot at a Vietnamese civilian who's taken off running as soon as she sees you in a rice paddy? Is that a lawful order? Is that person running away an enemy or a civilian? So I think these are more complicated issues, particularly in Vietnam. And let me also add that during this era, we also had what we called free fire zones. And the idea was that you would clear a particular geographic area of the enemy, or so you said. And then you told your soldiers, you may fire on anyone who's in that area because it's a free fire zone. You can assume that anyone who's there is in fact, the enemy. This was a big mistake because often you'd end up killing civilians who either didn't realize they were in a free fire zone or simply had bad luck to be there. But the bottom line is we did have the Geneva Conventions, but other than some rudimentary class, we didn't do much in the way of training or education on obeying only lawful orders.

[Lindsey Graham]

And of course, in Vietnam, as you hint, the situation was difficult. The Viet Cong, they often blended in with the civilian population. They didn't wear uniforms. You mentioned these free fire zones, but how else did the US army prepare for the reality of guerrilla warfare?

[Fred Borg]

The answer is not very well at all. And in fact, this is a very frustrating situation for any American soldier, because unlike World War II, where the enemy wore a uniform, or the Korean War, as you say, there's no way to really tell who the enemy is, at least when you're talking about the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese, a professional armed force. They wore uniforms. But if you're talking about combatants in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong are wearing black pajamas and they're farmers by day and they're guerrillas by night. So it's almost impossible for a soldier to know an American soldier, to know if this military age Vietnamese man is actually Viet Cong. And I think as a general rule, although we didn't talk about it at the time, the issue would be, is the person demonstrating some hostile intent? If you saw a farmer carrying a weapon, an ac, well, you might assume that that person is the enemy. But I've seen more than a few cases where a young Vietnamese male would simply start running away. And the conclusion by the Americans was, well, only the enemy would run away, so let's open fire. And the result was, of course, not good because you're not really sure that you're engaging the enemy. So to go back to this free fire zone, this was one of the solutions they came up with. They said, well, it's too hard to identify whether or not someone's the enemy. So let's just say we're going to have this geographic area and we're going to tell the Vietnamese, stay out of here or don't be out after a particular curfew. And then if we see somebody, we can assume that's the enemy. So that was one way to fix it, which I think in retrospect was.

[Lindsey Graham]

A big mistake in thinking about conflicts subsequent to Vietnam. They often resemble Vietnam more than they do World War II. I'm thinking of our engagements in the Middle east and Afghanistan. Has the military gotten any better at distinguishing between civilians and the enemy?

[Fred Borg]

Well, of course, you are exactly right. We have not had this sort of nation on nation conflict really since the Korean War. All right, you could certainly include the North Vietnamese. But in Afghanistan, for example, how were you able to distinguish between an Afghan civilian who's simply going about his or her business, and the Taliban or Al Qaeda? And so what the American military has done is said, okay, we're going to have rules of engagement. And one of the rules would be that you may not engage, say in this case, an Afghan, unless that Afghan shows some sort of hostile intent. And the hostile intent would be carrying a weapon, aiming that weapon at you, or otherwise indicating that he was a combatant. So the answer is, yes, we are doing better. But it's still difficult if you're in that situation where the enemy, if you want to call him that, doesn't follow the same rules that we do, which means doesn't wear a uniform or have insignia of rank or any of these sort of things. So we are doing better, but it's still very difficult. And like anything Lindsay, war is messy. People make mistakes. Accidents happen. And so even if you think someone's showing hostile intent and you engage them, well, maybe you make a mistake. It's just hard to know.

[Lindsey Graham]

So it sounds like these rules of engagement are there to assist the army and the individual soldiers to decide what is proper conduct in a conflict zone. And this is probably one of the central questions. What orders can soldiers disobey? What does military law say about that in general?

[Fred Borg]

Military law, or the law of armed conflict, says that you can only use force if it's required by military necessity, which means that you need to take the action to defeat the enemy quickly and efficiently. That's the first principle. And then the second principle we talk about, and this is what we tell soldiers, is distinction. And that is you're always allowed to move, precisely if you want to, say, against enemy elements. But you can't harm the innocent. You can't harm civilians. Now, we know that sometimes in attacking the enemy, civilians are harmed. And so the third principle that we tell soldiers is whatever you're doing, it has to be proportional. So civilians lawfully may be killed or injured, but the injury has to be proportional to the need to destroy the enemy. Now, this, of course, is a very sticky wicket, because what I may think is proportional may not be what someone else thinks is proportional. And then the last principle we always talk about is you can't use a weapon or do something that causes unnecessary suffering. So, for example, that's why we don't allow the use of poison or chemical weapons. And so those are the four things that we tell soldiers. And these rules of engagement are all built around that, with the key one being you distinguish between the enemy and civilians by looking for hostile intent. That is, assuming the enemy is not wearing a uniform.

[Lindsey Graham]

So would you run down these rules, then, in Calley's case?

[Fred Borg]

So in Callie's case, the intelligence that they got on March 16, 1968, was that they were going into the village of My Lai to clear out a very, very sophisticated Viet Cong battalion that had been there for years and years. So, at least based on the intelligence, it was militarily necessary for Cali's platoon to go into My Lai. The problem was, as probably your listeners know, is the military intelligence was just bad. There were no Viet Cong in the village. The only people who were at My Lai were unarmed and unresisting Civilians. And so Calley and his men violated the principle of distinction because there were no enemy there to engage because they were unarmed and unresisting. There were no military age males. They were just innocent civilians. And then of course, certainly wasn't proportional because you had no military reason to be in the village once you found out the enemy wasn't there. Unnecessary suffering doesn't really apply because they weren't using an illegal weapon of any way. But I would say the big problem is they violated the principle of distinction, which is you can only attack enemy elements, but you can't harm the innocent.

[Lindsey Graham]

So if one of these soldiers, and I feel for them greatly, it's a horrible situation and very stressful all around. But what if they were cognizant of these principles, realized that war crimes were happening around them, and then decided to act? What could they have done? How do you report a war crime in 1968 U.S. army?

[Fred Borg]

Well, in fact, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam published regulations that required all American soldiers to report war crimes that they saw committed by an enemy and also to report war crimes that they saw committed by Americans. Now, just because there's a regulation out there and a requirement to do this doesn't mean it's going to be easy to do. And I think that part of the problem is that it's very, very difficult for a soldier to decide to disobey an order. As a general rule, we want unquestioning and immediate obedience to orders. We cannot have soldiers questioning the officer's orders or a non commissioned officer's orders, because you can't fight a war and win a war if there's a discussion about whether or not I'm going to follow your order. The problem, of course, is that what do you do when you get a clearly illegal order? So we tell soldiers that if you get an illegal order, you must not follow it. But. But we also tell soldiers you disobey an order at your own risk, and if it turns out that you were wrong in refusing to follow this order, well, then maybe you will have to pay some sort of a price. So I think the problem here is that sometimes determining what's unlawful is difficult.

[Lindsey Graham]

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[Lindsey Graham]

1 of the people who in the moment did decide that something untoward or worse was going on was Hugh Thompson. But he was vilified for speaking out. Talk about the backlash that he and others who thought about speaking out faced.

[Fred Borg]

Well, I think Hugh Thompson is the real hero of My Lai. In fact, some credit Hugh and Hugh's actions as the helicopter pilot that day for really stopping the massacre. Although by that time as many as 500 had been killed. 350 to 500. But yes, Hugh Thompson, who was flying in a helicopter over My Lai, began to see bodies, dead bodies of civilians on the ground. And he said, whoa, what's going on here? This looks like some killing is out of control. He lands his helicopter. He actually has a discussion with Cali who says, mind your own business. Get out of here. And at one point he actually tells his gun crew in the helicopter, if you see Cali's platoon or second platoon, if they start pursuing some of these civilians, I'm telling you to open fire. I mean, this was shocking that an American pilot would tell his crew to open fire on other Americans. But you're exactly right. He reports it to his chain of command, the brigade commander, Colonel Henderson, and he also tells other people what he's seen, and nothing is done because there's a cover up. And you're right, he is vilified. He gets death threats, he suffers a lot. And this is really not that unusual. Sometimes you make a hard decision, it's the right decision, and others don't like it. There were many people who, after Callie was convicted, insisted that Callie really was a hero and that we should never have prosecuted him. So I think this is just the flip side of what Hugh Thompson faced. Yeah, I think it was a backlash. It was wrong. But sometimes this happens. If you were a whistleblower, if you want to call it like that now, at the time, there's not really. We're not talking about whistleblowing here, because this is the Army. But I think, you know, Thompson was willing to stand up for the courage of his convictions, and he did save many lives. But he did pay for it personally because of people who criticized him for what he did.

[Lindsey Graham]

If I can dig in a little there, you say it's not whistleblowing because this is the Army. Does the army not have any whistleblower protections in place?

[Fred Borg]

Well, we certainly do now, but at the time in 1968, I don't think there really was any sort of whistleblower kind of protection. I mean, certainly Thompson spoke up. I think he notified the chaplain, he notified the chain of command, but he didn't really get any sort of protection. So it's not the sophisticated sort of whistleblower protections that we have in the government today.

[Lindsey Graham]

Now, as you dig into this story a bit, something might occur to you that it's almost remarkable that we know about this story. Given the backlash of potential witnesses, given the code of silence within the army, the incentives to keep the truth hidden, should we be surprised that this incident ultimately came out at all?

[Fred Borg]

Well, I think so, because the other hero is a guy by the name of Ron Ridenauer. The murders at My Lai happened in March of 1968. And about a year later, Ron Ridenhour, who was not at My Lai and was not with Callie's unit, Ron Ridenhour began to hear people who had been there talking about this. And Ridenauer was shocked. He couldn't believe that this sort of thing had happened. Now this is all back in the U.S. now these guys are all out of Vietnam. They've all been discharged. And Reidenhour decides that he's going to write some letters. So you got to think Back to the 60s, 1969, if you wanted to let the government know about something bad, about all you could do. Well, you could send a telegram or you could write a letter, and no one's going to answer your phone call. So Reidenauer began to write letters. And he wrote at least 25 letters in which he explained that he'd heard about this massacre at My Lai, these killings at My Lai. And one of Ridenauer's letters reached General Westmoreland, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Army. And Westmoreland turned over the letter to, to the Army IG who began investigating it. So, yes, there had been a very sophisticated cover up for more than a year at the highest levels, including the entire division staff. And, yeah, I think you can say if it hadn't been for Ryan Ridenauer's letter writing, we might never have known about this. Certainly the South Vietnamese were not going to do anything about it because their view was that probably the people at My Lai were Viet Cong sympathizers anyway, and why do we want to do anything about this? So, yeah, I think if it hadn't been for Ron Ridenhour, we wouldn't know about it.

[Lindsey Graham]

After World War II, we saw increasing interest in psychology to try to discover why ordinary people can commit or allow terrible acts, probably in response to the Holocaust, in Nazi Germany. The Milgram experiment is one of the most famous. What role do you think this bystander effect or the groupthink that these experiments pointed to played in what happened at My Lai?

[Fred Borg]

There's a very famous series of articles or a book by Hannah Arendt who talks about the banality of evil and how people who ordinarily were just normal men and women ended up doing really evil things. And maybe that's a product of groupthink. I think that there are a couple of explanations here about what happened at My Lai. The first one would be, I think most of the soldiers kept quiet maybe because they were ashamed of what they did, or maybe they kept quiet because they did not want to incriminate themselves. Or maybe they kept quiet because they thought they did nothing wrong. And one of the big problems is, I think, is that, and we've done this in every single war and every single army does this. And that is you tend to dehumanize the enemy. And you look at the enemy and you talk about the enemy as not being like you. And consequently then it's easier to attack the enemy and kill the enemy. And so I think part of the problem at My Lai is that at least for some of these soldiers, okay, well, maybe some civilians were killed, but they're sort of all bad. They're not like us, they don't look like us. And so that makes the behavior easier. Has the military looked into this? Sure. And how do we prevent it? Well, again, one of the reasons, and we'll talk about this later, is we have decided that one way to prevent these war crimes is to put lawyers actually in combat operations so they can be eyes and ears and make sure that people are obeying the law. But I think to your original question about how people can commit and allow terrible acts, I think these are probably the best explanations.

[Lindsey Graham]

You mentioned the dehumanization of the Vietnamese as a factor here. And it's been pointed to over and over again by historians and investigators, including in the peers commission. How has the military perhaps reckoned with this aspect of its history and the necessity of making the enemy the enemy?

[Fred Borg]

Well, I think this is certainly a key problem. Dehumanization is always part of war. In World War II, we called the Germans the Krauts, we called the Japanese the Nips or the Japs. In Vietnam, we called the enemy the gooks. All this is racism. It's dehumanization. But you can easily see that this dehumanization also makes it easier for someone to commit a war crime because you end up not treating people, the enemy, the way really you should be treated. So I think that, yes, dehumanization is always part of the war and you are never going to see it disappear. I think at least where you're talking about someone actually has to close with the enemy in combat and take the person out. So, example, one other thing we don't talk about in the army about killing people. We talk about neutralizing the enemy. Right? I mean, you've heard some of these semantics, and that's all part of human psychology of making it easier to do what really otherwise isn't allowed. You're not allowed to kill people, but you are if you're in the army and you're doing it as part of national policy.

[Lindsey Graham]

And let's turn to the punishments or lack thereof. Following My Lai, many soldiers and officers were charged with either war crimes or part of the COVID up. But only William Calley was actually convicted you mentioned he was a terrible leader, but do you think he was also a scapegoat?

[Fred Borg]

Well, I don't think he was a scapegoat, because in the ancient religions, and I think this actually comes out of Judaism, is the scapegoat was an innocent animal that's blamed for everybody else's sins and is therefore at sacrifice. So Callie's not a scapegoat because he wasn't innocent. He's a murderer. And he was convicted of killing 25, 30, 50 people at my Lai. Now, if your question really is, yeah, but weren't other people guilty and the army failed to prosecute them? The answer is yes, we did prosecute some others. Captain Medina, the company commander, was prosecuted. Colonel Henderson, the brigade commander, was prosecuted. They were found not guilty. And they were found not guilty because the prosecutor messed up the cases. They didn't charge, in my opinion, the right things. But I think ultimately, sad to say, the army just wanted to get the whole sordid mess behind it and move on. And so I think that it was a failure. The army should have prosecuted, could have prosecuted others, but it didn't. You know, the interesting thing is that the Kelly case, which was prosecuted at Fort Benning in Georgia, even though the evidence was open and shut, the jury was actually out on the merits to decide guilt over 70 hours. 70 hours, which is incredible. But they did find him guilty. They did sentence him to life in prison. He never really served much time, but at least one case was prosecuted.

[Lindsey Graham]

So is it fair to say that in your opinion, you do not think that justice was served?

[Fred Borg]

Well, I think that there were others whose actions at My Lai should have been prosecuted at a court martial, and they weren't. So I think I'd probably conclude that other than Cali, this is not really something that we should be proud of, that justice was probably not done.

[Lindsey Graham]

Well, let's talk about the organization you served in for many years, the JAG Corps. Talk about its history, its role. What does JAG even stand for?

[Fred Borg]

Well, so from the very beginning of the American army, and you probably know this year is the 250th anniversary of the army. Our army started in June 1775. So almost from the beginning, there have been lawyers in the Army. George Washington, the commander of the Continental army, wanted a judge advocate. He wanted a lawyer to advise him mostly on courts martial in the early days of the Revolution. And so on July 29, 1775, Congress appointed the first judge Advocate general, which is the top lawyer in the Army. And we've had a legal corps pretty much since that time. For many, many years, it was really all about prosecuting and defending soldiers at courts martial. But after My Lai, and I think this is really, really important, the leaders of the JAG Corps in the army and I think also the other JAG Corps in the Navy and in the Air Force recognized that if we were going to prevent another My Lai, we had to have lawyers more engaged in military operations. So people sometimes are surprised to hear this. But no one in World War II said before launching an operation, hey, let's check with the lawyers to see if this is legal. Certainly no lawyer advised Harry Truman as to whether or not it was legal to drop the atomic bomb in August of 1945. But after my Lai, the Army JAG Corps said, hey, if we're going to prevent another war crime, we're going to have to have lawyers with commanders on military operations. So really, since the mid-70s and the 80s, anytime a commander goes to war, lawyers go with him or her. And that's really the JAG Corps reason for being now is to provide legal advice to commanders on military operations around the clock, 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

[Lindsey Graham]

I'd like you to detail a little more of the history of the evolving use of law in the army, especially perhaps after Operation Urgent Fury.

[Fred Borg]

So you've got the invasion of Grenada in October of 1983. And before that time, lawyers were involved in military operations, but they were really just looking at war plans. So the army and the other services have a war plan for everything. I mean, if anything you could think of, there's some sort of war plan out there. So is there a war plan for the invasion of, you know, pick your country? Yes, we've got it. And lawyers were looking at these war plans. But what happened in Grenada in October of 1983 was the JAG Corps sort of accidentally had a lawyer on the ground in Grenada. And all of a sudden a lot of questions came up that no one had ever thought of. For example, the Marxist government in Grenada had some Cuban officers and Cuban soldiers on the island providing military advice to the Grenadian People's Army. And as troopers from the 82nd Airborne Division out of Fort Bragg began to encounter these Cubans and took them into custody, the question was, hey, are these Cubans prisoners of war? Are we at war with Cuba? What sort of legal status do these people have? And it was not just Cubans. The Cold War was on. And so there were other Soviet style soldiers who were there as well. I think from some of the Warsaw Pact nations. So all of a sudden this was a wake up call that you can't just be looking at war plans if you're going to be relevant. You actually have to have your lawyers there, there on the ground with commanders. There were all sorts of questions that came up. There were American students on the island of Grenada attending medical school. They wanted to go home. And one of the questions was, can we put these civilian students on military aircraft and fly them home? You know, as a general rule, you can't just get on a military plane. So Grenada, I think as you raise the issue, is really the wake up call. A recognition that we've got. Not only got to be involved in planning, but you actually have to be there with the commander to be able to answer questions in a timely fashion. Got to give timely advice, relevant advice, good advice. That's really the lesson of Grenada.

[Lindsey Graham]

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[Fred Borg]

How hard is it to kill a planet? Maybe all it takes is a little drilling, some mining and a whole lot of carbon pumped into the atmosphere. When you see what's left, it starts to look like a crime scene. Are we really safe? Is our water safe? You destroyed our tap. And crimes like that, they don't just happen. We call things out.

[Lindsey Graham]

Accidents.

[Fred Borg]

There is no accident. This was 100% preventable. They're the result of choices by people. Ruthless oil tycoons corrupt politicians, even organized crime. These are the stories we need to be telling about our changing planet. Stories of scams, murders and coverups that are about us and the things we're doing to either protect the earth or destroy it. Follow Lawless Planet on the Wondry app or wherever you get your podcasts. You can listen to new episodes of Lawless Planet early and ad free right now by joining Wondry plus in the Wondry App, Apple Podcasts, or Spotify.

[Lindsey Graham]

Given the many failures that contributed to my life, there are obviously plenty of lessons to take away. But you've been an army lawyer for 25 years before becoming a full time military historian. So what for you are the most significant lessons of My Lai and have they been addressed?

[Fred Borg]

Well, I think I always tell people, and I certainly always tell my students that every army commits war crimes. It doesn't make any difference who you are, there's always going to be some soldier in an army who is going to commit a war crime. What you have to make sure is not the issue is that you have some institutional flaw or institutional failure or institutional shortcoming that's allowing these war crimes to occur. So I think the lesson for My Lai is it's a horrific war crime. Maybe we can't commit or prevent war crimes, but we have to prevent something from My Lai ever happening again, where you have have between 350 and 500 innocent, unarmed, unresisting civilians killed. So the first lesson has to be you've got to train and educate your soldiers on their obligations and responsibilities under the law of war. And you can't just do it at basic training. You've got to do it every year, every time you deploy on a military operation, you've got to get your lawyers in there to train and educate soldiers on their obligations and responsibilities. And then you have to have lawyers involved 24 hours a day, seven days a week to advise on the treatment of detainees, the lawfulness of targeting, whether or not it's appropriate, use of force. Are these the right rules of engagement? So I think those are the lessons and we've been successful. We have never had another situation like My Lai happen again. So I think that the military has done a good job and in fact, sometimes people find this hard to believe. But commanders actually, in my opinion, appreciate having lawyers there to help them because lawyers are rarely going to say, you can't do this. A lawyer is going to try to find a solution that will be lawful where you're complying with the law of armed conflict.

[Lindsey Graham]

Now, while we may not have ever had a my life since. There have been other famous instances of war crimes committed by American soldiers. And one notable case, that of Clint lorance. He and two others were pardoned by President Trump in 2019. What do you make of these cases?

[Fred Borg]

Well, whenever I'm asked about the Lorenz case or Matt Goldstein or Eddie Gallagher, the bott for me is that they were prosecuted. And in fact, in the Loranz case, the men who served under Loranz had no hesitation in testifying against him at trial, and he was convicted. Matt Goldstein admitted when he had an interview at the Central Intelligence Agency that he had assassinated, and that's actually Goldstein's word assassination, that he had killed suspected Taliban bomb maker. And of course, Eddie Gallagher was also prosecuted and convicted. I also tell people the President of the United States, President Trump, as the commander in chief, has the absolute authority as our commander to pardon these men. And President Trump did it because he thought it was the right thing to do. I don't think that's particularly important to me. What's important to me is that the cases were prosecuted and Matt Goldstein's never went to trial, but Gallagher and Loranz did. And I think you prosecute these cases, Lindsey, to deter others from committing these sort of war crimes.

[Lindsey Graham]

Continuing to look forward to the future of military conflict, we can look to Ukraine and see that armed conflict is evolving. And I wonder if there's a danger in further dehumanization if we move inevitably towards the use of drones and other technology. Do you think this conflict at a distance would necessitate new or updated rules of engagement?

[Fred Borg]

Well, I think that what is happening in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia has really turned warfare upside down. I'm not sure that the American public understands that the unbelievable use of unmanned aerial vehicles, of drones, is really something absolutely incredible, because if you swarm in with 500 drones, how are you going to shoot them all down? We're not really ready here in America to face this sort of technology. So I think that, yes, more and more, I think you're going to begin to hear commentators say that the Ukraine, Russia war really is the war of the future, particularly because you can build these drones for about $5 apiece, and they're able to really take the war to the enemy in a way it couldn't be done before. Now, as far as your question about dehumanization, I think that this is maybe one of the problems with technology. If we're talking about 500 years ago, where in order to kill the enemy, I actually had to get up to the enemy and actually kill that person face to face. Well, that's a big change from the way things are done today, where a lot of the technology allows us to neutralize or defeat the enemy without ever seeing him or her. And I think drones, if anything, probably are going to make this even more pronounced. And that is the technology takes you away from the face to face horrors of war. And without that face to face horror of war, I think it gets easier to kill. So, yes, I think that this may, in fact make it easier. Maybe it will promote dehumanization. It's hard to say. But I do think that I'm a big believer as a professional historian that it's the law of unintended consequences that you always have to be looking out for. And I think what's happening in Ukraine and Russia now is really so we don't really have all the facts yet, and I don't want to drone on here, but the estimates are that a million Russians have been killed and injured and probably 400,000 Ukrainians killed or injured in this war. These numbers are absolutely incredible when you consider, Lindsay, that we had 58,000Americans killed in Vietnam, and we consider Vietnam to be a pretty bad event. So I think that the drone technology is probably going to mean that we'll see even more horrific cases like this.

[Lindsey Graham]

Well, Fred Bork, thank you so much for talking to me today on American Scandal.

[Fred Borg]

You are very welcome, Lindsey. I hope it was helpful.

[Lindsey Graham]

That was my conversation with historian and lawyer Fred Bork. He served on active duty as an army lawyer for 25 years before retiring as a colonel. He then became the regimental historian for the Judge Advocate General Corps and served as a professor of its legal center and school in Charlottesville, Virginia. From wondering, this is episode five of the massacre at Neali for American Scandal. In our next series, during the early years of the 20th century, the United States came face to face with an ancient threat, the Black Death. When the bubonic plague hit San Francisco in 1900, the lives of millions were at risk. A brilliant young bacteriologist from the east coast was tasked with stopping the disease. But he would soon discover that he was not just battling the plague, but an alliance of politicians and businessmen more concerned with their profits than the health of the nation. If you're enjoying American scandal, you can unlock exclusive seasons on Wondery Binge new season first and listen completely ad free when you join Wondery in the Wondery app, Apple podcasts or Spotify. And before you go, tell us about yourself by filling out a [e-mail] survey American Scandal is hosted, edited and executive produced by me, Lindsey Graham for Airship audio editing and sound design by Molly Bond music by Thrump. This episode was produced by John Lee, managing producer Emily Burke development by Stephanie Hns senior producer Andy Beckerman. Executive producers are William Simpson for Airship and Jenny Lauer Beckman Marshall Louie Aaron o' Flaherty for Wondering.