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Ask Haviv Anything
Episode 24: With Iran down, Turkey steps into the breach - a conversation with Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak.
01:04:17
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- [00:05]
Aviv Gur
Hi, everybody. Welcome to Ask Aviv. Anything. The Israel Iran war is over about 24 hours and we've already heard from another leader in the region that he has learned lessons from the war. This is someone who leads a country that was the very first Muslim country to recognize Israel and had a long standing military and economic alliance and close ties and. And now does not. There's no economic trade between these two countries. And there is talk about the need for this country to build out a massive missile arsenal because the lesson from Iran is that ballistic missiles can penetrate the Israeli missile shield. Apparently there are already clouds gathering. People are talking about an arc of 10, 20 years. This country is dominant right now in Syria. It is the next big question, do I want a war? Do I think there is a war? God, no. But nevertheless, this is now one of the great questions that we're going to be asking. And I am joined today by my wife and producer and just generally the person who makes everything in my life possible. So be careful where you. But that was too much joking. I lost it. Okay. I'm joined today by my wife, Rachel Gur, who is going to be helping me ask these questions and by our expert, Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak. And I hope I got that right because my Turkish pronunciation is not as good as it used to be, I guess would be the joke. He's from the Moshed Dayan center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and a well known, often interviewed, expert on Turkey and Turkish matters in Israeli media and in Israeli public discourse. Before we get into it, I want to tell you that this episode is sponsored by an anonymous sponsor. Thank you very much for your sponsorship. Who follows in the great tradition of asking that we dedicate this episode to someone who fell on October 7th. Some dedications have been to members of the family who fought in World War II. It's been a beautiful thing just to watch. The sponsorships have almost been as felt as serious and profound and interesting of a kind of community building act as, as the actual episode. So really, thank you to our audience, to our Patreon members. You can join us on Patreon. It's $5 a month. You get episodes earlier. You get to take part in some conversations that we're part of. You also get to be part of a monthly live stream. Hope to see you there. This episode is dedicated to Aviva Tzili, 49, from Kibbutz Nir Oz. He was murdered by Hamas terrorists in the kibbutz on October 7th. And the reason we chose him to remember today is that his body was returned to Israel by an operation of the IDF in Shobak in Gaza two days before the Israel Iran war and kind of got lost and swallowed up in the events that followed. He was killed while fighting the terrorists alongside the Kibbutz's emergency response team. His body was then abducted to Gaza. His wife Liat was kidnapped and released in the November 2023 truce. In addition to Liat, he's survived by their three children, Ofri, 22, Neta, 20, and Aya, 19, as well as his parents, Telma and Yossi, and his brothers Oneen and Iftach. We remember him. We remember everyone who fell on October 7th. And we remember that we still have hostages currently held by Hamas in Gaza. Thank you for being here, Dr. Yanaloczak. And let's get into it.
- [03:38]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
It is my pleasure. Thank you very much for having me on this distinguished platform. Well, we are now in historical times, in the aftermath of this operation Rising lion, which changed the balance of power in the Middle east in a significant manner. Before the war, when we looked at the Middle east at large, we can say that there were several influential players who were there. Of course we have this so called resistance axis. Iran, Hezbollah, of course Hamas, Houthis, and of course the Iraqi Hashdishaabi. And of course we had and still have of course Turkey and Qatar, the Islamic Brotherhood axis. We can also tag the Gulf countries like United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, like we can say Abraham Accords axis. And of course we had Israel. And this war, of course, thanks to the very sophisticated success of the Israeli Defense Forces, air forces, the Mossad, this changed the whole balance of power. I would like to remind our audience that the Israeli Defense Forces first of all put an end to, to Hezbollah. We managed to assassinate Hassan Nasrallah and this created a kind of a domino effect. We later saw the fall of Bashar Al Assad and the Iranians lost their stronghold. And to that stronghold, another important country in the Middle East, Turkey. Basically they managed to fill the vacuum. And now thanks to the Israeli success, this unprecedented success, within 12 days. Now, when we are looking at the Middle Eastern map, we are seeing two important major military powers. These are Turkey of Mr. Erdogan and Israel of Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israeli Turkish relationship is a very complicated one.
- [05:58]
Rachel Gur
Yeah, you know, let me take you back one second, Doctor, because maybe focus a little bit. The question, because we've spoken so much about Iran and really all of the events over the last two weeks and one of the Things that stood out to me, and I think to many of our listeners, was that most of the Sunni states kind of gave some sort of perfunctory a condemnation of the Israeli strike. Whether we're talking about Saudi Arabia or the uae, some of them were very, very visibly silent, like Syria. But then there was one power, one rising power, as you said, Turkey, that was very, very vocal in its opposition, talking about genocide and the point of no return. Obviously this is, you know, the leader, Erdogan, the leader of Turkey. But it seems to have gone beyond rhetoric. I mean, just a few days ago, perhaps last week, he made the announcement that as Khaviv said, he's going to start stockpiling those ballistic missiles that we saw create such devastation just yesterday morning, Beersheva, but also in Tel Aviv and in Haifa. It seems to go beyond rhetoric to action. And should we be worried?
- [07:10]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
I assume that yes, we should be worried. At the end, we saw a huge turn in the Turkish foreign policy after the war, after the eruption of the war in the Gaza Strip. You know, it's very interesting, but approximately a month before the eruption of the war in Gaza, we witnessed a very important summit between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Erdogan at the outskirts of the United Nations. However, the war in the Gaza Strip, the declaration of a total war, a full scale war that seeks to topple and eradicate the Hamas terrorist organization, was not digested in Ankara. And we basically, with this kind of a decision, we pushed them to make a U turn. However, we really did not think that this U turn, you know, we may, we could foresee that this normalization could collapse, but we could not foresee that the traditional Turkish foreign policy of like being a pro Palestinian would be upgraded for being a pro Hamas. This is something unprecedented. And last October, the Turkish Parliament, the Turkish Parliament made a very important, took a very important decision. And in a closed session, they tagged the state of Israel as a national security threat. And they made it officially, they declared it officially on January that Israel is Turkey's number one adversary. So if we are not going to forget this very important fact and then let us now look how the Turks are evaluating of what is going on in Iran.
- [09:03]
Rachel Gur
Turkey, do they generally feel threatened? I mean, Greece was always the number one threat to Turkey, right?
- [09:11]
Aviv Gur
We want no war with them, no nothing with them. We want to just be left alone by them. This is internal regime ideology kind of stuff. This is the AKP party of Erdogan, right? Or do they have a reason other than the fact that they are some kind of an affiliate and ideological outgrowth of the mother. Can you explain that to us? This is very surprising to Israelis because first, generally both sides agree that they're each other's adversary.
- [09:36]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Okay? So first of all, I totally agree with you that we have nothing to do with Turkey. We, we are not seeking to get parts of the Turkish territory. First of all, let us put this very known fact for us on the table because we may also have some Turkish audience. Okay? So we would like to tell them from Israel that we have no hostile intentions against the Turkish people and the Turkish territorial integrity. This is the fact on the ground. However, when we are looking at the statements of the Turkish government and especially President Erdogan, we are seeing a very different rhetoric. They are pumping a propaganda to their people that Israel began this war not only to occupy Gaza. I'm quoting, by the way, it's not my words. I'm quoting their propaganda. Okay? Israel now is acting inside Gaza and then in Lebanon and then in Syria and then later, according to their, you know, fascinating vision, Israel might also penetrate into the territorial integrity of Turkey and may try to grab some land from Turkey. Of course, from our perspective, this is really ridiculous, but they are trying to make sense of this accusation by saying that southeast Turkey was defined within the boundaries of the so called promised land. And since they tag our Israeli government as a messianic radicals, Jewish extremist government, so they truly believe.
- [11:25]
Rachel Gur
When you say the, the promised land, we're obviously not talking about the partition plan of the UN we're talking about the biblical vision of the. From the Bible.
- [11:34]
Aviv Gur
Right?
- [11:34]
Rachel Gur
I mean that's, that's the, we're reckoning all the way back to those days.
- [11:38]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Yes, we are talking about the Bible and in their opinion, our government's, you know, hidden agenda is to realize, establish the so called Greater Israel. Okay? So of course from our perspective, we know that it's not the reality. What we are trying to get in the Gaza Strip is to eradicate Hamas's ability of launching rockets against our civilians. And we would like to put an end to this extraterritorial, we can say, threat that they may infiltrate into the Israeli territory and kidnap our citizens and rape them and murder them, etc. Every sovereign state has a right to defend itself and this is what Israel is doing right now. However, when we are looking at the Turkish media, this is not portrayed as such. In the Turkish media. The Gaza Strip is portrayed as the first phase of a grand plan. Okay? And in their opinion, the resistance, the so called resistance of Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria would be defending Turkey from a future imaginary Israeli attack. Let's say that you are a shoemaker, you're a tailor and you have a shop, you have a tv, but you're not looking to the tv. You are doing your work, but passively you are hearing the news all the day long. And in the Turkish TV they are only saying these kind of negative conspiracy theory based information about the state of Israel. And naturally I will not blame those ordinary Turkish citizens who harbor some negative sentiments and tendencies against the state of Israel, because they only exposed to this poisonous propaganda. So this is.
- [13:38]
Rachel Gur
Here's my question. The Turks hated us long before the Gaza war. I mean, I remember Erdogan came to power in his party and I'd love if you explain to our audience a little bit who he is and what his party is. But I remember 20 years ago, dating myself when I finished the army, I flew with some of my friends from the army to Istanbul. And we spent the day three girls wandering around Istanbul. We only had to cover our hair as we walked into mosques. We spoke in Hebrew, we spoke in English. We felt absolutely no fear. And not only that, we rented a car, it was dead winter. And we drove to Cappadocia, which is a, if anybody has had the opportunity to see it, really one of the wonders of the world in Central Anatolia, an early Christian site. And we never at any point felt any sense of fear. I mean, yes, we were young and probably stupid, but everybody was welcoming, you know, even though we were very clearly both secular Israeli and presumably Jewish. And today something like that is unimaginable. You know, three girls just out of the army, trekking across Turkey, you know, knocking on doors and eating in people's houses. It's just, it' a world that's gone. And that happened long before the current conflict with Aza. So what happened? How did that relationship sour so deeply so quickly since the rise of Erdogan to the present? What happened before Aza?
- [15:02]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
I think it was something gradual. I think it did not happen all of a sudden. But we cannot detach it from the Gaza, from the incidents in Gaza, since we are all living in Israel. I assume that you are very familiar, but maybe our audience is not. Unfortunately, due to Hamas's constant rocket fire against Israeli citizens, and from time to time, due to their attacks against the Israeli soldiers and kidnapping some of them, Israel had no choice but to launch some anti terror operations in the Gaza Strip. And we had several, unfortunately rounds of fighting. And in each fighting we witnessed Starting with the operation Cast Lead and the others, you know, we had many. Unfortunately, I lost the track. All of these operations began to have a huge impact on the Turkish public, because approximately, please correct me if I'm wrong, but once in two or once in four years, we had an escalation in the Gaza Strip. And in each escalation, the Turkish administration, in a gradual manner, they. They deteriorated the relationship with Israel in an intentional manner.
- [16:28]
Rachel Gur
Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip in 2005, and I believe it's by 2006.
- [16:34]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
2007, 2006, December, we had the operation.
- [16:38]
Rachel Gur
We're already in the first incursion due.
- [16:40]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
To a Hamas tunnel and the infamous confrontation in the Davos summit between the deceased Israeli President Shimon Peres and with the Turkish President, then Prime Minister Erdogan. Right. So since then, we began to see an intentional deterioration in the relationship. And in Turkey, they put this. They portrayed this in a manner like a football culture, like a soccer culture. Okay? Or you are with us, or you are supporting the other team. You could not criticize your own government. And if you did so, you would be tagged as a traitor. So who would be tagged as a traitor? Nobody wants such a thing. So this anti Israel criticizing Israel has turned into a kind of a public consensus between the pro government circles and anti government circles. And it basically began to function as a mechanism that it could also drop. It could also lower the tension between the two sides that they began to use these pro Palestinian rallies or any kind of parliamentary acts, for instance, you know, condemning Israel, etc. These incidents were used to rally their people around the flag, okay? To put an end to the fragmentation in the Turkish politics. So therefore we can say that Israel became a useful tool also for the opposition and also for the government circles. And another important issue here is whenever there was a verbal confrontation between Israel and. Between Israel and Erdogan, if you're going to observe the Turkish media and the public service, you will see that Erdogan's approval rates began to rise and therefore the opposition circles began to ask themselves a question. I think it's a legitimate question. If we are having a race here, a democratic race, and if you are trying to get rid of your political rivals. So you're asking yourself how his public approval rises. So you see that whenever we see. We witnessed Israel bashing, so his popularity is rising. So how are you going to neutralize this? You begin to imitate him.
- [19:30]
Aviv Gur
Can I ask.
- [19:31]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
This is cheaper.
- [19:32]
Aviv Gur
There's something really striking about this. This is the most worrying thing I've read about Turkey yet. I mean, when he arrests an opposition leader, that's fairly worrying. And when he talks about the need to remove Israel, ultimately Israel has to be removed, that's fairly worrying. But I think the most worrying thing I've heard is Professor Ruth Weiss. In her studies of antisemitism. She talks about how at the founding of Israel, the Arab world had a choice. And it could have chosen, for example, to build post colonial, post imperial states that are successful and democratic and have free markets and have success stories. Or it could choose in order to shorten up the dictatorships that had taken hold after the military, usually dictatorships or religious dictatorships that had taken hold after the withdrawal of the French and the British empires, it could have chosen to organize all of its politics around the question of Israel. Israel as a symbol of Islamic weakness, Israel as a symbol of Arab weakness, that has to be overcome so that the Arabs can come back to their own. The organizing of Arab politics around Israel was a foundational experience in the Arab world in the 1950s and 60s and a catastrophic one because it validated the dictatorships, it prevented a serious, healthy politics, a self critical politics, a politics of factions that compete in a democratic land. And it just turned everything into this kind of obsessive, as you say, soccer game. If that's what's happening in Turkey, then something bad is happening in Turkey. If the organizing of politics around Israel. Because one of the striking things about what you're saying that there's this argument that Israel ultimately wants Turkey, you know, Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime and many of the militias that Israel targeted in Syria and Iran itself, they're not seven enemies, they're one enemy. They're one deeply integrated enemy. Hamas is a tiny bit of an outlier, but profoundly integrated on the question of Israel. Took weapons, took money, took planning, took training from Iran. So Israel has now had a 20 month war against a single enemy which as its strategy had built out multiple proxies. Hezbollah took weapons, it took money and it took orders from Iran. So if Turkey is now coming forward and saying to its own people, to ordinary people who don't know any better, because why would they know the details of Iranian foreign policy? And it' saying to them, look at the Israelis, they invade this country and this country and this country and this, as if they're just on a rampage of invading everything. They can invade and they're about to cross Syria, cross Lebanon, enter into Turkey, a country with a competent army, unlike Syria, unlike Iran, a Country with an army that could potentially defeat us in the battlefield, in multiple kinds of battlefields, whether it's tank battles, whether it's the Navy, for sure, it has massive and total naval supremacy. It's organizing politics around fantasies about the threat of Israel and about the need to overcome Israel for Islamic dignity. So is Turkey 1950s Arab world, is it in decline? When antisemitism infects a society, it's never about the Jews. It's about the internal collapse of that own society. It's about the internal weaknesses of that society. What does it mean? What are we looking at?
- [22:57]
Rachel Gur
A small follow up. You actually lived in Turkey, right? You were born there, you grew up there, right? And moved to Israel when you were 22. Did you ever yourself experience, you know, as a child or as a young man, you know, the sort of anti Semitism that now seems to be, by your own description, very prevalent?
- [23:15]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Okay, so let me start from your question and then I'll pass to Habib if it's fine. First of all, I would like to emphasize that personally I really did not, did not witness any direct anti Semitism towards me. I only have good memories and I'm grateful for the Ottoman Empire of welcoming my forefathers from Spain who were expelled from Spain because of the Inquisition in 1492. And thanks to their bold decision, my forefathers were accepted in the Ottoman Empire. And while our Jewish relatives were killed in Christian Europe, we were protected in the Turkish Ottoman Empire. And you know, maybe the first Republican years may not be tagged as the golden age for the Jewish community, especially during the Second World War, we had many unpleasant memories like the wealth tax, etc. But at large, when we are comparing the Turkish Jewish community to other communities in Europe, I think we should be grateful and we should say this out loud because we are not like those people that we received a good treatment and now we are trying to make a defamation. No, we were treated very well. Okay. My case of moving to Israel is something very different. I wanted to be in Israel. I consider myself as a Zionist and therefore I wanted to start my life here, raise my children as Jewish Israelis. Of course, personally, again, I'm saying that I love Turkey. I love the Turkish language, the Turkish culture. So this is my story. And regarding Khaviv's question, I think this is a great question and I think that anti Zionism and pretty much anti Semitism plays a very crucial role here. But I would like to provide you a different angle. You know, maybe we should not look at the world only from this narrow angle of being Israeli or being Jewish. But when we are looking at the Turkish foreign policy at large, we can say that this is a neo Ottomanist foreign policy. So let's analyze this concept. We had this huge empire, Ottoman Empire, which ruled from 1299 until 1922. Okay. This is a huge venture. Okay? Very important player in history. And this empire ruled in the Balkans, in Southeast Europe, in Northern Africa, in the Middle east, some parts of Caucasia, of course, in Asia Minor. It controlled huge areas. And this neo Ottomanism of today is seeking to revive the Turkish influence in all these ex territories of the Ottoman Empire. So where am I heading to when we are looking at this empire, especially its successor state, Turkey? We had three important minority groups that were taken from the Ottoman Empire. These are the Jews, Greeks and Armenians. These three groups are known as the most important minority groups of the Ottoman Empire and its successor state, the Turkish Republic. When we are looking at the nation states of these three minority groups, which means Greece, Armenia and the state of Israel, look at their relationship with today's Turkey, you will see it is like a very fluctuating situation as well. Let's start from Armenia. We all know that in 2020 there was a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Turkey sided with Azerbaijan. Of course, Israel also sided with Azerbaijan. I just don't want to get lost.
- [27:48]
Rachel Gur
We have an ally in common there.
- [27:49]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Yes, I just don't want to get lost in other conflicts right now.
- [27:54]
Aviv Gur
But again, the Israeli siding with Azerbaijan has to do with Iran. That's nothing to do with Armenia or Turkey.
- [28:01]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
I would like to. I would like to make an emphasis on Erdogan. He put an emphasis on Turkish nationalism, pan Turkishness, because of his brotherhood with Azerbaijanis. And of course this is also applicable, of course, inevitably, as a religious blended relationship as well.
- [28:21]
Rachel Gur
Azeris are seen as something similar to ethnic Turks or because they're, they're.
- [28:27]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
In terms of ethnicity, they are Turkish.
- [28:30]
Rachel Gur
Right? They're Turkish, but they're not Sunni.
- [28:32]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
They are not Sunni. They are not Sunni. Okay, but still we have a Christian enemy. And of course Azerbaijanis are Shiites and Turks are Sunnis. But here the emphasis is not the religion, but rather we can say that it was the ethnicity and the Turkish brotherhood or sisterhood. Right? Azerbaijan and Turkey against Armenia. And whenever there is a friction with Armenia, his public approval rates are jumping, increasing dramatically. Why? Because the Turkish people, they do remember the Armenians as an underdog that they controlled once and now they are defeating them. So it's a great.
- [29:14]
Rachel Gur
The world is coming back into place.
- [29:16]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Yes.
- [29:16]
Rachel Gur
This is the way things are supposed to be.
- [29:18]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Yes.
- [29:19]
Rachel Gur
Right. And they are returning to. Yeah, you know, the empire to its former glory.
- [29:23]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Empire strikes back. Right. So the same is applicable for the Greeks whenever there is a friction between Greece and Turkey. So it is only playing to the hands of Erdogan. Why? Because the Greeks are like painkillers for the Turks. Okay. Really? And the last but not the least, of course, the Jews. Our nation state is the state of Israel. And whenever there is a friction with the state of Israel, again, Erdogan's public approval rates are jumping. So in my opinion, we cannot tag this only as an anti Semitic, anti Zionist, but as an anti minority of the ex Ottoman subjects. Okay. Of course it has anti Semitic and anti Zionist elements in it. Of course, I'm not ignoring it, obviously I'm not a naive person. But it is not only directed against us, it is something broader that it is directed towards the non Muslim ex minorities of the Ottoman Empire. And from their perspective, all of, I mean, some segments of Armenia and of course, obviously Greece, Israel, these territories were once upon a time part of the Ottoman Empire. So, you know, the very existence inside Syria, inside Iraq, in northern Cyprus or western Libya. Right. In all these territories, we have Turkish existence today, of course, Turkish occupation. Right. So they are justifying their existence on how? I mean, on what? On this Ottoman heritage. They are saying that we are not aliens to this land. Our forefathers ruled on these territories for 402 years.
- [31:31]
Aviv Gur
Let me jump in here. We have. So it's about them. They have their own story. It's got nothing to do with us. And when they build out these fantasies of us, they're responding to a century ago, an Ottoman imperial experience. They're responding. I can't help noticing that all of the massive and important imperial minorities that now have their own nation states and which Turkey is now, at some level or another, struggling with, chafing against, there's friction with them. They're all non Muslim minorities. In other words, the non Muslim minorities are the problem in this new Turkish sort of vision of the world or old vision of the world. So let me ask the brass tax. Turkey has total naval supremacy in any war with Israel. Turkey has a significant, dramatic, powerful navy. It has a land army that is what, twice the size of Israel's land army. Turkey has enough democracy to be competent. It is not one of these armies. Like this is something that we learned a lot about in the Ukraine war when Putin invaded and it turned out that his army on Paper was very large. But his army, army in reality, because so much of the spare parts and the fuel and all this other stuff never actually got bought because so much of the money of the budgets was pocketed and corruption along the way that actually it was a much smaller army that could barely struggle to keep up with Ukraine's army. There's an advantage to a democratic army that has these internal checks and balances within it that keeps the army actually functional. Turkey is democratic enough to have a functional army in that sense. It has a competent state. It has a serious air force. It has. It can actually challenge us. Now, we've seen run ins between Israeli and Turkish planes over Syria. Turkey wants to dominate Syria and is eager to do it. And its own militia has basically taken over Syria in the form of Mr. Giuliani, the new president. What are the chances that this reaches any kind of military conflict? What are the chances of any kind of military confrontation between Israel and Turkey in the next five, 10 years? What are the chances that that's the situation of the Middle east, the divide of the Middle east in 30 years. Do we need to start building a grand alliance with the Greeks and the Armenians against Turkish expansionism and neo Ottomanism? What are we actually looking at in terms of strategy, in terms of an enemy?
- [33:45]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Well, this is the question of the questions. I wish I had a crystal ball and I could answer your question, but I can refer to you in this.
- [33:56]
Aviv Gur
Doctor. I'm sorry. As a journalist, I have to say, you don't actually have to know. You just have to say it with confidence. That's how this works. Okay, I'll shut up.
- [34:06]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
So let me answer you this way. Before the fall of Assad, these two countries, they only shared a naval border. We can say if we can consider the Mediterranean Sea as a common border between Israel and Turkey. However, after the fall of Assad, now we are seeing a complete, almost complete Turkish domination in Syria. Northern Syrian territories of Afrin, Tel Elabyad, Jarablus, Ras Al Ain are still under Turkish occupation and they have no intention of evacuating these territories. This is, of course, strengthening the land.
- [34:45]
Aviv Gur
We should expect those to be permanent. Sorry for interrupting. Just to clarify, because you're saying a lot of things that maybe not all of our listeners and viewers understand. Turkey now has massive forces inside Syria as part of an offensive against Kurds, which it claims are helping Kurdish groups that it designates terror groups and Kurdish independence. Whatever. Now there's a whole Turkish offensive in Syria. It's not making the Western press because, well, I have my theories on why, but that's not relevant to right now. But do you think that's a permanent presence in Syria? We should expect that for years to come.
- [35:17]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Well, on paper, it was also launched against the isis. We should also mention it, at least. Their first operation in Jerablus Canton was directed against isis. But. But then in all other areas, as you mentioned, they targeted the pydypg, organization of the Kurds. In Turkish eyes, it is an offshoot of the pkk, another organization that, in eyes of Ankara, it is considered as a terrorist organization. Of course. So let me put it this way. The Turks, they did penetrate into northern Syria in 2016 and still did not withdraw from there. The Turks penetrated in northern Iraq in 2019, and since then they still occupy the Turks. It's such a different story, but again, we should underline the historical facts. They intervened in Cyprus in 1974, and half of the island is still occupied by Turkey. They are present in Libya since 2019. 2020, more or less. What am I seeing here? Whenever a Turkish army. Whenever the Turkish army is.
- [36:36]
Rachel Gur
And also Somalia and Sudan. Correct. They're also Somalia.
- [36:41]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
They have a military base.
- [36:43]
Rachel Gur
They have a full base.
- [36:44]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Right.
- [36:44]
Rachel Gur
A full permanent presence.
- [36:45]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Inaugurating a military base is something different because it's a voluntary invitation from the hosting country. For instance, we also see such a. Such a base also in Qatar, for instance. Qatar, yes. Okay. So, long story short, when we are looking at this picture, we see that the Turks are entering to a certain territory, but their car has no reverse gear. Okay. They are not withdrawing. Okay. So from an Israeli perspective, if Erdogan did not adopt this pro Hamas attitude, and if he even remained with the pro Palestinian traditional Turkish foreign policy, I can really tell you that Jerusalem could digest it. But since Erdogan is taking the State of Israel as the number one security threat against Turkey's territorial integrity, which is, in my opinion, unthinkable. Right. So of course Israel cannot say that. Oh, okay. We are in La La land and nothing will happen, obviously, after October 7th. We have not. We. We cannot have such a luxury of ignoring a future threat. This is a chess game, and we should foresee the moves our. Our opponents, our players. And unfortunately, Turkey has turned itself into an opponent of the State of Israel, as it was also emphasized in the Nagel Report. This Nagel Report, for those who are not familiar, it was a kind of a recommendation for the Israeli government. It's not a binding document, but it's.
- [38:33]
Aviv Gur
Yaakov Nagid is the national Security advisor. Yes, was the National Security advisor.
- [38:37]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
So it suggested for the Israeli government to take necessary precautions for this growing new threat that may replace Iran in the future. So the Israeli red line is such. When we are looking at Syria, we do not want to see that our air superiority would be challenged by a power like Turkey, because this is very ironic, but Turkey, and I'm very pleased with that, they did not declare any hostilities against Israel, but they are challenging Israel. So it is putting Turkey into a gray zone. Okay. And taking decisions in the gray zone is much more complicated because if you have an enemy, then everything is white and black. So you take the bold decision of, you know, having these targets, let's say, eliminated or not. Okay. But in case of Turkey, since Turkey is not categorized as the enemy of the state of Israel, of course, obviously, in a logical manner, our decision makers are not pushing the button to eliminate those potential threats because Turkey is still regarded as a member of NATO, a close ally of Donald Trump, etc. Etc.
- [40:06]
Aviv Gur
I have to say, I can't get over, for months now, I can't get over how utterly ridiculous it is. I'm watching it happen in real time. Something that I'd only ever read about in the 1950s. Iran has this anti Israeli vision that it was willing to sacrifice everything on half a trillion dollars on, over the course of 46 years, the future happiness of their own people. This is about the redemption of Islam. They think of themselves as this great Islamic revolution to rest, and they're willing to sacrifice it all on this fantasy about Israel. And Turkey is just slowly creeping into that. So I have to assume, and I'm assuming, and maybe this is some kind of a paradigm that will get us stuck in a bad place, but I have to assume that it's fake. And my instinct says to me it's fake. It's a political vocabulary that's useful for the political situation of Erdogan. And he doesn't mean to act on it. And that has happened. There have been times where they say evil, bad things and the Jews are this terrible thing, but they don't mean to act on it. It's literally just posturing and standing in front of certain audiences. It's good to have an enemy, and there's no enemy better than an enemy that is neither Muslim nor Christian, has no backing of a billion adherents behind it, and is annoyingly difficult to put down and to put in its place. And so Israel is this very convenient fall guy. Is that all it is? And we just, we let Turkey do its Thing A that Turkey dominates is a safe place for Israel because Turkey does not, over the long term, want any kind of conflict. And therefore, even though this feels like a bad thing, it's a good thing. Or is this just misunderstanding Hamas again? And to answer that question, I want to bring you back to the AKP party. Erdogan comes from somewhere. Erdogan comes from a party deeply affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, deeply affiliated with the same Islamic ideas born in Egypt in the 19th century and founded as an organization in the 1920s in Egypt, responding to Western imperialism, responding to the sense of Islamic weakness, talking about a return to a pious old first generations of Islam in order to redeem Islam and come back into God's grace and find geopolitical solutions through Islamic politics and the Qatari regime. Erdogan himself, his party, they're part of that now. Hamas is part of that. Hamas began as a Muslim Brotherhood chapter in Gaza, founded there in 1987. The ideological question seems to me fundamental because we're trying to understand if he really means this stupid, ridiculous, childish fantasy that's very clearly just a political manipulation of his own people about us, or if actually this is a larger religious vision that we have to be worried about. Tell us about the AKP party, about its ideology. Am I overstating the case? Are they slightly affiliated with the Muslim Brothers, but they're not even remotely Hamas. What should we know about them? And what does that mean for how we watch Turkish expansionism now?
- [43:15]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Okay, so the core nucleus of the justice and Development Party are the ones who came from the Turkish Islamist party called the Welfare Party. And of course we had Felicity Party and other parties, but the most dominant one, which was known all to Turkish public, etc. It was the Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan and Nejmetin Erbakan, the former Turkish Prime Minister, was known as the flag barrier of the Turkish Islam. And he was very much affected to from the ideas of this Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Actually, the Muslim Brotherhood ideology began to penetrate into Turkey during 1960s, 1970s. There was a very important print house in Turkey's province called Malatya. This print house and its name was the Crescent. They began to translate all of the works of the senior Muslim Brotherhood figures like Hassan Al Banna, like said qutb, etc. Etc. So their ideas began to penetrate into the Turkish Islamist circles. And obviously this had a huge impact. We can also say that many different intellectuals like Nejib, Fazl Kasakurek, who had a very important impact on Erdogan and his close circle, these people were deeply influenced from this pan Islamist ideas. But this is not only pan Islamism. I would like to remind you that the Turks are not Arabs. They had their glorious imperial past. So they injected this Muslim Brotherhood pan Islamist ideology into their Ottoman glory. And we had this neo Ottomanism. And they began to tag themselves as the, you know, elder brother, as the big brother of the other Muslim nations. Okay? So historically speaking, they feel that they have a historical role here. And in their opinion, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was the calamity, was the disaster for the old Muslim Ummah. Okay? And therefore they would like to, ideologically speaking, they want to restore this glory. And I would like to give you a very concrete example. Only from three days ago in Istanbul, there was the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation. And there Erdogan began to deliver a speech like, of course, not in a spiritual manner, but like a political leader, like the Caliph of the whole Islamic world. And he said the destiny of Istanbul and the destiny of Tehran, Gaza, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Mecca, Medina, Tripoli, etc. Etc. Cannot be separated from each other. And he said that the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation should turn into a very effective body that can deter Muslim countries enemies. He is proposing to have here an Islamic army, an Islamic alliance like NATO, but an Islamic one. And he is opening the gates also to the Shiites because he also mentioned in his metaphor Sana and also Tehran. Okay? So he's saying that let's unite together as an Ummah and then let's as a block, let's begin to influence world politics. Also in the United Nations Security Council, for instance, he's insisting that Turkey should represent all of the Muslim nations there. Right? So now when we are seeing the decrease, the deterioration of Iran, the fall of Iran almost militarily, so now they see themselves as the only really powerful nation that can speak in the name of the all Muslim countries. I would like to provide you another important example. We recently witnessed a confrontation between India and Pakistan. Look at the statements of the Indian army. You will see that the Pakistani army used lots of Turkish made UAVs, unmanned air vehicles. Okay? It means that Turkey's foreign policy is not solely focused on the Palestinians, but it is pan Islamist. It's also against India, they are favoring Pakistan. So we should also put the Turkish Pakistani cooperation under the magnifying glass. It is very concerning. And of course this is creating some other opportunities. It is turning India and Greece and Cyprus into Israel's number one allies. Of course, after the United States, let us not exaggerate, but we are seeing that Turkey is pushing Cyprus, Greece and India into Israel's arms. We do not have to persuade these states that they should be ally of the state of Israel. But Turkey, because it's aggressive pan Islamist, neo Ottomanist foreign policy, is doing everything to finish the job for us.
- [49:12]
Aviv Gur
So just to clarify, we should be worried and not immediately, but they'll take 20 years to potentially have any kind of clash. But there could be a clash in 20 years. And they'll spend the time between now and then preparing for it, and they'll do it at a grand level on the global stage. It's very easy to inject pan Islamism into the ideas of the Caliphate of the Muslim Brothers. The teacher of the founder of the Muslim Brother, Hassan Abana, is a guy named Rashid Rida. I talked a lot about him on the podcast because people need to understand these sort of foundational ideas that animate Hamas, that animate also the Shia. The Shia borrows these ideas from the Sunnis in the 40s and 50s. It's easy to inject pan Islamism, caliphateism into neo Ottomanism because the last Ottoman sultan was a caliph. He styled himself, he called himself a caliph. And when bin Laden after 911 explained in some text that he put out or some video that he put out, what his thinking was, he talked about, I think it was 1922, 1923, the founding of the Turkish Republic and the fall of the caliphate and the need to return to a caliphate. And he absolutely comes from this lineage that goes through the Muslim brother. Erdogan is now watching. Erdogan presumably is then very pleased that Iran has crashed because the Shia are not the vanguard, as Iran saw itself, of the great Islamic resurgence and restoration. And that means that the last, I would say, I don't know what to call it internally deeply competent, capable and militarily powerful Sunni Muslim country in the Middle East. There are others out there, but not here, not in this area. Can do that, can be that vanguard. The last reasonable claim to a caliphate was a Turkish claim. He wants to rebuild it. And everything plugs into that vision. And every institution fits into that vision. And that vision is his defining vision. And we should also say Ataturk, dismantling the Ottoman Empire and building secular Turkey created a secular constitution protected by the army. Bernard Lewis famously talked about postmodern revolutions, which is these bloodless military coups that restored secular democracy. And then the army always went home to their barracks and it was this weird kind of Turkish secularism. Was the foundation of Ataturk's project. But the Muslim conservatism percolates, and it percolates among the populations, especially in rural areas. And that population grew much faster than the secular population of Turkey. And now Erdogan is basically riding a deep conservative Turkish Islamism that is extremely popular, that's a majority of the people. And he's riding that, staying in power and building out a neo Ottoman vision in which Israel doesn't fit images, doesn't fit at all. Is that the bottom line? Is that what we're talking about? The Shia failed. The Sunni are now on a grander level, hope they will succeed. That's the Turkish vision. We're still having 150-year-old conversation about Islamic weakness and Islam taking its proper place in the world. And that's still the foundational animating impulse of these political worlds. And sorry, it's two days after the Iran war, maybe we shouldn't have done it today because it just feels exhausting, but that nothing's over.
- [52:42]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Let me put it this way. First of all, I would like to mention that Erdogan really enjoys from this humiliation of Iran, but he will never say it out loud because this humiliation was made by the state of Israel. Okay? So it is like an I love you, I hate your relationship here. He's really pleased that Iran cannot constituting a very strong state, a kind of a threat even. He is not threatened from Iran, but now he sees himself as the only dominant actor. Okay, so he is very pleased, but he will never admit it. I also would like to highlight here another thing, you know, when we are looking at Iran's strategy against the state of Israel, what was it we are calling in Hebrew? The rings of fire. Right. They created a ring of fire in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Yemen. So how Turkey works, okay. Of course, when we are looking at Iran, we can say that this body is very. In the eyes of the international community, especially in the West, Iran is considered as a controversial, not so legitimate and misogynistic regime. So it is very easy for the state of Israel to launch a diplomatic attack against Iran because it has many disefficiencies, it has very weak points. But when we are looking at Turkey, it's not the case. Turkey, as you mentioned, is marketing itself as a democracy. I'm emphasizing and highlighting that it is marketing itself because obviously I cannot tag a country democratic when they put the most important opposition leader into prison with fake charges. Okay, so this is. I'm only closing the parenthesis here.
- [54:44]
Aviv Gur
Food for don't Close the parentheses, another three sentences.
- [54:48]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
Yeah. How much?
- [54:50]
Aviv Gur
How much is it a democracy? How much isn't it? There's still elections, local elections, but as.
- [54:55]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
We can see, the potential candidate of the opposition will not be able to run because he is in prison. Okay? Obviously the Turks are marketing themselves as the member of NATO, a friend of the us, a close ally of the old European countries in their fight with Ukraine and Russia. You know, Turkey is securing the southern flank of Europe. So it is very hard for us to come here and to tell that, look, they are posing an existential threat against us. And I would like to give you a very important example here so that you will understand the Turkish motus operandi. Instead of creating, instead of forming rings of fire, Turkey lacks the word legitimate. In March, thanks to the initiative of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, there was a very important summit in Jordan. Five countries, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. They formed a new body called the neighbors of Syria. Okay? And this body also, they also formed a military command base, a joint with. And when they are asked why they need such a thing, so they say that we have a problem here in our region called isis and this ISIS should be kicked out. And every time we are seeing that because of some reasons, the countries who are not originated in this region, in other words, the United States is conducting here military interventions. So if we will going to erect this body and instead of the United States, these five states will find a military solution against that particular problem. So we can also prevent United States penetration into the Middle East. But let me tell you, and make no mistake, Haviv and Rachel, ISIS is the fig leaf. This is the nucleus of what I said before, this Islamic, Muslim, NATO, okay? And obviously when Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, they are saying that this is only against isis. So the international community is saying, okay, maybe it's really only against isis. But at the end of Idul Fit, when President Erdogan is calling his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fatah El Sisi, and he's saying that whatever we gonna do in the Middle east, let us coordinate together. What I understand from this phone call is Turkey, slowly, slowly is paving the way of Egypt into this alliance. But maybe today, because of this ideological friction between Erdogan and Sisi, because of this Muslim Brotherhood ideology, so maybe they cannot see themselves, the Egyptians, as a part of this entity. But let's imagine that the Egyptians would be also inside this venture. So let's look at the Israel's borders. Lebanon inside the spa, Syria inside this pact, Jordan inside this pact. And Egypt let's imagine most probably will be admitted to this pact. And you, in your previous questions already mentioned about the strength of the Turkish Navy. It means that Israel would be besieged from the Mediterranean and from all other borders. And let me be, you know, more creative for you. We also mentioned the Turkish military base in Somalia. And of course, we have Turkish Navy there as well. So they can, technically speaking, can also close the Bab El Mandab. Also Eilat will be besieged, may God forbid. But Turkey is the only country that it is capable of imposing a real siege against the State of Israel. So this is far more complex. And because of the fact that Turkey is, it's not declaring any hostilities against the State of Israel, it is inside the gray zone. And since it is inside the gray zone, it is almost impossible for us to act against it. So this is far more complex because it is in the gray zone. And it is very legitimate. It is very legitimate.
- [59:36]
Aviv Gur
That's the new divide of the Middle East. Israel, Turkey, going forward in 20 years.
- [59:41]
Dr. Khay Eitan Coin Yanaroczak
As a person who was born and raised in Turkey, I really love Turkey and I want Turkey to remain a friend of the State of Israel. Make no mistake, I'm not trying to make any incitement here, but I have to as an analyst who is watching after what is going on in the region, I must be alert and I must say the things that I'm seeing on the map and this is what am I doing. But my agenda and the State of Israel's agenda towards Turkey is friendly. We are not looking after turning Turkey into our enemy. This is something really ridiculous. We have lots of enemies. We do not have to add an additional one, okay? We don't want it. Israel is doing a grave mistake. We are not explaining ourselves to the international community, but especially in the Turkish language. Recently, the idf, the Israel Defense Forces, launched a Turkish X Channel account on Twitter, right? And they are doing a great job. I think this should be also adopted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. And let me tell you, in a very ambitious state, Israel should form its own TV channel. Like we have Russia Today, we have CNN, France 24, BBC, an English channel that would transmit the agenda of the State of Israel. And yes, if you're gonna. If you would like to call it propaganda, please call it propaganda. I really don't care, okay? I really don't care because our voice is not heard outside of the borders of the State of Israel and we are not doing anything properly. From time to time, I'm doing my best to raise the voice of the state of Israel, also in the Turkish language, also English, also in Azerbaijani. But this is not enough. This should be institutionalized. We have to internalize this as a national security goal. Yes, it is a national security goal. We are all using these smartphones, okay? So we should enter into the smartphones of everyone. Our voices should be heard. We are only speaking in the battlefield, which is not enough. We should expand the Abraham Accords and we have to emphasize the Abraham axis countries as an alternative to limit the Turkish penetration of this Muslim Brotherhood axis with Qatar. This is very problematic because Qatar has lots of money and Turkey has institutionalized state tradition. When you combine together, this is a serious adversary, okay? A serious opponent, if not adversary at this stage. So therefore, Israel should be cautious, should open its eyes, should explicate, explain itself in the Turkish language as well, and begin to treat Turkey as a part of the Middle east and not Europe, for God's sake. Turkey is a part of the Middle east and not Europe. At least their government's behaviors are not European. They are very Middle Eastern.
- [63:18]
Aviv Gur
Thank you. Thank you for joining us. Thank you, Rachel. And I hope you, you know, I hope we do all the things you said. You're talking about an Al Jazeera for Israel. It's a good idea. It's a fantastic idea. It's a massive liability in a war that we don't have anything, even we don't have a spokesperson, never mind have not have, you know, real capabilities to get Israeli voices out into the world. So that maybe should be something that people should be looking at seriously. And to me, you just upgraded the significance of the Abraham Accords in my mind, which was, you know, significant in many complex ways, including the internal debates within Islam. But now it's significant in a hard, strategic future looking kind of the next 25 years arc. It's a very significant potential boon to Israel. Thank you so much for joining us. And thank you very much. And we'll see you all in the next episode.