← Ask Haviv Anything
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- [00:05]
A
Hi, everybody. Welcome to another episode of Ask Khaviv Anything. This is a special episode. Again, I say that a lot. This time I mean it. We're going to have Yossi Cohen, the former director of the Mossad, responsible for some of its most astonishing operations and capabilities in recent years. We're going to talk to him about everything, about the state of Israeli society, the war in Gaza, the war in Iran, the war with Hezboll, the state of intelligence in an age of AI and surveillance and ubiquitous cameras, and why the Israelis cling stubbornly to human intelligence and whether that's a good thing or a bad thing. And we're going to talk about his own political future, which has been something that Israelis have been debating over the last few days. The whole thing, the whole gamut. Stay with me. Before we get into it, I want to tell you that this episode is sponsored by Jason and Loreal Klinghofer in honor of the memory of Jeroen Leshinsky and Sarah Sarah Milgram, two Israeli embassy staffers who were murdered in Washington, D.C. on May 21, 2025. They were fatally shot outside the Capitol Jewish Museum after attending an event for young diplomats. Yaron and Sarah were a couple. They were planning to get married. They were young, their whole lives were ahead of them. And they were gunned down in cold blood by someone who thought he was part of globalizing the Intifada. May their memory be a blessing. I also want to tell you that we actually draw topics for this podcast and get a tremendous amount of advice and wisdom and help from our Patreon community. You can subscribe for as little as $5 a month, and you can take part in stimulating debates. People share links, they share all kinds of interesting content and and they suggest episode topics. Patreon subscribers also join our live streams, which we do once a month, send in questions, comments following an episode, etc. So if you'd like to be part of that community that's being built around this podcast, Please go to www.patreon.com askham. Hope to see you there. Yossi. Hi, how are you?
- [02:26]
B
Thank you very much. And thank you very much for having me today.
- [02:29]
A
Your book didn't leave much off the table. There was a lot in there about you, about the Mossad, about the history of this moment. I mean, unfortunately, you left a lot off the table, but I guess that's understandable. I want to start with you personally and the place Israel is in today. You straddle different Israeli communities. You're born into religious Israel, religious community of Israel, modern religious, Zionist. You never lose contact, for example, with Rabbi Chaim Druckman, one of the great spiritual leaders of modern religious Zionism, even as you yourself maybe become more a part of secular Israel. I'll let you describe that. You also describe in the book some of your difficulties rising up the ranks of the Mossad, which is a more secular culture, more part of secular Israel, so to speak, as a more religious person, as somebody who is attuned to the divides of Israeli society in this moment that is extraordinarily divided and painful. Most religious Israelis, religious Zionist Israelis, want Hamas defeated because they feel that many of the soldiers, a disproportionate number of the soldiers killed in Gaza, come from their communities. Many of the secular Israelis feel that the hostages need to be brought out, even at the cost of ending the war without a defeat for Hamas. And notice that most of the hostages come from secular Israel. You're someone who straddles these things and you've been in the decision making of these kinds of decisions over time. Where do you think Israel is at today? Are we holding together? Are we falling apart? How do you see Israel right now?
- [04:10]
B
Okay, first, I have to admit that I am quite worried about even the description that you've described, Hafiv, because I do not see that any of Israeli previous wars or release of hostages were kind of a partisan thing in Israel or in Israeli society or politics. Meaning that the rightists would love to complete the war, the leftists would like to not defeat Hamas, and now the rightists do not like the hostages to be released and the others do. I think it is wrong, I hope it's wrong. And I think it is wrong because there are a few, a few elements that the state of Israel is absolutely united and I want to believe that they are. And one of them is the need to release all hostages whatsoever. Whatsoever means for then different, I believe, societies inside the state of Israel, different versions of under what cost or what will be the cost that the state of Israel would have to pay in order to release these hostages? And there are many prices that we can pay, many prices that we don't know that we have to pay. Because if I would place in front of us, I mean, kind of an agreement that says all hostages out in Gaza today. And this is agreement that the state of Israel would love to sign. I mean, would it sign it or not? Secular or religious? I don't think that there's a debate in between these two societies, to my absolute understanding, is that Hamas is A tough, brutal, evil negotiator using the bodies of our remaining hostages and the living hostages in Gaza Strip in order to force the State of Israel stopping what we have to do, which is defeating Hamas whatsoever. And therefore I believe that it is beyond a kind of a religious, secular acquisition. I believe that the, the. I want to believe again, and I hope this is the case, that all citizens of Israel, religious or non religious, secular or not, would, I mean ultra orthodox or Zionist, I mean, these that are, you know what, even Arabs, our Israeli Arabs. I mean, I think I want to believe that everybody wants to see the hostages home. And I think that what we are debating about majorly is about the prices that the State of Israel will have to pay. And we are paying huge price for the failure of the 7th of October. I mean, we cannot ignore that. I mean, we are paying a huge price, I mean, since October 7th, that the state of Israel actually failed to create a proper intelligence alert, and then again, the army failed to guard our proper international borders. I mean, of course Israel and Hamas borders, we're paying a huge price. It's not only that Almost close to 2,000 Israelis were killed, we've lost many soldiers in that war since October 7th. Is that still the remaining of the ultimate damage that has happened to the State of Israel is resonating into Gaza Strip, into the Israeli societies simultaneously. Meaning that the high price that we have to pay, and we're paying a huge price, as I said, will have to be adjusted to a proper agreement or a proper deal that we're not holding yet. I mean, you and I, we're not holding it yet. We don't really know what's in it to cut a deal with Hamas as we speak. I mean, what are the conditions that Hamas wants? I mean, beside the media that is communicating probably what they get, but I'm not sure if they get it fully, if they get it rightly, if they get it with a full authorization for the Prime Minister or his ministers to communicate it to the Israeli people. I don't really know.
- [08:23]
A
Let me just drill down. Let me just. Hamas, if it remains in Gaza, I mean, ultimately that's what it wants, to remain in Gaza. If it's still in Gaza, it can pretend like it won this thing. The damage to Gaza is secondary. Is there a deal in which Hamas leaves? That's something the Arab League has now called for. Nobody knows how, by the way, if we pull out and Hamas retakes Gaza, it's just another war. No money goes in. How does concrete rebuild Gaza rather than rebuild tunnels, if Hamas is still in charge the day after coming at it from just a very simple point of view, what could we Israel possibly give in a deal for that last hostage?
- [09:01]
B
Okay, I mean after the last hostage and eventually, I mean the main obstacle now is as I think, as I shared with you, my thoughts about a problem that may happen or may not is that Israel will remain or will hold the rights to re attack or to attack any terrorists all over the world, Gaza, including. We will not let terrorists, I mean running around trying to kill either Israelis or American citizens, as you've mentioned. I mean the loss of two beautiful people next to working the Israeli Embassy in the Jewish museum in Washington D.C. not so long time ago. Hope they rest in peace and I hope we can send some comfort and condolences to their families. We have to chase terrorism. Whatsoever we've done that, I did it, I mean a long part of my career or a big portion of what we did in the Mossad, I mean from its founding till today, is that we've chased terrorism and we have to do that. So I don't see any option that Hamas will rebuild itself in Gaza and will create a terrorism act or motion against the State of Israel and that would not come to re attack or to attack again and to take its capabilities down. I think that the problem is probably that differently than what we've done in the past, we have to sign a tougher agreement. Because a small reminder, a short reminder, every round of violence that I can recall from the past ended not with the Hamas being defeated, with Hamas being agreeing with the State of Israel. The terms of the termination of that round of violence we call, we used to call it so after Tsukitan protective edge. It was an arrangement the lengths or the depth of the perimeter. I mean, how much fishing area can they hold? How many, let's say civilians or Gazan civilians can cross into the State of Israel to work, what about even export their furnitures and stuff like that into the State of Israel? How many can cross through the country to go to Amman and then of course flying from Jordan to Iran and then being trained, I mean, to kill us even much more tougher than we've done in the past. Each round of violence, to my understanding and recall, was eventually signed with an agreement or ended with an agreement signed between Israel and Hamas mitigated by Egyptians or Qataris.
- [11:49]
A
So if we don't want a Hamas still in Gaza, a new Hamas Gaza, by the way, cannot be rebuilt. What kind of future are we condemning Gaza to if Hamas remains, then this can't end with the deal.
- [12:02]
B
I totally agree with you. I think that Gaza can be rebuilt. What we've tried, I mean, not only us. I mean, I once have listed dozens of international organizations that were trying together with us to help the Gazan people build their own whatever, what is it? Territory. How do you call that? I mean, let's say part of the Palestinian Authority. In the past, US aid was present in Gaza. Turkish authorities were present in Gaza, Norwegian. The donors, I mean, do you know, do you know what the donors are? I mean, I think it is well recommended for your precious audience to have a look at the donors meetings. Donors meetings were built to collect enough money for the Palestinian Authority and for the Gazan people to live better. And you know who was presenting the situation there at the donors meeting? Minister of Foreign affairs of the State of Israel. So this is not the first time that we're trying to aid or trying to help the Palestinians in Gaza to build themselves better future. Unfortunately, they have been captured under a brutal organization called Hamas. Not the only one. The Gap, as we call it, the Palestinian Jihad or organization which is running the same methodology next to Hamas and therefore controlling brutally. I mean the Gazan territory and therefore the Gazan people themselves. So we've invested so much. Not only the State of Israel did, by the way, not directly, but we have facilitated a lot of what you correctly said. I mean, they are taking the money from the Qataris, from the Egyptians, from the Arab nations, from the donors, from Norwegians, from France, from Italy, from US aids, sorry to say, and from Turkey to build kind of a civil facilities. And unfortunately they have used huge quantity of cement to build tunnels, no clinics, no schools, no hospitals. Right. That's what they did.
- [14:19]
A
So let me consider the chase. Is victory possible? Therefore we got to get rid of Hamas for us and for them.
- [14:25]
B
I believe that we should chase Hamas as much as we can, as long as we don't really have an agreement that would comprehend a kind of a one line that all hostages are home. If we do not get to that bottom line, we should keep on fighting in Gaza. Not because everybody believes that this will create a kind of a better conditions to release the hostages, but because we have to defeat Hamas. I'm not going to use like you know, an absolute victory or no, these kind of words. I mean, I have fought like let's say for almost consecutive 42 years, terrorism. I started when I was a commander and soldier in the first Lebanon War and then we fought Palestinians in Lebanon even before the days of Hezbollah was, I think was close to be created then. But Amal, you know, the other group of the Shiite community was already there, but we were fighting Palestinians in Lebanon because they were fighting against us. Yasser. So I started to fight terrorism then and there and continuously we're still doing it. I don't think that a terror organization could be totally defeated worldwide. Like Daesh is partially there, Al Qaeda is partially there. You know, look at Afghanistan. I mean, they're majorly there and in other places too, because unfortunately we can describe, do not agree with it, but we can describe the spirit of hatred and evilness will ever be there. And even the smallest remaining will be, let's say, terror organization called Hamas. We will have to fight and chase these small elements till it will be defeated, not risk in the state of Israel, a total victory. Yeah, I don't know what is it anymore.
- [16:27]
A
So just in a sentence, what you also write that in the book that absolute victories and absolute losses aren't part of modern warfare. But what, what is a good day after in Gaza? Just the one sentence version. I want to, I want to move on to get into Iran.
- [16:43]
B
I truly believe that the Gaza people should create their own leadership from within. I mean, first, no one Escoes account, no one's going to come help them. Right. I spoke to leaders around the world and I'm not going to refer to them personally here. No one's willing to help them really. Right. I mean, they said that's their problem. You have let them leave in all these 365 square kilometers alone in Gaza. You have released them for their own life and they have turned potentially heaven into hell. So the world is not going to come anymore. I'm not even sure that you're not right about Gaza. Could not be reconstructed again, unfortunately. I am absolutely afraid that because of the tiredness of the modern world, I mean, money will not come, it will not flood in as before to help them, to help them rebuild Gaza. So what they truly have to do is to create a kind of a local leadership which is modern, which is liberal, which is not based on hatred and terrorism and then themselves, by themselves, kick out Hamas as the Arab League is now offering.
- [18:02]
A
Okay, I have so many questions about that. You know, who, how. This is not something we've seen in Gaza, but let's move on, right? We are after that amazing 12 day war with Iran. There are dead on all sides. Calling a war amazing is a little bit strange nevertheless. Unbelievable precision, unbelievable intelligence operations on the ground. You Yourself during your term as head of the Mossad, oversaw the great discovery of Iran's nuclear archive. You talk about that in the book, about how it's just too big to move. So a whole lot of people have to move out of Iran with little bits and pieces separately, 10,000 documents. Something that also shifts the American conversation on Iran at that period. So first of all, you know, just bragging rights. Are there other intelligence organizations that can do that? Mossad famously is very into human intelligence. And it is said out there, I only read journalism, I don't know anything else.
- [19:01]
B
That the full reports, as we said.
- [19:03]
A
According to reports, that, that the Americans are much more into cyber and signal and all of that and not actually focused on human intelligence. Is Mossad unique? Is this something that anybody could do? Can you just.
- [19:15]
B
Yeah, I think, I think we are. I think we are. I think that what we have saw, what we faced or seen everybody in the last, I mean, for me, magnificent 12 days in Iran, the last, whatever attack and war that we had there is based on not less than 20, 25 years of work. We have learned Iran deeply. We know at the Mossad, I mean, due to our duties and because of very, I believe, brilliant operatives and good intelligence officers. And you know what, Aviv, more than that, I mean, the determination that we don't have a choice but to get ready. I mean, to get rid of what Iran really has to get rid of, which is major league. I mean, the nuclear sites and then the. All these huge industries of SSMs, as we call them, surface to surface long range missiles. And this is something that we have done. We've invested a lot collecting intelligence in Iran and creating a lot of surprises that partially were discovered right now, Partially, I think not yet. To make sure that we know everything, that everything every item in Iran communicates with the headquarters of the Mossad, telling us, this is what we do, this is what we think, this is what we plan for you guys. And here we are. Here we are physically. I mean, these are the sites. And yes, it's not only about cyber, cyber hacking, according to four reports or any signal intelligence, what we call the SIGINT of 8200 and others to collect inside Iran. It is also, I can't say majorly or dramatically, but I would say dramatically because of the human intelligence arm that Mossad have never abandoned like the others did. You're right. That other agencies have lost their human capacities, saying, we don't need that. I mean, think about a signal intelligence operation that gives you that streaming. I mean, a Man or a woman working in this organization, what could they add to, to the level of intelligence that the signal intelligence could create? And eventually it was wrong, it was wrong in the others organization. I mean till today the U S division, the Mossad, which I was its commander for about five years, is probably the biggest as operational division and, and for a good reason. If you really want to penetrate behind the enemy's lines and if you wouldn't want to join forces or to join the signal intelligence capabilities, you have to be there in order to do it. Like selling some items that have been manipulated or treated to the enemy. So they can, as I say, they can speak to us, they can talk to the headquarters of the Mossad and tell us who we are. And this is what we're hearing, okay? And this is something very important to know and to understand and only, only humans can create that. It's machine cannot do that. And fortunately we've been preparing that war or that attack with Iran. Not only the Mossad, of course the IDF and the magnificent air force that we have, we have prepared that war in length. And I cherish what we did and I'm very, I live the dream. I mean haviv I really, I mean, I mean listening or happening to what has happened in Iran the recent days. I mean it's not less than a dream for me and I'm very happy we did that finally.
- [23:18]
A
Nevertheless, what's changing? I remember there was, I don't think Israel ever took credit for this. So you know, according to far foreign reports, obviously the killing of Mahmoud Mapruch in 2010 in Dubai where purportedly Israeli agents, two dozen at the hotel carried out that killing some significant portion of allegedly according to news reports, the unit that carries out those kinds of operations in the Mossad were basically revealed. We're in a world where entry and exit databases of countries, you can apply AI to those things. We're in a world where tracking surveillance cameras are ubiquitous. Is that changing? Up until now this is a superpower the Mossad preserved everyone else gave up on too early.
- [24:04]
B
No, it was a big change of course, of course at first, I mean you see the results. It is still doable. Mossad didn't close its doors after the Mahoh event connected to Israel and I would not refer to that if that is true or false. But I can tell you that that was a slam on our face when we haven't realized I believe the magnitude of everything that you've mentioned from biometrics, facial recognition, AI data collecting data digesting and therefore coming into a conclusion, what has happened within what today, it's a second or a minute. At that time, it took them 24 hours or even less, I mean, to understand what has happened and to collect the right guys that have been part of that. According from reports again of this, of this operation, and since then, Mossad has dramatically changed its countermeasures and realizing that crossing borders is not as it used to be, going under false identity is not as it used to be. I mean, when I was an operative, I had like whatever, hundreds of different identities and passports, right? I mean, you can travel anywhere you want. I mean, claiming who you are. Now, everything has to be much more reliable and checked by anyone that you see. I mean, you say, okay, let me see, let me Google you, let me LinkedIn you. Let me see where you are. I want to see your cell phone, man. Do you have a family in your cell phone? I mean, who's your family? I mean, in the past, it was nothing necessary. I mean, you didn't have the cell phone, the smartphone, the whatsapps, the social networks, the connectivity. I mean, all these databases, I mean, that were there, but they were not tangible. I mean, to the enemy, now they are, and more and more and more. So everything that we had to do, and I've done that, I mean, consecutively, with the former directors, the Mossad, changing the entire strategy of work accordingly so to make sure that the state of Israel will still have a Mossad as a penetrative arm behind the enemy lines. And fortunately we do.
- [26:48]
A
If anything, you've proven that even those kinds of events, which I think a lot of intelligence agencies were learning from as they happened, nevertheless, there is this. It is still possible. I think that's what I learned this year. So getting out of the intelligence question, the Iran war, what happened? How much is the Iranian nuclear program broken? How much is Iran deterred? There was some hope, dream, fantasy aspiration. It wasn't the reason for the war, regime change, but it was certainly an Israeli dream out of a potential outcome of the war. I think that's how Netanyahu put it, if I'm not mistaken. How much should we still be worried about the Ayatollahs? Are they just going to rebuild and we're going to be doing this little dance until that regime falls? And are they going to take a new attack? We saw now we've learned about Iranian attempts to really attack the Jewish community in Australia. That's kind of pathetic. I mean, it's tragic and horrible and, you know, I'M angry at Iran for that, obviously. But it's also kind of pathetic for the great Iran to be reduced to chasing after synagogues. Should we still be worried about them? And how do we actually end that nuclear program? How do you see that whole issue right now? Where does it.
- [27:59]
B
Well, I. Well, I truly believe, and I still believe, or I believed always, and I still believe that Iran is the filthiest enemy for the state of Israel currently. Why? Is it because terror organizations are. Terror organization. I mean, if you go to the Jains and if you will compare Hamas to the IDF, or Hezbollah to the idf, or Daesh to the idf, you.
- [28:21]
A
Mean Jane's defense, the measures defense.
- [28:24]
B
I mean, you would see, you would see huge capacities. I mean, on the Israeli side, I mean, in comparison with what. I mean, yeah, practically we're not ready, I mean, for even this Kalachnikov and Peacock's attack, unfortunately. But you saw that when we got ready, I mean, to attack in Hezbollah, when the Israeli determination was like an exercise better than it was in the past. So within few days, I mean, you have really crushed most of Hezbollah's capabilities. And this is the situation today in Iran. This is not actually the case. It is a huge country, by the way, 85, 90 million people, somehow, or some of them are smart. And when there is a kind of a determination that is a composition of nationalism and an ethical thing, or I would say God's will thing, it is really hard, really hard to disconnect. So when they truly believe in their old hearts, and I lived among them, I know Iranians very well. I know the Persians, the Arabs, the Azeris there, I know the sectors in Iran. But majorly, when they do believe that this is Allah's will, and this is kind of a God's will, I mean, to destroy the state of Israel or to destroy every Jewish citizen or Israeli around the world, the only thing that we have to do in the state of Israel to make sure that they cannot do that. So that's why I listened very carefully when Iran said we're going to destroy the State of Israel. That was very blank, that was very on the table. And they said, we are going to do it. And we said, nah, you cannot, of course, let's make sure that they cannot. That's why the very intensive and determined war that we have conducted for years against the Iranian nuclear capabilities was to stop them from creating a kind of an existential threat against the state of Israel. Not only because it is right to do that, because the declaration of this is what we are going to do in order to destroy the state of Israel is something that the state of Israel cannot live with. So it's not over. Havi, I can tell you openly, and I know that this is the Israeli defense sentiment highly translated into action, is the war with Iran is not over yet. And they are, to my understanding, the sole country on earth conducting terrorism internationally. As you've mentioned, they've done that before in, in Australia, they've done that before and they're still doing it around the world. In the USA itself, I mean, in Judea and Samaria, in the heart of Jerusalem, you do find arms of the Iranians trying to conduct, not trying, but conducting sometimes successfully, terrorism around the world. This is the only country that's still doing, I mean, after all this, all these years and more than that, Iranian have never declared differently after the attack that they will abandon to the request of even the American president or to request, even to the renewed, whatever P5 1 or the, or the renewed engagement with Iran by the nations telling them, okay, so would you come to negotiate now a better deal so we can lift sanctions? And it can be, as President Barack Obama said, we welcome Iran back to the family of nations. Do you remember that? So I do not welcome them back to the family of nations before. I will make sure that Iran will never have any nuclear military capability that is a nuclear bomb. So they will never have the capability to destroy or to destroy potentially the state of Israel or being immune by these nuclear weapons.
- [32:27]
A
As much as you can tell, nothing fundamental has changed in the Iranian regime itself. Its old purposes, its old impulses, its religion, its ideology, all of it is just, I mean, it's going to have to recover for a while, but then we're back to the same old game.
- [32:41]
B
You know, nations are all the time in emotion, right? I mean, there's nothing that you can call national stability in the sense of the people's sentiment. And I do know the youngsters in Iran as well. And there is, let's say, even if the split we were not holding, really, I mean, exactly polls about who is against the regime, who is supportive of the regime, of the Iran regime. But let's say the split is 50, 50. The 50 that is holding the arms, the 50% that is holding the military capability, the brutal police, the Revolutionary Guards capability, all the prisons in Iran and the control of what you do, it is absolutely more than enough to keep the others of tampering down or taking down the Iranian current regime. Unfortunately, and not that we have not tried, we've been working in and out to see if there is a way from within the Iranian people to have that regime change. But no success. Why? Is it because the minute you text something to someone that is against the regime, you are risking your life. You know what? Even less than that is enough because you're risking your job. And if the next day they will find out that you have text something that is not really aligned with Ayatollah's messaging and you counter their regime, I mean even by a slight sentiment, you lose your job and the next day you're hungry and that's it. And no one is touching you or helping you or supporting you anymore. Because now you're stained. And who wants to be a friend in such of a dictatorship with someone that can eventually can contaminate. I'm sorry, I mean this kind of like non loyal regime family, I mean to each neighborhood. So it's hard to take this regime down. That's why when I gave my first interview after the 22nd of June's attack, I said please continue, complete the job. Complete the job. I didn't call for annihilation of any person. I mean I'm not looking for changing the regime by destroying kind of leadership. This is not what I said. I said go and destroy the regime facilities so they cannot operate in Iran anymore. But for the reasons that I'm not aware of and I think it was an historic opportunity to do that. But for reasons that I'm not holding, I don't nobody shared it with me. It was seized and this is what we see. So Iran's still there, risks are still there. The recap or the reconstruction of their facilities is still there will take them let's say months or years, I don't care. I want to make sure that it's gone or they will not have a continuous capability to enrich uranium. And this is the major thing that we have to take care of. I think it is was stopped because of the attack. I think the results are amazing. And you know what Chaviv? More than that, something very important. How many years Iran thought that we're not going to come? For many years Iran thought that America would not come and they said they're afraid.
- [36:07]
A
For many years I thought that that was very surprising to the world.
- [36:12]
B
And you know what? Absolutely right. And, and now I think not only we did they know that we can come again. So if Iran will claim we are rebuilding our facilities, I would say I would recommend ayatollahs look up at the sky, you may see our beautiful F35s and thank American citizens for all these measures and beautiful support that we need so much. Look at our F16s, look at our Israeli UAVs flying above your heads and wait for the B2 to come. Right. Do not feel the resilience of the Iranian regime the way, as you concluded or understood before, because we came for the first time, we can come again. And I would not be surprised if we did. And this is something I believe that will be or probably will change the regime's attitude towards probably a new agreement. But days will tell.
- [37:17]
A
Thank you for your time. Three questions to end with the first one. You have my pleasure. I want to ask about hostages. You have a wonderful vignette in the book when you're talking about spycraft of developing a Hezbollah asset to find out if two soldiers who were kidnapped or wounded or were dead in the early 90s. And you actually handled this person, and they were convinced that you yourself were an Argentinian businessman working for the Mossad for money, and they sold himself. This person came to Tel Aviv with you, but it was this development with Hezbollah. We also look, we saw the difference between October 7 and the Hezbollah war, and that partly is the difference between Mossad and Shabak. And so I want to ask two questions. One, on the question of hostages, we still don't have enough intelligence. I know we have the commandos willing to walk into fire to pull them out. We still don't have enough intelligence. Hamas is still managing to hold them back in ways that explain to me why we can't get those hostages out without a deal or haven't been able to or weren't able to at the very beginning. And the second question, and maybe it's the same question, the fault for October 7th. Look, in your book, you lay out, I think, in two chapters, the fault for October 7th. Now, I share with you the assessment that I think is implicit in your book, which is that it's not the Mossad's fault.
- [38:51]
B
That's true.
- [38:51]
A
It's literally not the Mossad's purview. The Mossad was not supposed to be operating there. The places the Mossad was supposed to be operating. Everything went very differently. But in the book, you do lay out sort of individuals who made mistakes rather than maybe systems, what's going on with intelligence, what's going on with hostages. Why don't we have better insight into Hamas, a better ability to fight the war in Gaza more intelligently, what's happening there?
- [39:22]
B
All right, so. Well, it's a very Sensitive question. And I have to deal with it. I mean, with like open hands. And I think that no more with gloves. The level of intelligence that we had in Gaza is poor. How do I know you don't have to be an intelligence officer or an ex Mossad, the director, I mean, to assess that or to know that if that has happened in October 7th and all our systems that were looking at Hamas didn't see that coming at the magnitude he did, it means that intelligence doesn't really exist. It's not like a unit of two to three terrorists or a lone wolf running around in Berlin trying to find a synagogue in D.C. or, or a couple of Israelis. I mean, next to the Jewish Museum. This is hard to do, but we have to do that as well. But it is at least 1,500 to 3,000 terrorists. And look at their logistics behind. I know what it is to send an operative. I'm sorry about the. I do not compare, of course, but in order to send someone over to the fight or to a. An operation, I mean, you have to have like 9, 10, 12 people behind him. So I can calculate something like, let's say 3, 5, 7,000 people, knowing that they are preparing this kind of operation. Probably not the time and the date, I mean, I mean, to the end of it. But when it did came, when the action was said, we didn't see it. And when we did, probably, I do not know, I'm not very much on the details, we turned it off, saying, let's see what happens the next day. That means that the level of intelligence was poor because a good level of intelligence will tell you they are coming, and they're coming this morning. So do something. Yeah, yeah, yeah, Khabib. I mean, you can see the differences between the precision.
- [41:35]
A
What's the lesson? What needs to happen there? You know, in the second intifada, I was a soldier in the second Intifada. These suicide bombers were going past us. We had to do ambushes all the time in the mountains of the west bank trying to catch them. And we were failing to catch them. And the Shabak was the blind one. And Ariel Sharon was so angry at the Shabbat that he brought in the head of the navy to rebuild the Shabak.
- [41:57]
B
He knew a complete insider of our Prime Minister Robinson, been murdered, I mean, inside Israel by an Israeli. And yes, I do think that it needs a very deep refresh or very deep reform in all these that have been taking their responsibility for this dramatic failure, saying, we know what has happened because we've investigated it, and this is the way that we're going to correct it. And that's why I'm calling for a national investigating committee. Not to find and to blame someone personally about what has happened, but to learn and to understand that the state of Israel cannot allow itself actions like that. And part of the reform should happen from within the idf, from within the Shabak majorly, by the concept of how do you collect intelligence and what do you do with the special ops to make sure that you have enough intelligence for exactly that day? I mean, your entire life in some of the verticals that you collect is exactly for these moments that you say, what am I facing here? What is the enemy planning for me right now? This is what we did in Hezbollah. This is what we did in Syria. This is what we did in Iran. Yes. And not only that. They say if they do. Not only that, I need to know that I want to disrupt it. And you saw, I mean, many strategic surprises. So it's super missing.
- [43:43]
A
So to zero in on that. And then I'll have just. I want to talk about your future. You write in the book angrily at these generals, at these IDF intelligence people, your secretary, your driver, your salary, are there to do everything in your power to protect the nation. If you can't do this, you should not have the honor of protecting your country. There is anger here. Absolutely.
- [44:07]
B
Anger.
- [44:08]
A
My question to you is, I'm angry.
- [44:09]
B
I'm angry. Of course I am. You are. You are too, I believe.
- [44:13]
A
I think most Israelis are angry. My question to you is, what about the political leadership? What about Gallant and what about Bibi? And those are complicated. And I get that there's a big debate, and I get that there's frenetic politicking around it, but what about the political leadership in that moment, the vision of Hamas being containable and deterrable, and the idea that Qatari money was buying stability? It turns out it was buying something else. I'm not saying they had great other options, by the way. At the time, I was very much in support of Netanyahu's middle of the road policy publicly. But nevertheless, he's the prime Minister. I'm just a guy commenting, what about the political leadership? What do they need to know? Or how culpable are they in that kind of an intelligence disaster?
- [45:00]
B
I think that when you've mentioned responsibility, and this is something that I've claimed again and again and again, you take responsibility when you sign the first day on your new job. This is not the responsibility that you declare or take when something wrong is happening. This is my responsibility from January 6, 2016 on. All the Mossad and everything that's happening in the Mossad and its Mossad's operators and operations, you know, at headquarters, if there is a. Someone scratches, I mean, the other colleague's vehicle in the parking lot, it is my responsibility too. So you do take responsibility the first day. You do take responsibility the first day when you are chief of staff, minister of defense, prime minister, head of Mossad, head of Shabak, head of a department, head of a branch, Everyone that is a commander along the chain, the responsibility that he was given by its, whatever, either commanders or the people of Israel is at the first day. I'm not expecting anyone to declare I am taking responsibility. Not the responsibility is yours for your first day in the office. Same applies for the Prime Minister. Same applies for the Minister of Defense. Same applies for anyone down the line. I called the Prime Minister to declare another round of elections in the state of Israel. So to let the people judge, because democracies, like democracies, they allow this kind of behavior. If I may, he does not really have to resign according to the war, to the law. I'm sorry. And he's not the only one doing it in the past. I mean, Golda Mere did not resign. Not only that, she did not resign.
- [46:56]
A
Eventually she did, but she did try to avoid it at first.
- [46:58]
B
Correct? You're absolutely right. But she resigned after winning the elections again in December, if I'm not mistaken, 1973, after the war, she won the elections again. She resigned in april 74, if I'm not mistaken. Okay, so in other wars that has happened here, I mean, I don't remember any of them taking responsibility, as I call them, when bad things are happening. I mean, you've mentioned the second Intifada. The Prime Minister resigned. So why is it that they do not resign? I don't know. We really have to ask them, what do I propose? I said, okay, there was a national failure here. You are the big boss of everything. Why don't you call elections and let us choose again? If we trust, if we don't, this is the right way to do. And I don't see that happening. And that's why I'm not going into politics. And this is because I don't. I don't see any vivid election period of time in which I can, like, plunge in or not. I know that I've declared them in according to whatever kind of a posterior.
- [48:05]
A
Yeah, wait, hold on. This was my. I guess Second to last or last question. This is the one place where my intelligence is as good as your intelligence. So I would like to, you know, really dwell on this question. You would like to be prime minister? You have said that and you said your family supports it, which is not something that was true in the past. And how shall I put this? You're very much identified with Likud. You were very, you were a confidant of Netanyahu. You were, I mean, you had to be, I guess, to be appointed to the positions you were appointed to. Likud is not a place that allows potential future rivals to Netanyahu to survive politically or post Netanyahu rivals to the front bench of Likud. I mean, it's not, you know, the machinery of the party is very loyal. Likud has had exactly four leaders in 77 years. It has never.
- [48:56]
B
Which is impressive, by the way, a leader.
- [48:58]
A
Yes. And so think about the others. Presumably you can't run against Netanyahu, but you do think you are someone who could be that future leader. And I just want to say one thing that distinguishes you from a lot of the other people who are positioning themselves in that way is that you explicitly talk about unity. You explicitly try and pull out from inside that party. Now, what are your chances? I mean, the nice question would be well done talking about unity. But, but I want to ask the very question, as the Yiddish word says, what are your chances?
- [49:36]
B
And blankly, because I think that this discussion is very important, I mean, happening today, I mean, in this important Thursday, after being looking at the Israeli media for the last three and a half days when this declaration of mine was a little bit manipulated. But nevertheless, I truly believe that I have to be part of the Israeli leadership. I liked it always being a member around the table of decision taking cabinet is something that speaks to me highly. And I appreciate these processes. And I think that because of the experience I have and the motivation I still do, I think that the contribution to the state of Israel is from my end is endless. I can still do it. Since all the posts are busy and since inside the Likud party there is a leader currently home, to my understanding, will continue trying or will be the leader till a given time sometime in the future, which I can't really predict. What I do believe is the right thing to do for us Israelis is to unify. It's not a bad thing to do the opposite. It is, by the way, looking at the criticisms that I receive already for the last 24, 48 hours from members that I call them to unify. And it's amazing. It is not only amazing, it is kind of a disturbing thing. Because what I really think that we should do is we have to agree that we do agree on 70% of the Israeli future agenda. This is service for everybody, ultra orthodox recruitment to the army, whatever, all needed legislations that will keep on the country running. High tech investments, education, you know, all this is super important. We do agree about that. Let's say 30% of the arguments that would left, I mean, behind, like a future Palestinian state. Yes or no? Nobody's interested in that anymore. They will one day, in five years, probably. I mean, we have to heal that wound of ours. And the only way to do it is by unity. I'm not naive. My previous commander at the Mossad, when he always thought that we were trying, like, to sell him something not easy or a little bit like, hard to digest, he said on the book of naivety, don't look for my name in the bibliography. So I'm not there too. I'm not there myself. And I don't think that. But I do speak, I mean, for the sake of the state of Israel, with a sense of naivety, which is a good one. I truly believe that we have to unify forces in order to create something better for the people of Israel. Right now, there's no hard decision.
- [52:51]
A
I haven't decided to go founding a party.
- [52:54]
B
Okay, whatever, a big party. You know, what if the Likud is still there and we don't like it the way it is? Because. Yes, I mean, I'm a rightist. I was born in a house. Like my father is an Edsel operative when I was a teenager. In all his life, in all my family's life. I mean, everybody is Likudnik and me too, by the way. But I don't believe that the state of Israel will gain a proper positive change when these parties, the way they are constructing the current coalition and opposition too, would create any change. That's why I put my. My heart and soul in this declaration, which is not easy. I know that I am now facing criticism. I know that some would say he's right, he has to go in. Some would say he's wrong, he's arrogant, he can't do that. Why him? Why not the others? I mean, there are so many better. I mean, I don't see anything new coming into the Israeli politics. And that's why my family, mainly my wife Aya, who, like, put my hand on the Bible in the past and said, swear to God that he will never go into politics majorly. After Bibi Netanyahu declared that I'm the heir, right, he said, he can do that. He could be our next prime minister. And she said, promise me you won't. And after October 7, she said, promise me you will. I don't think that we have a choice as a family but to plunge into this muddy arena and try to make something better for the state of Israel. And it's only a commitment. I'm not looking for whatever, a car or, you know, a nice office. I mean, I have all that, thank God. I don't care about that. I can work for one shekel a month or one shekel a year. I can volunteer the entire life from now on for the sake of the state of Israel. This is what I care about. Unfortunately, I don't see anything happening right now. I mean, I don't see really election time or something like that. And even if there will be an election time in Israel, I haven't decided that I will jump in this time. Because if these will not unify on the other side of the record, okay, I think that we may face the same result again.
- [55:28]
A
Okay, last question. We started with your assessment of Israeli society and I want to go back to that. A lot of Israelis I talk to on the right, on the left, a lot of them have a pessimistic outlook. The Gaza war has gone on too long. People are exhausted, the fractures. The Haredi non service is a problem now because after doing 200 days in Gaza, you suddenly feel it viscerally in a way that before you didn't care who does serve, who doesn't serve, who has a religious problem. The international standing of Israel is massively deteriorated from this war. The campaigns against Israel, both because of what's happening in Gaza, but a lot of it not because of what's happening in Gaza. The world did not take notice of much, much worse conflicts. Are they right? Are we in collapse? It is possible to argue we are stronger than we've ever been. Iran is very much on its back feet in a way that it wasn't a year ago. Our enemies have been shattered one after another. Hamas is a particular problem because the civilians it hides behind are its only strategy. And that is never not going to be a tremendous advantage to the enemy. All the other enemies are one level or another broken. How do you see Israel in five years, say, how do you see Israel standing its position? What is repairable? What is the most important thing that we really have to tackle and fix before it actually hurts us, you know, disastrously. Where do you see the country standing now? And we'll finish with this.
- [57:08]
B
Okay, so first, I believe that this, the defense status of the state of Israel is so much better than it was on October 7th. Hamas is clear to be, let's say demolished or close to that Hezbollah as well. I mean, there are internal discussions in between the Americans and Lebanese government how to maintain that situation, making sure that Hezbollah will not gain its power again and that they will hand over their weapons, I mean to the government winning one flag, one country, one gun. I mean, as all, as all normal countries do. Syrian army is not a risk anymore to the state of Israel. It does not exist anymore. Iran has been hit, as we have said in length, said in length to the point that I believe that we have reduced the risk on the state of Israel definitely long the time or the length of time to for Iran to be an existential threat to the State of Israel. So defense wise, we have changed the entire Middle east or our direction positively. Internally, we're healing bit by bit. I think that the Israelis have proven to the world that we can work together. That I mean, if you look at our economy, I mean, for example, I mean the shekel versus the dollar is getting stronger every day. It is the lowest. I'm not sure for how long. It was like less than 3.5 shekels a dollar which is. And it is still going down, meaning the shekel is still getting stronger, stronger. The stock market is amazing. I mean, me working for an international investment fund called the SoftBank or Vision Fund in SoftBank. We are investing in Israel during that time and we've done beautiful investments because the high tech is still flourishing. I see here from my window and I'm astonished by that. I know positively that the state of Israel is okay, but should heal much better from within its own system. Making sure that everything will be aligned with the national needs. That is, we have to recruit everybody to that mission or to that national mission. It will be defined sometime in the future, but a law should define that. I know that we have to look at some reforms in several systems. Someone has to do it and we have to do it ourselves. I know that we have to maintain unity again. I mean, the differences in between us because of that war, I think had been minimized to a different level that we have never faced in the past, unfortunately, or maybe fortunately because now we can unify for a better future. I look at my kids, I look at my kids and son in law that has served in Gaza for a long time as reserves. It's hard, but they're still there. And I believe that the State of Israel had proven that we're quite resilient. And even after that long war, and yes, it is expensive, not only financially, we're paying a huge price to maintain our independency here in the Middle East. And I know that after that war, not only the defense or the defense future or the security future of the State of Israel is going to be so much better. I can see behind the wall negotiations being successfully agreed to have more peace treaties in the region, like with the Saudis or maybe with others, I don't know, maybe one day we'll have an agreement with Oman and then with others, Kuwait. I mean, these kind of countries that do not really have a international debate with us that can eventually sign a peace treaty with the State of Israel or maybe Lebanon or maybe Syria too. So by nature I'm very optimistic. I think that the Israeli society needs a heel or something that will recover and will cover the wounds that had been so brutally opened from what we call the judiciary reform. And then by October 7th, it's too long, too much for all Israelis and now it has to be changed.
- [61:39]
A
Yossi Cohen, thank you so much for joining me.
- [61:42]
B
My pleasure, Hafiv, thank you very much for having me.