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Ask Haviv Anything
Episode 97: Can America and Israel finish the job? A conversation with John Spencer.
00:57:21
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- [00:00]
A
Foreign. Welcome to a new episode of Ask Khliv Anything. We are on day 11 of the war, depending on your time zone, maybe day 12. And there's so many questions being asked in Israel, in America, on the world stage, probably presumably in Iran, about what's happening in this war, what the strategy is, the United States, what Israel's goals and objectives are, when it all ends, what it's all meant to achieve and who's actually, who's actually winning, who's actually achieving their goals and who isn't achieving their goals. To answer some of these questions, or at the very least, to tackle them with deep knowledge, we've invited back and I'm very grateful that he's joining us. John Spencer, longtime friend of this podcast from its very early days, someone I have learned from a lot. For those who are not familiar. He's an internationally recognized national security and military analysts specializing in war, in strategy and tactics, specifically specializing in urban warfare. John currently serves as the co director of the Urban Warfare Project and the Chair of War Studies at the Madison Policy Forum. And he's the host of the Urban Warfare Podcast, now in its sixth year, which explores every dimension of urban combat through in depth conversations with commanders of major battles, technical experts, veterans and scholars. So we're going to take apart this war and really try to understand it from the perspective of someone who has commanded men in war and understands American strategy and understands historically how these wars look. Before we get into it, I want to tell you that this episode is sponsored by Tina and Akiva Katz, and it's dedicated to two very different groups of Israelis who are close to their hearts. The first, they write us, is our family, specifically the families Al Fassi, Pasal, Gizbar, Weiss and Megidish, who fought and served so bravely and sacrificed so much since the 7th of October. We are forever grateful for your service and deeply inspired by your devotion to the state of Israel. The second group is our family by choice, the Damari family of Kfar Aza. To the quietly indomitable and fierce Mandy Damari, who fought tooth and nail to bring her amazing daughter Emily and the rest of our hostages home. And to the Damari children, Emily, Ben, Tom and Sean, we love you. Thank you so much for that dedication. I also would like to invite you all to join us on the Patreon. We have a wonderful community there. It helps us keep the lights on. We have discussions. They help shape what we talk about on this podcast. Their questions are the first questions we try to answer on this podcast. And you get to join a monthly live stream where I answer your questions live. You can join us at www.patreon.com askhaliveanything and we'll put that link in the show notes for you. John. How are you, Havi?
- [02:54]
B
I'm well. How are you?
- [02:57]
A
You know, I didn't sleep much last night. We had three sirens and the kids all fell right back asleep because kids are better at that stuff. But, you know, I'm raring to go. I want to understand this war. It's day 11. One of the questions I want to ask you is how long it's going to last. But let's wait with that. Let's start with the tactical situation and then turn to the strategic. What the heck is actually happening right now in the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, in the air over Iran? How do you understand the American effort, the Israeli effort? What can you tell us? Just to, you know, everyone can read the sort of last three paragraphs of any news article that tries to give that summary. But take us a little deeper. What does this war actually look like? Where does it stand as you see it? Sure.
- [03:43]
B
So, I mean, there's a lot of people trying to do some comparative analysis, you know, four times greater than the shock and awe of the invasion of Iraq that I was a part of. And war isn't managed by Excel spreadsheets, but everybody is interested in the numbers. The United states hitting over 5,000 targets. Israel 4,000. The real target list to achieve what are less argued on what their goals are on not only continuing to hit nuclear program sites, hitting all the ballistic missile launchers in any part of the military industrial complex of the Islamic regime in Iran for both missiles or drones. But also since the United States put the navy at the very highest element of the strategic goals because of the 20% of the global oil production comes out of the Straits of Hormuz. So sinking the Iranian Navy in over 50 ships, either damaged or shrunk in the last 1112 days. You really see the tactical fight, of course, with Israel's help, a lot of the decapitation, I call it almost a neurological strike. So taking out the political and military leadership. Israel also has a lot of the mechanisms of the pressure or the suppression that the Islamic regime did on the population. So the besieged, the headquarters, the cyber, the other forms of suppression that the Islamic regime has used on the population. So what we see is this, I mean, a very large scale war. Actually it started with creating the ability to bomb certain parts of the industrial complex that they both Israel and the United States wanted to bomb and that they went through that very methodically. So the fact that they haven't lost, although there is of course this I think almost dubious headline of 140American soldiers wounded, although 108 of those returned to duty and went right back to mission. I think some of the news are trying to lead with were about these headlines and these 30 second clips of what's going on. But a very one of the most sophisticated since AI is being used a part of the targeting process and full admittance of that, which is its own conversation of people thinking that that doesn't happen to go through this vast target list of Iranian capabilities, which is a big part of their goals, is just reduce the capabilities not just in the nuclear, but the ballistic missile shield that it had built as we watched, although we know what the United States and Israel is doing because they're being pretty direct on what they hit per day. And then we can watch what the Islamic regime in Iran's been doing in probably one of the worst strategies that I've ever seen, which is attack everybody else not involved in the war to bring them into the war in some strategic thinking that it would cause political pressure on the United States. And it actually did the opposite. It brought an alignment of countries against Iran and rule. I'm sure we'll talk about the continuation of what started actually at the beginning of the Trump administration, which was really reducing the Iran's strategies and power in the Middle east and creating this Gulf state, Sunni Arab coalition of forces economically, militarily and big aspects. But from the day to day aspect, it's really the United States now and Israel going through this target list, a very large target list of Iranian capabilities to destroy. So if anything in the war happens already, the world is safer, Israel is safer just by the reduction of capabilities. While that may be short term, you can't deny its actual what's happening is the destruction of these capabilities.
- [07:31]
A
On day seven of the war. You wrote thus far, the United States has been consistent in publicly stating its goals. President Donald Trump's March 1 statement announcing the start of operations made clear that the war is aimed at ending the Iranian regime's nuclear weapons pursuit, destroying the missile capabilities that Tehran has long used as a shield for that nuclear ambition, eliminating Iran's ability to threaten global commerce through the Straits of Hormuz, that that basically is it. And then you say this is not a declared regime change war. Trump has said occasionally we wouldn't mind it. It would be great. I'D love it for that. Not to be. I want to be part of selecting the next leader, but the next leader in the Venezuelan sense. In other words, I don't care which regime, which structure of power throws up a leader. I just need the leader to play ball with America. Right? There is so much speculation on what this war is about. I have become joined the camp briefly for now of the China speculators. I read some interesting things from some think tank people and it occurred to me that it makes more sense if you take the things that America is targeting that Israel doesn't care about. Right. There's this whole discourse on the American right and on the American progressive left and I don't know what to call them. The woke, right, the Tucker Carlson's that Israel dragged America to this war and really Iran doesn't threaten America, it only threatens Israel and it's kind of wag the dog situation. And that never made any sense to me. Never mind. Just maybe Netanyahu has so much influence over Trump that maybe he convinced him or something like maybe the entirety of the American strategic planning echelon and all the leaders of the military and all the national and all these people who are going along with it keeping quiet is just because they're also maybe in Israel's pocket somehow. The whole thing is strange. But what I think drives some of it is that nobody has a or most people don't believe and I think we have polls on this, that they know exactly what America is doing this for and what the exit conditions are when this ends, when America can declare victory and walk away. So let me just stop the question and just say what is this war actually about in your estimation? Is it just literally what they've said? Have they been consistent?
- [09:52]
B
So it's an interesting question and why I'm sure you have a podcast because there is no simple answer to some of these questions. I even have a, hopefully a Wall Street Journal article on what are China's how is China involved in this? And what is, what does it impact in the Iran operation, especially after Venezuela, how does it impact the One Belt Road initiative? Everything the question begs, I mean mixes where two truths can be, two things can be true at the same time. Although I taught strategy at West Point, you know, people will argue does the United States have a grand strategy and does an administration have broader policy goals? Right. So if you read the national security strategy, that's, you know, when the, when the administration puts things on paper like what this is our kind of larger pursuit of rebuilding American strength Reducing the attacks on American greatness around the world, whether that's economically, militarily, politically, or even in the information domain. I would argue if I was teaching a class that all the things you just said are all true, that there is a much larger grand strategy. And why when the United States and the National Security Council, especially with Rubio and many of the actors sit around the table, they walk through, okay, what are the primary interests of this operation and how does it align with our foreign policy goals? How does it align with our grand strategy on, on what we're trying to achieve in this relatively four years? That's consistent. Although there is. I was just on this morning with somebody talking about this is not what he said on the, the campaign trail. There's no more wars, things like that. And a lot of times, actually somebody, if you study different administrations, I know it's different in Israel where you have, you might have the same people with the same policies when you have different administrations. Of course, people on the campaign trail talk about all the things they're going to do and things like that. And then you get into that seat of power making these very complex decisions where I can tell you, Habib, what the goals of this operation are not, hopefully not less of opinion, but by just taking the statements that I think matter more than every news interview that the President Trump or true social post that he makes. I actually, that's why in that article I talk about here are the formal statements, right. The prepared statements by the president, who is the commander in chief. And then you go down the chain of command.
- [12:27]
A
Right.
- [12:27]
B
So don't take anything that Lindsey Graham says as American policies on what's for this operation.
- [12:33]
A
Right.
- [12:33]
B
If you take the commander in chief, the president, the secretary of Defense, the joint chief of staff and the CENTCOM commander, I think, and actually I've had a little pushback that the goals that the United States have set have been extremely consistent. Yes. If you interview President Trump, you never know quite what he's going to say. And then you people read into that like, well, I don't care what he said in that formal prepared speech, which is more of a collective policy on what the goals are for this operation. I'm reading into the statement he made off the cuff. I just don't agree with that. So, of course, the operation, what you just read, I think are the goals which would set how long it will take. When can you say you've achieved those goals of destroying the missile program, destroying the Navy? Because it's so important to that that not Only the key, the operation, which would be the impact on the direct price of oil, all of that. But also this grander vision of rolling back the ability for China. There is a grander strategy. But I think, I think the American administration has been very specific to this operation because for many reasons it has to be right. Because if you live in my world, the attack is, you know, this is another regime change, war, this is, you know, failed, you know, Iraq, Afghanistan, all of that. Very poor comparative analysis. When in this case, since I actually did jump into northern Iraq and was told it would only be a 60 day operation and it ends up being a nine year operation in this case, I actually see the things that I would look for and going no, this is very specific. And I also have, I know a little bit about strategy where deception and uncertainty is actually built into this, whether that's a Trumpism or not.
- [14:20]
A
You've written about this, dive into that, don't mention it in passing. We have no, Trump is throwing a lot of stuff into the air. You think that nevertheless, if you listen to Rubio and Hegseth and General Kane and, and President Trump himself, at least early on, everything's coherent, everything's consistent and everything they've done since fits that thing. And it really is about Iran. Or let me ask you, if you would put it this way, it's 80% about the threat of Iran. Yes, obviously in the background there's the 20% of China and the larger architecture of power and all that, but it's 80% Iran. And then you said, and so everyone's confused about this. And so you wrote, I forget when I read this, but you wrote in some piece in the last 12 days, it's not like all that terrible for the war effort that the Iranians are guessing because everybody's guessing when America's goals are fulfilled, if America can do this for four more months or if America's done in four days, if the Iranians don't know that harms the Iranians ability to plan ahead and to try to survive this thing. So can you walk us through that? Sure.
- [15:24]
B
And actually we've talked about this with a much lesser enemy in Hamas, but the strategy of if, if, when Hamas knew where Israel wouldn't go, what Israel wouldn't do, and, and what, what were the things that, timeline wise, administration wise or whatever, it really, it is a worse strategy for your enemy to know what they can do, whether that's, to how long they can hold out, what you're not willing to do. This is really three Dimensional chess between two adaptive combatants. So the United States. I've said that absolutely. I believe that there is uncertainty not in the goals, but in the actions built into, on purpose. So sometimes, like, let President Trump say the things he says because it confuses everybody, definitely will confuse the Iranians on what we're willing to do and what we're willing not to do. And this is why, like the boots on the ground comments like you, you never would tell the enemy what you're not willing to do to achieve your goals. That's, that's built in like military theory for, from, from Sun Tzu till now. I mean, that's the worst thing you would do is like, oh, I'm going to attack you, but I'm not going to do these things here. I, I can't, this can't go on forever. I can't put boots on the ground. Like, that's just a, a recipe for the Islamic regime to build a strategy on how to survive. You want them to believe that they can't survive and hold on to all of their demands, right? To keep their nuclear program, to keep their fissile material, the 60% enriched radium, to keep doing the same thing that they've been doing for decades. That's what the uncertainty does. It removes that ideal. Because war is a contest of will that whoever takes command in Iran not to believe that they can just survive this for another few days, for another, and that, that we're not willing to do boots on the ground. Who's boots on the ground are you talking about? You insert the uncertainty, right? Because there is a little bit of war strategy and war is about creating more dilemmas than your opponent can deal with. Right? And that's the cognitive aspect. So I saw the Kurdish discussion, like CIA helping Kurdish forces. Even though I served, I actually fought with the Iraq peshmerga and Kurdish in northern Iraq was to create more dilemmas in which the enemy must address to create that sense of President Trump. I actually use this phrase sometimes cry uncle, right? To believe that there are too many problems that they can't deal with. And when people put restrictions, not like ideals that are restricting, that gives the enemy, okay, I don't have to worry about boots on the ground. I don't have to worry about this. And it's just poor strategy. So I've written, I've said that I believe the goals are clear, but there is some uncertainty built into as much as we saw during the 12 Day War, deception as well. Right. So, I mean, we put all of our B2 bombers, we sent seven towards the Middle east, we put six towards Guam just to confuse the world on what was going on. There's actually a bit of deception that has been built in from the beginning of this as well. As much as I know in Israel, the, you know, the, the commander is not, you know, moving their cars before the start of this operation and things like that that are built into the plan.
- [18:53]
A
You have written that, the, the hinting at a ground war while also saying publicly that first of all for domestic political reasons, obviously I don't think Americans would allow the administration to go to a ground war. But also Iran, you argue, was pushing for America to have to choose between a massive escalation, including a ground war, or conceding because it was going to choke the global oil supply and hurt all these allies of America. So forcing that choice on America. And by saying we're not going to a ground war, America's denying Iran the sense that America itself doesn't know what it's going to do or that America faces dilemmas. Let's get into Iran's strategy. You write, for decades Iran pursued a grand strategy built on terrorism, proxy warfare and regional chaos, or in just a shorthand, chaos. Chaos was the strategy. It invested billions in militant groups, missile forces, destabilizing campaigns across the Middle east from Lebanon to Yemen to Iraq. Tehran cultivated armed proxies designed to threaten Israel, attack American forces, intimidate neighboring states and destabilize the region. And then you have this one line. Chaos was not a side effect of Iran's strategy, it was the strategy. And now to survive, you argue, Iran has doubled down on that strategy. It feels like it's a one trick pony. And I completely agree with you. I don't see any other strategy. The stated goal of the American effort is to compel the regime to fundamentally change that behavior. Abandon the nuclear weapons ambitions, degrade the ballistic missile capabilities, stop threatening the closure of Hormuz, stop its decades long use of proxy terrorism across the Middle east and Iran's response. And here I'm quoting you again. Iran hoped to widen the war faster than the US and Israel could control it. And it hoped to do that essentially with rocket and drone attacks and missile attacks on 10 different countries. And that strategy so far appears to be failing. So forcing America to either retreat because the damage is too great, put all the political, you know, get the Emiratis and the Saudis and even the Turks to come running to America begging for it to stop the war, or all of that seems to have Failed. And America's also not going to go to any kind of ground invasion. So what we should expect is America, basically this is my question, holding the line. Iran's strategy to escalate the war has failed and America's going to hold the line and keep hammering away at their capabilities, their institutions, their people. Until when? How do you assess Iran's counter strategy and what's the American response to that counter strategy?
- [21:36]
B
Yeah, absolutely. Don't, I mean I don't, you know sometimes I'll be not, I won't quip but I don't underestimate the Islamic regime in Iran strategy and what it was trying to do for decades and what it's trying to do in this war and that attempt to widen the war of course that happened. But in that chaos strategy was also to separate to get, you know, not only to bring more actors into the war but then to create a not coherent strategy against them.
- [22:11]
A
Right.
- [22:12]
B
To get all these individual nations to come forth with a disagreement on what's happening. And I think that failed by the attack of 12 different nations as far as Cyprus, Turkey, Azerbaijan, which I've spent a lot of time in Azerbaijan. I think that was a great mistake. Saudi Arabia and others, the strategy completely backfired on pressuring the United States to shorten his timeline and actually has created resolve in the nations and in kind of a global interest towards. Look now we, we. It almost gives credibility to the necessity of the operation because it's you know, 2,500 missiles. Look what it did if it had had 8,000 or more what it wanted to have. What would it have done in this, this case of this strategy in order to protect this nuclear program in the worst case scenarios we tiptoe and to like a North Korea scenario where it's too late, you can't do anything about it. I think that they also wanted to increase the cost of the operation on the both the American administration both politically right. And this is what you've seen. I'm sure there's some bots involved in the disinformation fueling that. What we've also seen since October 7th fueling the disagreements within the, the American society to say like what's, it's not clear what are you doing here? You know, when's this over? You have to ask those questions and, but also the, the dollar amount, right. The whole cost of a barrel of oil and all of that out element in their strategy. I think it's thus far it's failed. I can't give you a timeline Habib and it goes back to this is a military strategic planner who teaches it the worst thing you could do is tell your enemy how long you're going to do this to them. If you're. If your true goal is to break their will to believe that they can survive it, the worst thing you can do is give them a timeline. Logically though, as both the United States and Israel goes through this target list of destroying capabilities 1 I believe that both the United States and Israel are in a safer place today than they were 12 days ago, just in a reduction of the regime's capabilities what had built billions of dollars. But also I do believe, well, some people argue that decapitation strikes don't work to achieve that. You just have other hardliners. I think the paradigm of what I don't want to get to a mow the grass scenario where this is necessary every few years. This is where the, even the boots on the ground. It's just, it's not right to say that you can't achieve the behavior change without boots on the ground because whose boots on the ground are you talking about? Are you saying we can't change the Islamic regime behavior won't change unless American boots are on the ground? I don't think that's a logical scenario. But this is the whole the population variable that hasn't been put into play that I think a lot of people well, hoops not a strategy based on January's protests that there is a belief that there will be even if the bombs stop falling. As of right now, the US Administration specifically, and I think I saw the Prime Minister Netanyahu on TV as well, talking directly to the Iranian people. But it's a not yet scenario of they want to continue to reduce the Islamic regime's capabilities across the board to not only project power outside the borders of Iran, which is also a definable goal, but also to suppress the population. Once somebody sends a signal this is your chance, try to take it now. And there's a lot going on in the background that we don't even know about to facilitate what that scenario is. I'm not in the camp either. I don't know if you're talking to anybody who says that the worst case scenario is a civil war and that would happen. I don't believe even in my understanding of of the different factions within Iran that that would happen either. But your question is, do I think the the Iran strategy is working? No. They thought they could hold on to a lot more than they've already lost. I think that they thought that they would make certain countries cower and thought they'd have a greater success. I have been surprised by even some of the Gulf states air defense capabilities despite you know, Saudi Arabia receiving more ballistic missiles this time than Israel and then the drone strikes. I'm bit surprised that defenses and I'm also happily surprised to see Ukraine sending advisors to many of those countries to facilitate which is this growing threat of these, you know, large slow moving drones and the damage that they've caused across the Middle East. As a American veteran, lastly he'll be, you know, having lost soldiers to the Islamic regime in Iran proxies and direct like Kuj force training going on to try to kill Americans all across the Middle East. I agree. I also further believe again American interests are safer in the Middle east just by the reduction of the IRGC couch force and their belief that they could continue doing what they were doing and have no repercussions.
- [27:22]
A
Bottom line, how is the war progressing do you think from an American view? How is the war progressing from the view of Israeli objectives and where do those diverge? Is it possible that America cuts out much earlier than Israel and Israel is left with, you know, I don't know what a longer term kind of operation. Is it possible that they're going to do this together? Perfectly well. We talked the last episode we had on a military expert in Israeli who journalist who said this is the first Israeli war actually fought in English and the Israeli Air Force is flying on Zulu time for the very first time because the level of integration with the American war effort is just that deep. So where do these diverge?
- [28:06]
B
Yeah, you would probably be, you could answer that probably a lot more. As I've been focusing on official U.S. statements on the goals of the war. I personally don't believe, I personally believe that just like we've seen the which the byproducts of this really is the, the birth of a new understanding of the capabilities of Israel not just diplomatically to survive what was supposedly the seclusion of Israel in the Middle east and all of the agreements with India and Germany and all of this it's doing quite well but really the birth of Israel as a, as a peer superpower almost military of the United States. And I have especially with my military analysis been really appreciated, surprised by some of the comments but also a realization of the world that like Israel's air force far exceeds many. Israel just overtook the UK in export of military technologies. But in this operation specifically to demonstrate the power of the Israeli military as in truly a peer in a joint operation against Iran has been a story that I think that will continue for a while and surprise a lot of people. Those of us that study it, it doesn't. But. But truly a joint operation like this and how many months that was planned together and the separation of targets and 300 Israeli Air Force flying side by side with American Air Force, matching capability, demonstrating more capability in some cases, especially with intelligence penetration, to be able to target leadership. I don't think personally, John Spencer, that there would be a scenario in which the United States would stop and then Israel would continue based on all of the shared goals. I don't know where exactly. There is, of course, different interests. Every nation of the world has different interests, both in their grand strategy on what they're trying to achieve larger than the operation, but specifically this operation. I've seen also a consistency while even saying, without saying directly, which I'm sure everybody wants to say, this is a regime change. Of course Israel wants to see a regime change because of they are the closest target. They are the number one statement of the destruction of Israel. And everything that they've done to include building this largest terror army ever seen on the planet of Hezbollah was in the. Of course we want to see a change, but we've already seen a massive change in Iran's ability to pursue its strategy unhindered recently. And that's what we saw for decades. So already I'm not going to say there's a victory. I'm clearly United States and Israel is winning the war. And as we've talked about in the past with other wars, I can't tell you who's going to win the war. And you always have to assess those wars based on the objectives, which some people say aren't clear. I say they are clear on what the objectives are. And that behavior change, I don't know when we will see that get put to the test. Will we see with this new leadership a change in behavior. But I know for sure we, we have already seen a change in their capabilities to pursue their behavior and that will last for a long time. So I was just arguing this morning that supposedly all the wars that have ever been started in the last 30 years have a worse outcome. I don't believe that this is. I don't. That's not true, actually. But also that this war, this specific operation will, will make things worse. Absolutely. I believe Israel becomes safer because of this war, that the United States becomes safer, its forces in the Middle east and its neighboring countries. But we have to see what comes after. I can't tell you when this is going to end, but I don't think that we would see Israel continuing the operation. But that paradigm, Habib and I just got this some more from, like, Hezbollah, this, this paradigm that people can attack Israel, and there's a certain threshold that that's okay. You know, they knocked it down, whatever the rocket was or their proxy forces are in check for right now, I think that paradigm has already been broken. So that's another positive accomplishment of the, the operation.
- [32:39]
A
I want to have you answer Walter Russell Mead. He wrote a piece in the Wall Street Journal recently. And maybe this, I guess, is there's a lot you don't know, and you don't want to say things that you don't know. And I keep asking you, okay, but how's this going? How's it going to end? Where's it? Right. But maybe the question is best articulated in the way he phrased it. He writes that if America ends the conflict before certain things have been achieved, specifically America violently, physically, through military force, reopens, for example, shipping through the streets of Hormuza and doesn't quit the war, and then Iran reopens, then America will have lost. That is, for him, the definition of defeat, because then Iran can impose costs that America can't handle. And everyone in the region will understand that even great America, even going to these lengths, can't handle. Walter Russell Mead writes, with missile and drone attacks, Tehran has succeeded in at least temporarily blocking nearly all traffic in and out of the Strait of Hormuz and has forced some Gulf countries to curtail oil and gas production. If it remains closed, then it might be the biggest energy shock since the 70s. And then, he writes, the war looks set to end in one of three ways. One is a clear and damaging American defeat in which America has to stop the war before Iran has to lift, essentially the oil blockade. And in the Straits of Hormuz, if a mix of global pressure and domestic opposition forces the Trump administration to end the conflict before full trade is restored through the Gulf, a battered Iran will emerge, having demonstrated its ability to close the Gulf against everything the world's greatest military power can throw at it. America's power and prestige, not to mention Mr. Trump's, would struggle to recover from such a fiasco. So even if we just set the terms at, you know, they launched missiles and rockets at 10 different countries, UAE also got, I think, three times more than Israel, if not more than that. And those countries have not therefore gone running to America begging for it to stop. Have not sided with Iran, have not hedged, have not begged. The Qataris are in a real crisis because they're like, where's anti Israel? As you get Iran? What are you doing? You're hitting. Oman was just complaining at Trump because Trump was negotiating through them while planning the strike. And now they're being hit by the Iran they kind of ran defense for. Right. So what the heck is Iran trying to accomplish? It's losing friends, it's not gaining them. But nevertheless, the closure of the Straits of Hormuz is a hard reality. If America can't impose the end of that, then has America by the time the war has to end, for whatever reason, on whatever clock, is that a valuable sort of test of whether it's losing or winning? Is America going to reopen that militarily?
- [35:22]
B
I think that's a very narrow metric in which to assess the. The four goals really of the war that are really not being argued. Although the regime change intent is argued closely.
- [35:37]
A
Is it fair to say that's the number one war objective of the Gulf allies, of America's Gulf allies? It's all about the oil flow. If you can keep the oil flowing, you know, Iran has lost. If you can't. We have to live in a world in which we have to assume for our perspective, the perspective of the Emiratis, the Bahrainis, the Qataris, the Kuwaitis. We have to live in a world in which Iran functionally has a veto over shipping.
- [36:01]
B
I mean, I think that's one of the guns. So deterrence theory relies on somebody having the capability and the will to do it. So Iran demonstrated that they had the will to attack everybody just because they want to, and then they had the capability. Right. So this is the air defense, air attack kind of capability conversation. So I believe Iran is already lost in by showing every neighbor to include Azure, you know, it's northern, like every neighbor around it, Turkey, Azerbaijan. And I, I really think that they really messed up with that. But even the Gulf states, like the Gulf states, of course care about their economic vitality, but all states care first about their national security survival. And to acknowledge through actual actions, not talk, that Iran has the ability and interest to attack everybody, to kill the citizens of their nation, which is their primary responsibility. I don't care what Mead says. That's the number one interest of a country. And yes, economic will cause pain. And economic is important. And yes, the oil, that 20% of that oil that comes through this straits is important, actually. But the recent news of Even the price of a barrel of oil dropping as when it fluxed a little bit. And while they have the interest which is the behavior. Right. They want the ability to threaten the Straits of Hormuz. They've already lost 50 ships and the pressure is continuing. And that may be a determination of. One of the metrics of when do does this stop is when you've taken that capability to threaten the Straits way down to almost nothing. And the United States signaling that we're willing to use the US Navy to escort ships through is a big deal. I don't think that's just talk. It is a signal of strength going back to what are you not willing to able to do. And the whole thing about ensuring the tankers, all of these things, it's not a game. But it's also not the single metric. It's an important metric. The straits are Hormuz. But as much as important is the the destruction, more destruction of the nuclear program and changing the behavior of their all of these pursuits. That would be measures the straits are Hormuz is not the only measure of this operation. And no, it wouldn't wouldn't say that they've been defeated or everybody wants to say that they they defeated the US made it so they couldn't achieve their objectives. That's why I always say is winning has it won? Because nobody knows. Not somebody writing in the Wall Street Journal and definitely nobody in the open source says how's this going to go? And how will we remember this in history? Based on why I started my article with. If you go on ahead, do all this conversation, all this analysis, don't start measuring what you believe the goals to be. Let's start with what they said the goals are multiple times over and over. Assess the war today based on the goals we have today. Yes. In the future we can say whether this what did it do to the global energy supplies? What did it do to the Middle east peace process? And aligning this greater vision of the Gulf State, you know, all the agreements and expanding the Abraham Accords, all these things, you measure that later. But in the operation, measure it against what they say the goals are today. And then if your metric is how many ships get through the Straits of Hormuz today versus tomorrow, great, do that. But it isn't the only measure. And yes, that is a high goal, but it's not the only goal. That's not the only thing that the United States is striking today. Although they have expanded the strikes to every basically boat that can float in Iran. So that to make sure that it's not a mind dropping boat.
- [40:00]
A
Will America succeed in holding open or reopening the Straits of Hormuz without ending the war? And will the war end before America has smashed deeply, profoundly set back by too many years for the regime to seriously contemplate rebuilding the strategic missile arsenal and the nuclear program? I mean, I guess I only have one question for John Spencer and I keep coming at it from 16 directions, right?
- [40:27]
B
That's right.
- [40:29]
A
Look, I gotta tell you, my kid's future depends on it. Is America gonna see this through? This is the moment of truth. I don't know who replaces Trump, but it doesn't even matter who replaces Trump. They're gonna have a harder time reaching this moment. Once again, for domestic political reasons, for a thousand other reasons, America's finally doubling down seriously on missile defense. We're seeing that in January. There's the uptick of the order for new thaad missiles from 96 a year to 400 a year. So America's understanding, and now the nevermind the Israeli capabilities which everybody was astounded by, we now see those capabilities in the Emirates. This is replic Israel's successes and all these things. So a lot of things are moving in a very good direction. But this is the moment. There isn't going to be another moment like this politically, probably, almost certainly for a generation. And this regime will do harm and will do damage and will do pain and inflict. And the younger Khamenei, who is replacing the older Khamenei? Iran's revolution was against the hereditary monarchy. And being hereditary was part of its corruption. Well, now it's a hereditary police state, so mazel tov. You've managed to make something of your revolution.
- [41:37]
B
Right?
- [41:37]
A
But this guy is said to be, by analysts in Israel, in America, in the west, worse than his father. He was in charge of the crackdown in 2009. He literally took the reins of the crackdown in 2009. The young Mukhtaba, Mujtaba Khamenei was now in charge. So it has to get done now. And speaking as an Israeli, not an analyst and a journalist and an interviewer, just, it's gotta get done now. And you have an ally. You mentioned Israel's willingness, capabilities almost as a peer in the battlefield at a very small regional scale. Yeah, we're a peer. I mean, you know, America can do this across the globe, we can't. But we're also willing to absorb the damage. We're also willing to lose the troops. We're also willing to fly into the war zone. If America had a couple of Israel's in terms of the capabilities and the loyal allyship in the West Pacific, right facing China, the whole China question would be different. It's all here now. Are they going to do it? I know they can do it. It's a question of test of will. You taught me that all war is a test. Are they going to do it? Because it's not going to come again.
- [42:47]
B
So this is, I don't know where it's going to go, but I know what's already happened. And it has been a generational combining of two great nations for a shared interest. I mean I don't want my son, who's 14, to have to fight the same battles against Islamic regime proxies that Americans have had to fight for different reasons. I believe that we've already seen a generational change and to decades of failed approaches towards Iran. And I know for Israel it's all the proxies but there are many other people who get to have to make a vote, right? This I truly also believe that I would love to see the power of Iran released right. So the Islamic regime has spent squandered the entire GDP of the Islamic State of Iran towards this terrorism and this grander vision of a caliphate with Israel destroyed and all the Jewish people killed out of the way. I believe that they now also have a once in a generational chance to vote with their feet and take the regime. And I truly believe that's the byproduct, intended byproduct, but not the stated objective of this operation for both Israel and the United States is to create that moment. But war is human and everybody gets to make a vote to include the other Russia and China aspects of this. They are involved. Everybody gets to vote. I'm extremely proud as an American just personal opinion that this operation has even happened because it would have been unimaginable prior to October 7th I believe for somebody to imagine the United States and Israel conducting this operation to reduce what has been built not overnight, but over decades. The nuclear program, the ballistic missile program, the Navy capabilities. I couldn't have imagined an operation to take this gun towards the global economy that Iran has had ready to pull whenever it wants as a threat to every administration of the United States. On yeah, but they could close the Straits of Hormuz and really cause pain on our, our US and our, you know, on India, on, you know, everybody to take that away because I do believe in the global international order and we've had this one who's been outside of that there are others but. And that this is a generational change. So I believe, I can't tell you whether what the outcome is that we already have seen a generational positive action. I believe Israel is safer because of this operation. I believe the United States is safer and the world has the potential to go into a level of peace in the Middle east that we haven't seen in 47 years. And of course we could do a lot of historical conversation in a very long time just aligning the Gulf states towards a shared enemy. I mean it's a lot of talk about that in the past. But to put that into reality, I still not going to answer your question though, whether whether we'll finish the job in order to achieve those goals, to get the behavior change that we all truly know is the, is the underlying goal. But also understanding every nation's grand strategy and strategy for the war. I believe that we've already had extreme success. Nobody, I don't care what they write, can say we've lost, we weren't able to do something or we won't win because of this metric. It's just context really matters. And that's why I hate sloppy analysis.
- [46:34]
A
I very much support this war because when you're being extorted, when you're being bullied by a brutal mafia, then you know, if you're small, if you're a little shopkeeper, maybe you have to pay protection, maybe you literally don't have a choice. But if you're competent and cohesive and serious and have the tools to fight back, caving only makes it worse and only ups the costs and only ups the danger. And they were getting in, they signed two months ago a contract with China to get supersonic missiles that could penetrate American air defenses around American, you know, naval strike groups. And so the danger from Iran was that not true.
- [47:17]
B
I'd be careful about believing in what China's technologies can do. I mean, okay, India just showed what a Chinese proxy in Pakistan can't do. And one of those things is stop missiles. So that it is a true statement that that is the belief and it
- [47:33]
A
on paper that is what Iran was buying.
- [47:35]
B
Yes, but the same thing don't buy Russian air defense systems. I'd be really careful by but I actually, I want them to buy Chinese stuff. Go ahead, keep buying Chinese knockoff weapons that are showing not to be effective against Israel in, in Iran.
- [47:50]
A
So you're taking that back and please buy them and buy them in bulk.
- [47:54]
B
That's right.
- [47:54]
A
Yes, yeah, yeah, we heard about the S3 hundreds and the S4 hundreds and how unbelievably dangerous and spectacular they were to the Israeli. Turns out you can clean them up on the way in without noticing them. And Putin now knows that at the end of the day, this is not a regime capable of compromise. It's not a regime capable of anything but slow escalation. We had an episode explaining what the mukawama was, what it means by resistance, this never ending, low grade war for all time on which it will sacrifice its own people, where that comes from religiously and ideologically. And so, yes, I am very much in support of this war, but we're a moment before and the number of people who have to make the decisions is very small. And so it's inherently unpredictable. We don't know what Trump will decide or Trump in consultation with Hegseth, Rubio, General Kaine, whatever. I mean, it's not a large group of people who make the next decision. And so we stand before the footfall. And nevertheless, you're saying, and tell me if this is a good summary. You're saying America has done this, right? Fundamentally it might still not succeed because it's war and the enemy gets a say. But America has done this the way it should be done and it is a reasonable war with clear objectives carried out properly. And you know, you parse that out in your writings and I urge people to google them and in great detail. Fundamentally, that's your perspective on this.
- [49:30]
B
Absolutely. I truly believe a piece through strength and that this has been a demonstration of enough is enough strength with clear goals and the capability to achieve those goals 100%. And I truly, John Spencer, believe this needs to continue because the depth of what was built is very deep and you need. And that's why they keep saying, well, tomorrow it's going to be bigger, right? The bombings and the targets destroyed will be much more. I believe we should continue this because the longer you continue it, the longer, if you did like a bell curve, the longer there is a period of them not rebuilding capabilities, even if they don't change their behavior, which also nobody could say they won't because they don't know what the other variables will happen when the bombs stop falling. I believe the United States did this right with Israel, could only have done it with Israel, and that there will be a greater peace coming through this demonstration of not just military strength that the world has never seen before, what we've seen in the last 12 days between the United States and Israel, the world has never seen. And it should put the fear of God in any rational actor, whether that's the next leader who can't show his face in public or Iran, Russia, China. It should put the fear in God. But I truly believe, and I don't like war, but this became a necessary operation in order to create a greater peace and to take that bully out of the picture, at least knock him down so he's not thinking that he'll continue with those threats anymore. I truly believe that.
- [51:08]
A
And so you just mentioned couldn't have been done without Israel. I want to just, just finish with this question. This was written down as my last question. People have been making this argument that Israel is pushing America to this war. And I've been challenged with this by several interviewers in various points, and I suggested, and I want to test this with you, that Israel did in one sense lead America to this war, drag America, convince America to go to this war. And that sense was what it did in June. In June, it demonstrated what American hardware can do. I mean, I'll take every compliment for Israel's capabilities you'll give me, but it's all with American tech, American hardware. American hardware, it turns out, can shrug off everything Russia has ever made. American hardware can completely ignore everything that Iran could possibly throw at it. And Israel showed that American hardware flying over Iran could deliver the blows it needed to deliver, work with the intelligence on the ground it need to work with and not be afraid. And because of the success of June, that's why President Trump made the decision to join the June conflict with the one big bombing strike at the end. He made the decision two days before. Right. It wasn't something that he expected to be because the Israelis were so successful doing this so well, he wanted to make sure it was as effective as it could have been. So he'll throw in that last little American, American sort of, you know, football pass. Right. That I, I suspect I sense with my psychic powers. I don't have evidence for this from anyone saying it explicitly, but that showed the Pentagon and showed the National Security Council, showed the people involved that this was very doable. This was much lower hanging fruit than anybody expected. Did the Israelis do that demonstration that opened up possibilities, made people able to think in these terms in the United States in ways that maybe they would not have had Israel not fought that operation in June?
- [53:13]
B
Absolutely. And I'll give. I agree. And I bleed red, white and blue. Right. American to that. Of course, American technologies, Whether it's the F35 or other aspects, but they're almost Israeli fied American technology. So technologies that the Americans built but didn't have a true adaptive enemy to put the test against a lot of war gaming. Israel modified almost every piece of equipment for the better and then we reaped the benefits. Whether that was in the Maduro raid Venezuela operation or now in this operation. It wasn't just demonstrating that American technology with Israeli advancements could dominate even Russian backed forces air defense capabilities. It's also that Israel had the intelligence capability that the United States doesn't have that deep penetration to be able to do this overwhelming reduce the risk to the forces military operation. But I definitely agree with your assessment that the Choal Day War demonstrated but also showed what not fear. But you always appreciate what your enemy can or can't do. I remember in I know you haven't had these people on there, but these different analysts that will say, you know, Iran was going to unleash Armageddon, it was going to sink American aircraft carriers, it was going to do this or that. Not with future capabilities but with their capabilities. Today in the 12 day war Israel demonstrated again they're not all that powerful and you can find their weaknesses. Not that they're not a threat, not that they're very dangerous, but, but 100% agree with you. That will reduce the risk for President Trump who of course any leader, especially the United States leadership wants to assess the risk both militarily but also politically reduce the risk. And that has been also, I mean this is why there are, you know, Israel and the United States and Iran, those are the belligerents of course, but there are of course all these other nations that are a part of this and that part of what happened in the 12 Day War. Where did everybody sit in response to what Iran was doing, which is attacking civilian sites in Israel versus what then in this war had been doing all a part of because Israel had the courage and bravery to do the 12 day operation. And the United States of course, like you said, joined in to provide a unique capability that Israel doesn't have and, and that facilitated lowering the risk to be able to do this necessary operation.
- [55:51]
A
John Spencer, thank you so much for joining me. I don't know how it's going to end. You don't know how it's going to end. I don't hear from the Israelis clarity on when Netanyahu, I should say unlike President Trump, unlike Pete Hexit has not spoken to the Israeli people over the course of these 12 days which is, you know, as we know is his way of doing things, but we don't know what's going to happen. Also me from my end of this conversation, but it was necessary and it's being done as well as it's being done vastly better than I had could, would have allowed myself to. Hope I'll put it that way. So hopefully this ends well. There are more countries in the Middle east today by a factor of probably three to one, who want Israel and America to win this than want Iran to win this. Thank you so much for joining me. Thank you for offering. I don't know if it's clarity, but constructive ambiguity.
- [56:47]
B
Thank you. And I leave you with the of course, Clausewitzian all that we know in war is clouded in three fourths of a fog. I know we're trying to see through the fog and have a better understanding because we live in democracies and that's the freedom that we have to question the objectives and whatever. But there is a lot of uncertainty. And I appreciate what you do on DAY TO Day on your podcast and trying to understand what's going on.
- [57:15]
A
Thank you. The same.