A (3:22)

There's a question of whether Israel would act without US backing or support. Now, Trump is reportedly frustrated by the stalemate. This is perhaps not a surprise after his official delegation that was to be dispatched out of the US to Islamabad was essentially snubbed by the Iranians. Axios has a report saying that Trump, quote, I would describe him as frustrated but realistic. He doesn't want to use force, but he's not backing down. So again, tensions here, the tensions are huge, aren't they?

C (3:54)

And a reminder that there are now three US carrier groups in the region, the highest concentration since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. No point in gazing in a crystal ball, but we can see two ways this can go from now on. Safiyyah, I believe something has happened in the Gulf, in Bahrain, I think in

A (4:15)

Bahrain, 30 people have been sentenced to life in prison. Five of those include two Afghans. They've received life sentences after being convicted of spying for Iran's Revolutionary Guard. The rest of them were sentenced to 10 year terms of accusations of spying for Iran and supporting Iranian attacks. This is on top of Bahrain revoking citizenship for 69 people over allegedly supporting the Iranian war. So a real weaponizing here of repression tactics and also of citizenship which we've seen across the region through this war. Iran too, also threatening to roll back citizenship for some of its people.

C (4:51)

I said earlier that the ceasefire is more or less holding. However, over in Lebanon, Israel has announced some attacks. The Israeli military warned residents of more than a dozen villages and towns in southern Lebanon to immediately evacuate and head northwards ahead of the attacks against what their IDF spokesman called Hezbollah elements. There is also, as you know, meant to be a ceasefire on between Israel and Lebanon, although ceasefires in the Middle east, as Chatham House's Sanam Vakil pointed out to us on Friday, are often punctuated by by violations. Meanwhile, a diplomatic spat between foreign ministries and embassies, basically in London. So the Israeli Foreign Ministry has urged Britain to act against Iran's embassy in London after it launched a campaign attempting to recruit Iranian expats for its war. Eff apparently on the embassy's telegram channel, diplomats urged this is the quotation all brave and noble children of Iran residing in the UK to sign up for the people's defense of the land. Let us all willingly give our lives. It is better than giving the country to the enemy. The Israeli Foreign Ministry says that Britain should act against embassies that spread violence. Says diplomatic cover cannot serve as a shield for terrorist activities. Action against such missions is an essential response to a regime that abuses diplomacy to spread via violence. So the latest diplomatic entanglement there. Sophia, what do you have for us on the. The state of tankers and the Strait of Hormuz.

A (6:23)

The first tanker carrying liquefied natural gas has crossed the Strait of Hormuz. This is for the first time since the beginning of the Iran war. This is based on vessel tracking data. Now, this particular tanker, it's 136,357 cubic meters. This is managed by the UAE. It appears to be off the west coast of India, having last been seen in the Persian Gulf on the 30th of March. This position now where it is near India, suggests that this vessel stopped transmitting its location in order to sail through. This is something that vessels do often when they're, when they're navigating through international waters, usually it's actually a sign that they're trying to hide what they're doing. So this is an interesting approach by the uae. The UAE is also linked now to some breaking News. As of May 1, they are pulling out of OPEC. This is an interesting, very interesting development, something that the UAE had considered before. This might put them more at odds with Saudi Arabia, which they do have ties with that were normalized only in recent years. But in the throes of war and the energy market volatility, if the uae, a major oil producer and exporter, is not facing restrictions of quotas as set through OPEC membership, this might actually be a welcome change for the world at a time when energy supplies are running low.

C (7:46)

This is extraordinary. I'm just looking this up, Sophia. As you said, this has occurred, listeners, since we sat down in the studio to start recording the podcast. The UAE has been. I think they weren't a founder member. They joined in 1967. This is the BBC quoting Saul Kavornich, head of Energy Research at MST Financial. He says it's the beginning of the end of. With the UAE leaving, OPEC loses about 15% of its capacity. And one of its most compliant members, Saudi Arabia, will struggle to keep the rest of OPEC together, effectively having to do most of the heavy lifting. So that is the latest news from the shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. But, Sophia, where should we look if we want to know what the Strait of Hormuz really looks like?

A (8:30)

Well, right here at the Telegraph, our Very own. Senior foreign correspondent Adrian Blomfield has gone there, so you don't have to. He's taking a look at actually what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz, what it looks like, how hot it is, how the haze on the water affects visibility, how these tiny Mosquito. Mosquito fleet boats from Iran are reacting. Is the strait as closed as it sounds? Here is an extract of a dispatch of Adrian literally bobbing around in the Strait of Hormuz in a small boat.

D (9:09)

We're at the narrowest point, pretty much in the Strait of Hormuz. 20 miles here separates Bandar Abbas, the Iranian port, from the mainland on the Gulf. And in normal times, a fifth of the world's oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. But that's come to a stop. This area behind me is under double blockade. And it's an example of how we've seen in other parts of the world, like in the Black Sea. A Mosquito fleet can bring huge disruption. It can gain control of a critical waterway. Got the US Navy down on that side blockading the strait.

C (10:02)

Motor vessel Tosca.

B (10:04)

Motor vessel Tosca, vacate your engine room.

C (10:07)

Vacate your engine room.

B (10:09)

We're prepared to subject you to disabling fire.

D (10:15)

But the fast boats and the drones of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy are still in action. The main navy has been destroyed by the Americans, but they're still able to hold global trade to ransom.

A (10:30)

Today, Iran fired on three separate ships in the waterway and seized two of them. This is while the US is still blockading Iranian ports.

D (10:38)

Doesn't mean that trade between Iran and the Gulf doesn't continue. Because we've actually today we've seen hundreds of speedboats passing along these waters between Iran and the Gulf. They're bringing diesel, which is much cheaper in Iran, petrol products, half the price that they are in certain parts of the Gulf. And they're taking various kind of products back. There's also livestock that crosses that's not being interrupted by the blockade. The traffic still goes across. And that's actually one of the reasons why it's possibly quite hard to spot when mines are being laid on the Gulf. But it's the traffic that's going through on both sides that is not passing. And there are a thousand ships that are trapped on the northern side, unable to cross. And global oil trade is choked as a result.

C (11:35)

The Telegraph's blockade of the Strait of Hormu is right there. We will have more from Adrian tomorrow. That was a small taster, and he will have a full written dispatch up on the Telegraph website. But listen to tomorrow's episode to hear from Adrian himself about a really intrepid bit of reporting there.

A (11:51)

We're taking a short break. When we come back, we'll speak with Arash Azizi, an author and historian, about what's going on with the negotiations between Iran and the US.

C (12:06)

Welcome back. You're listening to Iran the latest with me, Roland Oliphant and Sophia Yan. Now, the peace talks between Iran, the United States are going very, very slowly, partly because of domestic politics inside Tehran. But who exactly is pulling the strings in Tehran? Is there really a division within the regime between those who would like a deal and those who would not? And how will this war affect Iranian politics and society going forward? I'm pleased to say that we're joined now by Arash Azizi, contributing right to the Atlantic, an author and a historian who written several books about Iran, is currently about to produce his third. Arash, welcome to Iran. The latest right now, as we stay on, I think we're on day 21 of the ceasefire. How are you feeling about all this and where the world, where Iran in the Middle east is?

B (13:06)

This is clearly a momentous time, a turning point in Iranian history. And, you know, it has all the hallmarks of watching history happen and the events move so fast and you are following what is happening in the morning and the afternoon and the evening. But then the broader picture also crystallizes and you kind of can see how the next phase of history is being made. So how I feel, first of all, I'm very worried, obviously. First of all, you know, during the war, I was worried for my family daily and what happens to them now, it's much easier, thankfully. And I'm happy there's a ceasefire, but I'm also worried more broadly for Iran and Iran's future. It's hard not to be sad that it's gotten to this point when you look at this history. People love to talk about off ramps, as is a term usually meant for how awakened. But there were many off ramps of historical processes, if you will, by which I mean there were many chances in the last couple of decades for Iran to democratize and if at least not democratize, for it to normalize its ties with the US to basically not come to this point where we'll have to have this war and this ferocious war and everything else that comes with the war. I'm sad that we got in here, but I'm also cautiously hopeful that, you know, we needed to go over that chapter. We needed to Sort of paper over to the new chapter after Khamenei, and that chapter is being written now. I had always had in the last few years this cautious optimism that even short of us getting our democratic goals, for which we should never cease struggling, of course, the next phase of leaders in Iran, even if they come from inside the regime, they'll have to drop the hostility to the U.S. they'll have to kind of integrate Iran to the region, drop some of the most extreme aspects of the regime. And I think they're going toward that direction in a way.

C (15:01)

It doesn't look like it's starting that way. It starts with a war with America. And you're saying that actually, even notwithstanding that, they're going to have to drop a lot of this hostility and a lot of the more extreme stuff, you mean in the longer term?

B (15:16)

Especially given that. Because, I mean, that's the sort of thing, if you shout dev to America for 40 something years, they're like, okay, this is what it looks like. Here's the war. Now you fight. And you know, it's sort of a denouement, right? It's like, okay, this is what it looks like. What are you gonna do? Do you want to, you know, vejvar for another 20 years on and off, or do you wanna end it and open for new conditions? And I have evidence that many of those running Iran today realize that they need to end this war and end this hostility and seek new conditions.

A (15:54)

It's interesting because there is some thinking too that this war might actually bring the public together to galvanize them. I mean, that's interesting. Why do you think that the government, the regime going forward is going to be less aggressive and antagonistic against the US because right now, if they're under siege, once they get out of this period, they can use this to their advantage, right? They can say, well, look at what happened to us. We have to double down even more. I mean, isn't that another way by which the regime could argue for more of the, the other side of what you're saying? So doubling down on the anti American

B (16:24)

rhetoric, first of all, I don't think it can bring the public together in a sense, because the problems of the public continues. You have a ruined economy, isolated country, a heavily minoristic rule, by which, I mean, and you can see this in these pro government rallies that are every night on the street. They just don't look like most Iranians in any way. They are devout Islamists, partisans of a very particular line. Nobody would like to be ruled like that. The majority of Iranians are very different, they're very diverse. Some of them are more religious, some of them are less religious, but they're not this one party of devout fans of Khomeini and Islamism and all that. And to be ruled by them, nobody would like that. So the contradictions that have meant most Iranians are against the regime are not going to go away because of the war. There are those who would deprioritize their opposition to the regime, let's say, but it won't go away. The economic problems, the repression problems, they'll continue and they won't bring the public together. Now why do I think that the regime will have no way but to go toward dropping the anti Americanism? It's because it's not really possible to run the place anymore. So easily this war finishes, they're gonna have an economic ruin on their hand. What's the next step if they basically don't get an agreement with the usa? More war is down the lane with Israel, with uae, which is the new ally of Israel effectively. And even if it's not more, it's more isolation, it's more not being able to gain any benefits of the international economy. It's a rotten deal and they understand that. Sophia, I would say this. The difference between them and Khamenei is that Khamenei was a true ideologue who didn't care. He basically said I'll sacrifice this nation because in 200 years we'll build the Islamist caliphate or whatever. But I don't think these guys do. I think they are more businesslike, technocratic, sort of military folks who by their nature, of their profession and of their political path, are less rigid effectively and less of ideologies.

C (18:44)

Getting into this question, one of the reasons I really want to talk to you is because you're very eloquent at kind of explaining the minuti of the personalities and what's going on in Tehran in a way to those laymen amongst us who can't read Persian, for example, can you clear up one thing for us? So Donald Trump, Trump said the other day that Iran's leadership is divided. And he said, I'm going to extend a ceasefire because they can't get their act together because it's a big division. And he repeated the kind of line about hardliners versus reformers. Now, the FT reports today in public that there are squabbles, public squabbles between the hardline faction called the Paidari and Mohamed Calabaaf, the Speaker of Parliament and the top negotiator, and that those are spilling out into public. We also had Sanam Vakil of Chatham House on the other day. He told us in very robust terms that Trump is wrong to see these divisions. And he's kind of repeating this trope about a distinction between hardliners and reformers. That is kind of an oversimplification. So I just was wondering, I mean, who is right? Is there really a kind of division, a power struggle going on inside Tehran at the moment, or do you think they are all singing from the same hymn sheet?

B (19:55)

Iran obviously has politics and there are divisions. There have always been divisions between different. Between different matters on a matter as crucial as this. Of course there are divisions. But where Sanam is right and President Trump is wrong, is that the hardliners? And what do we mean by hardliners here? Let's clarify those who have come out against talks with the US There's a faction in Iran that says don't talk to the U.S. continue the war. Any talk to the U.S. is compromise. It's treason. We should fight on. Let's call this the hardliners. Do they exist? Yes. But crucially, do they have any serious power in Iran's ruling infrastructure? They don't. Very little. They do not control, like some people assume. They do not, for example, control or have even a very significant section of the Revolutionary Guards in their on their side. You know, this is very crucial because if you really did have Revolutionary Guards dedicated to a hardliner position, well, then the Revolution Guards control most of Iran's economy and politics and security. So nobody would stand a chance. But of course they don't. Khaliba is the Revolutionary Guard. Khaliba, there's no person in Iran who has more power, more sway with the Revolutionary Guards than Khaliba. He controls them. And the hardliners are very politically marginal. Basically their father, if you will, their living figure is Saeed Jalili, who is on the National Security Council. These people are mostly some MPs who support them, but they're very politically marginal. And let me tell you one big example of this. I'm very glad when I have a general analysis based and speaking to people. But then there's a smoking gun that confirms it. And then this smoking gun just appeared, which is that IRG sir Rush regards his main outlet, Tasnim basically is on attack against Raja News, which is an outlet for the hardliners attacking them very hardly. You know, it's very. This is like Fox News versus Newsmax, you know, in the US and this happened, you know, very recently. Why? Because. Because, of course, Taslim knows that Khaliba is negotiating and that they have to negotiate. And they cannot countenance all these guys who are telling them, oh, no, any negotiation is compromised. And, you know, it's also another important point to remember these hardliners, they're basically mostly a bunch of losers who don't have experience actually running things. And this is what makes a lot of Revolutionary Guards and these other guys angry at them, actually, because, you know, it's very easy to just say, go fight America. You know, go fight America. Go fight Israel. But they're not the ones doing the actual fighting most of the time. They're ideologues. You know, they go on TV and they control the state tv, by the way.

A (22:49)

So the FT also, they say specifically in this report that they've got today that the politicians that are linked to this ultra hardline faction is saying that the negotiators who are present at the talks with the US aren't following entirely the directives that were set by Moshtav Al Khamenei. I mean, what do you think is the aim behind this faction? I mean, what are they trying to do by sowing this division or going after Golubov at this moment?

B (23:11)

If someone like me, who is always an opponent of regime all the time, says I'm a little cautiously optimistic that the deal with the US can lead to opening things up? Well, obviously the Paidari Front has to be worried, right? So I think they're right basically in their assessment. They understand that any talks to the US and any deals with the US will lead to unraveling of much of regime's core policies. And they're against that because they're ideologues and they're in favor of holding to these policies. So that's. Oh, no. Why do they bring Mojtaba into it? Because, of course, that's what you do. I mean, that's, you know, in this system. It's very fascinating, actually. The history of factional infighting in the Islamic Republic and its relationship to the Supreme Leader is fascinating. From the very beginning of the revolution, this has been the case. And funnily enough, by the way, usually what happened then is. Let me give you an example. In the late 1980s, obviously you know about Iran Contra, right? Iran was making deals with the United States. This got leaked to the Lebanese press, so that national security, the former national Security Advisor of the US, Robert McFarlane, had come to Iran. He had Met with a group of Iranians and all that. And the eight MPs in Iran, they sort of sent letters, they caused a Roku. How dare we talk with America? And who shut them down? Khomeini. Khomeini gave a speech and basically said, shut the F up. We're doing what we need to do. And you can't be more hardliner than me, basically. So the Supreme Leader has historically been the one who shot down the hardliners at key moments. Of course, Khamenei didn't quite do that. He did it in allowing the 2015 nuclear deal. But he basically had sympathies with the hardliners for much of his career. But now we are faced with mostabaugh. Who is this guy who is obviously he's out of commission mostly, right? He's in a very medically precarious situation. He can't vein day to day decisions. And even if he was to be fully healthy tomorrow morning, you know, this is not a very easy job like your Supreme Leader. All of a sudden it's not like he can just tell everybody what to do and they'll follow it. I mean, I don't think it would be so simple. So the long story short of this is I think Khaliba has a much better chance of getting Mojtab Al Khamenei to agree to whatever he ends up agreeing than the hardliners do. Mojtaba, by all indications and evidence, is more likely to listen to the folks like Khaliba and them. He has better relationship with them. And you know, he also understands they're the ones running the place. Haidari Front can run the country. And I think someone like Mushtaba will understand that.

A (25:48)

I'm so interested in the factional dispute because right now, if you're a politician, if you're somewhere in the leadership, if you're an official, I mean, wouldn't the shared goal be to ensure the survival of the country, to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic, the regime? I mean, having any sort of dispute like this puts that at risk. Right? So why do you think these hardline this hardline factions willing to do that? Because they must know that questioning anybody who might be in the talks now or trying to find a solution and a way forward, that that puts everything on the line. Right? I mean, they could invite the U.S. attacks again.

B (26:22)

That's exactly what Kasnim and the leadership and others are telling these guys. They're basically telling them, look, this is not a time for infighting. Right. You need to stop. But I understand the other side because as I said, they understand that a deal with the US will lead to the unraveling of regime's core policies in la. Those of us who've said things like Islamic Republic is in a dead end, it's at a twilight and all that. That's what we meant. The dead end is this. You either if you make deals with America and you go toward any normalization of ties with America, you lose the core identity of the regime. Right. It will lead to that path. It will be very hard for it not to go to some sort of that path. The model we'll be talking about is Vietnam and I'm going to co write an article with a friend to go into more detail. Vietnam. Communist Party of Vietnam is in power. It's nominally as communist as it ever was, but economically it isn't. And it has to be best friends with the United States effectively. So that's one path that they'll end up in. But if they don't do that, if you're too rigid and you're like, no, no, no compromise with the U.S. we'll fight them, we'll fight them, we'll fight them, well, then you will get destroyed and overthrown. Or at the best case scenario, you have to rule or rule over a ruined country. And that's the Paidari line. Right. So this is the contradiction the regime faces itself. It's really between reform or destruction. But what kind of reform is the

C (27:49)

question on Calabaf, and you were talking about those. Okay, the Paidaris, we think they're marginal, but they're people who actually run the country. It looks like Calabar really is kind of one of the people who probably is running the country. I've spoken to you in the past, I mean, I've lost count actually, or when we started having these conversations. You've spoken to me about Calabar, let's length before and I think you've met him once or twice.

B (28:09)

Yeah, yeah, I have, yeah.

C (28:11)

What can you tell us about him? And what, what his character or the fact that he seems to be, well, one of the people in power now or certainly the person leading negotiations with America. What does that tell us about the state of Iran and where it's going and I suppose whether these peace talks succeed or whether there's going to be more war.

B (28:29)

So Yuqalibaf has been a character that I had always felt had a chance to be one who will lead this kind of transformation. And finally he finds himself in this seat and we have to see whether he can stay on and what he'll do. He certainly does seem to be running things in Iran right now. Now, who is Kaliba? Short story. He was one of the chief young commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, this militia that undergoes much of power in Iran during the 1980s when Iran fought with Iraq. He was best teased with Qasem Soleimani, the other IRGC commander in the war with Iran in 1980s, who later on Gassim Soleimani, headed the external operations wings of the IRGC and became sort of a global celebrity for a moment. The famed shadow commander. So Khalibaf, that was his past in the 80s he remained in Revolutionary Guards. He headed the Air Force. He's really the father of its missile program. He helped build it up. But somewhere along the line he became very much a politician wannabe. He clearly wanted to be a politician and wanted to run Iran. He ran for president in 2005. He was defeated by upstart nobody had heard of Ahmadinejad. His constellation prize was the mayorship of Tehran, which He held from 2005 for more than a decade. And so Khaliba has been an ambitious guy who wants to be president. He repeatedly has ran and lost for president either lost at the polls. He lost to Rouhani in 2013. He had to sort of withdraw on future occasions. And finally he again lost in 2024. People will also remember him. When he was mayor of Tehran. He sometimes won these global competitions for the best mayors of the world. In Davos in 2008, in World Economic Forum, he was hanging out with the then fellow young mayor of San Francisco, Gavin Newsom. And he sort of made a lot of headlines there. He spoke to Newsom, he said Iran should have ties with America, we should put our differences aside and all that. He has a brutal past in many ways. He was the national police chief. He boasted about how he had personally put down a student protest in 2009. In fact, in the presidential debate in 2013, he boasted about how he had personally got on a motorcycle and beat people up basically to show how he's a sort of a hands on guy. And during the reform era, he had definitely been one of the chief guards who threatened the reformist President Khatami to rein in the students and all that. So he definitely has that side. For that reason, he's seen as trusted by the Revolutionary Guards, by the hard core of the regime. But he also has this, as the other example shows, during his mayorship of Tehran, he has this technocratic side. So what does this all mean? I think Khaliba is the face of this kind of transformation of the Islamic world that I talked about. I think. I think these people understand that they need to drop the hostility to the U.S. this sort of eternal war with the U.S. i think they do understand that they need to drop the worst of social domestic repression, the most important symbol of which is the mandatory head covering, mandatory hijab for women. They need to drop that. They need to liberalize, if not democratize. By liberalize I mean loosen the socialist strictures that the regime imposes on the population and drop toxicity to the us get some sort of a normalization, go towards integrating Iran into the region and all that. So I think someone like Ali Baf understands that. And this is the kind of negotiations they will do with the U.S. of course, this doesn't mean they'll be successful on this path or they'll be actually able to get it done, but I think that's the direction they'll go towards.

A (32:08)

If you had to rank, say on a scale of 1 to 10, how desperate Golibov is right now to have a deal, how would you characterize that? I mean, they haven't agreed immediately. Obviously that means the risk of the war erupting again stands, which would be terrible for the economy. It's a question of how much longer Iran could sustain and how much do you think they want a deal?

B (32:31)

The question is what kind of a deal? Right? Let me tell you this. They're not desperate at all for any deal, right? Like if they see a deal will be seen as them capitulating, they would not want that deal because they think they can go on. And I think they can go on for a very long time. They can rule over a country that is much more ruined, much more poor, much more repressive for a very long time, or go down fighting, frankly. I mean, if they think, oh, if we don't do that, they'll fight us again, Israel will try to instigate something. The Lataka's 10 times more. They are ready to do that unless they can get a deal that they can accept, basically. They won't totally capitulate so easily. But they are also, as I said, they have every reason not to want to go back to war. They know war is gonna be difficult and they know economy is destroyed, so they don't want war. And they also don't want this. No war, no peace, actually. Because what they need is a lifting of the sanctions on the Iranian economy, economic reconstruction, which needs A definitive end to the war, not an inconclusive end like last year. So that's what they really want, but only if they can get a deal that they think they can sell to their base and that they think will not be a total capitulation. I think the contours of the thing that makes this all crazy is that the contours of a deal are kind of clear. Right? All of us who write about these things just on some level wish we were in the room to see exactly how they're talking about all of this. But the contours of the era are clear. It's clear what Iran would have to agree to at the end and what us will have to agree to.

C (34:14)

What are the things the Americans are going to have to agree with and what are the Iranians going to have to agree with?

B (34:19)

Americans have to agree that Iran will not say that it will never ever enrich nuclear material again, that it would accept to suspend its nuclear enrichment, but with the provision that it would be able to redo it again in some 10, 15 years under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and while renouncing any decision to build a nuclear weapon so that basically the nuclear program would continue to exist, but in a way that could be totally verified not to go toward weaponization. That's what Americans would have to agree on. And I think they will agree on. I mean, I think they have already shown a willingness to agree to that Iran should do something to its highly enriched uranium. The HEU either ship it to Russia, which is why the Iranian foreign minister was in Russia recently, ship it to Russia diluted on the Iranian soil, or something of the sort. So this is on the nuclear program. This is the most crucial part. And the United States need to lift the sanctions on the Iranian economy and unfreeze Iranian assets. These are the most basics. And they don't seem to want to get to a detailed deal on the missiles, for example. I don't think they want to do that. And so the other two outstanding issues usually is the missiles program of Iran and its support for these Arab militias in the region like Hezbollah and Hamas. The latter also has been partially solved because they're so weakened, these militias that they're not an important part of the equation anymore. So as the contrast of the deal is clear, I mean Iran verifying that it won't build a nuclear weapon in exchange for lifting of the sanctions and some sort of a, perhaps also some sort of an end of hostility with the US that is a non aggression

C (36:12)

pact, something like that then going for the specifics. So Abbas Aradchi went to, went to Moscow. No, sorry, St. Petersburg, I think yesterday. And he went to Islamabad twice. And between his Islamabad trips, he was in Muscat. He's been doing a lot of rounds. And we're told that what he was floating was a three stage plan for peace. From the reporting we've seen, the plan was right. First of all, we stopped the war. Both sides stopped the war. We're not fighting. Then we both unblock the Strait of Hormuz and then we sit down and talk nuclear. The reporting we've got this morning, us, Reuters, whoever else. Is that the word from the White House is that Trump isn't happy with that. Nuclear cannot be the last thing. It's all got to be solved together or nuclear has to be solved

A (36:57)

before

C (36:57)

a deal is agreed. You think they can bridge that divide before hostilities break out again? Because the longer this goes on, of course, the risk of the Americans and the Israelis resuming bombing increases.

B (37:09)

Exactly. And Iran could also resume. Iran could resume by helping to block the Strait of Bab el Mandab by Houthis. It could start attacking some UAE sites. So there is a risk of the war resuming. They can bridge the gaps. I mean, look at it. As I told you, it's all about sequencing. You know, I mean, it's very strange if two sides want a deal and they just break out over who does what first. And that has been the case several times in Ryan negotiations with Iran. You know, imagine if you want to exchange two houses, right, and you agree with the other person. Everyone agrees, you're just agreeing. Oh, do you move out first and then someone takes care of the place and then I move in second. Right. These are procedural differences. So it's the same thing here. They all agree. And the nuclear stuff, because they've been talking about this for more than 20 years. Everyone knows what are the contours of the deal.

A (38:02)

What do you think Iran might be prepared to offer by the way of guarantees that they will actually stick by their side of the deal? Because the criticism has been for so long that they say one thing but do another. The things are very different now, right? The with this war. So what do you think? What do you think they're prepared to offer? And what do you think will be palatable to the US to accept as goodwill and good faith that they are really going to do all these potential things that are being discussed?

B (38:25)

So first of all, if one is to be fair, the regime didn't range on the nuclear deal, for example. When it signed the nuclear deal in 2015, it didn't say one thing and do another. It kept on to its agreement pretty well even after Trump left. Now, and how do we know that? Which is also the question of how can we verify. Well, International Atomic Energy Agency, right. So the IAEA will have inspectors all over Iran who will inspect the deal and will. I mean, that's how this works, right? The way this works is you have inspectors on the ground now, of course. Can Iran have a secret nuclear program, agree to this, but secretly build a nuclear program somewhere else and develop a weapon? It sure can. I mean that, you know, but if he was able to keep it secret, you wouldn't have the crisis here in the first place. You know, the point is that what would be the benefit for it of doing that? The thing that is this question of leverage. You know, there are different kinds of leverage. The sanctions gave leverage to the west for a while, but they become anti leverage at a point. Basically, Iran has nothing to lose. All the sanctions. It has a lot to gain, but has nothing to lose. You know what I mean? If the sanctions are lifted, it could gain a lot of. But it has also lived with the sanctions for so long. Whereas if the economy is normalized, if Iran becomes a more prosperous country as a result, rocking the boat will cost it a lot. It would mean that it would have to go down again and it won't do that. But anyways, any nuclear deal is robustly carried by inspections, by disguise of the iaea, whose entire life purpose is basically to make sure these agreements hold.

C (40:13)

You've announced on your X feed that you are writing a new book called Counterweights Iran, Israel and the Battle for the Middle East. I think it sounds like a great opportunity to give you the opportunity to plug your book, I suppose, with the question of, you know, what's the thesis here? It sounds to me like you're writing something about, I don't know, how this war has changed the Middle East. Is that fair?

B (40:33)

So the book will go, you know, from 1940s to now. So it's not just this war, but sort of. It's a book about how Iran and Israel and as conduits in this region, how basically a better way to understand the history of modern Middle east is to look at Iran and Israel. You know, we often like to look at Israeli Arab conflict or others, but actually a lot of different things happen if you look at Iran and Israel. And yeah, the book is. I'm writing it now, but it should be published by next year. I guess what I'm trying to show is Iran, historically from the very foundation of Israel in the 1940s, Iran historically decided to not take a part in the conflict that the new state of Israel was gonna have in the region. He decided not to join it, right? Not to join this conflict against Israel, and it established relations with it. And in 1979 that changed and it flipped, actually, because the main Arab state ended its conflict, Egypt ended its conflict with Israel, whereas Iran joined the fray in conflict against Israel. And for Iran and Israel to be at each other's throats has been terrible for the Middle East. So I try to show in this book how the longer history shows that Iran Israel had no reason to want to fight and why did they come to fight and also what would happen if they stopped these hostilities? What would this look like if Iran and Israel were not fighting as they have since 1979? So that's what I try to show in the book. And I would just say one thing that even people who might consider themselves very well versed in this history, I think they'll find something surprising in most chapters of this book because I was very surprised when writing it. A lot of histories between Iran and Israel and how their dynamics really helped define the region in the last eight years is really not well known. So I hope to shed some light on it.

A (42:31)

That was Arash Azizi speaking to me and Roland Oliphant. That's it for today on Iran the Latest.

C (42:36)

We'll be back tomorrow. Until then, that was Iran the Latest Goodbye, Goodbye. Iran. The Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph, created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Oliphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciate this podcast podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app and if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondence on the ground, sign up for our new daily newsletter Cables via our website or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We are still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or you can contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show. Notes Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The Executive producer is Louisa Wells.