Loading summary
Transcript43 lines
- [00:04]
Sophia Yan
The telegraph.
- [00:09]
Mint Mobile Advertiser
Well, the holidays have come and gone once again. But if you've forgotten to get that special someone in your life a gift, well, Mint Mobile is extending their holiday offer of half off unlimited wireless. So here's the idea. You get it now, you call it an early present for next year. What do you have to lose? Give it a try@mintmobile.com switch limited time.
- [00:29]
Sophia Yan
50% off regular price for new customers. Upfront payment required for 45 for 3 months, $90 for 6 months or 180 for 12 month plan taxes and fees. Extra speeds may slow after 50 gigabytes per month when network is busy See.
- [00:39]
Amazon One Medical Advertiser
Terms Amazon One Medical presents painful thoughts do they ever actually clean the ball pit at these kids play gyms? Or is my kid just swimming in a vat of bacteria catching whatever cootie of the day is breeding in there? A cootie that'll probably take down our whole family. Luckily, with Amazon One Medical 24. 7 Virtual Care, you can get checked out for whatever ball pittitis you've contracted. Amazon One Medical Healthcare just got less painful.
- [01:16]
Sophia Yan
Because of all this fighting. It's led to this reemergence of concerns of what it means if this area of Syria cannot be held under control.
- [01:25]
Amazon One Medical Advertiser
We will measure our success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars we end. Right now all eyes are on Washington, but who's actually watching Europe at the moment?
- [01:40]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
The deepening ties between China, Russia and North Korea would certainly have some in Washington concerned.
- [01:46]
Roland Oliphant
And then Daddy has to sometimes use strong language.
- [01:49]
Amazon One Medical Advertiser
We're going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition.
- [01:56]
Sophia Yan
The IDF will continue to uphold the ceasefire agreement and will respond firmly to any violation of it.
- [02:04]
Roland Oliphant
I'm Roland Oliphant and this is Battle lines. It's Monday 26th January 2026. Now, over the past few weeks, while we have been, I think, understandably preoccupied with events in Venezuela, Iran and Greenland, dramatic things have been unfolding in Syria, where the autonomous Kurdish statelet in the northeast has effectively been overrun by troops loyal to the Transitional Syrian government run by Ahmad Al Sharar. The events of the past two weeks have dramatically redrawn the map of the country and the balance of power there and in the wider region. It raises all kinds of questions. Questions about whether the United States allies can trust it. Questions about the future of tens of thousands of Islamic State prisoners, and of course, questions about the future of of the Kurds themselves within the new Syria. To discuss all this I'm joined by Sophia Yan, our senior foreign correspondent who was recently in Syria, and Dr. Burcu Ostcilik, who is a Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security at the Royal United Services Institute and an expert on Kurdish identity. I began by asking Burcu what had happened over the past couple of weeks and why it's so significant.
- [03:21]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
The past few weeks have been a fundamental reversal of the good fortune that the Syrian Democratic Forces, the sdf, have enjoyed for quite some time. What's happened is a major rollback of SDF controlled areas in the north and northeast, primarily of Syria. They had controlled key territory in that area, including, including dams, including strategic border crossings, oil and gas fields, since around 2012, 2013, when the revolution in Syria, which became a multi sided civil war, first kicked off. And that was really the history of this dates back decades, back to the late 1970s. But in terms of the current status of what the Kurds were able to achieve in northeastern Syria, this is really 2012 we're talking about. After the war in Syria kicked off, Central Syrian army troops withdrew from these areas in order to focus attention on the Arab insurgency which was picking up pace at that time. So since then, mainly before the SDF was created, the current sort of structure.
- [04:35]
Roland Oliphant
This is the Syrian Democratic Forces, they call themselves.
- [04:38]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
That's right, that's right. And the SDF was formed during the rise of Islamic State or isis, and was a key partner, a security partner to the United States, chiefly in the global coalition to defeat isis. What has happened in recent weeks, to go back to your initial question, is that the central government in Damascus, led by Interim President Ahmed Al Shara, has acted militarily to take back key territory from the sdf. And this is mainly driven by, by the failure to progress on what's called the March 10th agreement, which was agreed last year. It was really more than an agreement. It was more a series of principles by which the SDF and Damascus, the interim government in Damascus, would agree on the terms of what an SDF integration into Central Security and Ministry of Interior structures in Syria, in Damascus would look like. And blame has been traded on both and all sides as to why more progress was not achieved. The deadline was 31 December, which passed with no agreement in place. The SDF has been blamed for dragging its feet for not agreeing in a substantial form to what integration might look like. They raised some, some demands of Damascus which were seen to be maximalist posturing. And Damascus was very firm in that they seek territorial control over the entirety of Syria and focused on creating a centralized state system. And this vision for the future of Syria is backed by the United States and special envoy Tom Barrack and of course the Turkish government as well.
- [06:35]
Roland Oliphant
I visited this area in 2019, right at the end of the offensive against ISIS. It seemed to operate as its own country in a way. They called it Rojava. That was their term for it. Could you just tell us, kind of, just so we get a sense of how far this has changed and what's changed. What is Rojava and what does that mean to Kurds? What do they mean when they use that phrase?
- [06:57]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
Rojava was a term that, that refers to the aspiration for a Kurdistan in Syria, in eastern Syria. If we take a step back and maybe describe the main Kurdish actors that have been influential in the creation of Rojava and this has been a contentious issue for a number of years. But fundamentally the main constituent part of SDF of the Syrian Democratic Forces was formed by the YPG and the ypj. And these are Syrian armed factions that are seen to be the offshoot of the PKK or the Kurdistan Workers Party, which is a designated terrorist organization recognized as such by the uk, by the eu, by the United States and certainly by Turkey.
- [07:43]
Roland Oliphant
This is the group that has been fighting for Turkish autonomy, independence in Turkey for many years.
- [07:49]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
Yes, targeted Turkey. It was formed in 1978. It launched its first attack against Turkish security forces in 1984. It's based out the mountainous area in northern Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan in the Kandil Mountains. Its Syrian presence dates back to 1979 when the founder of the PKK, Abdullah Jalan, was able to agree a safe haven inside Syria within Hafez Al Assad and the Syrian territory as well as the Bekah Valley in Lebanon were used for training purposes, indoctrination. The kind of the playground of the PKK at the time and the ypg, ypj. The YPJ is the all female unit of this fighting force gained a foothold in Syria. And even after the the capture of Abdullah Jalan, the PKK presence continued in northern Syria. And that's what became the backbone of Rojava. An area that was highly influenced by the ideological blueprint of which called for. Well, drew upon ideas around democratic autonomy in the first instance, democratic Confederalism, which was seen to be sort of a loosely formed borderless confederation of Kurdish majority areas that spanned Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. That would be the long term vision for what this might look like. Rojava was the first experiment of the PKK and its affiliates experiment in territorial control in northern Syria. And it's important, of course, and perhaps we'll get into this, but there are divergences in ideology, in political leadership, in strategy, between PKK linked groups and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq across the border.
- [09:44]
Roland Oliphant
Sophia, you've been following the events over the past week. Could you just give us a sense of where things are today as we speak?
- [09:52]
Sophia Yan
Well, the Syrian government, they did move in this part of the country into the northeast, and that's essentially why there were so many clashes. There was a ceasefire agreed only for a few days, that was then extended and renewed. And now that's going for up to 15 days. And the reason given is that the US which in this region, had been working with the SDF to secure camps that were holding Islamic State fighters and sympathists and their families. There's a plan now to move them to Iraq, up to 7,000 people. So this operation's being overseen by the US and they need time to do this. And so the ceasefire essentially is to allow for that. But it's created a lot of problems in the region, a lot of concerns. First within Syria, what Berji was talking about, I mean, there's a real concern amongst, I would say, all Kurds at any level about whether they can really trust this new interim Syrian government, if there really is a place for them as pledged that they will truly be equal citizens. I mean, there have been some changes made in place, for instance, to recognize their language, to recognize religious holidays, to recognize Kurds as citizens. Until now, they were stateless. This was something that had happened under Hafez Assad's time. It was a huge issue for Syrian Kurds. So there are changes that have been made, but there's a huge distress that still remains. There's a sense of, okay, this was taken from us. It's been given back to us now, but it can still be taken again in the future. And there is distrust of the US Too. I mean, there's a sense that everyone's just getting what they need right now in the moment, and that the Kurds in Syria will again be shafted. I just want to highlight what Berjie said before about this agreement from March 2025, after that was done. And the Kurds seemed to have really believed that this was going to be a good opportunity for them within Syria. Just a few days after that, President Al Sharra signed an interim constitution institution for Syria. It's very brief, and it's meant to govern the country until they can get something more solid in place. But in that it states that the religion for the country is Islam, and the name for the country is unchanged as the Syrian Arab Republic. Now, this may not sound like so much to outsiders, but to the Kurds, to them, this signified a disinterest in truly bringing them into the fold. So all of this was boiling all of 2025, in the first year that the new Syria was trying to rebuild after the fall of Assad. And you get to the end of 2025, this was when the Kurdish forces were meant to be integrated into the Syrian military, which was a problem because of all this distrust that we've been talking about so far. So that was always an issue. That was really a big concern. The other thing I think to highlight here is the risk of the resurgence of the Islamic State. So there are tens of thousands of people held in camps and prisons in the northeast of Syria that were being secured by the stf, and that was with the help of the us and the US has made clear that they had no state actor in which to work with in that area, that the SDF was the only partner they could have coordinated with on this particular aspect. But because of all this fighting, it's led to this re emergence of concerns of what it means if this area of Syria cannot be held under control. So, again, there's movement of prisoners. There were some escapes of people. The US has said that they were all found and recaptured and brought back. But again, this is an area where the international community has not focused enough attention at all. And it is a vulnerability, and it has to be addressed. But right now, everything's all happening so quickly. The fighting captures the difficulties that are on the ground and the differences between the various groups and factions involved. But there are much wider global concerns that need to be taken into account.
- [13:36]
Roland Oliphant
The change in territory that's happened here and also the question of the prisoners is really interesting. So at the height of isis, I remember being embedded with the sdf, basically, and they had basically taken control of this almost this huge northeastern corner of Syria down to the Euphrates, where ISIS were boxed in. They basically herded the prisoners that they took, including women and children, into these two enormous, enormous camps. You know, anyone who's seen them will know that these are just enormous areas kind of fenced off, almost like if you've been to a music festival, just tents and tents full of people. There's two things that I really want to ask you about. One is like, how have the Kurds lost control of so much territory so quickly. The second thing is why were the Kurds left with responsibility for these thousands and thousands of jihadists?
- [14:29]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
Well, your first question, why and how were the SDF sort of forced into this position where they're having to roll back into the furthest corner of northeastern Syria and Hasikah. I know it seems as though this happened very suddenly, out of the blue, the Syrian army and Damascus moving in to these SDF controlled areas. I think that actually all indicators point to how there will have been military intelligence, security planning ahead of this for quite some time, certainly post 10th March 2025 agreement and some anticipation on the Turkish side, on the American side that an agreement would not come to pass. So what has happened, I think took Kurdish forces by surprise to an extent. They were unprepared. And there, I think behind the scenes was a strategic miscalculation. And in that the SDF overplayed their hand. And what I mean by that is they exaggerated the extent to which the United States would continue to back them regardless of the major power dynamic shift in Damascus. So the SDF were the Americas and the coalition's main security partner on the ground during the fight against Islamic State. And there the fighters made incredible sacrifices in their battle against Islamic State and were able to push back the caliphate and retake key territory. What shifted though was when Assad fell on December 8, when Assad fell, the United States began to rethink their Syria policy and remember that America was for a while reconsidering their military troop presence in country. And so when Assad fell, I think the strategic calculation there began to shift as well. The US Prefers to work state to state rather than with armed non state actors or proxies when possible. And because a significant amount of planning and investment and effort had gone into preparing, I suspect, Al Shara for this role in Damascus, that was significant. And the Kurds, I think, didn't appreciate how that would impact the level of operational, tactical and strategic support that they would receive from the United States. On top of that, late last year, Ahmed Al Shara agreed to and formally joined the U. S led coalition against Islamic State. And this was significant because now the United States and its allies have in Damascus a state partner that has agreed to a fight against Islamic State. And this, I know, seems counterintuitive given the ideological and operational legacy of Al Sharah and Ayatahir Al Sham or hts. But bear in mind that HTS in Idlib, when Al Shara was governing in northwestern Syria, this province of Idlib. They fought against Islamic State. They clashed from 2017 onwards. And so there is a history there. That's not to say that HTS was pro Western, pro democracy. No. But they also, there were fractures within the jihadi Islamist world.
- [17:50]
Roland Oliphant
In that case, what has the role of the United States been in the past week's fighting? Have they been involved at all? Do they still have a troop presence there? And I suppose the big question is, do you think they gave the green light to this operation?
- [18:03]
Sophia Yan
Green light question. Unclear how much the US May have known, but you would presume they've had a lot of contacts through the Turkish ambassador, who's also the special envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack. He's there all the time. I mean, he knows Shahra, he knows his foreign affairs minister. I mean, they are always in touch to what level this was known or okayed or not. You know, like, wink, wink. Unclear. But the US has been using some intermediaries. They've actually been using a Kurdish leader in Iraq who's well known to help negotiate de escalation in fighting between the SDF and the Syrian government. I mean, there's a lot of different people involved in trying to figure out some way forward. And the US has made clear, I mean, Tom Barrack's been putting out statements on X. He's not engaging really with media on this issue, but he has put out several statements. And he's made clear that because there was no state actor to be working with, there was no government to be working with, they had to go with the sdf. And that's why they were in this position. But now they do see that there's a chance for the US to ramp down its presence to be a little bit less involved in this area. And that's why you're seeing this also, this agreement about moving prisoners to Iraq. The is prisoners over to Iraq. But again, this doesn't really address the issue. You're just moving the people from one country to another. It doesn't address the wider concern that a lot of nations in the region, in the Middle east and also the US and other Western countries have about the potential resurgence of the Islamic State. I mean, there are foreign nationals here. The estimates are really unclear. There have been children born into these camps, but some estimates are at 8,500 thereabouts for foreign nationals in these camps, in these prisons. And foreign countries with people with their nationals there have not done very much to figure out what next. Some countries have in the past sent them over to Iraq for trial to be put into prisons. But for instance, the UK has nationals there, they've got Brits there, but they haven't done anything or said very much about what they plan to do. And so there's a big question going forward, just by moving this group of people over what is that really going to resolve?
- [20:02]
Roland Oliphant
BURCU There must be a narrative of betrayal, I suppose, amongst the SDF and the Americans. Do you think it's justified here? Have the Americans betrayed their allies in a sense?
- [20:11]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
Of course they have. And that's a powerful narrative and that will resonate for quite some time. We've been here before during the first Trump administration when President Trump signaled that he would greenlight the US military withdrawal from northeastern Syria, effectively ending support on the ground for the sdf. This of course is a significant escalation of that now that we're witnessing unfold on the ground. But at the same time, I think we need to take a step back and look at the wider US strategy in Syria. The main objective was to defeat Islamic State. And yes, absolutely, we must not be complacent is Islamic State remains a live regional security threat and preventing a comeback will require sustained counterterrorism, pressure and stabilization of post conflict governance and delivery of basic services and a functioning state in Syria. But when we talk about resurgence, I think we have to be careful about the fact that there are varying levels of probability what that threat entails. Are we talking about a jump in attacks, a change in attack tempo? Are we talking about the reconstitution of territorial control and, and the declaration of caliphate that we saw when ISIS was at its peak? I don't think it's the latter and I would caution against exaggerating the Islamic State threat as the only reason to which lend support to the Kurdish cause in northern Syria. I think we need to be thinking about the rights of the Kurdish peoples inside Syria beyond what happens to the sdf. And the sdf, bear in mind, was always a constellation of various factions such that at the core the backbone of it was ypg, ypj. But then it grew in the anti ISIS coalition to incorporate integrate various major Arab tribes in the area. And this is why we often heard the statistic that the SDF was made up of 100,000 fighters. Again, that's sort of dubious, can be contested. But one of the reasons why, going back to your earlier question, why the SDF lost so much territory so quickly, and this is my point about how a lot of, I suspect a lot of planning behind the scenes went into the Syrian government's operation against the Kurds. In that these Arab tribes, they flipped. They began to more openly criticize the sdf and their loyalties changed towards in favor of Damascus. And that was a significant reason why the SDF began to lose not only territory, of course, that's significant, but their legitimacy in Arab majority areas. And that's important. We talk about northeastern Syria as though it's primarily predominantly a Kurdish majority. That was never the case. They were ruling over pockets of territory that were Arab majorities. And during the height of Assad, during the height of isis, these Arab tribes, these clans, took a very pragmatic choice and they aligned with sdf. That's where American support and allied support was. And they saw the priority in fighting, defeating isis. Since the fall of Assad, those loyalties were agitated. They began to shift. And that's why we are where we are now as well. And that the Arab majority tribes did not want to see Kurdish complete absolute control over oil and gas reserves, for example, which is seen as a Syrian national asset. And one of the maximalist demands that the SDF was making in its negotiations since the 10 March agreement was that they should receive in the new arrangement up to 30% of revenues of the oil and gas fields, for example, that should be transferred to the autonomous administration. And this was a contentious issue. And other actors in the country did not want to see this happen. And the statelessness of the Kurds for decades was hugely problematic for a number of reasons. And I can only hope that Al Shara will stick with his pledge to recognize the equal rights of all Kurdish people in the new Syria. And hesitation and suspicion, I think is valid, but at the same time, we have to kind of take into account the various, the tribal dynamics in the area under, under Kurdish control as well, and why that mattered in terms of the demographics there.
- [24:46]
Roland Oliphant
Coming up, what does the collapse of Kurdish ruled northeastern Syria mean for the wider region, especially as the United States gears up to strike Iran?
- [25:02]
Mint Mobile Advertiser
Well, the holidays have come and gone once again, but if you've forgotten to get that special someone in your life a gift. Well, Mint Mobile is extending their holiday offer of half off unlimited wireless. So here's the idea. You get it now, you call it an early present for next year. What do you have to lose? Give it a try@mintmobile.com Switch limited time.
- [25:22]
Sophia Yan
50% off regular price for new customers. Upfront payment required. $45 for three months, $90 for six month or $180 for 12 month plan taxes and fees. Extra speeds may slow after 50 gigabytes per month when network is busy see terms.
- [25:32]
Amazon One Medical Advertiser
Amazon One Medical presents painful thoughts. Do they ever actually clean the ball pit at these kids play gyms? Or is my kid just swimming in Nevada? Bacteria catching whatever cootie of the day is breeding in there. A cootie that'll probably take down our whole family. Luckily, with Amazon One Medical 24. 7 Virtual Care, you can get checked out for whatever ball pit itis you've contracted. Amazon One Medical healthcare just got less painful.
- [26:02]
Darina (Quo Co-founder)
Hi, I'm Darina, co founder of Quo. You might know us as OpenPhone. My dad is a business owner and growing up he always kept his ringtone super loud so he'd never miss a customer call. That stuck with me. When we started Quo, our mission was to help businesses not just stay in touch, but make every customer feel valued, no matter when they might call. Quo gives your team business phone numbers to call and text on your phone or computer. Your calls, messages and contacts live in one workspace so your team can stay fully aligned and reply faster. And with our AI agent answering 24. Seven, you'll really never miss a customer. Over 90,000 businesses use quo. Get 20% off@quo.com business. That's quo.com business and we can port your existing numbers over for free. Quo. No missed calls, no missed customers.
- [27:02]
Roland Oliphant
Welcome back. You're listening to Battle Lines, the Telegraph's defense and foreign policy podcast. I'm speaking to Dr. Bergi Ocalik of the Royal United Services Institute and Telegraph senior foreign correspondent Sophia Yan. We're discussing recent events in northeastern Syria. Sofia just gave us a really good kind of rundown of the, of the problem with the ISIS prisoners. Huge numbers held in these two camps. It does present a massive security challenge. I was just wondering whether you could cast some light on why the SDF were left in charge of all these. This vast number of. Well, I mean, many of them foreign, many of them Syrian, but terrorists.
- [27:44]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
Basically the reason the SDF had control over the camps and the prisons in this area, it was a function of them being positioned as the US's key ally on the ground. And they were trained up for this purpose. There was intelligence sharing and coordination ongoing with the US military presence in northeastern Syria as well. And they were competent actors on the ground that could be trusted. They were reliable in overseeing and asserting authority over these highly volatile camps and prisons. On the flip side, in recent days and over the past week or so, as Damascus has gained control of these sites, there have been allegations of abuse, of harassment that Those in these camps claim were the fault of the SDF as they withdrew. So what we're seeing is a real spike in disinformation in insides trading accusations and blame. But your original point, the SDF were very competent and able fighters and administrators that held control over the camps, the ISIS camps and the prisons, transferring them over the prisoners to a site in Iraq across the border. Again, I struggle to believe that this is all happening sort of on an ad hoc basis and planning spontaneously, this will have been in the pipeline for quite some time as a contingency plan. The question is to what extent Iraqi state capacity exists to process these detainees to ensure that they have access to a fair trial and are treated humanely in accordance with international humanitarian law and such. There are going to be questions, I think, in the coming period about how these ISIS detainees are handled or processed inside Iraq. But I think the overall strategic objective seems to be to move the ISIS threat outside of Syria and to amend the way in which the SDF has functioned. Their core function as being the guardians of ISIS detainees and camps has shifted to Damascus. Whether Damascus can pull this off, that's the question. This is going to be a big test for the government.
- [30:04]
Roland Oliphant
Now, Safiyyah, you were recently in Damascus. You were all over the country, really. What's your sense of the answer to that question? Can this new government, this new state, pull that off, or is it still in a place of chaos?
- [30:21]
Sophia Yan
Well, that's the million dollar question for Syria and its military and security forces right now. They had to expand so quickly their ranks, you know, governing Syria, the entire nation, and as much of it that they can, can manage to ensure safety over. I mean, this is much bigger than Idlib, which is a very small enclave in comparison to the wider nation. And so Idlib was the area that they did have control over before the fall of the Assad regime. And all of a sudden, Shiraz group had a lot more land to ensure would be safe and secure for its population. So this is a question that has plagued the new government since day one. They've had challenges. I mean, they've definitely had challenges. They've had clashes with different groups in different parts of the country. Some of this goes back to what the Kurds also face, which is this fear and distress that the new country may not really have a proper and equal place for them. There are some tensions underlying that are residual from the Assad regime. Just a lot of former regime officials, for instance, still walking around. And I mean, that's creating tension amongst regular Syrians but then on the whole, being able to manage and to try to keep the peace means that they've had to increase their ranks very quickly. They've had to vet people, and sometimes because they've had to move quickly, it seems maybe the vetting process wasn't always as deep as it could have been. There have been incidents of attacks just in December, actually, when I was there, it was the middle of December. There was an attack that was suspected to be linked to the Islamic State, but perpetrated by a member of the Syrian security forces. And in that one, American troops died. Syrian security force members also died. And that was the first attack where US Military had casualties within Syria in quite a number of years, I think since 2019, since the collapse of ISIS. These examples that show the strain that Syria faces when it comes to ensuring its security forces can manage the entire country. So it really remains to be seen they need a lot more people. They need them to be well trained. They need to make sure that their loyalties are with the new Syrian government. And when you're thinking about a country of this size that has been after 14, 15 years of civil war in this new burgeoning state, it's still very fragile. You've had a lot of different groups that were armed, different factions, different loyalties. I mean, this is very difficult to bring under one umbrella at a time when parts of the country really is still chaotic. And then there's that distress issue. I mean, this is something that will take a really long time to overcome. A lot of the officials and diplomats I talk to, both outside and ins Syria, there's a sense that the new president, that Al Shah, didn't really do enough to focus on outreach to all the different groups to really kind of assuage those concerns. So we'll see. I mean, Syria is now going into a second year post Assad. They are learning the new government's very interesting. They seem to be responding pretty quickly to the kinds of challenges that they face and the things that they've encountered. So there is a chance that things will be totally fine. But it is an understatement to say that they have an uphill battle. Every single Syrian you talk to, it doesn't matter of what socioeconomic class, of what, what job they have, what their background is. They'll all generally say the same thing. There's a saying in Arabic about how they're starting from below scratch, below zero, and that other countries, of course, face challenges. But what Syria faces is so unique and specific to them. It's very difficult for anyone outside the country to understand the massive mountain that they have to climb as a nation.
- [33:55]
Roland Oliphant
We've talked a lot about the American role, but the role of other powers here. And I'm thinking particularly of Turkey, who obviously have their own long running issues with the PKK and Israel in what's happening here. What do we make of the role of those two countries in this offensive over the past few weeks in the northeast and when you speak Berje, I suppose when you speak of this was in the pipeline, there must have been planning here. Do you mean there was planning in Ankara or maybe in Tel Aviv as well?
- [34:28]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
Both, but most certainly in Ankara. This is the issue of northeastern Syria and the possibility of a Kurdish enclave there becoming a constitutionalized entity akin to Iraqi Kurdistan, which is a very distinct case. And just a side note, Ankara has a highly functional relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government based in Erbil. Very different case. But when it came to northern Syria, because of the PKK link and Turkey's assessment that this would pose a long term existential threat to Turkish national security interests. And these are very well known, this point of view. There has been planning in place since prior to the fall of Assad, certainly, but post Assad, in the new Syria formation process, that somehow the Kurdish entity, the SDF led entity in the northeast, would have to be addressed. And there have been several points of highly escalatory rhetoric by President Recep Tsayyip Erdogan and his political security establishment in Ankara that have warned that another Turkish military incursion into northern Syria might be inevitable. I think what's notable about what's happened this past month, over the past few weeks, days has been that Turkey has been able to fulfill for now, let's say, let's speak with some caution. Turkey has been able to fulfill its objectives in northern Syria in terms of the Kurdish rollback and loss of territory. Turkey has been able to achieve this without putting boots on the ground. And I think that does speak to some security planning, intelligence coordination and diplomatic and political initiatives as well in Damascus and in Washington D.C. post Assad, both Ankara and Riyadh. Another key actor in Syria, of course, is Saudi Arabia. Have been lobbying very hard in D.C. to support and legitimize the government of Ahmed Al Shara. And we saw US President Trump lift sanctions, the Caesar sanctions, most notably against the Syrian government trying to open up Syria to the global market in every way possible. And those are positive steps. So Turkey will have been in support of of activities on the ground that achieved this ultimate outcome Israel is very interesting. And just very briefly, we saw over the past week, 10 days, again particularly on social media, PKK linked or SDF linked voices trying to encourage and openly calling for Israel to support the Kurds in the northeast. Similar to how Israel stepped up to defend the Druze in southern Syria last year when they were facing very dire circumstances and violence by Damascus linked fighters. Israel did not act in defense of the Kurds in northeastern Syria despite there being a long standing interest by Israel to cultivate ties east of the Euphrates. And this is sort of a long standing dynamic at play. And because Israel has positioned itself post Assad as the guardian of minority rights in Syria, but primarily Druze, because of the cross border interest in the Druze population inside Syria, there was an expectation among some Kurds that Israel might come to their aid. That has not happened. I don't think. My assessment is that that would was never going to be likely. But what that narrative did the sdf, not the entirety of the SDF as an organization, but the fact that some Kurdish actors were openly calling for Israeli support fueled some animosity and mistrust, some questioning across the Arab factions, the Arab tribes within the SDF as well, who have different views in terms of a potential Israeli action inside Syria. Right. So very complicated, various moving parts moving in different directions.
- [38:58]
Roland Oliphant
Sofia, you obviously, I mean you live close to this, but we've all been preoccupied, haven't we, over the past few weeks with, and we still are preoccupied about whether there's going to be a massive American strike on Iran and so on. Can you try and fit this into where we go from here? And I mean in kind of the big strategic regional context, what happens next and what does it mean in terms of this current dynamics in the Middle East?
- [39:25]
Sophia Yan
So I think the role of Iraq here is a little bit under appreciated or under evaluated because they have been involved. They have a leader of their, one of their big, their dominant Kurdish political party in Iraq that's pretty much trusted by the US again, a guy named Masood Barzani. He's been helping to negotiate de escalation and fighting between the SDF and the Syrian government. Iraq itself is kind of battling between their concerns because politically they don't to them they've got now a Sunni led government in Syria. They're concerned about that. They're also worried about this Islamic State issue, but they're taking in all these prisoners. But primarily I raise this because Iraq is becoming essentially the staging ground for the US versus Iran. I think this is not made so clear at times. And Iraq faces the same that most other Middle Eastern nations do in the region, which is that if they've got any sort of US cooperation or coordination or the hosting of U S forces, that means within their country there are various militias and militant groups that are very upset by this and this creates internal challenges. And so Iraq is dealing with this now. It looks like at all signs, I just think that they've got a really serious balancing act ahead of them. The other thing is Syria. Syria surrounded by US allies, allies and partners. If the new Syria can succeed, of course this is a, a bright spot for the entire region, but only if it can succeed in the way that seems to have been pledged from this new government, which is again a Syria that's equal and fair for all Syrians, not just the Sunnis. Not, you know, it's like something that really does unite the country. And you have to remember, I mean Syria only has Shara as their hope. He's their only hope. A lot of people have said this to me before, I mean he maybe they don't totally agree with everything he's got to say and everything he's done to date in his first year as interim president, but they've got nothing else after the fall of the Assad regime. So everyone there I think does really want to see things move forward in the right direction. But there's a lot of questions over where his loyalties might lie and where things might go from there.
- [41:26]
Roland Oliphant
Berji, would you like a final thought on this? Where does this go from here and how grim is the situation for people in northeast Syria?
- [41:34]
Dr. Burcu Ocalik
I think the bigger picture now when we look across the Middle east, the question is are we nearing the end of armed non state actors and proxy groups? You look at Hezbollah, you look at the various Iran linked militia under the PMF structure in Iraq as they try to move in the direction of becoming embedded within the state apparatus. You look at the wider Iran linked axis of resistance. Right. So the direction of travel is towards supporting centralized state systems. And this is linked to the bigger question of Iran. Right. With Iran in a weaker position now potentially facing a new round of US military action, the implications for this inside Syria is that we've been seeing concerted diplomatic, political and action to support Damascus. What this new state will look like is the big question. I think it's an open ended question and it will require the very active participation involvement of all of Syria's constituents populations, including the Kurds in the north.
- [42:48]
Roland Oliphant
A great deal to think about there. That is, unfortunately, all we have time for on this edition of Battle Lines. Thank you to Sophia Yan and Burcu Oculik of the Royal United Services Institute. We'll be back on Wednesday for our midweek Global Health edition of Battle Lines. Until then, that was Battle Lines. Goodbye. Battle Lines is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Oliphant and Venetia Richard Rainy. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Battle Lines on your preferred podcast app and if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others to find the show. To stay on top of all our news, subscribe to the Telegraph, sign up to our Dispatches newsletter or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. You can also get in touch directly by emailing battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or contact us on x. You can find our handles in the show. Notes the producer is Peter Schevlin and the Executive Producer is Louisa Wells.
- [43:57]
Dr. Horton Advertiser
Your new home is now ready. Dr. Horton, America's builder, has new homes that are ready today with new construction communities in Ellensburg and throughout the Greater Seattle area. Dr. Horton has the right home for you. At Dr. Horton, we're still building with flexible living spaces, smart home technology and two and three car garages. More communities and more homes available every day. Find your new home in Ellensburg now ready@dr. Horton.com Dr. Horton, America's builder and Equal Housing Opportunity Builder the new year brings new health goals and wealth goals. Protecting your identity is an important step. Your info is in endless places that could expose you to identity theft leading to lost funds. LifeLock monitors millions of data points per second. If your identity is stolen, our rescue restoration specialists will fix it, guaranteed or your money back. Resolve to make identity, health and wealth part of your New year's goals with LifeLock. Save up to 40% your first year. Visit LifeLock.com SpecialOffer terms apply.