Memphis Barker (7:38)

kind of hearing from the president himself, when he describes his number one goal in terms of ending the war in Iran. You hear about the Strait of Hormuz, but you also hear him say the one thing that matters is ending Iran's nuclear program. That's been President Trump's sort of goal in the region stretching back decades. And he appeared to believe that by going into the war, by striking more than 17,000 targets, applying the full might of the American military, he might be able to get some kind of ending peace deal which would see Iran move from a state that's sort of perpetually, if not on the brink of potentially acquiring a nuclear weapon sort of somewhere in that territory, to a state that has no nuclear ambitions and is sort of brought back into what Mr. Trump described as kind of golden age of the Middle East. Now, as we know, the war itself and the negotiations we're watching play out, neither of them are particularly going his way. And so you have had leaks from the peace process, from the talks in Islamabad to a variety of American media outlets which are talking about the compromises that President Trump is actually having to offer in order to potentially get a deal that ends this war. He wants to move on from, he wants to move on to other matters so that, as we understand it, involves an offer from the Americans which is, listen, we will unfreeze $20 billion of Iran's assets. In exchange, the US wants to see a 20 year moratorium on any civilian enrichment of uranium. So that would basically put a stop to Iran's effort to stockpile highly enriched uranium, which they have about 450 kg of at the moment. And that is the material which takes one or two weeks to turn into weapons grade uranium and is obviously another subject of fascination for Trump, who's trying to get hold of it, trying to remove it from Iran, asking them to hand it over or dilute it in exchange for this $20 billion of funds which would be provided to the regime. Now, if you start looking at that principle and that proposed deal, the Iranians have replied saying, we won't do 20 years, we might do three or five. But there's clearly potentially some leeway between those two points for a potential agreement down the line. What you see when you look at that outline is, well, this isn't kind of wildly different from 2015, from the deal that Obama led, struck between Russia, China, France, the uk, Germany and Iran with the European Union kind of coordinating took two years of negotiations and you saw time, limited blocks on Iran's nuclear program, but not a final end to it. At the time, many on the right, Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump himself, hawkish Republicans, said we cannot have a deal that only temporarily ends Iran's nuclear program. You've got to go harder, you've got to get rid of this entire threat. And Trump himself obviously came in in 2016. Two years later, he tears up the JCPOA. And so what you're kind of looking at now is in order to get out of the war in Iran and potentially reopen the strait in Hormuz, President Trump and his team are sort of being nudged, being cornered, being pushed towards a deal which doesn't look that different. You know, there will be differences, of course, in, you know, in this side, that side, various elements of it, but the overall shape of it not wildly different from 2015. And I spoke to Lord Philip Hammonds, who was the British Foreign Secretary at the time, making much the same point. He helped to shape that deal. He says, I'm looking at this one. It's going to be, in his words, similar, if not worse than 2015, because the Iranians are in a stronger bargaining position now than they were more than a decade ago. So it's kind of just the piece I was writing was looking at how this process will move forward, but also recalling the way that that 2015 deal was shaped and how it may or may not form some kind of basis for what we see in the coming weeks. Trump himself has responded to this accusation on social media, on Truth Social. He's said, no, no, my deal will be much, much better than Obama's, Just kind of wait and see. I think we all are very much waiting to see what happens.

Roland Oliphant (12:03)

Now it gets to the heart of the debate right about this because there were always two camps on a jcpoa. There were those who said, look, this was a good deal, it was the best deal we were going to get. Concrete had been poured into the Iranian reactors. Yes, it had an expiry date, yes, it wasn't perfect and so on, but it did the job it could. And those people would also point out that it's only since Donald Trump left the deal in 2018 that Iran has built up this stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Those on the other side, including people like Benjamin Netanyahu, would say, no, it was always a dud. And actually the only thing the, the regime would understand is force. Presumably you just referenced there that Donald Trump is insisting his deal will be better than Obama's. In what respects do you think he'll be able to secure something different and better than the previous settlement?

Memphis Barker (12:59)

Well, I think there are two avenues you could look at. One of them is the fact of a moratorium on any civilian enrichment. So in 2015, Iran was allowed to keep enriching uranium, but only to 3.67%. So highly enriched is around 60%. 3.67 is sort of power plants and quite a long way away from that weapons grade uranium. Now, if Trump can get the Iranians to agree to 3, 5, 10, I expect it will probably be somewhere between, you know, the 20 the Americans want, the five the Iranians have offered, probably 10, 15, possibly, at least, then you could say that at least is a step forward on one element of the deal and that this question of what is Iran doing with its enrichment program would at least be put off temporarily. Now, obviously crucial to that which all of the analysts, the inspectors involved with the monitoring of the 2015 agreement would say is, it's all very well saying you're not doing something, but unless we have really continuous, intrusive monitoring inside Iran, we can't take it for granted that they are following the deal. So I think that you can have a moratorium of 10 years. But there's a whole bunch of questions that follow on from that in terms of, yeah, what kind of monitoring rights are granted? Is Iran still allowed to build centrifuges so that when that period ends, they can immediately resume lots of enrichment? All these kind of questions would have to be worked out over the course of hammering out a deal which took two years before, but might be as little as 60 days according to the early leaks. In terms of finding a follow up agreement after talks in Islamabad, should they go? Well, the other side of it would be, of course, that from the Trump administration's perspective, it might not be necessarily better in a nuclear sense, but you would maybe see the Strait of Hormuz at least opened. So they would be able to say, well, the problem that we created is now being resolved. I expect, to be honest, you'll end up, this is kind of Lord Hammond's point. In order to solve that Strait of Hormuz problem, they might have to accept a slightly weaker nuclear deal than the Americans would want at this point in time, because the Iranians are pushing back hard. And we kind of see from their statements to the media, no, we won't hand over the highly enriched uranium. No, we, we insist on keeping uranium enrichment. So that's the kind of broad picture, as I see it.

Roland Oliphant (15:29)

Last question, Memphis. Where is Israel in all this? The United States obviously has an ally in this war, an ally that's been adamant that, well, was adamant that the previous JCPOA was a bad idea. At least that was what Benjamin Netanyahu thought. I know there were elements, especially in the Israeli intelligence community, who disagreed with that assessment. Presumably Israel would just have to go along with what Donald Trump comes up with, or will he face strong opposition from Jerusalem?

Memphis Barker (15:58)

You are seeing President Trump slap down Benjamin Netanyahu on social media every now and again at the moment, which is a sign of where he thinks the relationship is, which is what he eventually says will go, and the Israeli Prime Minister will kind of have to get on board with it. Again, some of that dynamic was seen in the process towards that ceasefire in Lebanon. But I think that if you kind of watch Netanyahu's speeches, televised addresses. He said some really interesting things about that. The stockpiles of heu, the highly enriched uranium, for example. He says either there will be a deal to remove it or we will go in and get it by fighting, which is a sort of stronger line than the Trump kind of negotiation attack. I mean, Trump will occasionally again threaten kind of broader strikes in Iran. But Netanyahu seems to be adamant that that question must be resolved and must be resolved the way he sees it for Israel really to end its war with Iran. I mean, my feeling slightly with that is that if there's a kind of fudged compromise of sorts and Trump backs it, he might be able to prevent Netanyahu going in and kicking things off again and tearing a kind of shaky ceasefire, slash peace deal apart with a renewed war. But you know, Netanyahu might have to accept that the president who's kind of rise he helped, who he sees as a friend, might leave him in a not too dissimilar situation to that in 2015, which he and his allies so loathed, which would be a kind of ironic result for both him and for Mr. Trump, two of JCPOA's biggest foes.

Roland Oliphant (17:36)

And just lastly on this point, we've talked about the nuclear elements to the agreement. As far as you're aware, is there likely to be in this agreement any discussion of limits to Iran's missile program or a commitment to halt support for regional proxies in 2018?

Memphis Barker (17:54)

Trump said the JCPOA terrible deal because it doesn't deal with those kind of questions, because it doesn't deal with proxies or Iran's ballistic missile arsenal. Now again, it's early days in terms of the reporting, but what we see so far is that these are largely nuclear talks. Axios said it was unclear if there were any discussions around ballistic missiles or around support for proxies. Now Trump had put that in his original 15 point proposal, but you're just not really hearing much discussion of that at the moment. So my sense would be, given the president's overwhelming focus on the nuclear side of things, that that might have to be put aside for now or downgraded, at least in terms of the kind of commitments we're going to get from Iran because they do not see themselves to be on the back foot here. So they are unwilling to strike a deal that would see them agree to really, really strict limits of the kind that Mr. Trump himself would want to see. And Mr. Netanyahu certainly too.

Roland Oliphant (18:49)

Memphis Barker, thank you very much for joining US on Iran. The latest.

Memphis Barker (18:53)

Thanks. Thanks, Roland.

Roland Oliphant (18:59)

We're going to take a short break now. When we come back, what exactly is the state of Iran's nuclear program? We ask Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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Roland Oliphant (20:55)

Welcome back. You're listening to Iran, the latest from the Telegraph with me, Roland Oliphant. Throughout this war, in fact, since well before the war, one of the biggest points of contention between the United States and Iran has been the latter's nuclear ambitions. Can it or should it have any capacity to enrich uranium whatsoever? What should happen to the stuff that it has enriched? And how could any such agreement about those ambitions be enforced or policed? Well, one person who's been at the centre of that debate is Rafael Grossi, the head of the iaea, the United nations nuclear watchdog. Our foreign editor, Louis Emanuel has been speaking to him. Here's their conversation.

Louis Emanuel (21:42)

I'm very interested to get your initial reaction on the framework of a possible deal with Iran and a possible new nuclear deal. What's your initial sense?

Rafael Grossi (21:53)

There have been a few unconfirmed hypotheses that have been floated, so I wouldn't take those as a description of the state of affairs on that. But my impression is that when there is a movement in a right direction in general, this means that on the different chapters or subchapters there is also some progress. So I hope this will be the case.

Louis Emanuel (22:20)

Some of those reports suggest that a deal that's coming into view in fact looks very similar to the JCPOA deal that Trump tore up and then latterly went to war to create a new deal. What do you think Trump has achieved since he's done that?

Rafael Grossi (22:42)

I don't know if I would agree with your affirmation that the agreement, at least what is being said. You know, my professional deformation is that I don't like to talk about things I haven't seen or read or know about. But my impression is that what is being talked about in terms of limitation on enrichment and possible moratorium, it doesn't seem to me to be similar to the jcpoa. JCPOA was a very complex agreement on which there are different opinions, but it had a number of clauses quite detailed on levels of enrichment, on amounts of material that could be accumulated. So it was quite complex, like a mosaic of things. And here I believe we are looking into something more, I would say, focused on one activity, which is enrichment. And of course we have to see what happens with the nuclear material. So this is why I respectfully disagree a little bit on your assumption that what seems to be emerging is, is similar to the jcpoa.

Louis Emanuel (24:06)

Do you think with that focus there is a risk that a deal is rushed?

Rafael Grossi (24:11)

Well, no. You know, one has to consider that the agreement, or the bone of contention, if you want here, and therefore the goal for the negotiation had to be laser focused on two or three things. JCPOA was an architectural sort of thing that was supposed to be putting order for a long time in nuclear activities in Iran. All that is forgotten that we cannot go back in history, irrespective of what we may think. So now you are concentrating, if a deal comes on a very concrete and well done defined areas. So it doesn't mean it's rush. It means it is concentrating on the points which, right or wrong, triggered the war.

Louis Emanuel (25:06)

What are the risks if the deal is not as Comprehensive as before, I

Rafael Grossi (25:11)

don't see a risk per se there. My impression is that here the point which has of course triggered the conflict or the war has been the impression in the United States that Iran is moving towards a nuclear weapon. All right, so this is what the United States and Israel believe. And this has pretty much centered on the amount of enriched material that they have. So obviously they have to concentrate on this. And, and as you remember, I was taking part in the previous effort up to February, the negotiations that were taking place in February, and the issues were more or less the same. It's like in music, it's variations on the same theme. The basic points continue to be the same.

Louis Emanuel (26:04)

And what must Trump and Iran do to get a deal that you're satisfied with?

Rafael Grossi (26:11)

That I am satisfied with. If you put it that way, my answer would be simple. It must be verifiable. So for us, any agreement must have all the provisions that should allow my inspectors to go to every place they must go up until the last round of negotiations. That was pretty much, I have to say, part of it. And I must say that Iran at those conversations was in agreement with the fact that when an agreement would be reached, there should be a very, very, as people like to say, robust verification, which means deployment of our inspectors everywhere and the ability to inspect unhindered. We know exactly what we need to see, where we need to see it, what are the behaviors that we need to be see, what are the accountables that we have to be able to check and verify. All of that for us is very clear. Immediately we will be able to determine whether the agreement, when it comes into form, is complied with. And I could add perhaps to that idea the fact that without verification, any agreement is no agreement. It's an illusion of an agreement.

Louis Emanuel (27:37)

And so part of a possible deal may see some enriched uranium being taken to a third country, according to reports. Now, which countries are able to do that effectively? And is there a recommendation on your behalf?

Rafael Grossi (27:53)

No, frankly, this is a delicate area because without being there, without being a party and part to the negotiation, it would be very speculative of me to say country A, B or C. Many countries, or perhaps not many, a few countries have been mentioned in this regard. So with regards to the country, you can go for different countries. For us, what is important is that this activity, if we go, or they go for a ship out of the material, is that this is done safely. Don't forget that you are dealing here with uranium in gas form enriched at 60%. So if it were to be shipped in this way and in this status in this form, then a number of safety, I'm talking about nuclear safety, avoid contamination and things like that would require a number of things to be done. There is also the possibility of a ship out after downblending the material. But again, I wouldn't like to speculate on that because they will know. I'm telling you what we had been discussing until end of February and these were the alternatives.

Louis Emanuel (29:20)

Listening to that, you must feel that some of the comments from the US Especially from Pete Hegseth about going in and taking some of the nuclear material themselves, that seems very irresponsible. Would you agree with that, given how interested you are in the safety of the process?

Rafael Grossi (29:37)

I wouldn't characterize the comments of the secretary. I would simply say, and this I have said to colleagues of yours in the United States, I would simply point to what I have just said. There are inherent challenges to such a move. I don't doubt for a second that the United States has military capacities or capabilities to do this. But I'm just saying this is a very delicate thing to handle and to manipulate and to move around. Not to mention the fact, as you know, and I think President Trump has talked about the dust under the dust and under the rubble. This material, as we know in its majority most of it is still in Isfahan in the underground facilities and tunnels where it was. So there is also an issue of access, which is possible, of course, but like in any other facility that has been bombarded attack, there are issues of the structural stability of the building and things like that. So I'm just pointing the challenges and difficulties to do that.

Louis Emanuel (30:59)

Of course, we are obviously not quite there, are we? But what is your level of confidence knowing both sides very well, that you're going to get to a deal, a deal that is satisfactory?

Rafael Grossi (31:09)

You know, again, it's a speculation, but I would say my sense is that there is a common will to get to an agreement, which I didn't see so clearly manifested before. I think both sides are saying that they want an agreement, of course, immediately. Like in any war, there will be the adjective and whether it's just long, fair and then you have all the qualifications and what you put under those subheadings. This is for them to see. But my impression is that there is a strong willingness on both sides to get to an agreement.

Louis Emanuel (31:50)

Given what you know about the Iranian side, do you think that they would ever accept zero enrichment?

Rafael Grossi (31:55)

Well, this has always been a difficulty for them. But because they claim that they have a right for enrichment. That thing per se does not exist. What they do have is a right for any activity related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which may include, of course, enrichment and other activities. But they have made of this sort of a symbolic activity and a demonstration of a national technological achievement. This is why this is so important, I would like to say, so important, so relevant in every discussion. It is also possible that in the context of the negotiation there could be modalities, moratoria or other limitations that could make it compatible. This is something that we have been discussing in quite some detail up to end of February. So it is possible that they are going to be moving into some interim arrangement which would be at least not contradictory with the affirmation that is no longer enrichment and on the other hand, that Iran at some point in some future could resume these activities.

Louis Emanuel (33:26)

Presumably it is the position of the IAEA and yourself that Iran does have the right to enrich uranium. Or do you feel personally that it's time that they drop that?

Rafael Grossi (33:37)

Well, this is a political matter. Whether a country wants to pursue an activity or not is really a political decision. So it will be the Iranian leadership that will have to decide whether what has happened, where Iran is now, and the reasons that led to this state of affairs justify maybe being flexible on this or not.

Louis Emanuel (34:07)

But it is their right, is it not?

Rafael Grossi (34:09)

They can Again, in legal terms, the right to enrichment is a fiction. It doesn't exist. It's as if I told you you have the right to drink water. I mean that per se does not exist. But Iran has every right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities as per the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty Article 4 But there is a big but. The but is that you have to submit all your activities to the IAEA verification and that the IAEA must be satisfied. And we know that there is Apache history as to compliance. This is why we are where we are at the end of the day.

Roland Oliphant (35:00)

Rafael Grossi of the IAEA speaking to Telegraph Foreign Editor Louis Emmanuel. That's all for today. We'll be back tomorrow with our eyes firmly locked onto the peace talks in Islam about it. Until then, that was Iran. The Latest Goodbye. Iran the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Roland Oliphant and Venetia Rainey. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following Iran the latest formerly battle lines on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, please leave a review as this helps others find the show to stay on top of all our news, subscribe to the Telegraph. Sign up for our Dispatches newsletter or listen to our sister podcast Ukraine the Latest. We're still on the same email address battlelinestelegraph.co.uk or contact us on X. You can find our handles in the show Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The Executive Producer is Louisa Wells.

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