‘Bitter, weak and corrupted’: How Ali Khamenei ruined Iran

Summary

Podcast Summary:

Iran: The Latest
Episode Title: ‘Bitter, weak and corrupted’: How Ali Khamenei ruined Iran
Date: July 12, 2026
Host: Venetia Rainey
Guest: Prof. Ali Ansari (Professor of Iranian History, University of St. Andrews)

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Episode Overview

In this bonus episode, Venetia Rainey explores the legacy of the late Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose death has just reshaped Middle Eastern geopolitics. Through an in-depth conversation with Prof. Ali Ansari, the episode retraces Khamenei’s unlikely rise, governance style, personal myths, and the transformation of Iran into an authoritarian, anti-Western state. The discussion concludes with an assessment of the likely future under Khamenei’s successor and son, Mojtaba.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Khamenei’s Origins and Rise to Power

• Background as a Revolutionary ([02:59])
  • Khamenei was an active revolutionary from 1963, close to both Khomeini and Rafsanjani.
  • Served prison time pre-1979, was not originally a major figure:
    “He was seen as a fairly sort of modest, in what we say, a modest individual with a lot to be modest about.” – Prof. Ansari (03:37)
  • Became president mainly because more senior leaders were eliminated.
• Transition to Supreme Leader ([08:49])
  • Khamenei’s promotion orchestrated by Rafsanjani after Khomeini’s death.
  • Lacked religious credentials; not a true Ayatollah but a “political Ayatollah.”
    “He was instantly made into an itola to fit the role... He’s not qualified for the post. …He hasn’t written anything.” – Prof. Ansari (05:47)
  • His legitimacy stemmed from perceived political acumen rather than theological authority.

2. Personality and Motivations

• Bitterness and the Impact of Power ([03:44])
  • Frequently dismissed and underestimated by peers, often interpreted as a source of personal bitterness.
  • Developed ambition to “have the last laugh.”
• Surviving Assassination ([06:31])
  • 1981 attempt didn’t fundamentally alter his approach — not especially radicalized by the ordeal.

3. Consolidating Power: The IRGC and Setad ([13:30])

• Institutional Expansion
  • Khamenei used the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and Setad (the properties office) to accrue unaccountable power and wealth.
  • Oil revenue and state finances were shifted towards the Supreme Leader’s networks post-2005 (Ahmadinejad era).
  • The title of “Absolute Jurist” was added to cement his supremacy in the constitution.
• Suppressing Reform ([16:00])
  • Landmark 2000 election: Khamenei personally intervened to block press freedom reforms, setting the tone for increasingly autocratic governance.
  • Strengthened hardliner alliances to oppose reformist trends, especially through control of security and economic apparatus.

4. Direct Political Interventions and Repression

• 2009 Green Movement ([18:16])
  • Khamenei personally endorsed the contested election, pre-empting due process.
  • Suppression of mass protests cemented his image as a repressive ruler:
    “From 2009 onward, …he was seen as someone who did not stand above political processes, but actually intervened actively in them.” – Prof. Ansari (20:31)
  • Political and civil freedoms sharply diminished.
• Exporting Shia Militancy ([21:38])
  • Continued Khomeini’s policy, but operationalized it with IRGC support.
  • Established Iran as a key patron of militia groups regionally (Hezbollah, in Syria, etc.).
  • Myth-making around his “spiritual” leadership intensified – some followers saw him as divinely ordained.

5. Personal Worldview and Family Life ([23:42])

• Intellectual Influences
  • Khamenei was a literary person, reading history and novels like Les Misérables and Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee ([24:27]).
  • Prone to “paranoid history” and conspiracy theories about the West.
• Private Life
  • Little is known; family kept out of public eye.
  • Paradox of privatized family life but public myth-making.
• Divine Self-Perception
  • Developed conviction of being God’s chosen, increasingly believing in his own mythos.

6. Succession: Mojtaba Khamenei ([27:06])

• Continuity vs. Change
  • Mojtaba presents as even weaker, with no revolutionary credentials.
  • Seen as a "princeling", lacking public charisma and rhetorical skill.
  • Chosen for continuity by the IRGC, unlikely to advance reform:
    “The Revolutionary Guard want to maintain their, the status quo. The best thing to do is to bring the son of the previous guy in and there's continuity.” – Prof. Ansari (29:00)
• Doubts Over Legitimacy
  • Hereditary succession contradicts the original anti-monarchist ethos.
  • Ansari predicts instability and questions whether such a succession can sustain the current system.

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Notable Quotes & Moments

• On Khamenei’s character:
  “For me, harmony is a classic case of generally a weak man who is corrupted by power.” – Prof. Ansari ([03:44])

• On Khamenei's legitimacy:
  "He was instantly made into an itola to fit the role... He’s not qualified for the post." – Prof. Ansari ([05:47])

• On the regime’s defensive posture:
  “He also was a strong sort of adherent and proponent of what we’d call paranoid history… He really did believe… some of the worst sort of historical interpretations of, say, Britain’s role in Iran or America’s role in Iran.” – Prof. Ansari ([24:30])

• On the 2009 crackdown:
  “If people don’t get off the streets, you know, I’m not responsible for what happens next. He sheds a couple of crocodile tears and then unleashes the Islamic militia… Most people have only seen his repressiveness.” – Prof. Ansari ([20:31])

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• Khamenei’s Early Life & Revolution – 02:59
• Assassination Attempt & Ideological Leanings – 06:31
• Ascension to Supreme Leadership – 08:49
• Building Power: IRGC and Setad – 13:30
• 2000s Shift Toward Hardline Rule – 16:00
• 2009 Green Movement Suppression – 18:16
• Exporting Shia Militancy – 21:38
• Personal Worldview & Paranoia – 23:42
• Mojtaba and the Future – 27:06

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Concluding Insight

Prof. Ansari paints a complex and damning portrait of Khamenei: not the “firebrand ideologue” but a weak, embittered figure whose consolidation of power led to a more autocratic, isolated Iran. The episode closes with warnings that Mojtaba’s succession portends more repression and little positive change, maintained by the same security hardliners.

“My own view, as I’ve said before, is that I don’t think this is going to end well.”
— Prof. Ansari ([30:20])

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Recommended for listeners seeking to understand how personal weakness, institutional manipulation, and myth-making steered the Iranian state into global pariahdom, and what the post-Khamenei era might bring.

Transcript

[A]

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[A]

I'm Venetia Raney and this is Iran. The latest. It's Saturday 11th of July 2026, day 20 of the 60 day deadline to reach a peace deal between the US and Iran. No news today, but a special bonus episode for you.

[D]

A short time ago, the United States military began major combat operations in Iran. Today, President Trump says Iran's Supreme Leader,

[A]

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the attacks.

[D]

The Pentagon is weighing a takeover of that island as a way to force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran begged for this ceasefire and we all know it.

[B]

The question before us now is how

[D]

much more can we accomplish together?

[B]

Can we turn over a new leaf? Can we change relations in the Middle east permanently?

[D]

Does anyone really think that someone can

[A]

tell President Trump what to do? Come on. This week has seen the funeral of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. But who was he? How did he come to be so anti America and anti Israel? And how did he shape modern Iran into the rogue nation it is today? I spoke to Ali Ansari, professor of Iranian History and Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies at the University of St. Andrews. Here's our conversation. Ali, welcome back onto Iran. The latest you've spoken previously with Roland on the podcast about the first Supreme Leader, Khamenei and his backstory, the cleric who came back to Iran on the eve of revolution, how he managed to take hold of this movement that actually could have gone in a lot of different directions. Dial us back and situate us. Where was Khamenei during the founding of the Islamic Republic? Just give us his brief backstory.

[D]

He was active in the sort of revolutionary movement, really. I think from 63 onwards. He was a follower of Khomeini. He was close friends with Rasanjani, and he was in. In prison, I think, in the late 70s. Whether, you know, how badly treated he was or not, I don't know. I mean, you know, some people exaggerate it, whatever. I'm sure it wasn't great. But the fact is that he had been someone who had obviously been at the sort of front line of fighting for the revolution and then obviously was one of the beneficiaries of it when it happened. But actually in a fairly junior position. I mean, he wasn't really in a very senior position. He only became president because all his predecessors were getting murdered. So, you know, he then sort of fell into that role. And, you know, he was seen as a fairly sort of modest, in what we say, a modest individual with a lot to be modest about. That was the view that the people had of him. They didn't take him too seriously. And I think fundamentally, if you want to understand, his character developed. It was this sort of bitterness at being dismissed so often that he was quite pleased, you know, to build up that because he had the last laugh. On a personal point of view. He had the last laugh. I mean, I think the country suffered for it, but he had the last laugh vis a vis all his rivals within the Iranian system. I mean, he's a classic case. For me, harmony is a classic case of generally a weak man who is corrupted by power. I mean, that. That's basically it because when he was brought into the leadership. But his own friend, the then speaker of the Parliament, and someone who was considered to be much more powerful than him actually in the. In the general political landscape. Ali Agra Hashmir Rafsanjani, who then became president in, in 1989, there was a general view that Harmony was a bit more junior. He was certainly younger than Rafsanjani. He was seen as a bit more liberal. And the key. The thing that singled him out before he became leader was that actually he said that when, you know, the fatwa was issued against Rusty, he made a public proclamation actually har. Saying, well, you know, if Rushy apologizes, you know, we can all forgive and forget. Which he was then severely rebuked over by Khomeini who said, don't speak about things you know, nothing about.

[A]

So this is Salman Rush, the. The British author.

[D]

So it was for the Satanic Verses. And. Yeah, so at the time there was this sort of view that, oh h. May take the, you know, the revolution in a slightly different direction, that Rafsanjani had played it in such a way that the sort of austerity of the earlier years, you know, the war was now over. There was going to be a general opening up of the country, you know, the Thermidor, in the sense of the Islamic revolution was going to happen. But actually what really happened, and it's a sort of a bit of a morality tale for us all, you know, that what basically happened was that harmony when he became supreme leader and, you know, there's a wonderful video of him being appointed to it and he's sort of very reluctant and he says, you know, I'm not capable. I'm okay. Which, you know, obviously is a bit of faux immodesty on his part. I mean, I. I dare say he probably was a bit overawed by the fact that he might become supreme leader and whatever. But nonetheless, you know, all this resistance, he had to be dragged up a bit like the speaker in Parliament when you drag them to the chair. So it was a bit like. It was a bit like that. And everyone sort of thought, you know, he's a bit of a non entity. And when I used to go to Iran in the early 1990s, you used to talk to a lot of clerics there. He sort of said, he's a bit of a fake eye toler. He was instantly made into an itola bit like his son has been now. He was instantly made into an itola to fit the role. And, you know, everyone sort of said, well, yeah, he's not qualified for the post. I mean, he's never written anything. You know, to be going ayatollah, you have to have written some great sort of judicial document or sort of a thesis. And he hadn't done anything. So the first 10 years of his supreme leadership actually were built him trying to sort of establish himself.

[A]

In 1981, he survives an assassination attempt by the enemy.

[D]

Yes, he does.

[A]

How significant is that for sort of, you know, shaping his approach to internal dissent?

[D]

I'm not so sure. I mean, a lot of them, a lot of people actually, you know, the whole era, you know, the first period of his of the revolution was a pretty violent era. I mean, it was a sort of civil war going on. Quite a few people died. I mean, kind of much More senior high toddlers and then were died and killed involved. And he obviously had that near death experience, if you will. But I don't, I don't think it had a profound effect on him. I mean, in the sense that it didn't really affect the way in which he approached things subsequently. He was far too junior in the clerical hierarchy to basically make much of an impact on some of the atrocities that occurred, for instance, at the end of the 1980s. But, and, you know, as his reaction to Rushdie indicates, he still had this sort of slightly sort of liberal mindset about how these things work. I mean, he, he wasn't a firebrand. He was never regarded as a firebrand, really, in this sense. And there's a very famous episode where he actually visit. He was in charge of, you know, the American hostages. And you can see this on YouTube if people want to have a look at it. There's a scene where he goes and visits the American hostages being held from the embassy. And he's slightly taken aback because one of the American hostages, John Limber, speaks back to him in fluent Persian. And he didn't really sort of appreciate that. And they have this extraordinary engagement where Harmony says, I'm sure you're being looked after very well and all this sort of thing. And John Limbert says something like, well, you know, Iranians are very famed for their hospitality, but we wouldn't mind going home now, if that's okay. And what does he say?

[A]

Sorry, you have to wait a bit longer.

[D]

You know, he just sort of says. He just sort of says that, you know, well, you know, let. I'm sure you'll come to. I mean, he basically avoids it. I mean, he doesn't want to. He. The whole thing is very awkward for him because he didn't expect John Limber to be fluent in Persian and to be able to sort of use Persian idioms. So it's a very interesting exchange. And he's slightly taken aback by it. And of course he's. He's there pretending to say that, you know, we're looking because I think he was in charge. I think he was the representative for looking after the hostages. And to say that everything was okay with him and he was trying to emphasize that actually the hospitality is very good, whereas Limbert was saying, no, being held captive is never very good. And, you know, he was sort of slightly. He was definitely caught out by it all.

[A]

So he's quite seen as quite a weak junior cleric. So how does he become the new supreme leader? How does that happen? Why does that happen?

[D]

Basically, because Raf Sanjani, who was his sort of his close confidant, who was then speaker of Parliament and probably the most powerful person in Iran after Khomeini, when Khomeini died, the Rafsanjani orchestrated it for him to become the Supreme Leader. It in essence, because first of all, Khamenei's first choice had been basically dismissed. Ayatollah Montesseri, who would have probably taken the Islamic revolution in a different direction, had protested the massacre of prisoners in 1988. There was this horrendous massacre that took place, extrajudicial killings, and Ayatollah Montezeri protested it. And Khomeini had said to him, know, you don't have the guts for this job and you're, you're, you're very lily livid and all this, and then basically dismissed him. I mean, there were, there were other issues that emerged, but that was basically the main point that found Moner out in the cold. And so the, the sort of leadership was up for grabs in some ways. And it's generally the consensus is, is that Rafsanjani essentially orchestrated it through the assembly of Experts to have Har elected. And of course, everyone thought this was a bit, you know, odd because he wasn't an itola, he wasn't qualified for the position. But the argument was, is that he was political, that he was a political idol, that he understood politics, and that to become the Supreme Jurist, it wasn't sufficient simply to be a great theologian. One had to be politically savvy and that Montessori had shown himself to be politically unsavvy, whereas Khamenei, because he'd been president for eight years, effectively had shown that he understood politics. And I mean, one point that I should highlight here is that when Harmony was president, I think it was the only time he ever traveled outside Iran. I think if I'm not mistaken, as president, he went to the un but that's the only time ever since once he became Supreme Leader, he's never left the country. And his vision is very narrow as a consequence of that. I mean, he just has no concept of the outside world at all.

[A]

We're going to take a short pause now. Coming up after the break, what will Ali Khamenei's son Mojtaba be like as a leader?

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Welcome back. You're listening to Iran the latest with me, Venetia Rainey and Ali Ansari. As far as I understand it and you'll correct me if I'm wrong, Sort of two main pillars that he uses to consolidate his control. Sort of IRGC and Setad. Can you talk us through sort of how he builds up these institutions that did already exist? I know Satad had just been established when he took over and how he turns them into these sort of monster institutions.

[D]

Throughout the 1990s, you know, he doesn't really. You know, he's trying to build up a sort of a following. And the Rasanjani is basically running the show as president and Harmony, I mean, I remember. I mean, when I used to go to. I mean, Harmony was a non entity. I mean, nobody really took him seriously at all. I mean, he sort of went on these tours of the country and people would film him and they'd have the. And even the propaganda was poor. You know, they would repeat show bits of film of people running after his car or whatever. And. But basically what happened was that there was a move in, within the politics of the country towards the reformism that, you know, both Rafsanjani wanted and then Har, who came in in 1997, was the sort of a cleric who then promoted reformism. And there were many more reactionary and hardline elements within the country, particularly around the irgc, the Revolutionary Guard, who were opposed to this. I mean, they. They thought this was a perversion of the way the revolution was going. For them. The revolution was not about the republic at all. For them, the revolution was about, you know, establishing an Islamic state around Supreme Leader. And they. One of the things that Rafsanjani had changed in the Constitution in 1989 when he became president was he added the title. I mean, this was the Murphy's Law, by the way, he added a bit to the clause about the supreme leadership to call it the Absolute Jurist, and he added the term absolute to it. Now, the argument was at the time that Rafsanjani had added this so that Harmony could deal with other more senior ayatollahs who. Who might object to some of his more, quote, liberal reforms. You know, fat chance of that, but that was the idea. What actually happened was, was that the reactionaries in the system used this notion that he was the absolute jurist, that he had absolute power and absolute authority to push through all sorts of hardline policies against the reform sort of political direction of the country at the time. And of course, there was this unholy alliance, if I can put it that way, that built up. The key moment in this development is in 2000, the reform movement won a landslide election in the parliament. And many people on the hard right, you know, that basically many people on the. The hard line factions got very worried about this because being in control of Parliament meant that they could then pass legislation that they wanted. I mean, this was the idea. You know, Khatami always said we're not doing street demonstrations, but we're going to do this properly, we're going to do this constitutionally. And in 2000 is the first time that basically Harmony intervenes in the legislative process of Parliament and says, you cannot pass this ledger. You cannot. They were about to pass a very liberal press. I mean, this is what I say about, you know, when. When people say to us that, oh, the Islamic Republic is, you know, there's something innate in it. There isn't. I mean, the fact is, in 2000, they may have gone in a different direction. That they didn't is because Harmony was persuaded, for better or worse, to intervene directly in the legislative process and tell the parliament that they could not pass a law liberalizing the press. And from then on, actually, it all went pretty much downhill. I have to say. Basically, Khamenei, not only did he build his alliance with the irgc, he did as, as you mentioned, with his sort of finance, his own financial situation. And the key to this really was the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the firebrand president of Iran, in 2005. And he started to switch a lot of the financial power of the state, particularly the oil revenues that were coming in in enormous amounts from 2005. In those days, oil was, you know, they all shock. It was about $150 a barrel or whatever, you know, worse than it is today in that sense. And, you know, he was raking in the money and. But what he was doing was he was shifting all the money and pushing all the money towards the Revolutionary Guard and towards the Supreme Leader. And of course, there's no accountability. There's no accountability at all. Nobody had any rights to account to say, you know, a lot of these institutions came under the Supreme Leader's sort of authority, and no elected, quote, official was allowed to. To hold that to account. So from, essentially from 2000 and then 2005, Khamenei's position becomes increasingly secure, increasingly powerful. He becomes more and more hardline, and he intervenes much more regularly in the, you know, the little, almost trivial aspects of government. That was not meant to be the role of the Supreme Leader, to deal with all the particularities. But he was going in, you know, he was interfering in elections. He interfered certainly in 2005, in 2009, during the Green Movement.

[A]

Yeah. How much was the sort of the way that the Iranian regime dealt with the 2009 green movement, this huge protest movement that rose up in dissatisfaction with the election result of 2009? How much was that down to Khamenei?

[D]

In a critical factor, it was because basically the whole election process, and I studied it quite closely at the time, and I have to say many others didn't, sadly. But if you look at it, you know, the whole election process itself was fairly. It was fairly ramshackle. But normally it takes about two or three days for the various bodies and institutions to confirm the election result. Khamenei came on the morning after the election. I think it was. I think the election was on the Friday and on the lunchtime of the Saturday. Harmony came in and basically endorsed the election and said, this is a marvelous triumph for Ahmadinejad. And everyone was like, you know, horrified, you know, and I mean, the point was, what then people said was, is that basically Khamenei was casting a test out there because he was saying, the Supreme Leader's word is final. Even if it's wrong, it's final. So a lot of people who protested the election result felt bound to support it because Harmony had intervened in support of Ahmadinejad and said it was final. And, of course.

[A]

And the election result, who did that back? Or do we not really know in the election result?

[D]

We can't really know what those are. I mean, my. My suspicion is, is that it would have gone onto a runoff, and if it had gone into a runoff, that Mia Hussein Mousavi would have very likely won it.

[A]

What they did preempts that and says, this is my guy.

[D]

Not only did he say that, he says, this is a marvelous election result. He said. And then he sort of came out with this comment. He said. He said, people say that, you know, it could be rigged or whatever. How can you rig 11, 12 million votes? And someone said, well, I mean, the. The point is we don't know what the election result is. I mean, you're saying he got an 11 million majority, but how do we know? And actually, the opposition parties, I mean, there were some astonishing results in that election, you know, where, like Mohsen Rezai, who's currently, you know, in. In. He's still hankering around as a sort of IRGC ex veteran. He didn't even get any votes in his home village. I mean, he was outvoted in his own village. And he sort of said, it's very strange that nobody in my own village will vote for me. You know, I mean, and Ahmadinejad be. You know, there were all sorts of things that were clearly done, which at the very least demanded a degree of accountability and auditing. And of course, they just steamrolled all over it. And really, from Then on, to be honest, from 2009 onward, Star, shall we say, within the firmament of Iran, has gone rapidly downhill as far as the majority of the population concerned, because he was seen as someone who did not stand above political processes, but actually intervened actively in them. And then two weeks later, he does his characteristic, you know, if people don't get off the streets, you know, I'm not responsible for what happens next. He sheds a couple of crocodile tears and then unleashes the Islamic militia and the. And the Revolutionary Guard onto the streets. And, and in this sense, you know, we have to remember that why Iranians have very mixed views about harmony is because the vast majority of people have only seen his repressiveness. I mean, they haven't seen anything particularly positive about him at all. And his. His entire rule, you know, from that 1989 to that, has been actually, to be honest, a complete disaster for the country on many different levels. Not only its economic ranking, but also its political freedoms. Anything that you could want. And people say that the country could have gone in a different direction had it not been for harmony.

[A]

He also masterminded or perhaps sort of developed this idea of exporting Shia militancy across the Middle East. Why was that seen as important to him?

[D]

Well, I mean, it's not his idea. I mean, this is Khomeini sort of like that. I mean, it's part of the revolution. It's just that he enables it, he operationalizes it. And of course, for him, it's very much part of this unholy alliance with the irgc, I mean, the ielts. So let's say, for the sake of argument, Syria. You know, everyone sort of says Iran's participation in Syria was a natural consequence of, you know, foreign policy thinking or whatever. In Iran. It wasn't. It was opposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They said, why are we going into Syria? Why are we supporting Assad? I mean, this is just not. But for the Revolutionary Guard, it was an important sign of their ability to basically manage the foreign policy of the country. And they had certain gains. They wanted Hezbollah, Israel, this, that, the other. They had this vision. And you have to remember also that it fell into this from 2000 onwards, this general cult of harmony that was developed around him, which has seen obviously his son succeed him, by the way, which was all about Ali being Ali, harmony, being the Ali of the age, and basically not just a sort of a constitutional ruler, you know, that the. The jurist was not just a constitutional position, but it was a rel. It was A theological position. It was one that basically was an aspect of Islamic belief. I mean, that's the way they developed it. They sort of said, if you don't believe in the vela ta pari, the guardianship of the jurist, you're not a proper Muslim. Which I have to say for most Muslims is completely blasphemous. But I mean, that's basically what they were saying. And this is, you know, this whole raft, this whole policy towards Syria, towards Hezbollah was all reshaped and reformed about this idea of sort of Shia that, you know, the sheer mastery of the region, the. The sort of conversion, the harmony is this leader of the oppressed. He was garnering for himself this enormously, you know, global position, in a sense. And people. Some people really believed it. They almost worship him, I have to say. I mean, it's not simply a sort of a, you know, they're not simply burying a head of state. They are burying basically a spiritual leader of charismatic quality.

[A]

That's the myth. What can you tell us about the actual man? Like, what do we know about his personal life, his family life, the kind of values he might have impart? Majtabat. What did he like to read? Do we know any of this?

[D]

Well, details. Again, he was a very. Seemed to be a very. No, it's quite interesting because someone said to me once, I said, you know what? How does he shape his worldview? And he said. Some guy said to me, he said, his. His. His worldview is shaped by four novels, he said, which he really likes. And one of them, of course, is Victor Hugo's Les, which he went on at great length about. But he also likes anything to do with, you know, anything that describes, you know, Western oppression. So I think Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee was a favorite one of his, and there was a couple of others on, you know, either slavery or something other, which he, you know, that where he developed his worldview from, he

[A]

was Islam versus the west. That kind of.

[D]

Yeah, yeah. And he was a big reader. Yeah, he was a big reader. He read history. He read this. But what he garnered from it also, if you look from his website and others, that he also was a strong sort of adherent and proponent of what we'd call paranoid history. I mean, he. He really did believe, you know, some of the worst sort of historical interpretations of, say, Britain's role in Iran or America's role in Iran or whatever, in the last.

[A]

You mean conspiracy theories?

[D]

Yeah, yeah, absolutely. So, I mean, he's a literate person, undoubtedly. He. He seems to have had a. We don't know enough really, about his family life. I mean, he kept. And we've never seen his wife or anybody. I mean, there's never. No, nobody. I mean, you just never see these things. And if anything, you know, where he reveals himself really is in the. In the support he gave to his son succeeded him as the jurist, even though the founder of the Islamic revolution, you know, Khomeini said that heredity, succession is a sin in the eyes of God and so on and so forth. So he pushed these sort of. I mean, it's difficult to. You know, I think it's very difficult to portray him in a. You know, you. It's like many of these sort of tyrants, you know, when you see them in their personal lives, you know. You know, Hitler loved his dog and this whole thing and was a vegetarian. But I. I think Harmony himself, you know, people who knew him probably thought he was. He was a fairly ordinary person. But the fact is that a lot of people also said that he got a lot. He got captured by his myth, effectively. I mean, he really believed that he was divinely ordained and put on this earth to do certain things in a way that no previous ruler in Iran really had. Had really been. I mean, they say the Shah had various sort of, like, aspects of divine mandate and this whole thing. But I think Harmony really believed he was in touch with the Hidden Imam, and the Hidden Imam would give him guidance and that he was some sort of spiritual gateway between the people and the divine. And, you know, I remember talking to people saying that, because in the 90s, nobody believed. You know, in the 90s, he was just seen as an ordinary person. But by the noughties, people were saying, no, no, he believes this stuff. And for me, that's an excellent sign of someone who's basically got a weak mind, who has been. Who has succumbed to flattery. People have told him, you really are God's gift. And he thought, yes, I am. You know, it's this sort of idea of, how did I achieve this amazing position? Is it because I'm lucky? No, it's because God chose me. And that's basically what you believe. You know, and Ahmadinejad did the same, of course. You know, you get this sort of. People don't sort of make the basic assessment that I have achieved this great position in life because it was contingent and I was fortunate, and other people helped me to get here. They started to believe the notion that I have achieved this great position in life because God chose me and therefore I'm somehow special, you know, that. That's the thing.

[A]

Do you think? It's obviously very early to tell and as you say, so little is revealed of these people. We just have to sort of take things from their statements and the acts that they do. But do we think Mojtaba will carry on that sense of sort of personal belief that he's this divine rul.

[D]

Well, I mean, most of us even weaker. I mean, this is the thing which never is a sort of, as they all say, is a sort of a He's the son or he's never. You know, the one thing about harmony that people could say, and fair enough, is that he did suffer under the shah. He was in prison. He had experienced, you know, abuse in some ways. I don't know how much, by the way, but he obviously had, you know, he fought the original watchtub. It's a princeling. I mean, he's. He's never done anything. And from what we gather, despite the way they try and present him and whether he's alive or not, I don't know, but he was. You know, the reason why a lot of people turned against harmony in the noughties is because they could clearly see that much about was this sort of like his political operator doing a lot of the intervening in politics and unleashing a lot of the repression from 2005 onwards against the people and much Sabah again, you know, when people. There was one person talked about him and said, actually, you know, while his father was a great orator and. And Khamenei could speak, I mean, he was a good speaker. Mojave isn't a good speaker at all. I mean, he can't deliver a good speech. So, you know, one of the issues is, is when is he ever going to turn up? If he ever turns up, you know, what will he look like? How will he operate? Will he be able to carry the charisma of his father? I don't think so. And I think much about himself because of this sort of element of hereditary succession, again feels he's there. You know, it's a sort of a transferral of charisma from his father. But I don't. It's very, you know, for me, people who know much about say that he's not a profound, you know, he's not a profound thinker. He's not, you know, he's not particularly. He's basically his father's son. And that's basically why they put him there. And they put him there, you know, to go back to an earlier point, because the Revolutionary Guard want him there. You know, the Revolutionary Guard want to maintain their, the status quo. The best thing to do is to bring the son of the previous guy in and there's continuity. Heaven forbid you should get a new supreme leader who might come in and say, time to get rid of this corruption or whatever, you know, much. Sabah has obviously been part and parcel of the entire operation for the last 20 years. So he knows exactly where the bodies are buried and that's exactly who they need in that place, you know. So I don't think, you know, people who say that the regime has become more hardline because of the war. I don't think they've been looking at Iranian history of the last 20 years. I mean, this direction of travel, it's been going in for the last 20 years. I was talking about Mujtaba as a successor to his father in 2008. I mean, that's as early as, you know, I was talking about it when it was unpopular notion at the time. I mean, it still is an unpopular notion in some ways, but the signs were there. If you describe Khamenei Senior as the Ali of the age within a Shia worldview that he is the sort of the Imam Ali of the age, it's an enormous, I mean, it's, it's a astounding claim to make. And it basically gives this sort of aura that he's some sort of charismatic religious ruler, spiritual ruler with, with extraordinary charisma that somehow surpasses simply this constitutional role that he has in many ways giving Khamenei much more power than Khomeini had. By the way, you know, the founder of the Revol. You know, Mujtaba is ostensibly a continuation of that, although my own viewers, I've said before, and I think that I don't think this is going to end well.

[A]

That was Ali Ansari from the University of St. Andrews. That's all for today's episode of Iran the Latest. We'll be back again on Monday. Until then, goodbye. Around the Latest is an original podcast from the Telegraph, created by David Knowles and hosted by me, Venetia Rainey and Roland Oliphant. If you appreciated this podcast, please consider following around the latest on your preferred podcast app. And if you have a moment, leave a review as it helps others find the show. For more from our foreign correspondence on the ground, sign up for our new daily newsletter, cable, or listen to our sister podcast, Ukraine. The latest. We're still on the same email address. Battleionselegraph.co.uk where you can contact us on x. You can find our handles in the show. Notes the producer is Peter Shevlin. The executive producers are Venetia Rainey and Louisa Wells.

[B]

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